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FIRST DIVISION

NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a

Resolution dated March 3, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 214273 (J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc.,

Petitioner, v. Westmont Bank (now UOBP) and Atty. Ricardo F. De
Guzman, Respondents). - This is a petition for review on certiorari1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision2 dated 28 November 2013 and Resolution3
promulgated on 17 September 2014 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92414. The CA reversed the Decision4 dated 12 June
2008 of Branch 98, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-99-38701.

Antecedents

Petitioner J.O.S . Managing Builders, Inc., (petitioner) obtained

loan and credit accommodation from respondent Westmont Bank, now
known as United Overseas Bank Philippines (respondent Bank), in the
amount of Php250,000,000.00 as evidenced by a Term Loan
Agreement. 5 As security for the loan, petitioner executed on 03 April
1997 a real estate mortgage over its properties covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. N-143061 , N-146444 and N-
146445, which was later amended on 16 June 19986 to reflect the total
consideration of Php250,000,000.00. 7 The proceeds of the loan was
used largely to fund the construction of Aurora Milestone building.

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118-B

1
Rollo, pp. 48- 112.
2 Id. at 119-142, penned by Associate Justice N ina G. Anton io-Valenzuela and concurred in by
Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
3
Id. at 144-145.
4
Id. at 226-266.
5 Id. at 181 -1 84.
6
Id at 2 10.
7
! cl at 50-51.
RESOLUTION 2 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

On 07 July 1998, respondent Bank considered petitioner in

default for the latter's supposed failure to pay quarterly amortizations.
Through several letters dated 29 July 1998, 02 September 1998,
08 September 1998, 12 October 1998, 23 November 1998, and 01
February 1999, respondent Bank repeatedly reminded petitioner of its
outstanding obligation.8

Sometime in November 1998, petitioner informed respondent

Bank that the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) had
expressed an interest in purchasing 6,000 square meters of office
space or at least five (5) stories of Aurora Milestone. Subsequently,
petitioner notified respondent Bank of its negotiation with PHIC. 9

Due to petitioner's failure to pay despite demand, on 22 March

1999 respondent Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. The foreclosure was done through Atty. Ricardo
F. De Guzman (respondent De Guzman), a Notary Public, who
accordingly caused the posting of a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale in
Quezon City on 22 February 1999. Said Notice was also published in
the The New Record on 27 February 1999, 06 March and 13 March,
10
1999, as stated in the Affidavit of Publication of its publisher.
Consequently, an auction sale was conducted by respondent De
Guzman on 22 March 1999 at the Main Entrance Lobby of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice, Quezon City. Thereafter, on 02 June
1999, respondent Bank notified petitioner of the Completion of the
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and that a Certificate of Sale
was registered on the corresponding TCTs on 27 April 1999. 11

Thus, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition to Annul

Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale by Notary Public 12 praying, among
others, that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties be declared null and void, and that the Certificate of Sale
and the Writ of Possession be cancelled. In particular, the petition
pleaded three (3) causes of action. First, petitioner was about to close
the deal with PHIC when respondent Bank hastily foreclosed the
mortgaged properties on 22 March 1999. As such, the planned sale to
PHIC did not proceed and petitioner lost a deal which could have
generated Php338,879,280.00. Consequently, respondent Bank should
pay petitioner Php20,000,000.00 representing actual damages.
Second, since the extrajudicial foreclosure was tainted with

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118-B

8
Id. at 14.
9 Id. at 165-166.
10 Id. at 76; 166-167.
11
Id. at 167-168.
12 Id. at 163-176.
RESOLUTION 3 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

inegularities, respondent Bank and respondent De Guzman should

pay petitioner exemplary damages in the amount of
Phpl0,000,000.00. Third, due to the hasty foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage, petitioner was constrained to hire the services of
counsel. Hence, respondents should jointly and severally pay
petitioner Phpl ,000,000.00 as attorney's fees. 13

Ruling of the RTC

On 12 June 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision m favor of

petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition

is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered,
viz:

1. Nullifying and invalidating ab initio the subject Extra-

judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage, the Public
Auction Sale conducted, the Certificate of Sale, and the Writ of
Possession issued;

2. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and

severally the amount of P20,000,000.00 as and by way of actual
damages;

3. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and

severally the amount of PS,000,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages;

4 . Ordering respondents to pay pet1t1oner jointly and

severally the amount of Pl,000,000.00 in attorney's fees; and

5. Ordering the consolidation of these pecuniary awards

for damages to be immediately deducted from the outstanding
P250,000,000.00 principal loan obligation of petitioner to
respondent Bank (now United Overseas Bank of the Philippines).

SO ORDERED. 14

In its Decision, the RTC explained, among others, that

petitioner should not be considered in default since the due date for
payment of the principal was on O1 March 2004. Furthermore,
petitioner made interest payments in the amount Php49,866,905.00
from July 1996 up to June 1998. 15

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13
Id. at 12-13.
14 id. at 265-266.
15
Id. at 99.
RESOLUTION 4 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

Respondent Bank filed a Notice of Appeal. On the other hand,

petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the
award for exemplary damages be increased from Php5,000,000.00 to
Phpl0,000,000.00. In its Order dated 07 November 2008, the RTC
granted said Motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion

for Partial Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12
June 2008 is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED, to read as
follows:

1. Nullifying and invalidating ab initio the subject

Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, the Public
Auction Sale conducted, the Certificate of Sale, and the Writ of
Possession issued;

2. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and

severally the amount of P20,000,000.00 as and by way of actual
damages;

3. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and

severally the amount of Pl0,000,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages;

4. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and

severally the amount of Pl,000,000.00 in attorney's fees;

5. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly

and severally the costs of the suit; and

6. Ordering the consolidation of these pecuniary awards

for damages to be immediately deducted from the outstanding
P250,000,000.00 principal loan obligation of petitioner to
respondent Bank (now United Overseas Bank of the Philippines).

SO ORDERED. 16

Ruling of the CA

The CA set aside the Decision and the Order of RTC, thus:

We SET ASIDE the assailed Decision, and the assailed

Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City, in
Civil Case Number Q-99-38701, and instead, DISMISS the
Petition To Annul Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale By Notary Public.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

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16 Id. at 128.
17 Id at 141.
RESOLUTION 5 G.R. No . 214273
March 3, 2021

According to the CA, the RTC cannot rule on the issue of

whether petitioner was in default because it was not raised in the
pleadings. Petitioner never alleged that it had not defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Instead, petitioner merely questioned the validity
of the procedure employed during the extra-judicial foreclosure.
Consistent with its position, petitioner did not present any proof on the
issue of default during its presentation of evidence-in-chief. However,
at rebuttal, and over the objections of respondent Bank, petitioner
belatedly attempted to show proof that it was not in default. Hence,
the CA explained that the RTC did not have authority to rule on the
matter of default since petitioner failed to allege it as an issue. 18

Moreover, the CA found no legal basis to declare the

extrajudicial foreclosure void. Foreclosure proceedings have in their
favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to
rebut the same is borne by the petitioner.19 However, petitioner failed
to present sufficient evidence of the alleged irregularities in the
foreclosure. 20

Petitioner moved for reconsideration21 of the aforementioned

decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution22 dated 17
September 2014. Hence, the instant Petition.

In the present Petition, petitioner contends the CA erred: in

ruling that the RTC had no authority to rule on the issue of default; in
not sustaining the RTC's findings that petitioner was not in default;
and, in finding no irregularities in the extrajudicial foreclosure. 23

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal

from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in
exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of
fact. 24 This Court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions
of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are final, binding,

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18
Id. at 27.
19 Id. at 28.
20
Id. at 32.
21 Id. at 146-151 ; 152-159 (Motion to Admit Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration).
22 Id. at 144-145.
23
Id. at 88-90.
24 Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, 711 Phil.576-591 (2013);G.R. No. 184116, 19June2013
[Per J. Brion].
RESOLUTION 6 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court when supported by

substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not
be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. 25

Nonetheless, the rule limiting the appeal by petition for review

on certiorari to the consideration and resolution of legal questions
admits of several exceptions, namely: ( 1) when the factual findings
of the CA and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the CA from its findings
of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the
CA, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (7) when the CA fails to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings
of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. 26

While the RTC and the CA differed in their factual findings, the
merits of petitioner's case still fails to convince. Upon judicious
review of the records, We find no reversible error committed by the
CA in upholding the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure. As will
be discussed below, the ruling of the CA is well in accord with
established jurisprudence and the evidence presented during trial.

Cause of action belatedly

raised in the rebuttal stage
cannot be considered

As correctly observed by the CA, the petition to annul the

extrajudicial foreclosure sale pleaded three (3) causes of action, to
wit: (i) that the arbitrary foreclosure of the mortgage resulted in the
abortion of the sale of petitioner's building to the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation; (ii) that the foreclosure of the mortgage is
highly irregular and anomalous; and (iii) that due to the hasty

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118-B

25 Philippine Trust Co. v. Gabinete, 808 Phil. 297-317 (2017); G.R. No. 216120, 29 March 2017
[Per J. Peralta].
26 Shangri-La Properties, Inc. v. BF Corp. , G.R. Nos. 187552-53 & 187608-09, 15 October 2019
[Per CJ. Bersamin].
RESOLUTION 7 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

foreclosure of the mortgage, petitioner was constrained to hire the

services of counsel. Accordingly, petitioner prayed for the declaration
of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and the
cancellation of the Certificate of Sale and the Writ of Possession. 27

Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,28

which was prevailing at the time the petition was filed in the RTC,
provides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 29
Likewise, if the evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that
it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the admission of
such evidence would not prejudice the objecting party in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merit. 30

Succinctly, when there is an objection on the evidence

presented because it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, an
amendment must be made before accepting such evidence. If no
amendment is made, the evidence objected to cannot be considered. 3 1

In this case, petitioner's causes of action were predicated on the

validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Nowhere in the petition,
however, was the issue of whether petitioner defaulted on its loans
raised in the pleadings. Neither was it presented nor testified to by
petitioner's witness during the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. It
was only during the submission of rebuttal evidence, that the same
was introduced by the petitioner, to which the respondent Bank timely
raised its objection. 32 This notwithstanding, petitioner did not initiate
the amendment of its pleadings. The RTC likewise failed to order the

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118-B

27 Rollo, pp. 121-122.

28 Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. - When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
29 Allied Banking Corporation (now Philippine National Bank) v. Eduardo De Guzman, Sr., G.R.
No. 225199, 09 July 2018 (Per J. Peralta].
3° Cagungun v. Planters Development Bank, 510 Phil. 51-69 (2005); G.R. No. 158674, 17
October 2005 [Per J. Chico-Nazario].
31 Id.
32
Rollo, p. 136.
RESOLUTION 8 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

amendment of the petit10n despite the continuing objections

interposed by the respondent Bank.

Applying the above provision, since no amendment was made

in the petition to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure, the evidence
objected to by the respondent cannot be considered.33 It is equally
important to stress that petitioner was supposed to present its rebuttal
evidence plainly to refute the evidence submitted by the respondent
Bank. The function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract
or disprove the evidence of the adverse party. 34 It is also defined as
evidence in denial of some affirmative fact which the adverse party
has attempted to prove. 35 As it turned out, petitioner introduced
another cause of action raising the issue that it did not default on its
loans by reason of overpayments of interests, which was evidently not
raised in its petition. Hence, We rule that the CA did not err in
reversing the decision of the trial court and finding that the issue of
default was belatedly raised as a cause of action.

Petitioner defaulted in the

payment of its loan obligation

Even assuming that petitioner validly raised the issue of default,

the Court still finds petitioner to have defaulted for failure to pay its
loan obligation. Notably, petitioner judicially admitted having been in
default since 07 July 1998. In its Answer, respondent Bank
specifically alleged:

16.4. The pet1t10ner failed to pay any of the quarterly

amortization of any of its loans, and has thus, since July 7, 1998,
been considered in default. 36

Conversely, petitioner's Reply contained the following

admission:

3. Petitioner admits the allegation in paragraph 16.4,

subject to justifying defenses to be proven during trial.37

Here, petitioner made a judicial admission of its default.

Clearly, petitioner did not question the fact of default but merely

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118-B

33
Supra at note 30.
34 People v. Padero, G. R. No. I 06274, 28 September 1993 [Per J. Davide, Jr.].
35 People v. Santos , 397 Phil. 564-574 (2000); G.R. No. 127846, 18 October 2000 [Per J.
Bellosillo].
36
Rollo. p. 468.
37
Id. at 469.
 RESOLUTION 9 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

claimed that such non-payment was justified. Under Section 4, Rule

129 of the Rules of Court, 38 petitioner may not contradict
this judicial admission unless it is able to show that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Hence,
petitioner's subsequent claims of payment during presentation of
rebuttal evidence is a direct contradiction of its judicial admission in
the Reply. However, petitioner failed to prove that such admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Thus, petitioner cannot contradict the same. 39

Petitioner's claimed interest

payments lasted until 24 June
1998 only,· since no further
payments were made, the
acceleration clause rendered
the entire loan obligation due
and demandable

Furthermore, the evidence presented during rebuttal, even if

considered, failed to establish that there was no default on the part of
petitioner.

To recall, petlt10ner claimed to have made interest payments

amounting to Php49,866,905.00 from July 1996 until 24 June 1998.
Further, petitioner insisted that the actual due date for payment of the
entire principal would only fall on 0 1 March 2004, which is still a few
years away from the extrajudicial foreclosure in 1999. 40

Upon review of the stipulations of their loan agreement,

however, the foregoing claims fail to excuse petitioner's non-payment.
The promissory notes uniformly provide that an acceleration of
payment covering the entire loan will occur in the event petitioner
fails to pay any quarterly amortization or interest when it becomes
due. Further, the said acceleration clause provides:

Upon the happening of any of the following events to any

of us, the whole sum remaining under this Note shall, at the Bank's
option, become immediately due and payable without need of
demand or notice:

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118-B

38
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof The admission may be
contradicted only by showi ng that it was made through pal pable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
39
See Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 674 Phil. 358-370 (2011 ); GR. No. 159328, 05
October 20 11 [Per J. Peralta].
40
Rollo, p. 98.
RESOLUTION 10 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

XXX

6. failure to pay any installment or interest on the due date

thereof- 41
'

It has long been settled that an acceleration clause is valid and

produces legal effects. 42 An acceleration clause is a provision in a
contract wherein, should the debtor default, the entire obligation shall
become due and demandable.43

In this case, the petitioner's claimed interest payments were

made until 24 June 1998 only. Thereafter, when no further payments
were made, respondent Bank was constrained to consider petitioner in
default as of 07 July 1998. Under the acceleration clause, petitioner's
failure to pay after 24 June 1998 granted respondent Bank the option
to immediately declare the entire loan obligation due. In fact,
respondent Bank's demand letters dated 29 July 1998, 02 September
1998, 8 September 1998, 12 October 1998, 23 November 1998, and
01 February 199944 were all issued after 24 June 1998. Ultimately,
respondent Bank acted within its legal rights when it proceeded with
the extrajudicial foreclosure on 22 March 1999.

Petitioner failed to prove that

the foreclosure was invalid

It has long been settled that the burden of proof is the duty of a
party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by
the amount of evidence required by law. 45 In civil cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. 46 The Court has likewise ruled that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and the
mortgagor who alleges the absence of a requisite has the burden of
proving such fact. 47

Petitioner insists that the CA committed reversible error when it

ruled that Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0 and Administrative

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41
Id. at 470.
42 KT Construction Supply, Inc. v. Philippine Savings Bank, 81 1 Phil. 626-635 (2017); G.R. No.
228435, 21 June 2017 [Per J. Mendoza].
43 Gotesco Properties, inc. v. International Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 2 12262, 26 August 2020
[Per J. Leonen].
44
Rollo, p. 14.
45 Heirs of Villanueva v. Heirs of Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172-186 (2017); G.R. No. 209132, 05 June
20 17 [Per J. Peralta].
46 Id.
47 Spouses Jonsay v. Solid Bank Corporation [now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company}, 784
Phil.78-113 (20 16); G.R. No. 206459, 06April 2016 [Per J. Reyes].
RESOLUTION 11 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

Order No. 3 of 1984 are not applicable in the instant case. However,
We are not convinced.

In RPRP Ventures Management & Development Corporation v.

Guadiz, Jr., 48 the Court held that Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-
0, which prescribes the rules in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage and requires the payment of filing fees and the raffling of all
notices of public auction in all extrajudicial foreclosures of mortgage,
was issued on 14 December 1999 and took effect on 15 January 2000.

Similarly, in Ravago v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 49 the

Court explained that upon effectivity of the the amendatory provisions
of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 on 15 January 2000, applications for
extrajudicial foreclosures under the direction of a notary public are
already required to be filed with the Executive Judge. Hence, it is
clear that prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, applications
for notarial foreclosures which are conducted by a notary public were
not required to be filed with the court.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that respondent Bank

caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage through
respondent De Guzman, a notary public, on 22 March 1999. Clearly,
when the said foreclosure proceeding was conducted, it was not yet
governed by the provisions of the said administrative matter and thus,
not applicable to the subject foreclosure proceedings.

It has been settled that a petition for foreclosure with the notary
public is not within the contemplation of the Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3 of 1984 as the same is not filed with the
court. 50 Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the said directive does not
apply to extrajudicial foreclosure conducted by a notary public. 51

Furthermore, petitioner insists that the the CA erred when it

ruled that there was prima facie evidence that the newspaper, The New
Record, was a newspaper in general circulation. It maintains that the
publication of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in The New
Record was not valid on the ground that the said newspaper does not
qualify as a newspaper of general circulation since it could not secure
copies of the issues of said newspaper where the notice was printed.

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118-B

48 640 Phil 98-108 (2010); G.R. N o. 152236, 28 July2010 [Per J. Peralta].

49 G .R. No. 188739, 05 August 2015 [Per J. Peralta].
°
5 China Banking Corporation v. Court ofAppeals, 333 Phil. 158-175 (1996); G.R. No. 121158,
05 December 1996 [Per J. Francisco].
51 Philippine National Bank v. Timbol, 491 Phil. 352-369 (2005); G.R. No. 157535, 11 February
2005 [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
RESOLUTION 12 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

It has been settled that the party alleging non-compliance with

the requisite of publication in the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage has the burden of proving their allegations. 52 However, the
records herein are bereft of any evidence to support the petitioner's
allegations.

On the contrary, We agree with the CA that The New Record

was a newspaper of general circulation for purposes of publication of
notices of extrajudicial foreclosure sale since it was enough that it was
published for the dissemination of local news and general
information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals.53

In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Eugenio

Penafiel,54 the Court ruled -

X x x Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be

followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the "Manila
Bulletin," the "Philippine Daily Inquirer," or "The Philippine Star"
which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot
publish legal notices that would be honored outside the place of
their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the
courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in general
circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are
located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it
was intended.

Coincidentally, the Court held that there was sufficient

compliance with the requirements of the law regarding publication of
the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in The New Record, as
evidenced by the affidavit of publication executed by its publisher.55
Thus, We see no such reason to deviate from the findings of the CA
that the affidavit of publication constitutes prima facie evidence of
compliance with the requisite publication. 56

All told, We find no error on the part of the CA in upholding the

validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. From the totality of

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118-B

52 Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Del Rosario, GR. No. 193228, 27 November 2017 [Per J.
Bersamin].
53 Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 332 Phil. 844-854
( I996); G.R. No. 11 5068, 28 November 1996 [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr.] citing Bonnevie v.
Court of Appeals, 2 10 Phil. 100-11 3 (1983); G.R. No. L-49101 , 24 October 1983 [Per J.
Guenero] .
54 599 Phil. 511-522 (2009); G.R. No. 173976, 27 February 2009 [Per J. Nachura] citing Fortune
Motors (?hits) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 332 Phil. 844-854 (1996); G.R.
No. 11 5068, 28 November 1996, [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr.].
55 Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 332 Phil. 844-854
( I 996); G.R. No. 11 5068, 28 November 1996 [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr.].
56 Rollo, p. 140.
RESOLUTION 13 G.R. No. 214273
March 3, 2021

circumstances and the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioner

failed to discharge its burden. Absent any irregularity in the conduct
of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, We accord to it the presumption
of regularity.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated 28 November 2013 and Resolution dated 17 September 2014 of
the Comi of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 92414 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." Caguioa, J., took no part,· Rosario, J.,

designated Additional Member per Raffle dated 23 February 2021.

By authority of the Court:

LIBRA A

by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULO
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
118-B

Atty. Nelson A. Clemente Court of Appeals (x)

Counsel for Petitioner
No. IO Nery cor. Rosary Streets
Remmanville Executive Village
1700 Parafiaque City
Public Information Office (x)
Library Services (x)
Supreme Court
(For uploading pursuant to A.M.
No. 12-7-1-SC)
Philippine Judicial Academy (x)
Supreme Court
Judgment Division (x)
Supreme Court
Manila
(CA-G.R. CV No. 92414)
Atty. Renato B. Corpuz, Jr.
Counsel for Respondent Westmont/UOBP
Unit 1404, Centerpoint Building
Dofia Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas Center
1605 Pasig City
Atty. Ricardo P. De Guzman
Respondent
Ground Floor (Unit 8), Prince David
Condomin ium, 305 Katipunan
Loyola Heights, 1108 Quezon City
The Hon. Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court, Branch 98
I I 00 Quezon City
(Civil Case No. Q-99-3870 I)

UR