3/26/2019 Śrīdharasvāmin — Brill

Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism Online

Śrīdharasvāmin
(4,323 words)

Life, Times, and Impact

Article Table of Contents
Traditional discussions of Śrīdharasvāmin often begin with
Life, Times, and Impact
a story. Members of the Advaita community in Varanasi felt
that Śrīdharasvāmin’s leanings toward bhakti (devotion) Writings
had threatened the doctrine of advaita (nonduality). The Śrīdharasvāmin’s Theology
community of Advaita scholars decided to place his written Bibliography
work before an image of Viṣṇu in Varanasi so that the lord
could judge it. It is said the lord appeared to them and said:

I know, Śuka knows, and Vyāsa may or may not know,

[but] Śrīdhara[svāmin] knows all because of Nṛsiṃha’s mercy.
(see Vireswarananda, 1972, iv; De, 1961, 18; Okita, 2014, 64)

Śrīdharasvāmin had indeed expressed devotion for Nṛsiṃha, a form of Lord Viṣṇu as a man-lion,
in his invocatory verses of his Bhāgavatapurāṇa commentary, but whether this event happened,
we do not know. Nevertheless the story speaks to the liminal place – between bhakti and advaita
– that Śrīdharasvāmin occupies in Hindu intellectual history.

Śrīdharasvāmin ourished in approximately 1380 to 1420 in Odisha, on India’s eastern central

coast, perhaps living during the reign of Narasimhadeva IV (1378–1414; Rath, 2006, 29; Gode,
1954, 175). He is most well-known for his commentary on the Bhāgavatapurāṇa called the
Bhāvārthadīpikā (Illumination of the Meaning and Intention, or Illumination of the Intended
Meaning), although his commentaries on the Bhagavadgītā and the Viṣṇupurāṇa remain in
print and in scholarly use today. He was in the Advaita tradition in the sense that he served as
the abbot (mahant) of a monastery in Puri, Odisha, established by Śaṅkara called Govardhana
Maṭha (Acharya, 1965), a community that still thrives today.
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 We do not know much about Śrīdharasvāmin’s speci
3/26/2019 c in— Brill
Śrīdharasvāmin uences. In his Ātmaprakāśa (Light on
the Self), a Viṣṇupurāṇa commentary, he acknowledges having read Citsukha’s (c. 1220) now lost
commentary on the Viṣṇupurāṇa (see Upreti, 2011, 1). Citsukha was an important contributor to
Advaita and is believed to have also composed a commentary on the Bhāgavatapurāṇa;
incidentally he was also a devotee of Nṛsimha and lived only a few hundred kilometers south of
Śrīdharasvāmin (Sarma, 1974, 2–3). In his Subodhinī, a Bhagavadgītā commentary,
Śrīdharasvāmin acknowledges having studied Śaṅkara’s Gītābhāṣya and commentaries thereon
before composing his own work (Shastri, 1901, 5). It is generally held that his guru was named
Paramānanda (Aufrecht, vol. I, 1891, 669); he frequently refers to a person named Paramānanda
as his guru in opening and closing verses, but we have no information about Paramānanda.

Historical evidence suggests a strong in uence of Vaiṣṇavism in 15th-century Puri. Prior to the
10th century, Vaiṣṇavism had little strength, but due to the active support of Anantavarman
Choḍagaṅgadeva (r. 1078–1147), who ruled over areas corresponding to modern day Odisha, West
Bengal, Telangana, and Andhra Pradesh, and by the construction of the Jagannāth Temple
starting in 1135, Vaiṣṇavism prevailed (von Stietencron, 2014, 45). It is believed that Rāmānuja
(1056–1137) visited Odisha and taught Śrīvaiṣṇava theology and ritual practice, and copperplate
inscriptions from 1081 to 1118 demonstrate that Anantavarman Choḍagaṅgadeva changed
a liations from Śaiva to Vaiṣṇava, and the king was eventually referred to as a highest devotee of
Viṣṇu in some inscriptions (paramavaiṣṇava; Miller, 1977, 5), but it is unclear whether Rāmānuja
converted him (von Stietencron, 2014, 22). Jayadeva’s Gītagovinda, an erotically devotional poem
from the 12th or 13th century describing the love between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, was also in uential
in Odisha (Mishra, 1977, 55) and was perhaps recited in the Jagannāth Temple as early as the 13th
century (Dash, 2004, 333). The prevalence of Vaiṣṇavism in Puri might have inspired
Śrīdharasvāmin to introduce Advaita theology to the Vaiṣṇava communities by writing
commentaries on Vaiṣṇava scriptures. It is also possible that Śrīdharasvāmin wanted to continue
the work of Citsukha.

In the 15th and 16th centuries, Śrīdharasvāmin’s immediate impact was on nondualist
saṃnyāsins like Viṣṇupurī (De, 1961, 18), especially his anthology of Bhāgavatapurāṇa verses
called the Bhaktiratnāvalī with his own autocommentary called Kāntimāla, as well as on
Śaṅkaradeva of Assam (Neog, 1965, 158), especially his Rukmiṇiharaṇa, a drama based on book 10
of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. With regard to the emergence of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition,
Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja’s (16th century) Caitanyacaritāmṛta, a text that is a foundation of Gauḍīya
Vaiṣṇava theology, reports that Caitanya said that “one who does not honor [Śrīdhara]svāmī is to
be counted as inwardly a prostitute” (Dimock & Stewart, 1999, 877); thus, we can surmise a
considerable in uence even if we do not know how much Caitanya read of Śrīdharasvāmin.

Jīva Gosvāmin (c. 1517–1608), Viśvanātha ( l. 1679–1709), and Vaṃśīdhara (c. late 19th cent.) of the
Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition draw extensively on his work, although at times as critical evaluators.
When commenting on Jīva Gosvāmin’s Tattvasandarbha, Rādhāmohana (c. late 18th cent.), also a
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 Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava, wrote the following:
3/26/2019 Śrīdharasvāmin — Brill

After grouping together the various di ferent viewpoints found in the doctrines of
Śrīdhara and other respected philosophers, Jīva presents his own viewpoint, making it
clear he does not belong to the sampradāya of any one of them. (Elkman, 1986, 51)

Nevertheless, Jīva Gosvāmin called Śrīdharasvāmin a great devotee of Viṣṇu (paramavaiṣṇava) in

his Tattvasandarbha, saying that he sometimes “inserted radical nondualistic (Advaitavāda)
conceptions into his writings to immerse the nontheists, who are now quite prevalent, especially
in central India, in the glories of the Personal Absolute, Bhagavān” (Dasa, 2015, 189). In other
words, Śrīdharasvāmin was secretly a dualist and devotee but pretended otherwise as a strategy
of in uence. To this, S.K. De (1961, 18) plainly said that “there is no evidence to support this
statement.” Whatever the case, Śrīdharasvāmin shaped early Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theology, and Jīva
Gosvāmin was not alone in framing him as a Vaiṣṇava. In the Bhaktamāla (c. 1600), Nābhādās of
the Rāmānandī tradition also referred to Śrīdharasvāmin as a devotee (bhakta), putting him
alongside Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Nimbārka (Sharma, 1987, 71).

Contemporary scholars tend to see Śrīdharasvāmin as articulating a mild form of nondualism. B.

Sharma (2000, 128), a scholar of Dvaita Vedānta, argued that he is not “obdurately monistic,” and
S.K. De (1961, 17–18) argued that he “attempted to combine the Advaita teachings of Śaṅkara with
the emotionalism of the Bhāgavatas” and that he “considers Bhakti as the best means of Advaita
Mukti [nondual liberation].” For S. Bhattacharya (1950, 24), Srīdharasvāmin’s “ultimate view of
the Bhāgavata[purāṇa]” is that it presents a “nondual consciousness.” S. Bhattacharya argues
that Śrīdharasvāmin referred to this nondual consciousness by di ferent names such as brahman,
paramātman, and bhagavat, but that this is not a hierarchical arrangement wherein each term
refers to a particular aspect or manifestation. If the terms were arranged hierarchically, then
brahman, as the impersonal radiance of the personal bhagavat or Kṛṣṇa, would be considered
the lowest manifestation, and the bhagavat or Kṛṣṇa would be considered the greatest
manifestation, being the source for brahman. S. Bhattacharya sought to distinguish
Śrīdharasvāmin from Jīva Gosvāmin’s and Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja’s hierarchical view; they argued
that bhagavat or Kṛṣṇa refers to the greatest aspects of the nondual consciousness. D. Sheridan
(1994, 65) thinks that Śrīdharasvāmin articulated a “quali ed nondualism,” which he also thinks
is the “original import of the Bhāgavata.” R.M. Gupta says (2007, 68) that Śrīdharasvāmin’s “views
stand far removed from the radical nondualism of Śaṅkara.” K. Okita provides the most detailed
contrasting of Śrīdharasvāmin with Madhva, Vijayadhvaja, and Jīva Gosvāmin; he argues that
Śrīdharasvāmin espoused an Advaita that is “closer to Rāmānuja’s nondualism of the one with
qualities (viśiṣṭādvaita) than Śaṅkara’s pure-monism (kevalādvaita)” (Okita, 2014, 75).

Writings
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Ś
 Śrīdharasvāmin’s commentary on the Bhāgavatapurāṇa
3/26/2019 Śrīdharasvāmin has
— Brilla long manuscript and publication

history, but the most readily available versions in Sanskrit are by R.T. Pāṇḍeya (1962), K.S. Shastri
(1965–1975), and J.L. Shastri (2000). Śrīdharasvāmin’s full-length commentary on the
Viṣṇupurāṇa, Ātmaprakāśa, was published by T. Upreti (2011). His full-length commentary on the
Bhagavadgītā was published by K.A. Shastri (1901). Śrīdharasvāmin wrote a devotional stotra, or
praise poem, called the Vrajavihāra, published by J. Haberlin (1847), and S.K. De (1934) published
many of his devotional verses found in Rūpa Gosvāmin’s Padyāvalī.

K. Okita (2014) translated Śrīdharasvāmin’s comments on the Catuḥślokibhāgavata, or the four

seed verses of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (2.9.32–35) that have historically been a locus of theological
discussion. A paraphrasing of Śrīdharasvāmin’s Bhāvārthadīpikā on book 1 was published by M.
Chatterjee (1895). The Subodinī was translated into English by Vireshwarananda (1972), and
signi cant portions of his Bhāvārthadīpikā are in Satyanarayaṇa Dasa’s (2005; 2014; 2015; 2016)
translations of Jīva Gosvāmin’s work.

The following are unpublished. He wrote a summary (sāra) of the Bhagavadgītā as well as a
book called the Padārthaprakāśikāpurāṇaṭīkā and the Sanatsujātīyavyākhyābālabodhinī
(Aufrecht, vol. I, 1891, 669; vol. II, 1896, 165).

Śrīdharasvāmin’s Theology

While Śrīdharasvāmin was a member of the Advaita tradition, as noted above, there is debate in
the Sanskrit and the secondary literature regarding the details of his theology, especially as to
how he incorporated dualistic and nondualistic approaches. The two selected readings below
exemplify some of this complexity.

Bhāvārthadīpikā 1.1.1

Bhāgavatapurāṇa

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3/26/2019 The supreme lord [or brahman] is indicated by inherent
Śrīdharasvāmin — Brill (svarūpa) characteristics and

extrinsic (taṭastha) characteristics. The inherent characteristic is that brahman is real

(satya). Why is brahman said to have the characteristic of realness? The answer is that
it is in or on brahman that the emanated world is real or not false. This emanated
world has the threefold qualities of māyā, that is tamas, rajas, and sattva, and it takes
the form, respectively, of the physical elements, the bodily senses, and the gods. Due
to the reality of brahman, even the false (mithyā) emanation appears as if it is real. It
is that supreme reality on which we meditate. There is an example here of re, water,
and earth. There is a transformation or an interplay of those natural elements, a
transposition of them. When there is the false appearance (avabhāsa) of one object in
another object, the false appearance appears as if it is real because of the reality of
the foundation [upon which it appears]…The extrinsic characteristic of brahman is
that it is “from brahman that this world is generated, and so on.” (BhAD 1.1.1)

There are ve technical terms from Advaita describing brahman and the world: svarūpa,
taṭastha, mithyā, avabhāsa, and adhiṣṭhāna.

Inherent (Svarūpa) and Extrinsic (Taṭastha)

Some translate svarūpa as “essential” and taṭastha as “accidental” (Dasgupta, 1922, 122), and there
is a lengthy debate about the terms in Nyāya and Vedānta (Timalsina, 2009b, 89–96). Svarūpa
refers to features that really belong (sva) to a particular object (rūpa) and cannot be separated
from that object, whereas the second term refers to features of an object that might come and go
without changing the essence of the object, or characteristics that change like the area (stha) on
the shoreline and the sea (taṭa). For example, a re is essentially illuminating, but it may or may
not be accidentally re ected in a mirror.

These terms are not used by Śaṅkara (c. 788–820 CE), but they are in Padmapāda’s (c. 820 CE)
Pañcapādikā, a subcommentary on Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtra commentary. Padmapāda is
considered Śaṅkara’s rst disciple (Potter, 1981, 563), and he used the terms to distinguish two
di ferent ways that the Upaniṣads talk about brahman. According to Padmapāda, the
characterization of brahman as the origin of the world does not describe brahman directly or
essentially, but rather it indicates brahman (upalakṣaṇa) since it exists separately from the
world, being the cause of it (Shriramashastri, 1958, 296). Thus, when the Brahmasūtra 1.1.2
(likewise TaiU. 3.1 or BhāgP. 1.1.1) says that from brahman this world is generated, and so on, this
only indicates or points to brahman, but it does not describe brahman directly, because it dwells
on features that are extrinsic or accidental to brahman’s being. For Padmapāda, statements like
“that you are” (tat tvam asi; ChāU. 6.8.7), which says that the supreme reality and the individual
self refer to the same object, and statements like “brahman is real, aware, and unlimited” (satyaṃ
jñānaṃ ananta brahma; TaiU. 2.1.1) are direct descriptions (viśeṣaṇalakṣaṇa) of brahman’s
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 inherent or essential nature (Shriramashastri, 1958,
3/26/2019 324).—Prakāśātman
Śrīdharasvāmin Brill (c. 1000 CE) provides an
example in his Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, an explanation of Padmapāda’s work. Suppose you were to
indicate a house as “the one with the crow on it.” What happens when the crow leaves? Does the
house or our idea of the house no longer exist? Surely not. The crow indicates the house but does
not characterize its intrinsic nature. Likewise, reasons Prakāśatman, brahman does not cease to
be brahman when it is no longer the creator of the world, as in the liberated or highest state, and,
he adds, the real object that one should desire to know is the brahman who does not act as
creator (Shriramashastri, 1958, 325; Sarasvati, 1989, 849).

From this brief analysis, we can conclude that Śrīdharasvāmin thought that “brahman exists” is a
feature really belonging to it, whereas “brahman is creator of the world” is a feature of brahman
that it might or might not have. Rāmānuja, in contrast, espoused the view that the relationship
between brahman and its qualities (i.e. the world and the souls) is viśiṣṭādvaita, meaning, the
“nonduality of distinguished or separated being(s),” or that there is a nondi ference or
nonduality between brahman and its qualities. For Rāmānuja, then, being the creator of the
world and being related to the world are an inherent part of brahman’s being, not accidental to
his being.

Mithyā (False)

This word is based on the Sanskrit root mith-, “to unite,” “to meet together,” or “to combine.” In
Advaita theology, mithyā often refers to a false or wrong cognitive state. When the agent is in
worldly life (vyavahāra), it con ates or incorrectly combines (mithunīkṛtya) the real and the
unreal, or the “I” and the “you,” or subject and object, which results in the sense that “I am this
body, this is mine, and so on.” The cause of this is the agent’s superimposition (adhyāsa) of the
properties of the self (the real) onto the not-self (the unreal). But the cause of this
superimposition is what Śaṅkara calls mithyājñāna, a false cognition, which is a lack of
discrimination of the self from not-self. This is discussed in Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
(Shastri, 1988, 9).

Śrīdharasvāmin, however, is not using the term mithyā to characterize a cognitive or a

psychological state of misapprehension or illusion, but to characterize the ontological state of
the world: even the false (mithyā) emanation appears as if it is real” (Bhāvāthadīpikā 1.1.1). For
Śrīdharasvāmin, the world is false, but it appears to us as if it is real. Śaṅkara also referred to the
world as false in his Vivekacūḍamaṇi while talking about the quali cations of one who seeks
liberation from the cycle of birth and death; they have the rm conviction that “brahman as real,
the world as false (mithyā)” (Sankaracharya, 1910, 6). Toṭaka, a disciple of Śaṅkara, takes a slightly
di ferent view in his Śrutisārasamuddharaṇa (Comans, 1996, 32–34) when attempting to explain
upanishadic statements about creation (sṛṣṭi). For Toṭaka, the goal here is not to explain the

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 process of creation, but to demonstrate the sameness
3/26/2019 of —the
Śrīdharasvāmin Brillworld, self, and brahman. This is

because the transformations of the world (vikṛta) are unreal (anṛtatva), and describing them
would be pointless and bene tless.

Whether the world, its transformations, or cognitions of it are false, Śrīdharasvāmin is

articulating an Advaita theology. While there is much debate about what the unreality or falsity
could mean, Śrīdharasvāmin a rms, like other Advaitins, that there is a reality behind the
world’s false appearance. To capture this idea, he uses the analogy of natural elements, which
sometimes combine to produce an illusion or a mirage. When seeing a mirage, one mistakes heat
vapor for water – the vapor is real, but the cognitive state it produces (that of a mirage) is false
(mithyā); this notion is explicated by the terms below.

False Appearance (Avabhāsa) and Foundation (Adhiṣṭhāṇa)

Śaṅkara wrote the following:

What does the term superimposition mean? It is said to be a false appearance

(avabhāsa) [to the self] of something seen in the past that is [wrongly] placed on
something else, taking the form of a memory. (Shastri, 1988, 10)

Superimposition is like placing the idea or memory of a snake on a rope, which results in the
false appearance of a snake. It is like superimposing the temporary qualities of one’s own body
(tall, short, fat, skinny, etc.) on the qualities of the spiritual and eternal self. In Advaita, there
must be a real entity or foundation on which a false appearance is based, although theologians
characterize the relationship between reality and appearance di ferently (Timalsina, 2009a, 376).

Śrīdharasvāmin’s terminology for the foundation, adhiṣṭhāṇa, may draw on the Tattvaśuddhi of
Jñānaghana (c. 1000 CE). Jñānaghana addresses how brahman can be the agentive cause
(nimitta) and material cause (upādana) of the world and yet also be without any modi cation
(nirvikāra), for it would seem that the world is constantly transforming, and if brahman is the
material out of which the world is made, then it would transform too (Potter, 2006, 177). To
address this concern, Jñānaghana argues that in the ultimate or highest sense (paramārtha),
brahman is not a cause of the world according to the scriptures (Sastri & Radhakrishnan, 1941,
16). Brahman is only the foundation or substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) for the false appearance of the
world (prapañcapratibhāsa), just as a rope is the foundation for the false appearance of a snake,
but one cannot say in an ultimate or highest sense that a rope or brahman is the cause of the
false appearance of a snake or the world – brahman only provides a foundation for a false
appearance to occur.

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 In saying that “brahman is creator of the world”Śrīdharasvāmin
3/26/2019 is an accidental
— Brill or extrinsic feature of brahman
and in saying that the world is a false appearance (avabhāsa) based on the reality of brahman
(adhiṣṭhāna), Śrīdharasvāmin is again locating himself in classical Advaita.

Bhāvārthadīpikā 1.1.2

There are places, however, in which Śrīdharasvāmin presents a theology that departs from
classical Advaita:

Here in this beautiful Bhāgavatapurāṇa the highest dharma is taught. Why is it the
highest dharma? Because cheating or deceit, which is action with the calculated aim
for a result, is completely rejected. The pre x pra- (as in pra + ujjhita from the verse)
shows that even the calculated aim of liberation (mokṣa) is thrown aside by the
Bhāgavatapurāṇa. This highest dharma is de ned as the exclusive worship of god
(Īśvara). The supremacy of this dharma is demonstrated even from the quali cation
(adhikāra) by the word “non-envious” from the verse. Envy means the inability to
tolerate the success of another person. The “saints,” who are discussed in the verse,
are free from envy, being compassionate on living creatures. Thus the
Bhāgavatapurāṇa is said to be superior to scriptures in the karmakāṅda, the section
of the Vedas dealing with ritual. And by the statement “it should be known” from the
verse it is even superior to scriptures in the jñānakāṅda, the section dealing with non-
dual knowledge. The verse says that one should know the substance that is
substantial or real, which has the nature of the ultimate reality (paramārtha)…The
word “substantial” (vāstava) from the verse means one should know that the
embodied self (jīva) is a part of the substance, that māyā is a power of the substance,
and the world is an e fect of the substance – all of this is substance and it is not
separate from the real. (BhAD 1.1.2)

Here Śrīdharasvāmin addresses three important terms – dharma, kāṇḍa, and paramārtha – and
in each case o fers a distinctly non-Advaitic understanding.

Dharma (Duty)

Śrīdharasvāmin recon gures the soteriologies and practices associated with the term dharma.
Mīmāṃsā and the Dharmaśāstras had de ned dharma as civic and ritual duties as articulated in
the Vedas with the aim of attaining a heavenly world (svarga) often through the sacri ce of
animals, whereas Śrīdharasvāmin provides a devotional concept of it, saying that dharma is
really about the worship of the supreme lord. A prerequisite for vedic ritual is Brahmanical birth
and the desire for paradise (svarga; encapsulated in the injunction “One who desires svarga
should sacri ce”), but Śrīdharasvāmin says that the only quali cation is compassion, which
would presumably undermine the violence of animal sacri ce, the sel shness of personal desire,
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 and the prerequisite of high birth. Buddhism and
3/26/2019 Advaita— had
Śrīdharasvāmin Brill de ned the highest sense of

dharma as aimed at freedom from the cycle of birth and death, but Śrīdharasvāmin denies that
as well, again favoring a devotional soteriology and practice that does not seek particular results,
not even the result of liberation (mokṣa). He is, then, carving out a space for thinking about
dharma as a form of devotion that does not seek particular ends, but is its own end.

Kāṇḍa (Section)

Śrīdharasvāmin not only recon gured the soteriologies and practices of Advaita but also
positioned the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, with its emphasis on devotion, as a superior category of
scriptural text. In his commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, while explaining why scripture
describes reality as dualistic (dvaita) and as nondualistic (advaita), Śaṅkara says that
karmakāṇḍa, a category of scripture treating vedic ritual, is dualistic because it is for those in
ignorance, whereas jñānakāṇḍa, a category of scripture that describes brahman and the path to
knowledge, is for those who are disgusted with ignorance (Potter, 1981, 204). For Śaṅkara the
jñānakāṅḍa, which teaches nonduality, is the best teaching of the Vedas. Śrīdharasvāmin rejects
Śaṅkara’s hermeneutical approach by placing the devotional teachings of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa
above the other kāṇḍas.

Paramārtha (Ultimate Reality)

The Bhāgavatapurāṇa says that it will describe the vāstava vastu, things or substances that are
substantial. Śrīdharasvāmin glossed this as “the highest reality” (paramārthabhūta). For Śaṅkara,
the individual self (jīva), the powers (śakti) that de ne the world of human experience, and the
world itself (jagat) are di ferentiated (vyākṛta) by name and form, but they are part of the
conventional reality (vyavahārasat; Shastri, 1988, 47–48). Śaṅkara, basing his views on
Gauḍapāda (600 CE), who is widely considered to have inspired Śaṅkara’s nondualism, argued
that ultimately there is no origination (ajāti) of the conventional reality (Timalsina, 2014, 188–
189). The things in the world of ordinary human experience (cause, e fect, agent, the world, the
powers that make the world, etc.) are “not an absolute object, because the [worldly] transaction
is just the name and form assumed due to ignorance, and [these passages (about the creation)
are in fact] directed to establish identity with Brahman” (BrSBh. 2.1.33, quoted in Timalsina, 2014,
195). After ignorance is gone, so is the conventional reality of di ferentiated objects.

In contrast to this view, Śrīdharasvāmin places the self, māyā, and world into the realm of the
highest or absolute reality, not in the conventional reality of ignorance. Śrīdharasvāmin states
that the fundamental aspects of being – self, world, and māyā – exist in a di ferentiated and real
state, thus deviating from a fundamental doctrine of Advaita.

Much work remains to be done on Śrīdharasvāmin, an in uential and creative thinker, especially
his blending of dualistic, nondualistic, and devotional approaches, and the place he created for
the Purāṇas in the context of Hindu theological and philosophical debate.
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 (Unless stated otherwise, all translations are byŚrīdharasvāmin
3/26/2019 the author. The author would like to thank
— Brill

Sthaneswar Timalsina for his comments.)

Jonathan Edelmann

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Cite this page

Edelmann, Jonathan, “Śrīdharasvāmin”, in: Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism Online, Edited by: Knut A. Jacobsen, Helene Basu, Angelika Malinar, Vasudha
Narayanan. Consulted online on 26 March 2019 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2212-5019_beh_COM_1010068425>
First published online: 2018

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