6 months of Iván Duque: subtly eroding the Peace Agreements

by Julio Vazquez

During a four-day visit to the United States that concluded on February 16, President Iván
Duque emphasized the strategic and strengthened U.S.-Colombia relation and reaffirmed his
position on Venezuela, including his unconditional support to Juan Guaidó and total rejection
for the usurping power of Nicolás Maduro. The President was also keen to talk about his
vision of prosperity for Colombia, however, he failed to include the peace process on his U.S.
tour agenda.

Peace not only has faded away from his speech in international settings, Iván Duque seems to
be putting aside the peace issue and changing the path towards a pre-peace-agreement era:

First, President Duque has delayed the signature of the statutory law of the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), a transitional justice mechanism that seeks to hold accountable
actors who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. The document was approved
by the Constitutional Court, was reviewed and signed by the both chambers of the Congress
and, since February 8, it is ready to be signed by the president on the next 20 days.1

Nonetheless, President Duque has argued that he wishes to thoroughly revise the document as
he expressed concerns about the vagueness of the measures on crimes against children. In this
vein, REDEPAZ, a network of Colombian civil society organizations, asserts that these
arguments seek to hinder the process since all crimes against humanity, including sexual
crimes, not only against children, are contemplated by the JEP.2

A JEP without a statutory law could lead to a narrower and unclear action framework and
represents a step backwards on prosecuting crimes committed by the oldest guerrilla of the
continent.

Secondly, on December 26, he signed an executive order to extend the prohibition of the
possession and carrying of weapons that was signed by former President Juan Manuel Santos
on 2016, nevertheless President added a paragraph to the decree that allows the issuance of
special authorizations to carry weapons at the discretion of the Ministry of National Defense.

This decree opens the possibility of obtaining a permit based on guidelines established by the
Ministry of Defense. Although Fernando Botero, head of the ministry, claims that this
measure will reduce the discretionality, critics argue that a sense of insecurity or threat could

1
El Espectador. "Congreso envía estatutaria de la JEP a sanción presidencial". February 8, 2019.
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/congreso-envia-estatutaria-de-la-jep-sancion-presidencial-articul
o-838623
2
Radio Nacional de Colombia. "227 organizaciones le piden al Presidente Duque firmar ley estatutaria de la
JEP". February 18, 2019.
https://www.radionacional.co/noticia/ivan-duque/277-organizaciones-le-piden-al-presidente-duque-firmar-ley-es
tatutaria-de-la-jep
be enough justification to be granted with a permit, which could give civilian population
broader access to weapons.3

Centro Democrático, Iván Duque’s party, has adopted the rhetoric of legitimate self-defense
for those who lack of the protection of the State to support the modification of the decree.

In this light, the flexibilization of exceptional circumstances can open the door to people in
rural areas with low presence of State to apply for special permits.

Two major issues arise from this scenario: the Colombian State avoids its responsibility to
protect its citizens and reinforce its presence along its territory. This behavior, at the same
time, has caused violence and persecution against indigenous leaders and environmental
activists in areas that used to be controlled by the FARC;4 after the Peace Agreements the
state has done no significant effort to avoid the advancement of other criminal groups and to
deploy law enforcement bodies.

At the same time, it enables larger groups to legitimize their position of weapons and to
create private armed bodies that serve to the interest of landowners who posses enough
resources to recruit and pay for employees that are willing to take up arms.

For instance, farmers from the Cesar department have declared they feel vulnerable to the
threat of drug traffickers and criminal groups. For this reason, they requested authorization to
the National Government to carry arms, follow their own security schemes, guarantee their
security and reinforce cooperation networks of business owners in rural areas5

It must be noted that CONVIVIR, a program of cooperative neighborhood watch, appeared

following a similar regulatory decree that sought to provide this self-defense groups
—formed by farmers and landowner to tackle guerrilla threats— with a legal framework.6
Eventually, CONVIVIR groups ended up operating without credible oversight and
committing abuses against civilians, becoming another page in the history of paramilitarism
in Colombia.

Both actions —a possible objection of JEP and the weapons restriction decree— could lead to
an increase in armed violence and a legal and moral erosion of the Peace Agreement. Thus, it
is not necessary to explicitly revoke the peace process: omitting the signing deadlines, adding
a new clause to an old decree is enough to discreetly undermine the consolidation of the
agreements and discourage its compliance.

3
Carlos Ortega. "Polémica por facultades a Mindefensa para reglamentar porte de armas" December 30, 2018. El Tiempo.
https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/por-decreto-ministerio-de-defensa-reglamentara-porte-de-armas-
310016
4
Nicholas Casey. "Los asesinatos de activistas y líderes sociales empañan la paz en Colombia". October 13,
2018. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/es/2018/10/13/colombia-lideres-sociales-asesinatos/
5
El Heraldo. "Ganaderos del Cesar proponen armarse contra la delincuencia". January 23, 2019.
https://www.elheraldo.co/cesar/ganaderos-del-cesar-proponen-armarse-contra-la-delincuencia-591261
6
El Tiempo. "Así nacieron las Convivir". June 14, 1997.
https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-605402