2K12 Kub mobile surface-to-air missile system

fires during multinational live-fire training

exercise Shabla 19, in Shabla, Bulgaria, June 12,
2019 (U.S. Army/Thomas Mort)

Getting the Joint This article provides the first orga-

nizational history of the joint functions
in order to better understand why dif-
ferences persist in how this concept is

Functions Right implemented in the United States versus

its North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) partners. Doing so allows us to
By Thomas Crosbie better understand enduring challenges
in interoperability and persistent cultural
clashes within the Alliance. The history
reveals that today’s joint functions are built
n July 2017, the Chairman of the of Defense (DOD) thinking and

I Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a

special out-of-cycle revision to joint
doctrine, adding information to the
practice.1 A 2018 article by Alexus G.
Grynkewich in this journal elaborated
on why this matters to the national
around a core of four kinetic principles
(leadership or command and control [C2],
maneuver, firepower, and protection),
to which subsequent revisions have at-
joint functions. The significance of security community.2 Nevertheless,
tempted to add a range of “softer” military
this policy change was highlighted despite these clear signals that DOD
fields (intelligence, information, sustain-
by the Secretary of Defense in a Sep- takes the joint functions seriously, and
ment, and civil-military cooperation),
tember 2017 endorsement, where he despite their centrality in military doc-
sometimes successfully, sometimes not.
stressed that inclusion in the joint trine, the joint functions remain little
The history of the joint functions is
functions signaled an “elevation” of understood by those who have not
a history of overcoming the resistance
information throughout Department served in an operational staff role.
in U.S. military thought to placing soft
and hard elements of the contemporary
battlefield on an equal footing. Viewed
Dr. Thomas Crosbie is an Assistant Professor in the Centre of Joint Operations, Institute of Military
from this perspective, another set of ques-
Operations, at the Royal Danish Defence College. tions is raised concerning the persistence

96 Joint Doctrine / Getting the Joint Functions Right JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019
of U.S. vulnerabilities to foreign military Table. The Joint Staff Directorates and Joint Functions
powers focused on exploiting the gray Joint Staff Directorates Joint Functions
zone between hard and soft power.
J1, Manpower and Personnel No equivalent
J2, Intelligence Intelligence
Combining Arms and Domains
Jointness is not easy, but it is good— J3, Operations Movement and maneuver + fires + protection
that has been the clear consensus from J4, Logistics Sustainment
scholars and practitioners for decades, J5, Strategy, Plans and Policy No equivalent
amply demonstrated in the pages of this J6, Command, Control, Communications and Command and control
journal.3 What makes it difficult is the Computers/Cyber
clash of cultures, command structures, J7, Joint Force Development No equivalent
and egos that inevitably occurs when J8, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment No equivalent
two or more distinct organizations are
tasked with working hand-in-glove.4
In this sense, the challenges of joint- instruments of power is particularly a joint staff can give structure to the
ness are not unique to the military and useful. They are in this sense a sort of enormous complexity of contemporary
are faced by any complex organization checklist to ensure that the latent poten- military operations.
that needs levels of coordination. The tial of jointness is in fact being realized. While a joint staff is designed to
benefits are, however, unique, as Robert In U.S. doctrine there are today seven organize its work around the joint func-
Leonhard and others have argued.5 joint functions: intelligence, movement tions, the joint functions should not be
All else being equal, we expect a force and maneuver, fires, information, protec- confused with the Joint Staff Directorates
that is better at combining arms and tion, sustainment, and C2. For the rest of (J1–J8), which they superficially resemble
crossing domains will win out over its the NATO community, there are eight, (see table). The relationship is clearly
competitors because jointness enables since NATO doctrine also includes civil- accounted for in doctrine. The purpose
commanders to compensate for the military cooperation (CIMIC). Despite behind the staff directorates is to ensure
weaknesses in one weapons system with their importance doctrinally and orga- that a joint staff has the right mix of
the strengths of another and to exploit nizationally, the joint functions are little expertise across key areas. The doctrine
a wider array of vulnerabilities in one’s known and rarely discussed in the national makes clear that an actual staff needs to
opponent while minimizing one’s own security community and are often poorly break up the silos that can be created by
exposure to risk. Axiomatically, then, understood by officers entering joint the directorates, and instead the experts
jointness provides benefits in efficiency, staffs. This is not entirely surprising. The should mix together in a number of sub-
freedom of action, and flexibility.6 joint functions are a paradox of stability groups (listed in the doctrine as “centers,
The spirit of combining instruments and change. On one hand, they are the groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements,
of power informs policy development at pillars of operational doctrine, establishing working groups, and planning teams”7).
virtually every level and is shared by most, a coherent framework for what a joint Once reassigned to their subgroup, staff-
if not all, of America’s allied militaries. By staff can and should do at the operational ers need to achieve certain types of effects.
contrast, the failure to combine is rou- level of war. On the other hand, the list The most important effects are sorted into
tinely disparaged as evidence of Service has undergone significant revision over six categories and are the joint functions
parochialism or even corruption. While the years, reflecting deep disagreements mentioned above: C2, intelligence, fires,
critics can be found, the weight of histori- on which concepts merit inclusion—and movement and maneuver, protection, and
cal evidence and of informed opinion is even what each concept means. And while sustainment. More recently, as described
clearly on the side of jointness. the term itself is fairly new, having only below, U.S. and NATO doctrine have
What does this mean in practice? entered common usage with its inclusion both changed to include information
Most important during times of conflict, in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, to this list, while NATO doctrine also
instruments of power are combined and in 2006 (and adopted into NATO doc- includes CIMIC. Thus, while staffs are
integrated through the joint force com- trine in 2011), it reflects ideas that have commonly divided into eight director-
mander and his or her staff. Officially, appeared off and on in U.S. Army doc- ates and are expected to achieve effects
a joint force is joint when it includes trine for well over a hundred years. through seven or eight functions, the two
elements from more than one Service. The challenge facing doctrine writ- things are ultimately quite different.
However, it only does jointness when it ers is how to realize the latent benefits The joint functions, then, were never
actively combines instruments of power of jointness given real-world limitations intended to be another level of organiza-
in some productive way. The term joint in time, attention, and resources. That tion. Rather, they are a heuristic model
functions has emerged in doctrine as is where the joint functions come in. By for understanding descriptively the way
a shorthand way of expressing those focusing on a delimited set of prioritized power can be directed to achieve ends on
dimensions of conflict where combining areas where joint effects can be achieved, the battlefield.

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Crosbie 97

 Figure 1. Elements of Combined Arms in FM 100-5 (1914–1962) entails would not arrive until the fourth
1914 1923 1939 1941 1944 1949 1954 1962
edition (1914), where combined arms
are described as the effective balanc-
Infantry
ing of the Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry,
Engineers
Special Troops (mostly Engineers), and
Artillery* Heavy Field Artillery.9
Cavalry (Armor)** In these early days, manual writers
Air Corps*** focused on what made up the combined
Signal Corps arms. The 1923 edition adds the Signal
Corps and Air Service and renames
Chemical Warfare
“Special Troops” as “Engineers.” It also
Medical
states clearly the value of combining arms:
Quartermaster “No one arm wins battles. The combined
Ordnance employment of all arms is equal to suc-
Transportation cess.”10 Five more editions followed (in
Military Police 1939, 1941, 1944, 1949, and 1954),
with each adding elements to the list. By
Key: 1954, the list had grown to include 10
* Until 1949, artillery was divided between normal and heavy field artillery. components: Infantry, Armor, Artillery,
** Until 1944, cavalry included both armored and horse cavalry.
*** In 1944, air power was discussed in a separate chapter. the Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps,
Chemical Corps, Army Medical Corps,
Quartermaster Corps, Transportation
Figure 2. Joint Functions in FM 100-5 (1968–1993), FM 3-0 (2001–2017), Corps, and Military Police Corps. So
AJP 3 (2002–2019) and JP 3-0 (2006–2018) unwieldy was this list that the 1962 edi-
1982– 2008– 2011– 2006– 2011– tion cut back to the original 1923 list:
1968 1993 2001 2017 2002 2019 2010 2017 2018 Infantry, Engineers, Artillery, and Armor.
Command and Notably, information and intelligence
Control elements are entirely absent throughout,
Movement and since these were viewed as separate from
Maneuver the combined arms.
Fires What we can conclude is that Army
Protection doctrine writers have long been com-
Intelligence mitted to the idea that the combining of
Sustainment
land power elements enables gains on the
battlefield. This belief has tended toward
Information * ** a kitchen-sink effect, with more and
CIMIC more elements highlighted as standing to
Planning benefit from combination until order is
Targeting restored by a return to first principles—
clearly visible in figure 1. Prodigality
Key:
balances against parsimony.
Green indicates U.S. Army doctrine, purple indicates U.S. joint doctrine, and blue indicates NATO
doctrine. A quirk of the doctrine up to this
* NATO doctrine in 2002 splits the Information function into “Public Information” and “Information point is that the writers never quite got
Operations” around to explaining how a commander
** U.S. JP 3-0 in 2006 (revised in 2008 and 2010) lists information tasks under the heading “Other should manage all of this complexity.
Activities and Capabilities”
The doctrine exhorted combined effects
and described the elements that needed
to be combined, but it failed to specify
Joint Functions in Army back over the history of the doctrine. how the elements should be balanced.
Doctrine, 1905–1954 The starting point is 1905 with the In hindsight, then, FM 100-5 from
But why these particular functions, publication of the U.S. Army’s first 1905 through 1954 had fairly modest
and what does it mean for the integrity combined arms manual, Field Manual aims, ensuring only that future lead-
of the list that this has changed and (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations.8 ers, when called on to lead a campaign,
remains contested? To answer these Surprisingly, the first extended discus- would at least know what arrows were in
questions, it is necessary to briefly look sion of what combining arms actually their quiver.

98 Joint Doctrine / Getting the Joint Functions Right JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019
Joint Functions in Army, editions. Nevertheless, Army doctrine NATO and U.S. joint doctrine were
Joint, and Alliance writers were still very much commit- finally coordinated with the revision of
Doctrine, 1968–2019 ted to these concepts, and in the 2001 NATO AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for
The major intellectual breakthrough edition of Army operational doctrine the Conduct of Operations, in 2011.16
came with the doctrine revisions of the (redesignated from FM 100-5 to FM NATO’s joint capabilities became joint
1960s, when the doctrine writers finally 3-0), a new element of combat power functions. Public information was folded
began to nail down the specific ways was added to the list: information. This into information operations, and the
combining arms can lead to better out- was not to last. Interestingly, the next outlier concepts planning and targeting
comes (see figure 2). In the 1968 revi- edition, released in 2008, drops informa- were dropped entirely. In 2019, the doc-
sion of FM 100-5, the writers switched tion and brings back intelligence, which trine underwent one last revision, with
from presenting a laundry list of func- had been missing since the 1968 edition, information operations renamed simply
tional elements that can be combined to and defines these elements of combat information to align it with the 2017–
identifying the types of needs that these power as “warfighting functions.” This 2018 U.S. doctrine. The current state
elements can address. The doctrine now remains, as of 2018, the current state of of NATO doctrine thus defines eight
described the need for “multicapable Army thought, which builds its descrip- joint functions: command and control,
forces” that combine their elements to tion of the Army’s capabilities around six maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment,
achieve better outcomes in five fields: warfighting functions: mission command information, protection, and CIMIC.
intelligence, mobility, firepower, combat (the new name for C2), movement and The current state of U.S. joint doctrine is
service support, and C3 (command, maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustain- identical, except it excludes CIMIC.
control, and computers).11 ment, and protection.
For a time, this insight was forgotten. Looking at the joint and Alliance Joint Functions Doctrine:
When General William E. DePuy drafted levels, the idiosyncrasies of Army thought Lessons Learned
the famous “Active Defense” edition of come into focus. In 2002, NATO pub- At the center of military innovation
FM 100-5 (1976), he dispensed with lished its first joint operations doctrine, since World War II has been the promise
much of the verbiage and most of the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3, Allied of realizing tactical, operational, and
concepts of earlier manuals, preferring a Joint Operations.14 The imprint of U.S. strategic gains through combining arms
livelier style, with vivid examples drawn Army doctrine is plain to see in this docu- and crossing domains. Combining, inte-
from recent experience. Dissatisfaction ment, with the elements of combat power grating, and making joint: these are the
with DePuy’s manual led General Donn now renamed “Joint Capabilities,” which explicit goals of the joint force, DOD,
A. Starry to oversee the publication of the included most of the persistent elements and the unified combatant commands,
equally renowned “AirLand Battle” edi- of the Army manuals (C2, maneuver, and they are now routinely celebrated by
tion (1982).12 Here, DePuy’s ideas about fires, intelligence, and sustainment, the separate Services as well. The joint
active defense were blended with Starry’s renamed logistics), dropped protection, functions are the doctrinal culmination
ideas about AirLand Battle and with the and added a number of unfamiliar items: of taking jointness seriously, and the
1968 manual’s ideas of multicapable planning, targeting, and CIMIC. Also shifts we have traced in what constitutes
forces. In the 1982, 1986, and 1993 edi- included were two information func- the joint functions can be taken as a
tions, this intuition was refined through tions: information operations and public broader history of joint thought at the
discussion of the so-called elements of information. Where Army doctrine operational level of war.
combat power, now listed as maneuver, downgraded the role of information in What, then, should we make of this
firepower, protection, and leadership, this period, NATO emphasized it. storied history? The most important les-
which replaced C3. This tighter focus— Meanwhile, American joint doctrine son concerns the nature of doctrine itself.
dropping intelligence and combat service was revised in 2006 to finally incorporate Although the joint functions may seem
support from the discussion—perfectly the Army’s elements of combat power, evolutionary, their history is filled with
reflects what has been described as the now named for the first time as joint starts and stops, with detours and road-
Army’s cultural shift toward preparing functions. Where NATO doctrine split blocks, each signaling a shift in how the
for high-tempo, conventional force information between information opera- doctrine writers understood the nature of
engagements.13 tions and public information, U.S. joint war. The impermanence and inconsisten-
Despite the prominent place given doctrine included it in the vague category cies of the doctrine studied here can serve
to these “elements of combat power” “Other Activities and Capabilities,” a as a reminder that no doctrine is ever
in the Army manuals of 1982, 1986 seventh joint function encompassing final, nor will it ever replace informed
and 1993, the first joint publication on psychological operations and deception. judgment.
the topic, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, The 2011 and 2017 versions of JP 3-0 Similarly, there is a lesson here in the
Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1993, dispensed with information entirely but false appearance of uniformity. As the
makes no mention of these principles. brought it back as a fully fledged joint doctrine has developed, the writers seek
Nor do they appear in the 1995 or 2001 function with much fanfare in 2018.15 agreement in language and expression,

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Crosbie 99

but this may mask deeper disagreements
in the actual meanings of words. NATO
joint functions are not exactly DOD joint Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision
functions—nor are they Army warfight- (to be signed within 6 months)
ing functions. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
Finally, this brief history raises another
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence
set of questions that demand reflection. If
the joint functions express the military’s JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations
collective wisdom on how to best com- JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations
bine arms and cross domains—how to do
JP 5-0, Joint Planning
jointness—then what should we conclude
from the reluctance of the doctrine to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System
put soft power concepts (information,
most notably, but also intelligence and JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)
CIMIC) on equal footing as hard power
JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations
concepts (fires, maneuver, protection)?
Does the adoption of information as JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations
a joint function in 2017 resolve this JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support
problem, or do these same vulnerabilities
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations
persist? These and other questions about
how to develop the right doctrine at the JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations
right time remain to be answered. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations
This historical understanding of the
JP 4-0, Joint Logistics
joint functions is intended to overcome
the longstanding reluctance to place soft JP 4-04, Contingency Basing
power elements of the modern battle- JP 4-09, Distribution Operations
field on the same footing as hard power
JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support
elements. Given that competitors are
increasingly oriented toward exploiting
our political vulnerabilities, getting the
joint functions right—striking the right 5
Robert Leonhart, The Art of Maneuver: Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, Changing
balance between hard and soft power—is Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle an Army: An Oral History of General William
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 93–94. E. DePuy, USA Retired (Washington, DC:
more important than ever. JFQ
See also Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary U.S. Military History Institute and U.S. Army
Military Theory, 95. Center of Military History, 1986); and John
6
Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand
Notes Military Theory, 95. Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine,
7
Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical
1
James N. Mattis, memorandum, “In- Force Headquarters (Washington, DC: The Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-
formation as a Joint Function,” September Joint Staff, 2007). mand, 1984).
15, 2017, available at <www.rmda.army.mil/ 8
Clinton J. Ancker III, “The Evolution 13
Michael R. Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War
records-management/docs/SECDEF-Endorse- of Mission Command in U.S. Army Doctrine, Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Param-
ment_Information_Joint%20Function_Clean. 1905 to the Present,” Military Review (March– eters (Autumn 2006), 22–35.
pdf>. April 2013), 42–52. For a fuller history of U.S. 14
Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3, Allied
2
Alexus G. Grynkewich, “Introducing Army doctrine, see Walter E. Kretchick, U.S. Joint Operations (Brussels: North Atlantic
Information as a Joint Function,” Joint Force Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution Treaty Organization [NATO], September 1,
Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 6–7. to the War on Terror (Lawrence: University 2002).
3
See, for example, John Gordon IV, “Joint Press of Kansas, 2011). 15
Grynkewich, “Introducing Information
Power Projection: Operation Torch,” Joint 9
Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service as a Joint Function.”
Force Quarterly 3 (2nd Quarter 1994), 60–69; Regulations (Washington, DC: Government 16
AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Williamson Murray, “The Evolution of Joint Printing Office, 1914), 74–76. Conduct of Operations (Brussels: NATO, March
Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 31 (3rd Quarter 10
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations 16, 2011).
2002), 30–37; and William O. Odom and (Washington, DC: Government Printing Of-
Christopher D. Hayes, “Cross-Domain Syner- fice, 1923), 11.
gy: Advancing Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly 11
FM 100-5, Operations of the Army Forces
73 (2nd Quarter 2014), 123–128. in the Field (Washington, DC: Headquarters
4
Jan Angstrom and J.J. Widen, Contem- Department of the Army, 1968), 1–5.
porary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War 12
The story of the 1976 and 1982 ver-
(London: Routledge, 2015), 93–109. sions of FM 100-5 is recounted in Romie L.

100 Joint Doctrine JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019