Gabriel Thomas R. Garcia Dr. Belen Tangco, Ph.D.

Diplomacy and Protocol

Diplomacy: A Balance of Interests

Introduction
In December of 2012, upon assuming his position as Australia’s Foreign Affairs
chief, Peter Varghese outlined Australia’s place in the world in his six + 2 + n formula.
The ''six'' is a reference to Australia's most significant relationships around the globe. It
lists China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and the United States. The ''two''
refers to the multilateral meetings that Australia is putting the most energy into - the
East Asia Summit and the Group of 20, or G20. While the “n” stands for neighborhood
or the multiple island states that surround them in the South Pacific. For Varghase, the
formula wasn’t meant to ignore the other important foreign policy work his department
was doing, but it was meant to serve as a means of judging what is essential for
Australian foreign policy (Flitton, 2013). However, Australia’s relationship with the six
aforementioned countries comes with its conflicting national interests in security,
economic prosperity and a rules-based international system (Tyler, 2013). This was on
display when Australia faced a dilemma on whether or not it should sell uranium to
India. Not doing so would damage Australia’s trade and security interests. Yet Australia
has a core interest in the maintenance of the nuclear non-proliferation system that the
United States has long advocated. Setting aside the fact that this highlights the inherent
difficulty in weighing various and contradicting interests, it is also worth observing that
the “national interest” seems to shift on whatever perspective policy makers decides to
use
Earlier in 2009, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton garnered a fair amount
of scrutiny on her first visit to Asia. Though state visits like this comes with the job of
being a diplomat of her rank, what drew the attention of some groups was her
statements on whether or not diplomatic talks with Beijing would include alleged human
rights violations. She replied that pressing China on the issue “cannot interfere with the
global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crisis” (Landler,
2009). Amnesty International called the comments “shocking and disappointing”. After
all, the United States has presented itself as the champion of freedom and liberal values
including human rights. According to Mathur & Kumar (2006), since the election of
Jimmy Carter in 1976, the United States has been a leader in making human rights an
integral part in the substance and machinery of foreign policy. The remarks sounded
like a tacit acknowledgement that the economic and security cost of dealing with China
was that human rights issues were to be sidelined if not, wholly ignored. However,
according to Thakur (2013b) the Secretary of State’s response was not at all shocking.
The examples above are by no means exhaustive. Yet it displays the careful
diplomatic “balancing act” of states’ national interests with the interests and constraints
from other countries while navigating in the international arena. Too often, this happens
simultaneously and related to the continuous progress of globalization and the ever-
increasing relevance of non-state actors. This has not only made modern diplomacy
more complicated and nuanced but it has also resulted in a reexamination of some of
the traditional tenets of diplomacy. This paper will discuss the layered interests that
states take into consideration in enacting their foreign policy. Specifically, how the
concept of a “national interest” was problematic to begin with and is now an outdated
framework. More importantly, this paper will look at the role diplomacy plays in this effort
of balancing.
National Interest: A Complicated and Problematic Concept
It may be counter-intuitive, but the term “national interest” is rather broad and
may not be as obvious as it may seem. Some see the concept itself lacks a clear and
an unambiguous meaning. For Thakur (2013a) the term has been used arbitrarily as a
justification for various foreign policy decisions that often contradict one other. He notes
that it may be the driver for isolationism and pacifism in one period and military
adventurism or war in another. It gives the impression of subjectivity in that a country’s
national interest is whatever it proclaims it to be. This then lends credence to Burchill’s
(2005) assertion that the concept is empty of substantive content. Despite glaring
challenges such as these, there are some scholars who contend that the idea is more
complicated than problematic. Nye (1999) sees the national interest as the set of shared
priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. Kaplan (2014) argues for its
objectivity, stating that just as it is in the interest of a system to obtain the valuable, so
too does the interest of the nation. It must satisfy the national needs by pursuing the
valuable. For its purpose, a report from the U.S Commission on America’s National
Interests (1996) outlines the idea behind the concept as the fundamental building block
in any foreign policy discussion. As a function, the term itself both describes and
prescribes foreign policy. This unfortunately, does not narrow the parameters
whatsoever. Taken broadly, defining the national interest can result in a tautological
description of itself in that the national interest are the interests that serve the nation.
This means that diplomatic engagement for whatever reason it may be be, whether it be
for military intervention, improvement of resource security, expansion of ideological
influence, or any other goal; can all serve any country’s national interest in some way or
another.
However, this is insufficient. Even in that aforementioned report, it found that
“Americans have no vivid or a shared sense of America’s interests in the world, nor is
there a clear ranking of those interests.” Despite the term being casually used by
administration officials, policy makers and the citizenry at large, the problem begins with
in the obvious but often overlooked reality that the national interest can be difficult to
pinpoint and is inherently contestable (Tyler, 2013). Simply put, a nation has national
interests as opposed to a uniform national interest.
Whose Interests? Which Actors? How Is It National?
 The most common pitfall in subscribing to the notion of a national interest is that
a nation implies a single monolithic actor. This is rarely the case. As Thakur(2013a)
notes, there are several competing actors. For realists, the state is still the primary unit
in international relations. However, it cannot be denied that there are several non-state
actors whose influence and roles have considerably increased in recent years. This
includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs), uncivil society organizations like
terrorist groups, arms and drugs smugglers, and human traffickers, multinational
corporations, philanthropic foundations, celebrities, transnational professional
associations which establish global standards and norms and that ultimately constitute
the networked global governance (Weiss, Selye, & Coolidge , 2013). This implies that
no country is fully homogenous and the presence of various actors and groups
competing for greater influence in the decision-making process immediately undermines
the impression of a uniform interest. Vanaik (2006) reinforces this point even more
when he points out that the state ultimately becomes a reflection of an array of
interacting and competing forces in society. It is a given then that not all interests are
equally represented as some interests had to come at the expense of others.
As mentioned above, this was the dilemma former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton faced on her first visit to Asia. Human rights groups certainly had thought their
disappointment was justified but as one of the U.S’ top diplomats, she was well aware
that antagonizing China on this single issue could jeopardize the entire U.S agenda. In
situations like these and many others, what emerges is some kind of balance reflecting
the intersecting interests of different groupings. To the extent that the state is itself the
'reflector' of this balance of social forces within, it can be said to more or less fairly
represent the overall collective interest. There are other approaches to view this matter.
Instead of a purely competitive manner as mentioned above, Easton’s (1965) model of
a “black box” that takes in demands and pressures from various units in the system and
converts it to outputs in the form of policies is seen when the state enacts its foreign
policy from the demands and pressures of various actors.
Another pitfall that presents itself in attempting to definitively argue for a national
interest is that a country’s short-term interests is too often incongruent with its long-term
interest. As Lamborn (1985) notes, what may be sound foreign policy today in the
pursuit of the national interest, may create the next geopolitical disaster. Take for
example the United States’ support for Afghanistan’s Mujahedeen during the Cold War
against the USSR. At the time, arming and radicalizing the Mujahedeen served the U.S’
policy of containment against communism. In the long term however, that decision
would haunt the U.S in the form of the terrorist group, the Taliban. Also, one might view
the Trump Administration’s mission to secure better trade terms with close U.S. allies
like European Union members countries as another example of conflicting interests.
The administration’s strategy of imposing tariff and trade would certainly protect and
effectively, benefit some of the U.S’ domestic industry in the short-term. However, in the
long term, this could have disastrous consequences as these countries could impose
their own protectionist policies that may deal a serious blow to the globalized world.
Worse yet, may begin to seek economic and political ties elsewhere, most notably with
Russia or China who are competitors, if not, outright adversaries of the United States
(Colebrook, 2020).
Subjectivity
Going back to one of the earlier criticisms of arguing for a national interest is that
it appears be subjective- subjective to the policy makers, to a country’s leadership, to
various system levels and to the resources available. The latter speaks to the limited
nature states can dedicate in achieving foreign policy goals. Therefore, priorities are
inevitably assigned. Though some goals are definitively worthwhile, some objectives
must be abandoned. The supply of trained soldiers, diplomats, money, and public
resolve is ultimately, limited. For Colebrook (2020), using these resources to secure one
foreign policy objective could very well mean making it impossible to pursue another.
The United States’ War with Iraq in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack is demonstrative
of this subjectivity. The initial rationale for the war was to serve as a pre-emptive strike
on Iraq who the U.S accused of having weapons of mass destruction (WMD) As the war
dragged on, the Bush administration could not substantiate it’s claims and had justified
its continued presence in Iraq to promote democracy and engage in nation building after
deposing a brutal tyrant (Harding, 2016; Hinnebusch, 2007). This reasoning too seemed
to change in the face of mounting public opposition and international support. This
became evident in the 2008 elections where Hillary Clinton in democratic primary
elections (Byler, 2019) and John McCain for the general elections (Carter, 2013) was
heavily criticized for their vote of support for the Iraq War. This was a glaring contrast
with then candidate Obama’s “no” vote for the war. In due time though, President
Barrack Obama was on the receiving end of criticism because of his decision to pull-out
U.S troops in Iraq. Critics allege that this created a power vacuum that was filled by a
new terrorist group named ISIS (Gunaratna, 2015). In this example, the arbitrary and
sometimes capricious nature of singling out a “national interest” was put on full display.
It demonstrates the incompatibility of short term and long terms interests, on how
domestic pressures and political infighting can morph the national interest for political
expediency in the face of a limited financial capacity and public support.
Accepting that the national interest is whatever its government declares it to be,
allows and ultimately excuses a whole host of bad behavior under the banner of
improving the country. As Thakur (2013b) notes, it is absurd to accept Milosevic’s
atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo, Saddam Hussein’s brutal repression in Iraq, Iran’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons, America and English military adventurism in the Middle
East, Russia’s illegal territory occupation, as part simply part of their national interest.
Accepting the paradigm of a national interest inevitably blurs the line between the “real”
motive behind these policies and the “real” national interest. Arguably though, bad
behavior such as these may be the product of miscalculation on the part of the country’s
leadership. Morgenthau (1948) accepts this as merely a consequence of believing that
the national interest can be scientifically deduced. However, this still does not answer
for the inadequacies of the concept. Reynold’s (1971) comments that government
actions can be said to serve the national interest if they serve the “real interest of the
community as determined by an omniscient observer”. Short of that however, this does
not offer solutions to the problems demonstrated above. It only adds additional
difficulties as it is not certain nor obvious that this “real interest” exists and that there is a
means of identifying it concretely.
A Balance of Interest: An Alternative
As the discussions above point out, the construct of a national interest provides
little or poor guidance in navigating and informing foreign policy decisions. Moreover, it
proves to be inadequate when competing and colliding interests from multiple actors are
involved in the process. Ultimately substituting the word ‘a’ in ‘a balance of interests’ for
‘the’ in ‘the national interest’ proves to be more than an exercise in semantics. Arguing
for a “balance of interests” is superior in matters of description, explanation and
prescription. (Thakur, 2013b). It does so by incorporating the element of human agency
in foreign policy discussions. That human agency not only accounts for human error that
is responsible for miscalculations and bad behavior but it also accounts for varying
perspectives of individuals and groups with broad backgrounds, predilections and
perspectives (Weinert, 2009). The metaphor of the balance scales is accurate because
too often internal policy debates are so fiercely contentious in that the opposing
arguments and proponents are so finely balanced. It takes just one extra argument,
consideration or policy- maker to tip the scales decisively on one side. “The national
interest” fails to do justice to this tipping- effect reality. In sum, “a balance of interests”
permits a far better assessment of the diverse interests, values, actors, short and long-
term effects, and different policy options.
Under this paradigm, the actions of various heads-of-state are interpreted not
simply as the arbitrary pursuit of a vaguely defined “national interest” but as a careful
balancing act designed to advance multiple interests simultaneously. Inevitably though,
this balancing may leave groups dissatisfied but it is worth noting then that their
interests were not capriciously disregarded but were simply not acted upon at that given
time as it will jeopardize the balance of other interests. This does not take away their
inherent value and the possibility that they may be acted upon in the near future. Take
then former President Obama’s visit to India. President Obama had to perform an
intricate and delicate series of balancing acts during his stay. He needed to
acknowledge India's rising status as a major global player without exaggerating their
accomplishments or downplaying the country’s shortcomings. He also needed to avoid
being seen as to be too pandering to India at the cost of relations with Pakistan and that
he needed to be mindful of the economic cost of job loss because of outsourcing in
India. His speech to India's two houses of parliament on November 8 tried to strike all
the right notes. But on the question of the trip’s success, it is a visible achievement.
Though the long-term effects may have been unclear at the time, the press’
commentary noted that while the forum was India's parliament, the target audience was
Beijing's leadership. Indians were pleased, Americans were satisfied, Beijing was put on
notice and Pakistan reacted angrily to the endorsement of India's quest for permanent
membership of the UN Security Council (Friedman, 2010). All in all, the visit touched on
several key foreign policy interest not only in the country but also in the region. All U.S
interests may not have been equally advanced, but the former managed to strike a
balance with his state visit.
Notable Examples: The U.S-China- Japan Triangle
The rise of China presents Japan a myriad of challenges and opportunities that
are clouded by uncertainties. As a consequence, Japan has been pursuing a mixed
strategy that involves elements of both positive engagement and realistic balancing
(Mochizuki, 2007). This complication stems largely from the fact that Japan after World
War II had been transformed into a liberal, vibrant democracy under the U.S security
umbrella. In fact, in 2018 Japan published its annual Diplomatic Bluebook— the weighty
document outlining the country’s current stance toward a wide variety of foreign policy
matters. In it, Japan regards its alliance with the United States as central to its security
and diplomatic strategy. It labels it as “the foundation of peace, prosperity and freedom
not only in Japan but also across the Asia-Pacific region” (Hurst, 2018). Like many other
countries, Japan has been grappling with a rising China for nearly two decades. On the
domestic side, Japan has an ongoing maritime border dispute with China that has
severely affected the tensions in the region. Meanwhile on a larger scale, with China’s
persistent challenge to U.S hegemony, Japan is left with little opportunity but to engage
in a careful balancing act with its interests and alliances. It too cannot ignore the appeal
of the Chinese market and economy while historical tensions and consistent border
disputes have consistently been a hindrance in improving the diplomatic relations
between the two. However, with Trump’s unpredictability and the U.S retreat in global
leadership, Japan is wary yet willing to renormalize relations with the country, with some
significant resistance (Basu, 2020).
Here all the complications modern states have to face become visibly present:
conflicting thematic interests, mounting domestic pressures over foreign policy goals
and a high stakes geostrategic dilemma. This is by no means mere theoretical posturing
as well. In 2010 there a Chinese fishing trawler that collided with a Japanese naval
vessel in disputed territory by the East China Sea. The diplomatic fall out was swift and
immediate. The Chinese crew were arrested and was facing three years of prison.
However, the Japanese government allowed that they be released as long as they
admit they were there illegally. Beijing responded by summoning the Japanese
ambassador twice in twenty-four hours. The row escalated to the point where the
Chinese had postponed an official visit and threatened to withhold exports of rare earth
metals that were essential in manufacturing electronics. It was a powerful statement as
China was the largest exporter of rare earth metals in the world and that the Japanese
economy is heavily reliant on manufacturing electronics (Bradsher, 2010).
 In this particular case, identifying a uniform national interest would neither be
useful nor arguably, possible. Releasing the detained Chinese would immediately
deescalate the tensions between both countries. However, not only would it be
domestically unpopular that could have serious ramifications in the next election cycle, it
could embolden further Chinese belligerence. If China knows its actions won’t be met
with protest nor reprimand, what prevents it from reclaiming greater and greater territory
in the region? Ultimately to resolve the matter, the Japanese had to strike a balance in
all these competing interests. A single-minded pursuit of vague national interest was
neither viable nor helpful at the onset of the dispute
Notable Examples: Iran’s Solutions is Problematic for the World

For the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of the U.S’ most
persistent problems in the Middle East has been the Iranian regime (Cordesman, 2018).
After the Iranian revolution in the 1970’s, the country has managed to exist outside the
U.S security umbrella in the region mostly because of a distrustful leadership and being
situated in one of the largest oil reserves in the world. It has grown to challenge the
existing power structure in the region headed by Saudi Arabia. Since much of the
countries in the area is allied with Western powers, Iran has adopted policies it sees as
necessary for their survival but on the other hand, the rest of the world perceives it to be
destabilizing and dangerous. It has openly financed and backed paramilitary groups
across the region that has committed acts of terrorism in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan Egypt
and elsewhere. Flouting international law, it pursued a ballistic missile program. And
perhaps most problematic of all, Iran has committed itself in the enrichment of uranium
and plutonium that could be used as fissile material for nuclear weapons (Beehner,
2006; Einhorn & Diepen, 2019; Lynch,2020). For the West, this is a dangerous situation
that could further destabilize the Middle East as the region could very well devolve into
a nuclear arms race with Saudi Arabia stating as recently as 2018 (Reif, 2018).
However, Iranian leadership has repeatedly stated that acquiring nuclear capability is
the only way to guarantee its existence as the U.S government has, at various points of
time, advocated for either regime change or outright war. Moreover, Iran justifies its
actions by claiming that it is surrounded by enemies and that the only nuclear power in
the region-Israel- has likewise claimed to seek the regime’s downfall. Despite this
though, Iran has been hit with various sanctions that has crippled its economy in recent
years. Like the previous examples, the “national interest” in this case is not particularly
clear. Worse yet, if Iran does pursue the most basic interest, that is, survival, by
pursuing nuclear weapons as a deterrent, it would be subjecting the country into further
security risk and economic hardship.
Conclusion
Following the discussions above, it can be ascertained that conceptualizing and
pursuing a uniform “national interest” is not only outdated but erroneous. It fails to
explain the key underlying dynamics in most foreign policy discussions. Adopting
instead a “balance of interest” framework accounts for the multiple layered interests that
states have to consider as well as the human agency present in most situations.
Ultimately this framework proves to be far more useful in the description, explanation
and prescription of foreign policy in the international arena. It is now imperative that as
the world experience significant shifts in almost every aspect, understanding modern
diplomacy and foreign policy has to be in pace with these changes and that means
accepting these conceptual changes.

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