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    Guy Fawkes
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    BASICS OF RELIABILITY AND ISH ANALYSIS Worked Out Problems and Solutions See ee Rd Sek MARTA more eae ARCO USE RC ‘SERIES ON QUALITY, RELASILITY AND ENOMEERNG STASTICS Ste rs 4 a ayo Se Sena eng "Bow (Uno) Paseo Vol! Saar Reeity Madling | VOLE: Respne Meng intosiy: npc Mating Exar sen Vo. ® laity Meg, aad Onzton Homan on on Maer hot ekity Motos or Rata ak nay tages flay nik rh: Wink Ou Pens Stans Ee PB a Seis i Raby eine etic], 15 BASICS OF RELIABILITY AND RUSH ANALYSIS Worked Out Problems and Solutions Enrico Zio , Francesco Cadini Paiteico Milan, Ky We world scientitic (ha: 2 Ware SS €,n, | | ‘Contents NGaheenenetraaben nectar BLA. se Chapter 1 Introduction q one Caper 2 Basi concepts of salty ands analysis s Caper Methods for haa ieiiton 9 oo Chapters Bases of probaly theory forapplcations 23 eee Covey an isk ana, ‘note r aa Chapter Reb of single systems s ait 201 Wa Sie big Co. Pe a “Af mare Ts. pr hee ap nfm ey, Chapter 6 Availability and maintainability B Chapter 7 Fault wee analysis 8 Chapter § Event re analysis read x osc of mami tt eying Hea eit rr in nc HAGE Beto naee pa Chapter 9. Estimation ofretiability parameters from 133 ve experingatal data so (Chapter 10 Markov chains 183 Sms oeasans References a About the Authors 209 Chapter 1 Introduction Reliability and safety ae fundamental atebutes of any modem technological system, To achieve this, diverse spes of protection ‘barriers are placed as safeguards from the hazard posed by the ‘operation of the sytem, within a multiple barrier design concept, “These barter ae intended to protect the system from failures of| any ofits elements, hardware, software, human and organizational. ‘Correspondingly, the quantification of the probability of failure of the system and is protective barriers, though reliability and Fisk analyses, hecomes primary task in both the system design and operation pases, This exercise ook serves as & complementary tool which in suppor to the methodology concepts introduced inthe books “An inoduction to the basics of reliability and risk analysis" and “Computational methods for reliability and isk analysis" by Enrico Zio, in that it gives an oppertnity of familiarizing withthe applications of classical and advanced techniques of reliability and riskanalysis. > ‘The parallelism between theory and practice is strengthened by the structure of the exercise book, Which is divided in nine Chapters coresponding to those of the methodological book “An introduction to the basis of reliability and risk analysis", and an auditional Chapter coresponding to the first Chapter ofthe other book “Computational methods for reliably and risk analysis. 2 Soe pas abi ond ais (Chapter 2 introduces the definition of risk in qutatve terms and its tanslation into quantiatve terns. ‘Chapter 3 teats the techniques fr the identification ofthe hazants| associated toa given system subject to risks, The output expected from these activities consists ofa list ofthe sources of risk which «can gve ise to significant dangers, The techniques applied inthis Chapter allow qualitative analyses ofthe system and its functions within a systematic framework of procedures, such asthe HAZOP and FMECA Tables, (Chapter 4 formulates reliability and risk problem in terms of basic probability laws, eg. the theorem of toil” probability, the 4efntion of conditional probabilities, the probability distributions of randoa variables, discrete (Binomial, Poison, Geometic, ee) snd continuous (Exponential, Gausian, Lognormal, ete) (Chapter 5 is centered om the concept of reliability as quantitative indicator of the performance of systems which must sity @ specified mission within an assigned period of time. The computation of the reliability of simple systems of components (series, parallel, stand-by, te.) is performed by analytical methods Chapter 6 deals with the concept of availabilty, as quantitative indicator of the ability of systems undergoing maintenance of Futiling the assigned mission at any specie moment of time. Chapter 7 presents a numberof exercises of application of fault wee analysis, which is a systematic, deductive technique for developing the eausal relations among events leading to a given undesired event, Familiarity with these techniques is necessary for ‘dealing with complex, mult-component systems for which file data cannot be collected and statistical flare analysis. therefore not posible ‘Chapter 8 presen exercises on the application of the event tee analysis for idenitying the secident sequences which ean generate from an inating event of system fire; the arising sequences are ‘hen quantified in terms oftheir oceurence probability ‘The exercises of Chapter 9 illustrat the way that information on| the lifetime distibation of a component can be obiained on the basso the esl of “lifetime test Finally, Chapter 10 inroduces the basics ofthe Markov approach to system modeling for reliability and availablity analysis. The Stochastic process of evolution ofthe system in time is described through the definition of system states, the possible transitions mong these states and their probability of eceurrence. The process can be mathematically described in terms of a system of ‘probability equations “which can be solved analytieally or ‘numerically. ‘The relation ofthis book would have not been possible without the suppor of the many master and Ph.D. students working in our research group. Many thanks are aso due to Sara Bastiani and Filippo Bellon, for their careful and precise editing Work. Chapter 2 Basic concepts of safety and risk analysis 2.1 Risk detniton Give the proper definition of risk and discuss it implications with respect to design, management and regulation of hazardous systems Solution ‘An informative and operative definition of tsk should allow answering the three fundamental questions of any sk analysis — Which sequences of undesirable evens transform the hizard ino an seal damage? — Whatis th probability of each ofthese sequences? — What are the consequences ofeach ofthese sequences? The answers to these questions lead to a definition of risk in terms of aso of tpt R= Espn} where ithe sequence of undesirable events leading to damage,» is the associated probability and x, the consequences. Thus, the ‘outcome ofa risk analysis sls of seenarios, such a the one in "Table 21, which represents the isk « Sot poo rey an i oir uence] Probability [Consequence a 7 Xp 2 Pe % (On the basis ofthis information, the designe, the manager and the regulator, can act effectively soa to reduce the risk. 2.2 HAZOP and FMEA Briefly illustrate the HAZOP and FMEA methods for hezard analysis, discussing thei diferences, Sotation 1. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) ‘This is qualitative method, of inductive nature, which aims et idenitying those failure modes of the components which could Aisable system operation oF become initiators of accidents with significant external consequences, ‘The analysis proceeds flows; @) Decompose the system into functionally independent subsystems; for each subsystem identify the various operation ‘modes (sar-up, regime, shut-down, maintenance, ete.) and its configurations when operating in sich mode (valves open ot lose, pumps on or af et.) (i) For each subsystem in each ofits operation mods, compile a fable such as Table 2.1, without neglecting. any of the subsystem components. The table for & component should i cop of ey nit 7 include its failure modes and the effets that suck failure has on ‘other components, onthe subsystem and onthe whol plant. The analysis takes into account ony the effects of single failures, except for the case of stand-by components, whose failure effects are obviously considered ony in ease of intervention due to the flue ofthe main component. Then, in general, there is no Indication ofthe risk associated with multiple or common cause fails. To ensure a coherent analysis, the analyst most be sure that similar components are given the’ same failure modes, with same probability vales 2. Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) HAZOP is a qualitative methodology which embraces deductive aspects (search for causes) and inductive aspects (consequences alysis) with the objective of identifying the initiating evens of| lndesired acident sequences. Conziy to FMEA, which is mainly based on the stracturaardwvare aspects of the system, HAZOP Took atthe processes which are undergoing inthe plan. Indeed, the method, initially developed for the chemical process industy. proceeds through the compilation of tables (such as Table 22) ‘hich highlight posible process anomalies and their associated ‘causes and consequences. “The analysis proceeds as follows © Decompose the gyste into functionally independent process ‘unis (reaction unit, storage unit, pumping nite): fr eae process uit identify the various operation modes (tar-up, regime, shut-down, maintenance, et) (i) For each process unit and operation mode, identify the potential deviations from the nominal process behavior. In fore todo ths, one shoal: . Std roan rb on risys 4 specify all the unit incoming and outgoing faxes (energy, mass, contol signals, etc.) and the characteristic process variables (lemperstue, ow rate, pressure, concenteations, et): , write down the various Fintions that the unit is supposed to fulfil heating, cooling, pumping, filtering, ete); ©. apply keywords low, high, no, reverse, et.) to the previously identified process variables and unit fanctions, so as to generate deviations from the ominal proces regime. (iy For each process deviation (qualitatively) identify its possible ‘causes and consequences. For the consequences, include cifect also on other units: his allows HIAZOP to aout also for domino effets among differen unis ‘Commercial software tools to guide HAZOP are avilable, utr OPERATION MODE ‘hte 22 Types AZO ule Chapter 3 ‘Methods for hazard identification ‘31 A smal external poot In the small extemal pool shown in Figure 3.1, the re-: probability of let turn at the intersection (On an intuitive basis, an observer counting the numberof left turns would experience the sime situation as inthe exercise “Traffic ‘control I”, Indeed, this observer would register an average of 60 cars pee hours (1000.6). Ths, from the point of view ofthe let tun observer the process isthe same asthe one considered in the exercise “Trafic conjol 1” and we expect the same solution. Note that in thie case we have impliily Introduced an elective rate 20 = 60he* = Lin for let ws, Let us now rigorously verify our intuitive result. Note that the observation that k-cars tur left at the intersection necessarily descend from the fact that r(r=kears have reached the Jmersection and that cars out ofthe x have made left cum. The umber of ears r2kean be any and by summing up the probabilities ofall these mutually exclusive evens, we obtain the probability of ft ums in the time inteval(0,1) P(e Lee Tame in (0.9)2,) p(y cars reaching he intersetion|4) (cas tum et out of the reaching the intersection») 5 (ad-py pan Ss (pho Tas, P(e Let Tamsin (0,9|2,p)= PAP ero which is the Poisson distribution with an effective rate of oveurrence 4° = pa te oar cnt, 2=!2 nis sad pol 20 t H=tmin"™ asc ebay opti ray anche 33 10" £P(Q0 Left Tun in 10 ims) =". 1251 hich isthe same solution found in Bxereise 425 47 Sirraft Hight pane An aircraft light pane is fited with two types of artifical horizon indicators. The times to failure ofeach indicator fom the star of & flight follow an exponential distribution with s mean valve of 15 hours for one and 30 hours fr the other. A ight lass for a pesod of 3 hous 1. What is th probability thatthe pilot will be without an artificial horizon indication by the end ofa light? 2, The mean time to this even, if height is ofa Yong duration? Solution toed H For exponential distribution, PYaiure before t)= I= Praystem 1 fails before 3 hs Ploystem 2 fails before 3 rs) Pino horizon indicaror after 3 hrs) (stem 1 fails and sytem 2 fils on). @-e™™) =00175 ) 2 Peatre before) (-e"*}( oleate lnm leet ae 16-306" 106°" = 15+30-10635 hours 48 Simple system Consider 2 system of evo independent components with exponentially distributed failure times. The failure rates are 2, and A, respectively. Determine the probability that component fails before component 2 Solution CComponcat 2 lives on component 1 if, for example, the failure of component 1 occurs ata time 7, within atime interval (t+) and the fale of component 2 occurs ata tine T, after , The probability ofthis events PUT, > HR) fel at sof rb ery or ptt iad ines 35 where Flt) dt = dea Furthermore, given the assumption of independent components, the conditional probability P(T, 27, =1) is equal to afr, > ‘Then, al he contbutions for any time imerval (r+ dt) have to ‘be summed co ive the required probability PT; >7,): Par,>T)=] P(t, >sif = « )-f00 de fet aetanaJoeta ak Nove This result can be easly generalized to a system of n independent components with filure res Aayu’,. The probability that component jis the First one to fal is Peomponent is ist 449 Machine survive period A imachine has been observed fo suvive & period of 100 houre ‘without failure with probability 0. Assume that the machine has a constant faire rte 1. Determine the failure rate 2. Find the probability thatthe machine will survive 500 hours without Failure. 53. Determine the probability thatthe machine fails within 1000 hour, assuming that the machine has besn observed to be functioning st $00 ours. Solution 1, The component is assumed to have constant failure rate, ie. t0 have exponentially distibute failure times. The failure rate 2 can be determined by Pereioy=0tm at m2. 100 -A100=-In2 > A=82-69.107 2. The probability thatthe machine wil survive $00 houts without failure, ie the reliabiity atime 500 hours, R(S00) is PCT > 500)= R(SO0) ‘3. The problem is solved bythe rule of conditional probabilities: ANB) PxalB) PCB) ses pat es fr onion yd anaats 3 Pr <1000017 > $00) Pur < 10007 > 500 PT > 500) P(500.<7 <1000) _R(1000)-R(S00) PT >500) (500) wre 97 = 4.10 Television pictre tubes ‘The television picture tubes of manufacuer A have & mean lifetime of 6.5 yeas and a standard deviation of 0.9 yeas, wale ‘hose of manufacturer B have a mean lifetime of 60 years and & standard deviation of 0.8 years. What is the probability that & random sample of 36 tubes fom manufacturer A wil have a mean lifetime that is atleast 1 year more than the mean lifetime of & sample of 49 tubes from manufacturer? (Nove: The statistical mean of a random sample, typically called “sample mean’, is @ function of the random sample an it i, therefore a random variable itself. In fact, f take another sample, it wil in general be diferent from the previous one snd the sample mean will take a different valu. It can be shown that the expected vale, or theoretical mean, ofthe sample mean coincides with the expected value of the underlying. population distbation fom ‘which the sample was drawn whereas the variance of the sample mean turns eut t© be equal to the variance of the underlying population distribution, divided by the number n of values constituting the sample) Solation X, ismonmal with mean 6 and standard deviation * Ste pons reba says 1X, is normal with mesn 6.0 and standard deviation =-95 = 0.11 a9 sone cots FETT a9 Let Z=*=25 be the standard normal variate, Then, nrsiee[zo 88] srt 2s 4441 Bulag safety In considering the safety ofa building, the total force acting onthe columns of the building must be examined. This would include the effects of the dead loa D (Geto the weight ofthe structure), the live load L(dae 1 human occupancy, movable furniture, and the like), and the wind load W Assume that the Toad effects on the individual columns are Statistically independent Gaussian variates with Akips oy = 0.7 ips 1. Determine the mean and standard deviation of the total load scting ona column 2, Ifthe stength Rof a column is also Gaussian with a mean fq 10 1.3 times the total mean force, what is the probability fof failure of the column? Assume that the coefficient of Pano pats fr pian lay ans 39 variation ofthe stength 8, is 155% and thatthe siength and load effects are tatstialy independent. Solution 1. The combined loa 5 is S=D+Law wtih is aso Gaussian with He“ tH ty =A24OS+34= Lip And a= ater toy? 2, Failure ofthe column will occur when the strength is less than the applied load S$. Let X denote the difference R—S, namely, os VOR S07 =1.1Kip X=R-S then (X4=10b, s0 we first assume 0 1000h the assumption a- snd transnter 2 does no fail from ¢ to] xP(no solar disturbances in 0,7) 2 Sot prone in reo a ae > (- *s[aewe “0 vale saetew ( ozetfardew Asha (1 a8) 2. The mean time to transmission failure als oh fava) a) ue Ti, 1 L “Ted, Ura? '52.Simpte system Consider a system of two independent components with ‘exponentially distibuted failure times. The failure rates are 2 and,, respectively. Determine the probability that component 1 fails before component 2 eof ingens 2° Sota Component 2 lives on component | if for example, the failure of ‘component 1 occurs ata time T; within a ime interval (+d) and the fallue of component 2 occurs ata time T, afer t. The probability ofthis evens PC; >t1t, Fylde where f, (= Ae-Md. Furthermore, given the assumption of ‘ndependeat components, the condiionsl probity P(T>117 = inequaton above sequal 240, >) =e ‘Then, all the contributions as the one considered in the first equation for any time interval (11+ at) have to be summed to give the required probability PCT, > 7) NOTE ‘This result can be easly generalized to system ofa independent components with flue rates 4,2,.,4,. The probability that components the fist one to fils Pleomponent fil first). Sot ros in rai an a ais eth ese ene 6 5:3 Parallel system 544 Series parallel system ‘Suppose that in the system sbown in Figure S.L the wo Suppose that in Figure 52, R,=Ry =e ‘components have the same cost, and their reliabilities are R,=0.7 ek £R,=0395, respectively. If it is permissible to add two components eee to te system, would it be preferable to ) replace component I by ‘thee components in parallel orb) to replace components 1 and 2 Re i=1,2,34 and Find the reliability ofthe system in the rare ‘each by simple parallel systems? a oI 1 2 4 2 L_} Solution fa ‘component is replaced by thee components in parallel, hen ra R,=1-€-R)'}-&, =09734095=0.92435, mi If each of the two components is replaced by a simple parallel system, Fee 52 Relay dag of ll ofan x RY MI“ 0-R1=091x0.9975 = 0.9077. Solution In thie problem the reliability R, i 9 low that even the riabilty , of simple parallel system, 2R,—R3, is smaller than that of Ry R=RI2-R)2-Q-R)R] “Thus replacing component 1 by three parallel components yields en the higher reliability. [Expanding the above tm we gt Roa. DRA ARE RE 6 See pao ray and it ont “Ten, we expand the exponential ina second-order Tylor series: Ro se! at-NAL+EN"CAN}~..t0 obi for small Zt ead 24+ 2(408] 21-3204 32) 1-420 4840) “Lar 425(4) -14640-18( 207 Ra(4-2-444-1)-B-6-16+20-6N20) = (-8+9432-504 18,20) + Relay) Had the coefficient of the (71) tem also been zero, we would have needed to carry terms in (22) 5 Common mode flare Suppose that a unit has a design-tife eisbility of 095, Assume an texponential distribution for the failure imes and the rere-event spproximation for the elibiity, R()=<"* =1~ At 1, Bstimate the reliability if two of these units are pu in ative parle 2, Consider now the possiblity of common-mode failures (shocks ‘which simultaneously fail both components. tn this cas, the failare rate 2 has tw0 contributions from independent () and common-mode (C failures pt wee 92 the timate the maximum faction ? of common failures that is acceptable ifthe parallel units in part 1 are to retain a system reliability of teas 0.99 aati mens o Solution 1. Ingeneral, R(¢)=2e"* ~e-™" in the rae-event approximation, RG) =095=1~2t and thus, 2° 0.05 RQ)=1-Cay =0.9975 oe ete -b- 7 =e i-ape8 jane ‘Thus, with Ar=005, we have: 0.001258" + 0.045 0.007 0.085: (2.0625%10°)"" ‘0.0025 For to be positive, we must take the positive root. Therefore, BS0166, Therefore, 56 Active parallel sytem ‘In an active parallel system each uni asa failure rate of 0.002, 1. Whats the MTF of the system if there sno load sharing? 2 What s the MTTF ofthe system ifthe file rate increases by 20% as a result of nereased load? 3. What is the MITF of the system if one simply (end conservatively) increased both unit alu rates by 2046? * Soe ois eb oni Sotation 3 24” aoa" ™ 1. re 2. Inthiseate, RO)=2e"# +e" —2—# sere =| Ronde =[[2e* 40-26% 2 MOET ade Thus with 4*=1.2*0.002=0.0024 he* we have 21 a MITE Somna* x0002 Goowa "°° 33 3. emp =3_-3 ease aa" oom £7 Shared load paral system In a “shared load paalel sytem.” the pail components equally share the loud, and, as component fils, the surviving components rust sustain an increased load. Thus, as sucessive components fail, the failure rates of the surviving components increase. An example of a shared parallel load configuration would be when bolts are used to hold @ machine member if one bot breaks, the remainders must support the lea, Consider sich a system with two components whose constant failure rates are defined follows eae ioe to » load failure ate 2, =falload failure cate Find the time-dependent Solution In solving this problem, the evo states that should be taken into consideration are the following rr Teor mn rn 0 Reliab: RG) = Pisystem successful upto] Pull load is adequately supported up to) =P and 2 survive up tt} +P fils at 7 we Setar aby ad at ana expression The realty of the system is Rl) = Pystem sucess a1) ful load is adequately supported at ) component I snd component 2 survive up (with failure densities f,() and f(0)) -+Picomponent | fails at any F<¢ and component 2 survives up + wit aur time density f, (0) ‘and fom £ o£ with lore time density (0) -+P(component 2 fils at any + Solution _R() = Plsystem survives up to) {sithercomponeat fails before) +Plone fils a some time F<, ‘he other one survives upto =, with (0, and from ¢ to with g()) minne saf(aemaryenyfee") ey atetfetoonge 2k “This is the solution for £#2.1F k=2, we find that RO 12a) « Sed pao rity and ie one 5.1 Pressure vee [A pressure vessel is equipped with six relief valves. Pressure ‘ransients can be controlled successfully by any three of these valves. Ifthe probability that any one of these valves will fail to ‘operate on demand is 0.04, wha isthe probability on demand that the relief valve system will fail to control a pressure transient? Assume that the fires ae independent. Solution ‘Let us define the unreliability ofthe generic component, F =1— R, as the demand failure probability, which is equal 9 0.08 in our ‘case, Using the rare-event approximation, we have, with A =6 and f= SUP ary Since Fis very small, (—F)=1 and only the tem F with smaller power k= r+ gives. significant contbuion othe sum. Thus, F,, = (7}0.08)* = 2 (0.08) =15%256x10" =038%10" aa 5.12 out-of detection system You are to design an rout-oF detection system, The number of| components, N, must be as small as possible to minimize cost. The fail-to-danger (he componeat is requested to detec an actually present danger but fais to do So) andthe Fai-safe the system gives false alarm in absence of danger) probabilities for the identical components are q,=10" and 4,=10°. Your design must moet the fllowing extra: Relay of age yes o 1, Probability of system fail-o-danger < 10 2. Probability of system false < 10% 3, What values ofr and N should be used? Solution Make a Table of unretibiliies (.e the flue probabilities) for fail-safe and fuitodanger (inthe Table 5.1 we have wed the are- ‘event approximations) aakotW a] Te 2 2x10" i @=10" Cz 3a = 3x10 38 3a, = 3X10" Ti =o" a 4a = 4x10" a 4q3 = 4107 64) = 6x10" w @s107 4g, = 107 A least N = four cofmponents are required to meet both criteria ‘They are met by 42/4 system. ‘5:13 Cold standby sytem of two units ‘Consider a “col” standby sytem of to unis. The online wnit has ‘an MITE of 2 years. When it al, the standby unit comes on line “« Sota pone reba i mass i} ety efter and its MTF is 3 years. Assume that cich component bas an ‘exponential failure times distribution. fyltd= [Ace den Aho 1. What is the probably density faction of the sytem failure : ee fet 2. What isthe MITE ofthe system? wade fetstae |. Repeat I and 2, assuming that tbe two components are in pall in a one-ou-of «wo configuration Solution 1. Probability density fonction For the generic component with exponential disteibution of failure Let w= 4 Then, 4 = 5h and A, = 4 3y ” MITE = yrs) [- a nif 3. Parle system With reference to the above figure, T; and T, are independent random variables denoting the times when the on-line and standby ‘its are operating, respectively. ‘The system failure time is also a random variable, T =7-+T; “The time ris the random realization ofthe failure time of the on- Tine component: MT St)= FAUT, Sth Sel) 1, St-FUT,Stl=F, {0 Se et yee Pate sett Hae ene (ard So =SB= AEM thew (At hye wlgled “2 3 ‘5.14 Temperature sensing elements ‘Three nominally identical temperature sensing. elements are ‘connected to nominally the same point on a process plant. An alan is designed to be given if any (0 or more of these temperature sensors rocond a temperature above a certain prescribed level. The times to failure of each element are exponentially distributed with a mean value of $000 b. What is The probability of the alarm system not working, fan excessive plant temperature rise takes place at $00 b, or secondly 2,000? 2, The mean time to complete failure ofthe alarm system? 3, The average unavailability over period of 500 8? Foreach sensor, p=1—e"" with 2°" =MTTF =3000 hs. 1 Probability ofthe alarm syst not working Lette tp event be: =the alarm system i not working ‘The fault woes: ‘The structure fnction X, # (XX) is Xp=IMIAX XIX KIA K) KK AX, AXGX, “2K If an excensive plant temperature ise takes place at time t, the instantaneous probability, 4). ofthe alarm sytem not working a a1) = FOX, XK) FLX BUX, 1+ BUX) BUX 1+ BUF XG) -2- FIX, BING} EX] 2 Sd pan rly and ik ante ‘The times to failure of each clement are exponentially distributed with a mean value of 5000 hha S000 and the probability, p,() that heh sensor filed before tis pl 0): Then, alt)=30°())-2p'()=1-30™ 420 1, =500 hrs we have Q(t) =0.025 and iff, =2000 hrs we have 2. Mean time to complete failure ofthe larm system Roy=1-4(9 = 20 oe els aaa, a 2-Average unsvaibiliy ove prod 500h al flooe (aa r sere = (7 Rn UCT =500)=8,84.107 Chapter 6 Availability and maintainal 61. Compressor A compressor is designed for T, =5 years of operation. There are two significant contributions tothe failure. The first is de to wear (Wyo the thrust bearing andi described by a Weibul distribution with 8=75 year and m=25. The second, which includes all ‘other causes (0) is described by a constant failure mate of 2,=0013 (yea) 1. What ie the reliability if no preventive maintenance is performed over the 5-year design life? 12. Ifthe celiablity ofthe 5-year design life isto be increased to at least 0 by peviodically replacing the thrust bearing, bow frequently mus ibe replaced? 3. Suppose that the probability of fault bearing replacement causing failure ofthe compressor isp =0.02. What will the design fe reliability be wits the replacement program decided in2)? ” Soe robin i rein isis Solution 1._ Reliability with no preventive maintenance Tine eiabiiy ofa system with two diferent failure modes (W and ovis ROD= PLO) where Xy isthe event in which the wear failure mode represented by the Weibull distribution doesnot occur before time rand Xy is the event in which the file mode with constant faire rate does rot occur Before time 1. Sine the modes are independent, we may ‘write the system reliability as the product of the mode survival probabilities: RO) (KP )=R ORO [Note that R,() isthe reliability i ony the trast Bearing wear is considered and R,(0) isthe reliability if only the constant failure rate is considered ‘Thus, RO)=R ATR = 0,6957-0.9971=06519 2. Frequency of replacement to achieve 0.9 reliability Preventive maintenance: Suppose tat we divide the design life into WV equal intervals; the Time interval, at which maintenance is cavied out is then T=T, IN. Comespoodingly, T,= NT. If we perform maintenance af T, restoring the sytem to an a8- g0od:as-new condition, the system at 1>7 has no memory of ccumolated wear effets at times before, Thus, in the interval T<1s2T, the reliability isthe product of the probability RT) thatthe system survived 9 7, and the probebiity R(e~T) that a Ary on manay co ‘system a good as new at T will survive fora file: RQERTIRE-T) , Ts0<2T ‘The same arguments may be used repeatedly to obtain the general expression Ri TY RO-NT) . NTSt<(N4DT , N- Since the system reliability at ime Ty isthe product ofthe # survival probabilies: ka TIRE) We can calculate separately the vo reliability contbutions, For bearing replacement at time T, = NP, we have Ry, sn for the constant flue rate we have Ry a 9371 which i exactly the same reliability ofthe system if no preventive maintenance is perfor. Thus, as expected, in case of failutes ‘occurring with a constant failure rate 4, preventive maintenance has no effect. For the criterion of 09 reliability tobe met, we must have: RG), 09 R = Ry O9aTI = RT) 209608 % Seed pole nr an ia se wit &y -( es J =0.36289, we calculate a) “\73, Rt) =e" we a io =] RodF,) | 086 0887 [095T [956 [0.968 “Thus the eiteion is met for N=5, andthe time interval for bearing replacementis 7 =7,/N=1 yar 3,. Reliability in case of replacement driven failures [At he end of the design life (T, =5 years) maintenance will have ‘been performed four ines. In case of perfect maintenance we haves RUT,)= RR, =0937-0968 =0.907 ‘whereas, with imperfect maintenance, (L,) = RR (L~ py =0.907-098" = 0.836 462 Sequenta and staggered maintenance scheme of a ‘ne-ouof-ine stem Consider a one-ou-of two system of identical components with constant failure rte 4. The testing and repair of each component last for «hours. 1. nthe sequential maintenance scheme, the two components are tested one ale the other, rbeing the ime between the end of the previous maintenance of the second component and the beginning of the next maintenance of the frst one (in ater words, every © hours we test both components in sequence), Find the average unavailability ofthe system, 2. In the staggered maintenance scheme, the fist component maintenance stats at kx. £-<1, where rs the time interval between the end of the previous maintenance of the second ‘component and the beginning ofthe next maintenance of the Same second component. Find the average unavailability of the system, Solution ‘To. solve this problem with regards to the two ferent maintenance sehetnes, we use the following general procedure 1. Calculate instantaneous unavailability and average system downtime in every subinterval 7, within a period T 2. Compute the average unavailability fiona D TF For academic purposes, we start considering single-component system undergoing periodic maintenance, Not thatthe sytem has 4 periodic behaviour because the maintenance restores the ‘component to an as-ood-as-new condition. With the maintenance sehieme ofthe following Figure the periods 7 =r, ~ Sot pronto ina In the two time subintervals OA and AB the system has a ferent plysical Behavior a: ‘The component is unattended (no repair is allowed), thus the instantaneous unavailability, q() ofthe component will be: a= FO and the average ime the system is down, < Day >, will be <0 >= [fel ar= fine) ate an $i amponc i lvaye ude epa qt «Dar aoae=s, ‘The mean down ver he pro Foor (rowers, 7P 5, TT Hee, 1. Sequential maintenance scheme ‘We now considera ane-ot-of.1wo sytem, Lea parallel system of| wo units. The following Figure represents the sequential ‘maintenance scheme: ‘We split the time interval T=1-+2¢, in the 3 subintervals: OA, AB, BC, and we compute the average time the system is down in ‘ach sobinteval a: Both components unattended, the fist one up since BY, the second since 0. gad e Wh nea ders yat = fant =¥ (5 =) : AB: Fist component is under maintenance, the second one is ‘unattended since O. em at = =" aoe sul iting wth 1'=1—kr we have [faa = fates, okearae BO =3E DE haper? o Fault tree analysis Second component under maintenance, fs component up since B, end oft at tot d-t-) 74 Coolant supply system Draw a ful tree forthe coolant supply system pictured in Figure 7. Here the top event is loss of minimam flow to a heat exchange, poe ete Substituing with r'=1—r we have: << Dye >= [Ale=#, +0-Re He ote 40-Bydee, del «(1-bee, = “The mean downtime over Tis AE 3ke DV BGR WYP, ks “The fault woo is shown in Figure 7.2. Not all ofthe faults atthe bottom ofthe tee are primary failures. Thus it may be desirable to * {ated polos in ean iat ae develop some ofthe faults, such as loss of the pump inlet supply, further. Conversely, the faults may be considered (0 significa to be taced further, o dts may be available eventhough they are not primary failures i ® ASHE Fe 72 Pao rca ye 72 Pumping ssstem Inthe pumping system shown inthe Figure 73, the tanks filled in 10 min ang empties in 50 min. ths, the eyele time is Ur. Aer the sth is closed, the meri sett open the contac in 10 min, Ifthe mechanisms fil then the alarm hora sounds and the operator ‘opens the switch fo prevent a tank rupture due to overfilling, Fe ois s Consider the operator as a component: «primary filure would ‘mean tat the operator functioning within the design envelope fils to push the panic button wien the alarm sounds the secondary ‘operator filre could be, for example, that the operator has fainted ve t0 the smoke of a fre, when the alarm sounded. For all ‘components (inching the operator) assume: For the top event tank rupture 1, Draw the ful tee; 2. Compute the probability ofthe top event; ge fen fine) ~ S 6 Se pale ri on ik ante Solution 1. Fault wee is presented inthe Figure 7.4 igus 74 at ne rp 2, Multpiying the probabilies ofthe events throug he ful te, a indicated in the Figure, one readily obtains: P(X, =1)=0.285 713 Stacture function Reduce the structure funtion @(X) to find the minimal eut sets and construct the corresponding fal tee wih an AND gate. PADMA AMAL AGS AN MAK HAAN KA RNA KKK AK RK K ALEK, ‘ns to be manipulated to get the minimal eut sts, We fist focus fon the term It has 1 be @ minimal cut st because it appears lone in the structure function with the sign” and thas cannot be the resalt ofa product of other minimal eu sets. The step for the successive groupings of the terms down to the minimal cu sts PUD= KAMAN MG MIN, EK ALKA, FIER hy HAN AA, EXER JkM KD) nef ra at ] MOM KK, 4 HN) =X) [IX XAG KA)) =X.) XAG) 1 XG) rs Se proton riya ik one “The corresponding fault ee is 714 Fault tree and structure funtion ‘Construct the ful tree forthe file ofthe system in Figure, write the system structure function and reduce it to obtain the minimal sven rs zh deh sym? ] Lal Lm iz}—ieh — Le oH Pat ree one » Sot ‘System 1: The system fal toe T oh gue 74 Fate For the tce components’ failures A, B,C, for the intermediate failure event E and for the top event of system failure, we introduce the logic variables X,, , Xo, Xey Xpy denoting ‘whether the corresponding event has occured or not. The vatiables Xa Xe, Ney Yes Xp assume the value 1 (ae) if the corresponding event has occured and the value © (fuls) ifthe event has not occured By descending the fault tee with the rules of Boolean lagi, we ‘obiain the system structure function by writing 2, a8 a function of the thre variables ,, Xy, Xu thus y= 1-I-X IH) ends Hy a1--X MIXX) Ky aXy Xho XXX In principle, the equations above can be processed withthe rules of| Boolean logic to obiain an expression of the system structure oo Sot els iri ania ante Paes nat ” function as a logic OR linking the system minimal cut sets System 3 ‘Actually, this i the ease of the frm of the indictor variable {in which this is expressed asa logic OR among the events X, and Xoo Ths, My=A, and M,=XyXe are the system minimal cat set. e TLE ~ S'd6'd The system structure function, which exprsses the indicator variable 2, as a function ofthe basic failure events X,, Xp, Xe Xo, isoblaned as follows, Keo NeXy ‘We introduce th indicator variables X;, Xs» Xyy Xe» Xow Xe X, for the events T, A,B, C, D,E,F,G. The meaning has already boen illustrated with reference to System Hp =1-0-X0=%5) pat G-¥.M-Xp) Aya M het X My MXN y XX aaa ea MyM ¥NeKa Kk No KNX ALK KN XeaXihy Kya XcXo Now, the above expression has 10 be manipulated to get the = Kg MIX) inital cut se. Th steps forthe successive grouping of the tems dove tothe minimal ut ses are (pkg + XeXp- XXX Xo “ “ Hout set ‘Anale ider those made for the last two equati Jeo MKet kako Nikon + Hoke logos considerations o or the ions Meee ‘of system 1, stand for the last two equations for the present HpXy XpXoXo KK pXo-X XpXy + XKiXeXy ‘system. Therefore, the minimal cut-sets are readily identified as SILEX Ke AX Xp XXX gt XoXo Mn XX, 290 My= Koy AHN Kea XK pKe Ky HM KK a Sot robs eon isos WX Ke AX Ko KikeXy hie HM aN yg KeKeky KM Kk PHN Mo +X Key XaKeKe H10~X Xo = Kiko Xap AKA Ky HAN p)-X Ke Hg Koko Mak HAeXyt KKK) =X KMIK Ky —HoKe Koy IM KeX ot LANG) HX KMIM Xp Make Kaky AN GX Xp ANNAN AKAN Mg KL GKeKD) KK MIA KoA HAMM) =H Ko XNe XoXo 4 HMI UX LMM NAIK Xyhy tXaXeKe) ION LMA yO Hye) aM -KAO] KM Xp MI“XXEI Hey) By so doing, four minimal eat sets ar identified My =X Xe Myo X Ko My=XaXe Me=XaXo ‘15 Network system Consider the network system in the Figure 79 below. AIL ‘components have equal falure protabity p'=5-10°. The system fails when thee is no connection between the source and terminal nodes SIR QR HY 1. Ideniy the minimal cut sts ofthe network system, 2. Bvaluate system unreliability fom the minimal cut sets found inl Sol 1. Minimal ext os We find the minimal cut sets directly by ingpection fiom the system structure, The network system fils due to the imterzuption of the connection between the source andthe terminal nodes. M.={12.3) Ms=(2346) My={6.78) (3567) My =(1478) (43,45,7) Me fh288) (245,68) ” Ses probed tk ane 2. System unreiabilicy Using the rare event approximation: Where, Uy = DPE) PUM.) = PUM) = 9? Pu, Pat Uy, 2p 4p" 2p" 1M PUL) Pt v, 31.25.10" 7.6 Flt ree and minimal eut sets Consider the fllowing fault we: E, T a a A A 5B é- 8 "M,)= POM) = P(A)=005, P(A) =003, (C 1, Write te system strcture function 2 Reduce the structure function to find the minimal et sets 3. Compute the probability ofthe top event working through the fault ce, 4. Compute the probability of the top event solving the structure function in 5. Compute the probability of the fop from the minimal cu sts found in. solution 1. Sytem sete function Kya XgXe, 1x) (1X4) Xe) Ky Xo—NpXe 1a XoMIMa) eXike Substinting the above expressions in equation for X,, we have Hy = AX Ke MaKe KaNe Hie PENMAN Ng KAKO) 2. Minimal cutsets ‘The above expression canbe reduced by doing the multiplication inthe nigh hand tem and applying the eles of Boolean logic. By doings, the expression can be simplified Kya Ket KeMy Hip 1X LG) 6 Sat probins re ani as ‘which explicitly identifies the two minimal eut sets ofthe system, MM, 3. Probability of top event working through the fait ree Repeated components appear in the fault tee. Therefore, the computation ofthe failure probability POX, =1) working through ‘he fault tee yields to wrong results. In fic, it has to be recalled that this approach is equivalent’ to calculating the failure ‘robebiliy by means of the non reduced expression ine pa Nyt Ke Mee XNg Hike XK NAL ALN KKK) ‘Tho value (wrong thereby obtained is 5.40-10 4 Probability of op event solving the etre fnction “The lure probability cbtained from the reduced system structure faction in PU, =D =FX AUX ELA HELA LX] + LX JEN .492510° 5, Probability of top event fom the minimal cut-ses found in 2 ‘The probabilities of the basic events are very low, so thatthe ‘typical race event approximation ean be used: P(O(X,. Xp Xe) 510° FLX} + BUC JEG Err, i can be seen thatthe approximation introduced has negligible cles ae be ” 727 lectreal generating system, ‘An electrical generating system is shown in the figure below in block diagram form. Only the major components are to be considered: the engines Fy, Ep, and the generators Gs, Oa, G, Bach lgenerator is rated at 30 KWA. The system is required 10 supply at least 6OKVA. 1. Draw a fault tee for the fur of the sytem to satisfy the required demand. 2. Find the minimal eut ses. 5, Etimate the unreliability ofthe sytem for one month operation tiven thatthe flue rate foreach engine is 5 10° hand for ‘each generator 10° 5 5 =] fe] fe — oe The fault wee is builjon the bases ofthe following considerations. ‘The systams fils 10 provide the required power (GOKVA) if at least two out of the thee generators donot work. In his case the supplied power i 30KVA or lower. Then, the causes forthe failure of each generator to provide the power are analyzed. The failures for generators Gy or Gs require the primary failure of the components or of the comesponding feeding engine Ey of Es respectively (brnches A and C in the tee). The failure of the ” Seed pao rab an i abe generator G2 ocenrs pon primary failure ofthe generator and upon failure of both engines Ey or Es (ranch B inthe tre). 2. Minimal cut sets For simplicity, we will deduce the system cut sts directly from the fault ee. We consider the three branches 1,2, 3 of the tee one at Subtree 1 ‘We can identify 4 ut sets, ot necessarily minimal Mi ={E,6,) M,=(G,.E,8,) Subtree 2: ‘With an analogous procedure, we gt forthe subse 2: M, ={G.E;} M,={6,,G,} M,=(E,E,) My = {EEG} Subtree 3: M,={E.E,} My=(G,.E.} {o.0) £64) only the minimal cu ses ate considered M, ={E,.G,} M, ={G,.E,) (5..G,} 3. System reliability ? ‘The components ave exponentially distributed file rates s that the probabilities of fire within | month = 720h equal 07° 23,68 3, forthe ovo engines Peale" 2728-3, forthe three generators, 0 Soha pols rity nik ante By resorting to a first order, rare event approximation for the system unreliability: P(@=1)23.P(44,) 7.404 Where PUM.) =3.6:107-72:107 POM) =36-10° 3.6.10 POM) =72-10°. 72-10 78 Emergency cooing system ‘The following system is designed to dever emergency cooling to ‘a meloa reactor. Pat ent vw In the event of an accident the protection system delivers an actuation sigal to the two identical pumps and the four identical valves. The pumps then stat up, the valves open, and liquid coolant is dolivered to the reactor. The following failure probabilities are found tobe significant Pq =10* the probed tat the prteton system wil not deliver signal tothe pump vale stators (py =240° dhe probity that pnp wil to start ‘wheat action signal i resived ,=10° the probability hac valve wil il open when the actuation signal is ezived 5-10" the probability tht the eseroir willbe cmpy at he ne ofthe acedent. 1. Draw a fault tee forthe failure of the system to deliver any coolant tothe primary system in the event ofan accident. 2, Weite the system structure function, 3. Reduce the structure funetion o find the minimal cut sets, 4 Compute the probity ofthe tap eve working tothe 5. Compute the probability ofthe top event solving the structure fiction in 2, 6. Compute the probability of te top event from the minimal cut sete found in 3 Solution ‘i 1 Fault re go @ ge On SNS ao “T: no coolant deliver tothe primary sytem incase ofan accident El: no signal delivered to the pumping system 2: pumping sytem fils to start reservoir empty Fe: pumping system A fist stare bs pumping system B fil to star Pa: pump a fails to start Pb: pump b fails to iat Vac valves fil to start Vb: valves b fal to tart Val: valve a also start ‘Vaz: valve a also start Vol: valve b fails o start ‘Vb2: valve by as o start Fate ts oy 2 System structure funtion The system structure funtion (X)= 2, which expresses the state of the system indicator variable X, as a funtion of the vector of the indicator variables of the basic failure events aXe Xn XnrXanXnarXnirna)s i obtained as follows: P= Hy 1-0 Ky MX MIN) Xn == Xp HOM X)= TON HOA Mia) =X X= Hq) = IOAN HLA Kis) ‘Substituting the ebove expressions inthe strvturefetion yield 1-0 ,.K0-XeaXna} OX, «1-0-4, X=, | ae Dl aeaeripearey J 5. Minimal eu sets ‘We firstly focus om the term XX. The step forthe successive sroupngs ofthe terms down tthe minimal et sets ar: Kon =U O-X pO Kuna O-X pip cK)] 1-0-Xy MIX IMAI (Xn +X, Xn Xie hXn + Xp — XX) wk Bak Enkeaknt Kako $8 phn Kain Hanke HAM aT AAT N oy I-14 Xp Xing + XX XX nXy t XX oy Ny KN aN Kinki” Xinkiadn EM aNakintXMeNiekin Xickkri vo Site rons relatos FOX Xn —Kikin —NoaKin NN nin KX nXn)-LnXn XXX —KoaXiy XN Kn tXnNed wl) SIU Xp XM Kndin Kickin Hain XXndn Xk nkin) LOX Xp MI Kiy Kickin Medi A Xakn Xa Xnkint Kaka Xn Kn dXnXn) 10 XX MCX Anka? XeXinXn) Xp X-Men XXn tA Xin 10K Xap Ain Mindi XXnXied A-OK Xp MINX MMA XnAy) =A Xn) Kai WAKA Xndl KiknaXnd (4) =p = 1-0 Ka MIX MIX) (Xp XAinsMIKnaXineXia) Keka Xe) [By so doing, N= minimal cu ses ar identified: M,={Pa,¥,¥22} M,= Val, Ve2,V01702} M,=(Pb,Val,¥a2} Pate ons vs 4. Probability of top event working trough the ful tee “Multiplying the probabilities ofthe evens through the faut wee, as inicatod inthe Figure, one reaily obtains PUL, 1) 9.15104 [Repeated components do not pear inthe different branches of the fault ree, Therefore, the computation ofthe failure probability P(X, =1) working trough the fault tre yields «comes esl, 5. Probability of the top event solving the structure function in 2 Applying the expectation operator to the structure function in 2, PU, (21% M= £1) 11~(1-0-£1%,.) C-ALX pg) BDO BLN yO ALS g 1% oD) POL, =1)=9.08:10" Note that we can use directly the equation in 2 because repent ‘components do not appear inthe fault tree. Otherwise, the correct probability would have to be obtained from the reduced form of the streture function equation in 3 6, Probability ofthe top event solving the structure function in 3, [By resorting oa frst order, rare event approximation: P(x, Lr) revs rerss rear) +PLPa)PUDI)PUD2) + Pal) PWa2)PVBIVPAE2) +PEPDPUA)P WD) 1 ete ron nay and rik one PX, =1)=9.15-10% 19 Network system 2 ‘Consider the network system shown in Figure 7.12. All the components have equal failure rato 2=10~ days. The system fail when there is no connection beoween node I and node O. We Also consider the nodes as perfec, they cannot fall ee 1. Par the network ofthe figure above, devel a fault tee forthe cevent “no signal at O given a signal at I. Neglect human erors fd extemal eases of secondary failures. 2. Identify the minimal et-ses ofthe network system, 5, Evaluate analytically the system unreliability at the mission time 7, of | year fom the minimal eut-sets found above 4, Evaluate the system unreliability atthe mission time Ty of 10 _year from the minimal ca-sets found in 3 Solution 1. Fault tee FO OF gue 78 ‘oe Sadao a iy andra ons 2. Minimal eu-sets Instead of using the fault ee, we Find the minimal cut sets directly fiom the system structure, The network system fails dve to the interruption ofthe connection between the I node and the O node, therefore the minimal cut ses are those configurations for which there is no pith from node Ito node O. This happens, for example, ‘when components I and 2 fail or when 2, 3,4 fai Following this logic, 6 minimal cut sets M,,i 8 1,2,3,45.6 canbe identified: M2112) M,= (67) M, = (435.6) M,= 185 M,= 235.7) ty athe mission se Ty of 1 year ‘The probabilities P(M,) of occurence of cut sels Mi depend on time and can be obtained from the proba the primary components failures ies of occurrence of Pall With the data of the problem, since 4, Ty = 1 year= 365 days, we get: Pilg) 0.0358, By resorting (0 a frst order, rare event approximation for the ‘stem unreliability: Use) =¥ P(M,)=2.7-10" Fate mabe © 4. System unreliability atthe mission time Ty of 10 year With the new value of Ty =10 years =10-365 days we have @ higher valu ofthe component’ failures probabilities: PMT) = 0305, k=12, 7 By resorting to fist order, rare event approximation for the system unreliability Ugfly) = PUo,)=02617 Ifa higher precision in the U,.(fy) value is required, we can compute a second order approximation which gives lower limit forthe unreliability Ut) = ¥POM)-ES Pom M,}=0.2090 Toss YPM) SS Prana) . Kg MX Xa) 4. Minimal eats At My=1Xhs Me= Xd My = Kah My = ah us Sot bn aon is mas BI My = 1X phe My =e Ming My = Kade Mi Mi Kea a My =X) Ma = igo Xaar Las) pa My = 1%) My = Mage Xaggh Me age Xagh Ma= Big Xagh 5, Probability of he top event working through the Fault te Considering the rae event approximation and mulplying the probabilities ofthe evens through the ful ee, a indicated inthe Figures, one readily obtains: A: PUG = AR: PLA, =r+34, ofthe tp event solving the structure function in 3 Al: PUY, =1) BE: POX, = (1-4) 4104) 049 KOI Xt Ie) Repeated components appear inthe ful tee for BI. Therefore the computation of the probability P(X, =1) through the structure functions of for BI in 3. yields to a wrong result. To obtain the correct failure probability We should firs expand all the prodets| fof the structure finetion of BI and reduce the system structure Function. At PU, = 0-H s) LOM g Ml ture I~ 999) Repeated components appear in the fault tee for B2. Therefore the computation of the probability P(X,=1) through the structure function of B2 yields to a wrong result. To obtain the comect failure probability we should fist expand all the products of the ‘quation of B2 and rece the system srture function, 7. Probability ofthe top event from the minimal eu-sets found in 4 Using the are event approximation: aL + Pkg DE Pa =D PUG, =D r34, 20:16 Be a: me: PUN, =D PU, =» +PUl ag “DAC ay PO DP (Xing = D434, = 0.13 B. Discuss which operator ithe best Saft Is important to kno wen the system is eperting, 0 avoid dangerous situations. ” mene he Sed pe arab on is as P eystem believed off'system actually on) < 2, (eystem believed oflsystem actually 00) u Aisbetter valli: I important to reduce false alarms (one thinks that the system is producing when, actually, is no}. a (ystean blivedonlystem actualy off)> 4 ostem blivedonstem actualy off) yu Bis beter 742 Domestic hat wate system In the domestic hot water system inthe Figure 7.16, the contol of the temperature is achioved by the contrller opening and closing the main gas valve when the water temperature goes outside the preset limits 7, SOF. 1, Formulate ist of undesired sfety and reliability events 2, Consrut the aul oe forthe top event rupture of water tank ‘assuming ony the following primary failure even. 3, Forthis even, wie the system structure function, 44, Reduce the structure fmetion to ind the minimal eu ses '5 Assume primary fire event probabilities equal to 0.1 and fompute the probability of the top event workang through the ful ee. 6. Compute the proba function in 6 7. Compte the probability ofthe top event from the minimal cut sets found in 7. ity of the top event solving the structure Solution 1. Undesired safety and reliability events © Tank rupture (safety) Water too cold (elibiiy) Water too hot (safetytclibility) Insufficient water flow (reliability) Excessive flow (reliability) to Soe poinsettia as 2. Fault woe Basic events 1s basie tank failure 2: rele valve jammed closed 3: gas valve fas jammed open 4: controler fil to close es valve 5: basic failure of tempertue. Monitor Reparvofwaerank | 0.13 =X =a) Ke =1-O=¥ XIX OX (1X) AAI Ky LADD Ay IMAM MG ANAK KK, MAK AKL) Ay IKK AN AI PKA IN, KKM KS) By successive manipulation ofthe last term ofthe above equation, we can reduce the structure function to find he minimal cut Set, Np =I WK MONK, XX AAA) KHUN, HX KKK) Hp K ILHAM NAG) OMX AMX, X)— XXL HAI] Xp=1(-X MIKA MILKMEN A) 4. Minimal cutset My OH) MK) 5, Pobaility ofthe top sven working through tefl we Mutilyng the probes ofthe evens th te ute, ab indicate inh Fir, oe realy obtains PU, =D) =013 Ste po nai an is ont 6, Probability ofthe top event solving the stracture function Applying the expectation operator wo The structure function in. we obtain PU =t 127 17, Probability ofthe top event from the minimal ex-sets From the minimal eu sets and the approximation of rare event, weaves 1404:0.140.-0.1401-01=013 PO, Draw, Chapter 8 Event tree analysi 1 Coolant sytem Consider the coolant system in Figure 8. ‘+ PI and P2 are electrically driven pumps, D is @ flow detector, and EP (not show) isthe eletrie power 4 Initiating evet is breakin the noma coolant pipe + Full system success (8) requires both pumps, the detection system, andthe eleaical power operating + One pump operating results in patil succes (P) + Two pumps filing or failure of eleeeal power (EP) results in sytem failure (F) ‘Numerical values are given in Table 8.1 wa Sad ren ny and i nabs | rent reais bs Benes Nene ae (2) = p(EP)p(D | EP)p(Pi| DEP) p(P2| Pl, D,EP) ‘Component | Reve oR Qr Fr, = 0.085 Pr By =095 ny Ryn 095 ‘Tae probability of system succes is given by: R= p6S1)+ PPD + p(P2) =0.939 82 Pletrc pump system Find he probability of system sucess. eee ‘An electric pump is fed by a group of three clectic generators | Given the high power requested by the pump, iis necessary that at Sottion least wo ofthe generators be in operation 1, Probability of system success. | —a a os 1, — Fe, atone PSD) = p(EP)p(D| EP)p(PI| D,EP)p(P2| PLD, EP) anak PPI) = p(EP)p(D | EP)p(P1| D,EP)p(P2| PL,D,EP) pk aR Or = 0085 Build the event te to calulate the probebility of operation ofthe system knowing the data in Table 8.2. Component —[ Raab | Prob of ae Pan 50 T10 Geseaise ET] es om Geseeuoe 1G | O89 nas Geoersor 1G] ts ns Solution 1. Probability ofthe system operating, * pease rot 8 Assuming tha the furs ae independent, the probability ofthe system operating is given by Ry = PST) p(S2)+ POSH = RRoyRes)* (Ry Re QesRes) +R Qo Ros Res)= 0845 3 Lamp supply sytem “The system represented in Figure 85 illustrates the operation of a lamp fed by two batteries and a power unt. In order to have energy inthe ciruit itis enough tht one among the two batteries and the power unit works. ae yore leerrenvs _|arnenv2 Tenais Toners re G=00 Oe k06 gee cil cet iting en Build he event te for the event “flue ofthe lighting system” and compute its probability based on the component failure probabilities indicated in Figure 8S Solution 1 Probability ofthe event “failure ofthe lighting system" ne Sahara relay art nab fe Joe low F ame Saget ee) Lon Bon SSF a2 Lo re Lo es -P a Lo a es La ps SFB mF Lo rs RS SPR P-L on Ray = (SI) w{S2) + 9(S3)+ (SA) + SS) + n(58)+ plST) m5 Oo = ‘84 Poisonous gas deposit Rog = 0.285 Let us consider a person working in a deposit of poisonous gas. ‘The deposit is subject to leakages which are controlled by a gas rn nova = detector, Ifa leakage occurs, an alarm sounds and the person should leave the place immediately although not all gas leakages necessarily imply the presence of gas in the work place. Failure tan be dic tothe detector not detecting the gas, the alarm not Sounding or the person not leaving the facility. The main concern is ifthe worker is wounded or not ‘Assuming tht the fare sequences are mutually exclusive, find ‘he probability ofthe Worker being wounded Sotation Probabiliy of the worker being wounded. gcerpiee ong sonics em ee Bene (woke being wounded) = (pap 2a) +0 7))+(0~F) 15 Electr fryer system, Let us consider the electric fryer system showed in Figure 88 with the following legen: ‘0 ‘Sed pale iil Brn eco i 1. Blectic yer ra = 2 oi ea” | Baee | Gem face | ee aaa = Sy Se 44 High temperture switch Te 5. Smoke detector "aa 6 Sprinkler Peer a er Construct the event tree stating fom the event “thermostat jammed closed” , Sot 1 Eventtree Chapter 9 Estimation of reliability parameters from experimental data 9. Falta times ‘The file time data (5.2, 68, 11.2, 168, 17.8, 196,234,254, 320,448 mingtes) are exponentially distributed as FQ) Make a probability plot and estimate the parameter, 9 Sot Probability plot and parameter estimate We have: tal z We then approximite (5) by Plexo whee 1 = 1,23, 0% Inourease, since 10, wehave wf J. Tra | "a5 1.2241.373,.571,.883,22,278,3666,55,1] ™ Soe ros nay andi ate In the nent Figure 9.1 these numbers have been plottd on semilog ‘ape versus the failure times. Aer drawing staght line trough 1m e=272, then 6 ee the data we note that when 2Imin gre Pei fps bus 92 Catalytic converter test “Twenty units ofa catalytic converter ate tested to failure without censoring, The times to failure (in days) are the following _ a 3 od 36 iar aa a co 35 34 ms Te wg—| 3 a3_{ ea a9 wa [ar [Plot on exponential paper snd determine whether the failure ate is increasing or decreasing with time. ums fre permcr fm geri dae 1S 2. Plt the results on Weibull paper and estimate its parameters 3. Find the method-of moments estimates of the Weibull parameters. Solution 1. Exponential paper 2 ae 9) J FO If 8>1 then A(¢) increasing. IF <1 then 2() decreasing, From Figure 9, 2(0 isthe slope and seems to be slightly increasing, therefore, we expect > 1 Oe Fire, geet etn oily pr ne Soe robo relay an ia nas 2. Weibull Paper ‘The Wel came dion non it: Fe) t=) Seingr=r, we ge F(C)=O632, Loking a Figue 23, we pete s12, Theslope B= 09 ow cy 090 ons ow av HE . aos aw. ry w w e ' gue. Wl tion pati oper mao rai parame fom epee de 17 3. Method of Moments weet 20 -ansio7es oan AGG) orl2 3) #6) =39804 lal ela The problem reduces to finding two unknown from two equations Solving for rand fe get: ral Stondg=12 93 Confidence bounds ‘Suppose that the time to failure 7 (years) of a certain item is an ‘exponential random variable with probability density function: me bo LIf we have a sample of 3 observations on 7, ic E=lt.=1t,=284,=22), find the 95% upper coatidence bound andthe 90% confidence interval for A using fequentst, statisti, bs So pbs rebar oaie 2. Find the 95% upper confidence bound and the 90% confidence interval for “A using freguentst statics and using. the information in 1. What are the coresponding Bayesian ‘quantities? Sol 1. The 95% upper confidence bound and the 90% confidence ierval The evidence B= (= Is, =2.8,4, = 2.2} constittes the result of an uncensored test, but we can consider the test as a type 2 censoring test (test ends atthe rth term failure) with a total time co flute 7-=1+22+28=6 and Using the Table forthe normal standard variate we compute: “The 95% upper bound ar) (26) (22) eae) (Fase, 126, where Zou denotes the upper & perceile ofthe chieqae Aisteibution with v degrees of freedom, ‘The 90% confidence interval for A. 05year ination fry prance fom pind 9 2, Censored test of 4 components Now the evidence is regarded as the result of « Type I Censoring test (est ends ata fixed 1), We have tested m= items, with ‘n=3 failures before f =2:8 Thus the total time to test 7 is P=Sh o(mn 422+28)+(4-3)- 28-88 ‘The 95% upper bound is ar_)' _(2-88)" Fara) (2a Where Zio, denotes the upper & percentile of the chi-square Aistibution with v depres of freedoms. “The 90% confidence interval for A: (z)o(2) 6 (ele ng} ; (25) 0 and we deve v= 3542 nd # = wept at arn of ypc fom point dee MS Note that (2), the prior dstbution of A. was a Gamma disteibution with parameter v= 2 snd A= 1 and tat also ="(2), the posterior distibutio of A, is a Gamma distribution with parameters Hence we have confirmed thatthe family of Gamma distebutions {is conjugate othe fanily of exponential distributions. 5. Posterior marginal density of T and posterior reliability Using the evidence 8, =2.2}, we compute the posterior marginal distribution of 7 as: lekeolela O+2s+22)e2]-4 flrs2s+22)+2}6j" 16384 “ery ‘The posterior reliability ofthe item fora period of 1 year is ieaed ar =s63 ws Sha robin eon risa 4. Prior and posterior mean values and variances of A Fora Gamma distribution with parameter £ and v, we have Ths: “Tle 9.2. Poa pti pois v |e ]at| vata fa Prior #[4 aya Posterior 2 | 6 Note thatthe evidence does nat move the mean ofthe distebution but reduces considerably the variance, a indication ofthe fact that the posterior contains more information than the prior. 5. The 95% upper confidence bound and the 90% confidence interval for A Froquentst stants ‘The evidence = {6,=1,%,=28,%,=22) constitutes the result of an uncensored test, but we can consider the test as a type 2 ‘censoring test (test ends a the rth te fire) with a total time to failue T=1+22+28=6 and r=3 nmap ow perineal 8 ‘Using the Table forthe normal standard variation we comput: ‘+ The 95% upper bound: ()-69 ee Aistioution with v degres of freedom, ‘©The 90% confidence interval for A. {e)o4 {ES ‘P(O.1367 <2 £1.05)= 0.9 nyt a (22) tase Bayesian staristies 4 The 95% upper bound “The 95% upper confidence hound for A isthe value 2, such that, vv Te) PA shy)= fee y= f with & and v"=8 hae, Efuea ono, 0906 uw ‘Sed pao ray and ok ane ‘+The 90% confidence interval for A Analogously the 90% confidence interval for Ais an interval [aos] suc that, Flings

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