ARTICLE 35
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of
 Teves v. People In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992.
During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married
Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with
Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy
was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime
charged.
Antone v. Beronilla.26 In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during
the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991.
On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage
which decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the
prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter
sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is,
therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale,
neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by
way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the
information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation
of evidence.
People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566 | July 17, 2013 | Peralta, J: A declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.38 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow
respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. 41 Respondent,
likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him,
because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the
complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In
addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches
to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability
the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription. 42
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, et. al. v. Ma. Lourdes Belen for and in behalf of
Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon G.R. No. 189121 | July 31, 2013 | Perez, J:
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 It must be pointed out that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in
effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. 1. Relevant to the
foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father.
The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of
either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. In the
instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
In Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to
file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein
respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit: Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. 24 It was emphasized in Niñal that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights,
such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage.
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, et. al. v. Ma. Lourdes Belen for and in behalf of
Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon G.R. No. 189121 | July 31, 2013 | Perez, J.:
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a
previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no
less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed
by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas,
Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said
marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years
ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently,
in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the
latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Renato Castillo v. Lea Castillo, April 18, 2016 | G.R. No. 189607 | Sereno, J.:
W/N Lea and Renato's marriage is void. No. The validity of a marriage and all its
incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages
was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code
was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case
using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages. Under the Civil Code, a
void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a
voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a
void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked,
while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage,
there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a
void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while
in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Renato Castillo v. Lea Castillo, April 18, 2016 | G.R. No. 189607 | Sereno, J.:
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza,  34 People v. Aragon,  35 and Odayat v. Amante,  36 that the
Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage.  In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages
in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the
first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of
the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until
annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus,
the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance,
hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
In Odayat (1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no
judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under
Article 80 of the Civil Code. It must be emphasized that the enactment of the
Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to
marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage
contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void. 39 
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of
this requirement: So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of
the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a
marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely
on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this
so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage
would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting
norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the
courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
However, as this Court clarified in  Ty v. Court of Appeals,  42 the requirement of a
judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of
the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified
that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which
embodied the then-prevailing rule: x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife
charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage.
The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into
marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the
promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of
private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this
case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is
valid. Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested
rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the
present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent
x x x.
Renato Castillo v. Lea Castillo, April 18, 2016 | G.R. No. 189607 | Sereno, J.:
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this
case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato
is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial
as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage
only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is
valid. In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason
to disturb its ruling.
ARTICLE 38
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory
Cause Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or
swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil
liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the
offended party. In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it
has been held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and
adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the
stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson; 18 by the stepmother
who commits theft against her stepson; 19 by the stepfather who steals something from
his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his grandfather; 21 by the accused who
swindles his sister-in-law living with him; 22 and by the son who steals a ring from his
mother.23 Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the
other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from
marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations. If marriage gives rise to one’s
relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the
extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship
by affinity?
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that
confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the
"dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the
American legal system, there are two views on the subject. The first view (the
terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view, the relationship by
affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its
duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it.
Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a
spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the
deceased spouse’s blood relatives. The first view admits of an exception. The
relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a
surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the
living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even
after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced
children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the
parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated
an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these
people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the
death of one of the married parties.30
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the
two views, we hold that the second view is more consistent with the language
and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code. First, the terminated
affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest.31 On
the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of
laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the
absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity
within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is
more appropriate. Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives
by affinity in the same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to
make no distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving
spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with
respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of
the family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it
is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. 33 Congress has also
affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the
family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family
harmony and obviate scandal.35The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more
in accord with family solidarity and harmony. Fourth, the fundamental principle
in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. 36 This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed
innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. 37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. 38 The rule
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute,
one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule
calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of
the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family
harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to
benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view. Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we
hold that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the
blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal
Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the
absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the
same Code.)
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code. The absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable. However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly
limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable
language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification. 39 The Information against
Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the
offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. 41 In other words, it is the
recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense,
that determines the crime being charged in the Information. 42 It is the exclusive
province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. 43 The
determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is
merely an opinion which is not binding on the court. 44 A reading of the facts alleged
in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but
with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime
that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents
(particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary
means to commit the estafa. Since the crime with which respondent was charged
was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally
liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No. However, a
proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal
liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332. The absolutory cause under Article
332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or
complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To
apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the
component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of
that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to
apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly
consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public
document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through
falsification of public document. Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the
State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical
right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a
private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply
when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and
presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010 |
Corona, J.: The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the
private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through
falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious
public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family
members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that
breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the
property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that,
to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from
the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would
disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction
between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of
crimes in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a
mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be
punished individually.
Gandionco v. Penaranda, G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987: In other words,
in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil
action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action
is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil
and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences
thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse,
among others. The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a
civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1,
Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107
simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." As earlier noted this action
for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the
conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the
contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code."2
Gandionco v. Penaranda, G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987: Petitioner also
argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the
action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal
separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.  Petitioner's assumption is
erroneous.  A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Gandionco v. Penaranda, G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987: Petitioner's
attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we
find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in
ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action
for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the
amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion
to modify or reduce the same. 7
Sabalones v. CA, G.R. No. 106169 | February 14, 1994: We agree with the
respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole
mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his
wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal. The law does indeed grant to
the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in
the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above
quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court
shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of
the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that
no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof).
That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued
in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus
protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the
suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the
act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final
judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.3
Sabalones v. CA, G.R. No. 106169 | February 14, 1994: The Court notes that the
wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now,
apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much
less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be
renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals. In her
motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that
the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park 
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom
on which they depend for their subsistence. The private respondent also complained
that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal
property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma
Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his
legitimate family. These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband,
show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent
and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. The twin
requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violation.5Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied
that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the
action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the
whole) of the conjugal estate.
Sabalones v. CA, G.R. No. 106169 | February 14, 1994: There is also, in our
view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the
petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture
of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow
him in the meantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the
injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of
the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code.
Macandangdang v. CA, G.R. No. L-38287 | October 23, 1981 : 2. Of the
aforesaid issues, the lower court resolved only the issue of legal separation and
reserved for supplemental decision the division of the conjugal properties. WE do
not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not become
final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution
and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute community of
property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Article 106 of
the Civil Code thus reads:  Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:  Xxx 2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned
by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;  xxx xxx xxx The
aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property
regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such
dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This
legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as
an inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation—for the purpose
of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.  property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided
Macandangdang v. CA, G.R. No. L-38287 | October 23, 1981: In resolving the
question of whether or not the judgment directing an accounting in an action for
recovery of properties is final and appealable, this Court further explained:  The Court,
however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now declare as is clearly indicated from
the compelling reasons and considerations herein-above stated:— that the court considers the better rule to
be that stated in H.E. Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co. (53 Phil. 481 [19291, to wit, that where the
primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who between plaintiff and defendant is the true
owner  and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, "the judgment ... rendered by the lower
court [is] a judgment on the merits as to those questions, and (that) the order of the court for
an accounting was based upon and is incidental to the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the
judgment ... (is) a final judgment ... ; that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the
judgment; that an appeal lies  from the rendition of the judgment as rendered ...
Macandangdang v. CA, G.R. No. L-38287 | October 23, 1981: Considering the
aforestated well-established jurisprudence on the matter, the clear mandate of Article
106 of the Civil Code and the aforequoted ruling in the Miranda case, the decision of
the trial court dated January 4, 1973 decreeing the legal separation between then
spouses Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had long
become final and executory and the division of the conjugal property in a
"supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation. 
Macandangdang v. CA, G.R. No. L-38287 | October 23, 1981: Since We have
ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing the spouses' legal separation as of
January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final disposition of
their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by reason of the final decree,
had been automatically dissolved. The law (Articles 106, 107 and 176 of the Civil
Code) clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the
conjugal property. The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was
declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal
property is effected, poses a new problem which can be resolved simply by the
application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the
deceased petitioner.  Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of gains under the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be
applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation became final.
Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects
of the final decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take
over in the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to
petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly pertain to the lower court. 
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the
liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134. 
Alfonso Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, G.R. No. L-23482 | August 30, 1968: We
hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the
said agreement are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses
and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. The law allows separation of
judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides: [Art.
134? FC] In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their
separation of property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not
appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements.  It is
likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years
- the wife's residence being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in
Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between
them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest.  wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are
Alfonso Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, G.R. No. L-23482 | August 30, 1968 :
However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this Court does not thereby accord
recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses, which again in
the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, supra — is a "state which is abnormal
and fraught with grave danger to all concerned." We would like to douse the
momentary seething emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic
tranquility — brought about by "mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners,
rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion" without more — would be minded to separate from each other. In
this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109, new Civil
Code). There is, therefore, virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married
couples — impelled by no better cause than their whims and caprices — to abandon
each other's company. ... For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the
obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals, yet it must be
carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn
to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good
husbands and good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful
master in teaching the duties which it imposes ..." (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint,
466, 467.) (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, Id., pp. 58-59).  against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: In examining the legal
questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's
cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband
to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly
expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this
obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of
a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it
had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode
and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make
provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and
he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily
incurred in enforcing such obligation, (Mercado vs.Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.)
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that
the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de
facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave
danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should
not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that
the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation
necessary from the fault of the husband. 
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the
eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the support of the
imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the only ground on which
such a proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in
Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294).
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: In the State of South
Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the
Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate
maintenance, where it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her
husband; but the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for
separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-
treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper conduct.
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: That the duty of cohabitation
is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is
cruelty? . . . What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not
accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners,
rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if
they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the
marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty
one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an
injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be
done, both must suffer in silence. . . . Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is
justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views merely to the
happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions. Every body
must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with
any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow
me to indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married
persons shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. To
vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be
difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true
wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular
cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with
great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the
married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, except
for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which
they know cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining
husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this
case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more
general good. (Evans vs.Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.) 
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: The same
considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively
prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right
to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral
and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him.
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: The only question
which here arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be properly
conceded to him by judicial decree. The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the
restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint
that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of
law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in unqualified terms, the
defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should refuse to
obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for the first
time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.  the family of which he is the head. When the wife's mission was circumscribed to the
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: Upon examination of
the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts
of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of
the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But
we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process
of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal
rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We
are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to
the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital
domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented
herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.  plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what
Arroyo v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-17014 | August 11, 1921: In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme
court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid  requiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the
property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does
not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.  neither of the spouses may be compelled to render (Arroyo vs. Vazquez de
In the case of Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 255, 256), this court,
interpreting the provisions of the Civil Marriage Law of 1870, in force in these
Islands with reference to the mutual rights and obligations of the spouses, contained
in articles 44-48 thereof, said as follows: The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil
Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to,
assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and
live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country. . . .
Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-39587 | March 24, 1934: The
plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what
is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services,
society and conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had
received from the accident now under consideration. Therefore, under the law and
the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's
assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the
performance of household duties, including the care and education of the children
and attention to the husband upon whom primarily devolves the duty of supporting
home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of the marriage alone, that she
performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the
husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance. However,
nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful to society and to the nation,
are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become man's equal in all the
activities of life, commercial and industrial, professional and political, many of them
spending their time outside the home, engaged in their businesses, industry,
profession and within a short time, in politics, and entrusting the care of their home
to a housekeeper, and their children, if not to a nursemaid, to public or private
institutions which take charge of young children while their mothers are at work,
marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with the duties
to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to
collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services
must prove such services.
Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-39587 | March 24, 1934: The
is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services,
society and conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had
received from the accident now under consideration. In the case under consideration,
apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as translator and secretary, the
value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented
any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature,
rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in
estimating their value. Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance
and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which
Arroyo, 42 Phil., 54), it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss
of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so
before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them
had he not been prevented from so doing. In view of the foregoing considerations
this court is of the opinion and so holds: (4) that in order that a husband may recover
damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness from an accident,
it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance and his wife's
willingness to continue rendering it had she not been prevented from so doing by her
illness.
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012: The sole issue
presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal
properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case. To determine whether the
obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the
properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses’ property
relations. Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the
personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can
be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article
256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert
into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains
that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. The
Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be
modified except prior to marriage. Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions
of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains
that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to
1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012: Post-marriage
modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of
legal separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed
to revive their former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been
had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to
comply with his obligations to the family;20 (d) there was judicial separation of
property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the
voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate
property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. This means
that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership
over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the
marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into
absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect
would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’ loose admission that absolute
community of property governed their property relation since the record shows that
they had been insistent that their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of
gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between them has been presented.
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012: What is clear
is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative
law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they
were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of
the Civil Code thus provides: Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing
conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of
gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code states: "x x x x The
provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships
of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256."23  Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding
whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer
for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122
provides: Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the
decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their
conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered.25 Those responsibilities are as follows: Art. 121 Contrary
to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are
liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have
been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not
altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."
Nobelza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038 | March 11, 2015: A buyer cannot claim to
be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while
ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale. An analogous
situation obtains in the case at bar. The TCT of the subject property states that its
sole owner is the seller Rogelio himself who was therein also described as "single".
However, as in the cases of Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are circumstances
critical to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the ruling of both the appellate
and lower courts that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. First, petitioner's
sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirley's
house - the subject property - in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City. Had
petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if Rogelio
had the capacity to dispose of the subject property. Had petitioner been more
vigilant, she could have inquired with such facility - considering that her sister lived
in the same Ladislao Diwa Village where the property is located - if there was any
person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the subject property. To be
sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa
Village - including petitioner's sister - not to engage in any deal with Rogelio relative
to the purchase of the subject property because of the cases she had filed against
Rogelio. 30
Nobelza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038 | March 11, 2015: As to the second issue, we
rule that the appellate court did not err when it modified the decision of the trial court
and declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in its
entirety. The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the subject
property is Rogelio alone, respondent was able to prove at the trial court that she
contributed in the payment of the purchase price of the subject property.
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of
respondent's financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual
contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community
property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property. Article 91 of
the Family Code thus provides: Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. The only exceptions from the
above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code;
and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement. Under the first exception are
properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:… Since the
subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92,
it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and
Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before
their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the
TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own
and without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property
via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 - or during the subsistence of
a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal
property is void, viz.: It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family
Code that Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the written
consent of respondent or the authority of the court. Without such consent or
authority, the entire sale is void. As correctly explained by the appellate court: The
subject property forms part of Rogelio and Shirley's absolute community of property. Thus, the trial court
erred in declaring the deed of sale null and void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the
one-half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-appellee Shirley. In absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property, such sale is void. The consent of both
the husband Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio who
contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the Deed of Absolute Sale x x x entered into
by and between defendant-appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29 December 1992, during the
subsisting marriage between plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was without the written consent of
Shirley, the said Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in declaring the
said Deed of Absolute Sale as void only insofar as the 1/2 portion pertaining to the share of Shirley is
concerned.[36]
Nobelza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038 | March 11, 2015: Finally, consistent with
our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with petitioner and
acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the contract under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the
reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under
Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall only be
"liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x." As
correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that the
amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.[37]
Sunga-Chan v. Chua G.R. No. 164401 | June 25, 2008: Third Issue:
Community Property Liable. Primarily anchored as the last issue is the erroneous
theory of divisibility of petitioners’ obligation and their joint liability therefor. The
Court needs to dwell on it lengthily. Given the solidary liability of petitioners to
satisfy the judgment award, respondent sheriff cannot really be faulted for levying
upon and then selling at public auction the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to
answer for the whole obligation of petitioners. The fact that the levied parcel of
land is a conjugal or community property, as the case may be, of spouses
Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent
sale of the property. Verily, said property is not among those exempted from
execution under Section 13,37 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. And it cannot be
overemphasized that the TRO issued by the Court on May 31, 2005 came after the
auction sale in question. 
Sunga-Chan v. Chua G.R. No. 164401 | June 25, 2008: Parenthetically, the
records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4,
1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal, their
absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by
either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: Art. 94. The
absolute community of property shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or
by one spouse with the consent of the other. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. (Emphasis
ours.) Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner
Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on
May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her
husband’s benefit. It may be stressed at this juncture that Chua’s legitimate claim
against petitioners, as readjusted in this disposition, amounts to only PhP
5,529,392.52, whereas Sunga-Chan’s auctioned property which Chua acquired, as
the highest bidder, fetched a price of PhP 8 million. In net effect, Chua owes
petitioner Sunga-Chan the amount of PhP 2,470,607.48, representing the excess of
the purchase price over his legitimate claims. Therefore, subject to the payment by
Chua of PhP 2,470,607.48 to petitioner Sunga-Chan, we affirm the RTC’s April 11,
2005 resolution, confirming the sheriff’s final deed of sale of the levied property,
ordering the Registry of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 208782, and issuing a
writ of possession in favor of Chua.  the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute
Spouses Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572 | June 18,
2012: W/N Joena owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and
lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of
the absolute community of property. No. Furthermore, it appears from the records
that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13
October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985),
Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12
April 1990). After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got
married on 28 May 1998.31 In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her
stepchildren; that the levied personal properties – in particular, a piano with a chair,
computer equipment and a computer table – were owned by the latter. We note that
two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit.
As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent
any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s
children, her claim cannot be sustained. Petitioner Joena also asserted that the
two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot
covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime.
However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community
property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second
marriage.
David Noveras v. Leticia Noveras (CELAJE), G.R. No. 188289 | August 20,
2014 | Perez, J. | Separation of Property: Absent a valid recognition of the divorce
decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial
court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. As a general rule, any
modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is
judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128,
135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18 Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition
for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family
Code, to wit: The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment
in this case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of
Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated: Moreover, abandonment,
under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to
have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give
any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in
Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the
relations between them worsened. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a
judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because,
community of properties.
David Noveras v. Leticia Noveras (CELAJE), G.R. No. 188289 | August 20,
2014 | Perez, J. | Separation of Property: The records of this case are replete with
evidence that Respondent Leticia and Petitioner David had indeed separated for more
than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living
separately since 2003 when Petitioner David decided to go back to the Philippines to
set up his own business. Second, Respondent Leticia heard from her friends that
Petitioner David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where
Petitioner David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita
listed as the wife of Petitioner David in the Consent for Operation form.20Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005. Having established that Respondent Leticia and Petitioner David
had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
David Noveras v. Leticia Noveras (CELAJE), G.R. No. 188289 | August 20,
2014 | Perez, J. | Separation of Property: The grant of the judicial separation of the
absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute community
regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 99.
The absolute community terminates: (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied). Under Article 102 of the same Code,
liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the
procedure under Art. 102 should apply. We agree with the appellate court that the
Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of
Petitioner David and Respondent Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties.
Franciso Muñoz, Jr. v. Erlinda Ramirez & Eliseo Carlos, (G.R. No.
156125, 25 August 2010): First Issue: Paraphernal or Conjugal? As a general
rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. 34 In the present case, clear
evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.35 Pursuant to
Articles 9236 and 10937 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by
either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property
and be the exclusive property of each spouse. 38 The residential lot, therefore, is
Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property. The CA, however, held that the residential
lot became conjugal when the house was built thereon through conjugal funds,
applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-
Canullas.39 Under the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that
originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of
improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership. We applied this provision in
Calimlim-Canullas,40 where we held that when the conjugal house is constructed on
land belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but
the husband is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership. The CA misapplied Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. We cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced
reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. As the respondents
were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal
partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property
relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the
Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have
been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article
105 of the Family Code states: x x x x The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership
of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Thus, in determining the nature of the subject
property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code,
except with respect to rights then already vested.
Franciso Muñoz, Jr. v. Erlinda Ramirez & Eliseo Carlos, (G.R. No.
156125, 25 August 2010): Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article
158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense
of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this
provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are
more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In the
present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through
monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 42 to April 30, 1992,43 Eliseo paid
about ₱60,755.76,44 not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest,
since the petitioner advanced the ₱176,445.2745 paid by Erlinda to cancel the
mortgage in 1992. Considering the ₱136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it
is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably
more than the ₱60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at
the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the
transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special
power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial. Nonetheless, the RTC
and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the contract between the
parties.
Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corp., Wilfrido Martinez, Miguel Lacson
and Ricardo Lopa, (G.R. No. 143382, 23 February 2004): May the conjugal
partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party? Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8 the conjugal
partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted
by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against
the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract
entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the
said provision? Where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family
business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.11 On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the
transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.12 It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof
must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. 13 In
the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a
third party.14 In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly
for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation
pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the
solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. 15 The underlying concern of the law
is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. 16 Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia9 that, in acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,10 we ruled
that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct
recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership."
Estrella Dela Cruz v. Severino Dela Cruz, (G.R. No. L-19565, 30 January
1968):
FACTS:
1. The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with the
CFI of Negros Occidental, alleging in essence that her husband, the
defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as well was
mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and praying for (1)
separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency
of the action, and (3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
2. The court a quo forthwith issued an order allowing the plaintiff the amount prayed for as
alimony pendente lite, which however, upon defendant's motion, was reduced to P2,000.
3. On June 1, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the
conjugal assets, and directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as
attorney's fees. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the case to us, "it appearing that the total value of the conjugal assets is over
P500,000".
4. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February
1, 1938. Six children were born to them, namely, Zenia (1939), Ronnie
(1942), Victoria (1944), Jessie 1945), Bella (1946), and Felipe (1948).
During their coverture they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod
Cadastre, all assessed at P45,429, and three parcels of the Silay Cadastre, all
assessed at P43,580. All these parcels are registered in their names.
The hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a net profit of P3,390.49.
5. They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets valued
as of December 31, 1956 at P496,006.92, from which they obtained for that
year a net profit of P75,655.78. The net gain of the Philippine Texboard
Factory, the principal business of the spouses, was P90,454.48 for the year
1957.
6. As of December 31, 1959, the total assets of the various enterprises of the
conjugal partnership were valued at P1,021,407.68, not including those of
the Top Service Inc., of which firm the defendant has been the president
since its organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up capital of P50,000,
P10,000 of which was contributed by him. This corporation towns he
Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, the Golden Acres Subdivision
and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Piñas, Rizal, and a lot and building
located at M. H. del Pilar, Manila purchased for P285,000, an amount
borrowed from the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company.
7. The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to secure which
they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory, the Silay hacienda, their
conjugal house, and all their parcels of land located in Bacolod City.
8. The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine errors the
defendant imputes to the court a quo, namely,  15. The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and children,
a. 4. In finding that the defendant has abandoned the plaintiff; 
b. 5. In finding that the defendant since 1956 has not discussed with his wife the
business activities of the partnership, and that this silence constituted "abuse of
administration of the conjugal partnerships"; 
c. 6. In declaring that the defendant mortgaged the conjugal assets without the
knowledge of the plaintiff and thru false pretences to which the latter was prey; 
d. 8. In ordering separation of the conjugal partnership properties; and 
9. The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendant started
living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City,
sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan,
instead of in the conjugal home at 2nd Street, Bacolod City.
10. Since 1955 the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although in
the said year he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief
conversations. After 1955 up to the time of the trial, the defendant had
never visited the conjugal abode, and when he was in Bacolod, she was
denied communication with him.
11. He has abandoned her and their children, to live in Manila with his
concubine, Nenita Hernandez. In 1949 she began to suspect the existence of
illicit relations between her husband and Nenita. This suspicion was
confirmed in 1951 when she found an unsigned note in a pocket of one of
her husband's polo shirt which was written by Nenita and in which she
asked "Bering" to meet her near the church. She confronted her husband
who forthwith tore the note even as he admitted his amorous liaison with
Nenita. He then allayed her fears by vowing to forsake his mistress.
12. Subsequently, in November 1951, she found in the iron safe of her husband
a letter, exh. C, also written by Nenita. In this letter the sender (who signed
as "D") apologized for her conduct, and expressed the hope that the
addressee ("Darling") could join her in Baguio as she was alone in the Patria
Inn and lonely in "a place for honeymooners". Immediately after her
husband departed for Manila the following morning, the plaintiff enplaned
for Baguio, where she learned that Nenita had actually stayed at the Patria
Inn, but had already left for Manila before her arrival.
13. Later she met her husband in the house of a relative in Manila from whence
they proceeded to the Avenue Hotel where she again confronted him about
Nenita. He denied having further relations with this woman.
14. Celia Bañez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was employed as a
cook in the home of the spouses from May 15, 1955 to August 15, 1958,
and that during the entire period of her employment she saw the defendant
in the place only once. This declaration is contradicted, however, by the
plaintiff herself who testified that in 1955 the defendant "used to have a
short visit there," which statement implies more than one visit.
but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the action, he started
to live separately from his wife. When he transferred his living quarters to
his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his intention was not, as it never
 has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her a lesson as
she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to
live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not
concentrate on his work as she always quarreled with him, while in
Mandalagan he could pass the nights in peace.
16. Since 1953 he stayed in Manila for some duration of time to manage their
expanding business and look for market outlets for their texboard products.
Even the plaintiff admitted in both her original and amended complaints that
"sometime in 1953, because of the expanding business of the herein parties,
the defendant established an office in the City of Manila, wherein some of
the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured or produced in the
business enterprises of the parties were sold or disposed of".
17. From the time he started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of
the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his
laundry. This latter declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff.
18. The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and
family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give
them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission in her
original and amended complaints as well as in open court that during the
entire period of their estrangement, he was giving her around P500 a month
for support.
19. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from
his office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He financed the
education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the
time of the trial and were not living with the plaintiff. While in Bacolod
City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the children. His wife
was always in bad need of money because she played mahjong, an
accusation which she did not traverse, explaining that she
played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the infidelities of her
husband.
20. Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard Factory,
corroborated the testimony of the defendant on the matter of the support the
latter gave to his family, by declaring in court that since the start of his
employment in 1950 as assistant general manager, the plaintiff has been
drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly, which amount was
given personally by the defendant or, in his absence, by the witness himself.
21. The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila. He came
to know Nenita Hernandez when she was barely 12 years old, but had lost
track of her thereafter. His constant presence in Manila was required by the
pressing demands of an expanding business. He denied having destroyed
the alleged note which the plaintiff claimed to have come from Nenita, nor
having seen, previous to the trial, the letter exh. C. The allegation of his
wife that he had a concubine is based on mere suspicion. He had always
been faithful to his wife, and not for a single instance had he been caught or
surprised by her with another woman.
22. On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, the plaintiff declared that
the defendant refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their
various business concerns. Although she did not allege, much less prove,
that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred
nevertheless that her husband might squander and dispose of the conjugal
assets in favor of his concubine. Hence, the urgency of separation of
property.
23. The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is that he has
applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his time, to the
management, maintenance and expansion of their business concerns, even
as his wife threw money away at the mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his
endeavors is that from a single cargo truck which he himself drove at the
time of their marriage, he had built up one business after another, the
Speedway Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod
Press, the Philippine Texboard Factory, and miscellaneous other business
enterprises worth over a million pesos; that all that the spouses now own
have been acquired through his diligence, intelligence and industry; that he
has steadily expanded the income and assets of said business enterprises
from year to year, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, as proved
by his balance sheet and profit and loss statements for the year 1958 and
1959 (exhibits 1 and 2); and that out of the income of their enterprises he
had purchased additional equipment and machineries and has partially paid
their indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank and the Development
Bank of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. (1) Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal
partnership properties? (2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to
inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of
his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a
division of the matrimonial assets? 
RATIO:
1. It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The
evidence presented by her to prove concubinage on the part of the
defendant, while pertinent and material in the determination of the merits of
a petition for legal separation, must in this case be regarded merely as an
attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had abandoned her, which
abandonment, if it constitutes abandonment in law, would justify separation
of the conjugal assets under the applicable provisions of article 178 of the
new Civil Code which read: "The separation in fact between husband and
 wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership,
except that . . . if the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for
at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of
property".
2. In addition to abandonment as a ground, the plaintiff also invokes article
167 of the new Civil Code in support of her prayer for division of the
matrimonial assets. This article provides that "In case of abuse of powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the
courts, on the petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or
administration by the wife, or separation of property". It behooves us,
therefore, to inquire, in the case at bar, whether there has been
abandonment, in the legal sense, by the defendant of the plaintiff, and/or
whether the defendant has abused his powers of administration of the
conjugal partnership property, so as to justify the plaintiff's plea for
separation of property.
3. We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our considered
view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of
such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as to
warrant division of the conjugal assets.
4. The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has been abandoned
by the husband for at least one year are the same as those granted to her by article 167 in case
of abuse of the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these
remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. 1 The
abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion.
5. Although an all-embracing definition of the term "abandonment " is yet to be spelled out in
explicit words, we nevertheless can determine its meaning from the context of the Law as well
as from its ordinary usage. The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be established in
relation to the alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the
husband, namely, receivership, administration by her, or separation of property, all of which
are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by
the husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and
steady source of support.
6. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the
husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.
7. The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce
utterly. 2 The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a bar". The emphasis
is on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or
claim one's rights or interests. 3 When referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word
has been defined as "the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to
forsake her entirely, never to return to her, and never to resume his marital duties towards her,
or to claim his marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the common
necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but for the charity of others."  4 The word
"abandonment", when referring to the act of one consort of leaving the other, is "the act of the
husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort wilfully, and with an intention of causing per
perpetual separation." 5 Giving to the word "abandoned", as used in article 178, the meaning
drawn from the definitions above reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations
and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
8. Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife
and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to
his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the
complainant, although she minimized the amount of support given, saying that it was only
P500 monthly.
9. There is good reason to believe, however, that she and the children received more than this
amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children continued to draw from his office
more than P500 monthly was substantially corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose
declarations were not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that the
plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit
reluctantly, that she frequently played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money;
to spare.
10. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any
intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
11. In People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after leaving his wife, continued to
make small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child, he was not
guilty of their "abandonment", which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be
perpetual, since contributing to their support negatived such intent.
12. In re Hoss' Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family where the
evidence disclosed that he almost always did give his wife part of his earnings during the
period of their separation and that he gradually paid some old rental and grocery bills.
13. With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a concubine, we
believe, contrary to the findings of the court a quo, that the evidence on
record fails to preponderate in favor of the plaintiff's thesis. The proof that
Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the defendant and that they were
living as husband and wife in Manila, is altogether too indefinite. Aside
from the uncorroborated statement of the plaintiff that she knew that Nenita
Hernandez was her husband's concubine, without demonstrating by credible
evidence the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and the defendant,
the only evidence on record offered to link the defendant to his alleged
mistress is exh. C. The plaintiff however failed to connect authorship of the
said letter with Nenita, on the face whereof the sender merely signed as "D"
and the addressee was one unidentified "Darling". The plaintiff's testimony
on cross-examination, hereunder quoted, underscores such failure:
a. Q. You personally never received any letter from Nenita?  A. No.
b. Q. Neither have you received on any time until today from 1949 from Nenita?  A.
No.
c. Q. Neither have you written to her any letter yourself until now?  A. Why should I
write a letter to her.
d. Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very well or not but, my question is this:
In view of the fact that you have never received a letter from Nenita, you have not
sent any letter to her, you are not familiar with her handwriting?  A. Yes.
e. Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?  A. Yes.
14. Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the conjugal
 partnership property, the record presents a different picture. There is
absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal
assets.
15. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal, the
conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a
million pesos.
16. The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the
husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of
the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of administration.
For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts
prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to
the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent
administration.
17. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or
omissions prejudicial to the latter. 7  may be happily resolved, and conjugal harmony may return and, on the
18. If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more),
engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband
continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal,
industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and
religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar,
we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of
property.
19. This decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his
wife; however, the remedies granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are
not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to
protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want.
Therefore, a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the
husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of
action.
20. Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in
ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic policy of the
law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of
the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
21. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in
harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help
expected of the spouses, the Civil Code (both old and new) requires that
separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in
marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial
decree during the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code,
Article 1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it may only be ordered
by the court for causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. 8  obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio
22. Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets where
there has been no real abandonment, the separation not being wanton and
absolute, may altogether slam shut the door for possible reconciliation. The
estranged spouses may drift irreversibly further apart; the already broken
family solidarity may be irretrievably shattered; and any flickering hope for
a new life together may be completely and finally extinguished.
23. The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed to the wife in 1958, long before the
devaluation of the Philippine peso in 1962, should be increased to P3,000. On the matter of attorney's fees, it
is our view that because the defendant, by leaving the conjugal abode, has given cause for the plaintiff to
seek redress in the courts, and ask for adequate support, an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff must be
made. Ample authority for such award is found in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article 2208 of the new Civil Code
which empower courts to grant counsel's fees "in actions for legal support" and in cases "where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be recovered." However, an award of P10,000, in
our opinion, is, under the environmental circumstances, sufficient. 
24. This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the plaintiff and the
defendant that the law enjoins husband and wife to live together, and,
secondly, exhort them to avail of — mutually, earnestly and steadfastly —
all opportunities for reconciliation to the end that their marital differences
basis of mutual respect and understanding, endure.
25. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees separation of
the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our
observations, however, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the
concept of support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have
rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the meantime, be
reduced or increased in the discretion of the court a quo as circumstances
warrant.
1.) Purita Alipio v. CA & Romeo Jaring represented by Ramon
Jaring
G.R. No. 134100, 29 September 2000)
FACTS:
1. Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the
fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The
stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00, payable in two installments of
₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on
June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
2. The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the RTC,
 Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the
rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the
balance.
3. Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.2 She based
her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided
that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and
the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it
shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, §20 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
a. When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which
the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided
in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
4. The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party
to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the
Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the
case.3 The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in
default.
5. On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the
Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's
fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
6. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to dismiss. In its decision 4 rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed
her appeal. It held:
a. The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be
dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court,
does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the action should be
maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the SC held:
i. Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a
cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was,
however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of
money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not
survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
ii. x x x           x x x          x x x However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the
only defendant, Manuel Co was also named defendant in the complaint.
Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it
dismissed the case against Co.
b. Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the
action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally
extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
i. We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may
bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum.
Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in
case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her
husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to
hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband
should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili,
90 Phil. 97).5 
7. MR denied hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt
which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim
must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We
reverse.
RATIO:
1. The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum
of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
2. First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months
before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on
October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21
which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the
defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure
to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding
for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner
especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of
a deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether private respondent
can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner.
3. Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed
the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is
one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art.
161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for—
a. All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership. 8 
4. When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved9 and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which
states:
 a. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either.
5. As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property.
6. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement
of estate proceedings.11 Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de
facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.12  and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
7. The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura
v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended
complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted
by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to
dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the
ground that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership
and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership,
should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial
court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of
Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was also a party to the
obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from
filing an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed,
holding that—
a. as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death
of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for
the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any
judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a
claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
b. In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there
is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the
conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be said to have no
remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court
for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the
deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for
administration or request that administration be granted to some other person.14  or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the
8. The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are
based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy
and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus,
apart from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it
was one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely
resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining
defendant Manuel Co.
9. With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally
executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection
suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the
Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving
spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the
enforcement of the entire obligation.
10. It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which
is primarily bound for its repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for
the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary
to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be
discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still
inapplicable to this case.
11. From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against
the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's
husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the
issuance of letters of administration 18 or for the allowance of
will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside
from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively
pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's
estate and not to any other court.
12. Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent
the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of ₱50,600.00 without specifying whether
the amount is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the
Civil Code provides:
a. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the
same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand,
prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
estates, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
13. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not
appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal
shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.20 
 14. Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are two
or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To
be sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration
of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and
severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the
contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. 21 In the case at
bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration
of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private
respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the sublease expired
on Sept. 12, 1990.
15. Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more than two
lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the
contract involved in this case reads:22 
a. 2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three
(3) years and two (2) months is (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all
fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to
the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
b. A. (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and
c. B. (₱185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.
16. Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and
Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance
of ₱50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of
₱25,300.00.
17. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The
complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate
of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the
unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.
2.) Josephine Go & Henry Go v. Leonardo Yamane
(G.R. No. 160762, 3 May 2006)
FACTS:
1. Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is
presumed to be conjugal in nature. This presumption stands, absent any
clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal.
Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to
have accrued to the conjugal partnership.  De Guzman alleging, in gist, fraud, misrepresentation, manipulation and
2. The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as follows:
3. "Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot located at Res.
Sec. 'K', Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife
of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent] herein, under TCT No. 12491.  10. "In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint hearing of Civil
4. "As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty.
Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841, entitled 'Florence Pucay
De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Cypress
Corporation,' which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs therein,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the Pucay sisters, the subject property
was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.
The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11,
1981.
5. "Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party Claim
with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the
ground that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should
not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters.
However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale despite [respondent's]
protest. The subject property was sold to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go
(or [petitioners]) as highest bidder. No redemption having been made during
the one-year period, a Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was eventually
issued on August 26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said property to
[petitioners].
6. "On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with the RTC of
Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No. 417-R, against [petitioners] and
Sheriff Melgar for annulment and cancellation of auction sale upon the
same ground stated in the abovementioned third-party claim.
7. Citing the Order of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No.
2288, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue new title in the name of Josephine Go x x x,
[petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion was denied by the trial
court.
8. "In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the
material allegations of the complaint and interposed the following special
affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment;
that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy to annul the execution
proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity in the auction sale; and that
since the execution sale was made in accordance with Section 21, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, it is deemed final and any irregularity
committed in the course thereof will not vitiate its validity.
9. "On December 28, 1984, Muriel likewise lodged a Complaint for Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 505-R, against [petitioners] and Atty. Guillermo
unlawful acts of the defendants in causing the levy of the subject property
with an estimated commercial value of P200,000 as against a charging lien
in the amount of P10,000.
 Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-R. On August 30, 1985, Muriel was declared
non-suited for failure to appear in the hearing despite due notice. As a
consequence, Civil Case No. 505-R was dismissed on October 15, 1985."5
11. In its Decision6 dated March 25, 1998, the (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4,
held that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late
Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal
property. The appearance of his name on the (TCT) was deemed to be
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner, his late wife.
Hence, finding that he had no legal standing to question the auction sale or
to pray for its annulment or cancellation, the RTC dismissed the case for
lack of merit. MR denied.
12. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA reversed the RTC's Decision. The Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and the Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 26,
1982, were declared null and void. According to the appellate court, property acquired during
marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to
have been used for the purpose. That the land was acquired during the spouses' coverture was
sufficiently established by the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both indicating that Muriel
Pucay Yamane was "married to Leonardo Yamane"; and by the undisputed testimony of the
previous owner, Eugene Pucay. Because of petitioners' failure to establish that the land in
question had been acquired by Muriel using her exclusive funds, the CA concluded that the
contested land was conjugal property. 
13. The appellate court further held thus:  "x x x [T]he disputed property being a conjugal property
of [respondent] and his wife, and absent any showing of some advantage or benefit that
accrued to their conjugal partnership from the transaction between the Pucay sisters and Atty.
De Guzman, the public auction sale of the subject property in favor of [petitioners] is null and
void."11
14. Hence, this Petition.12
ISSUES:
15. whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal. and assuming, ex
grati argumenti, that the subject property is conjugal property between
respondent and Muriel, w/n the same cannot answer for the charging lien of
Atty. Guillermo de Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841."
RATIO:
1. The Court's Ruling
2. The Petition has no merit. 
3. Substantive Issue: Paraphernal or Conjugal?
4. The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. 20Accordingly, the transaction
was aptly covered by the then governing provisions of the New Civil Code.
On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the issue of the nature of the
contested property.
5. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." 21 As
a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the
conjugal partnership,22 the party who invokes the presumption must first
prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. 23
6. In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.24 Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only
with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. 25 There must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, 26 and the
burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.27
7. The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They
acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967,28 or specifically
during the marriage.29 We then follow the rule that proof of the acquisition
of the subject property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of
land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
8. Petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the subsistence of
the marriage of Muriel to respondent. 30 Nonetheless, they insist that it
belonged exclusively to her for the following reasons:
9. First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim in Civil Case No.
505-R, which she had filed during her lifetime; or in AG-GR Sp. No. 01616
(entitled "Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Josephine Go"), that the disputed parcel
of land was her exclusive paraphernal property. They allege that his failure
to file a denial or opposition in those cases is tantamount to a judicial
admission that militates against his belated claim.
10. Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole name of
Muriel. Petitioners posit that, had the spouses jointly purchased this piece of
land, the document should have indicated this fact or carried the name of
respondent as buyer.
11. Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land within the
redemption period after the auction sale indicated that he was not its co-
owner.
12. We will discuss the three arguments seriatim.
13. Unilateral Declaration
14. Respondent's interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in her
Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-R that the subject parcel of land was her
paraphernal property. Significantly, the nature of a property -- whether
conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law and not by the will of one
of the spouses.31 Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse can
change the character of a conjugal property.32
15. Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505-R was not the nature of
the subject piece of land being levied upon, but whether Atty. Guillermo de
Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. In that case, Muriel claimed that
she had not officially retained him as counsel, and that no lawyer-client
relationship had been established between them.33
16. Deed and Title in the Name of One Spouse
17. Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy its conjugal nature.34Hence, it cannot be contended in the
present case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the
parcel of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her
personal and exclusive property. In concluding that it was paraphernal, the
trial court's reliance on Stuart v. Yatco35 was clearly erroneous.
18. As stated earlier, to rebut the presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property, petitioners must present clear and convincing evidence. We affirm
and quote below, for easy reference, the relevant dispositions of the CA:
a. "x x x. We are unable to go along with [petitioners'] contention that the subject
property was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds. Mere registration of the
contested property in the name of the wife is not sufficient to establish the
paraphernal nature of the property. This reminds Us of the teaching in the recent
case of Diancin v. Court of Appeals, that all the property acquired by the spouses,
regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. To quote:
i. "In the case at bar, the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal having
been acquired during the coverture of the marriage between Matilde and
Tiburcio, which was on April 9, 1940. The fact that the grant was solely
in the name of Matilde did not make the property paraphernal property.
What was material was the time the fishpond lease right was acquired by
the grantee, and that was during the lawful existence of Matilde's
marriage to Tiburcio.
ii. "x x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence. The burden of proving that the property belongs
exclusively to the wife rests upon the party asserting it. Mere assertion
of the property's paraphernal nature is not sufficient."
b. "The record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence lead us to conclude
that the contested property was indeed acquired during the marriage of herein
[respondent] and Muriel. To prove that it is nonetheless paraphernal property, it is
incumbent upon [petitioners] to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that
Muriel bought the same with her exclusive funds.
c. [Petitioners] failed to discharge the burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented by
them do We find any indication that the land in question was acquired by Muriel
with her exclusive funds. The presumption not having been overthrown, the
conclusion is that the contested land is conjugal property."36
19. Non-Redemption After the Auction Sale
20. The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period
prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence of his right or
title to it. Contrary to petitioners' allegation, the fact is that he filed a Third-
Party Claim37with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy and impending
auction sale. This fact was specifically admitted by
petitioners.38 Respondent claimed that the parcel of land was conjugal, and
that he could not answer for the separate obligation of his wife and her
sisters.39 Notwithstanding his claim, the disputed piece of land was sold at a
public auction on August 11, 1981. Consequently issued were a Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and a Final Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale dated August 26, 1982.40
21. Likewise, in his Opposition (Answer) to the Petition in LRC File Adm.
Case No. 2288,41 respondent raised the issue of the conjugal nature of the
property and reserved his right to file an independent action to annul the
auction sale.
22. In its March 30, 1983 Order, 42 however, Branch 5 of the RTC of Baguio
City did not rule on either the actual ownership or the nature of the parcel of
land. Rather, it granted the Petition to issue a new certificate of title in favor
of Petitioner Josephine Mendoza Go. It found that, under Section 75 of
Presidential Decree 1529, respondent had no legal standing to question the
auction sale, because he was not the registered owner of the property.
Instead, his right to prove his claim in a separate and independent action
was upheld.43 Thus, he instituted the present case for annulment and
cancellation of the auction sale.
23. The foregoing points clearly explain the failure of respondent to redeem the
property. Misplaced is petitioners' emphasis on his failure to do so within
the period required by law, because redemption in this case would have
been inconsistent with his claim that the sale was invalid. 44 Redemption
would have served as an implied admission of the regularity of the sale and
estopped him from later impugning its validity on that ground.45
24. Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the
property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands.
The next question before us is, whether the charging lien of Atty. de
Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of land in question. 
25. Charging Lien Not Chargeable Against Conjugal Property
26. It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired during
the marriage of respondent and Muriel. The lawyer's legal services were
engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in Civil Case No. 1841) the
balance of the purchase price of the sale of the exclusive property of Muriel
and her sisters.46 The recovery was done during the marriage.47
27. The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:
a. "x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters
appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was
acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring
the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever
 expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters'
private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly
cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property.
b. "Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be held liable,
levy on execution of the same property should still be denied in accordance with the
ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia that before a conjugal property could
be held liable for the obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing
of some advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove that the services rendered by
Atty. De Guzman in handling Civil Case No. 1841 for the Pucay sisters had,
somehow, redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of herein
[respondent] and Muriel. This onus, [petitioners], however, failed to discharge."48
28. We find no reason to deviate from the CA's findings, which are amply
supported by evidence. The expenses incurred by Muriel for the recovery of
the balance of the purchase price of her paraphernal property are her
exclusive responsibility.49 This piece of land may not be used to pay for her
indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be one of the
charges against the conjugal partnership. 50 Moreover, her rights to the
property are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.  Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility with
29. Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when
she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver
the needed sum;51 when administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts 52 or by the husband;53 or when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. 54 Failure to establish any of these
circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset may not be
bound to answer for Muriel's personal obligation.
30. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. 55 In this case,
therefore, the property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied upon.56
31. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
3.) Antonia and Alvin John Dela Pea v. Gemma Avila & Far East
Bank
G.R. No. 187490 | February 8, 2012.
FACTS:
1. The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together
with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously
registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia),
"married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" (Antegono) under (TCT) No. N-32315
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.4 
2. On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a
loan in the sum of ₱250,000.00 which, pursuant to the Promissory Note the
former executed in favor of the latter, was payable on or before 7 July 1996,
with interest pegged at 5% per month.5 
3. On the very same day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing
the payment of said loan obligation. The deed provided, in part, that "(t)his
contract is for a period of Three (3) months from the date of this
instrument".6 
4. On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila
(Gemma), for the stated consideration of ₱600,000.00.7 Utilizing the
document, Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well as
the issuance of TCT No. 337834 of the Marikina City Registry of Deeds,
naming her as the owner of the subject realty.8 
5. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over
said parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company [now
a credit limit of ₱1,200,000.00.9 As evidenced by the Promissory Notes she
executed from 12 December 1997 to 10 March 1998, 10 Gemma obtained the
following loans from Visayas Avenue Branch of the FEBTC-BPI, in the
aggregate sum of ₱1,200,000.00.
6. On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of
Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect, among
others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had
been titled in the name of Gemma under TCT No. 32315; and, that the Deed
of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. 11 As a
consequence, Antonia’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was inscribed on TCT
No. 337834 as Entry No. 501099 on 10 March 1998.12 
7. In view of Gemma’s failure to pay the principal as well as the accumulated
interest and penalties on the loans she obtained, on the other hand, FEBTC-
BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at the public auction
conducted in the premises,13 FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership
over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No.
415392 of the Marikina registry.14 
8. On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Peña
(Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale
docketed before Branch 272 of the (RTC) of Marikina City as Civil Case
No. 98-445-MK.
9. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property, the Dela Peñas
alleged, among other matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by
Antegono who had, by then, already died; that despite its intended 1998
 maturity date, the due date of the loan secured by the mortgage was
shortened by Gemma who, taking advantage of her "proximate relationship"
with Aguila, altered the same to 1997; and, that the 4 November 1997 Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma was executed by Antonia who was
misled into believing that the transfer was necessary for the loan the former
promised to procure on her behalf from FEBTC-BPI. In addition to the
annulment of said Deed of Absolute Sale for being simulated and
derogatory of Alvin’s successional rights, the Dela Peñas sought the
reconveyance of the property as well as the grant of their claims for moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs.15  May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute
10. Served with summons, Gemma specifically denied the material allegations
of the foregoing complaint in her 1 July 1998 answer. Maintaining that the
realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her
husband was still alive, Gemma averred that the former failed to pay the
₱250,000.00 loan she obtained from Aguila on its stipulated 7 July 1996
maturity; that approached to help prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage constituted on the property, she agreed to settle the outstanding
obligation to Aguila and to extend Antonia a ₱50,000.00 loan, with interest
pegged at 10% per month;
11. that to pay back the foregoing accommodations, Antonia agreed to the use
of the property as collateral for a loan to be obtained by her from FEBTC-
BPI, hence, the execution of the impugned Deed of Absolute Sale; and, that
conformably with the foregoing agreement, she obtained loans in the total
sum of ₱1,200,000.00 from FEBTC-BPI and applied the proceeds thereof to
the sums owed by Antonia. Together with the dismissal of the complaint,
Gemma also prayed for the grant of her counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs.16  ₱2,029,317.17 as of November 10, 1999, with twelve (12%) percent interest per
12. On 25 September 1999, the Dela Peñas filed a supplemental complaint,
impleading FEBTC-BPI as additional defendant. Calling attention to
Antonia’s 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the Notice of Lis
Pendens they purportedly caused to be annotated on TCT No. 337834 on 10
December 1999, the Dela Peñas alleged that FEBTC-BPI was in bad faith
when it purchased the property at public auction on 15 March 1999.17  November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonia’s claim that her signature was forged is
13. In their 12 November 1999 answer, FEBTC-BPI, in turn, asserted that the
property was already titled in Gemma’s name when she executed the 26
November 1997 real estate mortgage thereon, to secure the payment of the
loans she obtained in the sum of ₱1,200,000.00; and, that not being privy to
Antonia’s transaction with Gemma and unaware of any adverse claim on
the property, it was a mortgagee in good faith, entitled to foreclose the
mortgage upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans she obtained. Seeking the
dismissal of the complaint and the grant of its counterclaims for damages
against the Dela Peñas, FEBTC-BPI alternatively interposed cross-claims
against Gemma for the payment of the subject loans, the accumulated
interests and penalties thereon as well as such sums for which it may be
held liable in the premises.18 
14. On 14 April 2000, the RTC issued the order terminating the pre-trial stage and declaring
Gemma in default for failure to attend the pre-trial settings and to engage the services of a new
lawyer despite due notice and the withdrawal of her counsel of record. 19 In support of their
complaint, Antonia20 and Alvin21 both took the witness stand and, by way of corroborative
evidence, presented the testimony of one Alessandro Almoden 22 who claimed to have referred
Antonia to Gemma for the purpose of obtaining a loan.
15. By way of defense evidence, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI adduced the oral evidence elicited
from Eleanor Abellare, its Account Officer who handled Gemma’s loans, 23 and Zenaida Torres,
the (NBI) Document Examiner who, after analyzing Antonia’s specimen signatures on the 7
Sale,24 issued NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 482-802 to the effect, among others, that
said signatures were written by one and the same person.25 
16. On 18 December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject property
was conjugal in nature and that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed
in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130
of the Family Code. Brushing aside FEBTC-BPI’s claim of good faith,26 the RTC disposed:
a. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
b. 1). Declaring the Deed of Absolute dated November 04, 1997 in favor of defendant,
[Gemma] as null and void;
c. 2). Ordering defendant [FEBTC-BPI] to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of
the [Dela Peñas] involving the subject property now covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 415392 in the name of [FEBTC-BPI];
d. 3). Ordering [Gemma] to pay the [Dela Peñas] the following: a). the amount of
₱200,000.00 as moral damages; and b). the amount of ₱20,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees; and
e. On the cross-claim, [Gemma] is hereby ordered to pay [FEBTC-BPI] the amount of
annum until fully paid.
17. Aggrieved, FEBTC-BPI perfected the appeal which was docketed before the CA as CA-G.R.
CV No. 90485. On 31 March 2009 the CA’s Second Division rendered the herein assailed
decision, reversing the RTC’s appealed decision, upon the following findings and conclusions:
(a) the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the same
was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono; (b) having misled Gemma into believing
that the property was exclusively hers, Antonia is barred from seeking the annulment of the 4
belied by her admission in the pleadings that she was misled by Gemma into executing said
Deed of Absolute Sale and by NBI Questioned Document Report No. 482-802; and, (d)
FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee in good faith and for value since Gemma’s 26 November 1997
execution of the real estate mortgage in its favor predated Antonia’s 3 March 1998 Affidavit of
Adverse Claim and the 10 December 1999 annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No.
337834.28 
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. The petition is bereft of merit.
2. Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it
is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership,30 proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.31 
3. In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 32 this Court categorically
ruled:
a. Article 160 of the New Civil Code ….However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to
say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a
strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.33 
4. As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of
the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the
subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that
the property was purchased when she was already married, 34 the record
is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of
the realty can be ascertained.
5. When queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin
admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his
parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect. 35 Considering
that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, 36 we find that the
CA cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s
exclusive property.
6. Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela
Peñas insist that the registration thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela
Peña, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" should have
already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the
same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals,37 this Court ruled,
however, that the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also
a registered owner.
7. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife
while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither
would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was
acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal
in nature. "Since there is no showing as to when the property in question
was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse."38 
8. Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly
ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying Antonia’s 4 November
1997 sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required
under Article 130 of the Family Code.39 
9. That Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact,
be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the payment of
the ₱250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.40 Despite Gemma’s
forfeiture of the right to present evidence on her behalf, her alleged
alteration of the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to shorten the
maturity of the loan secured thereby was also properly brushed aside by the
CA.
10. The double lie inherent in Antonia’s assertion that the same deed was
altered by Gemma to shorten the maturity of the loan to "1997 instead of
1998" is instantly evident from paragraph 1 of the document which,
consistent with 7 July 1996 maturity date provided in the Promissory Note
she executed,41 specifically stated that "(t)his contract is for a period of
Three (3) months from the date of this instrument."42 
11. Antonia’s evident lack of credibility also impels us to uphold the CA’s
rejection of her version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma. In
disavowing authorship of the signature appearing on said deed, 43 Antonia
contradicted the allegation in the Dela Peñas’ complaint that she was misled
by Gemma into signing the same document. 44 The rule is well-settled that
judicial admissions like those made in the pleadings are binding and cannot
be contradicted, absent any showing that the same was made thru palpable
mistake.45 
12. Alongside that appearing on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage she admitted
executing in favor of Aguila, Antonia’s signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale was, moreover, found to have been written by one and the same person
in Questioned Document Report No. 482-802 prepared by Zenaida Torres,
the NBI Document Examiner to whom said specimen signatures were
submitted for analysis.46 Parenthetically, this conclusion is borne out by our
comparison of the same signatures.
13. For all of Antonia’s denial of her receipt of any consideration for the sale of
the property in favor of Gemma, 47 the evidence on record also lend credence
to Gemma’s version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
assailed 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale.
14. Consistent with Gemma’s claim that said deed was executed to facilitate the
loans she obtained from FEBTC-BPI which were agreed to be used as
 payment of the sums she expended to settle the outstanding obligation to
Aguila and the ₱50,000.00 she loaned Antonia,48 the latter admitted during
her direct examination that she did not pay the loan she obtained from
Aguila.49 Presented as witness of the Dela Peñas, Alessandro Almoden also
admitted that Gemma had extended a loan in the sum of ₱50,000.00 in favor
of Antonia. Notably, Alessandro Almoden’s claim that the title to the
property had been delivered to Gemma as a consequence of the
transaction50 is at odds with Antonia’s claim that she presented said
document to the Registry of Deeds when she verified the status of the
property prior to the filing of the complaint from which the instant suit
originated.51  and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by
15. With the material contradictions in the Dela Peña’s evidence, the CA cannot
be faulted for upholding the validity of the impugned 4 November 1997
Deed of Absolute Sale. Having been duly notarized, said deed is a public
document which carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution.52 The burden of proof to overcome said
presumptions lies with the party contesting the notarial document 55 like the
Dela Peñas who, unfortunately, failed to discharge said onus. Absent clear
and convincing evidence to contradict the same, we find that the CA
correctly pronounced the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding
between Antonia and Gemma.
16. Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the
mortgage debt,56 FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it
foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans
secured thereby. Executed on 26 November 1997, the mortgage predated Antonia’s filing of an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Register of Deeds of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and the
annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999. "The
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever
the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted."57 When the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee consequently
has the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to
the satisfaction of the unpaid loan.58  AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon
17. Finally, the resolution of this case cannot be affected by the principles that banks like FEBTC-
BPI are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in that their
dealings because their business is impressed with public interest 59 and their standard practice is
to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the
genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof, hence, the
inapplicability of the general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not
apply to them.60  Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
18. The validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia in favor of
Gemma having been upheld, FEBTC-BPI’s supposed failure to ascertain the
ownership of the property has been rendered immaterial for the purpose of
determining the validity of the mortgage executed in its favor as well as the
subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure thereof.
19. WHEREFORE, premises considered, AFFIRMED in toto.
4.) Ayala Investment & Abelardo Magsajo v. Court of Appeals &
Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching
(G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998)
FACTS:
1. The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the respondent
CA in "Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation, et. al.," docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
29632,1 upholding the decision of the RTC of Pasig, Branch 168, which
ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
2. Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added security for the
credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and
on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
3. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled
"Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming
Mills and Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
4. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-
husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
5. Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon motion of
AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated May
12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the
issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner
6. On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against
petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among
others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents, the lower court
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from
proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale
of the said properties at public auction.
7. AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals,3 questioning the order of the lower court enjoining the sale.
Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on
June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower court 4 from enforcing its Order of June
14, 1982, thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondents-
spouses conjugal properties.
8. On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder,
was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was registered
on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff
issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was registered on
August 9, 1983.
9. In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in
this manner:
a. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is granted and the challenged
order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is
hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar as it seeks to enjoin the
respondent Judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 46309 is, however, denied.
No pronouncement is here made as to costs. . . . 5
10. On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before
Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and
academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion
arguing, among others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property
attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, two (2) of
the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to Civil Case
No. 42228.
11. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits proceeded. Private
respondents presented several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not present any
evidence.
12. On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution
null and void. Petitioners appealed to the respondent court, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 29632.
13. On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the
decision of the regional trial court. It held that:
a. The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees.
b. x x x           x x x          x x x
c. As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the New Civil Code or Article
1211 of the Family Code-suffice it to say that the two provisions are substantially
the same. Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the Family Code is the
applicable law on the matter . . . . . . .
d. Article 121 of the Family Code provides that "The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for: . . . (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
. . . ." The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.
In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was
contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.
14. MR denied. Hence, this
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: RTC Affirmed.
petition for review. Petitioner contends that the "respondent court erred in
ruling that the conjugal partnership of private respondents is not liable for
the obligation by the respondent-husband."
15. Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that actual
benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnership; all that is necessary,
they say, is that the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that:
a. The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to
be held liable, the husband must have contracted the debt "for the benefit of the
partnership, thus:
i. Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
ii. 1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership . . . .
b. There is a difference between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" (on the one hand) and "for the benefit of (on the other). The
former require that actual benefit must have been realized; the latter requires only
that the transaction should be one which normally would produce benefit to the
partnership, regardless of whether or not actual benefit accrued.8
ISSUES:
1. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted
by the husband alone are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a
surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband
in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
RATIO:
1. T We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the
terms "redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand;
and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing.
Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are
similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of
personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
2. Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent court runs
counter to the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez
vs. Lantin,9 that the husband as head of the family and as administrator of
the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for the
benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
3. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not
applicable in the case at bar. This Court has, on several instances,
 interpreted the term "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
4. In the cases of Javier vs. Osmeña,   Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger &
10
Galinger, Inc., 11 Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin 12and G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 13 cited by the petitioners, we held that:
a. The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage relation, for and in the
exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes toward the support of
his family, are not his personal and private debts, and the products or income from
the wife's own property, which, like those of her husband's, are liable for the
payment of the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of such
debts. (Javier)
b. The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article 1412, Civil Code), has a
right to embark the partnership in an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, and
the fact that the wife may not approve of a venture does not make it a private and
personal one of the husband. (Abella de Diaz)
c. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession
by which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez).
d. . . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession
or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear
the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his
family. (G-Tractors)
5. However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity Insurance
& Luzon Insurance Co.,14 Liberty Insurance Corporation
vs. Banuelos,   and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De Garcia, 16 cited by the
15
respondents, we ruled that:
a. The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses, but
not to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty agreements) of the
husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit
to the family." (Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
b. When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by the
husband redounded to the benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal
debt but an obligation personal to him. (Liberty Insurance)
c. In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the
new Civil Code is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary
and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. (Luzon
Surety, Inc.)
6. From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the
following conclusions:
7. (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . .
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
8. (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person
or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
"obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of
loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is
"for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
9. Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the
three other companion cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty
Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the husband contracted
the obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the husband merely
acted as a surety for the loan contracted by another for the latter's business.
10. The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo
Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's
acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court:
a. The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-appellees — this despite the fact
that the members of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate
entity.
b. x x x           x x x          x x x
c. . . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the
case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted
by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is
apparent from the facts of the case is that the judgment debt was contracted by or in
the name of the Corporation Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only
signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondent-
appellant's right of recourse against appellee-husband as surety is only to the extent
of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of
gains of the family of petitioners-appellees. . . . . . .17
11. Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the conjugal
partnership. To support this contention, they cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes'
authoritative opinion in the Luzon Surety Company case:
a. I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in my opinion, the
words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership" used in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in
describing the charges and obligations for which the conjugal partnership is liable
do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership
from the husband's transaction; but it suffices that the transaction should be one that
normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio behind
our ruling in Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336, that obligations incurred by the
husband in the practice of his profession are collectible from the conjugal
partnership.
12. The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority decision that
the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement
which was clearly for the benefit of a third party. Such opinion merely
registered an exception to what may be construed as a sweeping statement
that in all cases actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal
partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no actual benefits to the
family need be proved in some cases such as in the Javier case. There, the
husband was the principal obligor himself. Thus, said transaction was found
to be "one that would normally produce . . . benefit for the partnership." In
the later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband was also the principal obligor
— not merely the surety. This latter case, therefore, did not create any
precedent. It did not also supersede the Luzon Surety Company case, nor
any of the previous accommodation contract cases, where this Court ruled
that they were for the benefit of third parties.
13. But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in such kind of
contract of accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when
the guarantee is in favor of the husband's employer.
14. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family
would reasonably anticipate were the following:
a. (a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he
would be entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of
time because of the loan he guaranteed;
b. (b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM
could be rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
c. (c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be
boosted should PBM survive because of the loan.
15. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil
Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
16. In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the
husband, 18 we underscored the requirement that: "there must be the
requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that such obligations
are productive of some benefit to the family." Unfortunately, the petition
did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate
existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or
(b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock
appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the
Ching family.
17. Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable increase in the
value of stocks) might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at
the time the accommodation agreement was entered into. But would those
"benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the "obligations . . . for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership"? Are indirect and remote probable
benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of
Appeals in denying the motion for reconsideration, disposed of these
questions in the following manner:
a. No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit respondents-appellants is purely a
corporate debt granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely signing as
surety. While such petitioner-appellee-husband, as such surety, is solidarily liable
with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code provisions is
specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for
which the husband is liable may not be charged against conjugal partnership
properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — "The payment of personal
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
b. Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in question falls under the
exception laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan
procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees.
c. . . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine Blooming
Mills (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said
PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the "benefits" contemplated by Articles
121 and 122 of the Family Code. The "benefits" contemplated by the exception in
Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived directly from the use of the loan.
In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM
itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family. The alleged benefit, if any,
continuously harped by respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also
speculative. 19
18. We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the odds involved
in guaranteeing a large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the probable
prolongation of employment in PBM and increase in value of its stocks,
would be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the benefit" of the
surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of certainty, that the
said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to the conjugal
partnership.
19. We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is not contested
by the petitioners) that the provisions of the Family Code is applicable in
 this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for
the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to
protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it.
20. This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the
obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded
to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership's liability
is to "the extent that the family is benefited."20
21. These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of
the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey
gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. 21 Thus, when co-respondent
Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely
put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the family home)
and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
22. In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that
acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondent-
husband.
23. This theory is new as it is novel.
24. The respondent court correctly observed that:
a. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, hence
the cited cases of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger &
Galinger; G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CAdo not apply in the instant case. Signing as a
surety is not embarking in a business.22
25. We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or
was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not be
taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or
guaranty.
26. This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives are often
asked to stand as surety for their company's loan obligations. This is
especially true if the corporate officials have sufficient property of their
own; otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in order to bind the
conjugal partnerships.
27. The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the
signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being
a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to
have acted for the conjugal partnership.
28. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the
extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.
29. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family. This is, of course, without prejudice to petitioner's
right to enforce the obligation in its favor against the PBM receiver in
accordance with the rehabilitation program and payment schedule approved
or to be approved by the Securities & Exchange Commission.
30. WHEREFORE, the petition, DENIED for lack of merit.
5.) Joe Ros & Estrella Aguete v. Philippine National Bank-Laoag
Branch
(G.R. No. 170166, 6 April 2011)
FACTS:
1. On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI,
Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803. The complaint was later
amended and was raffled to the RTC, Branch 15, Laoag City.
2. The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros
obtained a loan of ₱115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14,
1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real
estate mortgage involving a parcel of land – Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral
Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
3. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,
Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in
the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
4. Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of
the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed to annul the
proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the
property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.
5. In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause
of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees’ own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on
the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.4]
6. The Trial Court’s Ruling. On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision 5 in favor of petitioners.
The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public
to acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was
 not aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her family should vacate the
mortgaged property because of the expiration of the redemption period. Under the Civil Code, the effective
law at the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her husband entered into without her consent,
especially in the present case where her consent is required. The trial court, however, ruled that its decision
is without prejudice to the right of action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its interests from
Ros.
7. The dispositive portion reads:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
b. 1. DECLARING the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit "C") and the subsequent
foreclosure proceedings conducted thereon NULL and VOID;
c. 2. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of the City of Laoag to cancel TCT No. T-15276 in the
name of defendant PNB and revert the same in the name of plaintiffs spouses Joe Ros and
Estrella Aguete;
d. 3. ORDERING defendant to vacate and turnover the possession of the premises of the property
in suit to the plaintiffs; and
8. PNB filed its Notice of Appeal 7 of the trial court’s decision on 13 September 2001 and paid the
corresponding fees. Petitioners filed on the same date a motion for execution pending appeal, 8 which PNB
opposed.9 In their comment to the opposition 10 filed on 10 October 2001, petitioners stated that at the hearing
of the motion on 3 October 2001, PNB’s lay representative had no objection to the execution of judgment
pending appeal. Petitioners claimed that the house on the subject lot is dilapidated, a danger to life and limb,
and should be demolished. Petitioners added that they obliged themselves to make the house habitable at a
cost of not less ₱50,000.00. The repair cost would accrue to PNB’s benefit should the appellate court reverse
the trial court. PNB continued to oppose petitioners’ motion. 11
9. In an Order12 dated 8 May 2002, the trial court found petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal
improper because petitioners have made it clear that they were willing to wait for the appellate court’s
decision. However, as a court of justice and equity, the trial court allowed petitioners to occupy the subject
property with the condition that petitioners would voluntarily vacate the premises and waive recovery of
improvements introduced should PNB prevail on appeal.
10. The Appellate Court’s Ruling. On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision 13 and granted
PNB’s appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, and dismissed petitioners’ complaint.
11. The appellate court stated that the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it was improper
for the trial court to rely solely on Aguete’s testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were forged.
The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the documents knowingly and with her
full consent. Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled
that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family.
The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the family’s business. Therefore,
the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
4.
12. Petitioners filed the present petition for review before this Court on 9 December 2005.
ISSUES:
2. W/N
RATIO:
1. The Court’s Ruling
2. The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.
5.
3. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The
subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains.
The pertinent articles of the Civil Code provide:
a. Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
b. (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses; (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them; (3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during
the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
each spouse.
c. Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
d. Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
e. (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in
the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due,
during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership;
f. (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
g. (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband
and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit
the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
h. Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or
is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same.
i. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and
Aguete’s marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954,
while the subject property was acquired in 1968. 15 There is also no doubt
that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for
P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete,
as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the
subject property. On the other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to
the loan and also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan
documents.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do
so, then the contract is voidable. 17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows
Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the
same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of
 the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife
did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of
the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’
encumbrance of the subject property.
6. The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary
public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved.18 The execution of a document that has been ratified before a
notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged
signer.19 PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners’ omission to
present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was
fatal to petitioners’ cause. 20 Petitioners did not present any corroborating
witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that
Aguete’s signatures were really forged.
a. A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect
to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may
only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be
upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a
notarial document lies on the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an allegation of
forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it
has the burden of proving the same.21]
7. Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before
the courts with unclean hands. In their memorandum before the trial court,
petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguete’s signatures.
a. Joe A. Ros in legal effect admitted in the complaint that the signatures of his wife in
the questioned documents are forged, incriminating himself to criminal prosecution.
If he were alive today, he would be prosecuted for forgery. This strengthens the
testimony of his wife that her signatures on the questioned documents are not hers.
b. In filing the complaint, it must have been a remorse of conscience for having
wronged his family; in forging the signature of his wife on the questioned
documents; in squandering the P115,000.00 loan from the bank for himself,
resulting in the foreclosure of the conjugal property; eviction of his family
therefrom; and, exposure to public contempt, embarassment and ridicule.22]
8. The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." 23 In
her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but
claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of
loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the
money."24 Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the
family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.25
a. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very
nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.26]
9. For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
10. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. CA AFFIRMED.
Brigido Quiao v. Rita, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie Quiao, represented by
their mother, Rita Quiao (G.R. No 176556, 4 July 2012): a
FACTS:
1. The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children are
born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the community. Thus,
we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message they
send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case
involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
2. On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a
complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision 4 dated October 10,
2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
a. WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-
respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
b. As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but
the marriage bond shall not be severed.
c. Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely,
Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of
the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
d. Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC,
all the remaining properties, namely:
e. 1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; 2. coffee mill in
Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; 3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan
del Norte; 4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
f. 5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City; 6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City; 7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City; 8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
g. shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
 h. [Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children.
3. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal
Separation.6  a.
4. On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution which 7 
the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which reads: "Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is
hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the
Judgment.
5. Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution9 which reads as follows:
a. NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B.
QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic],
together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine
Currency.
b. But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution
and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the
said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are
enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
c. You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after
the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10  3.
6. On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying
the respondents the amount of ₱46,870.00, representing the following
payments:
a. (a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
b. (b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and (c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses. 11 
7. On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of
the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
8. To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an
Order13 dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT
EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the
debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family
Code.15 The dispositive portion of the Order states:
a. WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all
the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate
properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
9. Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 on
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order 18 dated November 8, 2006,
holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it
may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify
the meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside.
NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties'
common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article
102 of the Family Code.20 
10. On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a MR,21 praying for the correction and reversal of
the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, 22 the trial court had
changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the
Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
11. Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents
have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for
Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10,
2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
2. The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed
on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
a. Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
b. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
4. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration."26 
5. In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution." 27 In other words, a party litigant may
file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
6. In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for
reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order
granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after  123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a
writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days
had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned." From the foregoing, the petitioner
had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised
a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for
clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final. 28 
7. The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still
be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He
said that "a void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any
obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
8. "A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the
 subject matter or over the parties or both." 30 In other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31 
community or conjugal partnership of gains.
9. The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a 14. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article
case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city,
the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that
property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. 32 The Rule on Legal Separation 33 provides that "the petition
[for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner." 34 In the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao,
Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the legal separation.
respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that
summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that
the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001. 35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered
15. Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article
the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties. 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial
10. From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was court's holding.
rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the
modification is meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. 36 In fact, we have ruled that
for "[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
16. First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal." 37 Granting without record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital
admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed
within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows,
trial court's decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised
below and nothing more.
the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and
11. For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already
since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations
become immutable and unalterable, to wit: between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
a. (a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who is not his community or conjugal partnership of gains. 55 Article 119 of the Civil Code
wife;38 
provides:
b. (b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita; 39 
a. Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
c. (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; 40  relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
d. (d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership; 41  any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are
void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
e. (e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; 42 
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
f. (f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate wife.
succession;43 

g. (g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse; 44  17. Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the
h. (h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to Article
property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal
116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, partnership of gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the
is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; 45 
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
i. (i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living together; 46 
income from their work or industry."56 The husband and wife also own in
j. (j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed; 47  common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57 
k. (k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that
respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these properties; 48  18. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
l. (l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121 of the Family respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling ₱503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these
properties;49  same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
m. (m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate properties which can
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
satisfy his share for the support of the family;50  Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
n. (n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); 51  Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of
o. (o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime; 52  not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
p. (p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in Civil Code or other law."58 
favor of the common children;53 and

q. (q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of ₱19,000.00 as attorney's fees and 19. Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common
litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.54 
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited
12. After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the
enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the
Family Code?
13. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the
parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative 20. We respond in the negative.
21. Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired,
arguing: "As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the
spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive
application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs
his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."59  properties of the parties.66
22. In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half
of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article
143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife." 60 Thus,
since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties,
even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no
provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by
virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive
application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested
right.
23. However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on
stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,61 we define and explained "vested
right" in the following manner:
a. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
b. To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present
or future enjoyment of property.62 (Citations omitted)
24. In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro
Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also explained:
a. The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
25. From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
"vested right," he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
26. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. 65 In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community
 
27. Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family
Code.67 Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.
28. Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's
"vested right" is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code,
but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and
129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the
conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
a. Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share
of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both,
and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the
conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or
from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty
spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
b. In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net
profits.
29. From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a
legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the
chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in
fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the
guilty party.
30. More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing
ruling that:
a. [P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in
the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal
nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of
each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.
Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs.
31. Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its
 Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is
Article 129(7) of the Family Code.70 The petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded
from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final
judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005
because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor
reversed by this Court.71 
32. From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies
to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the
trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
33. The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of
the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor
and industry.
34. The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the
conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized
under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other
provision under the Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject
of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family
Code applies.
35. What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net
profits" earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of "net profits" earned in the absolute community?
36. Now, we clarify.
37. First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the
property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the
definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family
Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code.
38. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article
102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and
Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits
"shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution."72 
39. Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime
under Article 129 of the Family Code.
40. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime
under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the
Family Code.
41. Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute
community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
42. On Absolute Community Regime:
43. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband
and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.73 
44. Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an
inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered
to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution.74 
45. Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we
first find the market value of the properties at the time of the community's
dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we
subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result
to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the
time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.75 
46. Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us
see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
47. (a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife
have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above
are all part of the absolute community. And its market value at the time of
the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the "market value at
 dissolution."
48. (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally
separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and
obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted
from the "market value at dissolution."
49. (c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the
total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net
asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's
remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be
subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
50. (d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and
nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally
between them is simply the "net profits." However, in the Decision dated
October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in
favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which
should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties
entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
51. On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
52. Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we
make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant
case for purposes only of defining "net profit." As earlier explained, the
definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to
both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as
provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the
provisions on Legal Separation.
53. Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place
in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or
of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage." 76 From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend
to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.77  of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
54. Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family
Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to
wit:
55. In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation
of the properties of the spouses:
56. (a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing
the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. 78 In the instant
case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties
when they married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following
conjugal properties, to wit:
a. 1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
b. 2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
c. 3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
d. 4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
e. 5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
f. 6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
g. 7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
h. 8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80 
57. (b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of
the conjugal partnership;81 and if the community is enriched at the expense
of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.82 
58. (c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses
shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal
partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses
with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. 83 
59. (d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the
husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. 84 In the instant
case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of
them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective
heirs.86 However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing
will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
60. In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner
is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the
Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must
clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
 61. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
Magbaleta v. Gonong, (G.R. No. L-44903, 22 April 1977) Petition for certiorari,
Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, against the orders of
respondent judge in (Civil Case No. 633-IV of the CFI of Ilocos Norte dated August
31, 1916 and October 8, 1976 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint
filed against them notwithstanding that private respondent is the brother of petitioner
Rufino Magbaleta, the husband of the other petitioner Romana B. Magbaleta, and the
suit is to have a parcel of land, covered by a Free Patent Title in the name of Rufino,
declared to be the property of private respondent, who claims in said complaint that
the third petitioner Susana G. Baldovi is trying to take possession of said land from
his representative, contending she had bought the same from the spouses Rufino and
Romana, said orders having been issued allegedly in violation of Article 222 of the
Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, there being no allegation
in respondent's complaint that his suit, being between members of the same family,
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the same was filed.
Respondent judge premised his refusal to dismiss the complaint upon the sole ground
that one of the defendants, petitioner Susana G. Baldovi, the alleged buyer of the
land in dispute, is a stranger, hence the legal provisions abovementioned do not
apply. The Court holds that this ruling of respondent judge is correct. While indeed,
as pointed out by the Code Commission "it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family" hence, "it is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family" and "it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers" (Report of the Code Commission, p. 18), these considerations do not, however,
weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a
jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a
stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or
indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be
willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the
complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often than not
entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a
stranger to the family Who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of
interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to
depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves. We
find no cause in the reason for being of the provisions relied upon by petitioners to
give it broader scope than the literal import thereof warrants.
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan, (G.R. No. 178288, 15 August 2012): On
exemption of the subject property  and the exercise of right of redemption . Spouses
Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it
is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment.49  However, Article 155(3) of the Family
Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no
doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by
their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from
forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption
from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction. 1. Certainly, reasonable
time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the expiration
of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.52
As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals: While it is true that the family home is
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone: "Although the
Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless,
well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such,
it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a
reasonable period thereafter. "
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan, (G.R. No. 178288, 15 August 2012): Equally
without merit is spouses Fortaleza’s reliance on the cases of Tolentino53 and De Los
Reyes54 in praying for the exercise of the right of redemption even after the expiration
of the one-year period. In Tolentino, we held that an action to redeem filed within the
period of redemption, with a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered
to the sheriff, is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the
right to redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year period. 55 And
in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the disputed property after
finding that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made within the
one-year period and for a sufficient amount. The circumstances in the present case
are far different. The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal
offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous
tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to
lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage.
For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right
of redemption. Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of
the original owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of liberality to
accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence or omission to exercise the
right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.
De Mesa v. Acero, (G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012): Second Issue:
Nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). Anent the second issue, this Court finds
that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of
TCT No. T-221755 (M). The subject property is a family home. The petitioners
maintain that the subject property is a family home and, accordingly, the sale thereof
on execution was a nullity.
In Ramos v. Pangilinan, this Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of
20 
family homes from execution: For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must
be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under
Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the
filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of
Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also
be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of
constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. On the other hand, for family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should
belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution
must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon
the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988.21 (citations omitted)
In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.,22 we stressed that: Under
the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and
are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. 23  personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
De Mesa v. Acero, (G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012): The foregoing rules on
constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be
summarized as follows: First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of
the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home
either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code in order to be exempt from execution; Second, family residences constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed
to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein; Third, family
residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Here, the subject
property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no
showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family
home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The
petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
De Mesa v. Acero, (G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012): Indeed The family
home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Despite the fact that the subject
property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, we
nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for
nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the petitioners
should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out: In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident
that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable
time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year
period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the
property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat
the very purpose of execution – to put an end to litigation. x x x.24 
The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court’s November 25, 2005
Decision in Honrado v. Court of Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated that at
no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and
proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at
public auction: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As
this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone: Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within
which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a
the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter; "In the absence of
express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if
the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor has
taken any step involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within
a reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary
authority." In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not assert their
claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on
exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period. We now rule that  claims for
exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be
presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.26 (citations omitted)
Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court stated
that: The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by
the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction.  It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This
claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x x.
De Mesa v. Acero, (G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012): Having failed to set up
and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the
sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same.
Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption. Indeed, the
family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one’s lifetime. 29 It is likewise without dispute that the
family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment.30  The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases.31  However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure
to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the
levy or a reasonable time thereafter. In this case, it is undisputed that the
petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject
property is a family home and its exemption from execution and forced sale under
the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied upon and
the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property
was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s
Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name, still, the
petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time
of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a
family home, thus, exempt from execution. For all intents and purposes, the
petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time
gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert
it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is
incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject
property as a family home. The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their
present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that
cannot be countenanced without doing the respondents injustice and depriving the
fruits of the judgment award in their favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable
considerations demand that Claudio’s title to the property be respected. Equity
dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their unexplained
negligence.
Eulogio v. Bell, (G.R. NO. 186322, 8 July 2015). To summarize, the exemption of
the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to 300,000 in
urban areas and 200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by
law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the
peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the
value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in
excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations
specified in Articles 155 and 160. Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of
the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries
will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following
conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its
constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a
forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations
under Articles 155 and 160. Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the
exceptions to the exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale. They
claim that the actual value of respondents’ family home exceeds the 300,000 limit in
urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby private
respondents agreed to sell the property for 1 million way back in 1995. Therefore,
the RTC only properly ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160
to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them in Civil Case No. 4581. 47 As earlier
discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute
is a family home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the
statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the
property from execution.48 On the other hand, there is no question that the money
judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.
Eulogio v. Bell, (G.R. NO. 186322, 8 July 2015). Notwithstanding petitioners’
right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its
satisfaction at the expense of respondents’ rights over their family home. It is
axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must
bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory
requirement for its enforcement.49 To warrant the execution sale of respondents’
family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there
was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value
exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. During the execution
proceedings, none of those facts was alleged – much less proven – by
petitioners.1 The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court
had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual
transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses
Bells executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual
value of the property in dispute. The court thus agrees with the CA’s conclusion that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution
of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court had already determined
with finality that the property was a family home, and there was no proof that is
value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements
by respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave
abuse of discretion when one acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of one’s judgment, as in this case in which the assailed order
is bereft of any factual or legal justification.50
Narciso Salas v. Annabelle Matusalem, (G.R. No. 180284, 10 April 2013).
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in
ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is
the illegitimate child of petitioner.
32. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
 legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
33. Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth  (Exhibit "A-1") of
24
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father
but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who
filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
34. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument 27 and it has no probative value
to establish filiation to the alleged father.28
35. As to the Baptismal Certificate 29 (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.30
36. The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten
notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and
respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
37. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged
father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits "E" and
"F"32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit
thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit
"C") from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself
was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is
the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer
that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an
act of charity.
38. As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits "D" to "D-13") of petitioner and
respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child.
Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article
172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.35
39. Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is
misplaced.1 In the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained
a clear admission that he is the father of private respondent’s daughter and
were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence
which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the
father of private respondent’s daughter.
40. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained the
appellate court’s finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the
latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts
and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
41. Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open
and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless
considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation
to petitioner.
42. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like
his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 
43. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
44. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the
birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent
lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said
apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the
"overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial" presented in
Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate court’s ruling anchored on the
following factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length
in the ponencia:
a. It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself
b. Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection
on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment
she had always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29,
10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping
with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child —
bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child
enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are
 positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by
Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling
Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know the status of Leoncia.
c. Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3", and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic)
herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila
Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing
therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often
gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign
the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check
and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
d. During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic)
was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card
of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1"
and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were]
both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1"
and "H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of
Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
e. x x x           x x x          x x x When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial
Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication:
"To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I").
f. The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality
of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The
entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated
therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter. This
particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39
45. In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of
respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner.
46. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.40
47. Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s
counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010. The
action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was
still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code.
48. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the
action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate
child.43 The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
a. SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
b. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
c. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
d. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceas~d party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs .
49. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
CA Decision are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
2124-AF of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
6.) Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat
(G.R. 200169, 28 January 2015)
FACTS:
1. Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar
spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February
8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein
subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896
and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the
subject titles).6
2. In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod
City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and
assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint 7 alleged that
petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that
he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same;
that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same
with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he
filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s
copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent opposed; and
that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two
missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed
for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to
him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and
that damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
3. In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised
by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since
Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no
issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
4. During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following
documents, among others:
a. 1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit "C" and
submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
b. 2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated that Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
c. 3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10,
1957 (Exhibit "G"), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo
Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb
marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and
dependent;
d. 4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October
29, 1954 (Exhibit "L"), indicating that petitioner is his son;
e. 5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit "M"), where it is
declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
f. 6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a BMMC supervisor
introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for
employment.
child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted,
imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole,
petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in
one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with his family.10
6. For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired
teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his
name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by
consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under medication in a hospital until her
death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and funeral expenses were
paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an
affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her
husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but
that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a
prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push through because
when petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement
as to the agreed price.11
7. Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera
(Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were
married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she
admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose nickname was "Mait";
that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo
Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano.12
8. Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit "2")announcing among others that she and Alfredo
have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
9. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
10. On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:

g. 7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to
the effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were "all
destroyed by nature," hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit "Q").9
5. Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-
Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano),
his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed
petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar
spouses and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter
in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home built on one of the subject properties.
11.
On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister
of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son – herein
petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that after the death of the Aguilar
spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of the subject
properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole
a. From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to the fact that
plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither
was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship
as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the
affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo
and she have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof
that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
b. This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action to be
considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages
prayed for.
c. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with cost.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. 14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172
of the Family Code,15 an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the documentary
evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and
the sole heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records
covering the period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as shown by
 Exhibits "Q" to "Q-3"; for this reason, he presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his
relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s
SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G"), arguing that the same was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner
questioned the trial court’s reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit (Exhibit "2") attesting that she
and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of
evidence has been discarded by the trial court in a previous Order dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:
a. Except for defendant’s Exhibit "2", all other Exhibits, Exhibits "1", "3", "4" and "5", together
with their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence. 17
12. On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court’s August 17, 1999
Decision, pronouncing thus:
a. The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased
spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The Elementary School Permanent
Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of filiation. As enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
i. "Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute
evidence of filiation."
b. As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
i. "A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof."
c. With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the parents of the
former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal
declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent
evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.
d. The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") and the
Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit "L"), allegedly tend to establish
that plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has
been bearing the surname of his alleged parents.
e. WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family surname certainly does not
establish pedigree.
f. Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar
are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish and prove the
filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a public
instrument and the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute
clear and convincing evidence to show filiation based on open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved
according to the requirements of the law. All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to
hurdle the "high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one’s
legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous
possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
g. Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby
negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot
grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
h. xxxx
i. In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right
that has been violated. Neither had he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of
the writ.
j. With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the same. Aside
from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of
land so that he has not sustained any damage by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from
him, there is no clear testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result
thereof. Well entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral
damages is expressly allowed by law in instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious
anxiety and moral shock were shown.
k. ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
13. Petitioner MR denied. Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in] not
taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1 acknowledged
and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar,
recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the
requirement of Article 172 of the [Family] Code in the establishment of the
legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
2. The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to
the application of Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3
thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court relating to public document which is substantial enough to
merit consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence
and forestall future litigation.21
RATIO:
1. Petitioner’s Arguments
2. In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and
praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to surrender the owner’s duplicates of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends
that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status
as the latter’s son; this recognition should be accorded more weight than the presumption of
legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation
without need of court action. He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public
instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is the "highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of
the nature of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon" him as the son of the late Alfredo
Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally
attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant
to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code; 23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory
injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in order.
3. Respondent’s Arguments
4. In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the pronouncements of the
CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon
succinctly by the appellate court.
5. Our Ruling
6. The Court grants the Petition.
7. This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that –
a. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
 be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
b. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.27
c. Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar 28 and before their respective
deaths29 – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
"G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes
an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
8. Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth
since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil
Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to prove filiation. It was
erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation
under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
9. To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such
due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has
further held that:
a. In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
b. 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
c. 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child
shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
i. Article 3
ii. 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
d. It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."
Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development."30 
10. This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained
a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office
(NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed.
He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other
documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is
not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the
Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit "Q") contained just such an advice for
petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO
in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every
registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is
submitted to said office.
11. As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action
to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170
and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that -Article
26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and
prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present
case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all.32
12. Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
 spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left
with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate,
since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line. 33
13. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The CA and RTC Decision are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby
ordered to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's
duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462)
1070.
7.) Eugenio San Juan Geronimo V. Karen Santos
(G.R. No. 197099, 28 September 2015)
FACTS:
1. At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 and
Resolution2 of the (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on January
17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed the Decision 3 of
the (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled that
the subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and
void, and ordered herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio),
who was previously joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo
(Emiliano) as codefendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject
6,542-square meter property and surrender its possession to respondent
Karen Santos. In a Resolution4 dated November 28, 2011, this Court
ordered the deletion of the name of Emiliano from the title of the instant
petition_ as co-petitioner, viz.:
a. x x x The Court resolves:
b. (2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo,
petitioner vs. Karen Santos, respondent," considering the sworn statement of
Eugenio San Juan Geronimo that he does not know whether his brother is still alive
and that his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x x5
2. The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court in its assailed Decision, viz.:
3. On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with
the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-
02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law
on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves
as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to
themselves the property in question; and that consequently[,] they took
possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be
annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the
defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
4. In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff
was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their
ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They
claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the
plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or sojourned
in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never
filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963
until October 1984.
5. The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-
brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufino’s father
Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-
owned Lot 1716 with the defendants’ mother Carmen, and upon his death in
1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property
devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she
executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino’s estate
entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod
Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiff’s mother Caridad waived all her rights
to Rufino’s share and in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be
that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to have been
instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it
was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her
late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and
estate of the plaintiff.
6. The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the
real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the defendants took possession
of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This compelled
her to file the present case.
7. Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is
the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when
Rufino’s wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the
plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in
1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents’
household. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother
Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed
in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman.
8. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate.
 It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry
in the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6,
1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in
the box intended for the informant’s signature.
9. Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of
the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiff's service record as an elementary
school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not have any
maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division
Superintendent that the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her
service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it reflects
the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she availed of.
Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaves were reflected but
the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiff’s birth certificate, Exhibit
14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an
alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of the
alterations, he considered the document questionable.6
10. On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:
a. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
b. 1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman dated March 9, 2000
executed in favor of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo
as null and void;
c. 2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject property in the
names of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;
d. 3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-
Geronimo to vacate the ½ portion of the subject property and to surrender the
possession to the plaintiff;
11. The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir – being the legitimate child – of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that
respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented
in evidence. The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to
have been tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and
the name of the informant. The trial court held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to
explain how the erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the alterations were due
to the fault of respondent or another person who was responsible for the act. In the absence of
such contrary evidence, the RTC relied on the prima faciepresumption of the veracity and
regularity of the birth certificate as a public document.
12. The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo  that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of
her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC considered the following overt acts of the
deceased spouses as acts of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they sent her
to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made respondent a beneficiary of her burial
benefits from the Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a petition for
guardianship of respondent after the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held
that to be allowed to impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should have
brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. Since
petitioner failed to file such action, the trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the
ownership and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial settlement
executed by petitioner and his brother was therefore declared not valid and binding as
respondent is Rufino’s only compulsory heir.
13. On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and
the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the
birth certificate itself.
14. According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned
if it was legally permissible for petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the
spouses Rufino and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-defendant.
15. Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family
Code, giving the putative father and his heirs the right to bring an action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant case. She further asserted that the Family
Code contemplates a direct action, thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or
collaterally in this suit.
16. In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held that under Article 170,
the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two
dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth
of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It further resolved that the birth
certificate presented in this case, Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in
the civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
a. x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act No.
3753, the declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or in
default thereof, that declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of birth in the civil register. The document in question
was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either the parent of the
plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally,
cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant
as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened.
Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final
judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
17. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child
legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad
based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.8
18. Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a public or private
document that respondent is the legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the
appellate court – similar to the trial court – relied on Article 172 of the Family Code which
allows the introduction and admission of secondary evidence to prove one’s legitimate
filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The CA agreed
with the trial court that respondent has proven her legitimate filiation, viz.:
a. We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The evidence consists of
the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their
family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her
tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial
benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied
for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are
both the legal heirs of the deceased.
b. It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino
 and Caridad has been open and continuous. x x x The conclusion follows that the
plaintiff is entitled to the property left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the
defendants, which consists of a one-half share in Lot 1716.9
19. Petitioners moved for reconsideration10 but the motion was denied in the assailed Resolution
dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove one’s
filiation is admissible only if there is no primary evidence, i.e, a record of
birth or an authentic admission in writing. 12 Petitioner asserts that herein
respondent’s birth certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence
enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of both
courts a quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by law" should
have barred the introduction of secondary evidence. Petitioner expounds
this proposition, viz.:
a. The findings of the courts a quo  that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not [the]
one envisioned by law finds support in numerous cases decided by the Honorable
Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Where the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same. x x x
b. x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth originally
written in ball pen was erased and the date April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a
pentel pen; the entry on the informant also originally written in ball pen was erased
and the name E. Dano was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there is no
signature as to who received it from the office of the registry. Worst, respondent
Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she introduced in
evidence [Exhibit A] a mere Certification from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its
existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption that if such evidence is
presented, it would be adverse to her claim. True to the suspicion, when Exhibit 14
was introduced by the petitioner and testified on by no less than the NSO
representative, Mr. Arturo Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which
renders the birth certificate questionable.
c. Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or
falsity, the courts a quo  should have stopped there, ruled that respondent Karen is
not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.13
2. On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and abused
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he does not
have personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate filiation.14
3. While petitioner admits that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular
issue,"15 he nonetheless raises the said issue as an error since the appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so
affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation
of respondent is strictly personal to respondent’s alleged father and his heirs
under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, 16 thereby denying petitioner
the "right to impugn or question the filiation and status of the
plaintiff."17 Petitioner argues, viz.:
a. x x x [T]he lower court’s reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is
totally misplaced, with due respect. It should be read in conjunction with the other
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt
exists that a child is indeed a man’s child, and the father [or, in proper cases, his
heirs] denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not
merely that respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a child
of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x18
4. We grant the petition.
5. Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in
evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate
child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC
based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to
prove the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:
6. Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a
direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to
be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a
collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of
document and recovery of possession.
7. Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or
illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and separate
action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this
procedural prescription is stated in the case of Tison v. Court of
Appeals,19 viz.:
a. x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
b. The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
c. "The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
d. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in
the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
 because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
e. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
f. Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned.1âwphi1 The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a
child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that
the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring
during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
g. xxxx
h. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none –
even his heirs – can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory."20
8. What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy – or illegitimacy – of a child
is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
9. In the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at
issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of
his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges
is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before
the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother
Rufino.
10. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows
that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary
evidence of respondent – even if such proof is similar to the evidence
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant
case not being a direct action to prove one’s filiation. In the following cases,
the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary
evidence in actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not
the child of a particular couple – even if such evidence is similar to the kind
of proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.
11. In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente)
and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982,
while Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990, Vicente’s sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor
Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance of letters of administration of his
estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was "survived by no other heirs
or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x
x."22 They further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir [of
Vicente]."23 Marissa opposed the petition and proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente.
Marissa submitted the following evidence, viz.:
a. 1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
b. 2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
c. 3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
d. 4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
e. She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter.24
12. Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the spouses Vicente and
Isabel failed to beget a child during their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years
old, was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77 years old at the
time of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the biological child of the said spouses
who were unable to physically procreate.25
13. The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court reversed the RTC’s ruling
holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this
Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
a. A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like
in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of
a certain couple.
b. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child
of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of hisheirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused
to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat- Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:
i. "Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not welltaken.
ii. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to
this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is an illegitimatechild of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased."26
14. Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago 27 originated from a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership and possession before the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the
daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property
pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death. Respondents sought to
prove that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not
itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case of  Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263
of the Civil Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code), 28petitioner argued that respondents cannot impugn
her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning a child’s legitimacy but one for recovery
of title, ownership and possession of property. We ruled in this case that petitioner’s reliance on Article 263
of the Civil Code is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioner’s filiation in an action for
recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate
of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife." 29 Citing the
aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we stated, viz.:
a. This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity
 and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and
the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.31
b. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a
legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
15. Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting
secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of the
Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of the
evidence on record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein
respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad.
16. While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of
facts,33 this rule admits of the following exceptions where findings of fact
may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.: It is clear in the case
at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a
legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is
one based on a misapprehension of facts.
17. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would
show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the
date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel
ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of the
informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document.
Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima
facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for
failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that
respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The
appellate court did not agree with this finding and instead ruled that the
birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of birth
in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant
pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
a. x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not
identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who
attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned
by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates
to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be
treated as the final judgment  mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the
child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the
parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.35
18. Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent
has proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
a. x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her
putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and
sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was
the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death
of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and
property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of
the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.36
19. We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate
court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the
document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of
birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth
certificate which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities
on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to
respondent’s birth certificate, viz.:
a. 1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant
regarding the birth of respondent, remains unknown.
b. 2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the
Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have
any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as an elementary school teacher
at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from Dr. Teofila R.
Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not file any maternity
leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered
to prove that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
c. 3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the
marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born,
Caridad was already 40 years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad’s
delivery, and while it may have been possible for her to have given birth at her own
home, this could have been proven by medical or non-medical records or testimony
if they do, in fact, exist.
d. 4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant
case.
20. Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied
upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact
in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both
the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her
putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name
"Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary
of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and
was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino,
and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino as his legal heirs.
21. In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva 37 which incisively
discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez- Badua v.
Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence of a similar set of
circumstances – which were relied upon as secondary proof by both
courts a quo in the case at bar – does not establish that one is a child of the
putative parents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
a. In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to
prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate
of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for
membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming
her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had been
reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
b. By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents
had been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez- Badua’s supposed father
were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact
that was counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel
Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a
sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
c. Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
i. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.(emphasis ours)
d. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie  evidence
of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the
statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857 should have adduced
evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The
records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
e. There are several parallels between this case and Benitez- Badua that are simply too
compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted
birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of
parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their
alleged parents had lived together childless for several years.
f. There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez Badua  and this case
which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not
Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-
Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and
on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who
had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living
childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was
not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial
partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid. 39
22. In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a
quo and rule that the confluence of the circumstances and the proof
presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that respondent is a child
of the deceased spouses.
23. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated
January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-
M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of Possession is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas, (G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011): An
action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in
rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in
rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing"
itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in
rem.22 The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the
simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has
for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any
sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested parties
are deemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to
the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but
merely for satisfying the due process requirements. 25 This is but proper in order to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be
excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to
file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with
respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.
Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas , (G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011): The
statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood
and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural
aspect in a paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas , (G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011): Clearly
then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-
à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has
yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing. At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA
testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s
attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement
the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA
testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus,
address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a
court can issue a DNA testing order. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to
guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the
judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for
reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission
of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It
seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis,
is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and,
more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public."35 Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule
on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: SEC. 4. Application for DNA
Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that
is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA
testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before
a suit or proceeding is commenced.
Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas, (G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011): This does
not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established. In some states, to warrant the
issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under
their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained — Although a paternity
action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing. 37 The same condition precedent should be applied
in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding
these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is
absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence
to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court
may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
BBB (husband) v. AAA (wife), (G.R. No. 193225, 9 February 2015): The
deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA relative to the
award of support is not warranted. While CCC is not BBB’s biological son, he
was legitimated under the latter’s name. Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
receive support from BBB. BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole
care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to
support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB
justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him. This Court is not
persuaded. Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children conceived
and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated." Article 178 states that "[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent
valid marriage between parents." In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact
that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to
have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage.
Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but
falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code
pertinently provides: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon. At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of
estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to
his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility
arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the
legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179
of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a
legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support.
BBB (husband) v. AAA (wife), (G.R. No. 193225, 9 February 2015):
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising
before the proper court the issue of CCC’s status and filiation. However, BBB cannot
do the same in the instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA, 33 the Court
held that "the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The child’s
legitimacy "cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose."34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s
application for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his
biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to
remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted
custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and
the amount and manner of providing financial support. The RTC and the CA found
substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO
against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase
the fact that psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB
against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE
does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the award to him
of custody over the children. This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the
case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the children are now all
older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to
stay with.
Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, (G.R. No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013) W/N certain
expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support
in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April
12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. The pertinent provision of the Family Code of
the Philippines provides: Art. 194. As a matter of law, the amount of support which
those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of
the recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for
legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is
tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to
enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.20
Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, (G.R. No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013): In this
case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children
was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is
clear that the monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food,
clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines. As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt
that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education, transportation,
health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children, as well as those of
petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this,
respondent’s counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent was willing
to grant the amount of only ₱75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the
children and petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted
in court unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his children, it
appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter altogether.
Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for ₱500,000.00 monthly support and finding the
₱75,000.00 monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court
fixed the monthly support pendente lite at ₱250,000.00. However, since the supposed
income in millions of respondent was based merely on the allegations of petitioner in
her complaint and registration documents of various corporations which respondent
insisted are owned not by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the
amount of support pendente lite to ₱115,000.00, which ruling was no longer
questioned by both parties.
Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, (G.R. No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013) Controversy
between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(₱2,645,000.00) the sum of ₱2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars
for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and
his children. Respondent explained that the deductions were made consistent with
the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support
pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her
and their two children’s monthly support. The following is a summary of the subject
deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipts 22: Car
Purchases and Credit Card Statements. After the trial court disallowed the foregoing
deductions, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting that the
following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as additional
advances given to petitioner and the children 23: Medical Expenses, Dental Expenses,
Travel Expenses, Credit Card Purchases, School The CA, in ruling for the
respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent
should, in equity, be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the
support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the
absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support for their
children. On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued
support, we find as relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court
which found him in arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in
favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he
should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property
given by him to the children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of
arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the
husband (appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly
designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given to the
oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the
custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to
the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree. In the absence of
some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet
the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he
will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and made
payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948);
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in part: "The payments
to the children themselves do not appear to have been made as payments upon alimony, but were rather
the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be permitted
to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which
she should expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give
them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not
treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who
is required by a divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the
mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court
in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done
without injustice to her. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce
decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra.
However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on
his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra.
The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be
allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, (G.R. No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013) We reverse
in part the decision of the CA. Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as
fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its
sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by
respondent in settling the support in arrears. Here, the CA should not have allowed
all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted
by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as
salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy
sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli,
purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive
portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein
respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by
petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly
support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses
considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA
allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her
children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his
children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner
whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate
courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite
to petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:
Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, (G.R. No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013) On appeal,
while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly
support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the
sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that
any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover
those incurred for sustenance and household expenses. Accordingly, only the
following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued
support pendente lite for petitioner and her children: Medical + Dental Expenses and
Credit Card Purchases for Groceires.
Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, (G.R. No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013):
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on
her own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in
Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of lending money. He also
claims that the two children have finished their education and are now employed in
the family business earning their own salaries. Suffice it to state that the matter of
increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of
facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula 35 …
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. 36
Teodoro Lerma v. Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz, (G.R. No. L-
33352, 20 December 1974): The legal issue posed by the foregoing facts is whether
adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pendente lite.
In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife against the
husband for support, based upon a written contract, this Court held that adultery is a
good defense. The respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding the questioned orders
of the lower court, relied on Article 292 of the Civil Code, which reads: ART. 292.
During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall
be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of legal separation, or of
annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of
legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, the
judgment specifying the terms of such order. It is suggested that while adultery may be a
defense in an action for personal support, that is, support of the wife by the husband
from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the
conjugal partnership property. We do not see that the distinction is material in this
case. In the first place Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal right to
receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of
the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the
legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right in certain
cases. In the second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court
action and, inferentially at least, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper.
For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not
necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule
61, supra, which requires, among other things, when support pendente lite is applied
for, that the court determine provisionally "the probable outcome of the case."
Teodoro Lerma v. Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz, (G.R. No. L-
33352, 20 December 1974): Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both
spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..." In a
provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the probable
failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. It
is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the
same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid
Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the
fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used
as a means to obtain support pendente lite, which, without such action, would be
denied on the strength of the decisions of this Court recognizing adultery as a good
defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has to
do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter
how groundless.
Teodoro Lerma v. Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz, (G.R. No. L-
33352, 20 December 1974): The right to separate support or maintenance, even from
the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for
the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the
Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith,
such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse,
cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate
support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support
shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act
which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for
disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The
loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any
claim for support pendente lite. What has been said above, of course, is not meant to
be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending in the lower court
or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be
understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which
specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite.
Ma. Carminia Calderon v. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA, (G.R. No.
185595, 9 January 2013):The assailed orders relative to the incident of support
pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the
rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage,
and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they
consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of
psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal
assets. The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente
lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003,
this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders[17] which shall govern the
issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These
include orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights,
hold departure, protection and administration of common property.
Ma. Carminia Calderon v. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA, (G.R. No.
185595, 9 January 2013): Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that
the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondent’s
motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her own motion to increase
support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears
which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment under
the May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the nature of final orders
assailable by ordinary appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1
and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the
moment the accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which
the amounts were made payable by private respondent have ceased to be provisional
and have become final. We disagree. The word interlocutory refers to something
intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.[18] An
interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to
be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is
considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action.[19] Clearly, whether an order or
resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or non-
compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.
Ma. Carminia Calderon v. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA, (G.R. No.
185595, 9 January 2013): It is also important to emphasize the temporary or
provisional nature of the assailed orders. Provisional remedies are writs and
processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition,
and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and
are dependent upon the result of the main action.[20] The subject orders on the
matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly
support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by
the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the
court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for
his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite.[21] A few
years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed
her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and
support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order
granting support pendente lite. Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have
ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is
therefore untenable.
8.) Ma. Belen Mangonon for and in behalf of her minor children
Rebecca and Regina Delgado v. CA, Federico and Francisco
Delgado
(G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006)
FACTS:
16. On
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
50. T
Enrique and Jesus Jocson v. Empire Insurance & Intestate Estate of
Agustin, (G.R. No. No. L-10792, 30 April 1958) It is appellants' contention that
the expenses for their education and clothing during their minority were part of the
support they were entitled to receive from their father, so that when the latter paid
those expenses from the guardianship funds, he made illegal disbursements
therefrom for which his bond as guardian should be made to answer.  The
contention is clearly without merit. Support does include what is necessary for the
education and clothing of the person entitled thereto (Art. 290, New Civil Code). But
support must be demanded and the right to it established before it becomes payable
(Art. 298, New Civil Code; Marcelo vs. Estacio, 70 Phil., 215). For the right to
support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship, even from the relationship
of parents and children, but "from imperative necessity without which it cannot be
demanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless support is
demanded" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p. 181,
citing 8 Manresa 685). In the present case, it does not appear that support for
the minors, be it only for their education and clothing, was ever demanded from
their father and the need for it duly established. The need for support, as already
stated, cannot be presumed, and especially must this be true in the present case where
it appears that the minors had means of their own. In the circumstances, the
disbursements made by the deceased guardian Jocson, with the approval of the court,
for the education and clothing of the appellant minors cannot be said to be illegal, so
that the lower court did not err in holding the guardian's bond not liable for the same.
Furthermore, the claim for support should he enforced in a separate action and not in
these guardianship proceedings. In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is
affirmed, but without costs since this is a paupers' appeal. 
Gotardo v. Buling, (G.R. No. 165166, 15 August 2012) We have recognized that
"[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this
case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child." 31  One can prove
filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 32 We have held that such
other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his]
pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." 33  In Herrera v. Alba,34 we
stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child.35 We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported
by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at
this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. 36 We explained further
that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability
of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. 37  rooms in her house are being rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4 and 5 persons. Added
Gotardo v. Buling, (G.R. No. 165166, 15 August 2012) In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man,
the petitioner, at the time of her conception. 38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony
that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. 39  On the other hand,
the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only
that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was
physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant
already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. 40  However, the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear
and categorical assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a
matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this
reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction
or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.48 In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly
child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the
determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze,
during the pendency of this case.
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997):
Petitioner Teresita argues that she would be deserving to take care of Angelica; that
she had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself; that she has the financial
means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that she maintains a store which earns a
net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of
her husband, she rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a
total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of roughly P21,000, she
spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her house. Despite the foregoing,
however, and petitioner Teresita's "genuine desire to remain with said child, that
would qualify her to have custody of Angelica," the trial court's disquisition, in
consonance with the provision that the child's welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody 8 convinced this Court
to decide in favor of private respondent Maria, thus: The [respondent] Maria herein is
married to an Orthodontist who has lucrative practice of his profession in San Francisco, California, USA.
The [respondent] and her present husband have a home of their own and they have three cars. The
[respondent]'s husband is willing to adopt the [respondent]'s children. If the children will be with their
mother, the probability is that they will be afforded a bright future. Contrast this situation with the one
prevailing in the [petitioner]'s [grandmother's] house. As admitted by [petitioner] Teresita, four of the
to these persons are [petitioner] Teresita's 2 sons, Samuel and Alfredo, and their respective families and
one can just visualize the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And to aggravate the situation, the house
has only 2 toilets and 3 faucets. Finally, considering that in all controversies involving the custody of
minors, the foremost criterion is the physical and moral well-being of the child taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties, the Court is left with no
other recourse but to grant the writ prayed for.10
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997):
Petitioner Teresita argues that it has been amply demonstrated during the trial that
private respondent Maria had indeed abandoned Angelica to the care and custody of
the petitioner; that during all the time that Angelica stayed with petitioner Teresita,
there were only three instances or occasions wherein the private respondent Maria
saw Angelica; that private respondent Maria never visited Angelica on important
occasions, such as her birthday, and neither did the former give her cards or gifts,
"not even a single candy;"11 that while private respondent Maria claims otherwise
and that she visited Angelica "many times" and insists that she visited Angelica as
often as four times a month and gave her remembrances such as candies and clothes,
she would not even remember when the fourth birthday of Angelica was. We are not
persuaded by such averments. Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent
Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner Teresita, what she
gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar. Of considerable importance is the
rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor
children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the
state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407,12 we stated, viz: . . . [Parental
authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses. 13 As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 14
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law.15 The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as
a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 17 Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.

Christina Dempsey v. RTC, (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15 August 1988):
Respondent Joel Dempsey did not and does not challenge the validity of Presidential
Decree No. 603, Articles 46 and 59 on certain obligations of parents to their children
and Articles 60 and 210 penalizing violations of mandatory provisions. As a matter
of fact, respondent Dempsey's appeal impliedly recognizes the validity of the
judgment of conviction because he asked that the penalty of imprisonment be
changed to fine, not that the trial court's decision was void or that he be
acquitted.  There can be no question about the trial court's jurisdiction over the
criminal prosecutions. Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor
child by its parent, as provided in Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six
months or a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or both. Article 210
penalizes a violation of the obligation to give adequate support found in Article
46 with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or both, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised
Penal Code or special laws. The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial
court determined a matter not within its competence and authority. There is likewise
no basis for its gratuitous finding that a parent cannot be held criminally liable under
P.D. 603 for withholding support from his minor child. There is absolutely no
discussion on this ruling.
Christina Dempsey v. RTC, (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15 August 1988): As to the information charging abandonment, the
private respondent entered his plea of guilt with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with the
assistance of his counsel. The reversal of conviction based on a plea of guilty is an act which is not at all explained
by the respondent court and, therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction. It is well-settled as a general rule that a plea of
guilt is sufficient to sustain conviction without introduction of further evidence (People v. Formentera, 130 SCRA 114;
People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119; People v. Gravino, et al., 122 SCRA 123; People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 828). Only in
such exceptional cases as capital offenses is evidence still required.  sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance
Christina Dempsey v. RTC, (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15 August 1988): The
respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights
arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child.
Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority
of parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's
observations are wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate children.
Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted
children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that "all children shall
be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or
illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors."
Rights must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is possible to do so. The
Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive
Order No. 209, July 17, 1978 erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted
children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as
joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of
effectivity is approaching, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental
authority.  The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the
municipal trial court to the Department of Social Services and Development. It is
readily apparent that the DSSD cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal
sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned
child in the strict sense of the word as she is still in the custody and care of her
mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an abandoned child as follows: "... An
abandoned child is one who has no parental care or guardianship or whose parents or
guardians have deserted him for a period of at least six continuous months ... ."
Article 161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at bar. Thus, it is not the
Department of Social Services and Development which has jurisdiction but the
Municipal Trial Court. 
Christina Dempsey v. RTC, (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15 August 1988): There is
one other point which has to be corrected. As part of the civil liability in its
judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie as
his natural child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a child by
her father is provided for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this
criminal prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the
issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court
committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as
part of the civil liability in the criminal case. 
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): As clearly
inferred from the foregoing provisions (Art. 188) of law, the written consent of
the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent
has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of
the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. In
the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to
the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking.
Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors
for adoption by the natural father as follows: The allegations of abandonment in
the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner,
sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the
child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our
statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent
to the adoption of their minor children.
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): However, in
cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is
a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of
the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits. This
Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the
issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his
consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon''
means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this
word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and
publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or
interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe their children." 23
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): In the
instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount
abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his
wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims. Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both
his wife and children: Christmas letters, gifts, etc. Aside from these letters, petitioner
also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the
filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his
children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children
from 1985 to 1989.
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): These
pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the
courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial
support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and
his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts
he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were
"withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below attached a high
premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally brushed aside
the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological
well-being of the children. True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted
by his uncle and aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as
shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as
revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith's
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that
would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to. The courts
below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children. This is hardly
surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their
presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of
snuggling close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of
their emotional detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the
uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when they needed
help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital
bills.
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): In a
number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be
entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of
material comfort than his natural parent.
Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead
of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to
go with his mother. The Court said: Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of
affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.
to
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to
award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother: This court should
avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and
tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take
away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due
to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come
true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but
artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said
parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with regret
consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into
their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices,
ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh
and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare
and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the
father, the Court said: A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her
counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children
and the humiliation she suffered as a, result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than
the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children.  While the bonds between a mother
and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer
agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the
other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): Indeed, it
would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter,
taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and
spiritual needs of the child. 30 The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner
abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to
provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his
children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting
parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained
the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed
him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person
they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs. The Court is thus
dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's "meager" financial
support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his
family.
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998):
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald,
his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable
conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from their father.
One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna
Marie's health — she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a
heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not that
serious as she could still take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her
ability to physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in
Los Angeles 38 — she could not have been employed if her health were endangered.
It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority
apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna
Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would "never be at ease with the wife
of their father." 39
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): Petitioner,
who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to the
sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point.
Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from
being Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a
family man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his
family. Neither may the Court place a premium on the inability of a man to
distinguish between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality
that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as
sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit
father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a
"bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not
exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as
a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. 42 Petitioner has
demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of
sending a telegram 43 to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the
adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to
attend to the case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite
his family once more in the United States. 44 Private respondents themselves
explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement with his wife on the
support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As such,
he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute
petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal
home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may
not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner
tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter
how "meager."
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): The
liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the
adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the
overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper
context and perspective. In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance
on the manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie
which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private
respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into
contracts as a result of the legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore,
included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however,
anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse
to enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall
include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such
conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private respondents' apparent reliance on
the decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's consent to the
adoption. The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of
the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of
parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption.
Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal separation of parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court." In
awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit." If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse
the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse
shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The
innocent spouse shall have the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right
to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education,
health and religion. 50
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): In a number
of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of which is
vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental authority,
"there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor." Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the
law still disallows the same. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. 52  time that the petition for adoption was filed. 67  Said petition must be denied as it
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): As such, in
instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived
of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in
the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court
on the basis of the agreement of the spouses. While parental authority may be
waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, 53 there was no factual finding
in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he
should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law
that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the
court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie
back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion
for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the
transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt
charge against them. 54 The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority
over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal
separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner
had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their
adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of
adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely
because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on
the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation
that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record. Parental authority is a
constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established customs and tradition
of our people.
Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals,   a case involving the visitorial rights of an
57
illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that: Parents have the
natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their upbringing and
safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the
law not the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the
well being of the child.
Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998): Underlying
the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with
respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best
interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the
primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The
rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in
fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible. Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For
sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their
parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for
their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the
was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005): Third, the
award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is provisional and subject to change
as circumstances may warrant. In this connection, there is no need for a lengthy
discussion of the alleged finality of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order granting Crisanto
temporary custody of his son. For that matter, even the award of child custody after a
judgment on a marriage annulment is not permanent; it may be reexamined and
adjusted if and when the parent who was given custody becomes unfit.29
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005): Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child Article 213 of the Family Code31 provides: This Curt has
held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. 32  The general rule that children
under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds
its raison d’etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving
care.33 In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus: "The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ‘compelling reasons’
for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon
the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12) It
clearly mandates that "no child under five years of age shall be separated from his
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so."
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,39 the Court held that the use of "shall" in Article 363
of the Civil Code and the observations made by the Code Commission underscore
the mandatory character of the word. 40 Holding in that case that it was a mistake to
deprive the mother of custody of her two children, both then below the age of seven,
the Court stressed: "[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her
child below seven years, unless such a separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a
court."41
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005): Mandatory
Character of Article 213 of the Family Code In like manner, the word "shall" in
Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 42 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has
been held to connote a mandatory character. 43 Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly
contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other,
but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de facto
separation.44 In the present case, the parents are living separately as a matter of fact.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005): The Best
Interest of the Child a Primary Consideration. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration."45 The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine
cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict
with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in
choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should
always be the paramount consideration.46 Courts are mandated to take into account
all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s well-being and
development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations
of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the
capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children.47 Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each of
the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and
time availability; as well as the children’s emotional and educational needs
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005): Tender-Age
Presumption As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a
general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the
age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except
when the court finds cause to order otherwise. 48 The so-called "tender-age
presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only
by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease.49 Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that
under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a
compelling reason to deprive her of custody.50 But sexual preference or moral
laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact
that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would
render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. 51 To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an
adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse
from exercising proper parental care.52
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v. Navarro,53 wherein the mother was
openly living with her brother-in-law, the child’s uncle. Under that circumstance, the
Court deemed it in the nine-year-old child’s best interest to free her "from the
obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which the
mother ha[d] placed herself might create in [the child’s] moral and social outlook."54
In Espiritu v. CA,55 the Court took into account psychological and case study reports
on the child, whose feelings of insecurity and anxiety had been traced to strong
conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the child revealed, among other
things, that the latter was disturbed upon seeing "her mother hugging and kissing a
‘bad’ man who lived in their house and worked for her father." The Court held that
the "illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused the child emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values x x x."
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005): Based on the
above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that
Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her
purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son
or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development.
Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was
exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result. Moreover, it is worthy to note that
the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that
she had found the "reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling" 56 as to suffice as
a ground for separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion
after personally observing the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her
chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him
firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to witness the child’s
behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more weight than a mere
reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench
the child from the mother’s custody.
Beckett v. Sarmiento, (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, 30 January 2013):
Complainant has charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law. He
states in this regard that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own Decision
of September 25, 2006 which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the
issue of Geoffrey, Jr’s. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment
on compromise agreement. The Court cannot go along with complainant’s above
posture. Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in
favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more
appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011
Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to his
father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command
to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the
matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 12 "is not permanent
and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted." And as aptly
observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, 13 a custody agreement can
never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the
situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the
agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very real
sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded
the force and effect of res judicata.
Beckett v. Sarmiento, (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, 30 January 2013): Now to
another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-
settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. 14 And if
already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to
be under custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.15  private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals,16 We held that in custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in no
less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that "in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."17
Beckett v. Sarmiento, (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, 30 January 2013): In the light
of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong reasons to rule
otherwise, the preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live
with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a
competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to reiterate, permanent.
In Espiritu,18 We ruled that: x x x The matter of custody is not permanent and
unalterable.1âwphi1 If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes
unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best
interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is
chosen to be the custodian. x x
Beckett v. Sarmiento, (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, 30 January 2013): As Rosalind
and Reginald Espiritu in Espiritu,19 Geoffrey, Jr., at the time when he persistently
refused to be turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As such, he
was very much capable of deciding, based on his past experiences, with whom he
wanted to stay. Noteworthy too are the results of the interviews which were reflected
in the three reports previously mentioned, excerpts from which are hereunder quoted,
to wit: x x x In so far as Geoffrey, Jr.’s account of experience, being with his father’s custody is
something that he is afraid of and something he does not want to happen again. However, being with his
mother is the one (sic) he is looking to (sic) and aspires. 20 x x x x x x x Being in the custody of his mother
is something (sic) he feel (sic) secure and protected and this is manifested in the child’s craving for his
mother’s presence all the time and the desire to be always with her that even (sic) he sleeps he wants his
mother to embrace and hug him and cries when he wakes up and he cannot see his mother. 21 x x x x x x x
He locked me in the room. He always leave (sic) me. x x x they keep fighting, Daddy and his girlfriend ...
they'll get angry with (sic) me ... I'm scared with (sic) Daddy. 22 With these, We see no reason to
sustain the charge against respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law. For
clearly, absent any evidence to the contrary, Geoffrey, Jr. chose to live with his
mother for a reason, which respondent judge, consistent with the promotion of the
best interest of the child, provisionally granted through the issuance of the disputed
March 15, 2011 Order. In fact, in issuing the disputed Order, respondent judge
rectified an error previously made when he handed out the Judgment on Compromise
Agreement in 2006
Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, 18 February 2014): From the foregoing
provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 (Art. 176) is, in
case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father. In the case at bar, respondent
filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children
with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 15 is enough to establish the paternity of
his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, 18 February 2014): Now comes the
matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for
the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent? Clearly,
there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Art.
176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free
from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The
use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion 17 upon
the illegitimate children.
Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, 18 February 2014): It is best to emphasize
once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured
is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and
again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of
the minor child.

In Alfon v. Republic, 18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to
continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as
it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the
surname of her mother to which she is entitled.

In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the

child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of
the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is
second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation
considering his circumstances.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote, 20 We gave due deference to the choice of
an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his
interest, thus: The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his
identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child.
For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by
the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change. The law and facts obtaining here favor
Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court
found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s
petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his
name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This
Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)

Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, 18 February 2014): An argument,

however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s surname
upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255. Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an
administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22  Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the
above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory
use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of
his paternity. To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be
known