G.R. No.

182165 November 25, 2009

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO,
RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the March
28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo
and habeas data instituted by respondents.

The factual antecedents.

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land
situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor
Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.

By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its
affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.

The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They
thereupon filed cases against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those cases were dismissed
except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil
case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.

The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution
of the final and executory judgment against them.

By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that subsequent events changed the
situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent
writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is
hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition
dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally
resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased
premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues
raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent
injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of
the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property
were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued
is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of
Demolition.

On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however,
the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz,
along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans
and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor
in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and
maintain the possession of the property," entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of
Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest
them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.

Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of
heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’ entry;
and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped
in front of the property.

On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008,
issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7

The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:

Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into
on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the
Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January
25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the
pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians
proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger
and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police
operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21,
2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of
a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8

rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault;
Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal,
null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal
violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners
is declared ABSOLUTE.

Without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12

In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for

… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same
ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights; and
(2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos.
(Underscoring supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day
and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on
February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the
other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction
of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy
arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve
on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.

Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as
an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither
is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that
every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

xxxx

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights
to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation
omitted)

Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as
"acts of terrorism" the therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein
held:

On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of
past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.18 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life,
liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then
willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the
petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to
post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.20

Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent
any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that
there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the
writ cannot be justified.

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:

xxxx

11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch
10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng
kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa
ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)

Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are
gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.

As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order,
these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal
contempt against petitioners.22
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted
a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was
accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of
the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with
the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1

It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies
which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter
is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal
proceedings.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action
No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA
C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo
Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C.
Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection order,
production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records
in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas;
alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order,
production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no
evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents
pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this
incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide
protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation
and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3

We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which
she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon
and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz,
Tarlac for a future medical mission.7

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash,
journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope and medicines.9

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward
Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her
companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding
that they open up.11

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her
companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their
leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands.14 At this
juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths,
to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged
petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her.17 The van then sped away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19 After she
was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s
Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail
cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off
and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in
Laur, Nueva Ecija.22

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.23 The thrust of the interrogations was to
convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold."24 The torture, on the other hand,
consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.25

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only
relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named
"Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her
surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who
introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came
from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City.31 Before being released,
however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM 32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address
with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family.36

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. 37 Out of
apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular
phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records
linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this
Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police
hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division,
Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case
of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document
pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be
ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash.40

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified
written return.42

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the public officials
impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed."44 In support of their
accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report45 of
the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and
her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents
drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way of knowing
where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. 47 This can only mean, the public
respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with
the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was
subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was
choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises—her Medical
Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’s alleged abduction
and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of
abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and
at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents.51

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of
the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in
general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized,
the commission of such atrocities.53

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the
allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in
the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009,
when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily
armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial
investigation.56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction
incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward
Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house. 58 Other
witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and
two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59

At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different police stations
surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the
effort yielded negative results.60

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report61 that was transmitted to the
Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent
Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up investigations
were, at the same time, pursued.63

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3,
caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth
investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the purported
abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task
Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights—
organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation in the ongoing
investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for
inquiries were left unheeded.67

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted
to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest
report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and
affiliation of the abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow
victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged abduction
and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file
their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement
in the abduction.72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an
AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the
Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74

For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public
respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the
Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel
assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva
tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.76

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry.
In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any
involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version that she was indeed
abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by
which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was
telling the truth.80

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the
petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed
that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective
of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed
and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as
manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released.83 This threat, according to
the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material
perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of
amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction.85

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the
existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA.86 The
appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference
by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner
participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female
CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the
photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only
constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile
security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public
respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person
acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The
appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was
behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction
and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an
inspection order and production order also met the same fate.94

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her
abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer
for the return of her personal belongings.96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and
affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking
civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this
Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return
of her belongings.99

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification
in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo
proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:102

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked
in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in
the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of
the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does
not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in
turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:108

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in
the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—
not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given
special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents
is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had
condoned her abduction and torture.111

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal.
Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture—i.e., the forcible taking
in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit
communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.112

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a conclusion that she was
able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds
of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion
that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous
instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand
as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving
the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what
it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic sketches115 of
several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the
undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated,
the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere
estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat.
Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its
face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a
mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she was taken to Fort
Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether
formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that
petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps,
in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove
that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the
return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already
equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once
the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right
to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly
excludes the protection of property rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention
areas of Fort Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds
no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree
with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never
intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit
position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the
order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it
is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient
in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she
was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue
on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining
the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations
conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner
claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents
against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay
party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they
revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner
was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other
investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such
nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been
subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public,
Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong
sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or
reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without
evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must be protected by this Court.
We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that
any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the
Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only
inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their
press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and
torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right
to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas
data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility
on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case.
One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators
behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128 must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and
remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving
her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided
investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be
involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate
the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by
any petitioner in any amparo case.129

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the "respondent who is a
public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to
show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they
cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the
conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police
investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks
on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators
have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is
a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify
the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with
allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the
petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.131 While it may be
conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s
investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN
not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of law—
they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply
with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to explain why it never
considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction.
The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1

The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioner’s offer of
exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the
latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR
sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of
extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an
incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the
petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in
bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of
conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced by her
attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission. 135 Certainly, it would be reasonable
to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most
promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution
of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim
protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.

Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and
torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take
the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well
as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff
of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and
the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than
those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a
copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined
by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the
above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court
may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission
on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt
of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as
may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on
Human Rights—its own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against
the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities
and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not
contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,

vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas
data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and
calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2

By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed
the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in
light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals
and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCO’s
Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing
the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job
security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her
security in this wise:

xxxx

I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and
threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from
unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be
[sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my
transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real
intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think
twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive
one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she
raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.

By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats
to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas
data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by
petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from
effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by
Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition
for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7

By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to
victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and
security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her
person.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as employer
to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth
in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that
"although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place
of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee
relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring
respondent’s place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly
prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public
officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
engaged in such activities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and
available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules.13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas data
will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her
right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc.
No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms
set by the society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas
data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material, graduating
high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures
of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on
her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned
from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside
a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability
of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC
found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to
wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language or
symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the
office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that
during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including
Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents
the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on
March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction
and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement
exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On
March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the
photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students
to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation
rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed into their
swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to
privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum
submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes
an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered
to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing;
and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored,
reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of
habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following
grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are
engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no
violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the
Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas
Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual
milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not
prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users,
sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing
the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity
or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the
Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the
Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting,
or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that
the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent
the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e.,
private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness
of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the
information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are
not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part
therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to
Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21 (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves.23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each
system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said
flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy
in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same
vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013,
recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else
it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the
Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in
OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational
privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of
the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on
the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the
contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post
anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one,
some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way
to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s
going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the
user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the
other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public"
or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares
certain information to the latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the
South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this
caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy
settings are not foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility
of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to
"when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the
opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information.
Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many
OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his or
her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile
detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using
these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a
chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would
also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private
space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether the
disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images
were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors
carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon
their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was
a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends"
setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their
profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends,
including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children
testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who
these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres.
This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in
[F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls.
At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students’
act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them.
Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without
their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best,
self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent
to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the
cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones
of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any
conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the
former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which
was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook
friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and
socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been
said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said
to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors
nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs.
In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to
petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily
clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only"
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom"
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part
of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. 54 As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has
been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack
the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate
its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations
have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and
curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore,
considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly
or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in
disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings
and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student
Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware
that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more
importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they
desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.