In June 2022, it was announced that the Singapore government would take back the

ownership and the management of the Singapore Sports Hub from December 9,

2022 (Low & Ong, 2022). Managed previously under a public-private partnership

(PPP) model with Sports Hub Pte Ltd (SHPL), the termination of the contract raised

questions on the viability of the Sports Hub as a PPP project. The termination of the

PPP project cost the government about S$2.3 billion dollars, however, a sum

comparable to the total annual fees it would have paid if the contract period was

fulfilled (Heng, 2022).

Prior to the takeover, the government evaluated the performance of the Sports Hub

over a period of 12 to 18 months, including the pre-Covid period (Heng, 2022). A

multitude of reasons was referenced to as to why the government has decided to

terminate the Sports Hub PPP project. Firstly, there was a scarcity of events lined up

by the Sports Hub despite boasting first-class infrastructure (Aziz, 2022). The Sports

Hub has failed to secure international marquee events on an annually recurring

basis. Due to a lack of integration of services across various facilities coupled with

the risk of revenue losses from low audience turnout, the SHPL consortium could not

deliver marquee sports events consistently (Choo, 2022). Secondly, SHPL’s profit-

driven model was incongruent with the Sports Hub’s social objectives (Aziz, 2022).

The faulty grass pitch and a leaking roof were infrastructural indicators that the SHPL

consortium was largely driven by cost-efficiency rather than meeting key

performance indicators and delivering quality services to its target user groups.

There was also a lack of community participation due to the SPHL’s unwillingness to

stage events with little to no commercial returns. Thus, community events such as

National School Games and Family Days, which encouraged grassroots activation,
were not commonly held at the Sports Hub. Local sports organisations also found

grievances with the high booking and rental fees of the facilities, further undermining

the Sports Hub’s objectives to provide sports entertainment to the public at low

costs. Under the management of the SPHL consortium, the profit-driven model had a

tenuous relationship with the government’s social aspirations for the Sports Hub. The

disconnect between the private and public partners was attributed to a lack of

government representation on the SHPL’s board of directors, who was the entity

charged with making major decisions related to the Sports Hub (Ong, 2022). Since

the board of directors consisted mainly representatives from private stakeholders,

community-centric goals inadvertently took a backseat in lieu of the need to pursue

financial gains. The early termination of the Sports Hub PPP project has thus raised

questions on whether the PPP model is suitable for public projects with social

objectives. Thirdly, the government cited the strengthening of SportSG’s internal

expertise and the increase in demand for world-class sporting events as signs of a

maturing ecosystem in the local sports scene (Aziz, 2022). The PPP model was no

longer the best way forward, warranting the government’s decision to take over the

ownership and management of the Sports Hub.

Ong (2022) outlined internal issues leading to the demise of the Sports Hub PPP

project. Due to the competing interests of at least six major subcontractors who were

involved in the daily operations, many resources were spent on the coordination of

KPIs and operational details for sporting projects amongst the stakeholders. The

bureaucratic inefficiencies severely hampered SHPI’s ability to exercise effective

leadership.
Through the analysis of six Singapore PPP cases, Kim & Kwa (2020) found that no

single risk factor is consequential in the failure of the project. Instead, the failure of a

PPP project hinged upon a multitude of risk factors whose impacts extended across

the lifetime of the project. In the case of a social infrastructure PPP project, such as

the Singapore Sports Hub, the failure of a project could also hinge upon its ability to

deliver optimal social interests to the public. Besides fulfilling economic outcomes, a

social infrastructure project is also expected to deliver quality services to its target

group and achieve expectations meted out by the citizens. 

Under the new ownership model, Kallang Alive Sport Management (KASM), a

subsidiary under Kallang Alive Holding Co., would oversee the management of

Sports Hub (Kwek, 2022). Minister for Culture, Community and Youth, Edwin Tong,

highlighted in his parliamentary ministerial statement on August 1, 2022, that the

government takeover would allow the Sports Hub to realise its full potential as a

“community icon” (Choo, 2022; Heng, 2022). Singaporeans can enjoy greater access

to community spaces within and around the Sports Hub and school-centric events

such as the National School Games and Singapore Youth Festival performances.

(Choo, 2022)

In his article, Yuan (2012) outlined the partnership model governing the construction

and running of the Singapore Sports Hub. The private will design, finance, build and

operate the facilities in the Sports Hub for a contract period of between 20 to 30

years. Upon the conclusion of the lease, the ownership of the Sports Hub will be

reverted to the Singapore Sports Council.

Links:

https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/sports-hub-takeover-govt-pledges-hold-
more-affordable-community-events-school-games-1958061
https://www.straitstimes.com/sport/sports-hub-marks-new-chapter-after-takeover-
with-a-series-of-activities
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/costs-of-terminating-sports-hub-ppp-
represented-fair-deal-for-government-says-edwin-tong
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/government-takeover-sports-hub-
driven-social-not-financial-concerns-edwin-tong
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/big-read-sports-hub-nightmare-what-
went-wrong-government-run-it-better-2755361