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Islamophobia in Japan:
A Country at a Crossroads

Saul J. Takahashi
Osaka Jogakuin University

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL

VOLUME 6, NO. 2 Fall 2021, PP. 167–181.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley

Disclaimer:
Statements of fact and opinion in the articles, notes, perspectives, and so
on in the Islamophobia Studies Journal are those of the respective authors
and contributors. They are not the expression of the editorial or advisory
board and staff. No representation, either expressed or implied, is made
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and appropriateness of those materials.

167
168 ISJ 6(2)

Islamophobia in Japan: A Country at a Crossroads

Saul J. Takahashi
Osaka Jogakuin University1

INTRODUCTION
In many ways, Japan is a country at a crossroads, both politically and socially, with multi-
ple, contradictory elements at play. The country could easily regress back to the totalitarian Japan
of the 1930s, where dissent is oppressed and political and religious beliefs not in conformity with
the norm are not tolerated. Indeed, many elements in the political class seem bent on steering
Japan in this direction. Conversely, Japan could potentially evolve into a multicultural society
where diversity, if not embraced, is at least enjoyed. In many ways, Japan is already progressing
down this route, and it is almost inevitable that the trend will continue. Otherwise, Japan could
continue muddling on in its current state, unsure of the path it should take. It is within this cur-
rent, unpredictable context that the question of Islamophobia in Japan must be examined.

JAPAN IN THE MODERN ERA—BEATING EUROPEANS

AT THEIR OWN GAME
As noted by Bin Mohamed Osman, Islamophobia in Asian countries is “rooted in the
historical context of the colonial experience” (Bin Mohamed Osman 2018, 20). Protected by
geographical distance, a lack of natural resources, and a relatively strong and centralized gov-
ernment that had adopted advanced military technologies early on, Japan was never colonized
by the West. Nevertheless, its interaction with Western imperialism, and the wholescale
importing of Western imperialist philosophies during a certain period of Japanese history, has
had significant implications for attitudes toward Islam and Muslims today.
Having emerged victorious in 1603 from a century of conflict with other warlords, the
priority of the Tokugawa Shogunate (the ruling military government) was to consolidate its
rule over the country and to clamp down on any dissent. Foreign influences in particular were
viewed with suspicion, leading to severe restrictions on trade, even contact with, foreign coun-
tries. Europeans (Dutch and Portuguese, at the time) in particular were forced to reside in an
isolated, small island off Nagasaki, with any and all contact conducted through limited, official
channels. These measures were in force for approximately 200 years, a period popularly known
as the sakoku era, the era when the “country was closed off.”
The sakoku era came to an abrupt end in the mid-1800s, as Western gunboats brazenly
entered Japanese harbors and essentially forced Japan to engage in trade. The Shogunate col-
lapsed in 1867, and, fearing military domination by the West, the Meiji government embarked
on a rapid program of modernization, industrialization, and militarization. Meiji was a period of
frantic, often forced, institutional and social change, with Western methods and structures
adopted and even idealized, usually without much reservation. Government slogans such as
bunmei kaika (“opening to civilization and becoming civilized”) and datsu-a nyuu-ou (“escaping
Asia and becoming European”) are indicative of the mentality of the time. Indeed, there was
even a movement (albeit short-lived) to adopt English as the official language of the country, the
notion being that European languages were more suited for modern ideas.
 169

In contrast to sakoku, Meiji is usually called the kaikoku (“opening of the country”)
era—though this dichotomy has been called into question in recent years by many academics,
who argue that the opened–closed metaphor is itself Eurocentric. In any case, the Meiji efforts
bore fruit (at least in a macroeconomic and military sense) in an astonishingly short period of
time, and in 1905, Japan became the first non-European country in modern times to win a war
with a European power (Russia). Japan had truly entered the imperialist club—a path that
would eventually prove disastrous.
Therefore, like other Asian countries, the history of Japan in the modern era has been
shaped by the country’s interaction with Western imperialist powers. Unlike many other Asian
countries, Japan managed to escape colonization; however, it managed to do this only through
essentially “beating the Europeans at their own game”—adopting European institutions, shap-
ing itself as a strong, modern country worthy of respect by European rivals, and adopting the
same imperialistic methods as the European powers Japan so wished to emulate.

ISLAM IN JAPAN—A HISTORY

Japan is a country that prides itself on its homogeneity. Though much scholarship has
been done in recent decades showing that this self-perception is historically and empirically
little more than a manufactured illusion (see, e.g., Oguma 1995), the notion that Japan is eth-
nically pure and culturally uniform remains dominant and is repeated countless times in public
discourse.
Alleged homogeneity notwithstanding, it is noteworthy for the current discussion that
Japan has no national religion, and affiliation with a particular faith has almost never been seen
as a core component of belonging to the Japanese people. Historically, Japan has been heavily
influenced by Buddhism and its indigenous religion, Shinto, but over centuries these two reli-
gions (and their many sub-strands) have meshed religious practices, traditions, and even spaces
of worship to the extent that many Japanese are not conscious (or even cognizant) of the differ-
ence. Christians were persecuted by the Shogunate in the 1600s, and many were forced to
renounce their religion. However, this oppression was not conducted within a religious frame-
work, but a political one, as the Shogunate saw Western influence as a threat to its hold on
power (see, e.g., Suzuki 2017, 44–9).
During the Meiji period, the government started thinking that having an official faith
similar to that in European countries would add a spiritual backbone to its efforts to form a
modern nation-state and designated Shinto as the national religion. However, the above amal-
gamation of Shinto and Buddhism meant that the latter could never be truly excluded, and
most of the populace had difficulty taking the endeavor seriously. Official religion was abol-
ished after the war, and, under military occupation by American forces, Japan adopted an
American style separation between church and state (see, e.g., Sakamoto 1994). Nevertheless,
there remains an influential extremist right-wing element in the country that argues for the
restoration of Shinto as the “true” religion of the nation, and the separation of church and state
in Japan is, at times, somewhat precarious (see, e.g., Tawara 2018).
Japanese contact with Islam actually predates its contact with Christianity. Sakai notes
how Islamic philosophy came to Japan from China and Southeast Asia during the medieval era
of Heian, which spawned from the late eighth to the late 12th century (Sakai 2010, 126).
Nevertheless, the religion did not take root, and among the Western ideas imported wholescale
by Japan during Meiji were Orientalist notions of Muslims and Arabs being barbaric and lazy.
Notions that Islam was a backward and totalitarian religion that rendered Muslims incapable
of accepting new, advanced ideas were also featured (Sugita 1995, 97–9, 148)
170 ISJ 6(2)

At the same time, this was not the entire story; the bullish nationalism that was core to
the entire Meiji period contained a narrative that Japan would lead the rest of Asia to overthrow
Western colonialism. As self-serving as this narrative may have been, it was adhered to widely,
and some Japanese intellectuals stressed the need for solidarity with oppressed Muslims not
only in Asia but in Africa as well (Sakai 2010, 128, 129). It was around this time that the first
recorded conversion of a Japanese to Islam took place. In 1890, an Ottoman cruiser was ship-
wrecked off the Japanese coast, and the crew was rescued and returned to Istanbul by the
Japanese navy the next year. Shotaro Noda, a journalist who accompanied the return voyage to
report for his newspaper, converted to Islam during his stay in Istanbul (Komura 2015, 41–3).
The government continued to make efforts to establish friendly relations with Muslim
communities in Asia during the war as part of its efforts to promote itself as an ally against
Western imperialism. These efforts were half-hearted and generally ineffectual. Interestingly
enough, though, there is evidence that they led to more Japanese converting to Islam, though
the number was never statistically significant (Komura 2015, 46–50).

ISLAM IN THE CURRENT DAY

Modern Japan is a secular, a religious society. Most Japanese are skeptical, if not
downright suspicious, of religion, and while they may participate in religious ceremonies,
those are generally viewed as mere communal rituals, as opposed to expressions of faith. Japanese
regularly joke about taking part in Shinto rituals during the summer festival season, getting
married in a Christian church, and having a Buddhist funeral—simply put, for the majority of
Japanese, religion is not a core part of their identity, and while there are of course Japanese who
adhere to a specific religion, religion is largely kept out of the public sphere.
There is no official data regarding the religion of individuals in Japan. Opinion surveys
indicate that 62% of the population have no religious beliefs, a proportion that is increasing
(NHK 2019, 53). Of those who did respond that they had a religious faith, Buddhism was the
overwhelming majority, with only a small percentage responding they were Shinto believers.
There is also a Christian minority of approximately 1% of the population. There have been
three Christian prime ministers since 1945 (and two before), but since religion is largely viewed
in Japan as a personal matter, the Christian (or other) faith of prime ministers has been subject
to barely a mention by the Japanese media.
The current Muslim population in Japan is estimated at approximately 200,000,
amounting to nearly 0.17% of the population. Of this, approximately 90% are estimated to
be foreign nationals (or naturalized Japanese) who have roots in predominantly Muslim
countries—mainly Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Turkey, and Iran. As many as
one-tenth of the total—20,000—are estimated to be ethnic Japanese who have converted to
Islam (Tanada 2019).
All indications are that the Muslim population, including the Japanese Muslim popula-
tion, is increasing. New mosques are being established frequently. Tanada counts 105 mosques
as of the end of 2018 in 36 of Japan’s 47 prefectures (Mainichi Shimbun 2019a). Some of these
are purpose-built structures, visibly designed from the outset as mosques and with minarets.
This is an increase from 80 mosques in 2014 and only 14 mosques in 1999 (Tanada 2017, 27,
36). In 2016, a mosque was established with a specific focus on Japanese worshippers. Sermons
in this mosque are conducted in Japanese, as opposed to other mosques, where sermons tend to
be in various languages (e.g., Urdu or Turkish) according to the majority of the regular attendees
(Asahi Shimbun 2016). The establishment of the Japanese language mosque is significant, as it
suggests a critical mass of Japanese followers.
 171

The above notwithstanding, Islam remains obscure in Japan. In the public discourse
Islam is overwhelmingly presented as foreign and alien and is undoubtedly understood as such
by the vast majority of the populace. Books and media articles about Muslims residing in Japan
nearly all focus only on foreign Muslims, and either ignore (or have never thought that there
could be) Japanese Muslims (see, e.g., Mori 2018).
This is in stark contrast to the situation with Christianity. Whereas Christian Japanese
are not viewed as particularly unusual, Japanese Muslims are generally looked upon as oddities,
even un-Japanese (see, e.g., Sato 2015). Arguably, Christianity benefits from its perceived con-
nection to Western, modern values (many Japanese even seem to believe that Christianity
originated in Europe). Islam, on the other hand, remains associated in the mind of most Japanese
with West Asian strife, conflict, and terrorism. That a Japanese would be attracted, and con-
vert, to Islam remains a subject of surprise and even suspicion. This is unsurprising, given that
both the government and the mainstream media frequently present Islam as interlinked with
terrorism, as shall be examined below. Foreign Muslims are, of course, in a much more vulner-
able position than Japanese Muslims and are widely looked upon with suspicion.

OFFICIAL JAPAN: THE MUSLIM AS TERRORIST

Though the public discourse in Japan is generally free from the virulent, open racism
that can be observed in many Western countries, discourses on issues related to security are
dominated by Islamophobic narratives. In official parlance, terrorism, in particular interna-
tional terrorism, is associated heavily with Islamic groups. Though documents published by
law enforcement authorities regularly highlight the purported danger of “guerilla/terror” activ-
ities by extreme leftist groups (see, e.g., Keisatsucho 2018), the term “terrorist organizations”
is used to refer solely to “radical Islamic groups”—indeed, the two are used in an interchange-
able manner. A government paper from December 2017 is emblematic: though the title is
merely “Counter Terrorism Measures in the Run-Up to the 2020 Tokyo Olympics,” the entire
paper focuses on the purported threat by “radical Islamic organizations,” listing well-known
attacks in the United States and European countries, and asserting that Da’esh poses a grave
danger to Japan (Keishicho 2017). Other official statements are similar, focusing on the situa-
tion in West Asia as “background,” and stressing the threat of “radical Islamic groups” (see,
e.g., Keishicho 2015).
This is not to assert that there is no risk to Japan, or Japanese nationals abroad. As
the government points out repeatedly in its statements, Da’esh and organizations affiliated
with Al Qaeda have named Japan as a target due to Japan’s military alliance with the United
States and its participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Keishicho 2017, 1). However, the
government’s persistent equation of terrorism with activities by (or the mere existence of)
“radical Islamic groups” contributes to the notion that Islam, and individual Muslims, are
all terrorist threats.
The notion that Islam is synonymous with terrorism, and the extremely negative
impact that can have on the rights of Muslims in Japan, is readily apparent in the Muslim sur-
veillance case. In 2010, it came to light through a large leak of internal documents that for
years the police had been conducting a massive surveillance operation targeting all Muslims in
the country. Properties overlooking mosques were rented and officers stationed there 24/7, tak-
ing records of persons entering the mosque, following them, and gathering data on their
addresses, employment, immigration history and so forth. Mosques were not the only estab-
lishment subject to surveillance: businesses owned by Muslims or which employed large num-
bers of Muslims were also listed as targets (Keishicho 2007, 1).
172 ISJ 6(2)

The entire operation was explicitly based on the premise that all Muslims were poten-
tial security risks by mere virtue of their religious beliefs. Indeed, religious devotion was treated
as an indicator of a heightened propensity toward terrorism. Special red flags were raised with
regard to people who prayed five times a day, including one Muslim who raised suspicion
because he had “started praying diligently after his daughter was born” (Keishicho 2008).
Other red flags included the expression of views on contentious political issues, such as views
critical of the United States, Israel, and Japan’s involvement in the American invasion of Iraq
(Keishicho 2005, 1). The police were put on high alert regarding one Pakistani national who
had stated that he “hated the US and wanted them to leave Iraq” (Aoki 2011, 50), views which
were, of course, shared and openly expressed by thousands of people within and without Japan
at the time. The entire staff of the Iranian embassy in Tokyo (including personal bank accounts)
were subject to special surveillance for no reason other than that “the United States [had] des-
ignated Iran as a terrorism supporting country” (Keishicho 2005). As noted by this author in a
previous publication, the blanket nature of the surveillance makes it a stark example of ethno-
religious profiling, a practice violative of international human rights law (Takahashi 2019).
Immediately upon the leaking of the documents, a particular narrative was advanced
within the mainstream media. This narrative was very critical of the police, but not regarding
the operation itself. Rather, the media focused on the fact that the leaked documents included
intensely personal information of many of the subjects of the surveillance and that the leaking of
that information had caused “distress” for the individuals concerned (Asahi Shimbun 2010).
Had there been no leak of the information, there would have been no “distress”—so, according
to this narrative, the police should have taken more measures to secure the data. The only “right”
mentioned in the media was the individuals’ right to privacy—lost in the dominant narrative
was the fact that the entire operation itself was a clear violation of Japan’s international legal
obligations. Almost nowhere was there any suggestion that the surveillance itself was illegiti-
mate. And while there were few articles that stated explicitly that Muslims were all potential
terrorism threats, the unstated assumption was clear. Indeed, most media did not even refer to
the case as the “Muslim surveillance case,” preferring language such as the “counter terrorism
document leak case.” By accepting that the operation was a counter-terrorism one, this language
reinforced the notion that Muslims are terrorist threats.
This narrative was eventually adopted without reservation by the Japanese judiciary,
which judged in a subsequent court case concerning the surveillance that the operation was
legitimate and “necessary to prevent international terrorism” (Tokyo Chiho Saibansho 2014).
As justification for this reasoning, the court cited a long list of cases of terrorist attacks com-
mitted by Al Qaeda and other groups, none of which had taken place in Japan or had targeted
Japanese nationals. The court also cited the Dumont case of 2004, where an alleged senior
member of Al Qaeda had entered Japan several times with fake documents. There was (and
remains) no indication that Dumont had engaged in any illegal acts while he was in Japan, but
the court notes that Dumont was “a devout Muslim. He never failed to pray five times a day,
and frequented mosques” (Tokyo Chiho Saibansho 2014). Though not stated in so many words,
the implication is clear—Muslims are potential terrorist threats, and a high level of religious
devotion indicates an even stronger threat. Or, put differently, not all Muslims may be terror-
ists, but all terrorists are Muslims.
Besides the abject disregard by the judiciary of human rights standards, one notable
aspect of the surveillance case is the small number of victims who joined the lawsuit. Interviews
and informal discussions by the author with members of the Muslim community point to the
obvious conclusion, namely that they felt extremely vulnerable and did not wish to “cause any
more trouble.” It was also stated that there was internal strife, as the leaked police documents
 173

listed some Muslims as “informants” (even though in many cases police officers appeared to
have had only one or two conversations of a general nature with them). This had led to mutual
suspicion within the community, with fears that people were providing inaccurate informa-
tion, labeling them as terrorists, or even trying to settle personal disputes by using the police.
Media outlets highlighted this aspect from a different angle, stressing on numerous
occasions that Muslims who had cooperated with the police feared for their safety and that the
police had to take special measures to protect them (Tokyo Shimbun 2010). This arguably
contributed even further to the negative perception of Muslims, portraying them as violent and
as a community that had something to hide.

THE MEDIA
As noted above, the mainstream media played a pivotal role in spreading and solidify-
ing an Islamophobic narrative about police surveillance. Sakai’s 2010 survey notes that there
has been a huge increase in articles regarding Islam since the terror attacks on September 11,
2001, and that most of those articles associate Islam with terrorism. Sakai concludes that “The
main tendency in the media regarding the Islam represented by the Iranian revolution was to
see it as fanatical, violent, and backward” and states that it “seems very likely that the media
naively imported Western perceptions of Islam from Western media and followed them by
generalizing about Muslim society as an ‘other’ that may cause a ‘clash of civilizations’ with the
West” (Sakai 2010, 135, 125).
A quick survey of all articles mentioning “Islam” in the influential Asahi Shimbun
broadsheet from January 1 to October 31, 2019, shows that nearly all articles are related to
terrorism, armed conflict, or backward practices (such as the Iranian ban on women attend-
ing football matches, or a female student who was murdered in a Bangladeshi religious
school). One article on the boycott of Israeli athletes presents “Islamic countries in the Middle
East” as unreasonable for bringing political factors into international sports and mentions
the reasons for the boycott only in passing (Asahi Shimbun 2019). Other media outlets have
written that the “excitement” of Ramadan leads to an increased threat of terror attacks
(Tokyo Shimbun 2016).
Tabloids are of course less restrained, and often associate Islam and Muslims with
terrorists more openly. Many tabloid articles do not bother to distinguish between Muslims,
political Islamists, and terrorists, jumbling them all together in a misleading manner (see,
e.g., Shuukan Shincho 2016, 27). It is also not uncommon for tabloids to claim that there
are “radical Muslim illegals” in Japan that pose a terrorist threat (see, e.g., Shuukan Post
2015)—despite the fact that the above extensive surveillance by the police resulted in no
such evidence.
Japan also has its share of pseudo academics acting as Islamophobic commentators. For
example, the publications of the best-selling Akari Iiyama are full of wild and fantastical
claims, such as the notion that the Quran requires Muslims to kill all non-believers, including
Japanese (Iiyama 2019, 7). Blaming Muslim migrants for crime and sexual violence in Europe,
Iiyama (who surprisingly seems to have an advanced degree in Islamic studies) alleges that
“peace in Islam means subjugation to Muslim domination” and that Japanese who believe that
Islam is a religion of peace “are merely projecting their own feelings” (Iiyama 2019, 5).
Iiyama’s most recent publication contains a chapter with the provocative title “If the world
were ruled by Muslims” that does little more than repeat reported human rights abuses by
Da’esh. In other publications, Iiyama claims that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with
democracy (Iiyama 2018).
174 ISJ 6(2)

Though few are as overtly racist as Iiyama, other commentators advance substantially
similar “clash of civilizations” type ideas, claiming, for example, that protecting the rights of
Muslims as a community will lead to the denigration of liberal democracy (see, e.g., Ikeda
2018). Commentators such as Ikeda are subject to widespread criticism by serious academics
for their selective citation of religious texts and their essentialization of Muslims as a mono-
lithic entity (see, e.g., Usuki 2005); nevertheless, they remain influential in policy circles, and
receive attention in the media.
Other right-wing commentators, including some closely connected with high ranking
politicians, advance a more indirect “Muslims as savages” narrative by heaping praise on Israeli
security and military policies, at times in the most crass of manners. For example, Sono and
Sakurai suggest that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s aggressive stance makes him mascu-
line and sexy (Shukan Post 2013). Miura claims that the conscription of all Jewish Israelis
promotes the cause of peace in Israel (Sankei Shimbun 2019).

POLITICAL CONTEXT
None of the above can be divorced from the broader political context in Japan. Far right
elements have dominated Japanese politics in recent years, in particular during the second pre-
miership of Shinzo Abe, from 2012 to 2020. Abe is a staunch nationalist who stated repeatedly
his goal of revising Japan’s post-war, pacifist Constitution so as to allow the country to play a
more prominent military role abroad. Abe and nearly all of the members of his successive cabi-
nets have well-documented ties with extremist right-wing groups that openly long for a return
to the totalitarian order of the 1930s when the Emperor was worshiped as a deity, and the soci-
ety was highly militarized (Tawara 2018). Short of revising the Constitution, which is an ardu-
ous process requiring a national referendum, Abe did his utmost to re-militarize the country,
including changing longstanding government policy prohibiting weapons exports and ram-
ming through parliament legislation that allows easier dispatching of military forces abroad
(Takahashi 2016). Abe was forced to step down in September 2020, mainly due to his inept
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing corruption scandals. However, his succes-
sor, Yoshihide Suga, also has ties to the same extremist groups, and has stated his intent to
proceed down the same path as Abe.
Though these right-wing forces stress the need to “protect Japanese culture” (e.g.,
against “individualistic” human rights) (Jimin-to 2015), the paradox of the Japanese right is
that it is unabashedly pro-American. The “new” Japan is not conceptualized as a country that
defends Asian values and stands up against Western imperialism, or even one that offers a
viable alternative to Western values. Rather, Japan’s new, prominent role on the world stage is
seen as one squarely within the military alliance with the United States, defending Western
interests by military force if necessary—arguably a new manifestation of the Meiji longing to
be welcomed into the Western club of imperialist powers.
Within this context, the government has made no secret of its wish to see the Japanese
military participate in a more active way in American operations in West Asia (Mainichi
Shimbun 2019b). It is worth noting that the Japanese military has in recent years started con-
ducting training of urban warfare operations in desert environments (Nishi Nihon Shimbun
2015). The Abe government has also actively pursued closer relations with Israel and has strongly
encouraged Japanese big business to do the same, including through the joint development of
weapons (BDS Japan 2018). It is also noteworthy that the 2020 Tokyo Olympics has been used
repeatedly by the government to advance restrictive “security” measures, including measures
targeting undocumented foreign nationals (see, e.g., Keisatsu-cho et al. 2019; Kaido 2017).
 175

PUBLIC ATTITUDES—A MIXED STORY

Naturally, public attitudes are influenced by these narratives. Negative attitudes
toward Islam and Muslims came out starkly in a series of surveys conducted by a group of
researchers at one of Japan’s top universities between 2009 and 2012, in several locales where
the building of mosques were being planned. The 2012 survey in Fukuoka, Japan’s fifth city,
showed that 63% of respondents felt that Islam was an “extremist” religion, and 49% believed
that Islam was “frightening.” Only 22% agreed with the statement that “Islam is a religion of
peace” (Tanada, Ishikawa, and Okai 2013, 9).
27% of respondents believed that Muslims should not be allowed to reside in the country,
with 65% of respondents stating they “did not know.” Only 6% were positive toward increased
Muslim immigration. This is in stark contrast with how the respondents felt about increased
immigration in general; 44% stated they felt that foreign nationals should be allowed to come to
Japan, with only 14% disagreeing (Tanada, Ishikawa, and Okai 2013, 8). The other surveys in the
series show similar results, and all show that respondents get most of their information regarding
Islam from the media (Tanada; Ishikiawa, and Okai 2012; Tanada and Okai 2011).
Incidents of violence directed against Muslims are extremely rare, but Japan is gener-
ally not a violent society, and the crime rate is low overall. Hate crimes as such are not illegal
in Japan, and the authorities do not collect data on them in any comprehensive manner.
In July 2016, a Muslim group in Shizuoka that was in the process of constructing a
mosque posted on social media photos of several threatening postcards they had received.2 One
of the postcards was addressed to “fucking Muslims,” and stated:

You bastards have also killed people, haven’t you? Islam is a religion that loves killing people!
Please don’t kill any more Japanese or people from other countries. You should die!!! Ramadan?
Just starve yourselves until you die! You fucking idiots!3

Anecdotal stories of less overtly violent yet discriminatory attitudes are not uncommon,
ranging from Muslims being refused service at restaurants and other establishments (refusing
services on the basis of race or religion is not per se illegal in Japan) to Muslim girls and women
being forced to remove their Hijabs at schools or workplaces. Also noteworthy is the discourse
surrounding Warabi, a suburb of Tokyo that is home to the largest concentration of Kurdish
residents in Japan. Warabi is commonly referred to with derision as “Warabistan,” and it is
not difficult to find social and other media postings claiming that the Kurdish population is
responsible for a high crime rate in the area (see, e.g., Kamen Kizoku Yuri-ika 2018).

POSITIVE TRENDS
At the same time, the picture is not all bleak. As noted above, the Muslim population
in Japan is increasing, including, importantly, Japanese Muslims. There is a significant number
of publications stressing the need for “coexistence” with Muslim residents and of adopting
welcoming attitudes (e.g., Mori 2018). One typically Japanese factor has been the role of
Manga. For example, the award-winning series Satoko to Nada (Satoko and Nada), published in
a popular web-based Manga service, tells the story of a female Japanese student in the United
States who arrives at her university accommodation to find that her flat mate is a Saudi Muslim
who wears a niqab. Though wary at first, Satoko soon sees that she and Nada share similar
interests, and as their relationship becomes closer, Satoko learns about the positive elements of
Islam. The Manga is not entirely without problems—for example, it highlights violations of
176 ISJ 6(2)

women’s rights in Muslim countries, conveniently ignoring patriarchal structures in Japan and
the rest of the world—but overall, the “Muslims are people just like you and me” message is
one that promotes understanding (Yupechika 2018).
Though, as noted above, most of those publications focus solely on foreign Muslims,
stories of Japanese Muslims are also receiving attention, arguably pointing to an increasing
awareness among mainstream Japanese of the community (e.g., Sato 2015). There have been
Japanese Muslims featured prominently in the media, for example, Ko Nakata, a scholar who
received his doctorate in Islamic law in Cairo. Nakata has written several books promoting
Islam to the Japanese public, and for some years appeared frequently in the media to comment
on Middle Eastern politics.4 In 2016, several newspapers featured interviews with Junko
Hayashi, the first openly Muslim Japanese woman (or man) to pass the rigorous bar exam and
qualify as a lawyer (J-Cast 2016). Hayashi wears a hijab, as does Mari Nishimori, a journalist
listed as a “supervisor” for Satoko to Nada, above (Yupechika 2018).
No doubt such people are looked upon by most other Japanese as somewhat strange,
but their appearance as positive figures in the media arguably forces mainstream Japan to
rethink what membership in the national community means. As noted above, Japan has no
national religion, meaning that Japanese can in theory (and, in the case of Christians, are in
practice) be accepted as “normal” regardless of their religious beliefs, as long as they comply
with base social norms.
Also, on the positive side, Muslim organizations have been involved in charitable activi-
ties, for example, distributing food after the earthquake and tsunami in the northeast of Japan
in 2011. Those activities have been reported in the media, arguably creating a counter-narrative
to the “Muslims are terrorists” one (J-Cast 2019).
There are other, more indirect trends that may have a positive impact. The longstanding
economic malaise in the country has forced Japanese businesses to look upon foreign visitors as an
important source of revenue, and the government has made efforts to promote the tourism industry
as one way for Japan to lift itself out of the doldrums. The above has resulted in a large increase of
Muslim tourists and what is often referred to as the “Halal boom.” Though no comprehensive data
exists, it is plainly obvious that restaurants, major food chains, and other outlets in major cities and
tourist destinations have been scrambling in recent years to advertise their wares as Halal, and
many display prominent Halal certificates from one of several certifying associations. There is a
plethora of books available on the topic, and some local governments even provide financial sup-
port to companies wishing to obtain Halal certification (Taito-ku 2015).
Of course, the “boom” is clearly one driven by the prospect of profit and is based on the
image of the “good foreigner”—the rich tourist who drops plentiful amounts of money but
does not attempt to stay in the country any longer that “we” need him. Nevertheless, it is sub-
mitted that increased awareness of Islamic practices is in principle a good thing and has the
potential to lead to greater understanding, and acceptance, of Muslims in Japan.
Another trend is the increasing promotion of “diversity” in recent years. Diversity has
become a veritable buzz word in the country, with corporations in particular striving to adver-
tise their efforts in recruiting a more international workforce and providing products for diverse
markets (Keizai Sangyo-sho 2019). The Japanese fast-fashion giant Uniqlo, for example, intro-
duced in 2015 a series of Hijabs and generally modest women’s wear. These were first sold only
abroad, but a year later were also introduced in Japanese stores (Nikkei Trendy 2016). The
“Halal boom” fits neatly into this and into the increasingly dominant narrative of Japan being
a tolerant, welcoming country.
No doubt many, perhaps most, of the measures under the “diversity” umbrella are
superficial ones, and, as with the “Halal boom,” view Muslims only as short term visitors to be
 177

exploited as a market. However, that is not all—for example, this author has discussed with
several large Japanese corporations the opening of prayer rooms inside their offices after having
hired Muslim employees. Universities have also been doing the same. Arguably, these trends
indicate a growing realization that Japan’s purported ethnic and cultural homogeneity is in the
course of changing and that accommodation must be made for the “newcomers.”
In November 2018, the government made a sudden and dramatic policy shift, announc-
ing that for the first time in the country’s modern history, Japan would be admitting foreign
unskilled labor. Of course, Japan had always had foreign workers working in unglamorous and
dangerous jobs, including workers admitted as “technical interns.” Horrendous stories of forced
labor, physical, verbal, and even sexual abuse of foreign workers remain widespread (Solidarity
Network with Migrants Japan 2014), causing considerable damage to Japan’s international
reputation. Abuses notwithstanding, the shrinking Japanese population has meant that the
admitting of foreign labor on a larger and more long term basis has been a longstanding demand
of big business interests.
To make the new policy acceptable to the right-leaning public, the government insists
that workers will stay only temporarily and that the program is not a path to permanent immi-
gration. The stay of unskilled workers is capped at five years, and, in a widely criticized move,
they are prohibited from bringing their families. Concerns are strong that foreign workers will
be subjected to similar abuse as in the past (Ijuuren 2019).
So far, the new policy has not led to a large increase in foreign workers; indeed, the
number of applications has been embarrassingly low (AREA 2019). Nevertheless, it seems
clear that a bridge has been crossed, and, over time, Japan will be accepting an unprecedented
number of foreign residents. Presumably, this will include a considerable proportion of
Muslims, as has been the case with foreign labor up to this point. And government reassurances
to the right notwithstanding, evidence from other advanced economies shows that large scale
deportations often become logistically and politically impossible.
The need for “coexistence” is stressed frequently in the public debate, together with
public concern over the woeful unpreparedness of the authorities (Tokyo Shimbun 2018). How
this will play out is difficult to predict, but the emphasis on “coexistence” points toward a revi-
sion of the homogeneity myth and of the national identity in general. In any case, Japanese
attitudes toward Muslims in the country will surely be affected—for better or for worse—by
where the discourse on foreign nationals in the country in general leads to.

CONCLUSION
There are therefore several differing and mutually contradictory trends. Official Japan
continues to exhibit Islamophobic tendencies, branding Muslims as terrorists and subjecting
them to police surveillance. At the same time, economic realities have forced the government
to change course regarding foreign labor, a policy shift that will no doubt result in increasing
Muslim immigration. The public, on the other hand, is influenced by both Islamophobic nar-
ratives, but is also concerned about the need for peaceful and harmonious “coexistence.” There
also appears to be increasing awareness that there is a small but growing ethnic Japanese
Muslim community.
Where all of these developments will lead to is difficult to forecast. The right wing in
Japan is as xenophobic and racist as in any country; will they stoke and manipulate the public’s
fear of the “other,” and will Muslims prove a useful scapegoat? Or will Japanese society evolve
into a model of relative harmony and mutual tolerance, both with regard to foreigners and to
Japanese who deviate from the dominant social norm (such as Japanese Muslims)? There are
178 ISJ 6(2)

political and social forces pulling society in both of the above directions, and while there are
multiple positive factors, there is a definite need to be vigilant. It is submitted that how Japanese
Muslims in particular navigate this unpredictable landscape will play an important role in defin-
ing how Muslims in general are looked upon, and treated, within mainstream society.

ENDNOTES
1
The research for this paper was funded in part by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (“Kaken”),
grant number JP 19K23166.

2
This incident took place shortly after the terrorist attacks in Dhaka. Seven Japanese aid workers were amongst
the 22 foreign victims of the attack.

3
Translated by the author.

4
Nakata was recently referred to the prosecutor’s office for possible indictment, for having attempted to
facilitate the travel of several young Japanese to Syria to join Da’esh (Sankei Shimbun 2019).

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