Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No.

121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons,2 with the crime
of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation3 of those
charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N.
Vizconde;4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde,5 and her sister Anne
Marie Jennifer6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Parañaque, Metro Manila.

During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the sworn

statements of those who testified against petitioner.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the
DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And Examination of Evidence and
Documents for the NBI to produce several documents.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted
photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost the original of the sworn
statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case for
the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn
statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty.
Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in compliance
with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by
petitioner Webb to the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It
appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from the NBI the
copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his
request for its production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did
not commit the crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1,
1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi
was corroborated by several people. He support his defense, he
submitted other documentary evidence.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding
probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an
Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their
co-respondents, On the same date, it filed the corresponding
Information19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque. It was, the respondent judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend:
(1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them:
(2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with
homicide;
(3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation;

ISSUE:
1. respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination
before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
2. WON the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge petitioners with the crime of
rape with homicide;

RULING:
1. We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge
Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by
highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest
in a matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders
of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial court were incomplete
and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause; and
(4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a
mere accessory had a "NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ
Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to conduct a
"searching examination of witnesses and evaluation of the
documents" on the part of said judges.

The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty

and is regulated by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of

probable cause both with respect to issuance of warrants of
arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their
requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed out
by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus:32 "It is generally assumed
that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is
concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search.
But each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different
facts and circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other. In
search cases, two conclusions must be supported by
substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable
by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the
 items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also
necessary that a particular person be implicated. By
comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it, which of course can exist without any showing
that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that
person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide
for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of
arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest,
section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in
issuing search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Rule 126 provide:

2. The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ."
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a
person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State.21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an
opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law
reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.22 Other
jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the term
ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms are legally
synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the
law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the
street.25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which
his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common
sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.
In this case, the DOJ Panel relied on the statement of the witness
Jesicca Alfaro. The DOJ Panel then weighed the inculpatory evidence of
petitioners. Given the conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the
petitioners, the court hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while
probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.