1. Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990.

DOCTRINE: About Checkpoints; Unreasonable searches and seizures.

• Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case.

• Checkpoints are not illegal per se. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search.

FACTS:

This is a case which stemmed from a previous Court’s decision dated September 29, 1989 where
petitioners’ petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints in Valenzuela as
unconstitutional and their dismantling and banning was dismissed.

Just a short background of the previous and first case, [DO NOT STATE UNLESS ASKED BY ATTY.
PUNO. PERO ITO YUNG NASA PREVIOUS CASE KASI. NA-DISCUSS RIN KASI SA BERNAS BOOK KAYA BAKA
ITANONG.]

The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

The petitioners alleged that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

The Supreme Court in this first case held that the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any
particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved.

The contentions of the petitioners are not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

The petition was dismissed because the said checkpoints were lifted and the Commander in
Chief and Metropolitan Police Director will review and made refinement on the rules in the conduct of
the police and military manning the said checkpoints.

Now, petitioner filed an instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said
decision. Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents,
filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply.

The petitioner still contends in this case that the checkpoints are violative of the Constitution for
it is a warrantless search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether the installation of checkpoints constitutes warrantless search and seizure, which
therefore is unconstitutional.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that NO, the installation of checkpoints does not constitute
warrantless search and seizure.

One of the basic right of the State is to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to
pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the
government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for
best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.

According to the Supreme Court, checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and
safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.

Furthermore, the Court discussed that the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain
extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule,
it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.

Also, these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are, according to the Supreme
Court, quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of
a crime, or immediately thereafter. Moreover, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing
passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not
constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.

Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses
committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e.
whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. It is true that power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena. The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor
and they are assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry.

In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For
the military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their
authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

2. People of the Philippines vs. Escaño, G.R. Nos. 129756-58, January 28, 2000.

Doctrine: Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)
search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs
searches; (5) consented warrantless search;50 and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.

Facts:

In this case, the prosecution and accused-appellants had their own version of facts or stories
stating manner on how the accused-appellants were being in violation of the crime charged. However,
the regional trial court found that the prosecution's version was more credible than that of any one of
the accused, and ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the
accused.

The version of the prosecution states that, “on 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban,
some law enforcers of the Makati Police, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat
Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping
those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight,
they stopped a Kia Pride. One of the Police Officer Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person
seated at the passenger seat, who was identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as
Julian D. Escaño, to open the door. The Police Officer Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine,
from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other
passengers were searched for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they
seized from Escaño. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia
Pride driven by PO3 Nonato.

Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los
Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and
opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to
open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Hence,
accused-appellants in this case were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs). Escaño and Usana were also charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition in violation of PD 1866.

The two of the accused-appellants Usana and Lopez appealed before the Supreme Court and they
anchor their appeal arguing the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They
contend that the checkpoint manned by the Makati Police should have been announced. They also
complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Hence, the petition.

Issue: WOR the search conducted in the checkpoint was valid.

Yes. The search conducted in the checkpoint was valid. The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are
illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were
merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to
see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside
the cars they would stop, without opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search.
There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.

Further, Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)
search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs
searches; (5) consented warrantless search;50 and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.

Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, the court cannot invalidate the
search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escaño was consented
to by him.

However, despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for
violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1)
the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after
the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it
was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño,
without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening
of the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was
adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with
Escaño in the latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable
time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling,
distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez
knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is concerned with regard to accused-appellants
VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRY C. LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING their immediate release from confinement
at the New Bilibid Prison, unless their further detention is justified for any lawful ground. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of said accused-
appellants within five (5) days from notice of this decision.

3. Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004.

Doctrine:

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the CA’s decision. The CA reversed the Order RTC
Manila, denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.’s (“Maxicorp”) motion to quash the search warrant that the
RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 (“Section 29 of PD 49”) and for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”) On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of
Investigation (“NBI”) Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. filed several applications for search warrants in the
RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After
conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon
issued four (4) Search Warrants, against Maxicorp.

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized
property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. In September 1996, Maxicorp filed a
motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and
that the warrants are in the form of “general warrants.”

The RTC denied Maxicorp’s motion, as well as the latter’s motion for reconsideration.

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John
Benedict Sacriz, and computer technician Felixberto Pante. The three testified on what they discovered
during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from
petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners’
products.

Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with CA seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. The CA reversed the
RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The CA denied petitioners’ motion. It held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present
during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit
products. The CA pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he
bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz.”

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

1. Whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants.

2. Whether the search warrants are “general warrants.”

HELD: Yes. There was probable cause to issue the search warrants. Probable cause means “such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the
means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.” Thus, probable cause for a search warrant
requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to
be searched.

The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the
complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to “the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause.” The applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances.
“Reliable information” is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in
writing the complainant and his witnesses.
In this case, the testimonies of Samiano and Sacriz, coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause that there is reason to believe
that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The standards are those of a prudent
man. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not
eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited
to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling,
packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm
testimonies of petitioners' witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished.

The sales receipt by Samiano is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners' software occurred.
During the search warrant application proceedings, Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit
that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners'
software. Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners'
software on the same computer unit.

Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. For this reason,
the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only
upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.
Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any impropriety on the part of
the judge in this case. As one can readily see here that the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and
his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would
be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence at such preliminary
stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.

Hence, there was probable cause to issue the search warrants.

2. Paragraph (e) is not a general warrant, but paragraph (c) of the search warrants was lacking in
particularity and was in the nature of a general warrant. A search warrant must state particularly the
place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit
the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection
against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. In
addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue “in
connection with one specific offense.” The articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is issued. Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles
subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific offense.

It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow .
The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise . The nature of
the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter
of concern.

In this case, paragraph (e) is not a general warrant, which provides: e) Computer hardware, including
central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes,
photocopying machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal
and unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or which contain,
display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft
trademarks and copyrights;

The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically
identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those
articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software. This
language meets the test of specificity.

However, paragraph (c) of the search warrants is lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c) states: c) Sundry
items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION; The
scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes
not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers property
that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c)
simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not.
Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair competition.

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items
sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A
partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A search
warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible
in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items
seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be
returned to Maxicorp.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No.
44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search
Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.
SO ORDERED.

4. Sony Music vs. Judge Español, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005.

Doctrine: A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause,
meaning "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place to be searched"

Facts:

In 2000, Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. sought the assistance of the NBI through agent
Lavin as they complained that Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC, together with its officers were engaged in
the replication, reproduction and distribution of Sony videograms without license and authority from the
Video Regulatory Board (violation of P.D.1987);That Solid Laguna was manufacturing, selling, and
distributing various titles of CDs in violation of Sony Music’s copyrights (and a violation of RA 8293).
Agent Lavin, in applying for a search warrant, stated before Judge Dolores Español that an unnamed
person provided them information as to the presence of pirated CDs in the premises of Solid Laguna;
that Lavin and other witnesses were accompanied by unnamed persons to enter the premise and
conduct further investigation. The judge then issued two corresponding search warrants; one for
probable violation of PD 1987 and the other for probable violation of RA 8293.

The search warrants were subsequently enforced, and items were seized from Solid Laguna on the
strength of the two warrants. SLC thereafter presented a certification that they are actually authorized to
manufacture and sell CDs by the VRB at the same time it asked the court to quash the search warrants
and return the items seized. Judge Español then quashed the search warrant issued for probable
violation of PD 1987.Judge Español later quashed the other warrant because of the fact that the items
seized as a result of the two warrants were coming led hence they cannot be examined properly.

Judge Español also ruled that the issuance of the warrant stemmed from the intimation made by
petitioners that Solid Laguna was not authorized to manufacture and sell CDs but in fact they were
authorized by the VRB. This being the warrants are of no force and effect because of the lack of probable
cause

Issue: Whether or not the search warrants were valid.

HELD: No. The issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the requirements of probable
cause. Judge Español did not accordingly err in quashing the same, let alone gravely abuse her
discretion. It is also within her authority to quash the said warrants based on her findings which were
found to be valid by the Supreme Court. Further, it cannot be overemphasized that not one of the
applicants of the warrants testified seeing the pirated discs being manufactured at Solid Laguna’s
premises, they merely relied on unnamed persons which is at best are hearsays.

The Supreme Court also noted that the lack of supporting evidence and documents in applying for the
search warrants on this infringement case does not mean that the master tapes of the alleged copies
being pirated should have been produced. It is true that the Supreme Court, in the Century Fox Case,
underscored the necessity, in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement
cases, of presenting the master tapes of the copyrighted work. But, as emphatically clarified in Columbia
Pictures vs CA such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or
documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence xxx especially where the
production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of
proportion to its evidentiary value.

What the Supreme Court is saying is that any evidence presented in lieu of the master tapes, if not
readily available, in similar application proceedings must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at the
very least, be based on the witness’ personal knowledge.

Summing up, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-00 was, at bottom, predicated on the sworn
testimonies of persons without personal knowledge of facts they were testifying on and who relied on a
false certification issued by VRB. Based as it were on hearsay and false information, its issuance was
without probable cause and, therefore, invalid.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued on
February 19, 2003 is consequently RECALLED.
Stonehill vs. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Doctrine:

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

The Moncado doctrine was abandoned. Evidence obtained from an invalid/illegal search warrant cannot
be used against the petitioners.

legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties

Facts:

The respondent judges issued 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or corporations of
which they were officer to search the persons, premises of their offices warehouses and/or residences,
and to seize and take possession of the personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code." (no specific offense)

Petitioners

The search warrants are null and void because:

1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law

The petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction, and prayed that the contested search warrants be declared null and void and
commanding the respondents to return to the petitioners the documents, papers, things and cash
money seized or confiscated.

Respondents:

The respondent-prosecutors alleged:

(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;

(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and

(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless
of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners

Issue: Whether or not the search warrants are valid’

If the search warrants are invalid, whether the said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners.

Ruling:

No, the search warrants are invalid.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating
a given provision of our criminal laws.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants.

No. Evidence obtained from invalid search warrant may not be used as evidence against the
petitioners.
The Moncado doctrine was abandoned.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that
the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the
theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by
means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search
warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by
other laws.

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification)
for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs.

Other important discussion

those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,

We hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Soliven vs. Judge Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988.

Topic: Essential requisites for the issuance of valid warrant of arrest

Doctrine: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised, two of them are as follows: (1)
whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Issue: (1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.

(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued
a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause.

Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-
affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that
the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that the respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to
establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
Case Title: People of the Philippines vs. Veloso, G.R. No. 23051, October 20, 1925.

Topic: John Doe warrants

Doctrine:

• John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever
and whenever it is feasible.

• The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant
is to be served

• the rule or principle (expressing the name of the person to be searched and place to be
searched) does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is
unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in
the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating
his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other
circumstances by which he can be identified.

Facts:

The police of Manila had a reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club, which is
located in No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, which was also managed by Jose Ma. Veloso, also a
Member of House of Representative, was nothing more than a gambling house. Such information was
verified by the chief of the gambling squad when they had been to the said club.

A search warrant was obtained from Judge Garduno of municipal court. The police attempted to
raid the Parliamentary Club. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one
band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the
house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.

Once inside, nearly 50 persons were apprehended, and one of them is Veloso. Townsend showed
the warrant to Veloso, upon reading, Veloso argued that he was Representative Veloso and not John
Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was
considered as John Doe, and he asked the latter to show the evidence of the game as his pocket was
bulging. Five minutes passed but Veloso refused to obey the order of Townsend. When the patience of
the officer was exhausted, policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance, and
Veloso bit his right forearm and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the
policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally
laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were
taken from his pockets.

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of
gambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, except
Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court
where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500.

Counsel for appellant attacked the validity of search warrant contending that since the name of
Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had
a legal right to resist the police by force.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant against Veloso is valid, though his name does not appear, but
instead the pseudonym John Doe was used in the said warrant.

HELD: Yes. The Court first discussed the general rule for a warrant to be valid. According to Supreme
Court, citing different jurisprudence, the rule or principle (expressing the name of the person to be
searched and place to be searched) does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party
whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be
given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating
his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other
circumstances by which he can be identified.

Now, applying in the case at bar, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself
described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the
prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. The police officers were
accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the
so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably
engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has
been held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or
which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which
may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise.

Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search
warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized.
But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling
Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular
description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the warrant in
this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a
description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably
recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases
where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be
served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the
building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma.
Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified
therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information,
permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The
Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant
since a crime was being committed.

John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult
enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far
fetched judicial interference.

Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the trial
judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that the
judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the defendant
and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the
costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment into effect issue.