Doctrines - Art. III - Sec. 4-15

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
Article III
Bill of Rights
Section 4. . No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
A. Prior restraint
What is the clear and present danger rule? If the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent – Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. (DYRE radio
station)
Whether the EVAT law discriminates against the No. Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could
press because it removed the exemption from take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
VAT still granted to others? Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the
State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. – Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (EVAT law)
What is prior restraint? Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. – Chavez v. Gonzales (Garci
Tapes)
Distinguish between content-neutral and contest-
based restraint CN CB
Definition CN regulation is CB restraint or
merely concerned censorship, i.e., the
with the incidents restriction is based on
of the speech, or the subject matter of
one that merely the utterance or
controls the time, speech. The cast of the
place or manner, restriction determines
and under well- the test by which the
defined standards; challenged act is
or assayed with.
Test Substantial Strict scrutiny; clear

governmental and present danger
interest
- Chavez v. Gonzales
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. - The Closure of DYRE in Cebu was a violation of Freedom of Expression
137 SCRA 628 and therefore unconstitutional. All forms of media, whether print or
broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and
radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to newspaper and print media. Echoing an American case, the SC explained
that more than other forms of communications, radio broadcasting have the
most limited protection from free expression clause because: 1) broadcast
media is uniquely pervasive, with airwaves confronting citizens both in
Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 66
public and in the privacy of their homes; 2) broadcasting is accessible to
children unlike other medium or media.
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE. The clear and present danger
test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all-embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. The clear and
present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of
broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations—whether
by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The government has a
right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to
violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the
people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little
reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or
pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and
popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also
deserve special protection.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - The withdrawal of the “exempt-status” of the press from VAT DOES
235 SCRA 630 NOT constitute discrimination against the press and a form of “prior
restraint.”
Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple:
by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
The Supreme Court held that in the cases cited by the petitioner, the tax
involved was a license tax, which unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a
prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different.
It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and
the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to
its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make
the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate
its freedom under the Constitution.
Chavez v. Gonzalez, GR No. 168338, Acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
February 15, 2008 Commission in warning television stations against playing the “Garci
Tapes” under pain of revocation of their licenses were content-based
FOUR ASPECTS OF FREEDOM OF restrictions and as subjected to the “clear and present danger” test, it is
THE PRESS: INVALID.
(1) freedom from prior restraint;
(2) freedom from punishment It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some
subsequent to publication; form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made
(3) freedom of access to whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely
information; and concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the
(4) freedom of circulation. time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards; or (2) a content-
based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the
test by which the challenged act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation,

only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because
regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular
message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an
intermediate approach—somewhere between the mere rationality that is
required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to
content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the
Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require
that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or
significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this
manner: A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on
alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech

or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of
its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can overthrow this
presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down. In this case,
the acts focused only on one subject – a specific content – the “Garci tapes.”
They did not provide regulations as to time, place and manner of the
dissemination of speech or expression.
A review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show that the
Philippines has deviated from the American particularly as to which test
would govern content-based prior restraints. Our cases show two distinct
features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is
in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on
traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g.,
obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a
compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such
as national security or the electoral process. Second, regardless of the
regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has
consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to content-
based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to
traditional print or broadcast media.
B. Subsequent punishment
GR: “Freedom of speech, of expression…”
People v. Perez
XPN: unless the intention and effect be seditious
Gonzales v. COMELEC
XPN: COMELEC prohibited the making of speeches, announcements, commentaries, and other campaign-
related activities before the designated campaign period
People v. Perez - 45 Phil 599 Witnesses testified that Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar,
Sorsogon, talking about the Governor-General, said: "The Filipinos, like
myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence." The Supreme Court found the defendant guilty of sedition
based on his statement.
The Supreme Court ruled Criticism, no matter how severe, on the

Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of
liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. The
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s statements had a seditious
tendency which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws. The Supreme Court reiterated its
conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of
insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible
individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the general peace.
Gonzales v. COMELEC - 27 SCRA The case at bar raised the validity of the prohibition in Republic Act No.
835 4880 of the too early nomination of candidates and limitation found therein
on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity alleged by
petitioners to offend against the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association, which include:
1. "Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding
interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for
public office:
2. Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
3. Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or under-taking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party.”
No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
Thus, as a general rule, previous restraint on the communication of views
or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or
action for damages, or contempt proceedings are prohibited unless there is
a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to
insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other social values that press for
recognition. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the substantive evil
sought to be avoided is the debasement of the electoral process.
The Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger test. The term
clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the
substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the
time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate
danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
Justice Fernando, stated that the prohibition on the solicitation or

undertaking of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or
indirectly, by an individual, the making of speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for any party
or candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, suffers from the corrosion of invalidity. However, to
rule as such was impossible because the Court lacked one more affirmative
vote to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality.
C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process
The Supreme Court struck down resolutions/rules for violation of the right to freedom of expression, except for David
v. Arroyo, which involved a raid of a newspaper’s office.
- Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers during plebiscite campaign period – Sanidad v.

COMELEC
- COMELEC may not prohibit the posting of decals and stickers of candidates on “mobile” places, public or
private – Adiong v. COMELEC
- Prohibition on exit polls – ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
- Prohibition on election survey results – SWS v. COMELEC
- Raid on Daily Tribune - David v. Arroyo
- Size limitation on tarpaulins on private property (Team Patay/Team Buhay) – Diocese of Bacolod v.
COMELEC

Sanidad v. COMELEC -181 SCRA Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: During the plebiscite
529 campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues, is
INVALID.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda
was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the
police power of the state “to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the
electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws.” The
evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that
case does not obtain in a plebiscite.
In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter

unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for
some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against
issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of

expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may
express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such
abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner’s freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of
the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented
in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned
because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times. Accordingly, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and
void and unconstitutional.
Adiong v. COMELEC - 207 SCRA The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
715 whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.
The prohibited acts were found to present no substantial danger to

government interest (it did not satisfy the clear and present danger test).
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided
must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one’s mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled. The prohibition is effectively on the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private
vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his
own and not of anybody else.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we
have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. This

qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it
is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. It
is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the
right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to
convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC - 323 SCRA Comelec cannot ban the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their
811 results through mass media as it constitutes an essential part of the
freedoms of speech and of the press.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld
when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information
meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.
Exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study
influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition
would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the
use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-
term research.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the
probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially
cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public,
usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in
the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted.
In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent
May 11, 1998 elections.
SWS v. COMELEC – 357 SCRA 497 Fair Elections Act provision that surveys affecting national candidates shall
not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting
local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election is
INVALID.
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity

of §5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren,
held in United States v. O’Brien:
Government regulation is sufficiently justified:

1. if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
4. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of
speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
content-neutral regulations and is said to have “become canonical in the
review of such laws.” It is noteworthy that the O’Brien test has been
applied by this Court in at least two cases.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is “not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law
should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose
in question.
The Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom
of expression.
(1) The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of
the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It
constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not
made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days
immediately before a national election and seven (7) days
immediately before a local election.
(2) By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of
the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity
of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression,
while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In
effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not
viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results.
(3) As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, “junking” of
weak or “losing” candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called “dagdag-bawas.” Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more
narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils. Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
COMELEC is given the power: To stop any illegal activity, or
confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading
or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. This is
surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in
§5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate
bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters.
David v. Arroyo – 489 SCRA 160 As to dispersal of rallies and arrests of David et.al., PEACEABLE
ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE MADE A CRIME. Petitioner David, et al. were
arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They
were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be
gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General,
during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In
De Jonge v. Oregon, it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a
crime, thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be
proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be
branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free
speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the
auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as
to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend
the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If
the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order,
they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid
laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them
for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly
and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s

directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units.
This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”
Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing
that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may
deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show
or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of
permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was
eliminated.
As to the warrantless search of the The Daily Tribune, the search violated
petitioners’ freedom of the press. THE BEST GAUGE OF A FREE AND
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY RESTS IN THE DEGREE OF FREEDOM
ENJOYED BY ITS MEDIA. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff this Court held
that—As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the “Metropolitan Mail” and the “We Forum”
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the
nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and
growth of the citizenry.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the above case, yet it
cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement
duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing
of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the
arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship.
It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the
citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no
less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be
so rash as to disobey. Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected
to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments.
This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right
even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. FREEDOM TO
COMMENT ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE VITALITY
OF A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. THE MOTTO SHOULD ALWAYS BE OBSTA
PRINCIPIIS.
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC – COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015. preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
this case. The Supreme Court reiterated its decision in Sanidad v.
COMELEC. An examination of the provisions cited by the COMELEC
regulating the posting of campaign materials apply only to candidates and
political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two. Large tarpaulins,
therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They are fundamentally part
of expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution. The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party,
or party-list group. The Supreme Court cited the following paragraph in
R.A. 9006: Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the
scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website,
including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-
blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of
pecuniary estimation.
Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content
of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
The message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates
and political parties will carry in their election posters or media ads. The
message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that
it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire
of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this
social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily
advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost
incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
Clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made

by candidates or the members of their political parties or their political
parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of
our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v.
COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons

who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the
public must consider during elections is unconstitutional.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private
citizen which will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly
regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if

it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if
what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its
principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation
(a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of
the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as
discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners
consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio,

the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass
the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins
without any relation to the distance from the intended average audience
will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could
no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political
consequences.
GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC – Aggregate-based airtime limits goes against the constitutional guaranty of
734 SCRA 88 freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
The guaranty to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and

disseminate what is said. The prohibition will only allow each candidate
81.81 seconds per day TV exposure, if the will consider the three
mainstream TV channels, will only have allocation of 27.27 seconds or
airtime per network.
If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to

assert a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should
establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the
constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to
information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the press.
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to

communicate and disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to
reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such
dissemination becomes with critical. This is where the press and broadcast
media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach out
would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It
must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which the
communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9(a) of
the COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the aggregate-
based airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of
speech and of the press.
The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and

arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrain the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Reason –
levelling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government.
D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts

PROTECTED NOT PROTECTED
 Snide remarks or sarcastic False or recklessly Inaccurate Reports
innuendoes; context; not reckless  Having made no effort to verify the truth behind the
reporting - People v. Godoy news articles he published - In re: Emil Jurado
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial - RE: Radio/TV Coverage of Estrada Trial
In re: Emil Jurado - 243 SCRA 299 Jurado had been writing about alleged improprieties and irregularities in
the judiciary over several months in the Manila Standard. Jurado was
found guilty of contempt of court. Freedom of expression, the right of
speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the most zealously protected
rights in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as the Civil
Code stresses, obliged “to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” The constitutional right of freedom of

expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths—this
would not be “to observe honesty and good faith;” it may not be used to
insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute
—this would not be “to act with justice” or “give everyone his due.”
The protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is

also a matter of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor in
identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press
freedom and free speech.
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the

individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials)
in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be
accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or
accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in
the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish
statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other
public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist
guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does
prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or
circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain
the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of
balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a
consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics
adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines.
If relying on second-hand sources of information is, as the Journalists’ Code

states, irresponsible, supra, then indulging in pure speculation or gossip is
even more so; and a failure to “present the other side” is equally
reprehensible, being what in law amounts to a denial of due process.
The Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its
dignity, honor or reputation, which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the
administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or
the performance of its functions in an orderly manner.
People v. Godoy - 243 SCRA 64 A reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does
not constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair criticism.
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that

level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended
to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so.
The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and
criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil
which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so
exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to
disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally
and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of
passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that in every case
where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and
oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The
disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there
should be other than a bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the
cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and
tolerate everything which appears as but the momentary outbreak of
disappointment.

A person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or
publishing writings which are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily,
escape liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be
confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the
spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been
described as an abuse of the liberty of speech or the press such as will
subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.
The rule in England is that there can be contempt of court even after the
case has been terminated. In American jurisprudence, the general rule is
that defamatory comments on the conduct of a judge with respect to past
cases or matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even
though libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the judge and the court.
The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation

newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its
members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by
either of these two circumstances: (1) WHERE IT TENDS TO BRING
THE COURT INTO DISRESPECT OR, IN OTHER WORDS, TO
SCANDALIZE THE COURT; or (2) WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
WOULD BE IMPEDED. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of
freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt
proceedings.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident,
is that where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to
punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal
completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency
to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
The availability, however, of the power to punish for contempt does not
and will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after
the institution of contempt proceedings. In other words, the fact that
certain contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel
against the judge of the court contemned does not necessarily require him
to bring a libel action, rather than relying on contempt proceedings.
Re: Radio/TV Coverage of Estrada The media sought to cover the trial of former President Estrada via live
Trial – 360 SCRA 248 television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that
kind of access to the proceedings.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the

weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional
power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that
the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific
advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty
bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and
the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to
pay.
Within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the

paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice
Clark thusly pronounced, “while a maximum freedom must be allowed the
press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a
democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the
maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process.”
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the
trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during
the proceedings
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of
the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate
justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before
them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of
thoughts the known test truth in a courtroom.
E. Libel
LIBEL NOT LIBEL
 Cyber libel under Section 4 - Disini v.  Fair commentaries - Borjal v. CA
Secretary of Justice  Not unfair or reckless – Villanueva v. PDI
 Abets or aids person committing cyber libel – Disini
v. Secretary of Justice
Borjal v. Court of Appeals - 301 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
SCRA 1 identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably,
these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar.
Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is

himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note
that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not from
petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself when he supplied the
information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had private
respondent not revealed that he was the “organizer” of the FNCLT referred
to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in blissful
ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of
identifiability alone the case falls.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and

constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of
fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to
be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
An organization such as the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the

transportation laws of the country and seeking to source its funds for the
project from the public at large cannot dissociate itself from the public
character of its mission. As such, it cannot but invite close scrutiny by the
media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the
activity and of the qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it.
In New York v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. ruled against Sullivan holding that honest
criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated
from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press
prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
A “public figure” includes anyone who has arrived at a position where the
public attention is focused upon him as a person. But even assuming ex-
gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied
in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily
follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if
he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as
long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or
general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in
the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior
anonymity or notoriety.
The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent
Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal
herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel. To be
considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been
written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of whether they are false or not. Even assuming that the contents
of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not
prove actual malice.
The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been
written with knowledge that these are false or in reckless disregard of what
is false or not. This is not to say however that the very serious allegations of
petitioner Borjal assumed by private respondent to be directed against him
are true. But we nevertheless find these at least to have been based on
reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal
interviews and after considering the varied documentary evidence
provided him by his sources.
Villanueva vs. PDI, G.R. No. 164437, In this case, two days before the election, the Manila Bulletin published an
May 15, 2009 article that identified the petitioner, then a candidate for mayor, as having
been disqualified by COMELEC after conviction in three administrative
LIBEL is “a public and malicious cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment. A day later, PDI
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, published a similar story. Petitioner did not win the election. Believing his
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, defeat was due to the subject publications, he filed a complaint for damages
condition, status, or circumstance tending to against PDI and Manila Bulletin. The Supreme Court dismissed the
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of complaint.
a natural person or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.” We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private
Any of these imputations is defamatory and communications nor true reports of official proceedings without any
under the general rule stated in Article 354 comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
of the Revised Penal Code, every questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is
defamatory imputation is PRESUMED TO not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair
BE MALICIOUS.
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged and
The presumption of malice, however, does
not exist in the following instances: constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The rule on
1. A private communication made by any privileged communication had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but
person to another in the performance of any in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and
legal, moral, or social duty; and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled
2. A fair and true report, made in good that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
faith, without any comments or remarks, of protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
with MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST. These are matters about which
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very
exercise of their functions.” public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media
mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the
candidates. As one of the candidates, petitioner consequently assumed the
status of a public figure. But even assuming a person would not qualify as a
public figure, it would not necessarily follow that he could not validly be
the subject of a public comment (e.g. he is involved in a public issue).
In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published

articles in question were written with knowledge that these were false or
in reckless disregard of what was false or not. According to Manila
Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story from a fellow reporter
who told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted.
PDI, on the other hand, said that they got the story from a press release the
very same day the Manila Bulletin published the same story. PDI claims
that the press release bore COMELEC’s letterhead, signed by one Sonia
Dimasupil, who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. They also tried
to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was already
published in the Manila Bulletin, they felt confident the press release was
authentic. Following the narration of events narrated by respondents, it
cannot be said that the publications, were published with reckless
disregard of what is false or not.
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice - G.R. Constitutionality of Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
No. 203335, February 11, 2014
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There is “actual malice” or
malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with
the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article
355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above
merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for
committing libel.
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law
penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings
with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on
libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct
from that of print.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally
liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts
to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression. The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly
defamatory statement, “Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to
be regarded as “aiding or abetting?”
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a
square peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel. Unless the
legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique
circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on
the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of
their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement
officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is
a nullity.
F. Obscenity and indecency
Pita v. Court of Appeals - 178 SCRA DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The determination of what is obscene is a
362 judicial function. The public respondents should have first obtained a
judicial determination that the materials in question were pornographic
and obtained a search warrant in order to search and seize the materials in
question.
F: Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign, the Mayor of Manila, assisted by

different divisions of the police, seized and confiscated “Pinoy Playboy”
magazines along with other materials they considered to be obscene,
pornographic, and indecent. Later, they burned the seized materials.
Plaintiff, one of the editors of “Pinoy Playboy” filed a petition seeking to
enjoin the Mayor and the police from confiscating more of its magazines,
alleging that they are not obscene per se and are protected under the
Constitution under freedom of speech and of the press. The RTC denied the
petition. The CA affirmed.
I: Whether or not the determination of what is obscene is a judicial
function?
H: No
R: In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut—provided it is smut.
For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut.
So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-
ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization.
What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily
repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were
censored in the thirties yet their works are considered important literature
today. Goya’s La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition
but now adorns the world’s most prestigious museums.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were many conflicting

decisions in the US that made it difficult to identify a hard and fast rule
when it comes to determining whether something is obscene or not.

It did say, however that: undoubtedly, “immoral” lore or literature comes
within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free
expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise
of the right, barring a “clear and present danger” that would warrant State
interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, “the
burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would
justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . . authorit[ies].”
The Court was not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature
for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they
were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to
be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no “quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not
without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals.”3 Neither do we.
But it brings us back to square one: were the “literature” so confiscated
“pornographic”? That “we have laws punishing the author, publisher and
sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969),”3 is also fine, but the question,
again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the statute?
G. Assembly and petition

INVALID REGULATION VALID REGULATION
The mayor cannot deny a permit or change the  The Supreme Court held that B.P. No. 880 is
venue for the assembly on the following grounds: not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
 Persistent intelligence reports affirming] the restriction that simply regulates the time, place
plans of subversive/criminal elements to and manner of the assemblies – Bayan v.
infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly - JBL Ermita
Reyes v. Bagatsing  Freedom parks – Bayan v. Ermita

The MAYOR’S DISCRETION is limited to the following, in granting a permit for public assembly (Primicias v.
Fugoso):
1. To determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent
confusion by overlapping,
2. To secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and
3. To provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder
MAYOR’S ACT WAS INVALID

The Mayor of Manila granted a permit to rally in a venue (Plaza Miranda) other than the one applied for
(Mendiola Bridge) by the IBP, without application of clear and present danger test or giving IBP the
opportunity to be heard. – IBP v. Atienza
What is required if the venue for an assembly is private in nature?

Only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required - JBL Reyes v.
Bagatsing
What is the process in applying for a permit for assembly?

1. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place;
2. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached;
3. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.

4. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity.
5. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
- JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing
STUDENTS
Students have the right to freedom of speech, of expression, and of press, and to peaceably assemble,
subject to the right of the school to impose disciplinary action for “conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” – Miriam College v. Court of Appeals
SCHOOLTEACHERS
“…have the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances, but there is no like express provision granting them the right to strike” – Jacinto v. Court of
Appeals
Primicias v. Fugoso - 80 Phil 71 This case originated from a petition seeking to compel the Mayor Manila to
issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on
Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances on the ground that the respondent
refused to grant such permit.
The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. As there is no express and
separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the
holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the
provisions of said section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or
procession in any street or public places may be applied by analogy to
meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor of
the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse
to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and
the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be
granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose,
with a view to prevent confusion by over-' lapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must
adopt the second construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said
ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to
refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or
procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of
the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic
countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it
may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing - 125 Petitioner, retired Justice J.B. L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases
SCRA 553 Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march
and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy,
hardly two blocks away. The permit was denied due to “persistent
intelligence reports affirming] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people is expected to attend.” Respondent Mayor suggested,
however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities,
that “a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured.”
To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the
law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present
danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the
mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the
denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of
what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption—especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific
public place—is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there.
The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for
the American Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place.”
While the general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of
the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice,
another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown
that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such
change were made. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. Not that it should be
overlooked. There was in this case, however, the assurance of General
Narciso Cabrera, Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan
Police Force, that the police force is in a position to cope with such
emergency should it arise. That is to comply with its duty to extend
protection to the participants of such peaceable assembly.
By way of a summary: the applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
Miriam College v. Court of Appeals Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of
- 348 SCRA 265 the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of
Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the
Miriam College Discipline Committee. The letter notified them that
complaints were filed against them accusing them of violating regulations
in the student handbook. They were instructed to submit a written
statement to answer to the charges. None of the students submitted an
answer. They Disciplinary Committee proceed with its investigation ex
parte and imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students.
The right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute.
The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while we upheld the right
of the students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out
disciplinary action by the school for “conduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.”
The Supreme Court cited heavily from its Malabanan decision, which
involved a protest by students over a merger between their school and
another school.
It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus
Journalism Act. Provisions of law should be construed in harmony with
those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed,
wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the
fundamental law. A statute should not be given a broad construction if its
validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a
manner as not to infringe upon the school’s right to discipline its students.
At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to
unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with
jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean
that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt
class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others.
SCHOOL HAS POWER TO INVESTIGATE
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals - 281 This case involved schoolteachers who were administratively charged after
SCRA 657 they did not report to work in order to participate in a mass action by
public schoolteachers.
The Supreme Court held that although the Constitution vests in

schoolteachers the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express
provision granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant
of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be
done in accordance with law.
Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an
earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” by
stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government

employees, do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. Rather,
they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in September
1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful
assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim
that their gathering was not a strike; therefore, their participation therein
did not constitute any offense.
The Court cited previous decisions wherein it declared that “these ‘mass
actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it
was the teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons,” should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying
facts are allegedly not identical. Strike, as defined by law, means any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment; or
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employers and employees.
Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time—recess, after classes,

weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with
the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one—not the DECS, the
CSC or even this Court—could have held them liable for the valid exercise
of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted
public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined
by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must,
therefore, be made answerable.
Bayan v. Ermita – 448 SCRA 226 This case involves the constitutionality of BP 880, which codified this
Court’s ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. The Supreme Court held that B.P. No.
880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it

as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding
public assemblies.
Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. The permit can
only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
The law is not overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and
present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not
relevant to the regulation. The delegation to the mayors of the power to
issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-
sound “clear and present danger” standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding
liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to
designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after
that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of
the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind
shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be
written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper
coordination and orderly activities.
IBP v. Atienza - GR No. 175241, The Mayor of Manila granted a permit to rally in a venue (Plaza Miranda)
February 24, 2010 other than the one applied for (Mendiola Bridge) by the IBP. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA found no
GADALEJ. The Supreme Court reversed.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abused his

discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have
been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
permit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the
terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test
which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
A. Non-establishment of religion
NON-VIOLATION VIOLATION
 Postage stamps commemorative of Thirty-  Halal certification of food – Islamic Dawah v.
third International Eucharistic Congress – Executive Secretary
Aglipay v. Ruiz  Prohibition of certain medical professionals
 Wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer for from being Conscientious objectors (they
town fiesta – Garces v. Estenzo should all be allowed to be conscientious
 Exemption for religious reasons from closed- objectors if for legitimate religious reasons) –
shop clauses – Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Imbong v. Ochoa
Workers Union
 RH Law in general – Imbong v. Ochoa
Aglipay v. Ruiz - 64 Phil 201 The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner alleges that the issuance and selling of such
stamps violates provisions in the Constitution which prohibit
appropriation, application, or usage, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, etc.
The Supreme Court disagreed.
In its rationale, the Supreme Court discussed the principle of separation of

church and state, which is rooted in the grant of religious freedom.
However, the Court stressed that religious freedom is not an inhibition of
profound reverence for religious and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. The Court referred to provisions in the Constitution,
including the preamble, which recognize the influence of religion in human
society, including provisions that grant concessions to religious sects and
denominations (exemption from real estate tax, optional religious
instruction in public schools; certain holidays, crimes against religious
worship, etc.).
The Supreme Court considered the fact that the only purpose in issuing
and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of
an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed
(Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic

Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the
aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or
less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.
Garces v. Estenzo - 104 SCRA 510 This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay
council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast
day. The acquisition was made through the “selling of tickets and cash
donations.” One of the allegations of the petitioners is that the resolutions
contravene the constitutional provisions that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion” and that “no public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium” (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2],
Article VIII, Constitution).
The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any

religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or
property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a
waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or
the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be
placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having

a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his
image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the
barrio fiesta is a socioreligious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the

barangay council. Father Osmeña’s claim that it belongs to his church is
wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to
determine who should have custody thereof.
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the
Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the
image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public
funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional
provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Petitioner is a member of the religious sect, the Iglesia ni Cristo and an
Workers - 59 SCRA 94 employee of Elizalde Rope Factory, which had a CBA containing a closed-
shop provision. The prevailing laws allowed companies to enter into a
closed-shop agreement with labor organizations. The controversy arose
when another law was passed, amending the provisions allowing closed-
shop agreements by exempting members of religious sects that prohibit
affiliation of their members in labor organizations. Pursuant to that
exemption, petitioner resigned from the union he was a part of in Elizalde.
The Union notified the company and requested petitioners’ termination in
accordance with the closed-shop agreement. A TRO was filed against the
company, which prevented the same from terminating the petitioner’s
employment. Respondent alleges that the subject exemption is
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the exemption is constitutional.

What the exception provides, is that members of said religious sects cannot
be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are
not members of the collective bargaining union.
It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces
it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating
with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power
to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their
religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with
the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to
join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No.
3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to
promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right
to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they
can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be
gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
The exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The “establishment clause”
(of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted
to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
Islamic Dawah v. Executive F: The controversy in this case has to do with halal certification of food.
Secretary – 405 SCRA 497 Initially, petitioner Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc (ICDP)
was engaged in providing halal certification as a service. However,
pursuant to an EO issued by then President GMA, the Office of Muslim
Affairs (OMA) was given the sole authority to make halal certifications of
food. It was then published and communicated to food manufacturers that
halal certification may only be secured from OMA or else they would be in
violation of the executive order. As a result, ICDP lost revenue. Petitioner
filed a petition alleging that the EO violates the constitutional provision on
the separation of Church and state.
I: Whether or not classifying a food product as halal is a religious function?
H: YES
R: Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs.
By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO
46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) “to
ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino
society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and
institutions.” OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic
concerns of the Muslim community as a “national cultural community” and
not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does
not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the “free exercise of religion” provision found in
Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the
threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a
democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to

deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right
to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim
Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the
Muslim Filipinos’ right to health are already provided for in existing laws
and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims.
Imbong vs. Ochoa – 721 SCRA 146 The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The establishment
clause “principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups.” Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the
support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one’s belief and faith.
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the

State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that
one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the
things that are God’s.
B. Free exercise of religion

 “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” TV program is The City Treasurer alleged that the religious
subject to regulation by Board of Review for corporation required a license to disseminate religious
Moving Pictures and Television; it information – American Bible Society v. City of
externalizes beliefs into acts or omissions, Manila
which are subject to authority of state
(although basis for x-rating the show was Mandating children to salute the flag, sing the national
w/ GADALEJ) – Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge despite their
of Appeals objections based on their religion (Jehovas’ Witness) –
 Aglipayan priest was convicted for Ebralinag v. Superintendent
performing an illegal marriage ceremony;
elements of marriage ceremony on the law
were applied – Romulo v. People
Administrative complaint for gross and illegal conduct against a court interpreter; usually conjugal
relationships (where at least one is married to someone else) are subject to administrative liability; Court
held that it was the government’s burden to prove a compelling state interest that would prevent the court
from carving out an exception for religious belief that conjugal relationship was moral; OSG failed to prove;
complaint was dismissed - Estrada v. Escritor
American Bible Society v. City of In the case at bar, plaintiff American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock,
Manila - 101 Phil 386 non-profit, religious, missionary corporation, duly registered in the
Philippines and is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and
religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it
was conducting business of general merchandise without the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of City Ordinances and
required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff
protested against this requirement and claimed that it never made any
profit from the sale of its bibles.
Held: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like
other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear
and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a
little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that
plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For these reasons, the provisions of City
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of a license
fee for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied
to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.
As for City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires a Mayor's
permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or
occupations enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon the
enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices. Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to
plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff society involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance
No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff.
The Supreme Court quoted Tañada v. Fernando: “'We do not mean to say
that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of
government. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege
of delivering a sermon.”
Ebralinag v. Superintendent - 219 Several petitions concerning children who had been expelled due to their
SCRA 256 refusal to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge. Their refusal was due to their religious beliefs. As part of the sect
known as Jehovahs’ Witnesses, they considered such acts contrary to the
belief that they should not worship false idols. They were expelled because
pursuant to the applicable law and its implementing rules, such acts are
mandatory on all children in public schools.
I: Whether or not the laws making saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem, and reciting the patriotic flag mandatory on all school children,
regardless of their religious beliefs, violates the free exercise clause? H: YES
The Supreme Court overturned its previous ruling in Gerona:
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of
being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to
the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on
the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free
exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987
Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section
1[7], 1935 Constitution.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest

priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator
"The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute
as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."
The Supreme Court cited its decision in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope

Workers Union and said that a similar exemption may be accorded to the
Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out
of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag
ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
The Supreme Court also referred to West Virgina v. Barnette: “freedom to
differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order."
"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, x x x—assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
through coercion—is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the
expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means."
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television x-rated the TV
- 259 SCRA 529 Program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” The Board classified the series as “X” or
not for public viewing on the ground that they “offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.”
The Supreme Court held that although the Board does have the power to
review petitioner’s TV program, it did exercise grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it x-rated the same.
First, the Board has the power to review the TV program because the public
broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears
of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent,
i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare.
The people are given the freedom to believe. But where the individual
externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.
Second, the Board exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it x-rated the TV program for allegedly
“attacking” other religions, especially the Catholic church.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Board’s conclusion. Upon

examination of the evidence, especially will show that the so-called
“attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets
of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court
as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can
be prohibited from public viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This
ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with
its right to free exercise of religion. The respondents cannot also rely on the
ground “attacks against another religion” in x-rating the religious program
of petitioner. Even a glance at Section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is
not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of
petitioner’s television program.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by
the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to
justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible
attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the
type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.

Estrada v. Escritor – 408 SCRA 1 Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for gross and immoral conduct
against respondent, a court interpreter in RTC Las Piñas. The compliant
alleged that the respondent had been living with a married man with
whom she had a child. In her defense, respondent alleged that her
relationship was valid based on the belief and practice of her religion, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses.
In its 2003 Opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that in resolving claims
involving religious freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding
respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the
law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling state
interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.
In its 2006 Resolution, the Supreme Court applied its 2003 Opinion to the
facts of the case, after giving the OSG time to argue whether or not there
was a compelling state interest would justify non-exemption based on
religious beliefs.
To prove that a compelling state interest exists, the government must do

more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must
precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined
if exemptions are granted. Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved
a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state.
The Supreme Court, finding the evidence and arguments presented by the
OSG insufficient, held: that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious
freedom—may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect
the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man
must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
Romulo vs. People – 728 SCRA 675 Petitioner is an Aglipayan priest, who performed a marriage ceremony for
a couple, despite having been informed by the same that a marriage license
had not been issued to them. An Information for violation of the RPC was
filed against him for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
One of petitioners’ arguments in his defense is that what he performed was
a blessing, not a marriage ceremony, and that under the principle of
separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical
affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony.”
The MTC found him guilty. The RTC affirmed. The CA affirmed. The SC
affirmed.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the petitioner that the principle of
separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the
church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family
Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any
religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and
regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the
commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted
was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were
complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a “blessing,”
the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage
ceremony qualified this “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony” as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
A. Liberty of abode and of travel

SUMMARY OF RIGHTS
 Section 6 grants the liberty of abode and the right to travel, not the right to return.
 However, the right to return is granted through customary international law (which is adopted through
Article 2, Section 2)
 Still the right is not absolute and is subject to limitation based on equally important public interests.
- Marcos v. Manglapus
BAIL AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL

- The right to travel is not an absolute right. The Court granting bail may simultaneously restrict the
petitioner’s right to travel. The court granting bail is included in the phrase “except upon lawful order
of the court” – Manotok v. Court of Appeals
Marcos v. Manglapus - 177 SCRA The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically
668 guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is our well considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international
law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2
of the Constitution]. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being “arbitrarily deprived” thereof
[Art. 12 (4)].
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who
seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at
whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of
dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible.
For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression,

although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted
to the requirements of equally important public interests
The Court held that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must
be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the
short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
Manotok v. Court of Appeals - 142 Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right,
SCRA 149 neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him
from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an

absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
“The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health.”
The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
His “Motion for Permission to Leave the Country” is solely predicated on

petitioner’s wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly
attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities.
From the tenor and import of petitioner’s motion, no urgent or compelling
reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto.
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him
to travel abroad. Petitioner’s motion bears no indication that the alleged
business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his
behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner’s absence from the United
States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business
opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner’s non-
presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or
prejudice.”
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of
the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his
surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in
their having denied petitioner’s motion for permission to leave the country.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

A. Right to information
Article 3, Section 7 is self-executory – Legaspi v. CSC
TEST TO DETERMINE RIGHT TO ACCESS WHO DECIDES IF ‘INFORMATION’ IS OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION: CONCERN?
1. Of public concern; The Court – Legaspi v. CSC
2. Not exempted by law
- Legaspi v. CSC PROPER REMEDY
Mandamus – Legaspi v. CSC
OF PUBLIC CONCERN NOT OF PUBLIC CONCERN/

EXEMPTED BY LAW
 Civil service eligibility of persons  JPEPA negotiations; diplomatic negotiations;
employed as sanitarians in the Cebu international agreement negotiations; deliberative
City Health Department – Legaspi v. process privilege - Akbayan Citizen’s Action
CSC Party v. Aquino
 Management of GSIS funds –
Valmonte v. Belmonte
 Appointments made to public offices
and the utilization of public property –
Gonzales v. Narvasa
Legaspi v. Civil Service The CSC denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
Commission - 150 SCRA 530 eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. Legaspi filed a petition for mandamus anchored
on his constitutional right to information.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
ARTICLE 3, SECTION 7 IS SELF-EXECUTORY

The Supreme Court recognized that Section 7, Article 3 is self-executing. It
supplies the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access
to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized
may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What
may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must be consistent with
the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue
of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly
invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.
STANDING OF A CITIZEN TO CHALLENGE VIOLATION OF A PUBLIC

RIGHT
When a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
possesses the right.
GOVERNMENT AGENCY MAY REGULATE ONLY THE MANNER OF

ACCESS
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not
carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between
the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to particular
information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is
to be afforded.
The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information

sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987
Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with
the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be
exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be
avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta,
supra).Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the
duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
MANDAMUS IS A PROPER REMEDY

Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion
of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may
be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.
TEST TO DETERMINE RIGHT TO ACCESS:
(A) OF PUBLIC CONCERN; AND
(B) NOT EXEMPTED BY LAW
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security
(Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September
24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The
threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern.
COURT DECIDES IF OF PUBLIC CONCERN

In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case-to-case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is
the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil
service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. Public
office being a public trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities
for their respective positions. But then, it is not enough that the information
sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing
to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's
right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IS OF

PUBLIC CONCERN
The Court took judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass
the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence,
there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen,
has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility
of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. - 170 The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that
SCRA 256 certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition
were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately before the
February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
(1) MANAGEMENT OF GSIS FUNDS IS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its

employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. The
public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of
public interest and concern.
It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds
are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to
be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest
degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.
(2) INFORMATION SOUGHT IS NOT EXCLUDED BY LAW
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. GSIS, like
all other juridical entities, cannot invoke a right to privacy.
The Court cited ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government

Corporations and Offices: “the government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same
function of service to the people.” Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting
the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information. Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and controlled
corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of
the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest from the records of the
proceedings
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not
binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering
further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within
the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans

granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
may be insured.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant

thereto, are entitled to “access to official records,” the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of
mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the
respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific. The
request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on
the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
Gonzales v. Narvasa – 337 SCRA Petitioner asked the Court to compel then Executive Secretary Zamora to
733 answer his letter requesting that he be furnished with the names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their
appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the
BOC and turned over to Malacañang.
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” provides that, in the
performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged
to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days
from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents
for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the
reasonable claims of confidentiality.
The Court agreed with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to
answer petitioner’s letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of
public concern—that is, appointments made to public offices and the
utilization of public property. With regard to petitioner’s request for copies
of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is
obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the
reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.
Akbayan Citizen’s Action Party v. In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on
Aquino - GR No. 170516, July 16, matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature,
2008 petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is
anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their
capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of
the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity
as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in
jurisprudence.
The text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement

(JPEPA) having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has
become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the
“full text” thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because
petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is

evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations
are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an
exception to the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in

this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information,
the Court in Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), held that “information
on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake
of national interest.” Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in
People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Mang-lapus (G.R. No.
84642, Resolution of the Court En Bancdated September 13, 1988), wherein
the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 84642,

Resolution of the Court En Banc dated September 13, 1988), it is clear that
while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential—
since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved”—the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable
to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with
the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal
not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations. A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should
now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine
representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process
of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we

may be jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less
critical ones. Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no
exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])holds, recognizing
a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest
that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to
overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against
citizens’ demands for information, but also in the context of legislative
investigations.
While, in keeping with the general presumption of transparency, the

burden is initially on the Executive to provide precise and certain reasons
for upholding its claim of privilege, once the Executive is able to show that
the documents being sought are covered by a recognized privilege, the
burden shifts to the party seeking information to overcome the privilege by
a strong showing of need.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
A. Government employees
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES

Their right to self-organization is limited to the Their ineligibility to form unions, associations and societies
formation of unions or associations; no right to is constitutional under the clause “for purposes not contrary
strike – SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals to law”; the ineligibility of confidential employees has the
same rationale – United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union
v. Laguesma
SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals It appears that the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA)
- 175 SCRA 686 went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands.
The Supreme Court held that the strike was illegal.
While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of

government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted

the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of
government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit
the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of

government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180
which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that “[t]he Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress.” The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
under date April 21, 1987 which, “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees. . . enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs
and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service.”
At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision
of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution “[t]he civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters” [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where
the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees”] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R.
Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by

law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor
and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations,
not through collective bargaining agreements.
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution on its
Union v. Laguesma - 288 SCRA 15 contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it
declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join
The guarantee of right to self- unions, contravenes Art. III, §8 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
organization in Art. III, §8 is not dismissed the petition.
infringed by a ban against managerial In Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC:
employees forming a union. The right In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service
guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. By the
condition that its exercise should be for very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity
purposes “not contrary to law.” In the to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise
case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale
for prohibiting managerial employees behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a
from forming or joining labor labor union equally applies to them.
organizations. In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated
on this rationale, thus: “. . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated
to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership.”
To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of
confidential employees to organize. But the same reason for denying them
the right to organize justifies even more the ban on managerial employees
from forming unions. After all, those who qualify as top or middle
managers are executives who receive from their employers information that
not only is confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to
their competitors, or to other employees. It is hardly necessary to point out
that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is unconstitutional would be to
contradict the decision in that case.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
A. Elements of "taking"
What are the elements of “taking”? EMC-PO

(1) The expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously

affected; and
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
- Republic v. Vda de Castellvi
NOT ALL ELEMENTS WERE PRESENT TRANSFER OF TAKING

 AFP’s contract of lease indicates not  MERALCO sold to NAPOCOR – MERALCO v.
more than a momentary period and Pineda
non-ouster of owner or deprivation of
beneficial enjoyment – Republic v. Vda TRIAL BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS
de Castellvi  Indispensable – MERALCO v. Pineda
 Consent indicates not more than a
momentary period – Garcia v. Court of
Appeals
POLICE POWER & EMINENT DOMAIN ENTER/TAKE UPON PAYMENT OF PROVISIONAL

 The law reserving 6% of the total area VALUE
of the cemetery for charity burial of  Judge committed GADALEJ when he fixed the
deceased persons who are paupers provisional values of the properties for the purpose
constituted “taking” and was not valid of issuing a writ of possession on the basis of the
without payment of just compensation market value and the daily opportunity profit
- City Government v. Judge Ericta petitioner may derive
- NPC V. Jocson
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi - 58 The Republic occupied Castellvi’s land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the
SCRA 336 above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year
to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the terms and conditions therein
A number of circumstances must be stated. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the
present in the “taking” of property for Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP
purposes of eminent domain: refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract,
(1)The expropriator must enter a on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the
private property; latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the
(2)The entrance into private property property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for
must be for more than a momentary sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within
period; 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in
(3)The entry into the property should substantially the same condition as before occupancy. Lieutenant General
be under warrant or color of legal Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that
authority; it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the
(4)The property must be devoted to a permanent installations and other facilities. Defendant Castellvi then
public use or otherwise informally brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in Civil Case No.
appropriated or injuriously affected; 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment
and case was pending, the Republic instituted these expropriation proceedings.
(5)The utilization of the property for The Supreme Court held that the taking took place upon the filing of the
public use must be in such a way as complaint.
to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the THE ENTRANCE INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY MUST BE FOR MORE
property. THAN A MOMENTARY PERIOD The word “momentary” when applied
to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to -mean
“a limited period”—not indefinite or permanent. The lease contract was for
a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact
that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a
permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year
by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease
agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to
occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear
and express terms of the lease contract.
It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the
lands at some future time, but certainly mere notice—much less an implied
notice—of such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the
lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the
land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court.
THE UTILIZATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE MUST BE

IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OUST THE OWNER AND DEPRIVE HIM OF
ALL BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT OF THE PROPERTY. In the instant case,
the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same
for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the
lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of
all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals
until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26,
1959.
The two elements above not being present, the Court held that the lower
Court did not commit an error when it ruled that the “taking” of the
Castellvi property should not be reckoned from 1947. Instead, the “taking”
of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case. Under section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
“just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or
takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.
Garcia v. Court of Appeals - 102 National Power Corporation filed a complaint for eminent domain with the
SCRA 597 Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch Five, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3584 praying that it be allowed to acquire right of way easements over
To constitute "taking for purposes of the property of petitioners consisting of two adjoining parcels of land.
eminent domain the ff: circumstances
must concur: The National Power Corporation occupied as early as 1957 portions of the
1) the expropriator must enter upon two (2) lots for the construction of ‘steel towers and high power lines for
the private property; 230 KV Ambuklao-Manila Line and 69 KV Mexico-Tarlac Line.’ The
2) the entrance must not be for a portions of the two (2) lots occupied has an area of 20,439 square meters. It
momentary period, that is, the is designated as Block 19 in the sketch plan (Exhibit 3). Up to now the
entrance must be permanent; plaintiff has not paid anything for the portion occupied, either as rental or
3) the entry must be under warrant or as purchase price. A document was presented that was executed by
color of legal authority; defendants’ father, consenting to construction of the Ambuklao-Manila
4) the property must be devoted to transmission lines pending completion of the negotiation of the
public use or otherwise informally compensation to be paid.
appropriated or injuriously
affected; and As the private respondent’s entry was gained through permission, it did
5) the utilization of the property must not have the intention to acquire ownership either by voluntary purchase
be in such a way as to oust the or by the exercise of eminent domain. And the fact remains that the private
owner and deprive him of all respondent never completed the negotiation as to compensation. Not only
beneficial enjoyment of the this, private respondent went on to construct another line—the 69 KV
property Mexico-Tarlac without defendants’ permission nor a court authorization.
All these prove the private respondent’s intention not to expropriate Block
19, as it did not seek so in the action it instituted on August 8, 1969. Neither
did it have the intention to do so in 1953 as shown by the terms in Exhibit
“M”. It is clear, therefore, that the private respondent not only did not take
possession with intent to expropriate Block 19, but that it did not institute
expropriation proceedings over the same.
Consequently, since the areas covered by Block 19 were never entered into
or possessed for purposes of eminent domain, nor did they become the
subject of an action for eminent domain, neither the date of entry nor the
filing of the action by private respondent for expropriation of a “right-of-
way” easement on December 8, 1969 could be reckoned with as the basis
for the determination of just compensation.
By virtue of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, there
being no taking of the property in question for purposes of eminent domain
nor condemnation proceedings instituted over the same to speak of, the
time as of which the market value should be fixed is the time when the trial
court made its order of expropriation. It is the date of appropriation or the
investing date which as everyone knows required more than a day,
sometimes weeks to carry through as would an ordinary real estate
purchase and sale. Hence, in estimating the market value, all the
capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or
for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it
is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating
its value.
City Government v. Judge Ericta - This petition was filed questioning the constitutionality of an ordinance
122 SCRA 759 mandating that memorial park cemeteries set aside at least 6% of the total
area of the cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
There is no reasonable relation between and who have been residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to their death.
the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries The Supreme Court granted the petition.
for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries
morals, good order, safety, or the general is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
welfare of the people. The ordinance is Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
actually a taking without compensation dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
of a certain area from a private cemetery burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
to benefit paupers who are charges of the burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
municipal corporation. Instead of Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
building or maintaining a public Panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the
the burden to private cemeteries. city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however,
requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from
said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
MERALCO v. Pineda - 206 SCRA A complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against
196 forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. Pursuant to a
government policy, MERALCO sold to the National Power Corporation
In an expropriation case such as this one (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the
where the principal issue is the transmission lines traversing private respondents’ property. MERALCO
determination of just compensation, a filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its
trial before the Commissioners is interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation
indispensable to allow the parties to because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the
present evidence on the issue of just Commissioners was suspended.
compensation.
Subsequently, the respondent court issued an Order granting the private
Thus, trial with the aid of the respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal, thus requiring
commissioners is a substantial right that MERALCO to deposit P52,600,000.00 representing the consideration paid
may not be done away with capriciously by Napocor for the property it bought from MERALCO which includes the
or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such subject matter of this case, computed at P200.55 per square meter and to
instances, where the report of the render an accounting.
commissioners may be disregarded, the
trial court may make its own estimate of Private respondents filed for a TRO, among others, they contend that
value from competent evidence that may Respondent judge should have ordered that Napocor be impleaded in
be gathered from the record. The substitution of petitioner or could have at least impleaded both the
aforesaid joint venture agreement relied Napocor and the petitioner as party plaintiffs.
upon by the respondent judge, in the
absence of any other proof of valuation Records, specifically Meralco’s deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor
of said properties, is incompetent to of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land
determine just compensation. already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those
parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings
under Civil Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII),
as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of
easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus, Meralco had
already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid
parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals
that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of
the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco. (see Rollo, pp. 342-
343) Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore
proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of
the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff.
Respondent judge’s act of determining and ordering the payment of just

compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a
flagrant violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and is a
gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of
Court.
NPC v. Jocson - 206 SCRA 196 There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation:
“The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the

plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.’ An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,
of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to
be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in
the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.’
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of ‘the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners
would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit,
and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. x x x.”
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved
upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after due
notice to the defendant, to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in its
main office or any of its branches or agencies, “an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation.” This assessed
value is that indicated in the tax declaration. PD No. 42, however
effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the
provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the
assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that
purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to
be condemned.
B. Public use
Socialized housing meets “public use” requirement – Sumulong v. Guerrero
Local governments do not need to secure pre-approval from the Department of Agrarian Reform to
expropriate the lands for use as a housing project and other facilities that aim to provide the necessary
scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen
– Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals
Sumulong v. Guerrero - 154 SCRA The NHA filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
461 approximately 25 hectares in Antipolo,; Socialized housing is a valid public
purpose that justifies expropriation.
As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels
domain comes into play. As just noted, of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being
the constitution in at least two cases, to expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing
remove any doubt, determines what Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.
public use is. One is the expropriation of
lands to be subdivided into small lots for Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
resale at cost to individuals. The other is concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
in the transfer, through the exercise of environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of
this power, of utilities and other private housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot
enterprise to the government. It is be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications.
accurate to state then that at present A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all
whatever may be beneficially employed who need it, all at once.
for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Province of Camarines Sur v. Court The Province of Camarines Sur had adopted a five-year Comprehensive
of Appeals - 222 SCRA 173 Development plan, which includes the establishment of model and pilot
farms for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and
The LGC does not intimate in the least tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making,
that local government units must first small scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming
secure the approval of the Department of research center, and other progressive feasibility concepts objective of
Land Reform for the conversion of lands which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project
before they can institute the necessary for provincial government employees. The Solicitor General expressed the
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of
there is no provision in the the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law petitioners for use as a housing project. The CA agreed with the SOLGEN,
which expressly subjects the and ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of
expropriation of agricultural lands by Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of
local government units to the control of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be

the Department of Agrarian Reform. expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs is subject to
literal to a broader interpretation of prior approval of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as implementor of the
“public purpose” or “public use” for agrarian reform program? NO
which the power of eminent domain
may be exercised. The old concept was The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution
that the condemned property must is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center
actually be used by the general public would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make
before the taking thereof could satisfy available to the community invaluable information and technology on
the constitutional requirement of “public agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of
use”. Under the new concept, “public the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
use” means public advantage, project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As
convenience or benefit, which tends to held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, “Housing is a basic human
contribute to the general welfare and the need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
prosperity of the whole community, like significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the
a resort complex for tourists or housing general welfare.”
project
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government
units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying
for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in
the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform
to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that
shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated
shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy.
C. Just compensation
DEFINITION
 The equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
– EPZA v. Dulay
 It is a judicial function – EPZA v. Dulay
PRIVATE APPRAISERS
 The reports of private appraisers may be considered and adopted by a judge in determining just
compensation – Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals
FUTURE/PLANNED CONVERSIONS/POTENTIAL BUILDING
 Do not affect the value of just compensation – National Power Corporation v. CA
ACTION FOR JUST COMPENSATION
 Where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use,
he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such
property – Republic v. Primo Mendoza
EPZA v. Dulay - 149 SCRA 305 The President filed a complaint for expropriation over parcels of land
adjacent to public land reserved for the establishment of an export
The method of ascertaining just processing zone by EPZA in Lapu-Lapu City, Mactan, Cebu.
compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible Prior to this case, prevailing jurisprudence had provided the definition of
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It just compensation and that its determination is a judicial function.
tends to render this Court inutile in a However, promulgation of several presidential decrees limited the
matter which under the Constitution is definition of just compensation to the current and fair market value
reserved to it for final determination. declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as

determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower.
Just Compensation means the equivalent
for the value of the property at the time The Supreme Court declared the presidential decrees on just compensation
of its taking. It means a fair and full unconstitutional and void. The method of ascertaining just compensation
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
facts as to the condition of the property judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which
and its surroundings, its improvements under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
and capabilities, should be considered.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
The determination of "just still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
compensation" in eminent domain cases following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
is a judicial function. The executive stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
department or the legislature may make the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court
the initial determinations but when a to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
party claims a violation of the guarantee the need to satisfy the due process 'clause in the taking of private property
in the Bill of Rights that private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was
may not be taken for public use without not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the
just compensation, no statute, decree, or decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality
executive order can mandate that its own or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the
determination shall prevail over the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
court's findings. Much less can the courts of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
be precluded from looking into the "just- determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute
ness" of the decreed compensation. for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just
compensation is concerned.
The Supreme Court held that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's
discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to
undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Public use: public park; After receiving a copy of the commissioners’
Appeals - 93 SCRA 503 report, private respondent filed a “motion to admit additional evidence”
which was opposed by the petitioner but granted by the Court, which
constituted expert testimony of a duly licensed broker. The Court rendered
a decision disregarding the valuation made by the commissioners and
using the appraisal of Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino in 1969 as the basis in
determining the value of the land in 1962 The municipality contends that
the CA acted with GADALEJ when it gave credence to the appraiser
employed by private respondent and disregarded the report by the
commissioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court calls for the appointment of
not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken. The power of the commissioners is
limited to assessing the value and determining the amount of damages.
Corollary to this limitation, it has been held that reports submitted by
commissioners of appraisals in condemnation proceedings are not binding,
but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned.
An early case enunciated the rule that a Court of First Instance has the
undoubted right to reject the report of the commissioners as to the value of
the land, if the report is not founded upon legal evidence. The judge has the
undoubted right also to discharge the commission and appoint a new one.
He also has the right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of
the land in question, nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he
must base it upon competent evidence.
That the commissioners’ report is not final and conclusive, but merely
recommendatory is bolstered by the requirement in Section 8, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court of conducting a hearing thereon. Otherwise stated,
said provision requires that upon the expiration of the period of ten (10)
days within which all interested parties may file their objects to the report,
or even before the expiration of such period if all interested parties have
filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement
therewith, the court must conduct a hearing on the report.
Respondent court found that aside from being a civil engineer, Aurelio B.
Aquino is a licensed real estate broker and appraiser of long standing,
being one of the incorporators of C.M. Hoskins and Co., Inc., a corporation
engaged in real estate brokerage since October, 1938 and of which firm he is
presently the Chairman of the board of directors. With these qualifications,
respondent court committed no error in concluding that he was competent
to make the appraisal of the fair market value of the parcel of land under
consideration.
National Power Corporation v. Public purpose: constructing an access road to its Angat River
Court of Appeals - 129 SCRA 665 Hydroelectric Project; Pending negotiations with the owners, NPC obtained
permission to begin construction in 1961. In 1962, B. E. SAN DIEGO, Inc., a
The case of Manila Electric Co. vs. realty firm, acquired the land at a public auction sale and was issued a
Tuason, 60 Phil. 663, 668, cited in title.1 In 1963, NPC instituted proceedings for eminent domain against the
Municipal Gov’t. of Sagay vs. Jison, has original owners, which was later amended to implead SAN DIEGO. The
categorically ruled that it is the time of parties disagreed as to the value of just compensation sought to be
taking and not as “potential building” expropriated. SAN DIEGO alleged that there is a plan to convert the area in
site that is the determining factor, “x x x which the land is situated into a residential subdivision. The Supreme
if the property to be expropriated was Court disagreed with SAN DIEGO. In the case at bar, the taking by NPC
agricultural, the adaptability thereof for occurred in November 1961, when it constructed the access road on the
conversion in the future into a residential expropriated property at time when it was still “cogonal” and owned by
site does not affect its nature when the spouses Sadang. The Complaint was filed only in 1963.
plaintiff assumed possession of the
property, although it is a circumstance The convertibility of the property into a subdivision, the criterion relied
that should be considered in upon by respondent Court, is not controlling. Since SAN DIEGO bought
determining its value at that time, as an the land in question in the interim and was issued a title only on December
‘agricultural’ land.” 7, 1962, the “taking” as to it should commence only from said date.
On the issue of legal interest in expropriation proceedings, we held
inAmigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360(1972), that: “As regards the claim for
damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is
made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for
attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after
hearing.” In the case at bar, legal interest should accrue from December 7,
1962, the time of taking as far as SAN DIEGO is concerned, at six per cent
(6%) per annum, up to the time that payment is made by NPC.
Republic of the Philippines vs. This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the
Primo Mendoza - G.R. No. 185091, 8 Government in MTCC for its failure to acquire ownership of a privately
August 2010 owned property that it had long used as a school site (Paninsingin Primary
School; PPS; a public school in Lipa City, Batangas) and to pay just
the Court affirmed the RTC’s power to compensation for it. The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in
award just compensation even in the the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished
absence of a proper expropriation to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and
proceeding. It held that the RTC can subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the
determine just compensation based on name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent
the evidence presented before it in an improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-
ordinary civil action for recovery of declared. The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS
possession of property or its value and sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they
damages. As to the time when just never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the
compensation should be fixed, it is property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained
settled that where property was taken registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had
without the benefit of expropriation only been partially cancelled.
proceedings and its owner filed an action The Supreme Court held that while the lower courts were correct in ruling
that the Mendozas had a better right over the property as registered
for recovery of possession before the owners, still the lower courts should not have ordered the eviction of the
commencement of expropriation Republic.
proceedings, it is the value of the The Court held that where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of
property at the time of taking that is his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his
controlling right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering
such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, 603 SCRA
576 (2009), the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had
taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The
Mendozas’ remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not
ejectment. Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the
Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate
the Mendozas’ right to just compensation for it, the CA should have
ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to
their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.
D. Judicial review
De Knecht v. Bautista – 1980 Republic v. De Knecht - 1990
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no real In 1983, BP 340 expropriated the very properties subject of the
necessity for EDSA to be extended to Roxas present proceedings. The social impact factor that persuaded the
Boulevard through Rein and del Pan streets Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared.
instead of through Cuneta avenue. The SC All residents in the area have been relocated and duly
considered the social impact factor on residents of compensated.
that street as opposed to the original plan wherein Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this
mostly motels and hotels would be affected. project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control
problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. The
Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation
proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from
EDSA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening
events. BP 340 was not a legislative reversal.
De Knecht v. Bautista - 100 SCRA The Supreme Court ruled that there was no real necessity for EDSA to be
660 extended to Roxas Boulevard through Rein and del Pan streets instead of
through Cuneta avenue.
It cited J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration:
“In the same case the Supreme Court concluded:

“With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the
particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned
in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question
whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is
the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will
not allow.”
“x x x From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of

the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando
Rein—Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse
of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate
possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
Republic v. De Knecht - 182 SCRA The issue posed in this case is whether an expropriation proceeding that
141 was determined by a final judgment of this Court may be the subject of a
subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Moreover, the said decision, is no
obstacle to the legislative arm of the The Republic had acquired the needed properties through negotiated
Government in thereafter (over two purchases starting with the lands from Taft Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard,
years later in this case) making its own including the lands in Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. It acquired through
negotiated purchases about 80 to 85 percent of the lands involved in the
independent assessment of the project whose owners did not raise any objection as to arbitrariness on the
circumstances then prevailing as to the choice of the project and of the route. It is only with respect to the
propriety of undertaking the remaining 10 to 15 percent along the route that the petitioner cannot
expropriation of the properties in negotiate through a sales agreement with a few land owners, including de
question and thereafter by enacting the Knecht whose holding is hardly 5% of the whole route area.
corresponding legislation as it did in this
case. The Court agrees in the wisdom There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30,
and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. 1980 in De Knecht vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the
Thus the anterior decision of this Court “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the
must yield to this subsequent legislative EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not
fiat receive judicial approval. It is based on the recommendation of the Human
Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the
extension will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and
improvement therein are mostly motels. x x x While it is true that said
final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case
between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to
take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by
voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate
court action or by legislation.
When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340
expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings, and
for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events
that occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in
1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan
Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this
extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have
been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the EDSA
outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Only
private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that
will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also
minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. x x x The Court finds
justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings
through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening events after the rendition
of the decision of this Court in De Knecht. B.P. Blg. 340 therefore
effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this
Court. And the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the enactment of
B.P. Blg. 340.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Existing laws are read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties and reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order;
separation of pay and contracts of lease – Abella v. NLRC
A law/ordinance enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts; zoning
ordinance (converted street to commercial) extinguished obligation in COS to comply with condition of
building only single-only residential buildings
– Ortigas & Co v. Court of Appeals
Regulation of corporate rehabilitation is pursuant to police power; rehabilitation plans are subject to approval
by court and do not impair contracts with creditors
– Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation

Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals - In 1976, Ortigas & Co sold a parcel of land to Emilia Hermoso located at
346 SCRA 748 Greenhills, with the contract of sale providing that the lot be used
exclusively for residential purposes only and not more than one single-
A law enacted in the exercise of police family residential building. In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission
power to regulate or govern certain (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC
activities or transactions could be given Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for
retroactive effect and may reasonably the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial
impair vested rights or contracts. Police area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of
power legislation is applicable not only Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.On June 8, 1984, private
to future contracts, but equally to those respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P.
already in existence. Nonimpairment of Hermoso Realty Corp. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of
contracts or vested rights clauses will the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story
have to yield to the superior and commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.On
legitimate exercise by the State of police January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with
power to promote the health, morals, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil Case No.
peace, education, good order, safety, and 64931, the complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial
general welfare of the people. Moreover, structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.
statutes in exercise of valid police power
must be read into every contract. The lessee argues that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area
Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be
Intermediate Appellate Court, we read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police
already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81- power.
01 as a legitimate police power measure.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use
of the lot were duly annotated on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said
restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these
restrictions were agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No.
81-01.
The CA agreed with the lessee. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA The SC
recognized the general rule that laws are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation. However, such rule admits of certain exceptions,
including police power. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from
Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by
the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the
contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on
the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed
extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and
could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of
contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,
nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.”
Pryce Corporation v. China Banking The present case originated from a petition for corporate rehabilitation filed
Corporation - G.R. No. 172302 , by petitioner Pryce Corporation on July 9, 2004 with the Regional Trial
February 18, 2014 Court of Makati, Branch 138. On September 13, 2004, the rehabilitation
court gave due course to the petition and directed the rehabilitation
Rather than let struggling corporations receiver to evaluate and give recommendations on petitioner Pryce
slip and vanish, the better option is to Corporation’s proposed rehabilitation plan attached to its petition.The
allow commercial courts to come in and rehabilitation receiver did not approve this plan and submitted instead an
apply the process for corporate amended rehabilitation plan, which the rehabilitation court approved by
rehabilitation. order dated January 17, 2005. In its disposition, the court found petitioner
Pryce Corporation “eligible to be placed in a state of corporate
Contracts are indeed sacred as the law rehabilitation.” The disposition likewise identified the assets to be held and
between the parties. However, these disposed of by petitioner Pryce Corporation and the manner by which its
contracts exist within a society where liabilities shall be paid and liquidated. The order provides, among others,
nothing is risk-free, and the government that the indebtedness to China Banking Corporation and Bank of the
is constantly being called to attend to the Philippine Islands as well as the long term commercial papers will be paid

realities of the times. through a dacion en pago of developed real estate assets of the petitioner; all
accrued penalties are waived; no interest will accrue during the pendency
Corporate rehabilitation is preferred for of petitioner’s corporate rehabilitation.” China Bank and BPI both allege
addressing social costs. Allowing the that the approved rehabilitation plan violates the non-impairment clause.
corporation room to get back on its feet This court has brushed aside invocations of the non-impairment clause to
will retain if not increase employment give way to a valid exercise of police power and afford protection to labor.
opportunities for the market as a whole. Corporate rehabilitation is one of many statutorily provided remedies for
Indirectly, the services offered by the businesses that experience a downturn. Rather than leave the various
corporation will also benefit the market creditors unprotected, legislation now provides for an orderly procedure of
as “[t]he fundamental impulse that sets equitably and fairly addressing their concerns. Corporate rehabilitation
and keeps the capitalist engine in motion allows a court-supervised process to rejuvenate a corporation. Its twin,
comes from [the constant entry of] new insolvency, provides for a system of liquidation and a procedure of
consumers’ goods, the new methods of equitably settling various debts owed by an individual or a business. It
production or transportation, the new provides a corporation’s owners a sound chance to re-engage the market,
markets, [and] the new forms of hopefully with more vigor and enlightened services, having learned from a
industrial organization that capitalist painful experience.
enterprise creates.” Necessarily, a business in the red and about to incur tremendous losses
may not be able to pay all its creditors. Rather than leave it to the
strongest or most resourceful amongst all of them, the state steps in to
equitably distribute the corporation’s limited resources.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
A. Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale

Magtoto v. Manguera - 63 SCRA 4 The history behind the constitutional and legal guarantees as well as the
legal precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary, underwent a
slow and tedious development.
The Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision in question is

basically a procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency and
in admissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be included in the
term “penal laws;” and third, because constitutional provisions as a rule
should be given a prospective effect.
The Supreme Court also held that though the constitutional right of a
detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of
any confession given by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in
evidence, to be prospective, the confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence against
the accused. However, his fundamental right to prove that his confession
was involuntary still stands.
B. When the rights become available

NOT PROTECTED PROTECTED
 Admission/confession upon surrendering to the  Admissions before Agrava Board
police – Galman v. Pamaran
– People v. Taylaran
 Admission/confession from non-government

administrative investigations; PAL
- People v. Judge Ayson
People v. Taylaran - 108 SCRA 373 Snake bitten; killed “quack doctor” with a bolo…The applicability of the
foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the present
where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a
result of formal custodial investigation. What was testified to is only what
appellant told the police why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural
for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his
act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the
surrenderee is already “under investigation”, within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the
circumstances of this case: “If however, he voluntarily admits the killing
and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing, the
constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and to
counsel may not be invoked.”
In any case, as previously pointed out, another witness, Juanita Busalla,

who is not a policeman, also testified to appellant telling her when he was
already in jail, that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her promise to kill
him by means of witchcraft, the same declaration he supposedly made to
Pat. Basilad, upon surrendering after the killing. The constitutional
safeguard invoked can have no application to Juanita’s testimony on what
appellant told her not in the course of a police investigation.
At any rate, even without the admission, the accident version of appellant
is inherently incredible. As already stated, that he was not allowed by
Ofremia’s daughter and husband to enter their house when he went there
direct from the old woman’s house is a strong proof that he did not exhibit
the harmless mood of a repentant killer as he should visibly appear to them
if the killing was only accidental. On the contrary, he must have appeared
so angry, displaying unmistakable intent to kill them, after killing their
mother, as the daughter Juanita Busalla, so testified.
Galman v. Pamaran - 138 SCRA 295 Assassination of Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr at Manila
International Airport (MIA); Agrava Board was given authority to
It is not the character of the suit involved investigate the killing of Ninoy. The Board conducted public hearings
but the nature of the proceedings that wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
controls. The privilege has consistently documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
been held to extend to all proceedings response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who
sanctioned by law and to all cases in appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the
which punishment is sought to be herein private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero
visited upon a witness, whether a party Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica,
or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
only property rights were involved, “the
right not to be compelled to be a witness The reports of the Agrava Board were sent to the TANODBAYAN, which
against himself” is secured in favor of conducted a preliminary investigation. Following the preliminary
the defendant, then with more reason it investigation, the TANODBAYAN filed Informations for Murder with the
cannot be denied to a person facing SANDIGANBAYAN for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino and Rolando
investigation before a Fact Finding Board Galman. The TANODBAYAN marked and thereafter offered as part of its
where his life and liberty, by reason of evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents before the
the statements to be given by him, hang Agrava Board.
on the balance.
Private respondents, through their respective counsel objected to the
In the light of the first portion of Section admission of said exhibits. The SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution,
5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered
contempt power of the Board to punish by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced
any refusal to testify or produce by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886.
evidence, We are not persuaded that
when they testified, they voluntarily The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the
waived their constitutional rights not to testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did not
be compelled to be a witness against invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.
themselves much less their right to
remain silent. The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term
“custodial” by having it inserted between the words “under” and
“investigation”, as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase “any person’
goes to prove THAT THEY DID NOT ADOPT IN TOTO THE ENTIRE
FABRIC OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE.
In the light of the examination reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to

conclude that they were called to the stand to determine their probable
involvement in the crime being investigated. The Supreme Court held that
due to the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt
power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, it
was not persuaded that when the private respondents testified, they
voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a
witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent.
In this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results—the
private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the
law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if
IMMUNITY had in fact been offered.
People v. Judge Ayson - 175 SCRA PAL Ticket Freight Clerk Company investigation.. The Supreme Court held
216 that THE RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 12 ARE NOT AVAILABLE
BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS BECOME INVOLVED.
Rights of person charged with offense, in The rights under Section 12 do not cover admissions made in an
the matter of his testifying or producing administrative investigation conducted by PAL officials.
evidence:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN A defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
COURT (or with the public prosecutor, custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had
for preliminary investigation), but after been, would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the
having been taken into custody or criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors’ office). Hence, with
otherwise deprived of his liberty in some respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the
significant way, and on being public prosecutor’s office), there is no occasion to speak of his rights while
interrogated by the police: the under “custodial interrogation” laid down by the second and subsequent
continuing right to remain silent and to sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious
counsel, and to be informed thereof, reason that he is no longer under “custodial interrogation.”
not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiates, the free will; and to have
evidence obtained in violation of these
rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN
COURT—a) to refuse to be a witness; b)

not to have any prejudice whatsoever
result to him by such refusal; c) to testify
in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution; d)
WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to an
answer a specific question which tends
to incriminate him for some crime other
than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
C. Police line -ups: paraffin test: signature

Police line-ups Identification; photographs
Arrested for vagrancy without a warrant; included  first, a series of photographs must be shown
in a police line-up the next day; identified as a and not merely that of the suspect; and
companion; right to counsel was not violated -  second, when a witness is shown a group of
Gamboa v. Judge Cruz pictures, their arrangement and display
should in no way suggest which one of the
Warrantless arrest after search of moving vehicle; pictures pertains to the suspect.
included in police line-up; identified; right to - People v. Musa
counsel was not violated - People v. Dimaano
Gamboa v. Judge Cruz - 162 SCRA In this case, petitioner had been arrested for vagrancy without a warrant.
642 The following day, he was included in a line-up of 5 detainees. He was
identified as a “companion” in a robbery and brought back to his cell.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at
Given the clear constitutional intent in least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
the 1973 and 1987 constitutions, to was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. An information was filed
extend to those under police against him for robbery. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to
investigation the right to counsel, this Evidence on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to,
occasion may be better than any to and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
remind police investigators that, while counsel and to due process. The lower court denied the motion.
the Court finds no real need to afford a
suspect the services of counsel during a The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.
police line-up, the moment there is a
move or even urge of said investigators The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when
to elicit admissions or confessions or the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
even plain information which may confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
appear innocent or innocuous at the stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid
time, from said suspect, he should then the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
and there be assisted by counsel, unless confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
he waives the right, but the waiver shall commission of an offense.
be made in writing and in the presence
of counsel. As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at
least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
People v. Dimaano - 209 SCRA 819 The defendants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and multiple frustrated homicide. They were
police line-up is not part of the custodial arrested by Pat. Mario Pablo, a member of the Anti-Narcotcis Unit of the
inquest, hence, the appellants were not QC Police Station, who testified that at the night in question, he had been
yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. given a tip by an informant that a robbery was about to be committed at
Amparo Village, and that the robbers would be using a Galant car, greenish
Alibi cannot overcome positive gray in color, with the exact plate number. The patrolmen stationed
identification. themselves at the village and saw the vehicle described pass by. They
cornered the car and ordered those inside to disembark from the vehicle.
Identification of suspects credible absent After being frisked, a hand grenade, two guns, and a fan knife were found.
proof of ulterior motive A radio cassette, a hair dryer, cassette tapes and a reading glass were

likewise found inside the said car.
In the instant case, when the appellants were identified by the

complainants at the police line-ups the former had not yet been held to
answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and
convicted. The police could not have, therefore, violated their right to
counsel as the confrontation between the State and them had not yet begun.
As held in the case of Gamboa v. Cruz (supra), police line-up is not part of
the custodial inquest, hence, the appellants were not yet entitled, at such
stage, to counsel.
People of the Philippines vs. Musa - Jeepney Robbery; Roberto Barredo and the appellants were charged with
G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009 the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The appellants assail
the reliability and integrity of their out-of-court identification by Nancy and
Out-of-court identification is conducted Ryan. They argue that when these witnesses went to the police station, their
by the police in various ways. It is done minds were ready to accept that the persons they would identify were the
thru show-ups where the suspect alone suspects in the June 11, 2001 robbery. THE OUT-OF-COURT
is brought face to face with the witness IDENTIFICATION WAS VALID.
for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to Nancy testified that she and Harold identified the six persons who held
the witness to identify the suspect. It is them up from among the many pictures shown to them in the hospital. She
also done thru line-ups where a witness added that she went to the Marikina Police Station on June 16, 2001 after
identifies the suspect from a group of the police informed her that arrests had been made in connection with the
persons lined up for the purpose. hold-up. It took her some time to go to the police station because Harold
would not allow her to leave his side. At the police station, she recognized
In resolving the admissibility of and her co-passengers who were then in a detention cell, and she identified
relying on out-of-court identification of them as the persons who had robbed them. Thereafter, she executed an
suspects, courts have adopted THE affidavit before PO3 Manuel Ragay (PO3 Ragay). She likewise testified that
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES she had given a description of the robbers to a police inspector prior to June
TEST where they consider the following 16, 2001.
factors, viz.:
(6) The witness’ opportunity to view If any identification should be critically examined at all, this should be
the criminal at the time of the Nancy’s in-court identification, as she was shown photographs and made a
crime; previous out-of-court photographic identification in the hospital.
(7) The witness’ degree of attention at
that time; In the present case, Nancy significantly testified that “other” pictures, aside
(8) The accuracy of any prior from the pictures of the five appellants and of Barredo, were shown to her
description given by the witness; and to Harold at the hospital. From these pictures, they were able to
(9) The level of certainty identify the six perpetrators of the crime, including Barredo. The records
demonstrated by the witness at the are bereft of any evidence showing that Nancy’s photographic
identification; identification was attended by an impermissible suggestion that singled out
(10) The length of time between the the appellants and Barredo as the robbers. More importantly, if there was
crime and the identification; and, one person among the perpetrators who would have caught her attention,
(11) The suggestiveness of the it would have been Barredo because he was the one who pointed a gun at
identification procedure. her and at Harold, who took their bag and watch, and who shot Harold.
Thus, we uphold the integrity and reliability of Nancy’s in-court
In People v. Pineda, we laid down the identification of the appellants.
proper procedure on photographic
identification: first, a series of We emphasize that in convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the
photographs must be shown and not RTC and CA did not rely on the identification made by Nancy and Ryan at
merely that of the suspect; and second, the police station; they relied on Nancy’s positive identification of the
when a witness is shown a group of appellants during trial as well as the corroborative testimony of Ryan.
pictures, their arrangement and display
should in no way suggest which one of
the pictures pertains to the suspect.
D. Right to counsel
 Being given an IBP lawyer; ‘preferably  Interrogation/extra-judicial confession without
of his own choice’ does not exclude counsel; later reduced into writing with counsel <-
other competent lawyers – Lumanog v. does not cure violation – People v. De Jesus
People  Counsel left as the interrogation began; constitution
requires effective and vigilant counsel – People v.
Lucero
 Police admitted that he began questioning the
accused before he was taken to the IBP office to
obtain counsel – Lumanog v. People
People v. De Jesus - 213 SCRA 345 In the course of their investigation of the stabbing of a tricycle driver, police
officers asked the De Jesus and Tupaz if they knew anything about the
The right to counsel attaches upon the incident. They answered in the affirmative. One of them surrendered a
start of an investigation, i.e., when the dagger and a knife. They were brought to the police headquarters and were
investigating officer starts to ask interrogated without the assistance of counsel. The next day, the
questions to elicit information or investigator fetched a lawyer from the Citizen’s Legal Aid Office and in the
confession or admission from the presence of the lawyer, the statements of De Jesus and Tupaz were reduced
accused. in writing. EJ Confession not ADMISSIBLE.
Custodial investigation is the stage In this instant case, the investigating officer Pfc. Rogelio Lorbes admitted
where the police investigation is no that the two accused, Tupaz and de Jesus were turned over to him for
longer a general inquiry into an investigation on September 9, 1987 by the CID, interviewed them and
unsolved crime but has began to focus solicited from them facts and information surrounding the robbery hold-up
on a particular suspect who had been with homicide without the assistance of a lawyer. The facts and
taken into custody by the police who information were later reduced to writing on September 10, 1987 in the
carry out a process of interrogation that presence of a CLAO lawyer, a certain Atty. Saldivar. Considering such
lends itself to elicit incriminating circumstances, there was an apparent violation of the accused right to
statements. It is when questions are counsel. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e.,
initiated by law enforcement officers when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or
after a person has been taken into confession or admission from the accused.
custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. Tupaz was acquitted because the evidence presented was merely based on
the EJ Confession invalidated.
People v. Lucero - 249 SCRA 425 Dr. Madrid was robbed while he was with his driver in his Mercedez Benz
along Road 14 in Quezon City. They took his wallet and jewelry, shot his
We hold that when the Constitution driver, and then fled. The driver died. Eventually, the police apprehended
requires the right to counsel, it did not Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. The trial court convicted Lucero,
mean any kind of counsel but effective based on extrajudicial confession. THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
and vigilant counsel. IS NOT VALID.
In custodial investigation, the right to The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of
counsel attaches from the moment the appellant, arrived at the CIS Office on the second night of appellant’s
investigation starts, i.e., when the detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m.
investigating officer starts to ask and talked with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted
questions to elicit information and he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that
confessions or admissions from the appellant understood him. Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the
accused custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he
had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not speak well of the
importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial
interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It was during his
absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure
his uncounselled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two
(2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta’s house. In the presence of these agents, Atty.
Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he
signed it voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the
execution of the confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied and the trial court
ruled that appellant’s right to counsel was not infringed.

The circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant
received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In this case, at the
crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left
appellant to attend the wake of a friend. At that critical stage, appellant
gave his uncounseled extra-judicial confession. Surely, such a confession
where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.
Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of For the killing of Col. Rolando Abadilla, Police arrested Joel, but only
the Philippines-, 7 September 2010 presented to Atty. Sansano (his supposed counsel) the day after his arrest
when he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession. His right to
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION refers competent and independent counsel “preferably of his own choice” was
to the critical pre-trial stage when the violated.
investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
begun to focus on a particular person as when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s appointment
a suspect. during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. The
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL has been accused who can’t afford the services of counsel, still has the final choice
written into our Constitution in order to whether to accept or reject the counsel provided.
prevent the use of duress and other
undue influence in extracting But purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation
confessions from a suspect in a crime. is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads
The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to appellant to make self-incriminating statements. An effective and vigilant
being that of a mere witness to the counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and
signing of a pre-prepared confession, able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the
even if it indicated compliance with the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
constitutional rights of the accused. The extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
accused is entitled to effective, vigilant confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation
and independent counsel. Where the fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
prosecution failed to discharge the confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
State’s burden of proving with clear and undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to
convincing evidence that the accused counsel and to be presumed innocent. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that
had enjoyed effective and vigilant Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions
counsel before he extrajudicially of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering
admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first
confession cannot be given any place, verified from them the date and time of Joel’s arrest and the
probative value.146 circumstances thereof, or any previous information elicited from him by the
investigators at the station, and if said counsel inspected Joel’s body for any
sign or mark of physical torture.
E. Right to be informed
People v. Pinlac - 165 SCRA 675 The defendant is the husband of a cook, who worked for Mr. Koji Sato, who
lived in San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila. Mr. Sato and Mr.
When the Constitution requires a person Osamu were neighbors in the village. Mr. Sato came home one day, with
under investigation “to be informed” of his front door already unlocked and once inside, he noticed that some of his
his right to remain silent and to counsel, things were missing. When he went to the police to report the robbery, he
it must be presumed to contemplate the discovered that his neighbor had been killed.
transmission of a meaningful
information rather than just the Mr. Osamu’s maid told the police that she had seen the defendant enter
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of Sato’s house but not leave it. Mr. Sato’s maid alleged that she had received
an abstract constitutional principle. As a a phone call from the defendant, telling her to go to the guardhouse to pick
rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient up a letter sent by his wife.
for a police officer just to repeat to the
person under investigation the The police armed with a warrant of arrest, arrested the defendant at his
provisions of the Constitution. He is not home.
only duty-bound to tell the person the
rights to which the latter is entitled; he The defendant alleges that before they brought him to the police station, he
must also explain their effects in was brought to the houses of Sato and Osamu and ordered to reenact how
practical terms, (See People vs. Ramos, the crime was committed according to the theory of the police. He also

122 SCRA 312;People vs. Caguioa, 95 alleges that he was tortured for seven hours, after which he succumbed to
SCRA 2). In other words, the right of a their wishes and signed a prepared confession, which he was not allowed
person under interrogation “to be to read, and the contents of which were not explained to him.
informed” implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s appeal.
investigator to explain, and contemplates
an effective communication that results The Court cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile, which reiterated the
in understanding what is conveyed. correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in
Short of this, there is a denial of the right, conducting a custodial investigation:
as it cannot truly be said that the person
has been “informed” of his rights. “At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, x x x. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means—by telephone if possible—or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence.”
Even the SOLGEN filed a manifestation and motion praying that the
judgment of conviction be reversed and the accused be acquitted.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
A. Right to bail or recognizance

Before conviction After conviction
GR: Matter of right The subsistence of a bail bond is not a legal obstacle to the
accused-appellant’s immediate incarceration after
XPN: Discretionary if: promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable
1. Offense punishable by RP; and by reclusion perpetua, even when an appeal is pending –
2. Evidence of guilt is strong People v. Nitcha
EXTRADITION
Those detained to be extradited may be

granted bail – Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Olalia
People v. Nitcha - 240 SCRA 283 (Defendant, upon seeing his brother, who had been in a fight with the
victim’s siblings, chased after the group and fired upon them twice, one of
the bullets hit the victim in the back of the head). The defendant was
convicted by the trial court for murder. He challenges the order of his
immediate incarceration after promulgation of the decision, considering
that he appealed such decision.

The Supreme Court held that the subsistence of a bail bond is not a legal
obstacle to the accused-appellant’s immediate incarceration after
promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion

perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not
have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong—which would
have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction—it would have
likewise ruled that the accused’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Bail must not then
Government of Hong Kong Special Pursuant to an international agreement between Hong Kong and the
Administrative Region, etc. Vs. Philippines, Hong Kong requested the provisional arrest of private
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. – 521 SCRA respondent. After the request went through proper channels, the NBI
470 agents arrested and detained him. Eventually, private respondent field a
petition for bail. The Judge denied the petition, on the ground that there is
The SC considered that the State’s power no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
to deprive an individual of his liberty is respondent is a flight risk. Upon MR, however, the judge reversed himself.
not necessarily limited to criminal The Government of Hong Kong filed a motion to vacate the order granting
proceedings. Respondents in private respondent bail.
administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have The Supreme Court referred to the trends in international law, which places
likewise been detained. a primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human
rights. The Supreme Court also cited the Universal Declaration of Human
The SC also considered that bail has been Rights, the principles of which are now recognizes as customarily binding
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in upon members of the international community.
detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
cognizance the obligation of the should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
Philippines under international the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
conventions to uphold human rights. there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
Extradition has thus been characterized person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee
as the right of a foreign power, created to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
by treaty, to demand the surrender of various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
one accused or convicted of a crime promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
within its territorial jurisdiction, and presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should
the correlative duty of the other state to see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
surrender him to the demanding state.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer
to the demanding state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention”
may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time
of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private
respondent had been detained for over 2 years without having been
convicted of any crime. While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required

in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
B. Waiver of the right

Bail as a matter of right When the offense is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
● Right is absolute.
Bail as a matter of discretion If the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

● Bail shall be denied, if the evidence of guilt is strong.
● But, once the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right.
● Therefore, bail may be a matter of right in cases of capital offenses if
the evidence of guilt is not great.
People vs. Judge Donato - 198 SCRA Private respondent and his co-accused, who had been charged with
130 rebellion, had entered into a compromise agreement with the government,
which involved the withdrawal of their petitions for habeas corpus, in
WAIVER is “a voluntary and intentional exchange, 2 of the co-accused would be released on their own recognizance,
relinquishment or abandonment of a while private respondent would remain in legal custody.
known existing legal right, advantage,
benefit, claim or privilege, which except When private respondent was charged with rebellion, he filed a petition for
for such waiver the party would have bail in the same case. The judge granted the petition. The People question
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or the grant, alleging that private respondent had waived his right to bail by
surrender, by a capable person, of a right way of the compromise agreement in the case involving the petition for
known by him to exist, with the intent habeas corpus.
that such right shall be surrendered and
such person forever deprived of its The Supreme Court held that private respondent had waived his right to
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an bail.
inference of the relinquishment of such The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.
right; or the intentional doing of an act It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not
inconsistent with claiming it.” be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
C. Excessive bail
De La Camara v. Enage - 41 SCRA 3 Charged with multiple frustrated murder and multiple murder, Mayor
(Villaseñor v. Abano) The guidelines in applied for bail which the judge fixed at the amount at P1, 195,200, the sum
the fixing of bail are as follows: of P840,000 for the information chagrining multiple murder and P355,200
2. Ability of the accused to give bail; for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Despite recommendation of
3. Nature of the offense; SOJ to lower bail to P40,000.00, Judge kept the bail at original amount fixed.
4. Penalty for the offense charged;
5. Character and reputation of the The Supreme Court held that because petitioner had escaped from the
accused; provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the order. The
6. Health of the accused; case was dismissed for being moot and academic. It did say, however, that
7. Character and strength of the under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the
evidence; amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
8. Probability of the accused appearing information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
in trial; frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the
9. Forfeiture of other bonds; Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the
10.Whether the accused was a fugitive two offenses.
from justice when arrested; and
11.If the accused is under bond for Where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to
appearance at trial in other cases." a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we
will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required
remedy.”
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
A. Military tribunals
Olaguer v. Military - 150 SCRA 144 A military tribunal has NO jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts
are open and functioning. Hence petition should be granted.
Due process of law demands that in all
criminal prosecutions (where the The petitioners are all civilians who were arrested by military authorities,
accused stands to lose either his life or and charged for subversion upon recommendation of respondent Judge
his liberty), the accused shall be entitled Advocate General and the approval of the Minister of National Defense.
to, among others, a triaI. The trial The Chief of Staff of the AFP created Military Commission No. 34 to try the
contemplated by the due process clause criminal case against the petitioners.
of the Constitution, in relation to the
Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial As long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly
process, not by executive or military functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of
process. Military commissions or martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
tribunals, by whatever name they are jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
called, are not courts within the properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a
Philippine judicial system. violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned.
The records show that the accused were not given a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence on their behalf. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try
the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction
when, as observed by the Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed, it is well-
settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of
jurisdiction.
B. Due process
Scoty's Department Store v. ULP Case. The CIR decided the case without necessarily requiring
Micaller - 99 Phil 762 defendants to see witnesses face to face, and merely on preponderance of
evidence, and not beyond reasonable doubt. It also imposed penalties of
The procedure laid down by law to be fine. THE FIRST IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION. BUT
observed by the Court of Industrial IMPOSING FINE IS NOT WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF CIR.
Relations in dealing with unfair labor
practice cases negates constitutional All this means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the
guarantees to the accused. And this is so witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on preponderance of
because, among other things, the law evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt. This is against the due
provides that "the rules of evidence process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be contended that this gap
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial Relations to observe
not be controlling and it is the spirit and strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the requirements of
intention of this Act that the Court (of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the law
Industrial Relations) and its members which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our
and Hearing Examiners shall use every Government.
and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and The Court did a comparative study of the jurisdiction of the CIR and of that
objectively and without regard to of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The power to impose the penalties
technicalities of law or procedure." provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary
courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the
definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2(a) of said Act. Hence,
the decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of PIOO
upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.
C. Presumption of innocence
Presumption re: customs officers - U.S. v. Luling
Presumption of malversation; re: municipal treasurer – People v. Mingoa
United States v. Luling - 34 Phil 725 In this case, the defendant was an employee of the customs service of the
Government of the Philippine Islands. He accepted a sum of P100 in
It has been frequently decided, in case of connection with the importation of opium. The law provides that should
statutory crimes, that no constitutional such material facts be proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
provision is violated by a statute that his acts are not illegal. The defendant questions the constitutionality
providing that proof by the state of some of a provision of law, which makes certain facts constitute prima facie
material fact or facts shall constitute evidence, putting the burden on the defendant to show or explain that such
prima facie evidence of guilt, and that facts or acts are not criminal. The defendant alleges that such provision
then the burden is shifted to the violates the right to a presumption of innocence.
defendant for the purpose of showing
that such act or acts are innocent and are The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain
committed without unlawful intention. well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with
any criminal intent or intention.
People v. Mingoa - 92 Phil 856 Petitioner, without presenting evidence to the contrary, was convicted of
Malversation, as municipal treasurer accountable to missing funds. The
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code presumption of criminal intent in losing the money under Art. 217 of the
creates a presumption of guilt once RPC does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
certain facts are proved. It makes the innocent until the contrary is proved.
failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming, upon proper demand, any There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
public funds or property with which he that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
is chargeable, prima facie evidence that presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and
he has put such missing funds or enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption
property to personal use. The of innocence.". Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from
presumption is reasonable and valid. the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection
between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie
presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence
to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity
laid down in the above citations.
D. Right to counsel
DUTY OF THE COURT (People v. Holgado)
Requisites:
(1) To inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
(2) After giving such information the court must ask if he desires the aid of an attorney;
(3) If he desires and is unable to employ one, the court must assign an attorney de oficio; +
(4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.
WAIVER OF COUNSEL
 And plea of guilty in consideration of promise of fiscal to recommend a fine is not binding on judge,
judge must render decision and imposed punishment based on law - People v. Simben
“COUNSEL” IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE BAR
 An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed
against her; danger of inadequate defense – Delgado v. Court of Appeals
People v. Holgado - 86 Phil 752 The Judge who only asked the defendant: “Do you have an attorney or are
you going to plead guilty?” with the defendant responding “I have no
Under the provision of section 3 of Rule 112 lawyer and I will plead guilty.” Violated the right to counsel of the
of the Rules of Court, when a defendant defendant.
appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The
(1) he must inform the defendant that it record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to
is his right to have attorney before have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial
being arraigned;
court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an
(2) after giving him such information
the court must ask him if he desires attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to assign an
the aid of an attorney; attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do
(3) if he desires and is unable to employ you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a
attorney, the court must assign question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney
attorney de oficio to defend him; before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it
and could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion f from the court
(1) (4) if the accused desires to procure that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair
an attorney of his own the court hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.
People v. Simben - 98 Phil 138 Sim Ben pleaded guilty of exhibiting cinematographic films of indecent or
immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open
to public view in the City of Cebu. Sim Ben appeals, alleging he pleaded
guilty only because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would be
imposed. He also alleges that he was not given his right to counsel.
When the case was called for trial, the appellant was informed by the Court
of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid of one. He
replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have
the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His
answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the
information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a
plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of
guilty the punishment as provided for by law would be imposed upon
him and he answered “Yes, sir.” The Court asked him if he insisted on his
plea of guilty and he answered “Yes, sir.” At this juncture the fiscal
recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant.
Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and 1 day of
prisión correccional and to pay the costs.
A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the
sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out to
the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.
Delgado v. Court of Appeals - 145 SC granted the petitioners request to be entitled to a new trial, being
SCRA 357 charged estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents, and
therefore, all the assailed orders of respondent courts should be vacated
. and set aside, because her “lawyer,” Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer,
and she was not represented by counsel.
An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a

criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she
is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense
presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
prerequisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process
E. Right to be informed
NOT INFORMED INFORMED
Information did not allege that defendant Information charged defendant with rebellion with murder
knew, before or at the time of the assault, that and frustrated murder. Although rebellion may not be
the victim was an agent of a person in complexed crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion
authority – People v. Regala such as murder and frustrated murder, the information is
sufficient to charge defendant with simple rebellion –
Information alleged that the two accused Enrile v. Salazar
killed the victim by stabbing him multiple
times. However, one of the accused was only
proved to have helped the other accused in
throwing the body into a well. It was
determined by the medical examiner that the
cause of death was drowning not stabbing.
Thus, the other accused was acquitted because
of the Information lacks allegation on this. –
People v. Ortega
People v. Regala - 113 SCRA 613 Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of
murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority in an
The subject information cannot be cured information. A witness testified that they stabbed a PC Seargent who was
or validated by the doctrine enunciated then guarding a gate. The PC Seargent would not let them enter as the gate
in People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. was designated as exit only.
29, 1967), because unlike in the latter
case, there are no allegations of facts The appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with
from which it can be implied that the assault upon an agent of a person in authority because the information filed
accused then knew that, before or at the against appellant did not allege the essential elements of assault that the
time of the assault, the victim was an accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was
agent of a person in authority. an agent of a person in authority
Moreover, the fact that the crime of The information in this case barely alleged that the accused “x x x with
assault was established by the evidence deliberate intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and
of the prosecution without any taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
objection on the part of the accused feloniously attack and stab with a knife (cuchillo) one Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., a
cannot likewise cure the aforestated member of the Philippine Constabulary while he was then in the
defect in the information so as to performance of his official duty thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
validly convict the accused thereof; stab wounds at the mid-epigastric region penetrating abdominal cavity and
because to do so would be convicting the perforating cardial and cardiac region which injury directly caused his
accused of a crime not properly alleged instantaneous death,” which is similar to the information in the aforesaid
in the body of the information in Rodil case—“appellant ‘attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the
violation of his constitutional right to be latter was in the performance of his official duties, x x x” in which We ruled
informed of the nature and cause of the that “[S]uch an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential
accusation against him. averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily
requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
for the graver offense x x.”
He was convicted of homicide only, aggravated by in contempt or with

insult to public authorities.
Enrile v. Salazar - 186 SCRA 217 An Information was filed, charging Senator Enrile with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed

during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
The Court held that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would
complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
People v. Ortega - 276 SCRA 166 The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of
The hornbook doctrine in our “attacking, assaulting, and stabbing repeatedly with a pointed weapon on
jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y
convicted of an offense, unless it is ABLOLA.” The prosecution’s evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing
clearly charged in the complaint or to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega.
information. Constitutionally, he has a His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime
right to be informed of the nature and and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay.
cause of the accusation against him. To
convict him of an offense other than that An accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what he
charged in the complaint or information thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a principal,
would be a violation of this not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was
constitutional right actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment
and burial. NONETHELESS, IN THE PRESENT CASE, Appellant Garcia
A person who commits a felony is liable cannot be held liable as a principal because the prosecution failed to
for the direct, natural and logical allege such death through drowning in the Information. Neither may
consequences of his wrongful act even said appellant be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship with
where the resulting crime is more the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law
serious than that intended. (exempting relations)
F. Right to speedy trial

Conde v. Rivera - 45 Phil 650 Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements
of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period
of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to
obtain his freedom.
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been

forced to respond to no less than five informations for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no
less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has
twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now,
after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first
information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.
G. Right to impartial trial

Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz - 50 SCRA 18 The Judge by refusing to inhibit to decide on the case were an extrajudicial
statement which the judge himself notarized, and which was repudiated by
Due process cannot be satisfied in the the executor upon presentation as evidence in court, violated right of the
absence of that degree of objectivity on accused to impartial trial.
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants of his being fair and being This clearly negates the objectivity required in the Constitution. The judge
just. Thereby there is the legitimate passed on a question that by implication has already been answered by
expectation that the decision arrived at him. He refuses to act on the motion to dismiss since he was inclined
would be the application of the law to towards the extra-judicial confessions earlier made by Reyes. His sense of
the facts as found by a judge who does fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. For respondent
not play favorites. Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously
given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be
avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to the
requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
not being met are more than justified.
H. Right to public trial
Garcia v. Domingo - 52 SCRA 143 The trial of policemen charged with slight physical injuries, maltreatment,
etc., held in the city court judge’s air-conditioned chambers complies with
PUBLIC TRIAL - when anyone the constitutional requirement of public trial.
interested in observing the manner a There is now showing that the public was excluded. It is to be admitted that
judge conducts the proceedings in his the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those
courtroom may do so, regardless of who could be present. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some
being stranger to litigants.. There is the are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
well-recognized exception though that public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
warrants the exclusion of the public no matter with what offense he may be charged." Then, too, reference may
where the evidence may be also be made to the undisputed fact that at least fourteen hearings had been
characterized as "offensive to decency held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of
or public morals." respondent policemen.
I. Compulsory process / confrontation

No right to send written interrogatories abroad, when vital information to be secured from the witness
abroad can still be secured thru other witnesses and official records – Fajardo v. Garcia
Decisions of a different case cannot be adopted as complete facts to another case; such violates right to
confront witnesses – People v. Miyake
A portion of direct-examination testimony which was not subjected to cross-examination was deemed
inadmissible as evidence– People v. Seneris
Fajardo v. Garcia - 98 SCRA 514 The constitutional guarantee to an accused to compulsory process to
secure the production of evidence in his behalf was not violated by the
trial judge who refused to grant the request of the accused for leave to
serve written interrogatories on the doctor who treated their injuries who
already left for abroad. That the said medical testimony on the injuries
they sustained was vital to their defense can still be adduced thru other
witnesses and hospital records. The fact that the petitioners were treated in
the hospital by a doctor in question could be testified to by other witnesses
including the nurses who must have been present. It cannot be assumed
that there would be an insuperable objection to the presentation of the
medical certificate as to the wounds alleged to have been inflicted, as they
could very well show traces of such maltreatment. Even the length of their
stay in the hospital could be verified by its records.
People v. Miyake - 279 SCRA 180 Makati court’s adoption of the facts embodied in the decision of the
Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed by the
The right of confrontation has two accused, as its own facts in the Makati Case is VIOLATIVE of the accused’s
purposes: first, to secure the right to confrontation.
opportunity of cross-examination; and,
second, to allow the judge to observe It does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the
the deportment and appearance of the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies
witness while testifying. of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and DOES NOT
INCLUDE UTILIZATION OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS OR
This right, however, is not absolute as it JUDGMENTS. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in
is recognized that it is sometimes evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a
impossible to recall or produce a witness crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime
who has already testified in a previous charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the
proceeding, in which event his previous commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay.
testimony is made admissible as a
distinct piece of evidence, by way of Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court
exception to the hearsay rule. The according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not
previous testimony is made admissible be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where
because it makes the administration of what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of
justice orderly and expeditious the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based.
People v. Seneris - 99 SCRA 92 The decision of the lower court judge to rule as inadmissible the testimony
of the witness who died before the defense’s cross-examination was
The constitutional right of confrontation, completed, is NOT VALID.
which guarantees to the accused the
right to cross-examine the witnesses for It was a fortuitous event that caused the non-completion of the cross-
the prosecution, is one of the most basic examination. It was neither the fault of the petitioner nor the private
rights of an accused But while the right respondent. Further, the questioned testimony of its deceased witness is
to confrontation and cross-examination admissible in evidence because private respondent’s counsel had already
is a fundamental right, WE have ruled rigorously and extensively cross-examined witness Mario Nemenio on all
that the same can be waived expressly essential elements of the crime charged (parricide), all of which have been
or impliedly by conduct amounting to a testified upon by said witness in his direct examination-in-chief, and
renunciation of the right of cross- consequently, the cross-examination-in-chief, has already been concluded.”
examination. The common basic
principles underlying the application of The cross-examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of
the rule on implied waiver is that the the crime charged—parricide, fact of killing—is concerned. What remained
party was given opportunity to confront was merely the cross-examination regarding the price or reward, which is
and cross-examine an opposing witness not an element of parricide, but only an aggravating circumstance (par. 11,
but failed to take advantage of it for Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). The SC excluded only the testimony of the
reasons attributable to himself alone. deceased concerning the aggravating circumstance of price of reward,
which was not covered by cross-examination.
J. Trial in absentia; right to be present

Carredo v. People - 183 SCRA 273 The order of the Trial court to arrest the petitioner and to confiscate his cash
bond, upon his failure to appear in court (to be properly identified by
An accused may invoke trial in absentia prosecution witness) despite executing express waiver of appearance in
or waived his right to be present during Court trial (malicious mischief) is VALID.
trial only if he makes an UNQUALIFIED
ADMISSION IN OPEN COURT AFTER PETITIONER ONLY ADMITTED THAT HE CAN BE IDENTIFIED BY
HIS ARRAIGNMENT THE HE IS THE THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES IN HIS ABSENCE. HE DID NOT
PERSON NAMED AS DEFENDANT IN ADMIT THAT HE IS THE VERY PERSON NAMED AS DEFENDANT
THE CASE ON TRIAL IN THE CASE ON TRIAL. HIS ADMISSION IS VAGUE AND FAR
FROM UNQUALIFIED.
Waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the
prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the
accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for
the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does
not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to
appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right but
not his duty or obligation to the court. He cannot be convicted unless he is
properly identified.
SECTION 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

Doctrines - Art. III - Sec. 4-15

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

Test Substantial Strict scrutiny; clear

The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation,

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech

GR: “Freedom of speech, of expression…”

The Supreme Court ruled Criticism, no matter how severe, on the

Justice Fernando, stated that the prohibition on the solicitation or

C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process

- Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers during plebiscite campaign period – Sanidad v.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 4 of 66

In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter

While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of

The prohibited acts were found to present no substantial danger to

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 5 of 66

What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity

Government regulation is sufficiently justified:

Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial

Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s

Clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio,

The guaranty to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and

If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to

The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to

The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and

D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 10 of 66

The protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is

Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the

If relying on second-hand sources of information is, as the Journalists’ Code

Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 11 of 66

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation

The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the

Within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the

Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and

An organization such as the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the

In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 15 of 66

F. Obscenity and indecency

F: Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign, the Mayor of Manila, assisted by

The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were many conflicting

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 16 of 66

G. Assembly and petition

MAYOR’S ACT WAS INVALID

What is required if the venue for an assembly is private in nature?

What is the process in applying for a permit for assembly?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 17 of 66

The Supreme Court held that although the Constitution vests in

Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government

Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time—recess, after classes,

This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it

In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abused his

The Supreme Court disagreed.

In its rationale, the Supreme Court discussed the principle of separation of

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 22 of 66

The Supreme Court disagreed.

The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any