Verschuuren 2019

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SMR 572 No. of Pages 13
Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Sport Management Review

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/smr
Whistleblowing determinants and the effectiveness of

reporting channels in the international sports sector
Pim Verschuuren
Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration, University of Lausanne, IDHEAP, 28 rue de la mouline, 1022 Chavannes-près-Renens,
Switzerland
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Article history: International sports institutions have started to set up internal reporting mechanisms to
Received 27 July 2018 allow actors in the sports sector to provide information on ethical wrongdoings occurring
Received in revised form 15 July 2019 around them, such as match-fixing or doping. Analogous compliance mechanisms have
Accepted 16 July 2019
been implemented for years in non-sport sectors and are the subject of a vast quantity of
Available online xxx
literature analysing notably the determinants of whistleblowing behaviour. In order to
assess the potential effectiveness of reporting channels in sport, the author reviews the
Keywords:
literature on whistleblowing determinants and discusses their weight in the sport sector.
Whistleblowing
Sport organisations
Findings identify several sport specificities which undermine the likelihood of
Reporting mechanisms whistleblowing, with, in particular: the weak power position and moral reasoning of
Whistleblowing determinants athletes, intense organisational loyalties and non-supportive organisational culture. The
Effectiveness paper concludes with a number of managerial recommendations for international sports
organisations that want to infuse ethical values and promote reporting behaviour.
© 2019 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published by Elsevier
Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Over the last ten years, the international sports sector has witnessed a multiplication of internal reporting mechanisms
that enable actors in the sports sector to securely inform authorities about fraudulent behaviour they witness, are a victim of
or are responsible for. This managerial trend grew without external legal pressure. Most reporting systems in sport have been
implemented to address critical integrity issues, such as match-fixing, doping, institutional corruption, violence or
harassment, often following public scandals which have damaged the image and credibility of sport organisations. On an
international level, the first formal reporting mechanisms emerged as a response to the phenomenon of match-fixing. The
International Cricket Council (ICC) installed an anti-corruption unit and a reporting channel as early as 2000 (Transparency
International, 2013a), following scandals and rising online betting activity. In 2008, the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU) was
created by the international tennis authorities (with a similar model to the ICC anti-corruption unit), which included a
reporting mechanism and a duty to report for all tennis players (TIU, n.d.). The International Federation of Association
Football (FIFA) followed in 2013, not only for manipulations, but also for any breach of its regulations (FIFA, 2013), the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 2015, for all “matters which fall under the IOC’s jurisdiction” (IOC, 2018) and,
among other examples, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) launched a platform (“Speak Up”) to report doping violations
in March 2017 (WADA, 2017).
Managerial literature presents internal reporting systems as an effective tool of self-regulation, risk-management and
organisational efficiency (Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, & Schipani, 2002; Brown, Mazurski, & Olsen, 2008). Organisations that fix
internal problems also find an increase in loyalty and organisational culture (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009). Regarding the
sports sector specifically, a number of scholars have underlined the lack of robust and reliable whistleblowing systems
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2019.07.002
1441-3523/© 2019 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article in press as: P. Verschuuren, Whistleblowing determinants and the effectiveness of reporting channels in
the international sports sector, Sport Management Review (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2019.07.002
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2 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx
(Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013). Following a theoretical experiment on the fight against doping, Berentsen, Bruegger, and
Loertscher (2008) concluded that the existence of whistleblowing schemes (including leniency programmes) reduces
incidences of doping and lowers regulation costs since fewer controls are needed. Whitaker, Backhouse, and Long (2014) and
Erickson, Patterson, and Backhouse (2018) also suggested that whistleblowing systems should be implemented, as athletes
are at the forefront of the fight against doping and often feel powerless.
However, whistleblowing is still very often a challenging task. According to past research in companies and public
agencies, about half of individuals state that they remained silent when they witnessed wrongdoings within their
organisation, although estimates vary depending on the parameters (Olsen, 2014). Observers of wrongdoing may face strong
ethical dilemmas between conflicted identities, loyalties and personal values. The whistleblowing decision-making process
involves a high level of emotion and uncertainty, as well as potential personal risks for the whistle-blower, in the form of
ostracism, threats, or career damage (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008). Considering these hardships, one wonders if actors
who are invited, if not legally obliged, by sports authorities to signal breaches of regulations, will trust and use these
mechanisms. The aim of this article is to examine the extent to which reporting channels can be effective in attracting
whistle-blowers within the sports sector.
Although no quantitative research has been conducted in the sports sector to measure the propensity of actors to blow the
whistle, many publications have been covering the subject in corporate and public agencies over the past 35 years. Therefore,
I review this literature and identify the key determinants of whistleblowing that have emerged from it. These determinants
are individual, contextual, cultural and organisational factors or variables that, according to empirical research, influence
wrongdoing observers to report it. After having synthesized these conditions, I discuss to what extent they are met in the
sports sector and, on this basis, draw preliminary conclusions on the potential effectiveness of sport reporting mechanisms
to indeed attract whistleblowing behaviour. I conclude by proposing theoretical and empirical grounds that could be
explored by future research in this new scientific field and operational recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of
these reporting tools.
2. Background
2.1. Theoretical and conceptual background
The implementation of reporting mechanisms and their effectiveness have not yet attracted attention within the
scientific field of sport management, although a number of works have analysed the individual behaviour of whistleblowing
within sports. Nonetheless, such integrity and compliance management reforms (e.g., ethical codes, prevention and
monitoring programmes) can be understood in the broader framework of the professionalisation of sport organisation. In
their review of the concept, Dowling, Edwards, and Washington (2014) defined professionalisation as “the process by which
sport organisations, systems, and the occupation of sport, transforms from a volunteer-driven to an increasingly business-
like phenomenon” (p. 527). To account for the breadth of the concept, they distinguish three categories of
professionalisation: organisational, systemic and occupational. The introduction and management of reporting mechanisms
is one indication of organisational professionalisation: “the adoption of established governance functions, including
performance, conformance, policy and operations, indicates the degree to which sport is professionalizing” (Shilbury &
Ferkins, 2011, p. 122). As described by the multi-level theoretical framework of professionalisation proposed by Nagel,
Schlesinger, Bayle, and Giauque (2015), the consequences of professionalisation deserve more scrutiny, especially to
understand if “the professionalisation of a sport organisation lead[s] to the intended consequences and what are the
unintended results” (p. 426). Although the causes of professionalisation have mainly been explained from the lens of
institutional theory by underlining the effect of external pressures and stakeholders’ expectations on the modernisation of
sports organisations, the studies conducted so far on the impact of professionalisation did not apply a specific theoretical
vein (Nagel et al., 2015; Ruoranen et al., 2016). Therefore, I situate the current study in the conceptual frame of the
professionalisation of sport organisations while also remaining open in terms of theoretical grounds.
2.2. Definition of whistleblowing and typologies
In literature, whistleblowing is classically defined as the “disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of
illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able
to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4). The breadth of this definition requires drawing a number of segmentations
(King, 1999).
The first is between internal and external whistleblowing. Internal whistleblowing covers disclosures made through
technical systems and recipients that have been formally tasked by the organisation concerned to collect and handle the
reports, even if these mandated persons are situated outside of the organisation. External whistleblowing consists of
disclosures made to outside individuals or institutions who are not formally charged by the organisation concerned to
conduct this role of complaint recipients (the media, for instance). In this article, I concentrate on the internal, officially
mandated reporting procedures set up by sports institutions.
The second categorization of whistleblowing systems concerns the subject of disclosure. It can be of private interest,
where the wrongdoing affects one individual only (also called grievance claims), or public interest, where it is supposed to
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P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 3
affect most or all of society. Here I focus on the latter category, which in sport includes primarily: institutional corruption,
manipulation of competition, doping, harassment, physical abuse, or violence.
Internal procedures for wrongdoings of potential collective interest can take various forms. They can be either a phone
hotline, an email address, a mobile phone application, an internet platform or a dedicated person who collects vocal reports
(some systems allow several options). Also, the alert recipient can be either within the structure’s formal organisational
chart or independent from it to one degree or another.
The bulk of research on whistleblowing behaviour has grown exponentially since the 1980s, both in terms of quantity
and the countries and sectors covered. Traditionally, analysis has focused on the individual act of whistleblowing, through
a psychological or sociological lens. As seen in Fig. 1, whistleblowing is a process typically divided into five main steps
(Henik, 2008).
Despite the volume of research on the factors leading someone to blow the whistle, few systematic literature reviews
have been conducted. Three earlier attempts are noteworthy: a meta-analysis by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005)
and two non-systematic reviews from Miceli et al. (2008) and Vadera, Aguilera, and Caza (2009). In more recent years, two
works have proposed systematic reviews, albeit only for determinants of whistleblowing in the accounting sector (Gao &
Brink, 2017; Lee & Xiao, 2018).
3. Literature review of the research on whistleblowing determinants
3.1. Methodology
3.1.1. Data collection

I conducted a rapid review of the literature on whistleblowing determinants. This method was chosen since it allows
authors to focus on one specific question (“What drives whistleblowing?”), while using systematic review methods (Grant &
Booth, 2009). The objective of the review is restricted to identifying the essential trends that predict whistleblowing, in order
to subsequently apply them to the sports sector.
Clarivate Analytics’ Web of Science and Google Scholar databases have been explored. I chose 1980 as the starting point of
the time frame, since academic interest in the subject started only a few years later, with a commonly accepted definition of
whistleblowing being established in 1985 (Vadera et al., 2009). A first exploratory review of the literature on whistleblowing
determinants identified 4 main search terms: determin*, predict*, factor* and effect*. These were combined with
“whistleblow*” and “whistle-blow*”, through the Boolean “OR” function, to include the most sources possible. The search on
the Web of Science database provided 418 sources. From this list, only papers published in peer-reviewed scientific journals
or book chapters, in the English language, and presenting results of empirical research (both qualitative and quantitative) on
the determinants of whistleblowing behaviour (intention or actual behaviour) were retained, reducing the list to 100 papers.
A second search on the Google Scholar database was conducted, drawing a total of 4740 results. The 600 most relevant results
were reviewed and, among them, 23 articles which were absent from the Web of Science search were added, compiling a
total of 123 documents in the literature review.
3.1.2. Literature overview

This literature developed mostly after 2008 (See Fig. 2 below), perhaps as a reaction to the number of reporting channels
that developed within American and transnational companies following the US 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. The density
of the literature hides major conceptual differences and methodological patterns that limit the consistency of the findings.
First of all, the types of whistleblowing taken into account may differ. Some research includes both internal and external
whistleblowing, some only internal. Some study how influences differ between internal and external whistleblowing. A vast
majority (n = 119) used either cross-sectional self-reported surveys, scenario-based studies or experimental gaming
(quantitative methods). Only two articles used qualitative methods (interviews or case studies) and two used a mixed
method (QCA or a mix of surveys and interviews). Most of the research focused on determining whistleblowing intentions
instead of actual whistleblowing behaviour. Another review effectively determined that variables differ between them
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005), underlining that participants’ intention to blow the whistle may not reflect their
actual behaviour in a real-life situation. A number of researchers tested their hypothesis on a student population, which may
actually differ from an actual working place environment. An additional type of disparity concerns the sectors investigated.
An important part has been conducted on an auditor population (role-prescribed whistleblowing), but other research took
Fig. 1. Whistleblowing process.

(Sources: Henik, 2008; Richardson & McGlynn, 2015).
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Fig. 2. Year of publication by number of articles.
place within companies or public administrations and in many different cultural contexts. This alters the validity of the
overall results.
As a potential consequence of this variety of approaches, few consensuses exist today on what drives whistleblowing
behaviour. Also, since it covers a vast and multidisciplinary field, a high volume of sources and a variety of factors analysed in
the influence of whistleblowing, findings were clustered around three main categories: personal characteristics (of the
whistle-blower), contextual variables (the wrongdoing addressed) and organisational characteristics (the organisation
where the wrongdoing and the whistleblowing takes place).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Whistle-blower characteristics

Whistle-blower characteristics have attracted a great deal of research interest, with very diverse variables analysed. No
single factor has gathered sufficiently consistent results over time. However, by clustering the findings, two groups of
determinants emerge as potentially instrumental in driving a wrongdoing observer to become a whistle-blower. The first
group of influences concerns various forms of beliefs, morals or the value-based reasoning of the individual. Different
variables that enter this category have been positively linked to whistleblowing: moral ideals (Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989),
moral reasoning (Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009), moral perceptions (Keenan, 1995), moral identity (Zhou, Liu, Chen, &
Zhao, 2018), belief systems (Ahern & McDonald, 2002), ethical position (Jalilvand, Vosta, & Yasini, 2017), norm-based motives
(Lavena, 2016), moral competence (MacGregor & Stuebs, 2014), legal and moral principles orientation (Park, Blenkinsopp, &
Park, 2014), perceived moral intensity (Namazi & Ebrahimi, 2017; Taylor & Curtis, 2010), ideal values (Sims & Keenan, 1998),
or empathy (Hildebrand & Shawver, 2016; Singer, Mitchell, & Turner, 1998). When witnessing situations of wrongdoing in a
social group, individuals may face complex ethical dilemmas. Different loyalties, identities, or values might conflict and
taking the decision to speak up would require strong moral values, personal beliefs, and ethical awareness. Such forms of
moral competence may drive favourable attitudes towards whistleblowing. Attitudes have been positively linked with
whistleblowing intention (Ellis & Arieli, 1999; Namazi & Ebrahimi, 2017; Oh & Teo, 2010; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009)
A second main cluster regards the organisational status, responsibility and power position of the potential whistle-
blower. An individual with forms of supervisory status (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007), role responsibility (Victor, Trevino, &
Shapiro, 1993), personal responsibility (Alleyne, Charles-Soverall, Broome, & Pierce, 2017; Keil, Tiwana, Sainsbury, & Sneha,
2010), leverage (Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012), a managerial position (Jos et al., 1989; Keenan, 2002), performance
(Brewer & Selden, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1988), organisational power resources of position (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017), or
organisational status (Fieger & Rice, 2018), is more likely to blow the whistle. Hence, professional power position may
influence the decision-making process for a number of reasons. First, organisational compliance might actually be one of the
individual’s responsibilities, as a manager or an auditor for example. Second, through the position of power, whistle-blowers
might expect to benefit from support in their actions or that they will be seen as a credible voice within the organisation. A
position of power may drive self-efficacy, which some research has also highlighted as a determinant for whistleblowing
(Khelil, Akrout, Hussainey, & Noubbigh, 2018; MacNab & Worthley, 2008), as well as behavioural control (Oh & Teo, 2010;
Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). Linked with the position of power-position, pay-level (Miceli & Near, 1984) has also been
identified as an important predictor in earlier publications.
Another important form of individual influence has been studied by research on whistleblowing factors but with less
successful results: organisational commitment (Alleyne, 2016; Brewer & Selden, 1998; Caillier, 2015; Chen & Lai, 2014; Sims
& Keenan, 1998; Taylor & Curtis, 2010; Young, 2016) or identification (Liu, Zhao, Li, Zhou, & Tian, 2018; Zhou et al., 2018). High
identifiers and committed employees might blow the whistle only if they view it as defending the integrity of the collective
identity to which they belong.
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Other individual factors, such as age, education, gender and personality, have received considerable attention, but their
conclusions do not paint a consistent picture. Results are either contradictory – for example on the gender and education
variable – or are not sufficiently confirmed –to confirm that a proactive personality is more likely to blow the whistle, for
example. Some authors have concluded that no whistle-blower path or individual profile exists (Bocchiaro, Zimbardo, & Van
Lange, 2012; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Henik, 2015; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Two clusters (forms of moral or value-
based reasoning and organisational power) nonetheless emerge as potentially influential in the whistleblowing process and
had also been identified in earlier literature reviews (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Vadera et al., 2009).
To explain the low number of individual factors, some authors have contested the impact of rational factors and proved
that emotions can play a role (Curtis, 2006; Jones, Spraakman, & Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2014; Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas,
2008). Blowing the whistle in an organisational setting implies sensitive value dilemmas, trade-offs, and ethical tension
points for the wrongdoing observer. This makes it a highly volatile and unpredictable process. To better understand it,
contextual and organisational variables have to be taken into account.
3.2.2. Contextual variables

According to the reviewed literature, various elements linked to the quality of the wrongdoing and the wrongdoer have
serious implications on the decision to blow the whistle. Whistleblowing is all the more likely if direct evidence (or level of
proof) is at the hand of the observer (Miceli & Near, 1985; Miceli et al., 2012). Seriousness harm, or severity of the wrongdoing
also play a direct role (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Chen & Lai, 2014; Curphy et al., 1998; MacGregor & Stuebs, 2014; Masser
& Brown, 1996; Miceli & Near, 1985; Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004; Singer et al., 1998), as well as its frequency
(Grube, Piliavin, & Turner, 2010; Lee, Heilmann, & Near, 2004) and intentionality (Keil, Park, & Ramesh, 2018; King, 2001).
3.2.3. Organisational variables

Compared with individual variables, organisational influences have drawn more consistent results in determining the
likelihood of whistleblowing. One explicit cluster of findings regards the degree to which the whistle-blower perceives an
ethical climate or culture within his organisation. Each of the following elements has been clearly associated with
whistleblowing intention and/or behaviour: organisational ethical culture (Zhang, Chiu, & Wei, 2009), ethical tone (Mayer,
Nurmohamed, Treviño, Shapiro, & Schminke, 2013), climate (Alleyne et al., 2017), organisational culture (Alinaghian,
Isfahani, & Safari, 2018), ethical climate and environment (Aydan & Kaya, 2018; Dalton & Radtke, 2013; Huang, Lo, & Wu,
2013; Liu, Zhao, Jiang, & Li, 2016,2018; Zhou et al., 2018), and perception of justice or fairness (Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, &
Thornton, 2010; Young, 2016). Only Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) have expressed nuances regarding the impact of ethical
climate or culture.
A second collective concept which has been consistently associated with whistleblowing is subjective norms, or the
perception of social pressure to engage in whistleblowing. Four studies established such a link (Ellis & Arieli, 1999; Oh & Teo,
2010; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2013). Likewise, perception of supervisor support or openness
(Grube et al., 2010; Khelil et al., 2018; Lebel, 2016; Sims & Keenan, 1998), perception of trustworthy managers (Taylor, 2018),
ethical leadership (Bhal & Dadhich, 2011), transformational leadership (Caillier & Sa, 2017; Caillier, 2015), and organisational
support (Chang, Wilding, & Shin, 2017; Cho & Song, 2015) can convince observers to act. On the contrary, expected retaliation
had a negative effect on whistleblowing according to seven empirical studies (Bashir, Rafiq Khattak, Hanif, & Naseer Chohan,
2011; Casal & Bogui, 2008; Fatoki, 2013; Keenan, 1995; Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009; Masser & Brown, 1996; Mayer et al.,
2013). It can be inferred from this branch of empirical research that to decide to blow the whistle, organisation members
have to perceive and expect that their engagement is in tune with the climate of the organisation, or would be endorsed by
management and peers.
Besides general organisational acknowledgement, the effect of specific managerial tools has also been studied. The
existence (and knowledge) of internal whistleblowing options increases the likelihood of its occurrence (Brennan & Kelly,
2007; Zipparo, 1998). Other specific managerial measures have been empirically linked to reporting intentions, such as
leniency programmes (Feltovich & Hamaguchi, 2018), anonymous channels (Johansson & Carey, 2016), education
programmes (Caillier, 2017b), and financial incentives (Andon, Free, Jidin, Monroe, & Turner, 2018; Apesteguia, Dufwenberg,
& Selten, 2007; Pope & Lee, 2013; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). Nonetheless, a few authors have underlined that explicit
whistleblowing protection (Wainberg & Perreault, 2015), anonymous channels of financial reward (Feldman & Lobel, 2011),
or training programmes (Williams & Curtis, 2014) could actually have a counter-intuitive effect by highlighting the risks that
a whistle-blower may face.
No consensus exists on a preference for internal or external reporting channels. Some publications have presented results
where external reporting lines are more attractive (Gao, Greenberg, & Wong-On-Wing, 2015), while others found the
opposite result (Kaplan, Pope, & Samuels, 2015; Masser & Brown, 1996). It seems at least that external lines are preferred
when there is a risk of retaliation (Miceli & Near, 1985; Zhang, Pany, & Reckers, 2013), or when the whistle-blower has a low
organisational commitment (Chen & Lai, 2014).
Some professional sectors may be more prone to produce whistle-blowers. Rothschild and Miethe (1999), Rothwell and
Baldwin (2007), and Caillier (2017a) established that employees of the public sector may be more likely to become whistle-
blowers. Public service motivation or the voluntary provision of the public good may be the key explanation here, as outlined
by Cho and Song (2015) and Brewer and Selden (1998). Nayir, Rehg, and Asa (2018) detected that public sector employees are
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less inclined to blow the whistle externally and anonymously. This review did not find any research made in the associative
sector.
Whistleblowing appears as a context- and social-bound type of behaviour. The consistency of organisational
variables highlighted here was also underlined by earlier literature reviews (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005;
Vadera et al., 2009).
To conclude the review, although research on whistleblowing determinants is voluminous, very few areas of consensus
exist. Most of the variables have produced conflicted results. The sensitivity of the whistleblowing process and the absence of
a predominant theoretical model for predicting whistleblowing explains why many different variables are being tested. In
spite of conflicting results and general research volatility, a few global trends have emerged from the existing research, by
clustering the findings:
- Whistle-blowers seem to be influenced by forms of moral or value-based reasoning. Potentially interacting with other
variables, this gives them a sense of responsibility to act upon organisational wrongdoings.
- Whistle-blowers seem to benefit from a stronger power position, whether through a supervisory or role-prescribed status,
or through better job performance.
- The nature of the wrongdoing, the identity of the wrongdoer and the level of evidence are key contextual drivers.
- The perception of support from the close environment (supervisor, subjective norms) or from the organisation (ethical
culture, expected responses and retaliations) are instrumental in convincing observers to speak up.
None of these variables alone seem to predict whistleblowing. Empirical research, especially on actual whistleblowing is
still called upon to further validate these general trends and how they interact. However, since the reviewed research has
been conducted over various settings, private and public, with different types of individuals and in many different cultural
contexts, the general trends identified here can inform us about the configurations that make someone within an
organisation more likely to speak up against wrongdoings. Therefore, it allows us to test the theoretical effectiveness of
reporting mechanisms in sport by seeking to what extent the identified determinants are present within sports
organisations. On this basis, are actors in the field of sport likely to become whistle-blowers?
4. Discussing the weight of the whistleblowing determinants in sport
4.1. Individual variables: Moral disengagement and weak organisational position
Do actors in the field of sport display specific forms of beliefs or moral reasoning that might – according to the above
review – favour or impede whistleblowing behaviour? Early research found that moral reasoning is lower for athletes than
for non-athletes (Beller & Stoll, 1995). Furthermore, the concept of moral disengagement might offer relevant perspectives
for the sports sector. Moral disengagement results from cognitive mechanisms which a person may follow to downplay the
moral dimension of one situation (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). These complex mechanisms are
strongly related to social contexts, and the sports environment has been identified as potentially prone to harbour this moral
cognition, for example on doping-related issues (Boardley & Kavussanu, 2011; Engelberg, Moston, & Skinner, 2015; Long,
Pantaléon, Bruant, & d’Arripe-Longueville, 2006). Age (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986), gender (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986), or
sport disciplines (Lee, Whitehead, & Ntoumanis, 2007) could also foster moral disengagement within sport. Without strong
forms of moral reasoning, bystanders are unlikely to speak up. Likewise, Benavides Espinoza and Cunningham (2010)
demonstrated that political orientation influences the likelihood of student athletes reporting cases of sexual harassment.
The second individual factor expected to foster whistleblowing, organisational power, may also be lacking. Some sport
actors enjoying higher responsibilities and power might be more likely to blow the whistle: established sports staff,
managers and officials, or renowned athletes, for example. However, a majority of the athlete population, which is
specifically targeted by the reporting channels, might not feel able to become a whistle-blower. This could be explained by
their professional career, generally much shorter than the career of classical employees and the fact that they rarely have
opportunities to recoup career damages. Their professional fate is highly dependent on the agreement of staff and
management. Employment contracts are generally short-term and offer few legal protections, as established, for example, by
Aubel and Ohl (2015) in the professional cycling industry. Literature, especially in the United States, has already studied the
unbalanced, if not exploitative, nature of specific agreements administered at many levels in sport (Benford, 2007; Mitten &
Davis, 2008). Fragile bargaining power leaves potential sport dissenters at a higher risk of retaliation, especially since sport
governing bodies are in a situation of quasi-monopoly over their discipline (Smith & Stewart, 2010) and, at an international
level at least, collective representation of athletes is still lacking (Geeraert, Alm, & Groll, 2014). Hence, the typical athlete
profile is not (in theory at least) inclined to whistleblowing behaviour.
4.2. Cultural and environmental conditions
To what extent are sport environments and cultures supportive of dissent and whistleblowing? International sports cover all
continents. Reporting tools and the notion of whistleblowing might not be interpreted similarly in all national and cultural contexts,
as underlined by the general literature (Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2013).
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Situations may also vary across sport disciplines (for example between individual and collective disciplines), gender, and levels of
competition (for example between professional and amateur levels). In their study of athletes and anti-doping measures, Whitaker
et al. (2014) confirmed the existence of a strong code of silence but demonstrate that it can apply differently across disciplines. In
their observations, rugby league players were less likely to blow the whistle on doping issues, as opposed to track and field athletes
who were more prone to speak. Differences between individual/collective, amateur/professional sports and between perceptions
of wrongdoing (in this case doping) should be taken into account.
Broadly speaking, organisational silence and low ethical commitment within sports organisations can be attributed to the
primacy of team culture and hierarchy. Adler and Adler (1988) studied the environment of US college athletics and concluded
that it belongs to a particular type of organisation characterised by forms of intense loyalty, which they conceptualized
around five social features: domination, identification, commitment, integration and alignment. Generally, athletes are
strongly dominated by a head coach with strong structural authority and personal leadership. They identify with both their
organisation and their coach. A sense of commitment is legally entrenched by the signing of a contract and by a number of
symbols (team equipment for example). Integration refers to the “coalescence of discrete individuals into a cohesive unit”
bound together by “unification in opposition,” group solidarity and sponsorship (Adler & Adler, 1988, p. 410). Lastly, the goal
alignment factor describes how individual career aims fit with the organisation’s goal of winning. Adler and Adler underline
that in such intense loyalty organisations, subordination is more accepted, rather than dissent and non-conformism.
Subsequent works have confirmed this specificity of the sports sector by insisting on the specific role and scrutiny of
external factors in sport that might inhibit dissenting voices: the media, sponsors, municipalities, fans and community, other
teams and sports organisations (Babiak & Wolfe, 2009; Richardson & McGlynn, 2015). In this sensitive context, ethical
decision-making can become a challenging task. The rare research on the subject shows that a high level of retaliation can be
measured towards those actors in the field of sport who chose to go public, or to report to superiors about wrongdoings
occurring around them (Richardson & McGlynn, 2015). Dissenters in the cycling industry also attest to a high degree of
reprisals (Hardie, Shilbury, Ware, & Bozzi, 2010; Kimmage, 2007). Mediatized situations, like the Russian doping scandal
(2015–2019), tend to confirm the frequently tragic fate of sport whistle-blowers, especially if they signal frauds conducted at
collective and large levels. Erickson et al. (2018) have used a creative non-fiction narrative to convey the psychological
hardships and helplessness experienced by actual sport whistle-blowers. Hanna, Levine, and Moorman (2017) also explained
to what extent the American collegiate athletics authorities do not offer sufficient protection to inside whistle-blowers,
although they contractually oblige athletes and other National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) employees to report
rules violations. This is potentially true in many other countries, where legal protection for whistle-blowers in the
administrative and corporate sectors may not be extended to all sport actors.
Hence, the cultural factors facilitating whistleblowing in sport might depend to a great extent on certain contexts. This
is a key challenge for blanket international reporting channels covering very different local and organisational contexts.
The highly vertical and pyramidal structure of international sport might also be detrimental to whistleblowing intentions
(King, 1999) and complicates whistleblowing policies. While multinational companies can protect whistle-blowers
through working contracts with each of their employees, international sport organisations lack this contractual link with
all the athletes and stakeholders disseminated across the world. This weak legal structure creates further risks for the
whistle-blower. Future research in sport management needs to establish to what extent international sport authorities, in
particular their reporting mechanisms, are trusted by their internal stakeholders.
Hence, the whistleblowing determinants identified in the literature review seem to be lacking within sport organisations.
It may be specifically challenging for sport stakeholders to feel empowered and supported in reporting wrongdoings. Forms
of moral disengagement, the weak power position of a large proportion of the athletes, intense team loyalties and the high
power distance between international sport authorities and individual actors, are general trends within the sports
environment that indicate that it might be more difficult to blow the whistle in the sports sector than within other
organisational settings. Bystanders might stay silent (and thereby sustain the omerta—the code of silence) or might also
confront the wrongdoer directly (Erickson, Backhouse, & Carless, 2017). In theory, therefore, the effectiveness of reporting
channels in international sport is highly uncertain.
5. Perspectives for the effectiveness of reporting channels in international sport
5.1. Theoretical contributions and future research areas
The findings of the review suggest that the sports reporting channels might not attract a high volume of alerts (the
scarcity of information publicly available on the results of these channels indicates that it might be the case), although they
are a popular managerial reform within international sport. The implementation of reporting channels by international sport
organisations is in tune with the professionalisation of sport organisations, as modelized by Nagel et al. (2015). But, as this
research on whistleblowing processes shows, compliance mechanisms used in the for-profit sectors might not prove
effective if they are not adapted to the specific conditions of the sports environment. Results of the analysis, therefore, refine
the understanding of professionalisation and confirm the necessity to empirically analyse the consequences and
effectiveness of such reforms (Ruoranen et al., 2016). They call for the building of a specific conceptual and theoretical
framework to analyse the implementation of integrity and compliance tools that are increasingly being implemented at
national and international levels: ethical codes, prevention and education programmes, audits and monitoring programmes,
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reporting channels and self-administered questionnaires, amongst others. Researchers could use two conceptual and
theoretical roots for this frame: the larger professionalisation conceptual frame, and the corporate sustainable
responsibilities (CSR) analytical frames (see for example François, Bayle, & Gond, 2019; Walker & Parent, 2010).
Within this new scientific field, empirical research would examine the causes of these reforms, the processes in place and
their consequences. They could also offer information about the nature of the relations between sports organisations and
external stakeholders, who increasingly expect integrity reforms within international sport, and internal stakeholders
(national organisations, and the athletes in particular). Finally, sport management research could study how sports
organisations make sense of the potential decoupling between the policies implemented (the means) and the results (the
ends). Considering the increasing dimension of integrity and compliance at all levels of the sports sector, such developments
can be expected in the near future.
Regarding the analysis of whistleblowing behaviour in sport in particular, empirical research could adapt the methods
that have been used in other sectors:
- On reporting intentions, psychological research can contribute to determining the personality traits of potential and
actual whistle-blowers in sport. Case studies could also identify similarities or differences between whistle-blowers, both
in sport and outside it.
- If cognitive mechanisms of moral disengagement describe how an actor justifies transgressive behaviour, they might also
explain why observers might choose to remain silent when witnessing wrongdoings. Since moral disengagement
measurement scales have been built for the sports sector (Boardley & Kavussanu, 2007), it could be useful to measure the
moral disengagement of sport actors and link it with the likelihood of whistleblowing (or staying silent).
- Sociological research can specifically compare how whistleblowing and integrity issues are valued and promoted in
different social groups, according to the country of activity, the sport discipline, the level of competition, gender, age, etc.
For example, applying the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1994) would measure the weight of conformity, universalism
or benevolence rates across actors and give indications on how they might react to potential ethical dilemmas.
5.2. Managerial recommendations for the implementation of reporting mechanisms
Sports organisations implementing reporting channels might need to follow a number of managerial recommendations
to encourage stakeholders to blow the whistle on the various wrongdoings they become aware of. Firstly, a consistent
communication and education strategy should be coordinated and tailored to the contexts of implementation: disciplines,
countries, gender, level of competition. The objective of the messages should be to counter the cognitive mechanisms that
lead to moral disengagement. Where possible, integrity values and ethical reasoning should be cultivated in parallel with
performance ideals, team spirit and loyalty (Miceli et al., 2009). These two broad sets of values should be seen as compatible.
Also, dissent and internal reporting should be valued as a collective, rather than individual, act. As Whitaker et al. (2014)
explained, the whole sports community needs to be empowered and more receptive to the prevention of doping issues. As in
the corporate and administration sectors, ethical programmes such as whistleblowing procedures may not be effective
without the commitment of the top management and the enforcement and long-term promotion of an ethical organisational
culture (Miceli et al., 2008; Roberts, Brown, & Olsen, 2011). Reporting channels and whistleblowing policies need to be
embedded in a general compliance and integrity strategy to promote dissent and empower the potential end-users
(Maesschalck & Vanden Auweele, 2010; Roberts et al., 2011). Communication strategies might also specifically target non-
athletes individuals who, as we have established, may be more likely to feel responsible and capable of blowing the whistle.
Second, reporting channels need to be accompanied by whistle-blower protection policies (Erickson et al., 2018). These
include providing advice and assistance to potential and actual whistle-blowers. Informal channels of discussion would
reassure and accompany the observer, who might be unsure about the nature of the wrongdoing he may know of and request
background information about his responsibilities, reporting option and potential consequences (Near & Miceli, 2016).
Services should also offer legal support and guaranteed confidentiality. Strict prohibition (and sanctioning) of retaliation
against whistle-blowers should also be formulated. To dissemble structural and collective wrongdoings, rewards or leniency
regimes could be proposed under the model of law-enforcement strategies to unearth organised crime networks. A
“confidential integrity manager” could be set in place by authorities to take calls (or emails) and answer any question linked
to sport integrity and the whistleblowing process (De Graaf, 2015). This person needs to be knowledgeable about legal issues
and the organisation in itself, but he should be somehow independent from the formal sport administration (Erickson et al.,
2018). He will serve as an ombudsman between the organisation and the individual. Ideally, such person could be a former
athlete. All these actions taken to support whistle-blowers should be communicated repeatedly.
Third, to reduce the power distance between international umbrella organisations like WADA or international federations
and individual actors, national sports structures could adapt the communication strategies at a national level and participate
to the support or protection programmes for whistle-blowers. For example, National Anti-Doping Agencies (NADAs) could
complete the WADA’s whistleblowing policy, basically as they do for the implementation of the WADA Code. Many NADAs,
who often benefit from public status, already have reporting channels in place (Leeds Beckett University, 2018). The
experience of the Danish NADA, which runs a reporting channel for anti-doping as well as match-fixing issues, could be a
positive example. International reporting options should still be available, in case integrity violations occur at national level
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(as in the recent Russian doping affair). As reporting channels are burgeoning at all levels, national and international
authorities need to cooperate to provide a consistent and coherent whistleblowing policy framework, beyond the mere
provision of hotlines and confidential emails.
Fourth, to overcome the breakdown of trust following recent integrity scandals (regarding FIFA, the IAAF, the
International Biathlon Union, etc.), international sport organisations may consider engaging external and “neutral” actors in
the process. Independent report recipients can be more effective in attracting whistle-blowers (Vandekerckhove & Phillips,
2017). In early 2017, the IAAF created a separate entity, the Athletics Integrity Unit, to manage the Athletics integrity
programmes. The Unit reports to its own board, the Athletics Integrity Board (IAAF, 2017). Although this still needs to be
validated by practice, this is a rare situation for international sport (other examples exist, like the Cycling Anti-Doping
Foundation, dedicated to doping issues only, or the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation created in early 2019). At a national level,
more sports organisations have tasked outside actors to collect the alerts. In 2015, for example, the Czech Republic Hockey
Federation asked the Czech chapter of Transparency International to serve as independent mediator and alert recipient for all
potential ethical issues (Transparency International Czech Republic, 2017). In Germany, the professional football league has
empowered an independent lawyer to collect all reports related to match fixing (Transparency International, 2013b). Some
scholars have praised such external independent solutions for sport governance and integrity (Arcioni, 2015; Fowlie, 2017).
6. Conclusion
The recent set up of reporting systems within the international sport movement represents a critical step in the fight
against serious wrongdoings and protection of athletes from health and integrity hazards. Nevertheless, I argue that, in
general terms, the conditions for the success of such whistleblowing platforms – identified through a literature review – are
lacking within sports environments. In particular, moral disengagement, the weak power position of athletes, intense
organisational loyalties and the absence of supportive culture are likely to inhibit would-be whistle-blowers. The status of
athletes, the structure of the international sports sector and the cultural values it conveys may not be favourable to
whistleblowing behaviour. Therefore, opening reporting channels is a necessary, but insufficient, step. Fully-fledged
whistleblowing policies, including leadership commitment and organisational embeddedness, are needed to empower sport
stakeholders to speak up against wrongdoings and foster cultural change.
Such integrity and compliance measures implemented by sports organisations pertain to their ongoing organisational
professionalisation. They also appear in response to the flow of institutional scandals that have affected international sport
over the past years. Therefore, a new sport management research field is called upon to account for this growing managerial
trend, build conceptual and theoretical bridges with adjacent fields and propose evidence-based recommendations to
enhance the effectiveness of these tools.
Funding
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Declaration of Competing Interest
None.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the reviewers for their rich and insightful comments, as well as the EURAM 2018
Conference, where a previous version of this article was presented and awarded.
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SMR 572 No. of Pages 13

Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Sport Management Review

Whistleblowing determinants and the effectiveness of

2 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

2.1. Theoretical and conceptual background

2.2. Deﬁnition of whistleblowing and typologies

P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 3

3. Literature review of the research on whistleblowing determinants

3.1.1. Data collection

3.1.2. Literature overview

Fig. 1. Whistleblowing process.

4 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

Fig. 2. Year of publication by number of articles.

3.2.1. Whistle-blower characteristics

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3.2.2. Contextual variables

3.2.3. Organisational variables

6 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

4. Discussing the weight of the whistleblowing determinants in sport

4.1. Individual variables: Moral disengagement and weak organisational position

4.2. Cultural and environmental conditions

P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 7

5. Perspectives for the effectiveness of reporting channels in international sport

5.1. Theoretical contributions and future research areas

8 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

5.2. Managerial recommendations for the implementation of reporting mechanisms

P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 9

Declaration of Competing Interest

10 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 11

12 P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx

P. Verschuuren / Sport Management Review xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 13

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