Republic of the Philippines

Tarlac State University

SCHOOL OF LAW
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CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1
Case Digests
Submitted by:
DANIEL GARIDAN TOLENTINO
JD – 1A
(Student No. 2022)

Submitted to:
Dean Salvador N. Moya II, LL.M., D.C.L.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Spouses Afulugencia vs. Meropolitan Bank, et. Al ------------------------
Go, et. Al., vs. People of the Philippines -------------------------------------
People vs. Sergio and Lacanilao------------------------------------------------
Guanzon vs. Montesclaros-------------------------------------------------------
Adolfo vs. Adolfo--------------------------------------------------------------------
NAPOCOR vs. Spouses Asoque-----------------------------------------------
Enalbes, et. Al., vs. Leonardo-De Castro------------------------------------
Republic vs. Cortez----------------------------------------------------------------
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. CIR-------------------------------
City of Taguig vs. City of Makati------------------------------------------------
Viking Industrial Corp. vs. CA---------------------------------------------------

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G.R. No. 185145 (February 5, 2014)
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of
Bulacan, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Afulugencia filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure,
auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) with
the RTC of Malolos.
After the filing of the parties' pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, Spouses
Afulugencia filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum
to require Metrobank's officers to appear and testify as the petitioners' initial
witnesses during the hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to
bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering
the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of Spouses Afulugencia’s 200-square meter
land in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
This was opposed by Metrobank, arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing,
the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to
set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that
pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank's officers — who
are considered adverse parties — may not be compelled to appear and testify in
court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the
documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing
for evidence.
Petitioners submitted a Reply to Metrobank's Opposition, stating that the lack of a
proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank's Opposition; that
applying the principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored; that leave of court is
not necessary for the taking of Metrobank's officers' depositions; that for their case,
the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive, but instead
favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the
same during the presentation of its own evidence; that the documents sought to be
produced are relevant and will prove whether petitioners have paid their obligations
to Metrobank in full, and will settle the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the
foreclosure proceedings; and that the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting
the adverse party as its own witness.
RTC RULING: Ruled in favour of Metrobank. Denied Spouses Afulugencia’s motion
and later on, dismissed the petition. Even if the motion is given consideration by
relaxing Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, no such laxity could be
accorded to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court which require
prior service of written interrogatories to adverse parties before any material and
relevant facts may be elicited from them more so if the party is a private corporation
who could be represented by its officers as in this case. In other words, as the
persons sought to be subpoenaed by the plaintiffs-movants are of cers of the
defendant bank, they are in effect the very persons who represent the interest of the
latter and necessarily fall within the coverage of Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC’s decision.
The CA held further that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners' Motion to
secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad testi candum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite
clear in providing that the consequence of a party's failure to serve written

2
interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled by the
former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal. By failing to serve
written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to present
the bank's of cers as their witnesses. The CA declared that the justification for the
rule laid down in Section 6 is that by failing to seize the opportunity to inquire upon
the facts through means available under the Rules, petitioners should not be allowed
to later on burden Metrobank with court hearings or other processes.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: For the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum, Spouses Afulugencia assert that the questioned Motion is not a
litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the issuance of process. They insist
that a motion which is subject to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 is an application for relief other than a pleading; since no relief is sought but just
the process of subpoena, the hearing and notice requirements may be done away
with, citing the case of Adorio v. Hon. Bersamin. Spouses Afulugencia add that the
Rules should have been liberally construed in their favor, and that Metrobank's ling
of its Opposition be considered to have cured whatever defect the Motion suffered
from. Moreover, Spouses Afulugencia persists in the view that Metrobank's officers
— the subject of the Motion — do not comprise the adverse party covered by the
rule; they insist that these bank officers are mere employees of the bank who may be
called to testify for them.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Metrobank essentially argues in its Comment that
the subject Motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum is a
litigated motion, especially as it is directed toward its officers, whose testimony and
documentary evidence would affect it as the adverse party in the civil case. Thus, the
lack of a proper notice of hearing renders it useless and a mere scrap of paper. It
adds that being its officers, the persons sought to be called to the stand are
themselves adverse parties who may not be compelled to testify in the absence of
prior written interrogatories; they are not ordinary witnesses whose presence in court
may be required by petitioners at any time and for any reason. Finally, Metrobank
insists on the correctness of the CA Decision, adding that since petitioners failed up
to this time to pay the witnesses' fees and kilometrage as required by the Rules, the
issuance of a subpoena should be denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC and CA were correct in dismissing Spouses Afulugencia’s motion?
RULING:
YES, the RTC and CA were correct in dismissing Spouses Afulugencia’s motion.
Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served
with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give
testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks
to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial. In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank's
officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present
documents in Metrobank's possession as part of their principal documentary
evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of
the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank's officers —
who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations
act only through their officers and duly authorized agents — as their main witnesses;
nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank's documentary evidence for
the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case
from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on
petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own
evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself
from its own defense.

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As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness
stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides — Sec. 6. Effect
of failure to serve written interrogatories. — Unless thereafter allowed by the court for
good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse
party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later
opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the
process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might
bring.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court
may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
While it is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to
prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse
party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes
against the very principles of justice and fair play. Finally, the Court may not turn a
blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of
their causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners claim that they were not
furnished with speci c documents relative to their loan agreement with Metrobank at
the time they obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to
willingly provide petitioners with these documents even before petitioners can
present evidence to show that indeed they were never furnished the same, any
inferences generated from this would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may
be that by providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be admitting
that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these documents prior to the signing of
the loan agreement, and while the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.

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G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET
AL., Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila for Other Deceits
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution’s complaining witness, Li
Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country
back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However,
trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor
filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was
being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and
that, upon doctor’s advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of
ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners’ opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the
prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping.
Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a
Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for
reconsideration through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to
the CA. the CA denied petitioners’ motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in sustaining that the rules on deposition-taking in civil cases is also
applicable to criminal cases? Yes.
HELD:
YES. Rules on deposition-taking in civil cases is not applicable to criminal cases because
the examination of witnesses in criminal cases must be done orally before a judge in open
court in order to allow the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. The
Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is covered
under Section 15, Rule 119. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness’ credibility through his manner
and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. But for purposes of taking the
deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the
court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.

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G.R. No. 240053, October 09, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS LACANILAO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio, and Julius L. Lacanilao were friends and
neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and
susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in
Malaysia.
Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip.
She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy, but the latter simply replied that
because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to
Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane
realized that it contained prohibited drugs.
The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the
scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the
recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her
testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.
The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
(b) No cameras shall be allowed;
(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and
(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing. 
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. " It
averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court
because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the
court due to her imprisonment.
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be
made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the
Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in
open court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that
such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary
Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced
because the affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.
The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?
2. Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused to confront
the witnesses?

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Ruling: 
On Substantive Matters
The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's
conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian
President of an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against
Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve
particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any
question propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds
to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG's contentions are meritorious.
The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the
State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and the
suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that
the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated
since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect and preserve
their rights.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
is inapplicable in the instant case
Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , in order for
the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is
being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick
or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. Therefore, a liberal
interpretation of the Rules should be allowed. We should not silence Mary Jane and
deny her and the People of their right to due process by presenting their case
against the said accused. By the CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the
respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well
as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written interrogatories,
the Court of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to prove her innocence before
the Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply
with the conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.
The extraordinary factual circumstances
surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's
testimony as a prosecution witness proper? Yes.
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how
a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave
offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to
perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to
how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because
he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said
Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so
long as there is compelling reason.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court
sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on

7
Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
The deposition by written interrogatories
is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process
Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to
due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the
parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to
follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his
liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the
State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an
equal chance to present its evidence in support of a charge.

8
 MANUEL GUANZON, Petitioner,
vs. 
HON. PATERNO D. MONTESCLAROS, Presiding Judge, City Court of Cebu,
FERDINAND BRIONES and ROSARIO BRIONES, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-59330, June 28, 1983

Facts:

Respondents Ferdinand Briones and Rosario Briones instituted against petitioner

Manuel Guanzon an action for ejectment in the City Court of Cebu, docketed as Civil
Case No. 19392. Petitioner was served with summons and copy of the complaint on
April 21, 1977. At the hearing on July 7, 1977, petitioner appeared and asked for a
10-day extension within which to file his answer, which the court granted.
For failure of petitioner to file an answer, the court, on motion of private respondents,
issued an order dated January 20, 1978, declaring petitioner in default. Petitioner
was not furnished copy of said decision. It appears, however, that after he was
served with the writ of execution, he obtained a copy of the decision from the clerk of
court. Forthwith he filed a motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the
judgment, but the same was denied. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said order and, upon denial thereof, he filed a second motion for reconsideration,
which was likewise denied.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the respondent Court of First
Instance of Cebu, presided by Judge Alfredo Marigomen, seeking to quash the writ
of execution and to set aside, the judgment in Civil Case No. 19392. On February 25,
1981, the respondent court issued a decision dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action made by the petitioner proper?
Ruling:
No. In Luzon Rubber and Manufacturing, Co. vs. Estaris, 1 this Court set forth the
remedies available to a defendant declared in default by the city or municipal court
[now metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court] in order
to enable him to restore his standing in court, as follows: (1) he may ask the court
within one (1) day after notice of the order of default to set aside such order by
appearing and showing to the satisfaction of the court that his failure to appear was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence under Section 13, Rule 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court; or (2) he may, if he fails to avail himself of this remedy
and the judgment has become final and executory, file a petition for relief in Court of
First Instance under Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. He may also
file a motion to lift the default judgment and ask for a new trial before the judgment
becomes final and executory under Section 16 of Rule 5.
Should the court order the dismiss or denial of his petition for relief or motion to lift
the judgment by default, the defendant may interpose an appeal from such order. In
the case at bar, petitioner failed to avail of this remedy. It is a rule consistently
adhered to that where an appeal is in itself a sufficient and adequate remedy that
would promptly relieve petitioner of the injurious effects of the order or judgment
complained of, the existence of that appeal would bar the institution of the remedy of
certiorari.

9
Affirming the same principle, this Court, in Strachan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 5 said that "the innovation of the Revised Rules of Court in Section 2 of Rule 41 of
the Revised Rules of Court which allows a party who has been declared in default to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented
by him pursuant to Rule 38, is not applicable to municipal or city courts (Sec. 19,
Rule 5)."
It should be pointed out, however, for the guidance of the bench and bar, that the
pronouncement in said cases denying a defaulted defendant the right to appeal from
the judgment of city and municipal courts has been overruled by the provisions of
Section 22 of PD 129 6 and Section 21 (a) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines 7 promulgated on January 11, 1983. The provision therein that all cases
decided by metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial
courts may be appealed to the regional trial courts is broad and comprehensive
enough to cover not only decisions of the aforementioned lower courts rendered after
a full-blown trial, but also judgments by default; summary judgments and judgments
on the pleadings issued by them.

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner,
vs.
FE T. ADOLFO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for judicial
separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo. The petition
alleged that the parties were married, and bore one child, and during the marriage,
they acquired through conjugal funds certain lots, including the one in question. Later
on, the parties separated due to irreconcilable differences. Since reunion was no
longer feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal property, but
respondent adamantly refused. Respondent denied petitioner's co-ownership of the
subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal property inheriting it from her
mother.Several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them were
proved unavailing; and that a judicial separation of property is proper under the
circumstances and pursuant to Article 135 (6) of the Family Code.
In her counterclaim, she contends that she remained married to petitioner, the
petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler, drunkard, wife abused and neglectful father, and

10
she was also abandoned because petitioner transferred somewhere and took a
mistress having children with such. (Civil Case No.MAN-4821).
Respondent's sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the
Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The trial
courtrendered its Decision declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal
property of the marriage. (Civil Case No. MAN-2683) CA declared, among others,
that the subject property was respondent's paraphernal property.While above CA
decision is pending and have yet to attain finality, petitioner submitted as part of his
evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons' Complaint but
respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission.
Petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings stating that due to the failure
to answer, the respondent is deemed to have admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section
2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the subject property is conjugal asset of
their subsisting marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition for judicial
separation of property. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial court render judgment in
his favor based on the pleadings. RTC granted petitioner' motion for judgement on
the pleadings and treated it as a summary judgement.The CA said that although
respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by her failure to reply to
petitioner's request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits clearly
contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the trial court
disregarded the fact that the issue of whether the subject property is conjugal was
still unresolved. Petitioner moved to consider but denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of
substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable
jurisprudence.
Ruling:
No. Such property remains to be the paraphernal property of the wife. Therefore, it
cannot be judicially separated even if both of them are separated.
In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent's failure to reply
to petitioner's request for admission declaring that the subject property is a conjugal
asset. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it
would be premature to render judgment on petitioner's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly
resorted to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.While it
may appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent
admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the
case.
While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action,
petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to
secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such
relief, be allowed to repudiate or question the CA's ruling. The principle of estoppel
bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court, which
became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent's paraphernal
property.Upon the final and executory decision of the CA that the subject property is
indeed a paraphernal property of the wife, petitioner's case is not meritorious
anymore. Hence, there being no conjugal property, the petitioner cannot seek the
division of such property.

11
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs. 
SPS. MARGARITO ASOQUE AND TARCINIA ASOQUE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

Facts:
Spouses Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land located in
Barangay Bugtong, Calbayog City. Sometime in November 1995, the National Power
Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque's land to install transmission lines for its
350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project. The National Power
Corporation utilized 4,352 square meters for the project.
Spouses Asoque alleged that beforehand, they were made to understand that the
National Power Corporation would pay them the value of the portion of the land used
and all improvements that would be destroyed for the National Power Corporation's
project. Spouses Asoque incurred actual damages as a result of the National Power
Corporation's cutting off some coconut trees and other fruit- and non-fruit-bearing
plants during the construction.
They were also prohibited from introducing on the 4,352-square-meter area any
improvement that could rise by a few meters from the ground. Upon Spouses
Asoque's demand for just compensation, the National Power Corporation only paid
for the improvements destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352-
square-meter area utilized for the project.
The National Power Corporation claimed that it was only liable to pay for right of way
at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended. On September 20, 1999, Spouses Asoque filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Calbayog City a Complaint for payment of just compensation and damages
against the National Power Corporation.
In its Answer dated February 7, 2000, the National Power Corporation denied
Spouses Asoque's claims that it had illegally utilized their property. It alleged that it
entered the property with Spouses Asoque's consent, as shown by the
acknowledgment receipt for P9,897.00 as payment for damaged improvements and
waiver of claims to improvements damaged.
By virtue of the acknowledgement receipt and the waiver, the National Power
Corporation claimed that there was no more need for it to institute an expropriation
proceeding.
On June 25, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of
Spouses Asoque and ordered the National Power Corporation to pay them.
Aggrieved, the National Power Corporation filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied the National Power Corporation's appeal in its
Decision dated November 21, 2005. It affirmed with modification the Regional Trial
Court Decision by deleting the amount of P158,369.00 as compensation for the
damaged improvements for lack of legal and factual basis.
The Court of Appeals found no impropriety on the part of the Regional Trial Court in
allowing Spouses Asoque to present their evidence ex parte and in appointing the
Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Spouses Asoque's evidence ex
parte. It also found no irregularity in the trial court's adoption of the Commissioner's
report/recommendation, which was found to be comprehensive and supported by
evidence.
Rejecting the National Power Corporation's stance that only an easement of right of
way was acquired at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No.

12
6395, the Court of Appeals ruled that the determination of just compensation is a
judicial function and cannot be diminished by Republic Act No. 6395, as amended.
Finally, the Court of Appeals found that Spouses Asoque have already been properly
compensated for the damaged improvements per disbursement vouchers in the total
amount of P17,133.50, and Spouses Asoque failed to present competent proof that
they were entitled to an additional award of actual damages.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner was deprived of due process when respondents were allowed
to present evidence ex parte;
2. Whether the appraisal of the property was valid and the court-appointed
Commissioner exceeded his authority when he conducted an appraisal of the
property and recommended a valuation for just compensation.
Ruling:
1. No. The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 provides that if it is the defendant who
fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed "to present his evidence ex parte
and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof."
Petitioner and its counsel were absent during the first pre-trial setting on May 8,
2000. Respondents' counsel attended, although he was late. Had petitioner and its
counsel appeared on the first setting, they would have been reasonably notified then
and there of the second pre-trial resetting on May 24, 2000 and would have had the
opportunity to ask for a later date. Nonetheless, petitioner's counsel should have
tried to inquire from the court the next schedule of the pre-trial.

Attendance by the party and its counsel during a pre-trial conference is mandatory as
expressly stated under Rule 18, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.70 Petitioner alleges that it filed a motion for postponement of the first pre-
trial setting. This notwithstanding, it was still its duty to appear at the pre-trial first set
on May 8, 2000. A motion for postponement should never be presumed to be
granted.
"Parties are presumed to have known the governing rules and the consequences for
the violation of such rules." Moreover, the essence of due process is an opportunity
to be heard. Petitioner was given that opportunity. Yet, it failed to appear at the two
(2) pre-trial settings. A pre-trial cannot be taken for granted for it serves a vital
objective: the simplification and expedition of the trial, if not its dispensation. Non-
appearance of a party may only be excused for a valid cause. The Court see none in
this case.
2. The report of the commissioner shows clearly that he received and evaluated
[respondents'] evidence which were adduced ex parte. His preliminary determination
of the just compensation of the property [in] issue would not necessarily render
invalid the ex parte proceedings conducted by him. The valuations suggested by the
commissioner as just compensation for [respondents'] land that was utilized by
[petitioner] were merely recommendatory. The final determination of just
compensation was left to the court a quo as it rests within the exclusive domain of
the latter. Simply stated, the court a quo was still at liberty to reject or adopt the
recommendations of the commissioner.77 (Emphasis in the original) Hence, absent
any express limitation in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of Court Arty.
Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the court-appointed Commissioner, may make factual
findings and recommendations on the valuation of the property. Indeed, the
Commissioner's recommendation could have been necessarily rejected had it been
an ultra vires act.

13
We hold that the non-appointment of three (3) Commissioners in the court a quo
does not render infirm the entire proceedings. Neither do we find improper the trial
court's appointment of the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive and
report on respondents' evidence. The trial court is not bound by the Commissioner's
recommended valuation of the property. It still has the discretion on whether to adopt
the Commissioner's recommendation or to make its own independent valuation as
gathered from the evidence reported by the Commissioner.

RE: COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF ELVIRA N. ENALBES, REBECCA H. ANGELES

AND ESTELITA B. OCAMPO AGAINST FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO [RET.], RELATIVE TO G.R. NOS. 203063 AND 204743.

A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019

Facts:

This administrative matter originated from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by complainants

Elvira N. Enalbes, Rebecca H. Angeles, and Estelita B. Ocampo against former
Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Chief Justice De Castro), charging her
with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In their Complaint-Affidavit, complainants state that on September 4, 2012, Spouses
Eligio P. Mallari and Marcelina I. Mallari (the Mallari Spouses) filed before this Court
a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order.
On January 25, 2013, the Mallari Spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 204743, against the Philippine National
Bank and the Court of Appeals Special Former Fourth Division. Both Petitions were
assigned to this Court's First Division and were raffled to then Chief Justice De
Castro
Complainants aver that despite the lapse of more than five (5) years, respondent
failed to decide on both Petitions of Spouses Mallari. Complainants maintain that
respondent's failure to promptly act on the Petitions resulted in a violation of the
spouses' constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Complainants argue
that respondent committed graft and corruption for giving the Philippine National
Bank unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to the Mallari Spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent, former Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro,
should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, gross
inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Ruling:
Gross ignorance of the law is the failure of a magistrate to apply "basic rules and
settled jurisprudence.

14
To hold a magistrate administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not
enough that his or her action was erroneous; it must also be proven that it was driven
by bad faith, dishonesty, or ill motive.
Complainants' Complaint-Affidavit is predicated on respondent's failure to resolve the
Mallari Spouses' Petitions for more than five (5) years. They insist that respondent's
neglect to promptly decide on the Petitions resulted in a violation of the spouses'
constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Complainants rely on the
constitutional provision requiring this Court to decide on cases within 24 months from
their submission.Complainants' arguments lack merit.
Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that the 24- month period for
deciding on or resolving a case is reckoned from the date of its submission for
resolution. The 24-month period does not run immediately upon the filing of a petition
before this Court, but only when the last pleading, brief, or memorandum has been
submitted.
Magistrates must be given discretion to defer the disposition of certain cases to
make way for other equally important matters in this Court's agenda. In Coscolluela
v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this Court noted that "the right to speedy disposition of
cases should be understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Administrative Complaint against
respondent, former Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, for gross
ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE

SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) as the PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE, and the NATIONAL
POWER BOARD, Petitioners
vs.
HON. LUISITO G. CORTEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 84,
Quezon City, ABNER P. ELERIA, MELITO B. LUPANGCO, NAPOCOR
EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION (NECU), and NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES
AND WORKERS UNION (NEWU), Respondents
G.R. No. 187257, February 7, 2017

Facts:
The implementation of Republic Act No. 6758 resulted in the integration of all
allowances previously received, including Cost of Living Allowance and Amelioration

15
Allowance, into the basic standardized salary. When a government entity ceases to
be covered by Republic Act No. 6758, the new position classification and
compensation plan must also include all allowances previously received in the basic
salary, in line with the principle of non-diminution of pay.This is a consolidated case
resulting from a Petition for Mandamus filed by the president of the National Power
Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) and the president of the
National Power Corporation Employees and Workers Union (NEWU) before the
Regional Trial Court.
The Petition sought to direct the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), its
President and its Board of Directors to release and pay the Cost of Living Allowance
(COLA) and Amelioration Allowance (AA) to all NAPOCOR employees beginning
July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999. The Petition for Mandamus was granted by the trial
court and the NAPOCOR was ordered to pay a total of P6,496,055,339.98 as back
payment for COLA and AA with an additional P704,777,508.60 as legal interest.
On September 18, 2007, then Secretary of Budget and Management Rolando
Andaya, Jr. (Secretary Andaya, Jr.) wrote a letter to NAPOCOR stating that the
determination of whether the COLA and AA were factually integrated rested with it
since the payment of the allowances did not require the prior approval of the Budget
and Management Secretary. NECU and NEWU again requested the release of their
COLA and AA pursuant to Secretary Andaya, Jr.'s letter. NAPOCOR again referred
the matter to the Committee for further study. Due to the continued refusal of
NAPOCOR to release the allowances, NECU and NEWU were constrained to file the
Petition for Mandamus.
In its Consolidated Comment before the trial court, the Office of the Solicitor General,
on behalf of NAPOCOR, alleged that the Notice of Position Allocation and Salary
Adjustment (NPASA) of employees should be examined to find out if the COLA and
AA were nevertheless integrated into the salaries despite the ineffectivity of DBM-
CCC No. 10. The affected employees must also show that they suffered a diminution
of pay as a result of its implementation. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise
pointed out that the COLA and AA were not among those allowances specifically
excluded in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 and thus were deemed to have
been included in the standardized salary rates
In their Reply with Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings before the trial court, NECU
and NEWU submitted the following documents to prove right to COLA and AA:Letter
of [NPC President] Del Callar dated October 9, 2007 categorizing the
workers/employees of the NAPOCOR into three groups.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to withdraw its
appearance as counsel for NAPOCOR and asking for leave to intervene as the
People's Tribune. The Motion stated that the position taken by NAPOCOR ran
counter to the Office of the Solicitor General's stand that the COLA and AA were
already integrated into the standardized salaries.
On November 28, 2008, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision in favor of
NECU and NEWU. According to the trial court, the determination of whether the
COLA and AA had been factually integrated was already resolved when the
NAPOCOR Committee certified that the COLA and AA of the employees from July 1,
1989 to December 31, 1993 were not factually integrated into their standardized
salaries. The trial court also cited De Jesus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Employees Hired After July 1, 1989, and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System v. Bautista, et al.[45] in support of the conclusion that the employees were
entitled to COLA and AA from 1989 to 1999 as a matter of right.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal of this Decision. Secretary
Andaya, Jr. also filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing, among others, that the
employees were duly notified that their COLA and AA were already integrated into
their standardized salaries and that a Certification could be used as basis since this

16
was merely advisory for the Board of Directors. NECU and NEWU, on the other
hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution even within the period for appeal alleging
that the needed amount had already been certified available and that the release of
the allowances did not require the approval of the Department of Budget and
Management... the Regional Trial Court denied the Notice of Appeal and Motion for
Reconsideration; and granted the Motion for Execution
The trial court noted that since the Office of the Solicitor General withdrew its
appearance as counsel for NAPOCOR and entered its appearance as the People's
Tribune, it could no longer file an appeal that would accrue to NAPOCOR's benefit.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Solicitor General, acting as the People's Tribune filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibitio
On April 14, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Very Urgent Plea for a
Temporary Restraining Order[62] to enjoin the implementation of the trial court's
November 28, 2008 Decision, March 20, 2009 Joint Order, and March 23, 2009 Writ
of Execution.In a Resolution[63] dated April 15, 2009, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order[64] to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Executio
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that it filed its Notice of Appeal before
the trial court as the People's Tribune with the authority and duty to uphold the best
interests of the State.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Notice of Appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor General as the People's
Tribune. Whether the appeals were timely filed as to bar the finality of the Decision
dated November 28, 2008. Whether the case presented pure issues of law that
should have been appealed directly to this Court through a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Whether the trial court erred in deciding the case
based on a judgment on the pleadings.
Ruling:
Generally, the Office of the Solicitor General "represents the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers."
The exception to this rule is when it acts as the "People's Tribune." As such, it
represents the best interests of the State, and may take an adverse position from the
government agency under litigation. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the Solicitor
General may, as it has in instances take a position adverse and contrary to that of
the Government on the reasoning that it is incumbent upon him to present to the
court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a client's position.
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes
the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the
people themselves of which the individual lawyers in said office are a part. Moreover,
endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial
concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public
weal
In this instance, the Office of the Solicitor General initially represented NAPOCOR
and its Board of Directors in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. It later
on filed an Omnibus Motion To Withdraw Appearance as Counsel for Respondents
and For Leave to Intervene as People's Tribune, which was granted by the trial court

17
in its June 20, 2008 Order. In denying the Office of the Solicitor General's Notice of
Appeal, the trial court stated: The Court is of the humble opinion and so holds that
OSG has ceased to be the counsel of NPC and the subsequent filing of the notice of
appeal is not appropriately filed or such notice will accrue to the benefit of NPC. In
granting the Office of the Solicitor General's Omnibus Motion, the trial court allowed
a party, separate from NAPOCOR - the People's Tribune — to enter its appearance
in the case. As with any other party, it was allowed to file a Notice of Appeal
separately from NAPOCOR. Its Notice of Appeal was not for the benefit of
NAPOCOR; rather, it was for the protection of the interests of the State. Its Notice of
Appeal would have been timely filed.
By filing a Notice of Appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General intended to appeal to
the Court of Appeals via an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, sec. 1 (a). NECU and
NEWU questioned this mode of appeal on the ground that only questions of law were
presented.The Office of the Solicitor General's main argument, however, was that
the COLA and AA were already factually integrated into the standardized salary rates
of NAPOCOR's employees. It had intended this fact to be established by
documentary evidence such as the Notice of Position Allocation and Salary
Adjustment. NECU and NEWU likewise presented documentary evidence before the
trial court to establish their position. In order to review any appeal of the case, it
would have been necessary to review the weight and evidentiary value of the
documents presented. These would have been questions of fact better addressed in
an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals.The Office of the Solicitor General,
thus, did not err in first filing a notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court.
Considering that the Office of the Solicitor General represented an adverse position,
a judgment on the pleadings was improper in this instance.A judgment on the
pleadings may be allowed in cases "[w]here an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading[.]" NECU
and NEWU's documentary evidence consisted of documents by the NAPOCOR
Board of Directors stating that the employees were entitled to the back pay of their
COLA and AA. Thus, the Regional Trial Court concluded that since the NAPOCOR
admitted the material allegations of the complaint, a judgment on the pleadings was
proper. The trial court, however, operated on the mistaken assumption that the Office
of the Solicitor General represented NAPOCOR. At this point in the proceedings, the
Office of the Solicitor General had already withdrawn its appearance as counsel for
NAPOCOR and entered its appearance as the People's Tribune. In presenting an
adverse position, the Office of the Solicitor General could not be deemed to have
admitted the material allegations of the complaint.

18
 PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

G.R. No. 141973, June 28, 2005

Facts:

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos) is a domestic corporation

registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). They utilize fuel, oil
and other petroleum products which it procures locally from Petron Philippines
Corporation (Petron). Petron initially pays the Bureau of Internal Revenue(BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs the taxes and duties imposed upon the petroleum products.
Petron is then reimbursed by petitioner when Petron sells such petroleum products
to Philpos.
Philpos sought a refund of specific taxes paid on the purchases of petroleum
products from Petron which claim is pursuant to the incentives it enjoyed by virtue of
its EPZA registration. Since the two-year period within which Philpos could file a
case for tax refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) was about to expire and
no action had been taken by the BIR, Philpos instituted a petition for review before
the CTA against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue(CIR). CTA rendered a
decision finding that while Philpos is exempted from the payment of excise taxes, it
failed to sufficiently prove that it is entitled to refund in this particular case since it did
not submit invoices to support the summary of petroleum products sold and delivered
to it by Petron.
The prayer to present additional evidence partakes of the nature of a motion for new
trial under Section 1 Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It has already
been emphasized in several cases that failure to present evidence already existing at
the time of trial does not warrant the grant of a new trial because said evidence can
no longer be considered newly discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten
evidence. Neither can such inadvertence on the part of the counsel to present said
evidence qualify as excusable negligence.
On January 25, 1999, petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration with motion
for new trial praying that it be allowed to present an additional witness and to have

19
invoices and receipts pre-marked in accordance with CTA Circular No. 1-95.13 The
CTA denied the same for the reason that it found no convincing reason to reverse its
earlier decision and the motion for new trial was filed beyond the period prescribed
by Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court as well as for appeals as provided under
Sec. 4, Rule 43.14
Petitioner then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) which issued the herein assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition for review
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the Petition for
Review.
Ruling:
Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of affidavit of non-forum
shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-
forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party is mandatory. A
certification of the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is petitioner,
and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition. A certification against forum shopping signed by
counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. Hence,
strictly speaking, the CA was correct in dismissing the petition.
The CTA also could not deny that in its previous decisions involving petitioner’s
claims for refund, invoices were not deemed necessary to grant such claims. It
merely said that in said decisions, CTA Circular No. 1-95 was not yet in effect.  Since
CTA Circular No. 1-95 did not make it mandatory to present invoices, coupled with
the previous cases of petitioner where the certifications issued by Petron sufficed, it
is understandable that petitioner did not think it necessary to present invoices and
the accompanying certifications when it filed the present case for refund before the
CTA.
Even then, petitioner, in its motion for reconsideration, asked the CTA for
an opportunity to present invoices to substantiate its claims. But this was denied by
the CTA explaining that its prayer to present additional evidence partakes of the
nature of a motion for new trial under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. The
CTA held that under such rule, failure to present evidence already existing at the
time of trial does not warrant the grant of a new trial because such evidence is not
newly discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten evidence which is not
excusable.
It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, it must be proved that: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) it is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment. This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from
having a new trial. As pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by
petitioner could fall under mistake or excusable negligence.
The "mistake" that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against. Negligence to be "excusable" must also be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of
which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired.53 The test of

20
excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while
transacting important business.

CITY OF TAGUIG, Petitioner, 
vs. 
CITY OF MAKATI, Respondent.

G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016

Facts:

On November 22, 1993, Taguig, then a municipality, filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City a Complaint against Makati. The Complaint (Territorial Dispute
Case) was denominated as one for "Judicial Confirmation of the Territory and
Boundary Limits of Taguig and Declaration of the Unconstitutionality and Nullity of
Certain Provisions of Presidential Proclamations 2475 and 518, with Prayer for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order."
In this Complaint, Taguig asserted that the areas comprising the Enlisted Men's
Barangays, or EMBOs, as well as the area referred to as Inner Fort in Fort Bonifacio,
were within its territory and jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court, through Judge
Briccio C. Ygaña (Judge Ygaña), ruled in favor of Taguig, dated July 8, 2011.

21
On July 28, 2011, Makati filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This Petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120495. On December 19, 2011, Judge Suarez issued
an Order denying Makati's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. Makati then
filed a Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam dated January 3, 2012.
On January 6, 2012, Taguig filed its Reply to Makati's Comment on its Motion to
Dismiss the Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated February 2, 2012 reiterating
its position that it did not commit forum shopping. On January 21, 2013, Makati
moved for reconsideration.
December 19, 2011 and February 13, 2012 Orders as these Orders did not replace
but merely affirmed the July 8, 2011 Decision penned by Judge Ygaña, dated April
30, 2013, the Court of Appeals denied Makati's Motion for Reconsideration. It
abandoned its conclusions in its December 18, 2012 Resolution that the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment alleging that the Court of Appeals' pronouncement that the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment was premature was "inconsistent with and
emasculated by the pronouncements that the instant petition was not mooted by the
subsequent orders of the lower court and that petitioner.
Makati did not commit forum shopping.On February 24, 2014, respondent City of
Makati filed its Comment on the present Petition.

Issue:
Whether respondent City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously
pursuing: first, a Petition for Annulment of the July 8, 2011 Regional Trial Court
Decision; and second, a Motion for Reconsideration (later Appeal) of the same July
8, 2011 Decision.
Ruling:
Respondent City of Makati pursued two (2) simultaneous remedies: a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120495); and a Motion for Reconsideration (later, an
Appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.98377).
Alaban v. Court of Appeals discussed the nature, purpose, and availability of
petitions for annulment of judgment:
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action
is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal
of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds:
extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not
be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can
prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and he would be adversely affected thereby.
No stretch of legal imagination can justify as final and executory the Order assailed
in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by respondent City of Makati. It was
still subject to appeal. Respondent City of Makati's having availed itself of this
remedy is, in fact, the entire impetus for this Decision.
Besides, a Rule 47 petition was not even opportune. It was not as though respondent
City of Makati was left with no other remedy but a Rule 47 petition. Lack of
jurisdiction could have just as easily been raised as an error in its Appeal or in its
Motion for Reconsideration.

22
It is as much a cause for pursuing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal as it is
for pursuing a petition for annulment of judgment.
Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be committed in several
ways:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where
the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise
stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.

VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE L. LUISON, JR., respondents.

23
 G.R. No. 143794, July 13, 2004

Facts:
In 1993, petitioner extended to respondent Jose L. Luison, Jr. a loan amounting to
P2,000,000.00 secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Two years
thereafter, petitioner demanded from respondent the payment of P19,102,916.39,
purportedly representing the principal amount of the loan, plus interest and penalties.
Respondent disputed the accuracy of the amount. Thus, petitioner threatened to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, prompting respondent to file a petition for
prohibition and declaratory relief with the RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City. Petitioner
refused to answer the petition because it was erroneously impleaded as "Viking
Trading Corporation," instead of "Viking Industrial Corporation." Consequently, the
court, upon motion of respondent, declared petitioner in default and allowed
respondent to present his evidence ex parte.
On July 8, 1996, the RTC, then presided by Judge Ignacio L. Salvador, rendered a
judgment by default in favor of respondent.
Petitioner received a copy of the above judgment on August 9, 1996.  However it did
not interpose an appeal. Upon respondent's motion, the RTC issued an Order dated
October 15, 1996, directing the issuance of a writ of execution.  Thereupon, the
judgment was fully executed and satisfied. 
Petitioner refused to acknowledge the full satisfaction of the judgment by default.
Thus, respondent filed two motions, to wit:  (1) "Ex-Parte Motion to Require Viking
Industrial Corporation (petitioner) to Cause the Cancellation of the Annotation of
Mortgage and to Return (to respondent) the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100313"
dated November 29, 1996; and (2) "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Enjoin the Ex-officio
Sheriff of Quezon City or his Authorized Deputies from Selling at Public Auction the
Subject Property" dated January 3, 1997.
The RTC, this time, presided by Judge Normandie B. Pizarro, denied respondent's
twin motions in its Order dated February 5, 1997.  Ironically, the same Order set
aside the judgment by default on the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over petitioner because of improper service of summons. Summons was served
upon "Viking Trading Corporation," not upon petitioner "Viking Industrial
Corporation."
Upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC overturned its order and
reinstated the judgment by default. The court also granted respondent's twin motions
earlier mentioned. Petitioner filed a motion for... reconsideration but was denied filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals issued its
Decision dismissing the petition and held that Judge Pizarro did not commit grave
abuse of... discretion in reinstating the judgment by default
Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari but the
same was dismissed in it's Resolution dated November 16, 1998.  Eventually, it
issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment. The Court, therefore, finds that
respondent's failure to file its answer or responsive pleading was on account of an
honest mistake which is a valid ground for a new trial (Section 1 (a), Rule 37, Rules
of Court, as amended)."
Respondent moved for reconsideration, stressing that the judgment by default is
already final and duly executed and, therefore, cannot be set aside.
In the Order dated September 13, 1999, Judge Baclig denied respondent's motion
for reconsideration. Hence, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55253.  On February 29,
2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting the petition and holding
that Judge Baclig acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting petitioner's motion
for new trial considering that it was filed late. 

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Issue:
Whether petitioner filed its motion for new trial seasonably. 
Ruling:
The Court ruled for respondent.
Succinct and unmistakable is the consistent pronouncement that this Court is not a
trier of facts.  And well entrenched is the doctrine that pure questions of fact may not
be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of
law. Corollarily, a question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts.
Whether petitioner was served a copy of the judgment by default only on January 9,
1999 is clearly a question of fact.  It practically involves the ascertainment of the
veracity of the parties' factual allegations.  Unfortunately, we are not inclined to do
that.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court as long as they are supported by the
records, as in this case.
The Court finds no cogent reason why it should review the above findings of the
Appellate Court which are sustained by the records.
At any rate, even if the motion for new trial was filed on time, still, the same should
not have been granted by the RTC.  Petitioner claimed that it committed an "honest
mistake" in not filing an answer to respondent's petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief because of its belief that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner's "honest mistake" hardly qualifies as a ground for a new trial.  Section 1 of
Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
"SECTION 1, Grounds of and period for filing a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. -- Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may
move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial... for
one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said
party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably
been impaired in his rights; or"
Definitely, petitioner's reliance on "honest mistake" is misplaced.  The mistake
referred to above is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a mistake of law.  Its lawyer believed that
he should not... file an answer because his client is erroneously impleaded.  Had
petitioner's counsel reviewed more closely the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, particularly Section 4, Rule 10 and Section 1, Rule 16, he would not have
committed a mistake which, unfortunately,binds his client. Those Rules are quoted
below:
"SEC. 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and other
clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at
any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no... prejudice is
caused thereby to the adverse party.
"SEC. 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing of the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds.
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(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party."
Clearly, petitioner's counsel, instead of ignoring respondent's petition, should have
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction
over its person as the summons (with a copy of the petition) served upon it is
defective. Definitely, his invocation of "honest mistake" is misplaced.  He could have
prevented such mistake if only he is conversant with the Rules.
In fine, we hold that petitioner's motion for new trial is just a last-ditch attempt to
revive a lost case. To grant it will set a precedent allowing a new trial upon a party's
mere acknowledgement that in failing to file an answer, he committed an "honest
mistake." In effect, there will be no end to litigation.  Interest republicae ut sit finis
litium.
Principle:
Litigation is a not a "trial and error" proceeding.  A party who moves for a new trial on
the ground of "honest mistake" must show that ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against it.  A new trial is not a refuge for the obstinate.

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 “What may be done at
any time will be done at
no time.”

–Scottish Proverb

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