United in Diversity?

Asymmetry in Indian Federalism

Author(s): Louise Tillin
Source: Publius , Winter, 2007, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter, 2007), pp. 45-67
Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4624781

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 United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian
Federalism

LouiseTillin*

Many studies highlight constitutional asymmetry as a desirable feature of federal systems in

multinational countries. This article looks at India which, mainly because of the special provisions
for Kashmir in the 1950 constitution and the status of newer small states in the north-east,
is generally described as asymmetrically federal. I show that, while India exhibits considerable
de facto asymmetry, asymmetry in the constitutional powers granted to individual states has
(i) not been important for India's ability to 'hold together' as often assumed and (ii) not entailed
special protection of cultural or national minorities. I thus cast doubt on the normative political
philosophy, particularly informed by Canadian and Spanish debates, that advances the idea of
asymmetrical federalism as a model of governance in potentially divided societies.
Keywords: Federalism, asymmetrical, multinational, India, Kashmir

United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism

"Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the
dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed
from outside. It was something deeper, and within its fold the widest
tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged
and even encouraged."
Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, 31

There is considerable disagreement about the role of federalism in countries

containing more than one territorially concentrated ethnic group or nation. The
collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia led to renewed
questioning of the desirability of federal systems in heterogeneous countries, even
though their democratic shortcomings limited the federal character of their polities.
Valerie Bunce has argued that federal systems organized along the boundaries of
national groups in Communist countries contained the building blocks for
nationalist movements (Bunce 2004). Others, such as Jack Snyder, have proposed

*Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex

Publius: The Journal of Federalism volume 37 number 1, pp. 45-67

doi: 10.1093/publius/pj1017
AdvanceAccess publication 18 November 2006
? TheAuthor 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

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46 L. Tillin

that fed
ethnic di
(Snyder 2
multinatio
federal sy
violent co
This arti
emphasize
accommo
the granti
a federa
asymmetr
size, dive
developme
however,
democrac
accommod
design wit
have been
I will situ
the conte
asymmetr
against asy
naturally
likelihood
873). Scho
other situ
Basque Co
comment
the prot
multinati
scholar of
asymmetr
multinati
multinati
(Stepan 2
Distinguis
in favor
case bette
of cultur
liberal de

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 Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 47

a system-wide attribute of a federation t

of difference across a polity. The functi
what exists and what works. This argum
interchangeably with "creative" or "f
in which solutions have been sought (s
constitution to one-off problems of
sometimes underdeveloped, but used sim
for comparative purposes. The descriptio
here will engage with both the functiona
how important constitutional asym
"hold together" and, in so doing, w
of the normative argument in favor of
beyond.
The incorporation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir4 within the 1950 Indian
constitution on the condition of a special status of autonomy enshrined in Article
370 of the constitution, in addition to certain other arrangements for new states in
India's north-east and for some tribal areas, has given an asymmetrical appearance
to India's federal constitution. It is because of Article 370 that India is most often
labelled asymmetrical, but few writers on Indian federalism consider Jammu and
Kashmir's position in the federation in any depth. I will argue here that Article 370
should not be interpreted as representing a type of asymmetry with which many
Quebecois nationalists would be satisfied. Kashmir's asymmetrical status in the
Indian constitution did not stem from a recognition that its ethnic or religious
distinctiveness constituted a basis for a higher degree of self-government than other
Indian states, even though its majority Muslim population was a major reason for
the dispute in and over the state. Instead, Article 370 was a temporary expediency
designed to govern the state's relations with India before the military conflict over
its status could be resolved.

The significant erosion of the autonomy enshrined in Article 370 since 1953,
as well as the rise of a militant separatist movement in the Kashmir Valley in the
late 1980s, should give us pause to question the success of asymmetrical federalism
in managing minority nationalist conflict in India. Furthermore, asymmetry has
not been used in the resolution of other potential threats to Indian unity such as
Tamil cultural nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s and the Sikh separatist
movement in the Punjab in the 1980s. Some of the newer small states with large
tribal populations in the geographically remote north-east, separated from the rest
of India by Bangladesh, have certain asymmetrical provisions enshrined in the
constitution to protect customary law, social and religious practices, and land
ownership. But, these small states should be seen as rather different to 'mainland'
India. As Ronald Watts stresses, a distinction between "full-fledged" member-states
and "peripheral" units is analytically important (Watts 1999, 41). If we

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 48 L. Tillin

acknowledg
important
ranging re
linguistic l
languages,
theoretica
features of
Kashmir, t

Distingui
The Normative Case

The theoretical literature on asymmetrical federalism generally draws a distinction

between de facto and de jure asymmetry. The first refers to the type of asymmetry
that is a feature of all federations to some degree, namely differences between
subunits in terms of size and wealth, culture or language, and those differences in
autonomy, representation and influence in the wider federation that result from
such attributes (Watts 1999). De jure asymmetry, on the other hand, is the produc
of conscious constitutional design. It refers to the allocation of different amounts
or types of powers, or autonomy in certain policy areas, to some subunits of
a federation but not others. Strict de jure asymmetry may also arise from the nature
of the representation or veto rights of subunits in central institutions such as the
second territorial chamber of a federation, the civil service, or the judiciary. Most
federations display some level of asymmetry in their second chamber whether or
not federal sub-units have an equal number of representatives. This article is
concerned primarily with the more restrictive interpretation of de jure asymmetry
understood as the granting of different sets of competencies to different units of th
federation.5

As I have suggested, it is also useful to distinguish between two levels of claim

that are made in favor of de jure asymmetry. These, I have broadly described as
normative and functional claims. As Alain-G. Gagnon and Charles Gibb note
an important part of the federal debate is related to varying ideas abou
what is good or valuable in society (Gagnon and Gibbs 1999, 73). In the context of
debates about the role of federalism in multinational countries, the normative
argument hinges on a distinction between "nationality-based units
(such as Quebec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain or the Punjab in India) and
federal subunits that are simply regional divisions of a larger national majorit
group (such as Ontario in Canada or Uttar Pradesh in India). Will Kymlicka asserts
that while the former type of units tend to look for greater powers, regional-based
units may actually gradually seek to relinquish more of their powers (Kymlick
2001, 102). The existence of these competing visions in one federation

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 49

leads to the normative argument in

theorists such as Kymlicka and Charle
Requejo in the Spanish. These theorist
as a means of satisfying the demand
2001; Taylor 1991; Requejo 2005). R
minority communities with mere reg
federal subunits that are controlled
is intrinsically inegalitarian, both
(Requejo 2005, 312).
The normative argument for asymm
potential clash with a classic normati
protection of equality between individu
critics of this strand of multicultural t
Canadian arguments in favor of grea
would be the creation of two classes of
of asymmetry, generally sympathetic
liberalism, deny this is a real clash.
It is clear then that the normative a
asymmetry that enshrines a vision of m
of certain cultural group rights at the h
need of national minorities for 'recogni
asymmetry sought by the multinati
of concerns about equality, as well as th
that no federation currently lives up to
type of asymmetry found in federalizin
as insufficient for meeting the stan
nationalism.6 Quebec's 'distinct society'
(although it was granted a considerable
constitution) and, as is argued in this ar
constitution do not live up to the stand
contradict Will Kymlicka's assertion tha
the principle of asymmetry than Canad

The Functional Case

Other works on multinational federalism emphasize asymmetry to make a lower

order of argument, namely that the types of asymmetry currently observable in
multinational federations-Belgium, Canada, India, and Spain-have been crucial
for the long-term survival of those federations.7 This is the argument that Alfred
Stepan makes in favor of asymmetry. He argues that the dominance of the
US model in theories of federalism has led scholars to place a misleading emphasis

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 50 L. Tillin

on a numb
well as eq
This theor
option for
between "
reality, he
game in S
multiple
consolidat
demos-ena
and asymm
state boun
country t
normative
specific r
(Stepan 1999).
Opponents of this type of argument, such as Rainer Bauboeck, argue that formal
asymmetry is not a prerequisite of the accommodation of asymmetrical national
identities. Bauboeck argues that the "glue that can maintain federal cohesion in
multinational democracies is not a shared national identity, but a shared
conception of federal citizenship" (Bauboeck 2003, 2). A shared conception can
accommodate persistent asymmetries of national identities but a fairly symmetric
baseline for federal representation and the allocation of powers, "for at the core of
nationalism is a demand for self-government rather than for cultural protection"
(ibid, 26). "The challenge", for Bauboeck, "for a theory of multinational
democracy remains therefore to find some basis for agreement that would support
a mutual recognition of asymmetric identities while constraining the demand for
asymmetric powers" (ibid, 31).
I suggest that the examples of asymmetry that Stepan finds in existing
multinational federations do not correspond with the normative vision of
asymmetry he endorses. I have already shown that the proponents of this vision are
unhappy with the extent of asymmetry currently found in Canada or Spain. I will
show that India is not a good place to find asymmetry that is representative of a
politics of recognition either. An emphasis on asymmetry in the Indian case directs
our attention from those factors that have been most significant in enabling India
to hold together, many of which Stepan himself also indicates. My intention is not
to offer an alternative normative argument against asymmetrical federalism, such
that it encourages instability or secession (as Charles Tarlton argued). Rather, it is
to acknowledge that asymmetry of a type that recognizes competing claims to
nationhood within a country is, in the first place, notoriously hard to negotiate and
more fundamentally, may not be universally imperative or sought after in

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 51

multinational countries. This is impo

exemplar of asymmetrical federalism an
countries to consider asymmetry as a
in a multinational society.

India has de facto asymmetry in abu

boundaries of Indian states in the 1950s and 1960s, the federation has been
organized along lines of linguistic variation. Hindi is the official language of only
nine of India's 28 states, and as of 2003, 22 languages are officially recognized
under the Eighth Schedule of the constitution. India contains sizeable populations
of Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists, as well as Hindus who comprise over
80 percent of the population. The states vary greatly in population size: the ratio
between the population of the largest and smallest states is 307 to 1.8 There is also
significant inequality in terms of patterns of economic growth and levels of
economic development between states (Ahluwalia 2002). But, India does not have
a significant amount of the second type of constitutional or de jure asymmetry.
India's constitution did grant special protection to certain groups including
religious and linguistic minorities, as well as "reservations" in education, legislative
seats and government employment for Scheduled Castes (former "untouchables")
and Tribes. Reservations have since also been introduced for "other backward

classes". But, with the exception of provisions for some tribal communities in th
north-east, special rights have not been granted to territorially bounded groups th
formed states within the federation. Instead, India's federation is large
constitutionally symmetrical. Even where demands for greater autonomy ha
been made by regional players, these have not-apart from in times of great stres
(or provocation)-tended to be phrased as demands for a different level
autonomy than other states. In the centralizing decade of the 1980s under Prime
Ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, certain states (Assam, Kashmir, and Punjab), as
Balveer Arora notes, did seek "to compel a fresh look at the terms of thei
participation in the union" (Arora 1995). But, in all three cases, conflict w
preceded by (asymmetrical) central intervention in processes of state government
I will now look at the specific claims made about asymmetry in Indi
As examples of asymmetry, scholars refer to the special status accorded to Kashm
in the constitution and the varieties of special status adopted in north-east India
(Arora 1995; Stepan 2002, 4; Kymlicka 2002, 106).9 Stepan also suggests that t
asymmetrical design of the federation was important in allowing for t
reorganization of state boundaries along linguistic lines, and the consequen
accommodation of Tamil cultural nationalism. Balveer Arora, on the other han
says that asymmetries have been the result of the dual federalizing process in Indi
Federal subunits were created in two ways: (i) through decentralization of power
within the provinces directly administered by the British and (ii) the accession o

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 52 L. Tillin

former pri
India at in
administrat

Jammu and

Most autho
constitutio
Union (see,
that Articl
status as a s
it.1o As a
uniform co
draw up it
powers of P
Other matt
extended to
(Article 37
But, Articl
"distinct",
not intend
India's foun
would have
It was inclu
constituti
accession to
in October
India and
subject to
had commi
the state w
The amend
in the Con
of the Con
under th
While intr
Assembly
Union of India.

"The discrimination is due to the special conditions of Kashmir.

That particular State is not yet ripe for this kind of integration [that of
the other princely states that had merged with the Indian provinces directly

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 Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 53

administered by the British]. It is t

course even Jammu and Kashmir w
integration as has taken place in the c
it is not possible to achieve that integ
1946-9 1999, October 17th 1949, vol

He outlined the special conditions in the

1. The war within the state-a ceasefir

year but conditions are still "unus
yet restored
2. Part of the state is still in the hands of "rebels and enemies"

3. "Entanglement" with the United Nations over the issue of J&K and the
Government's commitment to giving the people of the State the
opportunity to decide for themselves whether they wish to remain with
the Republic or to leave it (including a plebiscite if the right conditions
prevail)
4. Agreement that the will of the people, through a constituent assembly,
will determine the constitution of the state and the sphere of Union
jurisdiction over the state.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar did not mention the distinct nature of Kashmir's society or
culture as a reason to grant the state a special status, although the fact that Jammu
and Kashmir had a Muslim majority and sat on the border between India and
Pakistan lay behind the disputed status of the state. There was only one
intervention in the Constituent Assembly debate at which the state's special status
was enshrined in what was then Article 306A of the draft constitution and what
remains today as Article 370 of the constitution. The unique circumstances of
Kashmir's position within the Union were difficult to contest. No other state in the
Union was embroiled in a war involving a foreign country or was the subject
of a United Nations resolution. All other princely states had by this point decided
to join the Union, or their decision had been secured through the use of force
(such as Hyderabad, where the Muslim ruler of a majority Hindu state had held
out against accession to India). Article 370, then, recognized Kashmir's distinct
position at the moment of constitutional design, but it was intended as an interim
measure before the convening of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir and/or the
holding of a plebiscite.
A major area of controversy surrounding Kashmir's constitutional position was
over the state's exemption from the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of
the constitution. Sheikh Abdullah, the National Conference leader to whom
Maharaja Hari Singh had handed over power after his accession to India,
had sought such an exemption in order to be able to see through the redistribution

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54 L. Tillin

of land wi
Kashmir (
which wer
Deputy Pr
October 16
anomaly of
any of the
does not a
(quoted in
That Kashm
one of the
secular co
negotiatio
Kashmir w
that Canad
As Mohit B
the frame
Kashmiri
(Bhattacha
The tenor
fact that d
final settl
regional id
state's ful
protect K
distinctive
led by th
the Hindu
parallel to
movement
in India (B
The histor
central in
involveme
The natio
population
after inde
Parishad ("
by S.P Moo
closer int
campaign

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 55

independence, leading to his arrest in

government which gave its consent t
constitution to Jammu and Kashmir.
The Constitution (Application to Jamm
beginning of Kashmir's constitutional in
government to legislate in J&K on mo
the Fundamental Rights (albeit with the
the state government on "security" gr
Supreme Court over Kashmir (Bose 200
the emergence of a militant separatist m
the use of Jammu and Kashmir's con
asymmetrically federal in either a funct
Bose writes, "Article 370 has been a ci
is an irrelevance" (Bose 2003, 70).
Furthermore Article 370 has not set a
asymmetry as a means of coming to
movements which have appeared to thre
points. In neither the case of Tamil na
nationalism in the Punjab in the 1980
recourse to asymmetrical solutions, at
of power or autonomy under the constit

Special Provisions for Small States in the

Besides Jammu and Kashmir, a number

included in the constitution for north
innovative constitutional arrangements
councils for the tribal areas of Ass
(Dasgupta 1997, 363). And some of the si
Assam since independence have als
constitutional amendment set out s
Nagaland (created in 1962 with an overw
to protect Naga customary law, social/
civil and criminal justice, and the owners
state of Mizoram was given a similar c
parts of the region were also given
Sixth schedule. The accession of Sik
an 'associate state' which was then inc
with a number of special provisions. T
became states via Union Territory st
addition to several others in the rest

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56 L. Tillin

preferent
(Arora 1995
The varieti
de jure asym
as quite dif
eastern side
strip of lan
did not com
period, and
has been l
(Manor 200
national sec
north-east (
with other
ranged fr
a populatio
166 millio
perhaps bet
units as th
of populat
of the m
entity"(Wat
India's cent
innovations
devices in t
have someth
which is ba
geographica
'modern' e
a difference
and in the r
founding fa
India thus:

"The triba
more or le
people in w
not the case. Their roots are still in their own civilisation and their own
culture. They have not adopted mainly or in large part, either the modes or
the manners of the Hindus who have surrounded them. Their laws of
inheritance, their laws of marriage, customs and so on are quite different to

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 57

that of the Hindus. I think that is the

have a different sort of scheme for As

other territories" (quoted in (Verghe

The Sixth Schedule sets out substant

powers for tribal areas in the northeast
Schedule, which applies in the rest of In
Advisory Councils to advise on tribal aff
Governor of a state to restrict the trans
much further, providing for district an
making powers in some areas.'6
It has also been argued that the lack
a contributing factor to its conflict-p
Baruah present arguments to the effe
Assam has been counter-productive. H
granted more constitutional asymmetry,
less likely to adopt some of the exclusiv
that have alienated non-Assamese minor
states (Weiner 1978; Baruah 1999). W
guarantee of a universal right to the f
open to the Assamese state governme
migration (Weiner 1978, 116).'7 Baruah n
Assam's lack of asymmetrical status that
subnational identity based on a politics o
the large Bengali-speaking population
to a prolonged series of campaigns fo
He asks whether a more radical form
tensions in Assam, suggesting that the p
addressed differently and the chances of
had had autonomous jurisdiction over
policies, (ii) cultural policy and (iii) de
of resources (ibid, 202). The question of
different given an asymmetrical const
factual, but it is not possible to argu
asymmetry would have led the ma
accommodating positions vis-a-vis non-A
So, while the Indian constitution grant
does so substantially only in the north
between the small states of the north-eas
differential approach to this region
constitutional asymmetry as a princi

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 58 L. Tillin

The state o
"norm". M
Jammu an
Article 37
helped pre
separate H
should be
national im
been advo
India's sec
are also su
be likely
identity of
nation's sel

Tamil Nad
Let us now
asymmetry
examinatio
India (Step
"special ty
nationalis
nationalism
future dec
did not in
prominen
the Tamil
of the ope
further h
the Indian context.

Stepan describes India's "special type" of federation as a "holding together"

(where power has been devolved from a formally fundamentally unitary state) and
demos-enabling model, as distinct from a U.S.-style "coming-together",
demos-constraining model. Of special importance is the "demos-enabling"
provision which granted the central parliament the right to redesign state
boundaries in coordination with India's linguistic minorities. This permitted the
1956 linguistic reorganization of states. Stepan distinguishes three stages in the
integration of Tamil Nadu into the federation. In the first stage, the Tamil speaking
lower-caste Congress Party leader Kamaraj Nadar played an important role in
reducing the potential tension between cultural and territorial nationalism.

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 Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 59

As a regional Chief Minister of Madr

reorganization) from 1954, he deliver
Congress Party, and because of his resou
of the demands of cultural nationalist
speakers in 1956) (Stepan 2002, 40). The s
which took the steam out of the potenti
all southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Kar
be questioned, however, how serious a
was, especially outside Tamil Nadu.'8 The
saw the formerly secessionist regiona
(DMK), renouncing its separatist goals
government about a ban on separatist
assembly in 1967, becoming "integrated
federation" (Stepan 2002, 43).
These norms, Stepan suggests, include t
multi-party electoral coalitions at stat
regional parties, creating incentives for b
system.
Thus, as we look more closely at Stepan's explanation of the dynamics involved
in taming secession in Tamil Nadu, we see that asymmetry drops away as a central
explanation. However, Stepan appears to contend that linguistic reorganization was
an asymmetrical reform. "The decisions to craft a 'demos enabling' and
'asymmetrical' federation allowed the parliament at the center to go forward
with the fundamental redrawing of the political boundaries of the federation to
reflect the cultural nationalist demands of language", he writes (Stepan 2002, 42).
To the extent that linguistic reorganization involved making different regional
languages the basis for statehood, thus embedding certain culturally specific rights
in the constitution, we could see it as asymmetrical. But to be truly asymmetrical
such rights would need to be granted to some states and not others.
Stepan himself states that he means by asymmetry, "that some states may have
special prerogatives not available to all the states of the federation that are
constitutionally embedded, and thus not subject to change by unilateral democratic
majorities" (Stepan 2002, 4). This was not the case after linguistic reorganization:
all states have the same constitutional rights with respect to language. Under Article
345, the legislature of every state may by law adopt any language in use in the state
or Hindi as the language (s) to be used for all or any official purpose in the state.
And despite linguistic reorganization, under Article 348, all proceedings of
the Supreme and High Courts, Bills and Acts passed in the central parliament and
state legislatures, and all orders, rules and regulations must be in English
(The Constitution of India 2003).

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 60 L. Tillin

More fund
made the c
of states w
assembly b
acceded t
British-g
governanc
provinces
The consti
and provi
(princely
from an
constitut
the Consti
distinction between Part A and Part B states was abolished on the advice of

the 1955 States Reorganization Commission. The Commission wrote that pu

opinion has been "severely critical" of the three-part classification of states:

which it has been argued, offends against the principle of equal rights and
opportunities for the people of India. The only rational approach to t
problem, in our opinion, will be that the Indian Union should have primar
constituent units have equal status and a uniform relationship with th
Centre, except where, for any strategic, security or other compelling reason
it is not practicable to integrate any small area with the territories o
full-fledged unit (States Reorganization Commission 1955, 67).

Linguistic reorganization was significant because it marked out Indian federalis

from other models of federalism by an explicit recognition of the possi
co-existence of cultural and territorial nationalism, encouraging the developmen
"multiple and complementary identities" (Stepan 2002). It made a certain type o
de facto asymmetry the basis for administrative organization of the federation.
its success lay in offering collective self-government to national minorities rat
than introducing a relational concept of autonomy. As Marguerite Ross Bennett
upon whom Stepan relies in his analysis, writes, "Control of Tamil Nadu provid
the opportunity for at least partial Tamil cultural fulfillment, and the power base
tackling the [regional] equity question within the constitutional framewor
(Barnett 1976, 325). It is arguably autonomy, or the restoration of autonomy, rat
than asymmetry that has been more important in negotiating the relation
between states and center under the federal system. The resolution of long-runn
bloody conflicts such as that in the Punjab has been based upon a return
"normal", electoral politics (Manor 1996; Brass 2001) and the restoration
autonomy by the Center rather than the granting of an asymmetrical leve

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 61

autonomy to such states in response t

Linguistic reorganization, then, provides
of a multinational model of federation b
The lack of calls from states in India fo
argument against across-the-board de
asymmetrical federalism in Canada an
divide between Hindi-speaking states a
levels of decentralization. Were the Hind
with a centralizing agenda, which it has
may become evident. But the party s
coalitions, seems unlikely to permit that
states that have called for greater dec
normally called for this across the boa
suggest that cultural nationalism in India
level of intensity to Quebecois or Catalan
that in countries with fewer linguist
linguistic nationalists may be more likely
asymmetry. What's more, the emergenc
but also at a national level since the 1990
important in India by offering an al
negotiation of regional demands and d
2004) asymmetries in the party system
asymmetrical or incongruent coalition-g
in India are expressed through the par
governments. This may help explain why
not an important part of the political la

Conclusion

India's constitution contains some nods to asymmetry, with regard to Jammu and
Kashmir and the tribally dominated states of the north-east. But, it has been shown
in this article that such asymmetry has (i) not been centrally important for India's
ability to "hold together" and (ii) not entailed special protection for the rights of
cultural minorities in India in a manner suggested by the political philosophy that
has developed in Canada and Spain around the idea of asymmetrical federalism.
The only possible exception to this is in the special constitutional provisions for
tribal communities in the north-east, but it has been argued here that federalizing
patterns in the north-east should not be seen as representative of the dominant
federal mindset. Indeed those group rights that have been accorded to minorities in
India, especially Muslim personal law, have not been granted primarily to
territorially concentrated cultural groups. India's federal design has been important

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 62 L. Tillin

for India's
"nations")
question w
Asymmetr
at least.

Linguistic
difference
language, a
federal sub
cross-cutt
linguistic l
1996). This
presence o
linguistic,
An emph
sidelining
inheritan
The nation
sources of
of India, J
in its dive
linguistic r
not have sp
which allow
1992). The
proposes an
by minorit
Hindu India.

But, if asymmetry has not been important so far in helping India to cohere,
there is one situation in which an asymmetrical solution may be necessary.
The status of Jammu and Kashmir is, as it stands, a poor example of asymmetrical
federalism, but asymmetrical status could be a necessary part of an eventual
resolution to the conflict in the region. This possibility does not negate the
argument in this article. The level of central government intervention in, and
manipulation of, the state's politics has been greater than in any other state since
independence. The conflict in Kashmir is internationalized and, unlike any other
state in India, there may be an international component to any constitutional
compromise over its status. We need to ask, however, on what basis such
asymmetry should or might be granted-in recognition of Kashmir's "distinct"
status within the Union or as an acknowledgment of past wrongs? Either would
take the Indian federation into new constitutional waters.

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 63

Notes

The author would like to thank the following people whose comments and questions have
improved this article at various stages of its conception: Tulia Falleti, Francine Frankel an
Douglas Verney at the University of Pennsylvania; James Manor and Mick Moore at th
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex; and Katherine Adeney, John
Echeverri-Gent and Lawrence Saez at the Political Studies Association conference, Universit
of Reading, 6 April 2006 where a version of the article was presented. The author is also
grateful to the editor and three anonymous reviewers for Publius, as well as to the Thouro
Award for sponsoring her study at Penn from 2003-2005.

1. Jack Snyder: "Wherever possible, democratizing states should try to promo

civic identities and guarantee rights at the individual level. For the same reasons,
ethnically based federalism and regional autonomy should be avoided, since they creat
political organizations and media markets that are centred on ethnic differences"
(Snyder 2000, 40)
2. This is not to say that the Indian state's relations with different identity groups have
been symmetrical, but that constitutional asymmetry has not been crucial.

3. The debate among Canadian scholars about the use of asymmetrical federalism t
accommodate Quebec's "distinct society" intersects with broader scholarly debates abou
multiculturalism, and procedural versus communitarian liberalism.

4. The state of Jammu and Kashmir contains the Muslim majority Kashmir Valley, th
Hindu majority region of Jammu and the region of Ladakh with a slight Buddhis
majority. In this article the state will be referred to interchangeably as Jammu an
Kashmir (J&K) or simply Kashmir. Another section of the former princely state has been
under Pakistani control since the end of the India-Pakistan war of January 1949. This
known as Azad ('free') Kashmir and the Northern Areas in Pakistan.

5. Even so, India would sit at the lower end of the scale of second chamber asymmetr
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. It should be noted that
India currently displays considerable asymmetry in its lower house of parliamen
because representation has not been adjusted with population change since the
1971 census.

6. But the recent referendum (18th June 2006) in support of greater autonomy
Catalonia, including the use of the word "nation" in the preamble to the autono
document, seems to indicate a greater willingness on the part of the Socialist
government in Madrid to contemplate asymmetry of a type closer to the normativ
interpretation. Other writers, such as Agranoff (1999) are less critical of the ty
of asymmetry that have emerged in Spain and their contribution to accommoda
diversity.

7. Functional arguments are also made on the grounds of efficient public administration or
economies of scale such as the justification for the principle of subsidiarity in the
European Union, or the Estado de las Autonomias in Spain.

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64 L. Tillin

8. Ratio calc
the 2001 ce
(Rajya Sabh
proportion

9. Most wr
These are s
that of Wa
10. Wording
Publius web

11. Princel
independen

12. For bac

13. Constitu

14. This has

Indeed, soo
expressed t
arrangemen
Parliament
not to acce
result of h
a popular m
filled with
the people
Centre." (P
(Anand 198
15. This do
for asymm
concerned t
distinct fro
Haryana an
ostensible b
demands f
(or 'Khalist
Punjabi pol
Bhindranw
political par
be confined
powers to b
for all states

16. The gov

arrangemen
extended to

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Asymmetry in Indian Federalism 65

17. He suggests that language policy was th

The state government's designation of Ass
provoked rioting and ushered in a period o

18. As James Manor writes, "I have, during

sought in vain to identify a single politi
Kannadigas who ever identified with the n
even heard of the idea" (Manor 2001, 89)

19. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer fo

20. Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (2004

India's party system in facilitating federal i

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