Christopher A. Hall, John Sanders - Does God Have A Future - A Debate On Divine Providence-Baker Academic (2003)

Does God
Have a Future?
A
Debate
on
Divine
Providence
Does God
Have a Future?
A Debate on Divine Providence
Christopher A. Hall
and John Sanders
P g Baker Academic
A Division of Baker Book House Co
G rand Rapids, M ichigan 49516
© 2003 by C hristopher A. Hall and John Sanders
Published by B aker Academic

a division of B aker Book H ouse Company
P.O. Box 6287, G rand Rapids, MI 49516-6287
w ww .bakeracadem ic.com
Printed in the U nited States of America
All rights reserved. No p a rt of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system, o r transm itted in any form o r by any m eans—for example, electronic, photocopy,
recording—w ithout the p rio r w ritten perm ission of the publisher. The only exception is
brief quotations in prin ted reviews.
Library of Congress C ataloging-in-Publication D ata

Hall, C hristopher A. (C hristopher Alan), 1950-
Does God have a future? : a debate on divine providence / C hristopher A. Hall
and John Sanders,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8010-2604-0 (pbk.)
1. Providence and governm ent of God. 2. Free will and determ inism —Religious
aspects—Christianity. I. Sanders, John, 1956- II. Title
BT135.H25 2003
31—dc21 2002043715
Contents
Chris and John: W hat This Book Is—and W hat It Is Not 7
1. John: How I Came to the Open View 11

2. Chris: My Pilgrimage 14
3. John: Practical Problem s for Classical Theism 18
4. Chris: A braham and the Sacrifice of Isaac 21
5. John: A braham and the Sacrifice of Isaac 25
6. Chris: Judas’s Betrayal and Peter’s Denial 28
7. John: Judas’s Betrayal and Peter’s Denial 30
8. Chris: Im plications of Open Theism 32
9. John: Im plications of Open Theism 34
10. Chris: Openness and the Problem of Good and Evil 37
11. John: Openness and the Problem of Good and Evil 40
12. Chris: Antinomies and Logic 43
13. John: Antinomies and Logic 47
14. C hris: Logic and M etaphor 51
15. John: M etaphor and Interpretation 55
16. C hris: Impassibility, Im m utability, and the Incarnation 60
17. John: Impassibility, Im m utability, and the Incarnation 64
18. C hris: Im passibility and Prayer 71
19. John: Im passibility and Prayer 75
20. Chris: Im passibility and Ontology 82
21. John: Thom ism 87
22. Chris: The Revelation of God in Jesus 94
23. John: How Do We Know W hat God Is Like? 101
24. C hris: The Church Fathers on Im passibility 106
6 Contents
25. John: The W estern Fathers and Im passibility 117

Chart: Classical and Open Theism Com pared 123
26. Jo h n : Scripture on Im m utability and Foreknowledge 124
27. Chris: Om niscience and Foreknowledge 130
28. John: Views of Om niscience 137
Chart: Classical, Freewill, and Open Theism Com pared 142
29. Chris: F u rth er Thoughts on Som e Divine A ttributes 144
30. John: Classical Theism 149
31. John: Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism 153
32. Chris: Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism 158
33. John: Openness and Tradition 167
34. Chris: Tradition and Theology 176
35. John: Can We Q uestion Theology? 185
36. John: Dialogical Virtues 189
37. Chris: Learning and Virtue 194
Chris and John: Postscript 197

Appendix: Sum m ary Definitions 201
Notes 205
Glossary 215
Chris and John: What This Book
Is—and What It Is Not
We have been friends for a n um ber of years, ever since John was offered
a position at E astern University. T hrough the intricate process of inter
views and visits involved in hiring a new professor, we couldn't help but
start talking theology. At th at tim e Chris was largely uninform ed about
openness theology, and John was m ore th an adept at both explaining
his ideas and critiquing the m ore traditional position Chris espoused!
After the faculty search ended we rem ained friends and continued to
correspond occasionally, both by phone and by e-mail. Fam ily issues
and concerns, particularly regarding children, were frequently the cen
terpiece of ou r conversations, b u t it should surprise no one th a t two
theologians invariably found them selves discussing theology.
W hat was encouraging to both of us was th at our strong theological
disagreem ents never th reaten ed ou r friendship, n o r did we ever feel
th a t friendship precluded vigorous argum ent and debate. In fact, we
believe th at ou r friendship has actually facilitated our ability to really
listen to one another. Knowing th a t for each of us our strongest desire
in doing theology was to help others im prove th eir relationship w ith
God, we did not see our conversation as a debate to be “w on” b u t as an
opportunity to learn from one another. At the end of this phase in our
extended e-m ail debate we still rem ain friends, although we adm it to
som etim es feeling bruised and occasionally m isunderstood! Perhaps
w hat has facilitated ou r discussion and enabled a frank exchange to be
carried on over such an extended period of tim e was the tru st we felt
and continue to feel tow ard one another. For instance, though Chris
7
g C hris and John: W hat This Book Is—an d W hat It Is N ot
fundam entally disagrees w ith the openness model, I know th a t Chris

w ould never intentionally m isrepresent or caricature m y ideas. Like
wise, though my ideas som etim es drive John crazy, I know th at John
carefully listens to w hat I have to say.
Indeed, if we were to offer a m odel to the b ro ad er church th at we
both can agree on, it w ould be th at of generous, em pathetic listening, a
type of listening and responding th a t is grounded in specific dialogical
virtues th at we are attem pting to cultivate in our relationship and also
in ou r debate. That is, as we discussed and debated, both of us worked
h ard to think the best of the other’s position. We strongly attem pted to
avoid caricature, nam e-calling, and prem ature rejection of the oth ers
point of view. On our best days it was only w hen we felt th a t we truly
understood the o th ers ideas th a t we p u t on the gloves and boxed.
In offering ou r exchange to a broader public we are sim ply inviting
others into the discussion. The im petus for these letters began w hen the
editors of Christianity Today m agazine w anted to do an article on open
theism . Chris, who is an editor at large for the m agazine, suggested th a t
the two of us should do the article as a series of letters. Letters 1-9 in
this book originally appeared in May and June 2001. M any people liked
the form at, and since we did not com e close to saying all we w anted to
say, we decided to continue the exchange over the next year.
We have left the letters in the order in w hich we w rote them rath e r
th an grouping them together topically. Though we knew th a t others
w ould be reading our letters, we purposely stayed w ith the e-mail for
m at, convinced th at in this inform al approach to theological engage
m ent we m ight incorporate insights, clarity, concerns, and even hum or
th a t a m ore form al approach m ight stifle. For example, both of us felt
the freedom to sim ply th in k out loud, a t tim es spinning off a quick
response, at o ther tim es chewing on each other’s ideas like a cow chews
its cud. O ur letters occasionally betray a fleeting sense of frustration
or irritation, and they contain, like m ost inform al exchanges, som e
repetitions, dead ends, and unresolved questions. (We have added two
sections at the end th at m ay help the reader fully participate in our dis
cussion: som e inform al notes and a brief glossary to clarify the sense in
w hich we both use certain term s.) W hat we offer, then, is an inform al,
spirited, and hopefully interesting correspondence betw een two friends
and theologians—no m ore and no less.
Readers will quickly see th at certain issues keep com ing up: questions
about how to in terp ret Scripture, the role of trad itio n in theological
reflection and biblical exegesis, the problem of evil, the nature of free
dom, God’s relationship to tim e, and the extent of God’s knowledge of
the future. These are im portant and som etim es complex issues, and we
do n ot pretend th at these m atters are easily settled. Those who think
Chris and John: W hat This Book Is—and W hat It Is Not 9-
they can m erely cite a few biblical texts to settle this debatjp will/Igsajn
th a t it is not so simple—for either side.
How have we changed our basic positions as a result of oui^ktendg/d:
discussion? On the broad issues, we are pretty m uch in the sam e place
as w hen we first began exchanging letters. John thinks the openness
m odel offers the best interpretation of the Bible’s presentation of God,
God's relationship to hum anity, and God’s saving acts on ou r behalf.
Chris continues to think he’s wrong. Though we rem ain in disagreem ent
on m any issues, John has spurred Chris to think through m ore carefully
his understanding of the nature of freedom and Chris has determ ined to
do so. Chris has helped John rethink aspects of his Christology as well
as see tim es w hen he has stated things in uncharitable ways.
Hopefully, our exchange of letters will encourage readers to investi
gate the issues surrounding the openness m odel fairly and thoroughly.
O ur correspondence is a small p art of the testing and sifting process any
theological m odel m ust undergo if it is to be wisely and safely offered to
the church. So, to pirate a popular line, “You’ve got m ail!”
1 John: How I Came to the Open
View
Dear Chris,
W hen I was in high school one of my brothers was killed in a m otor

cycle accident. For the first tim e I began to think about God’s role in
h u m an affairs—w as God responsible for my b ro th e r’s death? A few
years later, while in Bible college, I read w hat my theology textbooks
said about the natu re of God. According to these books God could not
change in any way, could not be affected by us in any respect, and
never responded to us. I was shocked! The piety th a t I h ad learned from
other evangelical Christians was directly opposed to such beliefs. For
instance, I was taught th a t our prayers of petition could influence w hat
God decided to do—not th at God has to do w hat we ask, but th a t God
has decided th at some of his decisions will be in response to w hat we ask
or don’t ask. Such problem s p u t m e into a state of questioning—either
the piety I had been taught was wrong, or the theology I was reading was
wrong, or both my piety and the theology had to be m odified in some
way. I continued to wrestle w ith these issues while in seminary, and it
took me m ore th an tw enty years to form ulate the views I now have. My
conclusion is th at the evangelical piety I was taught as a young Christian
was biblically correct, and th at therefore we need to modify our theology
at certain points (not every point!) so th a t ou r theology corresponds,
rath e r th an conflicts, w ith our biblically grounded piety.
11
12 Does God Have a Future?
Let me sum m arize the perspective I now hold—the so-called open

ness of God theology. According to openness theology, the triune God
of love has, in almighty power, created all th at is and is sovereign over
all. In freedom God decided to create beings capable of experiencing
his love. God loves us and desires for us to enter into a reciprocal rela
tionship of love w ith him self as well as w ith ou r fellow creatures. The
divine intention in creating us was th at we w ould come to experience
the triune love and respond to it w ith love of ou r own and w ould freely
come to collaborate w ith God tow ard the achievem ent of his goals. God
has granted us the freedom necessary for a truly personal relationship
of love to develop. Despite the fact th at we have abused our freedom by
turning away from the divine love, God rem ains faithful to his inten
tions for creation.
Second, God has, in sovereign freedom, decided to m ake some of his
actions contingent on ou r requests and actions. God elicits ou r free col
laboration in his plans. Hence, God can be influenced by w hat we do and
pray for, and God truly responds to w hat we do. God genuinely interacts
and enters into a dynam ic give-and-take relationship w ith us.
Third, the only wise God has chosen to exercise general providence
(God has overarching control) rath e r th an m eticulous providence (God
tightly controls every detail), allowing space for us to operate and for
God to be creative and resourceful in w orking w ith us. God has chosen
not to control every detail of w hat happens in our lives. Moreover, God
has flexible strategies. Though the divine nature does not change, God
reacts to contingencies, even adjusting his plans if necessary, to take into
account the decisions of his free creatures. God is endlessly resource
ful and wise in w orking tow ard the fulfillm ent of his ultim ate goals.
Som etim es God alone decides how to accom plish these goals. Usually,
however, God elicits hum an cooperation in such a way th at it is both
God and hum anity who decide w hat the future shall be. God’s plan is
not a detailed script or blueprint, b u t a broad intention th at allows for
a variety of options as to precisely how his goals m ay be reached. W hat
God and people do in history m atters. If the H ebrew midwives had
feared P haraoh ra th e r th an God and killed the baby boys, th en God
w ould have responded accordingly and a different story w ould have
emerged. M oses’ refusal to retu rn to Egypt prom pted God to resort to
plan B, allowing Aaron to do the public speaking instead of Moses. W hat
people do and w hether they com e to tru st God m akes a difference in
w hat God does—hum an history is not a scripted play in w hich hum an
choices and decisions are sim ply w hat God w anted to happen.
Finally, the om niscient God knows all th at is logically possible to
know. God knows the past and present w ith exhaustive, definite knowl
edge and knows the future as partly definite (closed) and partly indefi
Jo h n : How I Came to the Open View 13
nite (open). God’s knowledge of the future contains knowledge of w hat

God has decided to bring about unilaterally (that w hich is definite),
knowledge of possibilities (that w hich is indefinite), and knowledge
of those events th a t are determ ined to occur (e.g., an asteroid hitting
a planet). Hence, the future is partly open (or indefinite) and partly
closed (or definite). It is n ot the case th at ju st anything m ay happen, for
God has acted in history to bring about events in order to achieve his
unchanging purpose. Graciously, however, God invites us to collaborate
w ith him to bring the as yet open p art of the future into being.
Your fellow servant In Jesus,

John
2 Chris: My Pilgrimage
Dear John,
Like you, I th ink it’s quite helpful to reflect on w hat has shaped each
of us and how this no doubt influences how we do theology and the con
clusions we reach. My questions and struggles have surely shaped me.
Probably the greatest question I've faced over the years, theologically,
spiritually, and emotionally, has been the problem of evil. And lurking
behind this question, especially during m y early days as a Christian,
was the question of God. M ore particularly, is God good? Can God be
trusted?
The divorce of m y parents w hen I was a very young believer, for
example, caused m e great anguish, especially w hen it appeared as if
God had rem ained deaf to my fervent prayers th a t my p a re n ts’ m ar
riage be preserved. At th at tim e it seem ed to m e th a t my petitions had
bounced back into my face, ricocheting off the shut gates of an inac
cessible heaven.
D uring the sam e period I worked as a driver and handym an for one
of California’s largest m ortuaries, and thus I daily faced the question of
evil and suffering. Is God in control of hum an history? Does God genu
inely realize how m any people are dying in Los Angeles, often alone, in
despair, and in horrific circum stances? Does God care?
Then, during my later college years, I began traveling internationally,
and I quickly learned th a t the tragedies I had encountered in my family
and behind the wheel of a hearse are m ultiplied worldwide. Indeed, the
14
Chris: My Pilgrimage 15
level of suffering I observed in countries such as Indonesia and India

surpassed anything I had experienced in the States. I specifically recall
visiting a refugee cam p in Calcutta as w ar broke out betw een E ast and
West Pakistan in the early seventies. As I w itnessed children dying from
starvation and disease I again w ondered, “W here is God in all this? Is
God in control of h u m an history? Does God know the end from the
beginning? Is God sovereign over tim e itself? Is God’s knowledge of the
future perfect and com plete? Is God ever caught off guard or surprised
by w hat occurs as history unfolds? Is God good? Is God loving? Can God
be trusted? Are there certain decisions, events, and accidents th at God
could not have prevented, either because he did not know they were
going to occur or because he did not w ant to violate hum an freedom?
Did God possess the pow er and knowledge to protect m e from my own
folly, sin, and error? W hat could I expect from the God portrayed in the
Scripture?”
How have I gone about finding answers? Two key sources com e to
m ind.
First, there is the Bible. I, like you, affirm the absolute authority of
the Scriptures over my life and thought. This affirm ation is not a guar
antee th at I’ll read and interpret it well or correctly, but Scripture and
its inherent authority are an indispensable starting point for theological
reflection. Hence, if you can convince m e th a t the Bible affirm s and
supports the openness position, I’d have to m ake serious adjustm ents
in my ow n thinking and practice as a Christian.
Second, the church's history of exegesis o r “exegetical tradition"
deeply influences the interpretive choices I m ake as I read the Bible.
Tom Oden has particularly helped m e to see th a t the church’s exegesis,
particularly in its earliest years, m ust never be overlooked as we work
exegetically and theologically in the m odern context. Thus a key ques
tio n is, “Has the church, Orthodox, R om an Catholic, or in its m any
Protestant com m unities, ever taught th a t God’s knowledge of the future
is lim ited, or th at God is surprised or caught off guard by w hat occurs
as tim e progresses?” Stan Grenz ponders the sam e question in his com
m ents on your w ork in his recent book Renewing the Center. “W hat is
perhaps even m ore disquieting about Sanders’s proposal,” Grenz writes,
“is th a t it seem s to require the rejection of such a broad sw ath of the
Christian theological tradition. He intim ates th a t on som ething as fun
dam ental as our basic conception of God nearly everyone from the fifth
century to the present has deviated far from the tru e understanding of
biblical texts.”
I acknowledge th at there have been figures in the c h u rch ’s history
who have argued th a t God’s foreknowledge is limited, but they are m inor
figures at best, and the church as a com m unity has never validated
their conclusions. W hile the interpretive tradition of the church is not

infallible, extremely convincing exegesis will need to be forthcom ing if
the two hallm arks of openness theology are to be accepted, nam ely th at
(a) God’s knowledge of the future is lim ited, and (b) God’s knowledge
grows as tim e proceeds.
Finally, James Packer taught me that while biblical revelation is abso
lutely infallible, it presently contains certain irresolvable tensions, largely
because God has chosen to keep certain things to himself, at least for the
present. Thus, while God always speaks truthfully, God m ight well choose
to rem ain silent or incom plete in his com m unication. Indeed, Moses
taught Israel th at the “secret things belong to the L o r d ” (Deut. 29:29).
Packer has w arned me, both as his student in Vancouver and in m any
of his writings, to beware of draining the mystery out of the Scriptures
in a m isplaced desire for rational consistency. In Packer’s words, we can
frequently trace theological confusion and error to "the intruding of ratio
nalistic speculations, the passion for system atic consistency, a reluctance
to recognize the existence of mystery and . . . a consequent subjecting of
Scripture to the supposed dem ands of hum an logic." Hence I have learned
to live w ith incompleteness, paradox, incomprehensibility, and deep mys
tery in my relationship w ith God and in my theological thinking.
Simultaneously, though, the Bible m akes certain things quite clear.
For instance, while evil in its essence m ay rem ain inexplicable to me,
God has clearly spoken against evil and sin, m ost clearly in Jesus Christ.
W hile I m ay n ot u n d erstan d why God has allowed certain events to
take place, o r why he has seen fit to rem ain seemingly silent in answ er
to certain of my prayers, I can know th a t God loves m e and his w orld
infinitely because God has dem onstrated this love and goodness in the
incarnation, m inistry, crucifixion, and resu rrectio n of Jesus Christ.
W hile God allows evil to occur and, indeed, uses it to further his own
purposes, God has spoken and acted against th at very sam e evil, as seen
in the earliest sections of the biblical narrative (cf. Gen. 3). In Christ we
have God's definitive statem ent against sin, evil, and suffering. God’s last
w ord will always be a redem ptive one.
I find Tom Oden’s com m ents in The Living God to be helpful, both con
cerning the nature and extent of God's knowledge and concerning God’s
relationship to tim e itself. In a m anner of speaking, Oden is simply sum
m ing up the ecum enical consensus reached on these issues in the early
centuries of the church’s histoiy. God’s knowledge is "without lim itation
or qualification.” It is, as the psalmist writes, “beyond all telling” (Ps. 147:5).
W hat about God’s knowledge of the future? "God’s incom parable way of
knowing knows the end of things even from the beginning: ‘I reveal the
end from the beginning, from ancient tim es I reveal w hat is to be; I say,
“My purpose shall take effect, I will accom plish all th a t I please””' (Isa.
C hris: My Pilgrimage 17
46:9). God knows “past, present, and future . . . external events and
inw ard m otivations.” Unlike hum an knowledge, God's knowledge is not
partial or fragmentary, m ost im portantly because God’s knowledge does
not occur “from a particular nexus of tim e.” Rather, God "knows exhaus
tively, in eternal sim ultaneity.” In short, God’s knowledge is "incom pa
rable.” Surely this is w hat we should expect if we’re dealing with God.
A further w ord or two regarding God’s relationship to tim e m ight be
appropriate, particularly in light of the openness m odel’s contention
th at there are aspects of the future God does not know. I contend th at
this is incorrect, largely because God’s relationship to tim e forecloses the
possibility th at God does not know all aspects of the future. Here Oden
is again helpful. The argum ent runs along the following lines:
1. God’s knowledge of the world is infinite. Hence, God in relation

ship to tim e “m u st be aw are of d u ratio n and succession, even
though not bound by them . If God did not u n derstand duration
and succession, God w ould understand even less about tim e th an
we do.”
2. Even though God understands tim e, God is not trapped w ithin
it. God rem ains eternal. Thus, God "views all tim es as eternal now,”
w hile sim ultaneously u n d erstanding “the process of tem poral
succession.” Here is a key distinction betw een divine and hum an
knowledge. “We do not know next year until next year, b u t God
knows next year already. We learn only successively through expe
riencing, but God does not have to learn som ething God already
knows. We know things in p a rt and by pieces, b u t God knows
things fully, all a t once,” while still understanding duration and
succession.
3. Thus, future events are not future for God “b ut sim ply present.”
This seems to m e to be a critical distinction th at clearly sets off
the classical m odel from th a t held by openness theologians.
Let me know w hat you think.
With warm greetings,

Chris
3 John: Practical Problems
for Classical Theism
Dear Chris.
T hank you for your thoughtful and challenging rem arks. Theology
is, and always has been, produced in dialogue and I’m delighted to be
in conversation w ith you. In response, let m e say th a t I agree th at Jesus
is God’s definitive response to ou r evil, dem onstrating the divine love
tow ard us. This is no small agreement! I agree th a t God “allows” evil to
occur and th at God has “acted against th a t very same evil.” However, you
as a classical theist and I as an open theist disagree on the role of evil in
God’s plans. Since you believe th at God cannot change in any respect,
cannot be affected by us in any way, and th a t God m eticulously controls
everything th a t happens, you have to say th at every evil th a t occurs is
part of God’s plan and that each and every evil is for the good. Given this,
I w onder how you can claim th a t God acted “against” the very evil he
ordained in the first place. Do you have a schizophrenic God? Accord
ing to your view, nothing happens except w hat God specifically w ants
to happen, so God never takes risks and his will is never thw arted in the
least detail. Hence, you are forced to deny th a t God genuinely grieves
over our sin (Gen. 6:6), since it m akes no sense to say th at God grieves
over w hat he w anted to occur!
Moreover, if God never responds to us, you m ust affirm the doctrines
of irresistible grace (we cannot reject God's will) and unconditional elec
18
Jo h n : Practical Problem s for Classical Theism 19
tion (God chooses those who are saved w ithout responding to anything
the saved do). Of course, you m ay sim ply appeal to “m ystery” and say
th a t we cannot understand God’s ways. To th at I say, “A contradiction by
any other nam e is still plain nonsense.” You claim th a t I subject Scrip
ture to the dem ands of h u m an logic. Actually, we all use hum an reason
ing w hen reading the Bible—w hich is why you and I understand at least
parts of it. Moreover, your view is not so “m ysterious” as you suggest.
To claim th at divine sovereignty and h u m an freedom are contradictory,
one m ust give the term s precisely opposite m eanings. However, you
do not, since you believe -that God m icrom anages everything in such
a way th at his will is never thw arted and hum ans are “free” to act on
their desires bu t do not have the freedom to do other th an w hat they do.
That is, you affirm “com patibilistic freedom ” (determ inism and hum an
responsibility are com patible). In your view all God has to do is ensure
that we have the desires he w ants us to have and then we will “freely”
do w hat God has ordained. There is nothing contradictory or logically
m ysterious about that! However, we, along w ith the A rm inian tradition,
believe th at God does not tightly control everything and th at hum ans
have “libertarian freedom .” We have the freedom to do otherw ise th an
we did (e.g., a m urderer could have refrained from m urdering) and we
can thw art some of God’s will.
Moving on, we believe th a t God’s knowledge of the future is partly
fixed and partly left open for three m ain reasons. First and forem ost,
we believe th at the Scriptures teach this (e.g., God grieves, changes his
m ind). Second, though we agree w ith Arm inian theology on all but two
points (divine tim elessness and exhaustive definite foreknowledge), we
believe th a t com plete foreknowledge of our future decisions im plies
the loss of ou r free will. Third, the “future” does not yet exist, so there
is nothing "there” to be known. Hence, we do not believe th at "God's
knowledge of the future is lim ited.” We believe th a t God knows all th at
can be known, and thus we cannot say th at it is a lim itation for God
not to know “nothing.”
Finally, you beat on us w ith the club of church tradition. Nearly
everyone has said th a t God possesses com plete knowledge of w hat
hum ans will do in the future, so how can we even th ink of going against
such a cloud of w itnesses? To begin w ith, theologians have debated
the nature and content of God’s om niscience for m illennia. There are
several traditions regarding exactly w hat God knows. Second, we do
respect theological traditions: to disagree w ith the great theologians of
the past is serious business. Nonetheless, like L uther we feel compelled
to affirm ou r view because of Scripture and sound reason. You sound
like John Eck, the Catholic inquisitor of Luther, who claim ed it to be
unim aginable th at so m any theologians could have been wrong on so
central a teaching as salvation. I w ould have thought th a t som eone such

as yourself, teaching at a B aptist college, w ould have m ore em pathy for
those who challenge certain traditions. The Lutherans, Reform ed, and
Catholics killed the Anabaptists for espousing beliefs th at m ost evangeli
cals today take for granted. Clearly, Protestants believe th a t traditions
som etim es need changing. After all, it was not until the eighteenth cen
tury th at the virtually unquestioned tradition was challenged th at all
unbaptized children (or those b orn of non-C hristian parents) w ho die
are dam ned to hell! However, proponents of openness do not reject the
entire tradition. We affirm the ecum enical creeds, the m ain teachings
of the R eform ation, the authority of Scripture and the im portance of
prayer and comm unity. It is a gross overstatem ent to claim we reject
the entire tradition.
Blessings on your m inistry trips overseas and I look forw ard to hear
ing from you.
John
4 Chris: Abraham
and the Sacrifice of Isaac
Dear John,
Since for both of us the Bible rem ains the ultim ate authority, it’s prob
ably best to com pare notes concerning key exegetical issues. The key
question for m e is this: does the exegetical work th a t is being produced
by openness scholars possess the exegetical strength to overturn the
heart of the church’s interpretive teaching regarding God’s knowledge
of the future and God’s relationship to tim e? W hat if we focus on two
key texts: God’s testing of A braham in Genesis 22, and Judas’s betrayal
and Peter’s denial of Jesus?
You once asked me, “W hat do you do w ith all the Old Testam ent
references to God grieving, changing, delighting, and repenting? Does
not God say to A braham , ‘Now I know you fear God’ in response to
A braham ’s w illingness to sacrifice Isaac? Does this n o t indicate th a t
God’s knowledge of Abraham has grown in response to A braham ’s act
of great faith?”
Good question. You're right in seeing th a t we both will need to m ake
sense of God’s w ords in Genesis 22:12, “Do not stretch out your hand
against the lad, and do nothing to him; for now I know th at you fear God,
since you have not w ithheld your son, your only son, from Me” ( n a s b ).
Brueggem ann, w hom you quote in The God Who Risks, w rites th at “God
genuinely does not know. . . . The flow of the narrative accom plishes
21
som ething in the aw areness of God. He did not know. Now he know s.”
W hat did God need to know th at he did not yet understand? Why the
test to elicit the needed inform ation? You write: "The answ er is to be
found in God’s desire to bless all the nations of the earth (Gen. 12:3).
God needs to know if A braham is the sort of person on w hom God can
count for collaboration tow ard the fulfillm ent of the divine project. Will
he be faithful? Or m ust God find som eone else through w hom to achieve
his purpose? God has been faithful; will A braham be faithful? Will God
have to m odify his plans w ith A braham ?”
The straightforw ard, literal m eaning of Genesis 22 is th a t God now
learned th at A braham w ould be faithful. Even an opponent of openness
theology such as Bruce Ware adm its th at unless com pelling reasons can
be found for not accepting the straightforw ard m eaning of the text, this
m eaning should be accepted. Ware, though, lists at least three funda
m ental problem s w ith accepting the “literal” m eaning, objections th at
appear quite reasonable to me.
First, if God m ust test A braham to find out w hat is in his heart, this
surely calls into question God’s “present knowledge of A braham ’s inner
spiritual, psychological, m ental, and em otional state.” Yet other biblical
texts teach th at God does know the inner thoughts of hum an beings.
Indeed, one of the characteristics th at sets God ap art from hum ans, a
tra it th a t dem onstrates the glory of God, is God’s ability to do this very
thing. The chronicler w rites th a t “the L ord searches all hearts, and
understands every intent of the thoughts” (1 Chron. 28:9). In 1 Sam uel
16:7 we read, “the L ord does not see as m ortals see; they look on the
outw ard appearance, b u t the L ord looks on the h eart.” David writes, “O
L ord , you have searched m e and you know me. You know w hen I sit and
w hen I rise; you perceive my thoughts from afar. You discern my going
out and my lying down; you are fam iliar w ith all my ways. Before a w ord
is on my tongue, you know it completely, O L ord ” (P s . 139:1-2).
It escapes me how God could possibly know David’s thoughts before
he expresses them , if God cannot know fully his unexpressed inner life.
In fact, it is God’s w ondrous ability to far surpass hum ans in his knowl
edge th at elicits David’s praise: “Such knowledge is too w onderful for
me, too lofty for m e to attain ” (v. 6). Of course it is. David is not God.
Surely texts such as these can provide a lens through w hich I interpret
w hat is going on betw een God and A braham . If I can ’t use them to
in terp ret the A braham narrative, then one m ust conclude th a t there
are at least som e of A braham ’s thoughts—indeed, his m ost im portant
ones—th a t are beyond the ability of God to discern until A braham actu
ally acts. Thus God’s foreknowledge is not only lim ited as to the future,
b u t also in the present.
C hris: A braham an d the Sacrifice of Isaac 23
Second, as a result of the test, God now knows th at A braham fears

God. Ware rightly asks if God did not know this already. Is this lack of
knowledge plausible? H ad not A braham s actions, from his response of
faith to God’s prom ises in Genesis 12 to his willingness to continue to
live a life of faith in Genesis 15, show n th a t he deeply feared God? Is it
then plausible to believe th at God did not know th a t A braham feared
him until the very m om ent w hen Abraham raised his knife above the
child of the prom ise? If so, A braham seem s to have understood God
better than God understood Abraham, for Abraham realized that God pos
sessed the pow er to raise Isaac from the dead (Heb. 11:19). Did God
not perceive th a t Abraham understood th a t God possessed this power?
A braham understood this before he ever attem pted to sacrifice Isaac.
And yet God couldn’t perceive this trem endous faith in Abraham?
Think, too, of A braham ’s instructions to his servant in Genesis 22:5.
He instructs the servant to w ait for b o th him and Isaac. Why? A bra
ham fully expected th a t b o th w ould retu rn , even if a resu rrectio n were
required for th e re tu rn trip to take place. Such a perspective seem s
to be dem anded if the logic of H ebrew s is included in the interpretive
grid of Genesis 22. If so, how can your in te rp re ta tio n be correct? A
“literal” in te rp re ta tio n of Genesis 22 appears to ru n into insuperable
difficulties.
W are points, I think rightly, to Paul’s w ords in R om ans 4:18-22 as
evidence of A braham ’s long track record of faithfulness and reverence,
well before the com m and to sacrifice Isaac. “Against all hope,” Paul
writes, “A braham in hope believed and so becam e the father of m any
nations. . . . W ithout weakening in his faith, he faced the fact th a t his
body was as good as dead . . . yet he did not waver th rough unbelief
regarding the prom ise of God.” A braham ’s dem onstration of faith and
reverence, a faith credited to him by God as righteousness, is already
established by the tim e we reach Genesis 22. Is th a t sam e God suddenly
second-guessing him self by asking A braham to sacrifice Isaac? Was
God not convinced by the long history of faithfulness th a t h ad already
occurred betw een Abraham and him?
Third, W are asks how God can possibly know, at least from an open
ness perspective, th a t A braham will rem ain faithful in the future? In
W are’s w ords, “W hat open theists claim God gained from this was, on
openness grounds, either already know n to God (so he did not learn
som ething new in this test) or at best was a transient and passing tru th
(which could give no real assurance of how A braham w ould act in the
future). The straightforw ard m eaning open theists com m end sim ply
cannot be the intended m eaning of the text.”
B ut if the text does not concern the extent of God's knowledge, w hat
does it concern? W hen we find New Testam ent w riters such as Jam es
o r the au th o r of Hebrews com m enting on this text, they focus on Abra

h am ’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac as a sign of faith m anifesting itself
in good works, and on A braham ’s faith in God’s pow er to raise the dead.
Even if Isaac dies at A braham ’s hand, A braham believes God can bring
him back to life (cf. Heb. 11:17-19; Jam es 2:21). No New Testam ent
w riter uses this text to develop ideas concerning the nature or extent of
God’s knowledge. Hence, if I’m to find the heart of the text’s m eaning, I
need to hear the text as apostolic witnesses are hearing it.
This reading of the text, one th at focuses on A braham ’s faith in God’s
pow er to raise the dead, is also em phasized by early patristic com m enta
tors on this narrative. Origen does m ention briefly th at some opponents
(probably non-C hristian critics of the gospel) have “throw n out against
us th at God says th a t now he had learned th a t A braham fears God
as though he w ere such as not to have know n previously” (em phasis
added). Origen dism isses this possibility out of hand, as do alm ost all
patristic com m entators on Genesis 22. Why? He—and they—constantly
com pared Scripture w ith Scripture.
The interpretation th at Origen offers, along w ith other early Christian
com m entators such as Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Caesarius of Arles, is
m ultilayered. For example, the fathers frequently understood Isaac to
be a type of Christ; so was the ram caught in the bush. Caesarius under
stands Abraham to be a type of God the Father, who later is to willingly
offer his Son as a sacrifice for the sin of the world. Indeed, Caesarius
notes th a t in the liturgical rhythm of the year, Genesis 22 was read at
Easter, “w hen the tru e Isaac, w hose type the son of A braham showed,
is fastened to the gibbet of the cross for the h u m an race.” I find this
m ultilayered reading of the text to be exegetically fruitful and theologi
cally profound. Perhaps m ore to the point w ith respect to the openness
position, the com m ents of the New Testam ent w riters as well as of the
patristic com m entators insist th at the heart of Genesis 22 is A braham ’s
faith, not God’s knowledge. If the openness interpretation of Genesis 22
is valid, why do neither canonical no r patristic w riters advocate it?

Chris
John: Abraham and the Sacrifice
of Isaac
Dear Chris,
You raise the issue of the divine testing of Abraham . Let m e begin
by pointing out th at God puts a great m any people to the test in order
to find out w hat they really value and believe. God repeatedly tested
the people of Israel to see w hether they w ould tru st and follow him or
not (Exod. 16:4; 20:20; Judg. 2:22) and God tested people such as King
Hezekiah so that God would "know w hat was in his heart” (2 Chron. 32:31).
Why all this testing if God already knew the outcom es? Yes, God knows
our hearts, b u t he seem s to obtain this knowledge by testing.
The openness interpretation does not call into question God’s “pres
ent knowledge” of A braham ’s character. Rather, the point w ould be th a t
A braham ’s character is not fully form ed in crucial respects until he has
faced this ultim ate test. W hat God knows about A braham is different
after the test because A braham him self has becom e som ething differ
ent th an he was previously. A braham ’s decision and actions are p art
of the character-form ing process and the question for God is w hether
A braham will tru st him in this seem ing reversal of the divine prom ise.
Moreover, though God m ay have had a very good idea of w hat Abraham
w ould do, A braham ’s free decision was n o t enacted until th a t point.
You and I have different views about h u m an freedom . You believe in a
form of “soft determ inism ”: A braham could not have done otherw ise so
25
there is no uncertainty as to w hat A braham will do and so God’s test is

not a test at all. However, I believe th at A braham could, even at the last
m om ent, have refused to obey God and so the test is genuine.
You claim th a t A braham ’s faith is already established by the tim e we
reach Genesis 22. C ontrary to w hat you suggest in your last letter, I do
not believe th at God is “suddenly second-guessing him self.” Rather, in
Genesis 15:6 God indicates th a t A braham is in the right sort of relation
ship w ith God. Abraham is m aking progress in trusting God and God
inform s him th a t Abe is on the right track. However, the relationship is
not static. True, A braham has a history of faithfulness, b u t it is m ixed
w ith a history of not trusting God as well. He twice passes S arah off
as his sister because he fears m an rath e r th an God, has a son through
Hagar, and com plains to God th a t God has not fulfilled w hat he has
prom ised. That is, Abraham , like all of us, is a m ixed bag. All through
his life Abraham is w orried about protecting his own life and is anxiety
ridden about passing on his inheritance to his “real” son. All this is to
say th a t A braham is not a finished person, or the kind of person God
believes he can count on, until he passes this test.
You chide m e for finding som ething in an Old Testam ent text th a t
neither the canonical nor the patristic w riters advocate. This is a dubi
ous principle of interpretation if left unqualified. If we can only repeat
w hat the New Testam ent w riters said about Old Testam ent passages,
then we shall not have m uch to say. Though the interpretations of the
canonical w riters are correct, they do not say everything th at needs to be
said regarding the Old Testam ent. Just because Paul highlights certain
parts of the narrative th at suit his purpose does not m ean th a t there are
no other points to the narrative. Following your principle, the patristic
w riters you cite were wrong to see Isaac as a type of Christ since none of
the canonical w riters do so. How can you let the fathers get som ething
out of the text th at is not in the apostolic witness?
You ask why the fathers do not interpret the “now I know ” in Genesis
22:12 the sam e way I do. Elsew here I have docum ented th a t though
the fathers w ere correct to engage and m ake use of Greek philosophy,
they accepted certain philosophical notions th a t prevented them from
reading som e (not all) biblical texts in the correct way. We all have our
presuppositions, and theirs led m any of them to conclude th a t God can
not actually grieve or change his m ind or be affected by ou r prayers. I
find this quite unscriptural. Let m e give som e examples. God does grieve
over our sinful rebellion (Gen. 6:6; Eph. 4:30). Though God originally
planned to have Saul and his lineage be kings over Israel, God changed
his m ind due to Saul’s sin and selected David instead (1 Sam. 13:13; 15:11).
The p rophet Isaiah says to King Hezekiah, “Thus says the L o r d ,” you
will die and not recover from this illness. H ezekiah prays to God asking
John: A braham and the Sacrifice of Isaac 27
him to change his m ind. God does and sends Isaiah back to announce,
"Thus says the L o r d ,” you will recover from this illness (2 Kings 20:1-6).
Our prayers can have an effect on G ods plans. It m akes no sense to say
th at God grieves, changes his m ind, and is influenced by our prayers
and also claim th at God tightly controls everything so th at everything
th at occurs is w hat God desired to happen! F urtherm ore, on several
occasions God expected Israel to repent b u t they did not do w hat God
expected (e.g., Isa. 5:2; Jer. 3:6-7, 19-20). Also, God uses w ords such as
"might,” "if,” and “perhaps,” indicating th at som e of the future is open
(e.g., Exod. 4:8-9; Jer. 26:3; Ezek. 12:3); b u t such w ords m ake no sense
in your view—in fact, God seems less th an genuine to offer forgiveness
w hen he already knows they will not repent.
There are two types of texts concerning divine om niscience in Scrip
ture: those th a t portray God as knowing precisely w hat will happen (e.g.,
Jer. 5) and those th a t portray God as not knowing precisely w hat will
happen (the texts I’ve ju st cited). We believe th a t the best way of holding
on to both sorts of texts is to see the future as partly definite and partly
indefinite, even for God. The typical strategy is to claim th at the texts
portraying God as knowing exactly w hat will happen are literally true
while those th at depict God as grieving or n ot know ing do not tell us the
literal tru th about God. You accuse us of “subjecting Scripture to hum an
logic,” but th a t is exactly w hat you are doing here! We uphold both types
of texts ra th e r th an subsum e one u n d e r the other, so we believe th a t
openness is the perspective th a t is m ore tru e to the biblical data.
Your fellow servant,

John
6 Chris: Judas’s Betrayal
and Peter’s Denial
Dear John,
How about your interpretation of Judas’s betrayal of Jesus? I would

argue that this narrative clearly dem onstrates Gods perfect and complete
knowledge of the future. Jesus is not caught off guard by Judas’s action.
Rather, Jesus dem onstrates a full awareness of w hat Judas is soon to do
(Matt. 26:23-25). Perhaps even m ore telling, however, is the com m ent of
M atthew that the purchase of the potter’s field w ith Judas’s blood money
and its subsequent nam ing as the “Field of Blood” fulfilled a prophecy of
Jerem iah m ade hundreds of years before the event (Matt. 27:5-10).
I find your in terp retatio n of the Judas narrative in The God Who
Risks to be both selective and strained. First, you appear to base your
explanation of Judas’s actions on the highly idiosyncratic interpretation
of William Klassen, a study you argue “dem onstrates th at Judas was not
‘betraying’ Jesus.” Is Judas, as Klassen and you seem to believe, acting to
bring the high priest and Jesus together so that they “could resolve their
differences and bring about needed reform s”? W hen Jesus tells Judas
“Do quickly w hat you are going to do,” does this instruction truly violate
“a fundam ental rule of Judaism ” by telling Judas “to go out and deliber
ately com m it a sin”? You appear convinced by Klassen, writing that "in
this light it is clear th at Judas is not betraying Jesus and that Jesus is not
issuing any prediction of such activity.” I rem ain unconvinced, especially
because of the role Jesus assigns to Satan in Judas’s activities.
28
Chris: Judas’s Betrayal and P eter’s Denial 29
Second, you argue th a t “paradidomi does not m ean ‘betray’” to the

tem ple authorities. W hy not? Liddell and Scott provide clear instances
in secular Greek sources w here paradidomi does m ean “betray.” If so,
why can’t it m ean betray here?
Third, you write th a t “because Judas has come to symbolize villainy,
we tend to think Jesus’ w ords are clear and th at everything is working
out according to som e foreordained plan.” I don’t agree. Judas is alm ost
invariably considered a villain in the history of interpretation because
that is precisely how Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John portray him. John,
for example, gives us a glim pse into Judas’s character w hen he explains
the motive behind Ju d as’s objection to Jesus’ anointing at Bethany. "He
did n ot say this because he cared about the poor b u t because he was a
thief; as keeper of the m oney bag, he used to help him self to w hat was
put into it.” If such was Ju d as’s character, th en it seem s plausible to
me to view his betrayal of Jesus as an opportunity for Judas to m ake a
quick buck th a t goes terribly awry; I don’t think Judas realized th a t his
shortsighted action w ould lead to Jesus’ death.
While you don’t see the Judas narrative linked “to some foreordained
plan,” M atthew clearly makes such a connection through his reference
to Jerem iah’s prophecy (Matt. 27:9-10). Peter also distinctly connects
Judas’s actions and fate to a prophecy spoken “through the m outh of
David” (Acts 1:16). Neither M atthew’s nor Peters com m ents make sense if
this predictive/prophetic elem ent is drained out of the Judas narrative.
As I m entioned earlier, strikingly absent from your discussion of Judas
is any m ention of the role of Satan in the whole affair, while M atthew
insists th at "Satan entered Judas” the evening of the Last Supper, indicat
ing that dem onic m otivation or inspiration lay behind Judas’s thoughts
and actions (cf. Matt. 22:3). Not only so, but John had previously informed
his reader of the shady character of Judas. Jesus, it seems to me, clearly
predicts Judas’s betrayal in John 13, just as he predicted the exact num ber
of tim es Peter would betray Jesus.
How, by the way, could Jesus possibly know th a t Peter w ould choose
to deny him three tim es if God cannot know beforehand the choices of
free individuals, a position held by m any openness theologians? Was
Peter not free? Did God force him to deny Jesus? Was he sim ply a p u p
pet? If so, why w ould Jesus consider him m orally responsible for his
actions and call him to repentance and renew al in John 21?
Blessings,
Chris
7 John: Judas’s Betrayal
and Peter’s Denial
Dear Chris,
Regarding my interpretation of Judas’s sin and Peter's denial, please

realize th a t not all proponents of openness agree w ith m y particu lar
understanding. Not all Calvinists agree on how to interpret each passage
either. In my book I do say th a t it is not necessary to agree w ith Klassen s
interpretation, so I go on to give other possible readings com patible with
openness. L. D. McCabe, a nineteenth century M ethodist proponent of
openness, believes th at God rem oved the free will of Judas and Peter
in these p articular circum stances in order to accom plish his purposes.
Thus, they were not m orally responsible for their actions. B ut then, you
ask, if Peter is not m orally responsible, why does Christ rebuke him for
his actions in John 21? M cCabe’s answ er needs som e m odification, in
my opinion. If I w ere to go in this direction I w ould highlight Jesus’
statem ent in Luke 22:31 that Satan is after Peter, w hich is w hy Jesus tries
three tim es to get the disciples to pray w ith and for him in Gethsem ane.
They needed to be spiritually prepared for the events ahead. They let him
dow n and were not properly prepared. Peter was to have a special role
in God’s forthcom ing work, so God works especially w ith him . At this
point I w ould m odify McCabe and say th a t Peter was free to acknowl
edge his relationship w ith Jesus b u t w as spiritually unprepared. Jesus
knew this well and m akes the prediction. All th a t need be determ ined by
30
John: Judas’s Betrayal and Peter’s Denial 31
God in this case w ould be to have som eone question Peter three tim es
and have a rooster crow.
As for Judas, all three Synoptic Gospels say th a t Judas first m ade his
agreem ent w ith the authorities before Jesus announces th a t one of the
disciples will hand him over. Jesus’ statem ent is not “out of the blue.”
It is likely th a t Jesus and Judas have been discussing the issue. You cite
M atthew 27:9 to claim th at this happened to “fulfill” prophecy, arguing
th at it was p a rt of G ods foreordained plan. However, if you exam ine
the texts M atthew cites (Zech. 11:12; Jer. 32:6-9) you will discover th at
these are not predictions about future events at all! M atthew does the
same thing in 2:15 w hen he claims th a t H osea 11:1 has been “fulfilled.”
However, Hosea 11:1 is not a prediction bu t a statem ent of historical
fact. Does M atthew not know how to read Scripture? The problem is
not w ith Matthew, b u t w ith us, since we are the ones who see the w ord
“fulfilled” and jum p to the conclusion th a t these Old Testam ent texts
m ust have been predictions of future events. N ot at all. Rather, M atthew
is using the w ord “fulfilled” here to say th a t w hat happened in the past
is happening again. He is appropriating these Old Testam ent texts for
events in the life of Jesus. To borrow an idea from one of the early fathers
we could say th at these Old Testam ent passages are “recapitulated” in
the life of Jesus and so are “fulfilled.” We really do need to grasp how
M atthew used the term . Again, I do n ot believe th a t these are the only
possible interpretations available to openness. We shall have to see if
others arise.
By the way, though you address Genesis 22:12 you have not answ ered
how you interpret the wide array of biblical texts that, in my view, teach
th at God grieves, responds to us, changes his m ind, and the others I’ve
w ritten about. You have not given m e one biblical reason why I should
believe God is not affected by us.
Looking forward to your next letter,

John
8 Chris: Implications of Open
Theism
Dear John,
W hat are the im plications of the openness position for o u r under

standing of God, of God’s knowledge of and relationship to the future,
and of God’s relationship to tim e itself? I’m focusing on the issue of the
extent of God’s foreknowledge and God’s relationship to tim e because it
is at these two specific junctures th a t openness theology clearly moves
beyond classical A rm inianism and, indeed, classical theism . In addi
tion, I think it’s fair to say th a t if the theological im plications of a given
m odel prove untenable, it is best to rethink and reconstruct the model.
Finally, I’d argue th a t the im plications of openness theology are still
only bubbling to the surface of the church’s consciousness, for good or
for ill. The openness model, as Nicholas W olterstorff has com m ented, is
acting m uch like a strong tug on a thread dangling from a sweater. W hen
one pulls on the thread, how far will th e fabric of classical Christian
orthodoxy unravel? If we posit th at God’s foreknowledge is lim ited, for
instance, w hat other doctrines will require significant revision? Let me
m ention a few very troubling im plications of the openness model.
The openness m odel surely allows—indeed, describes—situations
w here God, on the basis of acquiring knowledge th a t God did not pos
sess in the past, can and does reassess his ow n past actions. I find this
position to be deeply flawed, largely because it well-nigh necessitates
32
C hris: Im plications of Open Theism 33
th at God will m ake m istakes, however unintentionally. How can God

help b u t err if God acts on the basis of w hat he thinks hum ans m ay do,
yet can’t be entirely sure of how they will act or respond in a given situ
ation? The result is a God w ho is constantly learning, w ho is som etim es
taken by surprise, and who occasionally acts in a m istaken fashion on
the basis of a m isdiagnosis of the future.
The plausibility of openness exegesis m ust be tested by the im plica
tions it produces. W hile conservative openness theologians affirm the
authority of S cripture and treat it w ith great seriousness, we are faced
w ith the irony th at openness exegesis leads to a devaluated view of God.
We are presented w ith a God who fum bles along like the rest of us, try
ing to do w hat seem s best, b ut often ruing w hat he has done in the light
ot how things actually tu rn out. Yes, God responds to his creation, but
these responses m ight well tu rn out to be wrong, at least w hen viewed
from the fuller knowledge God will possess in the future. How often
m ight God prove to be wrong? And in w hat circum stances? Isaiah
contends th a t w hat sets Yahweh apart from all false gods is Yahweh’s
w ondrous ability to know the future. This characteristic is p a rt of the
great glory of Yahweh th at sets him apart from the false idols Israel is
continually tem pted to worship (Isa. 41:21-24). Sadly, it is this very glory
th at fades dram atically in the openness model.

Chris
9 John: Implications of Open
Theism
Dear Chris,
No theological position, including my own, is free of difficulties. Som e

tim es it comes down to deciding w hich problem s we are willing to live
with. However, I don’t believe my problem s are as severe as you sug
gest, and your view has some rath e r unsavory im plications th at I shall
m ention.
To begin with, you claim th a t according to Isaiah 41:21-24, w hat
sets God apart from false gods is Yahweh s ability to know the future.
Please read the text carefully along w ith Isaiah 46:9-10 and 48:3-5. The
glory of Yahweh is not th a t he sim ply knows w hat is going to happen.
Rather, it is th at he can declare w hat will happen and bring it about th at
it does, in fact, occur. Isaiah is not touting foreknowledge, b u t contrast
ing Yahweh’s pow er w ith the im potence of the other gods.
Next, you are correct th at openness modifies traditional Arm inian
theology w ith regard to divine foreknowledge and timelessness. N one
theless, we agree w ith the freewill tradition in Christian theology against
those who, like you, deny both th at God can be affected by us and th at
hum ans have genuine free will. These are the w atershed issues in our
debate! Here we are solidly on the "Arminian” side of the fence. How
ever, we do have som e “family squabbles” w ith our fellow freewill theists
34
John: Im plications of Open Theism 35
and only tim e will tell w hether Arm inians and open theists can resolve
their differences.
You claim th at if God does not tightly control all th at we do and if
God does n o t know w ith absolute certainty w hat we shall do in the
future, then God just “fumbles along like the rest of us.” This is hardly
the case. God knows all the past and all the present completely, and he
has the w isdom and pow er necessary to work w ith us, and often in spite
of us, in order to achieve his purposes. Do we som etim es fail to do w hat
God w ants us to do? According to classical theism , no. B ut according to
openness and A rm inianism , yes, we can som etim es thw art God’s will.
The only way to guarantee th a t God’s will is never thw arted is for God
to m icrom anage everything and this is the position of classical theism .
.Arminianism and openness, however, believe th at God grants us free
will and so it is possible th at we can go against God’s will. The key issue
is not w hether God foreknows w hat we will do—Arm inians believe th at
God foreknows our evil actions b u t does not control them . Rather, the
crucial point is w hether God tightly controls each and every thing we
do. As an aside, I’m astounded th at our critics fail to realize th at m any
of their criticism s (e.g., th at we are “Pelagian,” God is not in control,
etc.) apply ju st as m uch to traditional Arm inianism .
Since you believe th at nothing happens except w hat God specifically
ordains to occur, you logically im ply th a t God w ants each and every
rape, act of incest, and other atrocities to occur. So God w ants little girls
abused? And you think our view dim inishes God’s glory! John Wesley
was correct to describe classical theism ’s understanding of God’s love
as “a love th a t m akes the blood ru n cold.”
H ere are som e of the im plications of openness theology. God does
not w ant w om en to be abused or children tortured. God is im placably
opposed to sin, b u t because God does not tightly control us, we can do
horrible things to one another th at grieve God. God does not arbitrarily
select som e h um ans for salvation by giving them irresistible grace.
Rather, God gives us enabling grace by w hich we m ay accept, but can
also reject, the divine love. The Scriptures clearly teach th at God is open
to being influenced by ou r prayers. In fact, God m akes som e of his deci
sions contingent on ou r intercession for one another, so prayer really
does m ake a difference. The open view places m ore value on interces
sory and petitionary prayer th an any other view. The open view exalts
God’s gracious working w ith us and his entering into genuine give-and-
xake relations w ith us. The open view exalts the true glory of God—the
way we see God working w ith us in Scripture.
Having listed several of our differences, I w ould be rem iss if I failed
to observe that, as brothers in Christ, we share m uch in com m on. For
instance, we both affirm th a t Jesus is the incarnate Son of God who
lived, died, and rose again on behalf of sinners. We both agree on the
authority of Scripture, even though we do not interpret every text the
same. Moreover, as evangelicals we share belief in the im portance of
prayer, an active discipleship under the leading of the Holy Spirit, and
the need for an ongoing personal relationship w ith God. Of course,
we share m ore th an these in com m on b u t the point is th a t we share a
com m on core of Christian beliefs and values th a t m ake us Christian as
opposed to, say, H indu, and our theological differences m ust not over
shadow our shared Christian faith.
Your fellow follower of Jesus,

John
10 Chris: Openness and the
Problem of Good and Evil
Dear John,
I'm sitting at my desk, thinking of the problem of evil, and listening

to a CD of Schindler’s List. Quite a com bination! I’m also thinking back
to the debate we had at H untington last November. I rem em ber the last
session we had together in the gym, and the terrible and m oving story
you told of the young girl who had been kidnapped, m utilated, and I
believe eventually m urdered. Surely here was evil present and active at
its worst. Of course, the problem of divine foreknowledge im m ediately
raises its head.
It’s at this juncture th at I have some difficulty in understanding how
the openness position helps us to deal w ith this kind of evil. If I under
stand you correctly, God has perfect knowledge of the past, the p res
ent, and those aspects of the future th a t God has ordained will come to
pass. Thankfully, God does not com m it evil, and yet surely he perm its
it. How does the openness position move us beyond the divine-perm is
sion m odel tow ard the construction of a m ore helpful, coherent model,
both theologically and pastorally?
I realize th a t openness theologians such as you are to a certain extent
com forted or encouraged by presentism —God’s perfect knowledge of
present events—but I don’t u n d erstan d how presentism significantly
37
improves on the traditional m odel (divine perm ission w ithin God’s over
arching sovereign will), at least as I presently understand m atters.
Think, for instance, of the awful account of this young girl’s m urder.
How does the openness position m ake this h o rro r m ore com prehen
sible, acceptable, or tolerable? Even if God, in this particular instance,
possesses only present knowledge, surely he is or was aw are of w hat was
occurring as the child was being tortured. This m ust have been present
knowledge to God. And surely God possessed the pow er to intervene
in these circum stances to rescue the child. That is, as David H unt has
argued, if God possesses “perfect knowledge of w hat is going on now ,”
surely God could choose to intervene to prevent this murder.
Almost all theologians w ould agree th a t God could choose to do so,
b u t for reasons alm ost always unknow n to us, he elects to allow some
horrific events to ru n their course. God perm its the evil action to occur,
but rarely if ever do we understand why. Classical theists generally argue
th at God’s reasons include his overarching, sovereign plan for hum an
history. F rom w hat I can understand, this response drives openness
theologians crazy. And yet I don’t understand how the openness m odel
alleviates the problem . Can you help m e here?
I suppose one m ight answ er th a t God does not intervene because
to do so w ould violate the exercise of h u m an freedom . After all, the
m urderer has freely chosen to act in this horrific m anner. To intervene
w ould surely violate his freedom , preventing him from carrying out his
w arped intentions. And yet, don’t we pray th a t God w ould act in such a
m anner all the tim e? For example, I try to pray regularly for you, your
wife, and your children. I ask th at God protect and keep the Sanders
clan safe from all harm : em otional harm , physical harm , or spiritual
harm . Indeed, my prayers for protection on your behalf w ould include
the following: if for some reason one of your kids w andered—knowingly
or unknowingly—into a situation of real danger, such as walking on a
railroad track as a lark, I'd be praying strongly th at God w ould inter
vene, w hether your daughter liked it or not. The exercise of her freedom
w ould be a nonissue for m e at this point. Hence, I think there are clear
instances, perhaps even the m ajority of cases, w here we can and should
pray th a t God intervene or overturn the free choices of h u m an beings,
for th eir sake and for the sake of others.
So I w ould pose two specific questions to you:
1. How does presentism and the overall openness position allevi

ate effectively the problem s posed by the reality of evil? How is it
a significant im provem ent on m ore traditional m odels of divine
providence and om niscience? As I’ve argued, even present knowl
C hris: Openness and the Problem of Good and Evil 39
edge w ould enable God to intervene quite effectively in the vast

m ajority of instances of evil in the w orld today.
2. If h u m an freedom is p a rt of the answ er to this question, don’t
we pray all the tim e th at God overcome a person’s freedom, par
ticularly if the exercise of th a t freedom is harm ing others or th at
person him- or herself? This kind of prayer w ould appear to per
tain to the prayers we offer for another person’s conversion, b ut
th a t will need to be a different letter. Looking forw ard to your
response.
You’re in my prayers,
Chris
11 John: Openness and the
Problem of Good and Evil
Dear Chris,
We had a little snow today and brisk w ind th at puts the red in one’s
cheeks. The sun is out now, tu rn in g the snow brilliantly w hite. The
purity of the snow contrasts sharply w ith the depravity of our world.
You raise a question about the value of open theism in general and pre-
sentism in p articular for explaining the problem of evil. (Presentism is
the view th a t God knows all the past and present b ut only th a t p a rt of
the future th a t is definite and will occur.) In the past few years it has
becom e clear to m e th a t presentism itself does not contribute m uch
by way of help in dealing w ith the question of evil. It seem s to m e now
th at early statem ents of openness overstated its value, for it is correct
that, according to openness, God w ould “see” th a t som ething dreadful
was going to happen and God has the pow er to prevent it, so why does
God not prevent it?
Openness utilizes the traditional “freewill defense,” w hich says th at
God grants hum ans genuine freedom to love, w hich also entails the abil
ity to not love. Though God w ants us to respond to the divine love by
loving God and our fellow creatures, we m ay refuse and choose instead
to hate and destroy. God cannot grant us freedom and guarantee th at
we will always use this freedom in loving ways. God cannot do w hat is
logically contradictory, and it is logically contradictory to claim th at God
40
John: Openness and the Problem of Good and Evil 41
grants us freedom and th a t God guarantees th a t everything we will do is

good. God is responsible for creating the conditions by w hich evil could
come about, b u t God is not responsible for creating evil itself.
So far, this is ju st the usual freewill defense used by Arm inians and
other freewill theists. Does openness have anything to add? I think so.
First, let m e distinguish two different issues.
The first is, w hat kind of sovereignty has God chosen to exercise: gen
eral or m eticulous? Freewill theists affirm general providence, whereby
God decides not to control tightly w hat hum ans will do. M eticulous
providence (also called specific sovereignty) holds th at God does tightly
control everything th at happens so th at nothing happens except w hat
God specifically intends to happen. This is the view of A ugustinians
and Calvinists.
The second issue is th a t those w ho affirm general sovereignty dis
agree as to w hether God foreknew th at hum ans w ould sin. Traditional
Arm inians hold th a t God knew p rio r to creation th a t hum ans w ould
sin b u t th a t God decided n ot to rescind his gift of freedom . Though
God knew the horrendous evils th at w ould occur, he w ent ahead w ith
his decision to create. As for presentism , it m ay be said th at God did
not know prior to creation th a t hum ans w ould com m it all the evils we
have. So God cannot be held responsible for creating a w orld knowing
th at h orrendous evils w ould ensue.
However, does this really help, since God could have prevented each
and every instance of h u m an m oral evil? Again, here the answ er of
openness is not any different from th at of traditional Arm inians. God
could not prevent us from doing harm to one another w ithout constantly
violating the very conditions in w hich he created us to live. That is,
God would habitually have to rem ove our freedom , rendering our lives
a w orld of illusion. God has a role th a t is different from all others, for
only God is responsible for upholding the very existence and structures
of reality.
You suspect th at you and I are in agreem ent here on the concept of
divine perm ission. Though we do agree on some aspects there rem ains
a huge difference betw een us, since you affirm m eticulous providence
and I, general providence. It is one thing to say th a t God, for reasons
we don’t fully understand, allows autonom ous agents to do tragic and
terrible things. It is quite an o th er thing to say th a t God deliberately
plans and intends for all these evil things to happen, so th at in no single
respect would God w ant the world to be any different than it actually is.
Proponents of m eticulous providence can go on saying th at this differ
ence m akes no difference, b u t I think m ost people will see th at it does
m ake a difference. If you were consistent you w ould have to say th at
God does not grieve over the rape of a little girl for it is exactly w hat God
w anted to happen. For me, God does not w ant such evils but he allows
them and seeks to redeem them .
But, you ask, don’t we pray th a t God w ould rem ove the free will of
people? W hen we pray for the safety of ou r families, for instance, are
we not asking God to override th eir freedom ? Som e A rm inians m ay
think this way, but those w ho reflect on it a bit will not. Removing our
free will is not the only option available to God to answ er such prayers.
God m ay w ork to keep my wife safe by rem inding her not to drive w hen
she is sleepy. You say you w ould pray for God to intervene for one of my
children if they were in danger on a railroad track. I have no problem
w ith this, for God can intervene in a variety of ways w ithout rem oving
my child’s free will by jerking her off the tracks. The difference here
betw een freewill theists and proponents of m eticulous providence is not
w hether God helps but the type of help God gives. For freewill theists,
m y child can resist the voice of the Spirit and continue walking into
danger. For you, however, if my child continued walking into danger it
w ould be because God specifically intended my child to do so because
the harm brought to my child w ould help bring about the fulfillm ent of
a greater good in God’s plan.
Though we m ay disagree as to precisely w hat God does in answ ering
our prayers, I w ant you to know, my friend, th at I greatly appreciate
your prayers.
Flere is a question for you. Why is your God of m eticulous providence
not responsible for evil w hen he specifically intends for each and every
evil to happen exactly as it does and does not w ant the w orld to be any
different th an it actually is?
Blessings,
John
12 Chris: Antinomies and Logic
Dear John,
I w ant to respond to som e of your ideas in The God Who Risks regard
ing antinom y (the affirm ation th a t two apparently contradictory truths
are both true). For quite a while I’ve used antinom y as a m ethodological
tool, following the coaching of one of my m entors, J. I. Packer. You have
a fairly sharp, negative assessm ent of Packer’s position in your book, so
it will do m e some good to see w hether I can defend the possibility of
using antinom y in theological reflection. W hat better person to discuss
things w ith th an som eone who feels antinom y leads to a logical dead
end?
I’ve talked to a colleague of m ine, Phillip Cary, about the use of
antinom y in philosophical and theological work, and I’ve found his
ideas to be helpful. It will be interesting to see w hat you think of them .
Cary m entioned various kinds of antinom ies, ranging from superficial
or apparent contradictions to those th at are m ore profound. Phil com
m ented th at these apparent contradictions are not to be taken lightly.
They always indicate th a t the reasoning process has been seriously
disrupted. This disruption, however, m ay well be unavoidable and is
not an infallible sign th a t we m ust im m ediately abandon our position.
For example, we m ay simply not possess the inform ation to resolve the
contradiction. A w orld in w hich antinom y could not occur w ould seem
to be a w orld of com pletely accessible inform ation. Plug in the neces
43
sary inform ation, think logically, and the antinom y m ust disappear. Or
so it w ould seem.
Phil groups antinom ies u n d er four different headings.
1. In the first group are merely verbal contradictions. Included here

w ould be statem ents biblical authors m ake th a t at first seem con
tradictory, b u t once the m eaning of an a u th o r’s term s o r argu
m ent is clarified, the contradiction disappears. For example, Paul
speaks of “Gentile 'sinners,’” at first glance seem ing to place him
self and other Jews in the class of nonsinners. Once Paul’s m ean
ing is clarified, “by putting the w ord ‘sinner’ in scare-quotes,” the
apparent contradiction disappears—there was no real contradic
tion in the first place. Irony rath e r th an antinom y is the operative
m ethodological category here. W hen we understand Paul’s literary
technique the contradiction is resolved w ithout difficulty.
2. We sail into deeper w ater when we encounter irresolvable antino
mies that can be directly traced to a lack o f knowledge and may well
be irremediable. For example, consider the wave-particle duality
in physics. Phil com m ents th a t E instein "always thought there
m ust be som e deeper theory th at w ould elim inate the apparent
contradiction.” If so, such a theory still rem ains inaccessible to
us. E instein’s opponents, physicists such as Nils B ohr and others,
appear to have w on the day, choosing to allow the antinom y of
light as wave and light as particle to stand. In fact, by doing so,
these physicists w ould argue, they have rem ained closer to the
tru th , though a t present the tru th appears incoherent. W hat is
one to do? At tim es one m ust think of light as waves. At other
tim es, as particles. In addition, one m ust restrict the im plications
of each pole of the antinom y so th at we don’t, as Phil puts it, end
up generating contradictions all over the place. That is to say, an
irresolvable antinom y needs to be contained in a specific concep
tual area rath e r th an allowed to spread like a virus.
3. It is striking to m e th at significant sectors of the scientific com
m unity employ the concept of antinom y in their scientific work,
specifically because they have observed empirical data that at
first glance are (and often after m any glances remain) contradic
tory and incoherent. Light functioning or behaving both as waves
and as particles represents just such an example. Conceptually,
the em pirical data are both observable and contradictory, at least
w ithin the boundaries of our present knowledge and models. Yet
because the phenom ena of light as both waves and particles have
been observed, physicists affirm both sides of the antinom y and
w ait for further inform ation to m ake sense of the observed phe
C hris: Antinom ies and Logic 45
nom ena. In addition, physicists appear perfectly capable of speak

ing to one another about physics and even about the antinom ies
ap parent in th eir science. The incoherence physicists m ust live
w ith in certain areas of th eir discipline does not prevent them
from effectively discussing the antinom ies in question and pos
sible ways in w hich they m ight be resolved.
4. W hen it com es to theological antinom ies, m any of them m ight
well be resolved through further inquiry, through the construction
of new theological m odels, and through further discoveries pro
vided by linguistic, historical, and cultural research. At present,
the openness m odel offers such a resolution.
The possibility does exist, however, th at there are genuine antinom ies
in theology. If so, we w ould expect them to occur at precisely those
junctures w here our access to inform ation or revelation is lim ited. Has
God, for instance, purposely chosen to rem ain silent or "secret” con
cerning various m atters we w ould like to know and investigate m ore
thoroughly? The possibility of divine secrets actually seem s probable
to me. We have been told by Moses, for example, th a t "the secret things
belong to the L ord ” (Deut. 29:29).
If so, why should we be surprised if the purposely lim ited revelation
given to us in S cripture leads to ju nctures w here theological coher
ence seem s to break down? Yes, like Einstein, we should do all in our
pow er to resolve an ap p aren t antinom y, w orking h ard to distinguish
betw een apparent and genuine antinom ies. (William Lane Craig’s work
on m iddle knowledge m ay well provide a way past the use of antinom y
in discussing foreknowledge and providence.) The possibility does exist,
however, th a t there is a deeper level of divine w isdom to w hich we do
not now have direct access. God, after all, has told us that there are cer
tain secrets th at rem ain his own. At this deeper secret level, antinom y
would disappear.
Not only so, but Phil believes—I think rightly—th at we should w ork
hard to m ake sense of antinom ies w hen we encounter them , m aking
as m uch sense of them as we can. Simultaneously, though, we should
attem pt to lim it o r contain contradiction, containing or fram ing it
w ithin one conceptual context, lest we breed contradictions and inco
herence on a vast scale. Still, at least for the tim e in w hich we live, the
use of antinom y seems to be a viable and defensible tool. Its use, though,
does require “discernm ent, astuteness, and honesty.” It should not be a
rabbit we pull out of the m agician's h at w henever we feel intellectually
lazy or can’t resolve a difficult theological problem immediately. You
are right, then, to challenge folks like Packer and me to defend the use
of antinomy, particularly if there m ight be a resolution to the problem
th a t is conceptually satisfying, coherent, and faithful to the biblical text.

At least for the present, however, I’m convinced th at the openness model
creates m ore problem s th an it solves. And even though you m ay feel that
the appeal to antinom y m ust inevitably lead to an inability to discuss
theological m atters publicly, I think you know exactly w hat I’m talking
about! I’ll sign off for now, b u t will add a thought or two on antinom y
t o m o n w Know th a t you rem ain in my prayers.

Chris
13 John: Antinomies and Logic
Dear Chris,
S o n y for my tardiness in responding. As you know there are some

people (including som e in the denom ination th a t owns my college) who
are upset w ith some of my views .This outspoken group of people doesn't
even come close to treating m e the sam e way you do. The m ost vocifer
ous am ong them do not even w ant to discuss m atters. They know they
are right, th a t I am therefore a “heretic,” and th at settles it. Some go so
far as to claim I’m not even a Christian. W hat troubles m e is not th at
people disagree w ith som e (not all) of my views. Rather, it is their lack
of Christian virtue in carrying out their crusade. The innuendo, gossip,
hearsay evidence, and even outright distortion of my views, coupled
w ith political pow er plays m ade to ensure th eir victory, leave me w on
dering w hether there is any place for thoughtful people in evangelical
theology. It appears to be m uch better in evangelicalism to be guilty of
adultery th an to be guilty of an e rran t belief, because evangelicals place
m uch m ore em phasis on correct doctrinal beliefs th an on correct living.
So, having to respond to all these attacks has taken up a lot of my tim e
lately, and th a t is why this is late.
Thank you for your com m ents on antinomy. Though I discussed this
in The God Who Risks, it is helpful to m ake some clarifications. First, I
w ant to point out th at it is not m erely proponents of openness who reject
the use of antinom ies. In his book The Providence o f God, Paul Helm
criticizes his fellow Calvinist J. I. Packer for putting forth this “solution”
47
to the problem of divine sovereignty and h u m an freedom . H elm and I

share some of the sam e criticism s.
Precisely w hat is an antinom y? The w ord literally m eans "against
law" (i.e., against the law of reason). Your colleague m akes some helpful
distinctions b u t does not go far enough. My colleague W illiam H asker
holds th a t there are at least four different types of antinomy. First are
the "merely verbal” or rhetorical type, such as the statem ent th at unless
a grain of w heat dies it cannot bring forth life. There really is no contra
diction here. Next are those th at are contradictions until a distinction is
m ade. For instance, an unbeliever is a living dead person. In this case the
w ords living and dead are not being used in the sam e sense—it m eans
one is physically alive though spiritually dead. Third are those th at are
straightforw ard contradictions, when both sides of the contradiction are
claim ed to be literally tru e and neither m ust be given up. For example,
God determ ines all things and God does not determ ine all things. These
are b oth tru e and we m ust not try to resolve them . Finally, som eone
else m ay acknowledge th at we have two contradictory statem ents but
hold th a t we m ust try to resolve them even if we presently do not know
how to resolve them . That is, there is no real contradiction b ut we don’t
know how to state the situation in such a way th at the appearance of
contradiction is removed.
Only in the th ird sense is there a genuine contradiction. Even Packer
says that the antinom y of divine sovereignty and hum an responsibility
is not a real contradiction—it is only an apparent one. W hat w ould be
a genuine contradiction? The assertion "God’s m ind is eternally settled
and God changes his m ind as he relates to us in history” is contradictory.
To say th at a tim eless being changes in any respect—for example, has
changing em otions—w ould be contradictory for change involves tim e.
The great classical theists such as Thom as Aquinas and John Calvin
understood th at this was a contradiction and so held th a t it is n ot true
th a t God changes his m ind or has changing em otions. A logical contra
diction asserts th a t “A is non-A.” Here are som e examples of contradic
tions: "The universe exists and does n ot exist,” or “This telephone is a
bald eagle.” They are gibberish, m eaningless statem ents of w hich we
can m ake no sense. So a logical contradiction is a very precise, narrow
m atter. It does not involve puns, riddles, and the like—only m eaning
less statem ents.
Packer seems to believe th at God determ ines everything th a t happens,
including hum an actions, and th a t hum ans are m orally responsible for
th eir actions. He says th at believing both of these is contradictory. But
actually there is no contradiction here whatsoever, since Packer defines
“m oral responsibility” as m eaning th a t hum ans are responsible for their
actions so long as they act on their desires. This is a "com patibilistic”
John: Antinom ies and Logic 49
account of h u m an freedom because it holds th a t divine determ inism

and hum an freedom are com patible rath e r th an contradictory; /Heneej-
hum ans are m orally responsible even though they are d e te rritW ^ JIy
God and could not have acted differently (since their desires are deter
m ined) because they act on th eir desires. Because he defines hum an
freedom in this way there is no contradiction at all, so why b other to use
the term antinom y ? This is a standard Calvinist explanation and there
is nothing antinom ian or contradictory about it.
In order to have a contradiction we have to define m oral responsibil
ity to m ean th a t hum ans are responsible for their actions only if they
are not determ ined to act in th at way (hum ans have “indeterm inistic”
freedom ). We w ould now be saying th a t God holds hum ans m orally
responsible for their determ ined actions and hum ans are not m orally
responsible for their determ ined actions. The gears in ou r brains grind
to a halt here. One m ight as well say th a t I ju st saw a colorless blue
car. This is literally nonsense. Are you claim ing th a t hum ans are both
indeterm inistically free (i.e., have libertarian freedom ) and not indeter
m inistically free? Do you hold th at God determ ines everything and th at
hum ans are not com pletely determ ined? I don’t think you do. B ut then,
w here is the contradiction and why bother to use the term antinom y ?
You say, “the use of antinom y seem s to be a viable and defensible tool.”
Aside from the fact th a t you do n ot even have an antinomy, I fail to see
how one could use som ething th a t is contradictory (a colorless blue car)
as a tool. How do you w ork w ith m eaningless statem ents?
Suppose we assert both that God determ ines all things and also that
hum ans are not completely determined. Now we are faced w ith a choice:
either both statem ents are simply true and genuinely contradictory, or
they both seem to be true but we don’t know how to resolve them right
now. If we simply stop w ith the contradiction, we have abandoned logic
and I for one don’t find it worthwhile to discuss m eaningless statements.
If you wish to hold contradictory theological statem ents as “true” you can
do so, but our conversation will be over. However, if we say that they only
seem contradictory, then we are adm itting th at at least one of the state
m ents is false. If one of the statem ents is false, then how can you object to
my attem p t to determ ine w hich one of them is false? You are welcom e
to disagree w ith my conclusion as to which one is false, but your attem pt
to short-circuit my attem pted resolution is simply not fair. Let m e be clear,
I’m not against you saying that I have not solved the problem and you
find it preferable to live w ith the problem rather th an accepting any of
the proposed solutions. But to say any attem pt to resolve the problem is
illegitimate is to reject the notion that one of the claims is false.
You uphold the wave-particle duality in physics as a scientific example
of an antinomy. Scientists understand light both as waves and as par-
tid e s—but do they see this as a contradiction? No, they do not. Physicists
do not say that light is a wave and also is a particle. Rather, waves and
particles are models, not literal descriptions. E ach model is an attem pt to
explain some of the data. In different experimental situations light seems
to operate differently. In some situations light has certain characteristics
in com m on w ith waves and in other situations has characteristics in com
m on w ith particles. Scientists are indeed puzzled by this, and no one has
yet developed a single model that explains all the data satisfactorily—but
it is not a contradiction. Consequently, your illustration fails.
You just had to bring up Deuteronom y 29:29, didn’t you! Well, I have
a few com m ents about this poor old, oft-abused little verse. The passage
is about the nature of the covenant between God and the people of Israel.
God says th at faithfulness to the covenant will result in blessings, while
faithlessness will result in curses. The future thus depends on the response
of the Israelites. This m ight leave people wondering how they could be
sure that they were faithful to Gods covenant. The answ er in the text is
th at God has revealed w hat they need to do—there is no mystery about
it! God has revealed his will for them ; it is not m ysterious, unknown, or
unfulfillable. God w ants them to know th at he has n ot m ade a secret
of how he will relate to them . There is no reason for them to be uneasy
about the future. This same them e carries on right into the next chapter,
where it is said that w hat God expects is not too difficult for them (30:11).
Though it is true th at the people are not inform ed as to the way in which
God will c a n y out the blessings and curses, they are to rest assured that
they know how God will relate to them . So, in my view D euteronom y
2 9:29 is not launching into some esoteric mystery but is giving hope to the
people. This verse has been so incredibly abused in church practice that
it is difficult for us now to see w hat the point of the text actually is.
Perhaps your underlying concern is that in our theology we need to leave
room for the fact that none of us fully comprehends God and that there will
always be areas of mystery. I affirm that this is the case. My concern about
antinom y is rather narrow. I’m only claiming that logical contradictions
(A = non-A) are not m eaningful discourse and should be avoided. You
m ay use the word contradiction in a broader sense, but I have this specific
m eaning in mind. If you speak to me in contradictions, I have no way of
understanding w hat you mean. Although the doctrine of the Trinity is a
mystery that cannot be fully grasped, I see no formal logical contradictions
in it. So, I’m no rationalist—I just w ant intelligible conversation.
In the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,

John
14 Chris: Logic and Metaphor
Dear John,
I w ant to develop som e of the ideas I m entioned in my last letter con

cerning antinom y and perhaps add a thought or two about m etaphor.
Here goes.
I’ve ru n across a set of essays by a group of R eform ed theologians,
none of w hom is pleased w ith the openness project. The collection is
entitled S ound Only Once: The Failure o f Open Theism, edited by Douglas
Wilson. It is W ilson’s essay th a t has caught my eye, and I’m interested
in how you m ight respond to aspects of his criticism of the openness
model. I’m going to attem pt to translate W ilson’s language into my own,
but if you ru n across an occasional statem ent surrounded by quotation
marks, the words are W ilson’s.
W ilson begins by noting “a fundam ental tension” in The God Who
Risks betw een your ideas on m etaphor and your call for a theology
based on logical consistency. W here does the tension lie? On the one
hand you w rite th at “m any people will be shocked by the notion that
God is a risk taker, for the m etaphor goes against the grain of ou r accus
tom ed thinking in regard to divine providence.” And yet you rightly note
that a good m etaphor shakes people’s conceptions, purposely rocking
their conceptual boat. Those m etaphors th at speak of God risking, for
instance, m ight well help us to see aspects of God’s character we w ould
too easily overlook because of the dom inance of other key m etaphors,
such as God as king.
51
W here does the tension lie, and how is it related to the issue of an tin
om y and the dem ands of logical consistency? You write th at “m etaphors
have the peculiar quality of saying th at som ething both ‘is’ and ‘is n o t.'”
That is, a m etaphor and anthropom orphic language are not designed to
be logically consistent. M etaphors and anthropom orphism s inherently
contain a yes and a no. M etaphors both affirm and deny. For instance,
w hen we speak of C hrist as a lam b we m ean to affirm th a t in som e sense
Christ is a lam b and is not a lam b. W hat’s the problem ?
W ilson observes th a t a few pages later in the book you contend th at all
theological m odels should be judged on their “public” and “conceptual
intelligibility.” E ntailed in intelligibility, you argue, is th a t “if a concept
is contradictory, it fails a key test for public intelligibility, since w hat is
contradictory is not m eaningful. . . . If concepts integral to the m odel are
m utually inconsistent, the coherence of the m odel is called into ques
tion.” Does this stricture w ork well for m etaphor? W ilson thinks not.
Because m etaphors inherently possess internal logical inconsistencies
(e.g., Christ is a lam b and isn’t a lam b), how do they m anage to com
m unicate coherently to us? If logical consistency is the stan d ard for
theological m odels, m etaphor ends up m eaningless, or else as a riddle
th a t m ust be reduced to nonm etaphorical language, squeezed for its
m eaning like one squeezes an orange for juice.
W hat is the result? We end up reducing the m etaphorical to the literal
in our search for consistency. Truth, by definition, m ust be nonm eta
phorical. Theology, by definition, m ust be reducible to publicly com pre
hensible logical statem ents. Though you have a strong allergic reaction
to Hellenistic thought, Wilson argues th at the preference for the literal
over the m etaphorical is rooted in the thought of Greek thinkers such as
Aristotle, who argued th at m etaphor was “a deviation from and a m ere
ornam ent on the literal.”
Can m etaphors be squeezed like lem ons to gain their inner truth, or is
som ething essential lost in the squeezing? Can a m etaphor be changed
easily into a logical syllogism, publicly coherent and com prehensible?
That, it seems, is the question. Of course, m any thinkers have believed
th a t the translation of m etaphor into logical proposition is absolutely
necessary if we are to attain genuine knowledge. David Kelley, for
example, writes th at w hen we reason "we are concerned w ith the logical
relationship am ong propositions. . . . To know how a given proposition
is logically related to others, we have to know exactly w hat the proposi
tion does and doesn’t say. If two people are using m etaphorical term s in
an argum ent, we w on’t know w hether they are really talking about the
sam e issue until we form ulate th eir position in literal term s.”
M etaphors in them selves ten d to be murky, messy, and logically
inconsistent. The real truth, then, lies underneath the m etaphor. M athe-
Chris: Logic and M etaphor 53
tnatics and logic are able to com m unicate knowledge, then, in a m anner
th at a m etaphor cannot, a position W ilson identifies both w ith Hellenis-
n : thinkers such as Aristotle and w ith E nlightenm ent thinkers such as
Locke and Hobbes. Again, can m etaphors be reduced to m athem atical
form ulas or logical syllogisms? W hat is lost in this reduction—a reduc
tion, it seems, based on the quest for logical consistency?
In W ilson’s words, “M etaphor calls up m any aspects of our being
em otional, m oral, aesthetic, im aginative, bodily) th a t are central to
knowledge b u t don’t fit into neat m athem atical boxes.’’ Are there not
'noncognitive depths” w ithin m etaphor th a t are lost w hen we employ
roo narrow a use of reason? This, at least, seems to be Wilson's argu
ment, and I think it’s w orth chewing on. He's convinced th a t openness
theologians such as yourself are trying to synthesize two w orlds—the
world of E nlightenm ent rationality and the w orld of m etaphor, but the
synthesis ends up drastically reducing the m etaphorical.
Let’s move on a bit. In your objection to antinom y, you w rite th at
those who employ antinom ies seek “to escape the rules surrounding
intelligibility.” If we are going to do theology, you believe, "we simply
have to ‘play by the rules’ of the game, and one of these rules is th a t our
discourse m ust m ake sense.” Fine, bu t then I begin to get a bit confused.
On the one hand you state th a t your position "does not rule out paradox
and m ystery. . . or m etaphors and riddles.” On the other hand, the open
ness m odel “simply excludes discourse th a t lies outside the boundaries
of consistency and coherence—th at is, nonsense.” A m ystery or paradox,
then, m ust be reducible to rational intelligibility.
I think this is precisely the problem. Your argum ent seems to be that
all m eaningful language m ust be literal, coherent, and capable of reduc
tion to a logical syllogism. How is this stance significantly different
from the logical positivism th at seems to have ru n its course? To quote
W ittgenstein: “The lim its of my language m eans the lim its of my world.
Logic pervades the world: the lim its of the w orld are also its lim its. . . .
The right m ethod of philosophy w ould be this. To say nothing except
w hat can be said.” Or A. J. Ayer: “It is only if it is literally m eaningful
. . th at a statem ent can properly be said to be either tru e or false . . .
(Otherwise] it w ould not be capable of being understood in the sense
in which either scientific hypotheses or com m on-sense statem ents are
habitually understood.” Hence, the m etaphorical m ust be reduced to
the literal. At tim es, John, you sound a lot like these guys. B ut w hat’s
the problem ?
Can the anthropom orphism s in the Bible be easily reduced to univo
cal term s? You readily acknowledge the b road n um ber of anthropom or
phism s in the Bible. Indeed, "the use of m etaphors and anthropom or
phic language (in the broad sense) w hen speaking of God is necessary.”
Right. I agree w hen you write, “If God decides to disclose him self to
us as a personal being w ho enters into relationship w ith us, w ho has
purposes, emotions, and desires, and who suffers with us, then we ought
to rejoice in this anthropom orphic p o rtrait.” I'm in agreem ent. All God’s
w ords are gifts and we should rejoice in all of them . I disagree, how
ever, w ith the deduction you draw from the anthropom orphism . For
you conclude th at we should accept the anthropom orphic p o rtrait as
"disclosing to us the very nature of God.” How so?
Here it seem s you reduce the anthropom orphic to the literal. That
is, the only interpretive option you seem to allow is the univocal under
standing of term s such as desires, em otions, suffering, and so on. The
both/and ch aracter of m etap h o r is reduced to the univocal, logical
syllogism. This seem s to m e to be a serious w eakness in the openness
model. I’d better sign off for now.
You’re In m y prayers,
Chris
I d John: Metaphor
and Interpretation
lood morning. Chris.
It is a beautiful Saturday m orning here and it was w onderful to

see the ducks and geese sw im m ing in the open w ater on the m ostly
ice-covered cam pus lake. In the distance I heard a dog barking and I
thought of your letter on my understanding of m etaphor. Woof! Woof!
Can you h ear it? That is the sound of a dog barking up the wrong tree.
You followed Wilson dow n the p ath and continued to follow him w hen
he left the path and now you have lost the trail and stand barking at a
tree thinking you have treed the raccoon (me), b u t I’m n ot anywhere
dose to w here you think I am. Since you have lost the scent so badly
perhaps I should take som e responsibility for not leaving enough on the
mail for you to follow. So let m e take this opportunity to get you back
on my tail. Aren’t these w onderful m etaphors! Just for fun, in the rest
of this letter I will boldface type for some of my m etaphors so you see
m at I relish m etaphors.
You say th a t W ilson sp ots a fundam ental ten sion betw een my ideas
on m etaphor and my claim th a t our theological discou rse m ust not be
logically contradictory. He argues th at m etaphors, by their very nature,
are self-contradictory. Since m etaphors say th at som ething both is and
is not, there is a contradiction. For instance, Christ is both a lam b and
not a lam b. We say th a t Jesus is the lam b of God w ho takes away the
55
sin of the world. B ut actually Jesus is a h u m an and not a physical lam b

at all so is this n o t a contradiction? No, it is not. In m y last letter o n '
antinom y I d efined a logical contradiction as the claim th a t A = non-A.
That is, holding th a t som ething both is and is not in exactly the sam e
sense. For example, claim ing th at the walls of my office are completely
w hite and com pletely purple at the sam e tim e. Is this the sort of thing
we are doing w hen we say Jesus is a lam b and not a lam b? Not at all.
Jesus is like a lam b in som e senses and not like a lam b in other senses.
If we said th at Jesus is the sacrificial lam b w hose blood w ash es away
ou r sins and th at Jesus is n ot the sacrificial lam b w hose blood washes
away our sins, that would be a contradiction. M etaphors are not inher
ently contradictory. W ilson is out to lunch on this.
You go on to claim th at I reduce the m etaphorical to the literal, since
tru th m ust, by definition, be nonm etaphorical. You think I’m saying "all
m eaningful language m ust be literal, coherent, and capable of reduction
to a logical syllogism.” You say th a t I’m buying into the preference of
placing the literal over the m etaphorical rooted in the thought of the
Greek philosophers, refined by E nlightenm ent thinkers and th at I end
up lookin g like a “logical positivist.” Ouch!!
Let m e respond by saying th at there has indeed been a strong preju
dice against m etaphor in W estern philosophy. The underlying assum p
tion has been th a t our language p ictures reality in a direct, literal
m anner w hen we exclude m etaphors. M etaphors have been considered
deviant expressions th a t can be tran slated into literal words. M eta
phors are sim ply flow ery language for w hat can be said in straightfor
ward words. This way of thinking runs deep in evangelical theological
approaches to Scripture. It was w hat I was tau g h t in the evangelical
schools I attended and in the leading evangelical theology books. In
fact, in a couple of unpublished papers, Charles W hite argues th at one
of the key problem s in the debate betw een classical and open theists is
the failure of the classical theists to grasp how open theists understand
m etaphor. W hite docum ents th at evangelical Calvinist critics of open
theism affirm the principle th a t the m etaphorical language of Scripture
is to be reduced to the literal and these sam e critics fault open theists
for failing to practice this. However, now you say just the opposite. You
accuse m e of operating by the sam e rules accepted by my Calvinist crit
ics. Well, do I or don’t I affirm th at the m etaphorical m ust be reduced
to the literal? Though I was taught this by my evangelical professors, I
do not, in fact, accept it. I have em braced a “post-critical” approach to
knowing and have rejected the "picture theory” of language.
So how do I perceive the use of m etaphors? Though I have m uch
m ore reflection to do on this subject, I will tell you th at I have been
in fluenced by the study of "cognitive linguistics.” In The God Who Risks
fetm : M etaphor and Interpretation 57
I noted a num ber of studies on m etaphor th at have shaped my think

ing. Among these is the w ork of George Lakoff and M ark Johnson. In
their book Metaphors We Live By, they sh ow how b asic m etaphor is
to the way we conceive reality. The w ord “conceive” is w hat they call
a. *dead” m etaphor in th at we forget th a t it is a sexual m etaphor and
take it to be “literal.” I hold th a t all of the biblical language about God
s m etaphorical. In The God Who R isks I wrote: “The m etaphorical and
anthropom orphic language of the Bible is taken seriously because it is
through the idiom of Scripture and its various m etaphors th a t we under
stand and relate to God. The language of Scripture is ‘reality depicting’
in that w hat we understand to be real is m ediated through its m etaphors
and images. M etaphors help us m ake sense of things.”
In these very few w ords I was trying to sum up a lot of discussion
about m etaphor. Lakoff and Johnson suggest th a t m etaphors do not
prim arily "describe” one item in term s of another (a standard view of
m etaphor). Rather, they think of m etaphors as con cep tu al m aps by
which we give m eaning to our experiences. Conceptual m etaphors are
abstractions drawn from concrete objects or events by w hich we under
stand ou r experiences. One of th eir m any illustrations of conceptual
m etaphor is “argum ent as war.” W arfare is a very concrete, physical,
event. Though not all cultures conceptualize verbal disputes in term s
o f warfare, we in the West do. That is, we m ake sense of our debates by
framing them in light o f war. For instance, we say:
1. Your claims are indefensible.

2. He attacked every weak point in my argum ent.
3. H er criticism s were on target.
4. I destroyed his argum ent.
5. I’ve never w on an argum ent w ith her.
6. If you use that strategy he’ll wipe you out.
7. She shot down all my ideas.
These expressions m ap ou r conception of w ar onto the activity of

argum ent.” O ther cultures do not understand argum ent in term s of w ar
out we have found it useful to do so. We are not saying th a t argum ent
actually is war. Rather, w arfare is the conduit through w hich we co n
ceive of argum entation. Conceptual m etaphors are vehicles by w hich
we understand our world. Hence, we can’t do w ithout them . However,
conceptual m etaphors m ap out reality only partially, and they constrain
the ways in w hich we think. That is, thinking of argum ent as w ar m ay
help us m ake sense of argum entation, but it also m ay prevent us from
understanding argum entation in other ways. Conceptualizing God as
an eagle carrying its young on its back to safety (Exod. 19:4) helps us
m ake sense of God’s relationship to Israel. Conceptualizing God as

having protective wings over us (Ps. 17:8), as a husband (Hosea 2:2),
o r as stretching out his arm (Deut. 4:34) tow ard us “m aps” the way the
biblical w riters understood w ho God is and the way God relates to us.
God blew his nostrils and the w aters parted (Exod. 15:8) is a delightful
conceptualization of w hat God did for his people.
My evangelical Calvinist critics ask why open theists don’t take the
biblical language about God having arm s and eyes or wings literally
if we take the biblical language about God changing his m ind, having
em otions, and the like, literally. They say, “If you take one m etaphor
literally, you m ust take them all literally.” Well, p art of the answ er is that
the w ord literal is unhelpful here. For me, all of these are conceptual
m etaphors—I don't take them “literally” in the sense in w hich my crit
ics employ the w ord literal. For them , literal m eans th a t the language
is describing an object as it really is. They em phasize the descriptive
function of language, while I em phasize the conceptual function of
language. The biblical m etaphors about God enable us to conceptualize
(i.e., give m eaning to) our experience of God in term s of very concrete
events or objects.
M any of the critics of open theism take term s such as im m utable
(unchangeable), impassible (cannot be affected by another), and sover
eign (has control over) as literal descriptions of God. But these term s are
conceptual m etaphors, not literal descriptors. However, we have long
forgotten th a t immutable is a m etaphor, and thus it has now becom e a
dead m etaphor th a t is taken literally. M any of my critics seem to take
the dead m etaphors for literal representations of God.
Let m e move on to your last criticism : th a t I only allow for a “univo
cal understanding of term s such as desires, em otions, suffering, and so
on” w hen speaking of God. I tru st by now th a t you see this is not so.
N evertheless, there is one statem ent in ch ap ter tw o of The God Who
Risks w here I slip up in this regard o r at least need to explain myself. I
did speak of a “h ard literal core” or a “univocal core” to ou r talk about
God. Thus far, David Williams, in an unpublished paper, is the only one
who has called me out on this. I see now th at my choice of words there
could lead one to think th at I agree w ith Carl Henry, N orm an Geisler,
and other evangelical theologians in disparaging the use of m etaphors
in favor of “literal” language for God.
If I don’t agree w ith this line of thinking, then w hat do I believe? As
already stated, I believe th at we are using conceptual m etaphors to think
about the nature of God and God’s relationship w ith us. This is the way
things are, and it is good. O ur conceptual m etaphors are the m eans by
w hich we give m eaning to our experience of God. The position against
w hich I was arguing in this section in my book is the view that, since
John: M etaphor and Interp retatio n 59
God is ontologically different from creatures, we cannot speak about

or know anything about God. That is, I was arguing against the long
standing tradition of viewing the biblical language about God as “baby
talk” and not the p roper way to think of God. M any have held th a t there
is a “God behind” or "beyond” the God of the Bible. For them , hum an
language, including the biblical language about God, does not disclose
any tru th [any significant truth?] about who God is. W ith Luther and
Barth I affirm th at God genuinely discloses him self to us in the biblical
revelation and m ost fully in Jesus (Heb. 1:3), such th a t there is no “God
rehind God.” Rather, h u m an language is adequate, though not perfect,
tor understanding the God who comes to us, especially in Jesus. I stand
opposed to those w ho deny th at the biblical portrayal of God, in all its
m anifold conceptual m etaphors, is “reality depicting.” We need the
m ultitude of m etaphors for God, since they p ain t different p arts of the
mosaic. But I hold th a t these m etaphors are not necessarily contradic
tory just because they are m etaphors.
Is all this clear as m ud? It is well past tim e for lunch and I m ust get
home. Let m e adm it th a t I’ve been rath e r playful w ith you in this let
ter and I hope you take it in the spirit I send it. W hen we are together
we know how to tease one another even while we are doing "serious”
theology. It is my hope th a t w hat I’ve said will put you onto my scent
so that you will be able to find the right tree in w hich this raccoon is
sitting.
¥dur fellow servant,

John
16 Chris: Impassibility,
Immutability, and the Incarnation
Dear John,
I’m sitting at my desk, looking out the w indow lazily, and wishing I
were outside hitting golf balls rath e r th an inside trying to fathom Gods
providence, nature, relationship to tim e, the problem of evil, and why
so m any people seem to be angry w ith you! It’s enough to give one a
headache. I was m using, for instance, on a line of yours I m entioned in
a previous letter. In p art it reads, “If God decides to disclose him self to
us as a personal being . . . w ho has purposes, em otions, and desires, and
who suffers w ith us, then we ought to rejoice in this anthropom orphic
po rtrait.” Indeed, you write, it discloses “to us the very nature of God.”
R em em ber those lines? Well, they’ve got m e thinking, and today I’m
pondering the idea of God suffering.
W hy am I both attracted to the idea of God suffering and confused
by it? W hy has the church insisted century after century th a t God is
im passible (incapable of suffering or being affected by som eone else)?
Is this a doctrine th at I should continue to defend? If so, why? If not,
why not? Does God experience suffering or passion? W ithout a doubt,
as you point out, som e biblical texts portray God as suffering. One only
has to th ink of Paul’s words in Ephesians 4:30, “And do n ot grieve the
Holy Spirit of God, w ith w hich you were m arked w ith a seal for the day
of redem ption.” If the Holy Spirit can be grieved, surely God can suffer.
60
C hris: Im passibility, Im m utability, and the Incarnation 61
Or so it would seem. Yet the church fathers, m edieval theologians such

as Anselm and Thom as Aquinas, and reform ers such as Calvin affirm ed
divine impassibility. It’s enough to m ake one w ant to grab a three wood
and h ead for the first hole!
I can u n derstand and to an extent appreciate openness theologians’
insistence on divine passibility. It is deeply com forting to know th at God
is near to us, understands ou r suffering and fears, and loves us deeply.
.And if God is genuinely open to us in the m anner you describe, surely
God can be disappointed, w ounded, saddened, grieved, and so on. If
God experiences these reactions w ithin “the very nature of God,” God
can and m ust actually change.
Furtherm ore, it certainly seems th at a robust understanding of divine
passibility goes hand in hand with the reality of God changing in response
to situations or influences outside of God. If I can grieve God by my atti
tudes or behaviors in the same m anner th at I can grieve my wife, then my
actions in tim e can move God from a state of happiness or joy to a state
of grief or sadness, at least w ith respect to the relationship betw een God
and me. Hence, God w ould surely be vulnerable: I, as an external cause,
could cause suffering and its attendant changes in God.
I don’t seem to be the only theologian struggling w ith impassibility.
Many folks have jettisoned the doctrine because they have felt th at it
is simply indefensible. Clark Pinnock comes to m ind. Clark writes, for
example, th a t “im passibility is the m ost dubious of the divine a ttri
butes discussed in classical theism , because it suggests th a t God does
not experience sorrow, sadness o r pain. It appears to deny th at God is
touched by the feelings of our infirm ities, despite w hat the Bible says
about his love and his sorrow.” Im passibility does seem to separate God
from som e of the m ost significant aspects of h u m an life. And yet I’m
still unwilling to let it go. Why?
Well, one reason is th a t there seems to be quite a bit in Scripture th a t
affirms God’s impassibility, th at is, God’s w ondrous self-sufficiency. Part
of the w onder of God is th a t he does not need anything outside him self
to com plete or satisfy him self (Job 22:2-3; 35:6-7; Ps. 50:10-12). God
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit has always enjoyed an ineffable rela
tionship of exquisite love. No aspect of the divine nature is insufficient
or wanting. In a m anner of speaking, God does not need us b u t freely
invites us into the family—for ou r sakes, not his.
Second, Scripture does seem to teach th at God is not obligated to us.
W hen God responds to Abraham's request to spare Sodom, for example,
he does so out of mercy, not obligation.
Third, I still find it difficult to und erstan d how God can possibly
learn anything from us th at w ould surprise God, catch him off guard,
or elicit an em otional m ovem ent of grief in God as God. I do think this
is possible for God incarnate, but I w ould lim it this m ovem ent to the
hum anity the W ord has assum ed for o u r sake.
We probably need to discuss biblical texts in m ore detail reg ard
ing the nature of God’s response to h u m an beings. I realize th at there
are biblical texts th a t speak of God being surprised or grieved at the
behavior of Israel. You’ve been rem inding m e of this for m onths! The
question for m e is how we are to interpret these texts. For instance, is
God som ehow accom m odating him self to us in these texts or should
they be interpreted univocally? That issue will have to be set aside, at
least m omentarily. I w ould contend, though, th at texts such as Rom ans
11:33-36 indicate th a t God is neith er obligated to any h u m an being
nor counseled or instructed by any h u m an being. He doesn’t need our
advice and is not surprised by w hat we do. And yes, I realize I will have
to m ake sense out of the biblical texts th a t portray God as listening to
Moses, being surprised by Israel’s behavior, and so on.
Finally—and here’s the big one for w hat we finally decide about
im passibility—I don’t believe God changes. Im passibility is inextricably
linked to imm utability. If suffering entails change, God cannot suffer.
N um bers 23:19, for example, states “God is not a hum an being, th at he
should lie, o r a m ortal, th at he should change his m ind.” Also 1 Sam uel
15:29 and M alachi 3:6 come to m ind. It was biblical considerations such
as these th at convinced the church fathers th a t God was both im passible
and im m utable. This does not m ean, however, th at I’m forbidden to
affirm “God suffers.” W hat is decisive is w hat I m ean w hen I say this.
Cyril of Alexandria, for instance, argued for years w ith N estorius
over the phrase theotokos (“G od-bearer” or “m other of God”). Should
M ary be called the m other of God? Cyril said yes. N estorius said no.
At first glance, N estorius’s position seem s both m ore biblical and m ore
logical. After all, can God be born? This possibility seems a contradic
tion in term s. And yet, Cyril argued, Nestorius's reluctance to call Mary
the m other of God dem onstrated a failure to understand the w onder of
the incarnation. W ho was being b o m in Bethlehem ? W ho had joined
him self to h u m an natu re in M ary’s womb? Simply divinity? No. Rather,
the second person of the blessed Trinity had joined him self to hum an
nature and was born on Christm as day. Thus it was not only appropriate
to call M ary the m other of God (theotokos), but to fail to do so w ould be
to seriously u ndercut and weaken the gospel itself.
Cyril unapologetically defended the use of theological language th at
at first glance m akes little sense: God has been born, God has died,
God suffers. However (and this is the point w here I think I differ from
openness theologians), it is the incarnate W ord who genuinely suffers
in his hum anity. Thus we affirm th a t God suffers. In Cyril’s words, “The
m ystery of Christ runs the risk of being disbelieved precisely because
Chris: Im passibility, Im m utability, and the Incarnation 63
it is so incredibly w onderful.” How so? “For God was in hum anity. He

who was above all creation was in our hum an condition; the invisible
one was m ade visible in the flesh; he w ho is from the heavens and from
on high was in the likeness of earthly things; the im m aterial one could
be touched; he who is free in his own n a tu re cam e in the form of a
slave; he who blesses all creation becam e accursed; he who is all righ
teousness was num bered am ong transgressors; life itself cam e in the
appearance of death.” God is born, suffers, and dies because God the
Word has joined him self to h u m an nature, and in th a t natu re the W ord
experiences birth, suffering, and death.
In a sense I've com e full circle in this letter and u n d erstan d m ore
clearly w here we differ. You understand the po rtrait of God painted by
biblical authors as “disclosing to us the very n a tu re of God.” W hat I
m ight describe as accom m odation you see as univocal com m unication.
I would argue, then, th a t the incarnation is the clearest instance of God’s
accom m odation to us. In the incarnation the W ord enters our world,
accom m odating his divinity to ou r hum anity, and indeed suffers and
dies w ith us. This is possible because of the hypostatic union—the W ord
has genuinely joined his nature to ours. In th at natu re he suffers w ith
us. As for the “very nature of God,” however, God rem ains w ondrously
and ineffably im passible and im m utable. This thought needs further
development, but I’d better sign off for now.
You’re in m y prayers,
Chris
1 7 John: Impassibility, Immutability,
and the Incarnation
Dear Chris,
Som e pastors in the denom ination th at owns my college are upset

w ith my publications on open theism and inclusivism (my hope th a t
God will provide a m eans of salvation for those w ho have never heard
the gospel). One of the regular com m ittees has decided to look into the
m atter. Yesterday I m et w ith the chair of the com m ittee and found him
to be gracious and thoughtful. Moreover, he is able to state my views
correctly! That is som ething th a t m any folks are either unable or unw ill
ing to do. Som e evangelicals m ake little or no effort to understand.
Instead, they resort to hearsay, innuendo, and inflam m atory rhetoric.
Som e evangelicals seem to believe th at getting rid of som eone who is
teaching som ething they don’t like allows them to use even unethical
m eans to accom plish this end. Again, it seem s th a t correct belief m at
ters m ore to evangelicals th an m oral behavior. I’m am azed th at even
scholars are resorting to underhanded m easures in order to discredit
my views. Their acerbic tone and their, I believe som etim es intentional,
m isstating of my position shows th at they do not w ant to have dialogue
w ith me, they sim ply w ant to bury me. That is why the conversations
betw een us are so refreshing. We disagree, but we are trying to learn
the tru th through the process. Moreover, we are both able to take our
w ork seriously w ithout taking ourselves too seriously. Of course, we
64
John: Im passibility, Im m utability, and the Incarnation 65
both seek to serve ou r Lord but neither of us believes th at the kingdom

of God stands or falls w ith us.
Now to your discussion of divine impassibility. The term impassibility
has a range of m eanings, and historical theologians debate its m eaning
when used, for example, in the Council of Chalcedon in a .d . 451. Gen
erally, however, the term m ay be understood to m ean th at God is not
affected by creatures. We do not influence God n o r does God respond
ro us. W hat we do has no affect on w hat God decides to do or on w hat
God experiences. For example, God cannot be m ade sorrowful. This
seems to go against the clear teaching of Scripture. The biblical w riters
portray God as “grieving” over h u m an sin (Gen. 6:6; Eph. 4:30), being
disappointed in the failure of Saul (1 Sam. 15:11, 35), being provoked to
anger in response to habitual faithlessness (Exod. 32:10; Isa. 5:25), and
as being affected by the prayers (or lack of them ) of his people (Exod.
32:14; 2 Kings 20). These are but a few of the sorts of texts we cite in
our books as evidence th a t the notion th at God is not responsive to us
and is unaffected by us is sim ply w rongheaded.
You ask, “W hy has the church for century after century insisted that
God is im passible?” I have two responses to this.
First, it is correct th at the m ajority voice in the Christian tradition was
for impassibility. However, it is no longer the m ajority voice. For the past
r.vo centuries the doctrine of divine im passibility has been increasingly
discarded by Christian thinkers. Today, it is a m inority position, even
within evangelicalism. Wayne Grudem , for instance, criticizes the W est
m inster Confession for accepting the “unbiblical” notion th a t God is
-w ithout passions.” M illard Erickson surveys recent evangelical theolo
gians and concludes th a t “the traditional doctrine of im passibility is not
die current one” am ong contem porary evangelicals. So you are incor
rect to say th at “the church” has always affirm ed this doctrine (unless
you don’t th in k th a t these m odern th in k ers belong to th e church).
Moreover, from the beginning there has been a tension in the writings
of m any theologians regarding divine impassibility. For instance, Justin
M artyr discusses the issue but then blurts out, “B ut God is not a stone!”
He is wrestling w ith the problem and does not know how to resolve it. In
die ninth century John Scotus Erigena affirm ed absolute im passibility
but then adm itted th at the Bible “shouts on all sides” th at this is false.
In addition to this tension there has been a “protest” m inority position.
In the th ird century Gregory T haum aturgus w rote a treatise on divine
impassibility in w hich he argued that, unlike us, God cannot be forced
to suffer b ut God can voluntarily choose to becom e vulnerable and open
to suffering. It is God’s free will to decide w hether or not to be open to
being affected by us. If God cannot choose to suffer, says Gregory, then
God is subject to great suffering for then God is lim ited. My point is
th at the church has not been of one voice on this m atter, and today you
represent the m inority view while I affirm the m ajority position. Can
you see my chest all puffed out w ith pride about this?
Second, great C hristian thinkers did read th eir Bibles and yet still
affirm ed impassibility. Why? They had powerful argum ents th at shaped
the way they interpreted Scripture. One of these argum ents is th at God
is perfect and a perfect being could never change, for any change w ould
only be a change for the worse. If God suffered because of us or was
affected by us in any way, th a t w ould be a change in God and thus God
w ould not be perfect. Another argum ent th at goes along w ith this is th at
as creator God m ust be absolutely independent of us—he cannot rely on
us for anything. Also, God m ust be timeless, and a tim eless being cannot
experience any change (because change involves tim e). Since suffering
involves a change, a tim eless being cannot suffer. All of these argum ents
center aro u n d the notion th a t change is contrary to perfection. The
desire for som ething th at is unchangeable seem s to have been an influ
ential value in Greek thought. Today we no longer hold th at all change
is im perfection. In fact, to be in relationship and not change seem s less
th an perfect. But in the centuries after the apostles, the Christian writers
swam in the w aters of the predisposition th at all change is bad for divin
ity. This notion was taken for granted and few challenged it. Instead, the
route taken by m ost C hristian w riters was to uphold the assum ption of
im passibility and yet try to say in som e way th a t God cares for us. In my
opinion it would have been better if Gregory T haum aturgus’s view had
w on the day—th a t God could voluntarily choose to suffer. However, the
influence of this Greek philosophical notion (any change is bad for God)
proved, in the end, too strong for m ost Christians to overcome.
This led m any C hristians to the very conclusions you now affirm:
God, as God, cannot suffer. You are not saying th a t God chooses not to
suffer. Rather, you are asserting th at there is som ething th a t God cannot
do even if he w anted to. Hence, w hen it comes to Jesus, you follow their
lead and say th at only the hum anity of Jesus suffered because his divin
ity is incapable of suffering. The “God side” of Jesus “know s” about the
suffering of the h u m an side of Jesus, bu t the God side never experiences
suffering. I think the reason the Council of Chalcedon anathem atizes
anyone w ho says the divinity of Jesus suffered is because the Council
m em bers held the assum ption th at God, as God, cannot suffer, so you
cannot allow the divine natu re of Jesus to experience any suffering.
But w hat if we did not accept this assum ption and w ent instead w ith
Gregory’s idea th a t God cannot be forced to suffer b u t th a t God can
voluntarily choose to suffer? I believe this opens up a m uch better way
to go and avoids several significant problem s.
John: Im passibility, Im m utability, an d the Incarnation 67
One of the problem s is your incorrect conclusion th a t if God can

suffer, God is not self-sufficient. This sim ply does not follow. Nobody
is saying th a t God had to create a world and th at if God decides to cre
ate one, he has to suffer or depend on us. However, we are saying that
God can choose to create a w orld in w hich he freely decides to delegate
responsibility for som e things to us. God can choose to be, for som e
things, dependent on us (e.g., feeding the hungry). God is not obligated
to operate this way. Nobody is m aking God ru n the w orld this way, it
is sim ply the way God decided to do it. Do you w ant to say, w ith Paul
Helm, th a t God cannot do it this way? The open view em phasizes the
eternal love of the Holy Trinity. God did not have to create in order for
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to eternally share love. There is no
“lonely God” needing to create. The loving Trinity freely created a w orld
and w ants to share the eternal divine love w ith creatures. B ut love can
not be forced, and so God freely took the “risk of love” in th a t it was
possible th a t we w ould not respond to God’s love by loving him back
and loving our fellow creatures. Clearly, hum anity has spurned God’s
gracious love and this has led to God’s experiencing grief. Yes, God as
God can suffer because God opens him self in his love to us to allow us
to affect him. The self-sufficient God opens him self to include others
even to the point of being, for som e things, vulnerable to disappoint
m ent w hen we fail to love.
The next problem this approach avoids is sum m ed up in the following
question: Does Jesus reveal w hat God is really like? One of m y Calvinist
critics said at a conference: “You cannot use Jesus to establish w hat God
is like because Jesus is also h um an.” I about fell off my chair. This per
son was, however, identifying a problem in th e tradition: affirm ing th at
Jesus is fully God and yet holding th at w hat we actually see in Jesus is
only his hum an nature. W hat then are we to m ake of statem ents such as
“He w ho has seen me has seen the F ather” (John 14:9); “Jesus discloses
to us the very nature of God” (Heb. 1:3); and “in [Jesus] the fullness of
deity dwelled in bodily form ” (Col. 2:9)? You say th at “the incarnation
is the clearest instance of God’s accom m odation to us.” I prefer to say
that the incarnation is the clearest instance of God's self-disclosure to
us. The things th a t Jesus said and did are w hat God is like. Unless, th at
is, you have som e presum ed concept of God th a t you use to filter the
revelation of God. Do you have a presupposed notion of w hat God m ust
be like (dignum Deo) th a t you then im pose on the biblical text and on
Jesus so th at you know th at the sufferings of Jesus are m erely hum an,
not divine sufferings? You say th a t you agree w ith Cyril th at in Jesus
“God has died, God suffers” and you go on to say th at “it is the incarnate
Word w ho genuinely suffers in his hum anity.” “Genuinely suffers?” How
so if the divine Son cannot suffer? I affirm w hat you and Cyril w ant to
get to: God suffered in Jesus. However, I think you folks took a w rong
tu rn and cannot actually get to w here you w ant to go unless you tu rn
around.
The approach th at says th at God as God cannot suffer and cannot
lim it him self in any respect has led to all sorts of confusion regarding
the claim in Philippians 2:7 th a t the divine Son "em ptied h im self’ in
becom ing incarnate. Em ptied him self of w hat? Som e have said th a t the
Son gave up certain divine attributes such as om niscience (Matt. 24:36).
But then, was he really God? God in Christ saved us so the hum anity of
the Son cannot involve a surrender of divinity. Perhaps if we began w ith
Jesus as the disclosure of w hat God is like it w ould lead us to modify our
preconceived notions of w hat is fitting for God to be. Thus, self-lim ita
tion need n ot involve giving up deity. Perhaps self-giving, self-sacrifice,
and self-lim itation is p a rt of w hat the loving Trinity is like. For me, w hat
Jesus is like discloses w hat God is like. W illiam Placher puts it well: "So
the God who becom es a particular, lim ited h u m an being is acting out
ju st w hat it m eans to be a God of love.” I agree w ith Luther: the cross
discloses the very heart of God. If we allow Jesus to teach us w hat God
is like, then we can say th at God, as God, can suffer in his love for us
and we need not go through the m ental gym nastics to ensure th at only
the hum an nature of Jesus suffered.
Finally, I believe this approach overcom es the problem of accom m o
dation. The issue is not, as you say, th at I believe the biblical language
to be a univocal (one-to-one) com m unication from God while you think
it is an accom m odating com m unication. I already said th a t they are
conceptual m etaphors. The real issue here is, from w here do we get our
m ost basic inform ation about w hat God is like? In one sense I can agree
w ith you th a t God has to speak our lingo if he w ants to com m unicate
w ith us. But you go on to say th a t God is speaking a sort of “baby talk”
to us in m ost of Scripture. To know th a t som eone is speaking baby talk
you also have to know “adult talk.” In the case of God, you also have to
know God’s grown-up talk in order to know th at God is speaking baby
talk to us. You believe I’m taking the baby talk of Scripture way too
seriously. Well, please teach m e God’s grown-up talk. But how are you
privileged to know God’s grown-up talk? How did you come to know
w hat God is really like so th a t you could read the Bible and pick out
God's baby talk from God’s grown-up talk? Again, is Jesus sim ply God’s
baby talk to us? I think not.
I say you see “m ost of S cripture” as baby talk because you do lift
up som e verses as describing w hat God is really like. You say th at the
Bible teaches divine im passibility because to suffer involves change
a n d the B ible says th a t God does n o t change (Num . 23:19; 1 Sam .
15:29; Mai. 3:6). This sounds like you have, heaven forbid, some sort of
John: Im passibility, Im m utability, and the Incarnation 69
"univocal” understanding in m ind. Ha! Do these verses teach th a t God

cannot change in any respect? These verses have been favorite proof
texts for theologians throughout the centuries. The reason I say “proof
texts” is because they already had preconceived notions about w hat
God m ust be like (the philosophical argum ents I m entioned above)
and used these verses to support their claim s of absolute im m utability
unchangeability).
However, m ost biblical scholars today do not believe these verses
teach this. The two texts th a t say th a t God will not change his m ind
refer to specific situations in w hich God refuses to reverse a particular
decision. In one case God refuses to allow Balaam to change the divine
m ind and curse Israel (Num. 23:19), while in the other God rejects
Saul's pleas to keep the kingship in his family (1 Sam. 15:29). The first
Samuel passage is especially instructive. God inform s Sam uel th at he
"regrets” th a t he m ade Saul king (15:11) to w hich Sam uel responded
by praying all night for God to change his m ind back and allow Saul to
rem ain king. But God refused Samuel's intercession. Subsequently, Saul
begs th at the divine decision be rescinded. In response Sam uel says that
God will not change his m ind back to his original plan (15:29). The story
concludes by reiterating th at God changed his m ind about m aking Saul
king (15:35). And sandw iched betw een two declarations of God chang
ing his m ind (15:11, 35) is the rem ark th at God will not change his m ind
15:29). This chapter says both th a t God changes his m ind and will not
change his m ind. In its context the teaching is clear: God reserves the
right to alter his plans in response to hum an initiative and it is also the
divine right not to alter an alteration. God had originally planned on
establishing Saul's household for a perpetual kingship in Israel (1 Sam.
13:13-14) but has changed his m ind about this due to Saul’s disobedi
ence. Despite Sam uel’s intercession, God proclaim s th a t he will not
change his m ind about this change of m ind he has had. If one reads
these “I will not change my m ind” texts in th eir literary and historical
contexts it becom es clear th a t they are not abstract propositions about
ditine imm utability. Rather, they speak of God’s steadfastness in certain
concrete situations to reject the hum an petition.
Texts such as “I the L ord do n ot change, therefore you, O sons of
Jacob, are not consum ed” (Mai. 3:6) and “Jesus Christ is the sam e yes
terday, today and forever” (Heb. 13:8) are also not about absolute im m u
tability. After all, if the divine Son is interceding for us, th a t is a change.
These texts are referring to God’s steadfast love. God’s love for Israel
does not fail, thus they are not destroyed says M alachi. Open theists
hold th at the divine nature does not change (God’s love, power, wisdom,
and faithfulness) but th a t God can and does change in his em otions,
thoughts, will, and actions. So I agree w ith you th at som ething about
God is im m utable. But I think you go too far in saying th a t everything

about God is im m utable. The divine Son was not always incarnate—that
sure seem s like a change to me!
Thanks m uch for prodding m e to think through these issues.
Blessings,
John
’— ~
18 Chris: Impassibility and Prayer
Dear John,
It’s Friday, the sun is out, and it’s around fifty degrees outside. Too
good to be true! Once again I h ear the golf course beckoning. Before I
succum b to tem ptation, though, I think I’ll w rite a quick note to you. In
my last letter I w as beginning to com m ent on a few biblical texts. Why
not continue to investigate biblical texts in this letter?
I’ve ju st re-read sections from your excursus on divine repentance
in The God Who Risks. You m ention m ore th an once the account of
King Hezekiah. You ask, “W hat do such texts intend to teach us if they
do not m ean w hat they say? If God knew all along, for instance, th at
King Hezekiah was not going to die, then w hat was God doing when he
announced th at H ezekiah w ould die shortly? Was God lying?” You then
add th a t to claim th a t “biblical texts asserting th at God ‘changed his
m ind' are merely anthropom orphism s does not tell us w hat they m ean.
If, in fact, it is im possible for God to change his m ind, then the biblical
text is quite m isleading.”
I don’t agree. The text concerning H ezekiah w ould only be m islead
ing if God lied to H ezekiah by instructing him to p u t his affairs in order
because H ezekiah’s death was im m inent. Are there other viable alterna
tives? I can see you rolling your eyes at me. “Why,” you m ight say, “can’t
we sim ply take the text at face value? Why do we have to tu rn it into a
‘m ere anthropom orphism ’?” Well, I don’t believe in “m ere” anthropo
m orphism s. A nthropom orphism s can teach us all kinds of things about
God and about ourselves. Even m ore im portantly, though, if we take
71
the text at face value, then w e re going to ru n into significant problem s

concerning divine om niscience and will be forced to develop, as you
presently are doing, a new theological m odel of w hat om niscience
m eans. For instance, alm ost all m odels of om niscience th at I’m aw are of
describe God’s om niscience as encom passing past, present, and future.
The openness m odel significantly m odifies the traditional model. God
knows fully the past and present, and those aspects of the future God
has ordained to occur. God does not know beforehand, however, the free
choices of h u m an beings. If God knew these decisions, the future would
already be decided and freedom lost. Or so I understand the openness
position. I w ant to debate these p articular issues further w ith you, but
not in this letter. Back to Hezekiah.
You argue that God learns som ething from Hezekiah’s prayer th at he
did not know previously. W hat m ight this be? Perhaps God did not realize
adequately how the news of Hezekiah's forthcom ing death would trouble
Hezekiah. Perhaps God didn’t understand how fervently Hezekiah desired
to live for a few m ore years. Maybe God didn’t realize th at Hezekiah was
going to pray so fervently. If God had understood the content and fervency
of Hezekiah’s prayer, God would not have predicted Hezekiah’s death.
None of these possible interpretations m ake m uch sense to me. W hen
I attem pt to m ake sense of the account at face value as an openness theo
logian would, I don’t seem to get anywhere. Is God actually this dim in
his understanding? God’s lim ited knowledge of H ezekiah’s response to
Isaiah’s first prophecy—a response th a t could have been predicted by
m ost people—has now necessitated a tu rn in m idstream . "No. You won't
die. If I had know n how you w ould respond to the prediction of your
death I never w ould have m ade it in the first place. My m istake.” Divine
ignorance births divine error. I find this interpretation fairly jarring.
If I reject a face-value reading of the text, though, w hat does the text
mean? As you rightfully comment, "It has to m ean something. Just w hat is
the anthropom orphic expression an expression of?” You then comment,
“Thus classical theists are left w ith the problem of m isleading biblical
texts, or, at best, meaningless m etaphors regarding the nature of God.”
I think you’re moving too fast in your criticism. That is, I don’t think the
text is misleading, nor do I think the m etaphor is meaningless.
W hat other exegetical possibilities present them selves th at preserve
a robust understanding of divine om niscience and capture the m eaning
of the m etaphor well? Your interpretation dem ands th a t God in some
way be in tim e, responding in tim e, rath e r th an outside of tim e. How
m ight the H ezekiah narrative m ake sense if God is outside of tim e? Let
m e toss out a possible interpretation, one that I think is plausible and
m akes coherent sense of the text. It comes from Paul Helm and hence
is based on the eternalist perspective, i.e., God is outside of tim e. While
Chris: Im passibility and Prayer 73
I'm finding the idea of m iddle knowledge increasingly interesting, I still

n n d H elm ’s ideas thought-provoking and enlightening.
The case of H ezekiah is indeed intriguing. Does God genuinely
change his m ind? For an eternalist such as Helm, the idea of God chang
ing his m ind m akes little sense. Why w ould God change his m ind? W hat
could possibly lead him to do so? Only the acquisition of new knowl
edge, it seems, a knowledge gained as tim e passes and new knowledge
becomes available. God’s imm utability, steadfastness, and om niscience
all appear threatened. In H elm ’s words, “Can this [God changing his
m ind] be m ade consistent w ith w hat the Bible says elsewhere about
God’s im m utability and steadfastness? If God is steadfast, how could
God’s first utterance—th a t H ezekiah will not recover—be sincere?”
M ust Hezekiah believe th a t God m ay change his m ind for H ezekiah’s
fervent prayer to m ake sense? Helm says no, for H ezekiah could believe
that God’s eternal, tim eless decree could be either th a t Hezekiah will die
shortly, or th a t H ezekiah will live a n um ber of years longer, if Hezekiah
prays to the Lord and changes his ways. H ezekiah doesn’t know w hich
of these alternatives is true, and thus prays accordingly, asking th a t he
m ight live longer. W hat H ezekiah m ust believe, H elm argues, is th at
‘w hat God says on one occasion is not necessarily a full account of w hat
God has decreed.” God m ight well be disclosing only p art of w hat is to
take place, perhaps to elicit a certain response from Hezekiah. That is,
maybe God is testing Hezekiah, after the p attern of other biblical char
acters. If so, God as a being who exists tim elessly m ust act w ithin tim e
to test H ezekiah’s character and elicit H ezekiah’s prayer. How m ust God
act to produce such change in H ezekiah’s life? Isaiah’s first prophecy
and God’s later m odification of the initial prediction suffice perfectly to
carry out God’s purposes. How so?
Helm argues as follows:
1. Suppose th at at T God announces A (Hezekiah will die), w hich

X (Hezekiah) notices at T r
2. At T, God announces not-A, w hich X (Hezekiah) notices a t T,.
From the point of view of Hezekiah, there is a change “in precisely
the sam e sense in w hich a h u m an person m ay be said to have
changed h er m ind if she sincerely declares she believes A at Tt and
then sincerely declares th a t she believes th at not-A at Tr " That is,
"over the period of tim e in question God is perceived to have willed
w hat, had this been a hum an action, w ould m ake it reasonable
to say th at the person in question has changed her m ind.” God,
however, is not tim e-bound. Thus, though there m ay be a form al
contradiction betw een A at Tt and not-A at T2, the succession in
tim e from T to T2 does “not require a real change in the will of
God.” All along God’s design had been to elicit the fervent prayer
of Hezekiah. The initial prophecy has served ju st this purpose.
3. W hat God has actually decreed outside of tim e is not the recov
ery of H ezekiah b u t the recovery of H ezekiah “upon request.”
God’s announcem ent of H ezekiah’s death a t T was specifically
designed to elicit the prayer request of Hezekiah.
4. Now comes a very im portant juncture in Helm’s argument. Because
God is not tim e-bound, God m ust use “accom m odated language
. . . to be able to interact w ith his creatures in tem poral sequence.”
Accom m odation, then, is absolutely necessary, precisely because
God is not tim e-bound in the m anner th at hum an beings are. God
has no choice b u t to accom m odate his tim eless perspective to the
tim e-bound understanding of Hezekiah. "It is a logically neces
sary condition of dialogue betw een people, or betw een God and
hum ankind, th a t the partners in the dialogue should appear to act
and react in tim e.” God accom m odates him self to the dem ands of
a tim e-fram ed dialogue. H um ans have no choice in the matter.
5. God m ust accom modate himself to us, precisely because his nature
and perspective are tim eless and we are tim e-bound. Hence, if God
is timelessly eternal (I realize this is a disputed point), creates crea
tures in time, and desires to teach them by testing them , “he m ust
represent him self to them in such a way th at it is natural for them
to think of him as changing even though (strictly speaking) he does
not change and even though those who are in tim e can see, on
reflection, th at he does not change.”
6. A key question th en raises its head: Is God deceiving or lying to
us as he uses the language of accom m odation? Helm argues th at
from an eternalist perspective, God is n ot deceiving Hezekiah.
"The king w ould be being deceived only if he believed th a t God’s
announcem ent th a t he w ould die was unconditional. B ut why
need H ezekiah believe this?”
I’m not sure I'm entirely convinced by Helm’s argum ent, but I believe it
is plausible and coherent. If God is not time-bound, God m ust constantly
accom m odate himself to his creatures’ situation in time. Hence, in the
Hezekiah narrative, God is neither lying nor deceiving Hezekiah. Rather,
God is accomplishing his purposes within time by graciously accom modat
ing himself to the needs and perceptions of his creature. Of course, if one
holds that God is time-bound, Helm’s argum ent may fail to convince.
Let m e know w hat you think.
Chris
19 John: Impassibility and Prayer
Dear Chris,
Sorry for my delay in getting back to you. On M onday I m et w ith the

denom inational com m ission looking into my views on open theism and
inclusivism. I felt the m eeting w ent very well. One of the m em bers of
the com m ission w ho is sharply critical of my views on inclusivism, an
Arminian himself, seem ed surprised to learn th at all the people who are
writing books attacking open theism are strong Calvinists or theological
determ inists. I hope to com m ent m ore on this in another letter.
In your last letter you exam ine the interchange betw een God and
King Hezekiah in 2 Kings 20 to see if you can come up with a “plausible
and coherent” interpretation of the text th a t is an alternative to the open
theist interpretation. Let m e com plem ent you on your good work. I do
not claim th a t anyone who disagrees w ith our reading of such texts is
stupid or disingenuous. I deeply appreciate your attem pt to explain w hat
the text m eans rath e r th an sim ply saying th at it is an anthropom orphic
expression and giving m e a "W hat is w rong w ith you?” look. There are
several issues on w hich I w ant to com m ent. The first one concerns your
rem ark th a t “the openness m odel significantly m odifies the traditional
model.” This is a very im portant charge and I will address it in a future
letter.
You don’t like the idea th at God “learns som ething” from H ezekiah s
prayer. You list a n um ber of options as to w hat God m ight have learned,
find them all unappetizing, and w onder w hether this m eans th at God
75
thinks som ething like, "Darn. If I’d know n you w ere going to pray,
H ezekiah, I w ould not have uttered the th re a t in the first place!” "Is
God actually this dim ?” I do not agree w ith your way of stating things
so let m e see if I can do better.
First, let’s take a look at the context. In chapter nineteen Hezekiah
has decided not to pay his annual “trib u te” (taxes) to the king of Assyria.
In response the Assyrian arm y m arches on Jerusalem and dem ands an
am ount of gold and silver th at could not possibly be met. The Assyrians
boast th at no gods have been able to stand before them , so the people
of Jerusalem should not tru st th at Yahweh the God of Israel will be able
to help them . In response H ezekiah sends one of his m en to Isaiah the
prophet, and Isaiah predicts th at the Assyrians will go away. Note that
Flezekiah does not pray here and, as it tu rn s out, the prophetic w ord
of Isaiah is only partially fulfilled. The Assyrians retu rn w ith renew ed
threats and insults. H ezekiah takes th eir letter and goes to the tem ple
and prays before Yahweh, describing the situation and giving Yahweh a
reason why Yahweh should do w hat the king requests—so th at the earth
m ay know th a t Yahweh alone is God (19:19). In response Isaiah says,
"Thus says Yahweh, the God of Israel, ‘Because you have prayed to me
about Sennacherib King of Assyria, I have heard you’” (19:20).
In fact, Isaiah gives a lengthy statem ent about w hat will happen to
the Assyrians, gives a sign th a t these things will indeed take place—and
then God acts quickly in answ er to his prayer. It is interesting th at w hen
H ezekiah failed to pray, things did not go exactly as God w anted, but
w hen he did pray, things happened. God even gives a reason why he will
do w hat he is about to do: because Hezekiah prayed! Prayer or lack of
it is an im portant p a rt of this narrative.
Som etim e later H ezekiah becom es ill and Isaiah is sent to the king to
announce th at he will not recover from this illness, but will die shortly.
This is stated in no uncertain term s, for Isaiah uses the "Thus says the
L ord ” form ula and puts it unconditionally (20:1). God does not say,
“You will die unless you pray.” The th reat is given in stark unconditional
term s. W hen we read the form ula “Thus says the L ord ,” we typically
th ink th at there is no possibility for such a w ord to tu rn out differently.
Yet H ezekiah does not accept this word! He again prays and gives God
reasons why God should heal him and let him live. The king does not
acquiesce in the presence of the prophetic w ord but challenges it. This is
som ething th at Abraham, Moses, Samuel, and others did. In response to
the king’s prayer, God sends Isaiah back to the king to announce: "Thus
says the L ord . . . I have heard your prayer and seen your tears, behold
I will heal you.” The sam e unconditional prophetic form ula “Thus says
the L ord” occurs, b u t this tim e w ith the exact opposite content. Note
th a t there is no repentance on the p a rt of H ezekiah, for he has done
John: Im passibility and Prayer 77
nothing wrong. He sim ply prays. That is the crucial change in the situ
ation. This certainly seem s to be a case w here the prayer of a righteous
person accom plished m uch (Jam es 5:16).
You ask why God w ould change his m ind in a situation such as this.
As I see it, God has chosen to relate w ith us in such a way th at p a rt of
God's decision-m aking processes for certain situations involves w hat we
do or do not do. God has chosen to be responsive to us as we develop
in relationship w ith him. God has sovereignly decided that, for some
situations, w hat God decides to do will be influenced (not determ ined)
by w hether we pray or not. W ith H ezekiah God is putting forth w hat
will be unless som ething in the situation changes. Though God states
the th reat unconditionally, H ezekiah does not take this w ord of God to
be the final word. It m ay yet be changed. This is so sim ply because God
wants it to be this way. God does not have to be open to our input.
W hat new knowledge did God receive? The knowledge of w hat Heze
kiah specifically w anted and why he w anted it. Though God knew all the
possibilities of w hat H ezekiah m ight do in response to God's announce
m ent, he now knows precisely w hich of those possibilities H ezekiah
chose to enact. It is not th at H ezekiah’s response surprised God in the
sense th a t he did som ething God did not know was possible. W hat God
previously knew as possible God now knows as actual.
I see this sam e sort of relationship going on betw een Moses and
God in Exodus 32, w here God tells Moses to leave the divine presence
because God is going to destroy the people and start the nation over
again w ith Moses. Moses, however, does not take this w ord of God as
God’s final w ord and so he prays, giving God three reasons why God
should not take this route. In response, God decides to go the way Moses
wants to go, n ot because God has to go th at way but because God values
w hat Moses wants. Moses does not provide God w ith new inform ation
that God had failed to consider. W hat Moses provides God w ith is the
route Moses prefers to go. God does not have to go th a t route, b u t he
so values his friendship w ith Moses th a t God is willing to go down th at
path if th a t is w hat Moses w ants to do.
Some people flinch at this, w ondering if we th en can ever tru st God’s
word. If God says thus and such is going to happen, can we believe it?
Well, God h ad told Eli in apparently unconditional term s th a t his sons
and th eir sons w ould be priests forever in Israel. However, because
they w ere so w icked God responded by rem oving Eli’s line from the
priesthood (1 Sam. 2:30). God said th a t his original plan was to go
w ith Saul’s line as a perpetual kingship in Israel (1 Sam. 13:13). How
ever, due to Saul’s disobedience God gave the kingship to David’s line.
In each of these situations God’s seem ingly unconditional w ord does
not tu rn out to be the final word. At other tim es, however, God’s w ord
is the final word, as Sam uel found out w hen he prayed all night long
for God to allow Saul to rem ain king but God tu rned dow n Sam uel’s
prayers (1 Sam. 15:11). We don’t know w hen God has finally m ade up
his m ind. God sim ply invites us to m ake our requests known, even to
argue w ith God.
The m otif of God changing his m ind (divine repentance) is a m ajor
one in the Old Testam ent (e.g., Gen. 6:6; Exod. 32:14; 1 Sam. 15:11,35;
Jer. 15; Joel 2:13). Som e people tend to dism iss this them e, b u t it is an
im portant one. God m ay change his m ind because the people repent,
because som eone prays, or simply because the divine com passion elects
to forgive (H osea 11:8-9). In fact, Jonah runs the other way instead
of delivering God’s m essage of judgm ent because Jonah w ants God to
destroy Nineveh. W hen God does not destroy the Assyrians, Jonah is
furious w ith God. W hen God asks why he is so m ad, Jonah responds,
"because I knew you were a God who changes his m ind” (4:2). Jonah
knew th a t the unconditional w ord of the Lord m ay n ot actually be
unconditional.
Som e critics respond by citing the three verses th at declare th a t God
does not change as proof th at God does not really change his m ind. “I the
L ord do n ot change therefore you [Israel] are not destroyed” (Mai. 3:6).
I find it interesting th at theology books typically only quote the first half
of the verse and ignore the context. “I the L ord do not change” is lifted
out as an ultim ate tru th about the divine nature: it is im possible for God
to change in any respect. The verse does not say this, however. W hat it
says is th at God is faithful to his covenant people and he refuses to allow
them to be destroyed. M alachi is not stating an abstract philosophical
principle—although th a t is the way m any theology books treat it, out of
context. The sam e is tru e of N um bers 23:19 and 1 Sam uel 15:29 (which
is a quote of Num. 23:19). God refuses in these two situations to change
his m ind. These texts do not say th at it is im possible for God to change,
only th at in these specific situations God will not change his m ind no
m atter w hat the hu m an response is. You believe th a t my view threatens
“God’s imm utability, steadfastness, and om niscience.” Not in the least.
God’s nature does not change, b u t God can change in his thoughts, will,
and em otions. God is not wishy-washy, b u t neither is God a stone. God
is steadfast to his covenant, but the exact way in w hich he carries out
its fulfillm ent is not set in concrete. C hristianity does not require an
absolutely im m utable God, one who cannot change in any respect—it
only requires a faithful God.
You explain the H ezekiah case (and I presum e these others) as God
"testing” the king. In your view God always knew he was going to heal
him and th at he w ould not die shortly. You say this because you don’t
w ant God to look insincere o r deceitful. Though I believe the "testing”
John: Im passibility and Prayer 79
interpretation is a valid one, I don’t believe it is the best interpretation.

You follow Paul H elm ’s explanation, so let m e com m ent on it. First,
Helm is a theological determ inist, m eaning th at nothing happens except
w hat God specifically w ants to happen. God is in m eticulous control
of everything th a t happens. So, for Helm, H ezekiah cannot respond
differently th a n God had eternally decreed H ezekiah w ould respond.
If God had not w anted the king to pray, then the king w ould not have
prayed. Hezekiah simply cannot respond differently th an God has deter
mined. True, H ezekiah does n ot know w hat God has eternally decreed,
but so what? W hichever way H ezekiah responds—w hether he prays or
not—will be precisely w hat God ordained he w ould do. H ezekiah could
not fail to pray in this situation. T hat does not seem like a personal
relationship to me.
Moreover, w hen it comes to God’s p a rt in this situation you m ake it
sound as though God was tim elessly responding to H ezekiah’s prayer.
The notion of a “tim eless response” is, in my opinion, a contradiction in
terms. You have one event following another and th at involves tim e. You
seem to be saying th at a tim eless being experiences tim e. If so, it m akes
no sense. Also, to hold th at God is responding to som ething outside of
himself is to give up divine impassibility, since you are then saying that
God is affected by creatures. To com pound m atters, it calls into ques
tion your affirm ation of im m utability, for a response is a change. If you
affirm th at God is impassible, im m utable in all respects, and timeless,
then it is inconsistent to also say th a t God responds to our prayers. Since
many, m any Christians believe th a t God does respond to our prayers, I
think you will find this a tough sell.
Helm m akes it clear th a t he rejects any "real change in the will of
God.” Actually, he rejects all change of any kind in God. That is why he
says th at the dialogue betw een God and hum ans "should appear to act
and react in tim e.” God is not reacting at all because, as Helm argues,
God is im m utable in all respects, is not affected by us (im passible), and
is timeless, so God has no “reaction.” Besides, everything th at happens
is precisely w hat God w anted to happen in the first place so w hat would
there be to react to?
I th ink your "testing” interpretation runs into problem s elsewhere as
well. You say th at this is why God has to use “accom m odated language”
w ith us. Hm m . Could not God have sim ply stated the tru th to Hezekiah:
"You will die unless you pray?” Could not God have said, “I am not really
grieved about hum an sin (Gen. 6:6), it is ju st th a t you are experiencing
my judgm ent on sin?” Were the biblical w riters ju st intellectual dunces
that could not u n d erstan d the way God really was? T hank goodness
som eone has figured out th a t all this biblical language about God’s
grieving, being angry, changing his m ind, and using w ords such as "if,”
"perhaps,” and “m aybe” do not depict reality b u t are only accom m oda
tions for us "duller folk.” It is w onderful th a t at least som eone knows the
tru th behind the accom m odated language of Scripture. However, I see
no biblical basis for affirm ing im passibility or absolute imm utability.
In Exodus 3:16 God tells Moses to “go” back to Egypt, implying that
their conversation is over. In 3:18 God says th a t the elders of Israel will
believe th at God has sent Moses. However, Moses replies, "What if they
don’t believe you have sent m e?” (4:1). In response God gives Moses a
sign but then says th a t in case the elders don’t believe th a t sign, here is
a second one, and if they don’t believe the first two signs, here is a third
sign. According to your view, God eternally knew th at the elders w ould
not believe w ithout the signs. Hence, God needed to have Moses ask his
question in order for God to provide the signs. If so, then it seem s th at
God did not really m ean for Moses to go in 3:16, since he needed Moses
to stay there and ask his question. Moreover, the use of "if” by God in
this passage m ust, on your account, be purely hypothetical, since God
eternally knew precisely how m any signs it w ould take for the elders
to believe. Also, you have the problem of God asserting th at the elders
w ould believe, while knowing th a t they w ould believe only after Moses
questioned God. God seem s less th an aboveboard in this view. You can
escape this problem if you say th at God knew the elders w ould believe
w ithout the signs, b u t God gives them to M oses as a concession to
M oses’ doubts. B ut th en you have to explain why God keeps saying, “If
the elders don’t believe this sign, then here is another one.” It seem s the
signs were for the benefit of the elders, not Moses.
A little later in this passage Moses says th at he is not a good speaker
and God seem s to switch to “Plan B” by allowing Aaron to do the speak
ing. Again, one could interp ret this text as an o th er exam ple of God
"testing” Moses. In this case God w ould not be changing to “Plan B”
because God had always planned to have Aaron do the speaking. I see a
problem w ith this explanation, however. W hy does God get angry w ith
Moses (4:14) if God always foreknew th a t Aaron w ould do the speak
ing? Even worse, why does God get angry w ith Moses if it was always
p art of God’s plan th at Moses w ould not do the speaking? If everything
is working out exactly according to God’s plan, then why is God getting
angry? Is God angiy w ith himself? If God is im passible as you say, then
God does not really get angry, for th a t would m ean that God was affected
by a creature. So again this text does not m ean w hat it seem s to m ean.
If God is im passible then it m akes no sense to say th at God gets angry,
for the only being God could be angry w ith is himself. In your view, God
suffers from som e significant psychological problem s.
A sim ilar problem arises if we retu rn to the prom ises God m ade to Eli
and Saul. If God never intended to m ake the priesthood ru n through the
Jo h n : Im passibility and Prayer 81
house of Eli and the kingship through the house of Saul, then why did
God m ake those prom ises? Was God deceitful? According to your view
God is m aking prom ises to these people knowing th at he will never keep
his w ord because God has im m utably and im passibly willed th at the
priesthood and kingship will pass to other families. That seem s un eth i
cal on God's part. On your view, how could we tru st w hat God says? So,
even though interpreting these texts as God “testing” the people is a valid
interpretation, I think it has serious problem s. It is no “test” w hen God
has decreed exactly w hat will take place. I think your view ultim ately
calls the integrity of God into question.
I have to get ready for a class. I hope what I’ve said is understandable.
Your friend,
John
20 Chris: Impassibility and Ontology
Dear John,
I w ant to re tu rn to our discussion of God's impassibility, both to

extend the previous conversation and to respond to your recent letter.
Do you recall a com m ent you m ade during ou r debate on openness at
H untington? I don’t w ant to quote you incorrectly, but I believe the gist
of your com m ent concerned the static nature of an im passible God. I
have read Clark Pinnock saying m uch the sam e thing.
Clark, for example, in Most Moved Mover, com pares the Greek view
of God w ith the biblical one. Clark understands the Greek view to pic
tu re God as “absolute,” “tim eless,” “unchangeable,” “unconditioned,”
“unchanging,” “impassible,” and “totally in control.” By way of contrast,
the biblical God is “dynamic,” “vulnerable,” "sym pathetic,” “accessible,”
and "com m itted to relationships.” Hence the openness m odel is designed
to reflect m ore effectively the deeply personal nature of the biblical God, a
w onder th at Clark feels has been deeply obscured by Hellenic philosophy
and the theology built on it. Clark hopes the "openness m odel will help
us com m unicate belief in God m ore intelligibly to people at large and
liberate believers to love God m ore passionately.”
Does im passibility serve only to b lu r the biblical picture of God?
B oth you and Clark conclude th at if God is im passible, God cannot
genuinely respond to us. W ords such as inert, static, unresponsive, life
lessly m onolithic, im personal, passionless, and lifeless com e to m ind as
appropriate descriptors of the im passible Greek God. I can understand
82
C hris: Im passibility an d Ontology 83
how im passibility m ight be interpreted along these lines, b u t I believe

th a t such an interpretation is a m isunderstanding.
W hat if God’s im passibility and im m utability actually facilitate his
ability to love w ith intense, infinite passion? Though Clark feels th a t
Thom ism ’s em phasis on im m utability "m ust be criticized for th reaten
ing real relationships,” perhaps Thom as’s ideas m ight actually enhance
our understanding of God’s passionate nature. Creatures change because
they fu rth e r actualize th e ir po ten tial for good, th u s m oving closer
tow ard perfection, or fu rth er actualize th eir potential for evil, thus
becom ing less perfect (an idea and phrasing I have borrow ed from
W einandy’s First Things article). God, however, cannot be furth er actu
alized because God, as Thom as argues, is “pure act." He cannot becom e
m ore perfect. W einandy believes two points im m ediately follow from
the reality of God’s perfect actualization.
First, God perform s acts th a t are grounded in his perfect and com
plete actualization. Only God can perform these acts. The act of creation
would be such an act. Hence, God as perfect act creates a w orld separate
from himself, a creative act "that assures creation’s im m ediate, intim ate,
dynamic, and enduring relationship w ith God as God truly is in all His
transcendent otherness.”
Second, as pure act, “all th a t pertains to God’s nature is in pure act.”
Huh? Weinandy suggests thinking of divine impassibility this way: while
both God and a rock m ay be im passible, “they are so for polar opposite
reasons.” A rock is im passible because it is an inert, im personal object
and lacks the characteristics th a t “p ertain to love.” God is im passible
'because His love is perfectly in act (‘God is love’) and no further self-
constituting act could m ake H im m ore loving.” Im passibility does not
extinguish or elim inate the possibility of passion w ithin God. W hy
should it? In W einandy’s words, “God is absolutely im passible because
He is absolutely passionate in His love.” H um an beings, as creations of
God, are the im m ediate objects of God's passionate, intim ate, im pas
sible love.
W einandy argues th a t this sam e im passible, passionate love charac
terizes Trinitarian relationships. The persons of the Trinity are im pas
sible, not because their love is static, lifeless, inert, or unresponsive, but
'because they are entirely constituted as who they are in their passionate
and dynamic, fully actualized relationship of love.” Im passibility w ithin
the divine nature, rath er th an quenching passion and reciprocity, actu
ally describes divine love’s infinite fulfillm ent as the F ather eternally
begets the Son and breathes forth (spirates) the Spirit. As W einandy
puts it, “h u m an beings can actually abide w ithin the very trin itarian
relationships by being conform ed by the Holy Spirit into the likeness
of the Son and so becom ing children of the loving Father.”
fi||ftt)i||-ii8ii|iliWl!J
Can such a God suffer? Indeed, w ould we desire for him to suffer if
-jnp-
we realized w hat m ust be sacrificed for suffering to occur w ithin the
divine nature? W hile God is related to all creation as its creator, God
exists, in W einandy’s words, "in His ow n distinct ontological order as
the Creator.” This is n o t som ething we should lam ent. Rather, God’s
, H l
ontological distinctness ensures th a t the evil and sin th a t m ar the
/ - j -j,,
present created order cannot overcom e or defeat God or contam inate
God’s goodness. Suffering w ithin the divine nature w ould necessitate a
=4,
blending or mixing of ontological orders th at m ust rem ain separate. I
i
think W einandy’s right. In fact, it is the suffering God who ends up m ore
i
closely resem bling the gods of the Greek pantheon, gods who are surely
related to their creation but also subject to its evil and sin.
Does the m odel of divine passibility actually provide all it seem s to
prom ise? For instance, exactly w hat do we m ean w hen we speak of
it
God suffering w ith us? Does God grieve as we grieve? Suffer pain as
*
we suffer pain? Experience sequentially sensations or em otions such
as pain, suffering, happiness, and love? I can m ake som e sense of pain
• • - i t
and suffering on a hum an level. I experience pain, for example, as the
nerve endings of my central nervous system com m unicate inform ation
’
to my spinal gate. I experience em otions of sadness or anger because I
live in the m idst of a fallen w orld and am subject to the evil th at is pres
■
ent there. I am also subject to the evil present w ithin me. I experience
*> ' '

life sequentially, one m om ent at a tim e, from one situation to another.
•
At this m om ent I’m happy. At another m om ent I grieve. My responses
are related to the situation in w hich I find myself; or related to past,
•
rem em bered events; or to future, envisioned situations. In addition, my
- t*
grief and happiness are often related to, and som etim es grounded in, my
lim ited knowledge. I know and recognize very little of the complexity
i,
th at surrounds my ow n actions, the actions of others, and God’s overall
,•
providential activity.
• - g
Can we describe God’s relationship to the w orld and the characteris

v -
tics of this relationship in the sam e way in w hich I analyze and describe
" ‘- • ■
my own physical and em otional responses to life? I don’t know how to

speak of this relationship ap art from the use of m etaphors such as the
biblical authors employ. If God has em otional reactions of sadness and
grief, joy and happiness, w hich are exactly like m ine and subject to the
r.
sam e elations and descents I experience em otionally in response to my

changing circum stances, how can we m ake coherent sense of these ups
i
and downs w ithin God? Im agine the m illions of contrary em otions God
w ould be experiencing. As W einandy puts it, "If God did need to adapt
3
u
and re-adapt and re-adapt Him self again to every personal situation in
every m om entary instance, He w ould be perpetually entangled in an
unending internal em otional whirligig.”
Chris: Im passibility and Ontology 85
W hat do the different biblical m etaphors m ean to teach us, then, con
cerning God’s differing responses to us? They com m unicate to us God's
impassible love m anifested in concrete situations. God is not changing
mom anger to sadness to joy. Because God’s love “is perfectly existent,
all aspects th a t pertain to th at love are fully existent.” The appropriate
aspect of the divine love m anifests itself to us situationally. Exactly w hat
do I mean?
To use W einandy’s m etaphor, “God is always in ‘go position.’” T hat is,
‘when a person repents of sin, God need not change the m an n er of His
love w ithin Him self from th at of an adm onishing love to th a t of a for
giving love.” From our perspective, however, the m anifestation of God’s
rally actualized love does change according to ou r situation. W hen I sin
I experience God’s love as “rebuke and adm onishm ent.” W hen I repent
I ‘experience God's love as com passion and forgiveness.” God’s im pas
sible love burns unchangeably like a colum n of fire. Its m anifestation
within my experience changes as my situation changes.
I w ould likely em brace divine passibility if the m odel of a passible,
suffering God was the only viable alternative available. It seems, though,
chat the gospel provides m e w ith an even better m odel, for in Christ I
encounter the transcendent, incarnate God. In this model, key ontologi
cal boundaries are m aintained, while sim ultaneously God draw s near
to us in the incarnate Word. As I have m aintained in earlier correspon
dence, the incarnation allows, even com m ands me, to affirm th a t “God
suffers”—the very affirm ation m odern theologians long to proclaim .
The incarnation, though, also prevents m e from blurring ontological
categories th a t m u st rem ain distinct, as I have m entioned earlier in
this letter.
If we fail to preserve these absolute ontological differences, key divine
attributes m ay well end up falling by the wayside. In your response to my
previous letter on im passibility you argue th at texts such as “I the L ord
do not change, therefore you, 0 sons of Jacob, are not consum ed” (Mai.
3:6) and "Jesus Christ is the sam e yesterday, today and forever” (Heb.
13:8) “are not about absolute im m utability. . . . These texts are referring
to God’s steadfast love. God’s love for Israel does not fail, thus they are
[not] destroyed, says M alachi. Open theists hold th at the divine nature
does not change (God’s love, power, wisdom, and faithfulness) but God
can and does change in his em otions, thoughts, will, and actions.”
My response? God’s steadfast love is im m utable precisely because it
is ontologically grounded in the divine being itself. In short, the m oral
attributes you praise in God m ust have a sufficient ontological basis.
It is this w ondrous ontological grounding th at establishes, or critically
supports, the m oral qualities you rightly applaud. I contend w ith Wein-
andy th at “for God to be ethically im m utable, unchangeably loving and
good,” God m ust be "ontologically im m utable—th a t is, ontologically

unchanging in His perfect love and goodness.”
In fact, it is only by m aintaining God’s transcendence, w ith accom
panying characteristics such as im m utability and impassibility, th at we
coherently express and w orship the Trinity’s w ondrous ability to save
us from sin. The transcendence/incarnation m odel assures me th at God
draw s n ear to m e in my suffering and sin, b u t is not overcom e by them .
All the benefits of the openness m odel w ithout its defects!
"Hold on,” you m ight say. Indeed, in your last letter you asked a n u m
ber of im portant questions. One th at keeps com ing back to m e concerns
Jesus. "Does Jesus reveal w hat God is really like?” That's a great question
and deserves a careful response. B ut this letter has already ru n on too
long. I’ll be w riting soon.

Chris
21 John: Thomism
Dear Chris,
So now you are a Thomist! You do present a “m oving target,” since

you switch around from one position to another. In this discussion of
im passibility you draw on the w ork of Weinandy, a R om an Catholic
theologian who utilizes the philosophy of Thom as Aquinas (Thomism)
to argue th a t God is im passible b u t not static. Aquinas drew on the
m etaphysics of the Greek philosopher Aristotle. The w ork of W einandy
is intriguing, although I find his argum ents weak—especially the ones
he supposedly draw s from Scripture. Aquinas, of course, is one of the
lum inaries of Christian thought for w hom I have great respect. However,
I’m not attracted to Thom ism as a solution to the debate betw een us. To
explain why, I m ust begin w ith Aristotle.
Aristotle’s interest lies in the “problem of change”—explaining how
and why there is change or m otion in the universe. In searching for an
explanation for change he arrives at a God w ho is essentially a m eta
physical principle needed only to explain m otion. Aristotle argued th at
there m u st be an “unm oved m over” as the first cause of all m otion.
Though the universe is eternal, it m ust be eternally dependent on som e
thing. B ut the unm oved m over m ust move the universe w ithout itself
moving or changing in any way. For if it itself moved, then it w ould no
longer be perfect, for “any change w ould be change for the w orse.” The
way the unm oved mover moves the universe is by “final causation,” not
“efficient causation.” That is, if God actually pushed or fashioned the
87
w orld in any way, th at w ould m ean a change in God. Instead, God is the
final cause or goal (telos) of the universe. God starts m otion not because
he acts as an agent b u t ra th e r by sim ply being so beautiful and perfect
th a t the universe desires (eros) to be like him, and so it moves tow ard
God—b ut God does not move tow ard the world.
God m ust be absolutely independent of all others. God cannot even
choose to enter into relationships w ith others, for if God enters into
any sort of relationship w ith the world, God w ould then in some sense
be dependent on the world. In any relationship, one party depends on
an o th er p arty for the relationship to exist. F or example, a m aster is
dependent on the slave in order to be master. Consequently, God has no
real relationship w ith us.
This unm oved m over is pure actuality and possesses no potentiality
(possibility of change). To have potential is to be susceptible to change,
so God m ust have only actuality. This God is absolutely im m utable. It
also follows th at this God cannot be affected by any other being—he
is im passible, since he has no room for change. Then w hat does this
com pletely actual being do? It thinks! Of w hat does it think? “It m ust be
of itself th a t the divine thought thinks,” since to think of anything else
w ould be less th an perfect. If God knows about us, God cannot be per
fect. Moreover, for God to “receive” anything w ould imply dependency
and deficiency. God cannot even receive our w orship, let alone hear our
prayers. Aristotle’s God is unaw are of the existence of the w orld and
certainly cannot enter into relations w ith others. “Since he is in need
of nothing, God cannot have need of friends, n o r will he have any.”
God is literally apathetic tow ard the w orld as he has no concern for or
feelings tow ard it. God does not interact w ith the w orld n o r enter into
covenantal relations w ith hum ans—God only “contem plates.” God is
neither providential nor righteous w ith regard to the world: “God is not
an im perative ruler.” For Aristotle, the unm oved m over is a m etaphysical
necessity needed to explain m otion in his philosophical system. Though
this God m ay not be religiously satisfying, several aspects of Aristotle’s
unm oved m over found their way into the Christian tradition.
Thom as Aquinas, the apex of medieval theology, sought to harm onize
biblical statem ents about God with the classical synthesis and especially
w ith the works of Aristotle. Clearly, Thomas, as a Christian, could not
accept all th at Aristotle said about God, since the Christian God m ost
certainly knows that we exist and has come to redeem us in Jesus. Though
there is nothing wrong w ith m aking use of philosophical resources in
seeking to elucidate the Christian faith, I do not believe Aquinas success
fully m odified Aristotle’s apathetic God enough.
Thom as believes th at God is pure actuality containing no potentiality.
That is, there can be no “becom ing” (change of any kind) for God, since
John: Thom ism 89
he is eternally actualized. W hen this idea is applied to divine election

of individuals to salvation, it is clear th a t election does not depend on
God’s foreknowledge of how individual hum ans will respond, since th at
would m ake God dependent on creatures. Instead, God sim ply chooses
those he will save. The “A rm inian” view of salvation m ust be completely
rejected, for hum ans have no “say” in their election whatsoever. If God’s
knowledge of w hat w ould happen in history depended on the crea
ture, then God would be dependent and passive. But God is completely
independent, im m utable, and impassible. One of the things th at Aquinas
wants to protect in this discussion is the notion th a t the being of God
is not altered by creation, since God w ould be God even w ithout a cre
ation. This is an im portant point and I agree w ith it. However, one can
uphold th a t God is the independent creator w ithout defending it by this
particular philosophy. The problem w ith going w ith Aristotle here is that
it m akes it difficult, if not impossible, to think of God’s “relationship”
with us in personal term s. For Aquinas, the creatures’ relationship w ith
God is “real,” while God’s relationship to the creation is only “logical.”
God is like a stone colum n, he says, around w hich we move. O ur rela
tion to the colum n changes as we move, b ut the colum n never changes
in relation to us. There is no give-and-take relationship w ith God.
Although this m etap h o r expresses God’s steadfastness, I th ink it
utterly fails w hen it comes to expressing the biblical po rtrait of God’s
relationship w ith us. The Thom istic u n d erstanding of God m ay be
appealing to those who w ant a spirituality th at em phasizes contem pla
tion of the divine m etaphysical principle, b u t it cancels out the give-and-
take spirituality found, for instance, in the relationships betw een God
and Abraham and God and Moses. Since God cannot receive anything,
God sim ply cannot have the types of relationships w ith hum ans th at
God is depicted as having in the Bible. For Aquinas, our prayers can
never affect God. Rather, God has ordained our prayers as a m eans of
bringing about w hatever the divine will has decreed. This cancels out
the view of prayer held by m any Christians. If th at is w hat you w ant to
do, okay, b u t please be up front about it.
Philosophical systems such as Aristotle’s have been used by Christians
to try to answ er specific problem s. That is legitim ate. However, I think
that the problem s raised by m any of these system s are w orse th an the
problem s they solve. A doctor prescribed an antibiotic for my father-in-
law th at caused a reaction th at alm ost killed him. Of course, the doctor
was well intentioned, but the m edicine w ound up causing m ore serious
problem s th an the original illness. I think this is w hat has happened in
Christian theology w ith respect to some aspects of the doctrine of God.
As the zenith of medieval thought, Aquinas epitom izes the tensions of
the biblical-classical synthesis in attem pting to reconcile the God of
historical action depicted in the Bible w ith the understanding of God as

m etaphysical principle needed to explain the cosmos.
H
Aquinas said the best nam e for God is “He who is,” for God is the
i
only being whose essence it is to exist. For me, the New Testam ent nam e
for God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and we know this God through
'ii1
tu'ii T i 1itiiT'mriViVirTtnviimriif.fitii'iiiriii'M
the activities of the T rinitarian persons in salvation. If you desire to
preserve the God of salvation history, then do not go this route. Begin
w ith the God who com es to us in history and especially in Jesus, rath er
th an beginning w ith a m etaphysical principle used to explain why the
w orld exists. After all, I know you approve of Athanasius, who argued
from salvation in Jesus to the deity of Jesus against Arius. I think I’m
defending precisely th a t sort of move here.
You say th a t God cannot becom e m ore perfect. Following Plato and
Aristotle you assum e th a t “perfect” m eans w ithout change of any kind.
1V11
However, I prefer to th ink of “perfect" in dynam ic term s: relational
perfection. God is always in perfect relationship w ith us, and as the
relationship changes so God changes. It w ould be less th an perfect not
to change in a changing relationship. Ulysses had to be tied to his ship’s
m ast in order to resist the Siren’s call. Unless we tie ourselves to the
m ast of the God revealed in Jesus, we will end up following Plato’s call
to theological shipwreck.
You suggest th at your approach will protect God from resem bling the
gods of the Greek pantheon. It has been a com m on com plaint for two
m illennia th a t the biblical p o rtrait of God is overly anthropom orphic,
and even today critics of biblical personalism refer to this view of God
as a “spook.” In my opinion, the biblical w riters present a view of God
th a t falls betw een the fickle and capricious gods of Olympus on the one
h an d and the rationally understandable God of philosophical theology
on the other. It is ironic th at you chided m e a few letters back for being
overly concerned w ith rationality—now you are the one putting forw ard
a fully logical and rational explanation of God th a t sm oothes o ut all the
problem s of the biblical God who is too m uch like us.
You don’t w ant God to suffer, for th en God w ould be "subject” to
evil and sin. We experience, you say, negative em otions of sadness and
anger because we live in a fallen world. God does not live in a fallen
w orld and is not subject to evil so God does not experience sadness and
anger. I have two points to m ake in response. First, w hat about posi
tive em otions? Does God experience them ? If the Holy Trinity eternally
experiences love am ong the three persons, then why not say th at God
experiences joy and satisfaction? If God loves us, is it then not possible
th a t God experiences joy w hen we respond appropriately to God’s love?
You will reject this, because for you God cannot receive anything from
us, including our love. If God could receive anything, then God would
John: Thomism 91
re less th an perfect. So it seem s to m e th at the God of pure actuality is

locked into his own self-love and cannot be open to others. W einandy
argues th at the Son of God cannot suffer in his divinity because “suf
fering is caused by the loss of som e good.” Since God does not "lose”
anything, God does not suffer. B ut it seems to me th at God does indeed
“lose” som ething: he loses hum anity in sin and w orks to restore us
x himself. Did not God lose the love relationship w ith us due to our
rebellion? The God w hose heart breaks in H osea 11 and who w anted
S3 gather Israel under his wings (Matt. 23:27) is a God who does lose
something he cherishes. To put it simply, one m ay read the biblical story
is a rom ance: boy loses girl, boy gets girl back.
This leads to my second point. If God does not experience sadness
and grief because God is not involved in this fallen world, then w here is
the God who redeem s hum anity? If God cannot becom e deeply involved
3T and affected by this world, then I think you have sacrificed the God
f Jesus Christ to a m etaphysical principle th a t protects God from all
change, since a God w ho w ould get into the nitty-gritty of ou r sin would
re less th an perfect. This is not the God I see in Jesus.
You think that if God was affected by this fallen world, then God would
re subject to experiencing “millions of contrary em otions.” Though I
relieve th at God suffers, I think that God suffers in a way proper to God.
I don’t claim that God suffers exactly in the sam e way we do, for God is
cbe creator and I’m a creature. I do not profess to even begin to grasp how
God could experience millions of different em otions due to the millions of
different relationships God experiences at each m om ent, any m ore than I
claim to understand how God hears millions of prayers each m oment.
Let me retu rn for a m om ent to the notion th at God cannot receive
anything. In his book The Triune Identity, R obert Jenson observes th at
Anus, along w ith m any others, held God to be a “sim ple” being, one
who has no differentiation. But the Nicene Creed affirm ed th a t the Son
is “out of the being of the Father,” for the Son is “true God of true God,
begotten not created.” This differentiates the Son from the F ather so
chat the godhead has internal relations. In Jenson’s words: “To be God
if to be related. W ith th a t the fathers contradicted the m ain principle of
Hellenic theology.” He goes on to com m ent on the statem ent th at the
Son is “begotten of the Father.” "To be God is not only to give being, it
is also to receive being. And there w ent the rest of Plato.” This is a pro
found insight by Jenson: the w riters of the Nicene Creed affirm ed th at
God, as God, could be relational and th at God was capable of receiving
and not m erely giving. Though C hristian theologians have not consis
tently followed through on this insight (see Catherine LaCugna's God
For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life), it is right there in the creed. Hence
I feel in good com pany in m aintaining, against you, th at God, as God,
can be open to the creation and receive prayers, w orship, love (which
includes the possibility of the pain of rejection).
You attem pt to have your cake and eat it too w hen you say th a t "the
incarnation allows, even com m ands m e to affirm th at 'God suffers.’” I
am quite baffled now because you have been arguing up to this point
th at suffering is bad so God does not suffer, b u t now you reverse yourself
and say th a t divine suffering is a good thing. Well, w hich is it, good or
bad? You claim th at via the incarnation “God draw s n ear to m e in my
suffering and sin.” I agree w holeheartedly but I w onder w hat you really
m ean. How does God, as God, "draw n e a r” to ou r sin if God cannot
experience this fallen world? You use gospel language here, b u t your
view does not really allow God to experience this. I think you w ant to
hold onto the gospel’s view th a t God’s suffering for us is a good thing,
but you are to rn by your com m itm ent to Hellenic theology in w hich
suffering is bad.
W hat is it th at you w ant to protect th at you believe I’m giving up?
Following W einandy you suggest th at I’m sacrificing the "absolute onto
logical differences” betw een God and us. Am I giving up the im portant
distinction betw een creato r and creatures? No. I affirm th a t the tri
une God w ould exist even w ithout any creation. God does not need
a creation in order for God to exist. God has being even a p a rt from
us. However, if you push too h ard on the w ord "absolute” in “absolute
ontological difference,” you end up m aking God absolutely different
from us—having nothing in com m on. The problem w ith this is th at
you and I cannot know th at w hich is completely, one h undred percent,
different from ourselves. If we have nothing in com m on w ith God, not
personhood, thoughts, love, relationality—absolutely nothing, then we
cannot know anything about God nor can we have any sort of personal
relationship w ith God. We could say th at "God loves u s” b u t it w ould
have no m eaning whatsoever. I don’t see you w anting to go th at route.
I suggest we say th a t God created us different from him self b u t no
m ore different th an God intended us to be. We are creatures m ade in
the “image of God” and so have som e sort of sim ilarity to God. We are
different but not absolutely different. You suggest th a t God m ust be
ontologically im m utable in all respects in order to have steadfast love
tow ard us. Again, I th ink this is overkill. God’s nature is im m utable: the
divine love, power, wisdom , and faithfulness never fail. B ut God can
change in som e respects and can receive from us.
It is no problem in my view for God to “draw near” to us in the incar
nation and suffer w ith us and for us, since this is w hat God is like in the
triune identity. You w ant to use philosophical principles to “correct” the
biblical p o rtrait of God. We do use philosophy and science to “correct”
biblical teaching from tim e to tim e. For instance, we no longer believe
M m : Thom ism 93
± e earth sits on a foundation, n o r do we believe th a t the earth is the

renter of the solar system as did the biblical w riters. So, although it is
legitimate in principle to use philosophical principles to “override” w hat
biblical authors taught God was like, we should be up front about w hat
>e are doing. The Hellenic principles you utilize in reading Scripture
■io m ore h arm th an good. Also, I w ant to point out again th a t you have
Td~:er given m e a single biblical reason to affirm divine impassibility.
Whew! This is too long. I need to get to a basketball gam e—ou r col
lege team is in the second round of the playoffs. My prayers are w ith
you as you prepare to go to Thailand.
-Chn
22 Chris: The Revelation of God
in Jesus
Dear John,
In this letter I w ant to respond to the interesting question you posed in

an earlier letter (letter 17) concerning impassibility: “Does Jesus reveal
w hat God is really like?” I’m not sure w hether I agree o r disagree with
the Calvinist critic w ho said, “You cannot use Jesus to establish what
God is like because Jesus is also hum an." My agreem ent or disagree
m ent would depend on w hat the Calvinist m eant by “establish.” If this
critic m eant to say th a t in the incarnation we can observe or perceive
only the hum an nature of Christ, I w ould disagree.
I w asn’t sure w hether you m eant to argue in your earlier letter that
the tradition of the church affirm s th at all we see in Christ is his hum an
nature. Am I m isunderstanding you? If not, I don’t believe you’re cor
rect. I’m also hesitant to accept the distinction you m ake betw een God’s
self-disclosure and w hat I understand as God’s accom m odation o r con
descension to us in the incarnation.
God does disclose him self to us in Christ. How? By condescending or
accom m odating him self to us in the w ondrous and m ysterious m anner
of the incarnation. Hence, m any of the things Jesus said and did can
teach us about God. Am I wrong, however, to draw a distinction between
the hum anity and divinity of Christ as I in terpret the gospels? I don’t
94
- i r is ; The Revelation of God in Jesus 95
r~~rik so, but your good questions do provide food for thought and are
sanely w orth w orking through carefully.
Let’s take a closer look at your argum ent. It appears to ru n som ething
l i e this:
1. Does Jesus reveal w hat God is really like?

2. The “tradition” contains a “problem ”: it affirms th at Jesus is fully
God and yet holds th a t “w hat we actually see in Jesus is only his
hum an n atu re.”
3. Key texts indicate th a t “Jesus discloses to us the very natu re of
God” (cf. Heb. 1:3; John 14:9; Col. 2:9). If w hat we see in Jesus is
only his hum an nature, w hat are we to m ake of these texts?
4. Jesus is the “clearest instance of God’s self-disclosure to us. The
things th a t Jesus said and did are w hat God is like.”
5. This last point rem ains true unless I have “some presum ed con
cept of God” th a t I use to “filter the revelation of God.” As you
ask, "Do you have a presupposed notion of w hat God m ust be like
(dignum Deo) th at you then im pose on the biblical text and Jesus,
so th at you know th at the sufferings of Jesus are m erely hum an,
not divine sufferings?”
6. If the divine W ord “genuinely suffers in his hum anity,” how can
this occur if “the divine Son cannot suffer”?
7. W hat did the Son em pty him self of in becom ing incarnate (Phil.
2:7)? The Son cannot give up "certain divine attributes such as
om niscience” and still rem ain divine. The incarnation cannot
involve “a surrender of divinity.”
8. Hence, if Jesus is the disclosure of w hat God is like, we m ay need
“to m odify o u r preconceived notions of w hat is fitting for God
to be. . . . Perhaps self-giving, self-sacrifice, and self-lim itation is
p art of w hat the loving Trinity is like. For me, w hat Jesus is like
discloses w hat God is like.”
9. Does God change? "The divine Son was not always incarnate, th at
sure seem s like a change to m e!”
How to respond? W hat does the incarnation teach us about God? Per
haps we can ask the question in a different way. W hat is Jesus teaching
as about God and about h u m an beings? I think the second question is
better. Why? Jesus was b oth God and hum an. Thus, in trying to m ake
sense of the texts th at speak of Christ’s person and work, we need to
keep three things in m ind: Jesus is God, Jesus is hum an, and divinity
and hum anity have been joined together in a personal union in Christ.
If we forget or confuse these three propositions, we will have difficulty
making sense of the New Testament. L uther wrote, for instance, th at the
devil continually attacks the church’s understanding of Christ as both

God and hum an. "Now he does not w ant to allow th at He is God, then,
again, he does not w ant to allow th a t He is m an."
W hat are the herm eneutical and theological principles the church
has employed in interpreting texts concerning Christ? I like Athanasius's
illustration of the skilled interpreter as an honest m oney changer. For
instance, how do we determ ine w hether a specific text about Jesus is
intended to teach us about “w hat God is like” or w hat a h u m an being "is
like”? Can we simply argue, as you appear to do, th at all texts concerning
Jesus are designed to teach us w hat God is like? The possibility surely
exists th at some of these texts m ean to teach us im portant truths about
h u m an beings. After all, Jesus was both divine and hum an. It w ould not
be surprising, then, to find som e texts focusing on Christ’s deity and
others on his hum anity.
A thanasius argues th a t “expressions used about His [C hrists] God
head and His becom ing m an are to be interpreted w ith discrim ination
and suitable to the p articular context. . . . He who expounds concerning
His G odhead is not ignorant of w hat belongs to His com ing in the flesh;
b u t discerning each as a skilled and ‘approved m oney changer,’ he will
walk in the straight way of piety; w hen therefore he speaks of His w eep
ing, he knows th at the Lord, having becom e m an, while He exhibits His
h u m an character in weeping, as God raises up L azarus.” The honest
m oney changer w ould becom e a dishonest one by shortchanging either
the divine or the hum an nature of Christ. Oden com m ents, “The hon
est m oney changer keeps the two currencies (divinity and hum anity) in
fitting congruence as one reads narrative after narrative.” Thus, certain
texts concerning C hrist do teach m e “w hat God is like,” but others teach
m e w hat a h u m an being “is like.” In addition, some texts m ay simply
be referring to Christ w ithout carefully distinguishing betw een the two
natures.
I often refer to Cyril of A lexandria concerning the issue of im pas
sibility. It’s interesting to note th at as the N estorian controversy finally
began to settle, the Form ula of Union betw een Cyril and the bishops of
Antioch ( a .d . 433) advised biblical interpreters to distinguish betw een
gospel narratives th a t had prim ary reference to the one person of Christ
or to one of the two natures. “As for the words of the gospels and of the
apostles concerning the Lord, we know th at theologians have consid
ered som e as com m on because they are said of the one person (proso-
pon), while they have distinguished others as applying to the two natures
(physeis), reserving those w hich befit God to Christ in His divinity, while
assigning those w hich are lowly to Christ in His hum anity.” The problem
the interpreter faces, of course, concerns w hat the focus of a particular
text is. Is the one person of Christ in view in a given passage, or one of
Chris: The Revelation of God in Jesus 97
the natures? This has been a continuing question for church exegetes
over the centuries. John IV, for instance, w rote to Constantius in a .d . 641
that som etim es w hen a w riter is “teaching about the suprem e nature,
he is com pletely silent about the h u m an nature, b u t som etim es w hen
treating of the hum an dispensation, he does not touch on the m ystery
of His divinity.”
You are right in pointing m e to texts such as Colossians 2:9, w here
Paul teaches th at "in Christ all the fullness of the Deity lives in bodily
form .” I don’t doubt this for a m om ent. W hen I look at Christ I do see
God. The question, however, is w hether every text concerning Christ is
pointing to, or illustrating a tru th about, his divinity. The church has,
as far as I know, frequently used the m odel of perichoresis to m ake good
sense of texts such as Colossians. That is, the divine nature in a w onder
ful, em bracing m ovem ent (“proceeding around”; “walking around on
all sides”) “penetrates and perfects every aspect of the h um an,” w ith the
hum an "pervaded by the divine” (Oden’s words). We don’t have a m ix
ture of the divine and the hum an in the incarnation. Rather, in Christ the
divine pervades his hum anity, m uch like iron being pervaded by heat.
The iron rem ains iron while sim ultaneously penetrated by fire.
Of course, the analogy breaks dow n if too m uch w eight is placed
on it. Analogical language is ju st th at—analogical. John of Dam ascus
writes th at “examples do not have to be absolutely and unfailingly exact,
for, just because it is an example, one m ust find in it th at w hich is like
and th at w hich is unlike. For likeness in everything w ould be identity
and not an example, w hich is especially true w ith divine things. So, in
the m atter of theology and the Incarnation, it is im possible to find an
absolutely perfect exam ple.”
My point so far is th a t yes, Jesus shows us w hat God is like, b u t
this statem ent needs careful nuancing if we are to m ake good sense of
the New Testam ent. Why? Christ is both divine and hum an. So I don't
think we can im m ediately conclude th a t Jesus’ suffering m u st m ean
that God suffers w ithin the divine essence. Luther, for instance, drew a
careful distinction concerning w ho suffered in the suffering of Christ.
“If I believe th at only the h u m an nature has suffered for me, I have a
Savior of little W orth. . . . It is the person th at suffers and dies. Now the
person is true God; therefore it is rightly said: ‘The Son of God suffers.’
For although the divinity does not suffer, yet the person w hich is God
suffers in His hum anity. . . . In His own nature, God cannot die; but now
God and m an are united in one person, so th at the expression ‘God’s
death’ is correct, w hen the m an dies w ho is one thing or one person w ith
God.” L uther’s understanding seem s quite sim ilar to Cyril’s.
N either Luther no r Cyril seems to struggle, at least not in any detail,
with the question you raise about the suffering of the Word. That is, as
you p u t it, if the divine W ord “genuinely suffers in his hum anity,” how
can this occur if “the divine Son cannot suffer”? I suppose their answ er
w ould be th a t the Son suffers in the hum anity the W ord has assum ed in
the incarnation. How the Son suffers in such a m an n er rem ains incom
prehensible and ineffable to me, b u t if we drain all incom prehensibility
out of the incarnation I’m not sure we still have the w ondrous reality
we began with!
F or th e sake of th o ro u g h n ess a n d p erh ap s overkill, let m e go back
to som e earlier po in ts I’ve m ade in th is letter. You w on’t be su rp rised
th a t Tom O den h as helped m e to u n d e rsta n d th e c h u rc h ’s reflection
on C h rist’s a ttrib u te s. At tim es Jesus did th in g s th a t clearly m a n i
fested his divine n a tu re . These th in g s can tea c h us, as you p u t it,
“w h a t God is like.” T here w ere o th er th in g s th a t C hrist did, however,
th a t teach us w hat genuine h u m an ity is like. F or instance, Jesus expe
rien ced physical suffering, em otional suffering, pow erlessness, and
physical death. He w as able to experience these realities of h u m an
life precisely b ecau se he p ossesses a gen u in e h u m a n n a tu re . The
div in e-h u m an u n io n in C hrist enables, th en , th e second p erso n of
th e Trinity to suffer p a in in his hum anity. As Jo h n of D am ascus puts
it, “It w as in one n a tu re th a t He w orked m iracles a n d in a n o th e r th a t
He e n d u red suffering.” Indeed, as I have argued, precisely because
it is God th e W ord w ho has u n ite d him self w ith h u m a n n atu re, we
can speak of God suffering. Jo h n of D am ascus describes th is w onder
well: “W herefore, th e L ord of Glory is even said to have been cru c i
fied, alth o u g h His divine n a tu re did n o t suffer; a n d th e Son of M an
is confessed to have been in heaven before His passion, as th e Lord
H im self has said."
The econom y of salvation enables m e both to say “Jesus is w hat God
is like” and to say “Jesus is w hat a h u m an being is like.” That is, Jesus
as the second Adam dem onstrates the glory of w hat a genuinely hum an
person really is. If Jesus only shows m e "w hat God is like,” half the
w ondrous reality of the incarnation disappears. Gregory of Nazianzus
captures both sides of the econom y well:
He hungered—but He fed thousands . . .

He was wearied, b ut He is the Rest of them th a t are w eary . . .
He was heavy w ith sleep, b u t He walked lightly over the sea . . .
He prays, but He hears prayer.
He weeps, but He causes tears to cease.
He asks w here Lazarus was laid, for He was Man; b u t He raises Laza
rus, for He was God.
Chris: The Revelation of God in Jesus
He is sold, and very cheap, for it is only thirty pieces of silvkj; but Tie
redeem s the w orld . . .
He dies . . . b u t He gives life . . .
Gregory helps us avoid the very erro r I think you are com m itting,
namely, overlooking the logic of the economy. W hen we fail to observe
the inherent rhythm s of the econom y of incarnation and salvation, we
inevitably end up blurring essential distinctions. We, for instance, can
err by identifying h u m an characteristics of Christ as predicates of his
divine nature. I think you do so w hen you contend th a t C hrist’s suffer
ings teach us th a t God suffers w ithin the divine natu re itself.
The incarnate Word, by becom ing w hat I am (genuinely hum an apart
trom sin), heals my w ounds and restores my hum anity while rem ain
ing w hat he has always been. He is able to do so, though, only because
of the reality of both his natures, each w ith its ow n set of predicates or
attributes. Leo, Bishop of Rome, explains: "As w hat is fitting to heal our
wounds, one and the sam e 'm ediator betw een God and m en, the m an
Christ Jesus’ (1 Tim. 2:5) could die in one nature and not in the other.
The true God, therefore, was born w ith the com plete and perfect nature
of a true m an; he is com plete in his nature and com plete in ours.”
It is som ew hat ironic th at an early criticism of Christianity ran som e
thing like this: "If Christ is God, and Christ died, then God died,” and
‘if God cannot die and Christ is said to have died, C hrist cannot be
God because God cannot be understood to have died.” By failing to
'understand the econom y of the incarnation, early C hristian opponents
couldn’t m ake sense of the gospel. I like N ovatian’s response to this
puzzling query. “W hat is God in Christ did not die, but w hat is M an in
Him did die.” H ilary says m uch the sam e thing. Ambrose w rites th at the
S in "died according to the assum ption of our nature, and did not die
according to the substance of eternal life. . . . He himself, by a kind of
new operation, though dead, opened the tom bs of the dead, and indeed
nis body lay in the tom b, yet He him self was free am ong the dead.” The
Son, then, both suffers and does not suffer. In A thanasius’s words, "He it
was who suffered and yet suffered not. Suffered, because His own body
suffered, and he was in it, which thus suffered; suffered not, because the
Word, being by nature God, is im passible.” Again, John of Dam ascus
nets the nail on the head: "Christ, while being two natures, suffered in
nls passible nature and in it was crucified, for it was in the flesh th at he
nung on the cross, and not in the divinity. Should they say, while inquir
e s of us: Did two natures die? We shall reply: No, indeed. Therefore,
two natures were not crucified either, b u t the Christ was begotten, that
s to say, the Divine W ord w as incarnate and begotten in the flesh, and
he was crucified in the flesh, suffered in the flesh, and died in the flesh,
while his divinity rem ained unaffected.”
L uther says pretty m uch the sam e thing hundreds of years later: “For
God in his ow n n a tu re cannot die; b u t now, since God and m an are
united in one person, the death of the m an w ith w hom God is one thing
or person is justly called the death of God. . . . For though suffering,
dying, rising are attributes of the h u m an nature alone, yet since Christ
is the Son both of God and of M ary in one indivisible person w ith two
distinct natures, we correctly say of the entire person: God is crucified
for us, God shed his blood for us; God died for us and rose from the
dead, not God ap art from m anhood b u t the God who has united him self
into one person w ith h u m an n atu re.”
I w ant to also respond to your question concerning Philippians 2:7
and the nature of the Son’s self-emptying in the econom y of salvation,
b u t this letter is already too long. I’ll be w riting again soon. Bet you
can’t wait!

Chris
23 John: How Do We Know What
God Is Like?
"ear Chris,
Thank you for stating my objections so clearly and orderly in your

letter. You spend m ost of your tim e arguing against my second objec
tion: though the tradition affirm s the full divinity of Jesus, it seem s to
suggest th a t w hat we actually see is only his h u m an nature. You also
touch on the sixth: how can the divine W ord suffer in Jesus if the divine
nature cannot suffer? You say th a t you will get back to num ber seven
in a future letter. That will be fine, b u t I w ant to hold your feet to the
tire on objections three and four and especially on five and eight (they
are the same). I believe th a t you do have a preconceived notion of God
through w hich you read the biblical texts, distinguishing texts th at speak
"appropriately” from those th at speak “accom m odatingly” about God.
Unfortunately, you have yet to tell m e precisely w hat this preconceived
notion of God is and how you know this is the true God.
Let m e begin w ith your response to my second objection, since m ost
of your letter is given over to it. I do not m aintain th a t all theologians
have thought th a t all we see in Christ is his hum an nature. Of course
they said th a t we see divinity in Jesus. B ut did the people you cite do
an adequate job of this? I th ink not. Moreover, I have not affirm ed th at
"every text concerning Christ is pointing to or illustrating a tru th about
his divinity.” I do not believe th at God bleeds or sheds tears as Jesus did.
101
Hence, I agree w ith you th a t not every biblical text about Jesus applies
directly to his divinity. Also, I affirm th at Jesus teaches us w hat it m eans
to be truly hum an—to live the way God intended us to live. (In the near
future I w ant to apply openness theology to social ethics.) So we have
m uch in com m on here.
You do an excellent job of quoting several of the fathers, as well as
L uther and Oden, to show th a t they spoke of the divine Son suffering
and even dying in som e sense of those term s. I do not doubt this. Hence
I agree w ith m ost of w hat you say in the letter. However, for m e the issue
is w hether w hat they say in this regard is coherent w ith other things
they say. Again, I think not. You point out th at people such as Cyril did
not seem to struggle w ith the question I raise about the suffering of the
Word. Well, so w hat? If you claim th at a point in my theology is inco
herent and I were to respond, "I really don’t struggle w ith that, I simply
affirm it all,” w ould you think th at a satisfactory answer? Just because
I don’t see a problem does n ot m ean one is not there. The history of
theology has seen m any tim es w here certain people saw no problem
b u t later w riters did. (For instance, th at infants should be baptized, that
all unbaptized children th at die are dam ned, and th at all Jews deserve
persecution for killing Christ.) I suggested th a t there is a fundam ental
incoherency in saying th at God, as God, cannot suffer and also saying
th a t the divine Son suffered in the one person of Jesus.
Your answ er to this is an appeal to incom prehensibility. You write,
“How the Son suffers in such a m anner rem ains incom prehensible and
ineffable to me, b u t if we drain all incom prehensibility out of the incar
nation I’m not sure we still have the w ondrous reality we began with!”
So I’m draining all incom prehensibility out of the m ystery of the incar
nation? Your rem ark is an ingenious rhetorical ploy—it sounds ever so
pious—b ut it is not an argum ent against trying to get as clear as we can
on the m atter. Your accusation am ounts to saying th a t if I disagree with
your position on the suffering of the Son I ’m doing a naughty thing.
However, I don’t believe I’m being naughty at all, for I’m n ot trying to
rid the incarnation of mystery. W ho can fathom it? I like w hat Charles
Wesley wrote: ‘"Tis m ystery all, the im m ortal dies. W ho can explore its
strange design? In vain the firstborn seraph tries to sound the depths of
love divine.” W hat I am trying to do is m ake sure we are not contradict
ing ourselves and hiding behind the cloak of incom prehensibility. This
goes back to previous discussions, so I will say no m ore about it now.
I agree th a t God, as God, cannot suffer physically and cannot cease
to exist. How do I know this? I w ould argue from Scripture and phi
losophy th at God, as creator, cannot do these things because they are
contrary to the divine nature. You say th at “Jesus experienced physical
suffering, em otional suffering, powerlessness, and physical death” and
John: H ow Do We Know W hat God Is Like? 103
hold th a t God cannot experience any of these. Hence, only the hum an
nature of Jesus experienced these. First, let m e say th at Jesus did not
experience “pow erlessness.” Rather, he exercised the pow er of love and
chose not to use other types of pow er available to him . It was not th at
he had no power. Rather, he chose to restrain the full use of his power.
W hen I w restle w ith my young children I can restrain the full use of
my power, b u t th at does not m ean I’m suddenly powerless. Now this
opens the question w hether God, as God, can restrain the full use of
his power. I believe th at God can and has done so repeatedly in hum an
history. Consequently, the fact th a t Jesus chose not to utilize pow ers
that were available to him says nothing against his divinity. If we go this
route there sim ply is no need to hold th at this applies only to his hum an
nature. The New Testam ent w riters speak of the pow er of the cross and
resurrection (Rom. 1:18), for the cross of Christ m anifests God’s power
and wisdom (1 Cor. 1:22-25).
The sam e principle applies to your claim th at God, as God, cannot
experience em otional suffering. As I’ve pointed out in previous letters,
the Scriptures have m any passages depicting God as experiencing em o
tional suffering (e.g., Gen. 6:6; Hosea 11:8). You claim th a t such Scrip
tures are “accom m odations” to us because we cannot really understand
the way God is. Well, you u n derstand the way God is enough to tell me
that I’m being im pious for taking such passages as disclosures of w hat
God is like. You claim to know th a t God, as God, cannot have em otional
suffering. My question to you is: How does Chris Hall know th is? You
do not give biblical support for your claim —in fact, you say th at these
biblical texts cannot m ean w hat they say. I conclude th at you have some
as yet undisclosed philosophical conception of God w hereby you filter
the divine revelation. Like a stock boy in a grocery store you know how
to sort the biblical texts into those th a t are appropriate to apply to God
from those th a t are inappropriate. From w here do you get such know l
edge of proper sorting?
Following Athanasius you claim to "walk the straight way of piety,”
and from Cyril you claim to know w hich passages of Scripture truly
‘befit” divinity and w hich texts are “lowly” and should not be applied
to God. T hat is w onderful. Can’t you teach m e how to do this? W hat
criteria do you em ploy to know w hat God m ust be like (dignum Deo)? I
do not w ant you to give m e a fish, as you did in your letter—I w ant you
to teach m e how to fish! That is, don’t ju st restate your conclusion over
and over. Tell m e how you got there.
The Old Testam ent w riters depict God as suffering. The New Testa
m ent w riters w orship Jesus as God in the flesh and they speak of the suf
fering of the Son of God. In fact, they see the way of God (God’s wisdom
and power) as going through suffering ra th e r th an being im perm eable
to it. It seem s to m e th a t the New Testam ent w riters believed th at God

was in Jesus and th at Jesus suffered even as God. If this is correct, then
it casts doubt on the church fathers you quote. It seem s to m e th at the
burden of proof is on you to dem onstrate th at you are interpreting the
Bible correctly w hen it seems, on the surface, th a t Scripture is teaching
th at God, as God, can suffer.
It is correct th at the m ajority of early C hristian pastors who wrote
theology held th a t God cannot suffer. So did Arius. It w as an im portant
argum ent for him . God cannot suffer, Jesus suffered, so Jesus cannot
be fully God in the sam e sense as the Father. This conclusion was right
fully rejected at Nicea. However, nobody seem ed to call into question
the fundam ental Greek philosophical assum ption (that is w here it came
from, not Scripture) th at God cannot suffer. Even the Gnostic Christians
said th a t God cannot suffer! Their argum ent w ent like this: since God
cannot suffer, the Son of God associated w ith Jesus cannot suffer. Hence,
they cam e to two possible solutions. E ither Jesus only appeared to be
a hum an being (he was not really hum an), or the divine Son “adopted”
the hum an Jesus such th at the hum an Jesus suffered b u t not the divine
Son. Again, people ju st took for granted th a t God cannot suffer; the dif
ferences lie in their solutions.
This notion that God cannot suffer seemed to be in the very air the early
Christians breathed. However, some early Christian w riters thought the
air was polluted. They attem pted to retu rn to the biblical p o rtrait of God
w ithout sacrificing w hat orthodox Christians took to be im portant in
affirm ing im passibility For instance, I m entioned in a previous letter
th a t the third-century w riter Gregory Thaum aturgus w rote a book on
divine impassibility. He argued th a t if God cannot choose to suffer, then
God's will is confined and hence God is subject to great suffering! A
better solution, says Gregory, is to say th a t God’s suffering is not identi
cal to ours, though it is similar. It is not identical because we can be
forced to suffer, b u t no one can force God to suffer. Gregory thinks that
the purpose of the doctrine of im passibility is to keep God safe from
being forced to do som ething. Consequently, he believes th at it solves
the problem the fathers you cite were wrestling w ith if we say th a t God
voluntarily chooses to share in the sufferings of his creatures for the
sake of h u m an salvation. W hat is w rong w ith that?
Lactantius, a Latin writer, also criticized the supposed im passibil
ity of God, producing a treatise on God’s anger in w hich he defended
the reality of divine em otions. He held th at God’s blessedness does not
prohibit the experience of joy, benevolence, anger, or pity. If you rem ove
these from God, he says, you rem ove any genuine religion and relation
ship w ith God. Amen! P reach it brother! Against those who claim ed
John: How Do We Know W hat God Is Like? 105
that God is perfectly im passible and at rest, Lactantius replied th at to

be perfectly at rest is to be dead.
Thus not all the early Christians agreed on this issue. I believe th at
Gregory and Lactantius were on the right track. In my opinion, if we
say th at God, as God, can suffer, th en it rem oves a m ajor incoherency
in m uch of the tradition regarding the incarnation (even though it does
not rem ove all m ystery o r imply th at we fully com prehend all there is
to know about it). Is h u m an suffering fundam entally different in kind
from w hat God can experience? The theologians you cite say yes. But
if we allow th a t God, as God, can suffer or restrain the full use of his
pow er (.kenosis), then the suffering of the divine Son is not at odds w ith
the divine nature. In fact, it discloses an aspect of the divine nature. So,
again I repeat your citation of m e in point eight of your letter: “We m ay
need to m odify ou r preconceived notions of w hat is fitting for God to
be. . . . Perhaps self-giving, self-sacrifice, and self-lim itation is p a rt of
w hat the loving Trinity is like. For me, w hat Jesus is like discloses w hat
God is like.”
You believe th a t God cannot suffer—God cannot even voluntarily
choose to suffer. According to classical theism (which is w hat you seem
to espouse) God does n ot have changing em otions. This forces you to
go through the Bible sorting out w hich texts really apply to God and
the divine nature of the Son and w hich texts do n ot because they are
inappropriate for God. I believe my position is superior for a num ber
ot reasons. First, there is no contradiction in saying th a t the divine Son
suffered. Second, we can learn m uch about God from Jesus. Do we
.earn everything there is to know? Of course not. B ut this does allow
us to affirm, w ith the biblical w riters, th a t the life, ministry, death, and
resurrection of Jesus do disclose the nature of God to us.
In conclusion, I’ve noted in this letter th a t you and I have m uch in
comm on on this issue. However, I point out again th at you have never
given me a single biblical reason to affirm divine impassibility. Moreover,
you still have not disclosed the philosophical notions of God th at you
use to filter the Scriptures. These notions involve timelessness, im m uta
bility, impassibility, and used to involve simplicity (but few affirm that
anymore!). There is nothing wrong w ith using philosophical argum ents
in this way, but we need to get them on the table so we can argue their
merits.
Thanks for your friendship and efforts to teach me.
Have a meaningful Easter,

John
24 Chris: The Church Fathers
on Impassibility
Dear John,
It was good to h ear from you in your m ost recent letter on im passi
bility and I’m thankful for the opportunity to resum e ou r discussion. I
know you’re eager to h ear my understanding of the biblical argum ents
for impassibility, b u t before I get to biblical issues I w ant to respond
to som e of your specific ideas and inquiries as expressed in your m ost
recent correspondence.
For instance, you’ve m entioned m ore th an once th at you believe that
I have a preconceived notion of God by w hich I’m reading the biblical
texts: my understanding of w hat is w orthy of God (dignum Deo) is caus
ing m e to m isread the Bible. That is, this preconceived notion serves
as a filter I use to determ ine w hich texts speak "appropriately” of God
and w hich speak “inappropriately” o r “accom m odatingly.” You then
com m ent in your m ost recent letter th a t I have yet to tell you "precisely
w hat this preconceived notion of God is and how [7] know this is the
true God.”
F air questions, I suppose, b u t I have to ask in response, Am I the
only one of the two of us who has a preconceived notion of God? Do
you m ean to say th a t w hen you approach the text of Scripture you do
so w ith your m ind as a kind of tabula rasa? Do you som ehow have a
pristine, unm ediated access to the biblical text? I’ve heard you speak of
106
Chris: The C hurch Fathers on Im passibility 107
■St
yourself as a “Bible-thum per,” tongue in cheek I think, but behind the

rhetoric appears to be a specific herm eneutical stance: I, John Sand
ers, am starting w ith the Bible and am sim ply going to allow this text
10 speak directly to me. If I ru n across a text th a t appears to teach th at
God changes his m ind, grieves, o r suffers, I'm going to allow the text to
shape my understanding, rath e r th an straining out the m eaning of the
text through the application of foreign ideas or presuppositions.
Can any of us say we have no preconceptions w hen we come to the
text? We all have been influenced and m olded by our family circle, cul
ture, teachers, churches, pastors, theologians, and key life experiences.
As I read and interact w ith openness theologians I'm m ore th an ever
convinced th a t they, too, have th eir ow n set of lenses th rough w hich
they read the Bible. So w hat is the lens th rough w hich you read the
text? W hat are your preconceived notions? W hat or who has deeply
influenced your perspective as you read the text of Scripture?
Back to the issue at hand. W ho has deeply form ed o r shaped my
approach to Scripture? As you already know, I attem pt to read the Bible
with and through the history of exegesis as practiced in the church over
its history. I acknowledge th a t the history of exegesis is com plicated
and diverse. W hat I attem pt to do is listen carefully to the voices of the
past (and occasionally the present!) and hopefully discern through this
the consensual heart of the church’s reflection on a given biblical text
or them e.
I don’t believe th at the exegesis of the fathers was always correct
or th a t the fathers always agreed w ith one another. Alexandrian and
.Antiochian fathers som etim es strongly disagreed w ith each other. Nei
ther do I believe, however, th a t we read Scripture well by attem pting to
interpret it individualistically rath e r th an communally. This is one of the
reasons why, by the way, I think it’s im portant to listen to you and others
such as Greg Boyd and Clark Pinnock. You’re p art of the com m unity of
taith and surely have insights th a t will aid me in reading the Scriptures
m ore effectively. It does me good, for example, to attem pt to defend a
doctrine such as im passibility w ith other m em bers of the church who
seriously question it. O ur debate forces m e to rethink issues, to clarify
my thinking on past form ulations, and again to listen carefully to my
community, past and present.
All of us, including yourself, have a theological and herm eneutical
pedigree. As H arold O. J. Brow n puts it, no biblical in terp reter ever
came to the Bible “cold, as it were, but each had been exposed to the
Christian m essage and to form s of C hristian life before being ‘reform ed’
by the text of Scripture.” In my own case my first Bible teachers were
prem illenial dispensationalists such as Hal Lindsey. Only later in my
journey was I exposed to figures such as Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory,
Athanasius, Augustine, Cyril, Luther, and Calvin. So I agree w ith you

th a t the notion of preconceived ideas is an im portant one. We all have
been shaped and form ed by others.
How have the fathers taught m e to read the Bible? First, they insist
th a t I read the Bible holistically. That is, a p articular text m ust be read
and interpreted in light of the overall narrative and them atic structure
of the Bible. Key them es and w ords—God, Jesus, Israel, church—m ust
be interpreted in light of the biblical narrative’s overarching story line
as presented by biblical authors.
Second, I try to listen to the fathers as they encourage m e to read
the Bible christologically. All the fathers, as far as I can tell, read the
entire Bible through the prism or lens of Christ’s incarnation, crucifix
ion, resurrection, and ascension. As Hilary puts it, “Every p a rt of Holy
W rit announces through w ords the com ing of O ur Lord Jesus Christ,
reveals it through facts and establishes it through examples. . . . For it
is our Lord who during all the present age, through tru e and m anifest
foreshadowings, generates, cleanses, sanctifies, chooses, separates, or
redeem s the Church in the Patriarchs, through Adam ’s slumber, N oah’s
flood, M elchizedek’s blessing, A braham ’s justification, Isaacs’s birth,
and Jacob’s bondage.”
Third, as I have already m entioned, I try to read the Bible com m u
nally w ithin C hrist’s body, the church. In a word, biblical interp reta
tion is an ecclesial affair. It takes place in the church for the church.
As Jenson puts it, “It is the church th at knows the plot and dramatis
personae of the Scripture narrative, since the church is one continuous
com m unity w ith the story’s actors and narrators, as w ith its tradents,
authors, and assem blers.” Thus, since you, Clark, and Greg are m em bers
of the church, I need to listen and test carefully w hat you are saying,
b o th by the prim ary stan d ard of Scripture and by th e history of the
church’s reflection on th a t sam e text. It m ay well be th at you are observ
ing aspects of the text or are offering interpretations of the text th at the
church has overlooked or m isinterpreted. Could be. On the other hand,
it m ay also be true th a t you are offering a view point th at will ultim ately
have to be rejected. Time will tell.
One m ore illustration a n d th en on to the specific issues you raise
concerning coherency, impassibility, divine em otions, and so on. Pon
der the following sym phonic illustration. Im agine the first m ovem ent
of the sym phony as the Old Testament, the second m ovem ent as Jesus’
birth, ministry, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension, and the third
m ovem ent as the apostolic interpretation of the first two movem ents.
In addition to the symphony, though, we also have a postlude of sorts,
the m usic the church has produced over the centuries in its exegesis
and theological reflection. The question is w hether the postlude is in
harm ony w ith the preceding symphony, or w hether its harm onic struc
tures are actually discordant. To extend the m etaphor a bit, the m usic
of the postlude seem s to m e to interpret the prim ary m ovem ents of the
sym phony well. And w hat is heresy? Interpretations of the sym phony
that are fundam entally discordant w ith its m ajor them es and m elodic
variations.
Am I, then, as you contend, applying a preconceived notion of God to
the biblical text? Perhaps. That is one of the issues u n d er dispute. But
the possibility does exist th a t rath e r th an applying a foreign, discordant
melodic line to the symphony, i.e., a preconceived notion of God th a t is
foreign to the biblical narrative itself, I’m actually singing m usical inter
pretations com posed and played by m usicians th at knew the original
score well and developed faithfully and skillfully the original symphony’s
rhythm s and tonal qualities. The key question, at least for this letter,
is w hether im passibility is a discordant or harm onic interpretation of
the original score. W here, for instance, can the idea of im passibility be
found in the original sym phony itself? In a word, is there biblical evi
dence th a t God in se does not experience passion or suffering?
Before we look at the biblical background for impassibility, though,
I think it is im portant to note th at fathers such as John Chrysostom did
not understand impassibility to m ean th at God was a Stoic or Epicurean
deity, divorced from his creation, a m etaphysical, static, stone pillar of
some sort. For instance, Chrysostom w rites th at divine providence is
neither m echanistic n o r distant. “For he does not sim ply w atch over us,
but also loves us; he ardently loves us w ith an inexplicable love, w ith an
Impassible yet fervent, vigorous, genuine, indissoluble love, a love th at
is im possible to extinguish.”
Chrysostom , then, does not view im passibility and fervent love as
m utually exclusive. G. L. Prestige, com m enting on the fathers’ under
standing of impassibility, believes th a t im passibility guarantees the
consistency of all God's attitudes and actions tow ard hum anity. While
the passions th a t plague fallen people cause their love to w eaken or dis
appear as circum stances change, God’s transcendent, im passible nature
rem ains above “the forces and passions such as com m only hold sway
in the creation and am ong m ankind.” Prestige writes, “It is clear th at
impassibility m eans not th at God is inactive or uninterested, not that His
Mill is determ ined from w ithin instead of being swayed from w ithout.
It safeguards the tru th th at the im pulse alike in providential order and
in redem ption and sanctification come from the will of God. If it were
possible to adm it th a t the im pulse was w rung from H im either by the
needs or by the claims of His creation, and th at thus w hether by pity or
by justice His hand was forced, He w ould no longer be represented as
absolute; He w ould be dependent on the created universe and thus at

best only in possession of concurrent power.”
I’m unconvinced th a t a defense of im passibility dem ands th a t we
deny an em otional life in God. Hence, Chrysostom readily describes
God’s love as both im passible and fervent. God always acts tow ard us
in consistent, unchanging, fervent love.
Im passibility would m ean, however, th at God experiences em otions
in a m anner different from the way hum ans experience em otions. In
addition, God does not experience all the em otions hum ans experience
(God does not experience the em otional rem orse th at norm ally accom
panies sinful h u m an actions), nor is God’s em otional life characterized
by the distorted passions th a t m ark sinful h u m an existence. Exactly
w hat is a distorted passion?
R oberta Bondi describes the desert fathers’ understanding of a pas
sion along the following lines: a passion “has as its chief characteristics
the perversion of vision and the destruction of love. A passion m ay very
well be a strong em otion, b u t it need not be. A passion can also be a
state of m ind, or even a habitual action. Anger is usually a passion, b ut
som etim es forgetfulness is called a passion. . . . Strong em otions w hich
accom pany love, lead to love, o r even are an expression of love are not
passions.”
Thus, at least in the m inds of m any early Christians, to speak of God
as being passionless or im passible w ould not necessarily m ean th at
God was emotionless. Rather, it w ould m ean th a t God did not possess
either em otions or dispositions th at crippled God’s ability to love. By
definition, the passions cripple the h u m an capacity to love. As Bondi
puts it, the “passions blind us so th at we cannot love. They create for
us in terio r lenses th rough w hich we see the world, lenses w hich we
very often do not even know are there. W hen we are u n d er the control
of ou r passions, even w hen we think we are m ost objective, we cannot
be—we are in the grip of em otions, states of m ind, habits th a t distort
everything we see.”
Thankfully, God does not possess passions such as these. Hence, Chrys
ostom ’s w ords concerning both im passibility and fervent love are not
incoherent. In Chrysostom ’s Exhortation to Theodore After His Fall, he
highlights the pastoral implications of the distinction betw een change
able hum an passions and God’s unchangeable tenderness. He writes,
"For if the w rath of God were a passion, one m ight well despair as being
unable to quench the flame w hich he had kindled by so m any evil doings;
but since the Divine nature is passionless, even if He punishes, even if He
takes vengeance, he does this not w ith wrath, b ut w ith tender care, and
m uch lovingkindness [my emphasis]; wherefore it behoves us to be of
m uch good courage, and to trust in the power of repentance. . . . He acts
C hris: The C hurch Fathers on Im passibility 111
with a view to our advantage, and to prevent our perverseness becoming

worse by our making a practice of despising and neglecting Him .”
Chrysostom em ploys the exam ple of p aren tal love in a later w ork to
m ake a sim ilar point. He knows th a t his readers, especially in the tim e
of persecution they and he are presently experiencing, will be tem pted
to feel abandoned by God. Could this actually be the case? Chrysos
tom rem inds his audience of Isaiah ’s words: "Can a w om an forget h er
nursin g child, or show no com passion for th e child of h er w om b?”
(Isa. 49:15). A ccording to C hrysostom , th e lesson to be learn ed from
Isaiah is clear: “The p ro p h et says this to m ake the point th a t ju st as
a w om an w ould not forget h e r ow n children, so n eith er w ould God
forget hu m an k in d .”
Chrysostom exhorts his readers, however, to m editate even m ore
deeply on the w onder of God’s love. The interface betw een the hum an
com parison and the love of God is insufficient in itself to com m unicate
the incom parable reality of the divine love. We m ust im m ediately exer
cise our reason to move beyond the boundaries of the m etaphor. Thus
he exhorts: “I have given these examples so th a t w hen I introduce other
illustrations you w ouldn’t lim it your thinking to the m easure of w hat is
spoken by the prophets, but having this rule you should use your reason
to go even further and see the unspeakable excess o f the love o f God” (my
emphasis).
Chrysostom continually prods his readers to move beyond hum an
com parisons. “Do you see how the degree of God’s love exceeds th at of
a m other? In order th a t you m ight see how God’s love super abundantly
transcends the w arm affection of a m other and the love of a father for
their children. . . . As great as is the difference betw een light and dark
ness, betw een evil and goodness, so great is the difference betw een the
goodness and providence of God in com parison to the tender love of a
father.”
W hat of the issue of suffering? Im passibility does entail the idea th at
God does not experience suffering as the result of actions im posed on
him by others. This affirm ation, as I have already argued, does not m ean
that God is em otionless. Rather, in the relationship of creator and crea
ture God rem ains and will always be ontologically distinct, the active
p artner in the dance, so to speak. That is, God as God and as creator does
not need anything or anyone outside of him self to fulfill a need, lack,
or desire. God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit was dancing the rhythm s
of love before creation ever took place. In the act of creation God has
invited us to join in the dance, b u t as creatures. The ontic distinction
betw een God and hum anity rem ains and will always rem ain. God does
not need us to be absolutely fulfilled as God. Even Job’s counselors
seem ed to get this right: “Can a m ortal be of use to God? Can even the
wisest be of service to him ?” (Job 22:2-3). “If you have sinned, w hat do
you accom plish against him? And if your transgressions are m ultiplied,
w hat do you do to him ?” (Job 35:5-6). Or com pare the w ords of the
Psalmist: "For every wild anim al of the forest is m ine, the cattle on a
thousand hills. I know all the birds of the air, and all th at moves in the
field is m ine. If I were hungry, I w ould not tell you, for the w orld and
all th at is in it is m ine” (Ps. 50:10-12).
In addition, im passibility affirm s th a t God, as God, is under no obli
gation to anyone outside himself. He is obligated to act justly tow ard
his creation, not because anything in creation itself obligates God to act
justly, b u t because justice itself is fully actualized in God's character. To
put it som ew hat crassly, God cannot help but act justly. It is ontologi-
cally im possible for God to act otherwise. He is the source of life and all
its accom panying goodness to us, b u t he needs nothing from us and is
obligated to no one. As Paul puts it in his evangelistic serm on in Athens,
God is n o t "served by h u m an hands, as though he needed anything,
since he him self gives to all m ortals life and breath and all things.” If
God ever stopped acting on ou r behalf, an acting th a t is enabled by the
absolute ontic distinction betw een God as creator and us as creation,
we w ould cease to exist, as w ould the universe. He does not need us,
but we surely need him . ‘“Or who has given a gift to him , to receive a
gift in return?’ For from him and through him and to him are all things”
(Rom. 11:35-36).
As you have already com m ented, im passibility is connected to a series
of other im portant issues we need to discuss: God’s imm utability, om ni
science, relationship to tim e, the problem of evil, and so on. Before we
move on, however, I w ant to respond specifically to a few com m ents
you m ade in your last letter. As I m entioned at the beginning of this
letter, you chide m e for having a preconceived notion of God by w hich
I read the biblical texts, a notion or understanding I use to distinguish
betw een texts th a t speak “appropriately” of God and those th at “speak
accom m odatingly” o r “inappropriately.” I don’t think you're correct or
consistent in your criticism .
First, I will continue to argue th at texts in w hich God accom m odates
him self to us are appropriate, not inappropriate. This is probably som e
thing we need to discuss m ore thoroughly. Perhaps m ore im portantly
at this juncture, you w rite th at you “do not believe th a t God bleeds or
sheds tears as Jesus d i d . . . I agree th a t God, as God, cannot suffer physi
cally and cannot cease to exist. How do I know this? I w ould argue from
Scripture and philosophy th a t as creator God cannot do these things
because they are contrary to the divine n ature.”
Of course, I agree w ith you. But I’m not sure th at you’re being con
sistent w ith your ow n herm eneutic. W hat of the m any texts in the Old
C hris: The C hurch Fathers on Im passibility 113
Testam ent th a t portray God as having a body? Moses, Aaron, Nadab,

Abihu, and seventy elders of Israel see God on M ount Sinai. U nder
God’s "feet” they see “som ething like a pavem ent of sapphire stone.”
Yet despite seeing God these m en do not perish. God does “n ot lay his
hand on the chief m en of the people of Israel; also they beheld God, and
they ate and drank” (Exod. 24:10-11). How do you know God does not
have feet o r hands? Only, it seem s to me, by applying other texts and
philosophical principles to texts such as these—the very error you lay at
my doorstep. Are you practicing a consistent herm eneutic? O ther texts
speak of Moses speaking “face to face” w ith God, “as one speaks to a
friend” (Exod. 33:11). Later in the sam e chapter Moses is described as
being allowed to see God’s “back” b ut not God’s “face” (Exod. 33:23).
Does God have a body or not? Is God corporeal or not?
It seems to m e th a t Clark Pinnock is applying the openness herm e
neutic m ore consistently th an you. You’re too m uch like me! In Clark’s
m ost recent book, M ost Moved Mover: A Theology o f God’s Openness,
he lists and com m ents on the texts from Exodus I’ve ju st m entioned.
I’m interested in your response to his ideas, though of course you don’t
have to agree w ith Clark. Clark writes: "There is an issue th at has not
been raised yet in the discussion around the open view of God. If he is
w ith us in the world, if we are to take biblical m etaphors seriously, is
God in som e way em bodied? Critics will be quick to say that, although
there are expressions of this idea in the Bible, they are not to be taken
literally. B ut I do not believe th a t the idea is as foreign to the Bible’s
view of God as we have assum ed.” How so? “H um an beings are said to
be em bodied creatures created in the image of God. Is there perhaps
som ething in God th a t corresponds w ith em bodim ent? Having a body
is certainly not a negative thing because it m akes it possible for us to be
agents. Perhaps God’s agency w ould be easier to envisage if he were in
som e way corporeal. Add to th at the fact th at in the theophanies of the
Old Testam ent God encounters hum ans in the form of a m an.”
I began to get nervous as I followed Clark’s argum ent, for it seem ed
to m e th a t he was m oving tow ard viewing the m etaphors concerning
God’s hands, feet, and face as in som e way pointing to som e kind of
a literal reality. Perhaps Clark was sim ply pondering the incarnation.
And yet furth er in his argum ent Clark w rites th a t “God loves to draw
near to us through nature, theophany, and incarnation.” Fine. B ut then
Clark writes, “It is possible th a t God has a body in som e way we cannot
im agine and, therefore, th a t it is natural for God to seek out form s of
em bodim ent. I do not feel obliged to assum e th a t God is a purely spiri
tual being w hen his self-revelation does not suggest it.”
Clark is clearly linking personhood and em bodim ent. I don’t have a
h ard tim e w ith this coupling if we lim it the connection betw een person-
hood and em bodim ent to hum an beings. Clark, though, appears to be

taking a huge step in seem ing to argue th a t even for God em bodim ent
and personhood are linked. As Clark states m atters, "The only persons
we encounter are em bodied persons and, if God is not em bodied, it m ay
prove difficult to understand how God is a person. W hat kind of actions
could a disem bodied God perform ?”
The direction Clark is m oving in his thinking and interpretation hits
m e as a consistent openness herm eneutic, and I’d like to know w hat you
think of Clark’s ideas. Is Clark reading the Exodus texts well or not? In
addition, on the basis of an openness herm eneutic, how do you know
th a t God doesn’t bleed, shed tears, and experience physical pain? W hat
preconceived notion of God are you applying to the text th a t prevents
you from viewing God as em bodied?
A few lines fu rth er Clark writes: “As h u m an subjectivity expresses
itself in, with, and through bodies, so the transcendent subjectivity of
God is som ehow im m anent in the patterns, processes, and events of the
w orld.” Clark seems to be close to saying th at the w orld and its various
processes, patterns, and events m ight well be the em bodim ent of God.
Clark’s ideas are troubling to m e and yet consistent w ith the applica
tion of the openness herm eneutic to the text of Scripture. W hat do you
think?
To move on, in your letter you continue to argue th a t Cyril is speaking
incoherently w hen he writes th at the W ord suffers in the hum anity he
has assum ed for our sake. How can God the incarnate W ord genuinely
suffer and God not suffer in se, a suffering th a t both F ather and Holy
Spirit w ould experience? In your words, “there is a fundam ental inco
herency in saying th a t God, as God, cannot suffer and also saying that
the divine Son suffered in the one person of Jesus.” I don't know how
the W ord suffers in his assum ed hum anity. How God pulls this off is a
mystery to me. But I believe th at the stick you like to spank m e w ith—the
issue of incoherence—is ju st as applicable to you. How so?
W hile you don’t like Cyril’s model, you do “like w hat Charles Wesley
wrote: "Tis m ystery all, the im m ortal dies.”' Sorry, b ut to speak of one
who is im m ortal dying is a contradiction in term s. How is it coherent
to speak of one who cannot die actually dying? This is indeed a “strange
design,” as Wesley writes. I resonate w ith his words, but I don’t know
why you would. After all, if coherency is a fundam ental criterion for
public discussion of theological issues, as you have contended, why
w ould you agree w ith Wesley? Maybe I’m m issing som ething here, but
your support of Wesley seem s surprisingly incoherent to me. Wesley’s
expression becom es m ore coherent w hen interpreted against the back
drop of the Cyrillian model, w here the incarnate W ord indeed dies as
his hum an natu re expires on the cross. B ut this is the position I've been
arguing all along.
Finally, it’s unclear to m e why you w ould argue th a t Jesus did not
experience “powerlessness.” In my letter I grouped together four expres
sions: physical suffering, em otional suffering, powerlessness, and phys
ical death. Perhaps my inclusion of powerlessness is less th an wise, but
it seem s th a t Jesus surely underw ent the h u m an lim itations th a t all
hum an beings experience. Why? He was h u m an as well as divine. At
times Jesus m anifested his divinity quite clearly. The incident of Jesus’
walking on w ater com es to m ind.
At other tim es, as you rightly p oint out, Jesus purposely chose in
love "not to use other types of pow er available to him. It was not th at
he had no power. Rather, he chose to restrain the full use of his power.”
I also agree w ith you th a t God “can restrain the full use of his power.”
God does so all the tim e for any num ber of reasons. Som etim es, as you
indicate, divine restraint is a m anifestation of divine love. At other tim es
divine restraint m ight well be a sign of divine judgm ent. Paul teaches
in Rom ans 1, for example, th at a sign of God’s judgm ent against sin is
his willingness to “give people u p ” to their sin (Rom. 1:24, 26, 28). This
giving over is surely a divine refusal to act, a divine restrain t of w hat
God could do if God chose to do so.
If we refuse to ascribe “powerlessness” in any sense to Jesus, however,
we can easily lapse into a kind of docetic error. For instance, if Jesus
chose not to exercise his divine power, he w ould not as a hum an being
inherently possess the capability to swim u n d er w ater for long periods
of tim e, breathing oxygen through gills like a fish. Why? Christ’s body
was a genuine hum an body, w ith all of a body’s characteristics. If som e
one had attached weights to Jesus’ ankles and tossed him into the sea
he w ould have drowned, as far as I can tell, apart from his choosing to
exercise divine power. Jesus was not a ghost. He possessed a hum an
body, a body subject to the lim its and, yes, powerlessness and vulner
ability th at all hum ans experience w hen placed in certain contexts.
Having said all this, it rem ains unclear to m e why the issue of Christ's
powerlessness was such a red flag for you. I’m not sure how this relates
to the openness position.
Finally, I think you need to move m ore slowly in som e of the deduc
tions you m ake. For example, you w rite “it seem s to me th at the New
Testam ent w riters believed th a t God was in Jesus and Jesus suffered
even as God. If this is correct, then it casts doubt on the church fathers
you quote. It seem s the burden of proof is on you to dem onstrate th at
you are interpreting the Bible correctly w hen it seems, on the surface,
that Scripture is teaching th at God, as God, can suffer.” Maybe so. New
Testam ent w riters do insist th at Jesus is God. That is not, however, the
sam e thing as saying th a t God suffered as God w hen the divine Word
suffered in his incarnate hum anity. Your conclusion th a t “Jesus suffered
even as God” is a theological deduction based on your exegesis of certain
New Testam ent texts, none of w hich you m ention in your letter.
You closed by noting th a t I have n ot yet broached the topics of
tim elessness, im m utability, simplicity, and om niscience. You’re right.
Perhaps a discussion concerning om niscience is the next aspect of our
debate we should develop. The validity and coherence of the openness
position surely hangs on w hat we m ean by om niscience. How m uch
does God really know after all?

Chris
25 John: The Western Fathers
and Impassibility
Dear Chris,
You raise about six different issues in your letter. I will not address
all of them , and som e of them I will barely touch on, b u t we can retu rn
to them .
Let m e begin by saying th at I do not claim to approach the biblical
text em pty-headed. We are all shaped by traditions th a t include ser
m ons, Sunday school, and for me, academ ic studies. I’ve already w rit
ten you previously th a t I’m a critical realist in my epistemology, not a
com m onsense realist. So I do not believe th a t I read the m eaning of the
biblical text w ithout any interpretation. As I said before, I approach the
text w ith assum ptions and teachings absorbed from other Christians.
These assum ptions can be questioned. In fact, I was taught m any of the
sam e presuppositions you hold, b u t I’ve come to reject som e of them .
As a critical realist I have to be open to correction, for our learning is
always an ongoing enterprise.
You ask w ho has deeply influenced my reading of Scripture. Fair
enough. A braham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets really challenged m e as
an undergraduate to un derstand som e of the basic differences betw een
H ebraic and Hellenistic thought. Though they are not completely differ
ent, there are som e crucial distinctions. One of them th at Heschel points
out is the n a tu re of God's love and suffering. Greek thought simply
117
could not allow for these conceptions and, unfortunately, m any—though

n o t all—C hristians bought into the Greek philosophical approach to
deity. O ther influences included m y professors: W alter K aiser w hen
I was m ajoring in Old Testam ent and then Donald Bloesch w hen I
sw itched to theology. Bloesch taught a sem inar on the doctrine of God
in w hich we traced the developm ent of the “biblical-classical synthe
sis" in church tradition. That is, the bringing together of the biblical
po rtrait of God w ith Greek philosophical concepts. It is not th a t w hat
the Greeks thought is autom atically wrong, but the Hellenic concept of
divinity created a n um ber of problem s for the Christian understanding
of God. Also, the detailed studies on God and providence by Hebrew
Bible scholar Terence Fretheim , as well as my doctoral supervisor, the
Dutch Reform ed theologian Adrio Konig, have influenced my reading of
Scripture. Finally, let me say th at the w ork of contem porary Christian
philosophers has been very im portant to me. In the past three decades
incredibly detailed w ork has been done on divine attrib u tes such as
impassibility, imm utability, om niscience, and atem porality. H ere I have
in m ind people such as Nicholas W olterstorff, Vincent Briimmer, Alvin
Plantinga, W illiam Alston, and my colleague W illiam Hasker. I will
retu rn to these in a m om ent.
W hat I asked you in my previous letter was to tell me why passages
such as Genesis 6:6 and Hosea 11:8 do not m ean w hat they seem to mean.
The Scriptures portray God as suffering, so why m ust we interpret them
to m ean God does not suffer? I asked how Chris Hall knows how to cor
rectly interpret these texts. Your response seem s to be “because th a t is
the consensus of the first eight centuries of the church." I have a num ber
of problem s w ith this response, but they will have to w ait for a future
letter. Suffice it to say th at I w onder w hich “church” you m ean. You seem
to gravitate tow ards the E astern fathers and don’t bother w ith W estern
thinkers such as Augustine. The W estern church cam e to the conclusion
th a t unbaptized infants th at die are dam ned (though they don't suffer
pain). Very few Christians believe th a t today. Are we wrong?
Just a brief note on divine em bodim ent. I don’t agree w ith everything
th at Pinnock wrote. Please recall our discussion of m etaphors, as well as
w hat I said previously as to why I don’t take “God walked in the garden”
to imply th a t God has physicality. The biblical w riters claim th a t neither
tem ples n o r the heavens can contain God. “God is spirit” (John. 4:24),
...
though I do not profess to u n derstand w hat this m eans in any positive

sense, for we cannot envision a form less being. Yet the elders of Israel
“saw the God of Israel” (Exod. 24:11) and in the new heavens we will
“see the face of God” (Rev. 22:4). I take these expressions to be about an
experience w ith p articular m anifestations of God.
John: The W estern Fathers and Im passibility 119
You say th a t I’m com m itting the “very erro r” of w hich I accuse you.
I am not accusing you of error in having preconceived notions of God
when reading Scripture. I ju st w ant to know your definitions of the
divine attributes and from w here you get these definitions.
I’m so glad we can agree on a good sense of the term “im passibility”
Ithat God is n ot overw helm ed by em otions). However, this is not the
usual definition. If it were, there w ould not have been a huge debate
about it in the early church and again for the past two centuries. Why
w ould Justin M artyr defend im passibility and th en cry out “B ut our
God is not a stone!” if he only m eant w hat you say it m eans? W hy did
Gregory and Lactantius w rite w hat they did in opposition to others if
your definition of im passibility is correct? In my historical surveys of
the divine attributes in The Openness o f God and The God Who Risks I
detailed the debates about the definitions of God’s attributes. Why all the
scholarly studies on this issue? W hy do contem porary evangelical theo
logians such as Wayne Grudem , R onald Nash, and Gordon Lewis call
im passibility into question? W hy does the classical theist H. R Owen,
in his im portant historical survey of the divine attributes, say th a t "this
is the m ost questionable aspect of classical theism ” if im passibility only
m eans th at God is not overw helm ed by negative em otions?
You appeal to Chrysostom for your understanding, b u t his view
is not the stan d ard view, especially not in the W estern church. If we
tu rn to Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Calvin we see the term used
in its m ost accepted sense th a t has dom inated W estern theology, both
Catholic and Protestant. Gordon Lewis gives the standard definition of
impassibility: “The doctrine that God is not capable o f being acted upon or
affected emotionally by anything in creation." Although this becam e the
“consensual” view for m ost of church history, an incredible n um ber of
biblical scholars, theologians, and philosophers today reject it both as
being unbiblical and as having philosophical problem s. Very few defend
this doctrine in its classical sense.
So, I have two m ain problem s w ith your argum ent for impassibility.
First, your definition is not the one I’m criticizing. Second, the biblical
support you give for it will not work. Let m e com m ent on the biblical
problem first. I’ve repeatedly asked you to give me biblical support for
impassibility. You prom ise to do so at the beginning of your letter b u t it
is not until you are tw o-thirds of the way through that you m ention three
texts. You give two texts from Job and one from the Psalms. However,
none of these are about impassibility! These texts do not even address
your w eak definition of im passibility th at God is n ot overw helm ed w ith
negative em otions. So, I claim th a t you still have given m e no biblical
support for impassibility.
Now to the proper definition and w hat it is th at open theists don’t

like about it. You say th at God is not dependent on creatures—he does
not need us. I agree th a t God w ould be God even w ithout creation.
However, th at is a statem ent about God’s self-sufficiency, not about the
issue of im passibility—unless you add to this definition th at God cannot
even will to be dependent on creatures for som e things. Self-sufficiency
and im passibility are not identical b u t they can be related. Returning
to w hat Gordon Lewis said, im passibility is the notion th a t God cannot
be affected by us. God cannot respond to w hat we do. N othing we do,
including our prayers, ever influences w hat God decides to do. God’s will
is never affected by us. God m ay have bliss, b ut God never experiences
anger, pity, joy, or grief. Following Augustine’s discussion of im passibil
ity we m ay say th at God is blissfully aw are of us, b ut our failings and the
h arm we do to one another never bring God pain. N othing th a t happens
in our lives changes God’s blissful, unperturbed serenity.
Following Augustine, Saint Anselm says in his Proslogium, “But how
art thou com passionate, and, at the sam e tim e, passionless? How, then,
art thou com passionate and n ot com passionate, O Lord, unless because
thou a rt com passionate in term s of ou r experience, and not com pas
sionate in term s of thy being.” That is, the biblical language about God’s
mercy, love, and com passion are "accom m odations” to us. God cannot
have such experiences. W hat then really is God’s com passion? It is God’s
benevolence tow ards us th a t we interpret as com passion. God cannot
experience anger either. Again, it is an accom m odation to us. God is
n ot really angry a t sin, it is we w ho interpret divine judgm ents as God
being angry.
Anselm did not invent these ideas; they are p art of the tradition begin
ning early on in Christian thought. The Gnostics, Arius, Athanasius, and
Augustine all agree th a t this is w hat God is like. Why did the ancients
go this way? W olterstorff proposes th a t they had two pow erful argu
m ents. The first, derived from Plato, is the argum ent from perfection
(I’ve discussed this in a previous letter). A perfect being cannot experi
ence changing em otions, say, from joy to grief, since this would destroy
perfect bliss. After all, perfect bliss is w hat all of us desire, so God m ust
have it unchangingly. The second argum ent is th at God m ust be totally
unconditioned by creatures, since the quality of God’s life cannot be
dependent in any way on us. In other words, if we affected God in such
a way th a t God experienced som ething th a t he did n ot already have,
then we are adding to God’s life, and the thought of th a t is utterly alien
to the notion of deity. This goes back to Aristotle’s idea th at for God to
have a relationship w ith us w ould m ake God dependent on us for the
relationship.
I
John: The W estern Fathers an d Im passibility 121
These are the hurdles th a t Gregory and L actantius w ere trying to

overcom e w hen they argued th a t although we cannot force God to
experience joy or grief, God can freely choose to enter into the kinds of
U: i.: . |"|||- -i * S «i i
relationships w ith us w here such experiences are possible. That is, if

God freely chooses to suffer because of us, then creatures are not forcing
God to suffer. As I m entioned before, however, their ideas lay dorm ant
for over a m illennium .
Let m e finish by pointing out som e doctrines related to, and im plica
'i-.|
tions of, strong impassibility. Using the above argum ents for im passi
bility also led the ancients to connect it w ith im m utability (God cannot
-jiii-i.- .H ■iV:i-'
change in any way, for a change w ould only be a change for the worse),
zimelessness (God cannot experience tim e, since th a t w ould be change),
necessity (God m ust exist), omnipotence (God m ust be all powerful, since
he cannot lack any power), omniscience (nothing can be added to God’s
i
a-ffi i n il |h-‘
knowledge as th at w ould imply deficiency), omnipresence (God cannot

move), aseity (totally independent and unconditioned by anything else),
and simplicity (God actually has none of the foregoing properties, since
God is not distinct from God’s essence—we really can’t differentiate
between the attributes of God). The doctrine of sim plicity is difficult to
i,>:
understand, b u t the basic idea is th at although we speak as though God

V iw r .i i'.'i t 'i
has various characteristics (om nipotence, im m utability), God actually

has none of them , for God, unlike us, is not com posed of parts. Rather,
God’s essence is an indivisible unity. N ot m any people today have even
0 B
heard of the doctrine of simplicity, let alone believe it. Nonetheless, it

t
was a key doctrine throughout the M iddle Ages and an essential argu
m ent used by Aquinas to support his understanding of tim elessness and
impassibility. Get rid of divine sim plicity and you seriously underm ine
Aquinas’s concept of God.
This cluster of divine attributes cam e to be know n as "classical th e
ism.” It is an exceedingly influential conception of God th a t was devel
oped by a line of thinkers from Plato th rough Philo of Alexandria to
Plotinus and on into Christian theology picking up steam in Augustine
and Anselm, and finding its apex in Thom as Aquinas. This is quite a
prestigious pedigree and m any critics of open theism claim to be clas
sical theists. Are you a classical theist? It does not seem th a t you really
affirm the definition of impassibility. However, the ancients p u t these
attributes together for very strong reasons, and once you begin tinkering
with one it is going to affect m any of the others. Listen to W olterstorff:
' Once you pull on the thread of impassibility, a lot of other threads come
along. Aseity for exam ple—th a t is, unconditionedness. The biblical w it
ness seem s to m e clearly to be th at God allows him self to be affected
by the doings of the creatures God has created. One also has to give
up im m utability (changelessness) and eternity [tim elessness]. If God
really responds, then God is not m etaphysically im m utable; and if not

m etaphysically im m utable, then not eternal [tim eless].”
Today, m any people w ant to jettison im passibility and sim plicity but
retain strong im m utability, tim elessness, and unconditionedness. Per
haps I'll address this in a future letter.
W hat im plications are there if we do affirm im passibility? If none
of God’s decisions are ever affected by w hat creatures do, th en the
doctrines of unconditional election, irresistible grace, and m eticulous
providence follow, as Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin clearly saw. The
view of m any of the early fathers th a t God uses his foreknowledge to
“look ahead” and see how we will respond to the grace of the Holy Spirit,
and th at he will elect us if he foresees us putting our faith in Christ, is
absurd if God is strongly im passible. It cannot be th at God’s decision
to elect is in any way dependent on a decision we make, for th a t would
m ake God conditioned by and dependent on us for som ething. Every
thing th at happens in our lives is th en exactly the way God w anted it
to be. God does not w ant anything different th an it is. O ur prayers of
petition never influence w hat God decides to do. Rather, our prayers are
the divinely ordained m eans of bringing about w hat God has already
ordained to happen. In other words, God never responds to our prayers,
we respond to God’s will. Do you believe these teachings?
I w ant to elaborate m ore on classical theism and its im plications,
since this will take us into the key points of difference betw een open
theism and other views.
Your friend,
John
Chart: Classical and Open Theism Compared
C la s s ic a l T h e ism O p en T h e ism
O p e ra tiv e R o o t G o d a s creato r, ju d g e , a n d k in g . G o d a s savio r, lover, a n d frie n d .
M e ta p h o rs
N a tu re o f G o d E m p h a s is o n d iv in e so v e re ig n ty . G o d E m p h a s is o n d iv in e re la tio n a lity ,
is u n c h a n g e a b le a n d u n a ffe c te d by G o d is c h a n g e a b le in w ill a n d e m o
c re a tu re s. tio n s a n d is a ffe cte d b y cre a tu re s.
Type G o d e x e rc is e s u n ila te ra l p o w e r in G o d e x e rc is e s u n ila te ra l p o w e r in

o f S o v e re ig n ty c re a tio n , p ro v id e n ce , a n d re d e m p tio n . cre a tio n , b u t b ila te ra l p o w e r w ith
G o d t a k e s n o risks b e c a u s e h e t ig h tly cre a tu re s in p ro v id e n ce a n d re d e m p
c o n tro ls e v e ry d e ta il. tio n . G o d ta k e s ris k s b e c a u s e he
e xe rcise s g e n e ra l co n tro l.
C re a tu re ly H u m a n s h a v e c o m p a tib ilis tic fre e d o m . H u m a n s h a v e lib e rta ria n fre e d o m .

F re e d o m
R e la tio n s h ip G o d a s e te rn a l— i.e ., tim e le s s — eve n G o d a s e v e rla s tin g — i.e ., e n d u rin g

b e tw e e n G o d , if th e e te rn a l d iv in e d e c is io n s h a v e fo re v e r— a n d in te ra c tin g g e n u in e ly
Tim e , a n d E te rn ity te m p o ra l e ffe cts. in a g iv e -a n d -ta k e re la tio n s h ip w ith

te m p o ra l cre a tu re s.
T h e N a tu re T h e fu tu re is c o m p le te ly d e fin ite — it T h e fu tu re is p a rtly d e fin ite a n d

o f th e Fu tu re w ill tu rn o u t e x a c tly a s G o d d e c id e d it p a rtly in d e fin ite — G o d is w o rk in g
sh o u ld tu rn o u t. w ith u s to b rin g a b o u t th e fu tu re .
F o re k n o w le d g e E te rn a lly d e fin ite fo re k n o w le d g e o f a ll P re se n tism : G o d k n o w s th e p a st a n d

fu tu re e v e n ts. G o d k n o w s th e fu tu re p re se n t e x h a u stiv e ly a n d th a t p art
b e c a u s e he d e te rm in e s th e fu tu re . o f th e fu tu re th a t is d e te rm in e d .
P ro b le m o f E v il A ll e vil is p la n n e d b y G o d to d is p la y th e E vil is p e rm itte d b u t n o t w a n te d by

d iv in e g lo ry. G o d in o rd e r to m a k e re la tio n s o f
lo ve w ith cre a tu re s p o ssib le .
S a lv a tio n S o le ly o f G o d 's c h o o s in g — w e re sp o n d G o d 's c h o o s in g is b a s e d on o u r

to G o d 's ch o ice . ch o ic e — w e co o p e ra te w ith G o d .
■
P e titio n a ry P ra y e r N e v e r in flu e n c e s G o d ; it is G o d 's M ay in flu e n ce G o d ; G o d m a k e s

m e a n s o f b rin g in g a b o u t w h a t G o d h a s so m e o f h is d e c isio n s d e p e n d e n t on
o rd a in e d . w h e th e r w e p ra y o r n o t.
G o d 's W ill G o d h a s a b lu e p rin t fo r o u r liv e s G o d d o e s n o t h a v e a b lu e p rin t fo r

re g a rd in g jo b , m a rria g e , e tc. o u r liv e s re g a rd in g jo b , m a rria g e ,
e tc. T o g e th e r w ith G o d w e d e te r
m in e w h a t o u r fu tu re s w ill be.
26 John: Scripture on Immutability
and Foreknowledge
Hey, Chris,
I w ant to try to tie some of the different topics we’ve discussed together:
how to interpret Scripture, imm utability, and foreknowledge. M ost of
us are well aw are of som e of the longstanding debates on im portant
theological m atters. For instance, did Jesus die for every single hum an
being or only for the elect? Christians are reading the sam e Bible, but
they do interpret som e key passages differently. There is disagreem ent
as to the “clear m eaning” of the biblical texts. Arminians argue that John
3:16, 1 Timothy 2:4, and 2 Peter 3:9 are the clear passages, so we should
conclude th at Jesus died for everyone. Hence, they claim th a t texts on
divine election such as Ephesians 1:11 and R om ans 8:28-30 should be
interpreted in light of the clear passages. On the other hand, certain
Calvinists quite naturally disagree, claim ing th at Ephesians 1:11 is very
clear, so we should conclude th at the Bible teaches unconditional elec
tion to salvation. They reason th at the Bible clearly teaches th a t God
totally controls everything th a t happens. Hence, if God w anted every
one to be saved then everyone w ould be saved. Since the Bible clearly
teaches th a t not everyone will be saved it is reasonable to conclude th at
texts such as John 3:16 and 1 Timothy 2:4 cannot m ean w hat the Arm in
ians claim they m ean.
124
John: Scripture on Im m utability and Foreknowledge 125
Is there a way to settle such disputes? Is there a neutral herm eneu

tical m ethod on w hich all will agree and by w hich we can com e to a
foolproof, absolutely certain understanding of the biblical texts? That
is, is there a way of determ ining the clear teachings of Scripture such
that, once determ ined, one w ould be either irrational or sinful to dis
agree w ith these clear teachings? M any evangelicals have sought such
a m ethod, b u t none has achieved it. Personally I don’t believe it is pos
sible to find a foolproof m ethod of reading Scripture. One reason is
th at we are finite or lim ited. None of us ever knows everything—there
is always m ore to learn. Moreover, sin can even affect our reading of
Scripture. We m ight overlook certain passages o r dism iss som eone else’s
interpretation because of sinful motives. For instance, are there aspects
of Scripture th a t I, as a W estern Christian, overlook th at Christians in
Brazil o r Sudan m ight call to my attention? Due to o u r finitude and
sin, our understanding of the biblical texts is not infallible o r im m une
to correction. We cannot arrive at absolute certainty w ith regard to the
interpretation of Scripture. Hence we need each other. You and I are in
dialogue seeking to understand how the o ther is reading Scripture and
form ulating theological beliefs. This is helping me immensely.
Now I w ant to apply all this to som e of the issues we’ve discussed
in previous letters. Let m e begin w ith divine im m utability. There are
passages th a t say th at God does not change: “I the L o r d do not change
therefore you (Israel) are not destroyed” (Mai. 3:6); God is not hum an
th at he should change his m ind (Num. 23:19; 1 Sam . 15:29). There
are also passages th at say th at God does change: the Lord was grieved
th at he m ade hum ans because they continually sinned (Gen. 6:6); God
changed his m ind about w hat he said he w ould do (Exod. 32:14).
W hat are we to do w ith these seemingly contrary teachings? In his
book The Providence o f God, Paul Helm says th a t Scripture does not
contradict itself, so we m ust do som ething w ith these apparent contra
dictions. According to Helm we have two options: (1) we can hold th at
the texts th a t say th a t God changes are the clear, strong, and correct
texts and su b ordinate the passages about God n o t changing to them ;
or (2) we can reverse this and claim th a t the passages about God not
changing are the clear, strong, and correct texts and subordinate the
changing God texts to them . That is, we m ust resolve the problem by
positing one set of texts as the clear passages and interpreting the other
set of texts (the unclear ones) in their light. One set gives us the clear
teaching about the nature of God while the others are “anthropom or
phism s.” B ut which set is the “clear” teaching?
If we subordinate set (2) to set (1) then, according to Helm, we can
say th a t God can change his m ind, th a t he is open to persuasion, th at he
is surprised by som e things, and th at som e of his plans can be thw arted.
Moreover, we could attribute a “rich, ever-changing em otional life” to

God. M any will find this appealing, but not Helm. The choice, he says,
“seems obvious.” We m ust subordinate set (1) to set (2). The texts about
God n ot changing are the clear and correct teachings about God. If we
did not say this, says Helm, then we will allow the “w eaker” statem ents
in Scripture to control the stronger, resulting in "theological reduction-
ism in w hich God is distilled to h u m an proportions.” That is, we m ust
use the clear, strong texts of Scripture th a t teach strong im m utability
and m eticulous providence to interpret the unclear, weak texts that seem
to teach th a t God changes and th at God’s will can be resisted. Otherwise,
we m ake God into a very large hum an—we create God in the im age of
hum ans. W ho w ants to do that?
Helm ’s m ethod for handling the problem is rath e r com m on, b ut there
are a num ber of problem s w ith it. First, we should notice th at Helm has
used a philosophical criterion to determ ine the correct interpretation of
these biblical texts. This is legitim ate, but we should be up front about
w hat is going on—subordinating biblical texts to philosophical argu
m ent. Helm claim s th at it is im proper to think of God as having hum an
characteristics such as changes of m ind and em otions. Why? Because
we don’t w ant to reduce God! Reduce God from what? From an exalted
conception of divine transcendence and sovereignty. After all, any God
w orth his salt is strongly im m utable, im passible, tim eless, exercises
total control over creation and never, ever, takes any risks th at hum ans
w ould do things God does not w ant done. But w ait ju st a m inute. If we
are going to use philosophical argum ents to tell us w hich texts of Scrip
ture teach the tru th about God and w hich texts are m erely m etaphorical,
th en we need to p u t those philosophical argum ents on the table in order
to debate them . Simply asserting th a t I’m “reducing God” o r th at I’m
being im pious are rhetorical devices intended to scare m e off.
A second problem is th at Helm begs the question. He says we m ust
take the clear/strong texts and read the w eaker ones in light of them .
B ut hold on—th a t is precisely w hat is being debated. On w hat grounds
does he decide w hich texts are the strong ones? Those texts th a t agree
w ith his view of God! Isn’t th at interesting? The passages about God not
changing and exercising m eticulous providence are the clear teaching
of Scripture because they agree w ith his understanding of the divine
nature. Otherwise we don’t really have a God at all. In other w ords, for
H elm only the strong Calvinist view affirm s a “real” God. However, this
begs the question by assum ing th a t his view of God is the correct one.
Moreover, it can be argued th at H elm ’s understanding of God is a reduc
tion of God to h u m an proportions. After all, for m any the im age of the
ideal W estern m ale is a do-it-alone individual, not relying on anyone’s
John: Scripture on Im m utability an d Foreknowledge 127
cooperation, who is never affected by w hat others do and whose will is

always done. God is a real M arlboro man!
Helm ’s m ethodology here is replicated by m ost of the critics of open
theism to characterize the open view as holding to a dim inished deity.
For Helm and others, any deity th at does not exercise total control is
deficient and dim inished. Any God w ho takes risks is a lesser God than
one who takes no risks. W hat m any fail to notice is th a t this claim m eans
that Arm inians w orship a lesser God, not the real God. This attack on
open theists is also an attack on all A rm inian theology as well as on the
theology of m any of the early church fathers.
Instead of taking the scriptural texts about God responding to w hat
we do and subordinating them to the texts about God not changing, I
propose a better solution. Do we have to subordinate either set to the
other? We need to ask w hether the two sets of texts are actually in con
flict w ith one another. In order to have a conflict betw een these differ
ent texts we have to interpret, as H elm does, M alachi 3:6 to m ean God
cannot change in any respect. If God cannot change in any way, then
clearly God does not grieve over h u m an sin or respond to our prayers.
But do the verses about God not changing say th at God does not change
in any way? No, they do not. W hat M alachi says is th a t God is faithful to
his covenant people and refuses to allow them to be destroyed. M alachi
is n ot stating an abstract philosophical principle about divine im m uta
bility! He is speaking of G od’s covenant faithfulness to his people. The
same is true of N um bers 23:19 and 1 Sam uel 15:29 (which is a quote of
Num. 23:19). God refuses to change his m ind in these two situations.
These texts do n o t say th at it is im possible fo r God to change, only th at
rn these specific situations God will not change his m ind no m atter w hat
the hum an response is.
In my view, we can affirm both sets of biblical texts rath er than im pos
ing one on the other. (You should like this both/and thinking instead of
either/or.) There is no conflict betw een the texts if we hold th a t God’s
nature does not change b ut th a t God can change in som e respects. The
evangelical professor of Old Testam ent and president of Gordon-Con-
well Seminary, W alter Kaiser, recently w rote on this issue and discussed
these very texts. God does not, says Kaiser, change in his natu re or his
unconditional prom ises, b ut “God is not a frozen autom aton who can
not respond to persons; he is a living person who can and does react
to others.” Open theists agree w ith this and, going a b it further, hold
that God can change in his thoughts, will, and em otions. God is not
wishy-washy b u t neither is God a stone. God is steadfast in keeping his
covenant, b u t the exact way in w hich he carries out its fulfillm ent is not
set in concrete. Christianity does n ot require an absolutely im m utable
128 Does G od Have a Future?
God, th a t is, one who cannot change in any respect—it only requires a
faithful God.
Now I w ant to briefly apply this sam e line of reasoning to the issue of
divine om niscience and the status of the future. There seem to be two
types of texts in Scripture: (A) those w here God is portrayed as learn
ing (Gen. 22:12), changing his m ind (Exod. 32:14), and being surprised
(Jer. 3:7), and (B) those w here God is portrayed as declaring th a t X will
occur or knowing th at X will occur (Isa. 42:9; 44:28). That is, som etim es
God says som ething specific will happen and it does, b u t there are other
tim es w here God says som ething specific will happen and it does not
come about. Bruce Ware, Paul Helm, and others say th at we m ust sub
ordinate one set of Scriptures to the other. To say th at God changes his
m ind, switches to Plan B, or is surprised in som e way is to dim inish
God. Instead, the “clear” teaching of Scripture is th at God knows every
detail of w hat will happen in the future—the future is com pletely defi
nite for God. Again, there are good philosophical argum ents to support
this view of God. However, open theists (as well as others) find these
argum ents problem atic.
Proponents of openness think th at there is a b etter way of handling
such scriptural texts. They claim th at we do not have to place either set
of texts, A or B, “over” the other. Set A above m ay be called the “m otif
of the open future” while set B is the “m otif of the closed future.” That
is, som e aspects of the future are definite o r settled while others are
indefinite or not determ ined. Helm and others believe th at the m otif
of the closed future is the way God really is in relation to us, while the
m otif of the open future is the way God only “seem s” to be in relation
to us. Hence, one set of Scriptures is true while the other set represents
God’s "accom m odation” to us (i.e., they do not depict God as he really
is). But w hat if both sets are true? Helm and W are believe th a t set B
teaches th at God has exhaustive definite foreknowledge such th at the
future is completely definite or determ ined. Consequently, they believe
th at only one set of S criptures teaches the real tru th . Proponents of
openness reject this. Instead, they say, set B is about th a t part of the
future th a t is definite or determ ined. Som e aspects of the future are
definite and God knows them as such, and so God can u tte r predictions
about w hat will happen. Set A then is about th at part of the future that
is indefinite or open—yet to be determ ined—and God knows it as such.
Hence, b oth sets of texts teach the real tru th about God and neither has
to be subordinated to the other. Thus there is no apparent contradiction
in Scripture. God can declare the future regarding those events that
are definite and be surprised, change his m ind, etc., about those future
events th a t are indefinite.
John: Scripture on Im m utability and Foreknowledge 129
This approach allows us to m aintain th at God is open to o u r prayers

and allows him self to som etim es be persuaded by them , th at God has
a rich em otional life, and th at God enters into reciprocal relations of
love w ith us, responds to us, and is faithful and steadfast. This m odel
better handles the scriptural data Helm w ants to explain, and it does
so w ithout sacrificing notions of God th a t m any of us find im portant,
such as divine relationality and divine faithfulness. Also, it does not
subordinate one set of texts to the other but allows both sets to speak to
us, since there is no contradiction at all. Hence this is a m ore excellent
explanation (theology).
I look forw ard to your thoughts.
Your friend,
John
27 Chris: Omniscience
and Foreknowledge
Dear John,
Just got your m ost recent letter on “two types of texts in S cripture,’’
and I am eager to discuss these im portant issues w ith you. I have a few
initial responses to the letter itself and then some general thoughts con
cerning divine om niscience.
1. I’m in full agreem ent w ith you th a t the search for a "foolproof
m ethod of reading Scripture” is fruitless. We are finite and sinful.
Hence, ou r reading of the Bible, as you put it, “is not infallible
or im m une to correction.” We do need each other, as I have w rit
ten in my m ost recent letter. I w ould only add, however, th at we
need m ore th an each other. We need the entire com m unity of the
saints, those present and those who have gone before. T hat is, if I
discover th at my interpretation of a text goes dead set against the
church’s reading of the text, particularly in the church’s earliest
years, I need to take a second and th ird look at m y interpretation.
I think you and I differ at this point. I'm m ore willing to accept
the ch u rch ’s exegetical trad itio n as the fram ew ork for my own
in terp retatio n of Scripture, and you’re m ore likely (as a good
Protestant!) to hold on to your interpretation until you’re proven
130
Chris: O m niscience and Foreknowledge 131
incorrect, even w hen your interpretation is quite new, novel, and

provocative.
2. You’re correct in noting th a t certain texts in Scripture do p res
ent God as changing and others as unchanging. As for H elm ’s
interpretation, I resonate w ith his w arning against a "theological
reductionism ” th a t distills God to “h u m an p ro p o rtio n s,” a ten
dency th a t I’ve noted in the openness model. Yet, as you rightly
observe, no openness theologian I know of desires to “m ake God
into a very large hum an—creating God in the im age of hum ans.”
The question rem ains, however, as to w h eth er there are w eak
nesses or blind spots in the openness m odel and herm eneutic th at
seem to hum anize God in a m anner the church has been reluctant
to advocate. W hen Clark Pinnock argues, for instance, th at "God
anticipates the future in a way analogous to our own experience,” I
think he’s inverting or turning the dynam ic of the imago Dei on its
head. Too often the openness m odel m akes hum an characteristics
or qualities the m easuring rod for understanding God, som ething
we’ve already discussed quite a bit.
3. The question of God "risking” rem ains interesting and problem
atic for me. The possibility of divine risk certainly entails specific
positions regarding the extent of God’s knowledge and God’s rela
tionship to tim e. If God’s knowledge of the future is exhaustive, as
I will argue, it is difficult for m e to u n derstand how God can risk
in the sense of taking chances.
4. I’m glad to have the opportunity to w ork w ith you through the
issue of God’s im m utability. I’m n o t sure I will agree th a t God
cannot change in any respect, at least w hen relational issues are
involved, but you’re probably going to call m e incoherent! I’ll try
to argue th a t God is im m utable and yet still grieves over hum an
sin and responds to our prayers. We’ll see how successful I am. I
w ould affirm strongly w ith you th at "God’s nature cannot change.”
The conclusions we deduce from this proposition m ight well dif
fer. By the way, your reference to W alter K aiser interested me. I
w ould agree w ith K aiser th a t "God is not a frozen autom aton who
cannot respond to persons,” b u t I’m n ot convinced th a t a strong
view of im m utability w ould tu rn God into such.
5. I think you’re w rong in your insistence th at texts in w hich God
accom m odates his revelation to hu m an understanding and capa
bilities "do not depict God as he really is.” As I m entioned in my
last letter, if an openness theologian is going to consistently and
coherently argue against any kind of accom m odation in divine
revelation, th en God is going to end up as an em bodied divinity.
Pinnock seem s to me m ore consistent at this point th an you in his

m ovem ent tow ard advocating the em bodim ent of God.
6. Your proposal concerning set A texts and set B texts is quite inter
esting, b u t I doubt it will be convincing to theists who contend
th at God is eternal (outside of time). The idea of set A texts only
works if certain aspects of the future are indefinite or open in the
sense you describe, and of course th a t is p a rt of the debate itself.
Your advocacy of "presentism ” is a possible way to bring set A and
set B texts into congruence, b u t it in tu rn hits m e as problem atic.
Think, for instance, of our debate on the testing of A braham in
Genesis 22. God seem s to be ignorant of both A braham ’s future
action and of the present state of A braham ’s heart. The fact that
the testing of Abraham is a future action does not belie the fact
th a t God is testing Abraham to find out w hat is in his heart, not
w hat will be in his heart. Hence, I th ink you need to com e up with
a m ore convincing dem onstration th a t God knows the present
exhaustively, b u t not the future.
Indeed, I find the openness m odel’s contention th a t God does not

know the future exhaustively terribly difficult to swallow, b u t this is no
surprise to you. God’s p u rported ignorance of the future is surely one of
the m ost troubling and provocative aspects of the openness m odel and
clearly includes the possibility of divine error.
As you p u t it, God m ay give a forecast of w hat he thinks will occur
"based on his exhaustive knowledge of the past and p resent.” The lim i
tation of God’s com plete or exhaustive knowledge to the past and pres
ent (your “presentism ”), at least w hen the extent of God’s knowledge
includes the decisions of free persons, leaves open “the possibility that
God m ight be ‘m istaken’ about som e points.” I find the possibility of
divine error to be terribly problem atic and its implications, theologically
and pastorally, horrific. If so, it's only fair for m e to offer an alternative
explanation of w hat divine om niscience and foreknowledge entail. A
few opening thoughts: O m niscience is clearly a w atershed issue for the
openness model. If I'm correct, all of the following propositions would
be included in the openness understanding of om niscience:
1. God’s knowledge is com plete and perfect. God knows all things
th at are possible to know. As you w rite, “O m niscience m ay be
defined as knowing all there is to know such th a t God’s knowledge
is coextensive w ith reality.”
2. God knows completely all future acts and events that God has sov
ereignly ordained m ust come to pass. Question: Do these sovereignly
ordained future acts/events include the choices and responses of
Chris: Om niscience and Foreknowledge 133
people? If so, is God in these specifically future cases willfully vio

lating the freedom of hum ans? In The God Who Risks you describe
"nonconsensual control” as "divine rap e,” precisely because “the
will of one is forced on another.” The specific context for this divine
rape concerns salvation, b u t the principle can be extended. Fur
ther, you adm it “the desire God forces on the elect is a beneficent
one—for th eir own good—b u t it is rape nonetheless.” If so, how
can other sovereignly ordained, beneficial decisions and acts of
God related to the future avoid the charge of divine rape? Only, I
suppose, if these future choices and actions of God do not involve
the choices and actions of hum an beings. God’s future actions and
knowledge then becom e severely lim ited. Is this w hat you m ean
to say? God ends up w ith a knowledge of the future th at is quite
lim ited indeed. Or else God occasionally rapes us, b u t only w hen
absolutely necessary.
3. God does not know exhaustively all of the future, precisely because
the future includes the decisions and actions of free hum an agents,
defined in a libertarian sense. If God were to know the decisions
and actions of free hum an agents before the agents themselves act,
the decisions and actions of these agents w ould not be free. That
is, if God knows beforehand w hat I am going to choose to do, I
am no longer free to do otherwise. Hence, significant aspects of
the future rem ain "open” to God. God is "open” to the decisions
and actions of free hu m an agents, genuinely “vulnerable” to w hat
we choose to do, a divine risk taker of sorts. Indeed, as you put
it in the title of your book on providence, God is "The God Who
Risks.”
I w ant to debate these ideas w ith you in this letter in two ways (it
m ight take two letters!). First, I w ant to present w hat I think has been
the church’s understanding of om niscience for by far the greater p art
of its history. Second, I w ant to apply pressure to possible cracks in the
openness m odel of om niscience itself. W hat alm ost all opponents of
the openness m odel find fault w ith is its lim iting of the extent of God’s
knowledge, i.e., there are som e aspects of the future th at God simply
does not know. We need to explore together carefully the im plications
of this proposition. Of course, other propositions, both of the traditional
model of om niscience and of the openness model, will have to be exam
ined. Is it true, for example, th at God’s knowledge of the actions of free
individuals, defined in a libertarian fashion, precludes the possibility
of hum an agents acting freely? Is this a necessary conclusion? Or are
there o ther possible m odels th a t preserve the traditional or classical
understanding of om niscience and also preserve libertarian freedom?
I contend th a t God’s knowledge of the future is perfect and exhaus

tive. In O den’s words, “God’s incom parable way of knowing knows the
end of things even from the beginning.” Or as Isaiah states, “I reveal
the end from the beginning, from ancient tim es I reveal w hat is to be;
I say, ‘My purpose shall take effect, I will accom plish all th at I please’”
(Isa. 46:9-10).
Patristic w riters consistently affirm exhaustive divine om niscience.
Clem ent of A lexandria w rites, “F or God knows all things—not those
only w hich exist, b u t those also w hich shall be—and how each thing
shall be.” In fact, Clem ent contends th a t God’s knowledge extends to
the innerm ost secrets of the hum an heart. “And foreseeing the p articu
lar m ovem ents, ‘He surveys all things, and hears all things,’ seeing the
soul naked within; and possesses from eternity the idea of each thing
individually.” F or Clem ent at least, God sees all things, knows all things,
w ith a single glance: “For in one glance He views all things together, and
each thing by itself.”
While God knows all things in a single glance, Clement does not believe
th at this knowledge elim inates h u m an freedom and the benefits reason
provides for hum an life. "Now, then,” Clem ent writes, “m any things in
life take their rise in some exercise of hum an reason, having received
the kindling spark from God. F or instance, health by m edicine, and
■
soundness of body through gym nastics, and w ealth by trade, have their
origin and existence in consequence of Divine Providence indeed, but
in consequence, too, of h u m an reason.”
Augustine argues that God’s knowledge is immeasurable. God’s knowl
edge cannot be bounded or comprehended. “Let hum an voices be hushed,
hum an thoughts still: let them not stretch themselves out to incom prehen
sible things, as though they could com prehend them .” Paul speaks in a
similar fashion in Romans 11:33-34: “O the depth of the riches and wisdom
and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgm ents and how
inscrutable his ways! ‘For who has known the m ind of the Lord? Or who has
been his counselor?”’ Nothing is hidden or unknown to God. “There is noth
. . .
ing in creation that can hide from him; everything lies naked and exposed
c
to the eyes of the One with w hom we have to reckon” (Heb. 4:13).
Oden speaks of divine om niscience as “the infinite consciousness
of God in relation to all possible objects of knowledge.” The question
th en becom es, as you oftentim es have m entioned, W hat are possible
objects of knowledge? If God cannot know the actions of free agents
before these actions take place w ithout violating o r erasing freedom,
as you m aintain, then God’s knowledge of the future does not include
the actions of free agents.
As I’ve m entioned earlier in this letter, you do argue th at certain
aspects of the future are settled and the subject of God’s knowledge
Chris: O m niscience an d Foreknowledge 135
i.e., those aspects th a t God has sovereignly ordained to take place. How
God can avoid your charge of divine rape in these future ordained areas
rem ains a m ystery to me. Maybe you can help m e here.
Still, the openness m odel does argue th at God possesses com plete
knowledge, but this knowledge does not include certain aspects of the
future. These aspects—entailing the choices of libertarian free agents—
are sim ply not present in the future for God to know. I rem ain uncon
vinced th a t the openness m odel is the only alternative available to those
who desire to m aintain both libertarian freedom and exhaustive divine
om niscience. And com patibilists m ight have other m odels they can use
in m aking sense of om niscience and hum an freedom.
To begin to w rap things up for this letter, my position, and the m ajor
ity position in the church’s history of exegesis, is th at God’s knowledge
is perfect and complete, encom passing all aspects of the past, present,
and future, including the actions of free agents. John of D am ascus, for
instance, writes th at God “knew all things before they w ere” and specifi
cally includes in God's knowledge the future fall of hum anity into sin.
He “saw th a t in the future m an w ould go forw ard in the strength of his
own will, and w ould be subject to corruption.”
I find Hilary's discussion of Christ’s knowledge to be helpful in m aking
sense of the extent of God’s om niscience. In com m enting on Christ’s
knowledge, H ilary directs his rea d e r to “appeal to the judgm ent of
com m on sense.” “Is it credible,” H ilary asks, “th at He, W ho stands to
all things as the A uthor of their present and future, should not know
all things?” Indeed, Hilary points to Paul’s statem ent th a t in Christ are
hidden “all the treasures of w isdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:2-3). Thus,
“Jesus Christ knows the thoughts of the m ind, as it is now, stirred by
present motives, and as it will be tom orrow , aroused by the im pulse of
future desires.”
Interestingly, Hilaty com m ents th at the apostle John specifically writes
th at “Jesus knew from the beginning who they were th at believed not,
and who it was th a t should betray H im ” (John 6:64). The im plication
of John’s teaching is th a t by C hrist’s “virtue His natu re could perceive
the u nborn future, and foresee the aw akening of passions yet dorm ant
in the m ind: do you believe th at it [Christ’s knowledge] did not know
w hat is through itself, and w ithin itself? He is Lord of all th at belongs
to others, is He not Lord of His own?” H um an knowledge, founded on
“hum an n atu res” w ith their inherent lim itations, foresees “w hat they
determ ine to do: knowledge of the end desired accom panies the desire
to act.” In like m anner, divine nature and the extent of divine knowledge
are inextricably linked. “Does not He W ho is born God, know w hat is
in, and through, Himself? The tim es are through Him, the day is in His
hand, for the future is constituted th rough Him, and the D ispensation
of His com ing is in His power.”
Well, I think I’ve hooted at you long enough for one letter. You’re in
my prayers and thoughts.
Chris
28 John: Views of Omniscience
Hey, Chris,
R egarding your last letter, I w as disap p o in ted th a t you did not

respond to my m ain concern: W hat view of God do you bring to the
biblical text such th at you are able to differentiate the correct way of
interpreting the passages of Scripture I raised? If there is a clear set of
texts, how do we ascertain it? How do we determ ine w hen we are reduc
ing God to h u m an proportions and w hen we are not?
You say th a t open theism has a tendency to distill God to hum an
proportions. W hat criterion are you using to m ake this judgm ent? You
do not seem to accept all the divine attributes of classical theism . For
instance, you don't seem to accept the classical definition of im passi
bility, and in your last letter you say th a t God m ay be able to change in
some respects. Hm m . Do you know w hat Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin,
and contem porary classical theists w ould say about you? They w ould
say, “Chris Hall has a tendency to reduce God to hum an proportions.”
You see, it all depends on the view one holds as to w hether som eone is
reducing God. I don’t think I am b u t you think I am. You don’t th ink you
are b u t Aquinas w ould say you are. Aquinas did not th ink he was but
Tillich w ould say even Thom as m ade God too hum an. So, I welcome
you to the “club” of those who are accused of reducing God to hum an
proportions.
Concerning your com m ents about my statem ent about “divine rape”:
you have m e there and I cry “uncle.” That statem ent was a m istake. I
137
don't know why the rest of the inform ation on the note card did not
m ake it into th a t paragraph in my book. The statem ent was supposed
to cite som e fem inist theologians w ho refer to m eticulous providence as
divine rape. M ost evangelical open theists believe th at God can remove
our free will if God sees the need to accom plish some specific action—
w hich w ould m ost likely be related to the redem ption of hum anity.
Som e open theists believe God does this regularly. I think God does it
rarely, if ever. John Polkinghorne and others say th a t God never over
rides hum an freedom.
You say you are unconvinced th a t open theism is the “only alterna
tive available to those who desire to m aintain both libertarian freedom
and exhaustive divine om niscience.” You are quite correct. Let m e try to
clarify three different views on the subject (I will include another chart
at the end of the letter th a t differentiates these views). The first view,
classical theism , affirm s th a t God is strongly im passible, im m utable,
unconditioned, and exercises m eticulous providential control. God never
responds to w hat we do, is never grieved, and the divine will is never
influenced by our prayers or actions. God’s om niscience includes knowl
edge of w hat is, for us, the future. God knows everything th a t we will
do in the future because God is the one who has determ ined the future.
L ibertarian freedom for hum ans is rejected. Calvinist classical theists,
for instance, argue th at if h um ans had libertarian freedom , then God
could not know w hat we w ould do in the future. Since God does know
w hat we will do in the future, hum ans do not have libertarian freedom.
So God knows the future because God ordains the future.
The next two views have m uch in com m on over against classical
theism . They agree th a t God is om niscient, b u t they disagree as to the
precise content of th a t om niscience. Specifically, does om niscience
include exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future contingent events?
B oth of the following views agree th a t God is affected by our prayers
and actions, and both views reject specific sovereignty w here God knows
w hat will happen in the future because God determ ines the future.
B oth views reject the classical th eist definitions of im passibility and
im m utability because they affirm th a t God enters into genuine dynam ic
give-and-take relations of love w ith us. Both views believe th a t hum ans
have libertarian freedom and th a t God takes the risk th a t we will not do
w hat God w ould like us to do. I call these two views "freewill theism ”
because they have so m uch in com m on. They do, however, divide on a
couple of issues.
The first version of freewill theism I call traditional freewill theism .
This has been one of the m ost popular views am ong Jews and Chris
tians. In C hristian theology this was the view of m ost of the fathers
p rio r to Augustine; today it is typically called “A rm inianism .” In this
John: Views of O m niscience 139
view God knows everything th a t creatures w ith free will are going to do
in the future (though it is claim ed th a t God’s foreknowledge does not
cause us to do w hat we do, so hum ans still have free will). This view of
foreknowledge is typically called “sim ple foreknowledge” or "timeless
knowledge.” God sim ply “sees” all of history/tim e at once, since God is
not subject to tim e—everything is an eternal present to God—no past
or future. Hence, God has exhaustive definite knowledge of all future
contingent events (there is nothing th at will ever occur th a t God did not
know prior to creation). B ut God does not determ ine everything th at
will occur. According to this view, w hen God says to A braham “now I
know th at you fear m e” (Gen. 22:12), or w hen God “changed his m ind”
after Moses prayed (Exod. 32:14), these texts are not to be taken at face
value, since God always knew these things and it is logically im possible
for God to change his m ind.
The other version of freewill theism is open theism (som etim es it is
called “neo-A rm inianism ”). This position agrees w ith traditional free
will theism (Arm im anism ) on the rejection of strong im m utability and
impassibility, as well as on soteriology, guidance, prayer, grace, sin, etc.
However, it is a distinctive version of freewill theism in two respects:
divine tim elessness and exhaustive foreknowledge. In this view God
knows all the past and all the present exhaustively, but it views the future
as partly definite and partly indefinite. God knows th at certain events
will happen because certain causal factors have occurred (e.g., w hen an
earthquake will occur) o r God knows th at God will bring about specific
events because God determ ines them to be (e.g., the new heaven and
new earth). God does not “know ” precisely w hat creatures w ith free
will will do in the future, though God m ay have very accurate “beliefs”
about w hat we will do, since God knows our pasts and our characters
exhaustively. God is involved in genuine give-and-take relations w ith us,
inviting us to join him in carrying out the divine will on earth. According
to this view, God tested A braham to find out w hether A braham w ould
tru st God, an d God was affected by the prayer of Moses. Of course,
Arm inians w ant to affirm th at God is in genuine give-and-take relations
w ith us and th at our prayers m ake a difference even to God. However,
we believe th a t our Arm inian brethren are inconsistent w hen they affirm
that God tim elessly foresees all th at we do and also th a t God responds
to us and even “grieves” over our sin.
So, we have two different understandings of the divine nature and the
type of sovereignty God exercises: classical theism and freewill theism .
We also have two different understandings as to how God knows w hat
hum ans will do in the future and w hether hum ans have free will. For
classical theists, God knows the future because God determ ines it. For
traditional freewill theists, God knows the future w ithout determ ining
hum ans. M ost of the early fathers said th a t God tim elessly foresaw
w hich individuals w ould place th eir faith in Jesus and so God elected
them p rio r to creation. Classical theists reject this approach, since it
m eans th at God is affected (conditioned) by creatures.
This last point is very im portant, for it is the key to answ ering your
question about how God can exhaustively know the future and yet be
said to take risks. If God gets exactly everything he w ants, th en God
takes no risks. For classical theists this is the case, since the divine will
is never thw arted in the least detail. For classical theists, God exercises
m eticulous providential control and h um ans do not have libertarian
freedom . Things are m uch different, however, in traditional freewill
theism . For this view, God exercises general providential control, is
conditioned by creatures in som e things, and grants hum ans libertar
ian freedom . Hence, hum ans can sin, w hich thw arts God’s will, for God
does not w ant sin. So God takes the risk in creating hum ans w ith such
freedom th at they will rebel against him.
But how can it be a risk if God eternally foreknew th at hum ans would
sin? To understand this we need to break dow n the "logical order” of
God’s decisions. We are not speaking about a "tem poral order” (in time)
of God’s decisions, so the words I will use will m ake use of verb tenses,
but please rem em ber th at we are not speaking about these decisions tak
ing any tim e for God—it is sim ply the logical order of thought. Accord
ing to the sim ple foreknowledge view God decides to create a particular
type of world. He decides th at he will grant hum ans libertarian freedom
and th at God will not tightly control everything. “Next” God looks ahead
in tim e and foresees w hat hum ans will do. W hat God foresees is that
hum ans do sin. Technically, God’s knowledge th a t hum ans w ould sin is
subsequent to his decision to create us w ith free will. Consequently, God
took a risk in m aking the decision to create, for it was only “after” this
decision th at God knew we w ould not do w hat he w anted us to do. So,
even though God foreknew th a t hum ans w ould sin before God created
anything, God still took a risk. Once God creates, God knows every
thing th at will ever happen, b ut the fundam ental risk has already been
taken. Thus, the early fathers, E astern Orthodoxy, A rm inius, Wesley,
C. S. Lewis, Philip Yancey, and m any others believe th at God has taken
risks, even though they also affirm exhaustive definite foreknowledge
of future contingent events.
Sum m arizing, the crucial issues for the question w hether God takes
risks are (1) the type of sovereignty God decided to practice and (2) the
type of freedom God granted hum ans. Both traditional freewill theism
and open theism agree on these points and thus agree th a t God takes
risks (contra classical theism ). B ut open theism goes beyond traditional
freewill theism by denying divine tim elessness and exhaustive definite
John: Views of Om niscience 141
foreknowledge. I will leave the argum ents th a t open theists use for
another letter. Here, I have sim ply tried to clarify the different views
rather th an argue for one.
Have a good weekend, Chris.
Blessings,
John
Chart: Classical, Freewill, and Open Theism Compared
All three views agree th a t God is creator, savior, self-sufficient, personal,

wholly good, om nipotent, om niscient, and om nipresent. They disagree
on divine changeability, w hether God can be influenced by us, the type
of sovereignty God exercises, foreknowledge, w hether God experiences
tim e, and the nature of hum an freedom.
C la s s ic a l T h e ism F re e w ill T h e ism O p e n T h e ism

O p e r a tiv e R o o t G o d a s cre a to r, ju d g e , a n d G o d a s sav io r, lover, a n d S a m e a s fre e w ill
M e ta p h o rs k in g . frie n d . th e ism .
N a tu re o f G o d E m p h a s is o n d iv in e c o n tro l. E m p h a s is on d iv in e re la tio n a l- S a m e a s fre e w ill

G o d is u n c h a n g e a b le a n d ity. G o d is c h a n g e a b le in w ill th e ism .
u n a ffe c te d b y cre a tu re s. G o d a n d e m o tio n s a n d is a ffe cte d
h a s no e m o tio n s. by c re a tu re s. D ivin e n a tu re is
u n c h a n g e a b le .
Type G o d e x e rc is e s u n ila te ra l G o d e x e rc ise s u n ila te ra l S a m e a s fre e w ill

o f S o v e re ig n ty p o w e r in c re a tio n , p ro v id e n ce , p o w e r in c re a tio n , b u t b ila t th e ism .
a n d re d e m p tio n . G o d ta k e s e ral p o w e r w ith cre a tu re s in
no ris k s b e c a u s e h e tig h tly p ro v id e n c e a n d re d e m p tio n .
c o n tro ls e ve ry d e ta il. G o d ta k e s risks b e c a u s e he
e x e rc ise s g e n e ra l co n tro l.
C r e a tu re ly H u m a n s h a v e c o m p a tib ilis tic H u m a n s h a v e lib e rta ria n S a m e a s fre e w ill

F re e d o m fre e d o m : w e ca n a c t o n o u r fre e d o m : w e c o u ld h a v e d o n e th e ism .
d e sire s b u t o u r d e sire s a re o th e rw is e th a n w e d id — n o t
d e te rm in e d . d e te rm in e d .
P ro b le m o f Evil A ll evil is p la n n e d b y G o d to E vil is p e rm itte d b u t n o t S a m e a s fre e w ill

d isp la y th e d iv in e g lo ry. Every w a n te d b y G o d in o rd e r to th e is m .
e vil h a s a s p e c ific p u rp o se m a k e p o s s ib le re la tio n s o f
a n d s e rv e s G o d 's g o o d p la n — lo ve w ith c re a tu re s. H u m a n s
h u m a n s re sp o n d e x a c tly a s d o n o t n e c e ss a rily re sp o n d as
G o d w a n ts . G o d w a n ts th e m to.
S a lv a tio n /
E le ctio n
S o le ly o f G o d 's c h o o s in g — w e
re s p o n d to G o d 's c h o ic e . Irre
s istib le g ra c e , u n c o n d itio n a l
G o d 's c h o o s in g is b a s e d on
o u r c h o ic e — w e co o p e ra te
w ith G o d . E n a b lin g g race ,
S a m e a s fre e w ill
th e ism . i:
e le c tio n . c o n d itio n a l e le ctio n .
P e titio n a ry O u r p ra ye rs n e v e r in flu e n ce M a y in flu e n c e G o d ; G o d S a m e a s fre e w ill

P ra y e r G o d ; th e y a re G o d 's m e a n s o f m a k e s s o m e o f h is d e c isio n s th e ism .
b rin g in g a b o u t w h a t G o d h a s d e p e n d e n t on w h e th e r w e
o rd a in e d . p ra y o r n o t.
.
G o d 's W ill G o d 's w ill c a n n o t be G o d 's w ill c a n b e th w a rte d . G o d 's w ill c a n be
th w a rte d — it is a lw a y s d o n e . S o m e b e lie v e G o d d o e s n o t th w a rte d . G o d d o e s
G o d h a s a b lu e p rin t fo r o u r h a v e a b lu e p rin t fo r o u r lives not h a ve a b lu e p rin t
liv e s re g a rd in g jo b , m a rria g e , re g a rd in g jo b , m a rria g e , etc. fo r o u r liv e s re g a rd in g
e tc ., a n d w e a lw a y s fu lfill it. T o g e th e r w ith G o d w e d e te r jo b , m a rria g e , e tc. W e
m in e o u r lives. c o o p e ra te w ith G o d to
d e c id e w h a t th e fu tu re
w ill be.
The R e la tio n s h ip G o d a s " e te r n a l." G o d is tim e M o st (n o t a il) A rm in ia n s a gre e G o d a s " e v e rla s t in g ."
b e tw e e n G od , less. He e x p e rie n c e s a il tim e at w ith c la s sic a l th e ism here: G o d e n d u re s fo re v e r in
Tim e, an d o n c e (th e e te rn a l " n o w " ). G o d is tim e le ss. S o m e A r m in " tim e " a n d in te ra cts
ia n s a g re e w ith o p e n n e s s on w ith u s in g iv e -a n d -
E te rn ity
th is p o in t. ta k e re la tio n s h ip s .
The N atu re The fu ture is co m p le tely definite T h e fu tu re is c o m p le te ly d e fi T h e fu tu re is p a rtly

o f th e Fu tu re b e ca u se G o d d e te rm in e s it. n ite b e c a u s e G o d tim e le s sly d e fin ite a n d p a rtly
s e e s a ll th a t w ill h a p p e n in in d e fin ite — G o d is
h isto ry. G o d d o e s n o t d e te r w o r k in g w ith u s to
m in e a ll o f th e fu ture . b rin g a b o u t th e fu tu re .
G o d d o e s n o t d e te r
m in e a ll o f th e fu tu re .
F o re k n o w le d g e E te rn a lly d e fin ite fo re k n o w l E te rn ally definite fo re k n o w l P re se n tism : G o d k n o w s

e d g e . G o d k n o w s a ll th a t e d ge . G o d k n o w s all th a t th e p a s t a n d p re se n t
h u m a n s w ill d o in th e fu tu re h u m a n s w ill do in th e future e x h a u stiv e ly a s w e ll a s
b e c a u s e h e c o n tro ls w h a t w e b e ca u se he " fo re se e s” it— he th a t p a rt o f th e fu tu re
do. F o re k n o w le d g e is b a s e d d o e s not control w h a t w e do. th a t is d e te rm in e d
o n fo re o rd in a tio n o f a ll t h in g s. Fo re kn o w le d g e is b ase d on o r fo re o rd a in e d . G o d
tim ele ssn e ss, not fo re o rd in atio n . k n o w s a ll th e p o s s i
b ilitie s o f w h a t h u m a n s
co u ld d o a n d w h a t
w e a re lik e ly to d o b u t
la c k s a b s o lu te ce rta in ty
a b o u t w h a t w e w ill d o .
Note: Some people w ho claim to be “classical theists” affirm th a t God has changing
em otions (e.g., grief) and th a t God is affected (passible) and influenced by hum ans. Some
even reject divine tim elessness. Those w ho m ake such changes are really n o t "classical”
theists.
29 Chris: Further Thoughts
on Some Divine Attributes
Dear John,
Thanks m uch for your recent letter. I don’t m ind you pressing m e on
my preconceptions of God and how they affect m y perceptions of the
biblical portrayal of God. I have discussed in p ast letters how I read the
Bible and the key voices from both past and present th at have played
a role in shaping my thinking. It is very difficult to discern my precon
ceptions, though, largely because they are ju st th a t—preconceptions.
Preconceptions only rise to the surface, I suppose, w hen som eone such
as a debate p a rtn e r forces them to the surface in the context of discus
sion and argum ent. Even after our extended discussions, though, it is
difficult for me to identify exactly my preconceptions of God, th at is,
w hat God m ust be like.
I do realize that my thinking is not entirely settled, however. To say
th at I’ve shifted my point of view w ould be to speak too strongly. Never
theless, I’m less settled in my thinking, particularly regarding the nature
of hum an freedom . My earliest teachers were firmly grounded in the
W estern theological tradition: Augustine, Luther, and Calvin come to
m ind. Almost all my sem inary professors were grounded in the Reform ed
tradition and I’m thankful for each one.
Part of m e still struggles w ith the idea of libertarian freedom , largely
because of the effect of sin on the m ind and will. Unless God acts pre-
144
Chris: F u rth er Thoughts on Som e Divine A ttributes 145
veniently, how can a h u m an ’s fallen, distorted, skewed m ind and will

respond to the gospel? The m ind and will need to be b rought to life
through the regenerating w ork of the Holy Spirit, w ith the result th at
we love those things th at are indeed w orthy of love, God being at the
top of the list. Yes, I'm sure you can hear the voice of Augustine in the
background. B ut I’d also argue th a t behind Augustine one can discern
the form of Paul.
Having said this, over the past few years I’ve been listening to voices
other th an Calvin, Luther, and Augustine. The Cappadocians come to
mind, along w ith John Chrysostom. In addition, Tom O dens w riting has
been rich food for thought. These voices are encouraging m e to take
another look at the issue of freedom , and I’m reexam ining the question
carefully.
J. I. Packer has also had a profound effect on m y thinking. It was
Packer, for instance, who taught m e th at antinom y was a feasible m eans
of dealing w ith the problem posed by divine sovereignty and hum an
responsibility. Packer cam e to m ind as I read your ideas about "the logi
cal order” of God’s decisions. How so? Packer, w ho one w ould think is
a supralapsarian, is actually an infralapsarian. I rem em ber distinctly
sitting in Packer’s office one day and Jim speaking of God’s response
against evil and sin. That is, in the “logical order” of God's decree and
decisions, Packer saw God as responding against evil and sin, rath e r
than God decreeing sin and evil “before the Fall” (supralapsarian).
As a result of Packer’s influence I’ve been willing to think two thoughts
side by side as it were, affirm ing both m eticulous providence and hum an
freedom and responsibility. I don’t know w hether Packer affirm s liber
tarian freedom o r not. The m ore I think about this, though, if there is an
antinom y here, as Packer argues, at least one pole of the antinom y m ust
be libertarian freedom . Com patibilism w ouldn't require the antinomy,
as far as I can tell.
All this to say th a t I’m rethinking the issue of hum an freedom . On the
one hand I continue to affirm th a t true freedom is found in the ability
to love God, our neighbor, and the goodness in h eren t in the created
order. On the other hand I’m thinking through the issue of libertarian
freedom and w hether the synergism (cooperating w ith God) advocated
by the E astern fathers and theologians such as Oden m akes m ore sense
than the m onergism (only God works) of the Reform ed tradition. Wil
liam Craig’s thoughts concerning m iddle knowledge and the M olinist
tradition also have been thought provoking for me.
As I look at your different charts I find myself in agreem ent w ith the
following propositions (some from your charts and some not):
1 .1 think th at we need to affirm God as creator, judge, and king along
w ith God as savior, lover, and friend. All are root m etaphors th a t teach
us im portant tru th s about the nature of God. It's unclear to me why we

w ould prioritize one set of m etaphors over the other set. On w hat basis
do we ascertain m etaphorical priority? For example, a fallen hum an
being such as m yself is apt to flee from the m etaphors th a t present
God to m e in an image or illustration th at I do not like. W hile I mighi
naturally like to prioritize God as lover and friend, the m etaphor of God
as judge o r king m ight actually be w hat I need to hear loud and clear.
Evangelical students are frequently com fortable and fam iliar w ith God
as savior, lover, and friend, and not infrequently com m it the sin of pre
sum ption. That is, they (and we) presum e on God’s friendship, im agin
ing God to be the chum next door, and act accordingly. Lewis is helpful
at this point. W hen Aslan appears in the tales of N arnia, the children
delight in rubbing against him, jum ping on him , kissing his face, and
=&» ^i!iFiVB]^Py^h m
so on. Simultaneously, though, we can h ear Aslan softly growling. His
claws rem ain unsheathed. This is n o t a tam e lion.
I’m rem inded of a favorite passage in The Lion, The Witch and the
Wardrobe. Susan com m ents on the prospect of m eeting Aslan: "1 shall
feel ra th e r nervous about m eeting a lion.’ ‘T hat you will, dearie, and
no m istake,’ said Mrs. Beaver, 'if there’s anyone who can appear before
Aslan w ithout th eir knees knocking, they’re either braver th an most
jh rT.'-c Lij!L;.ll'i| ,lr,M i v

or else ju st silly.’ 'Then he isn’t safe?’ said Lucy. ‘Safe?’ said Mr. Beaver.
‘Don’t you hear w hat Mrs. Beaver tells you? W ho said anything about
safe? Course he isn’t safe. B ut he’s good. He’s the King, I tell you.'”
I think Lewis has got it ju st right. N earness and distance. Transcen
dence and im m anence. Intim acy and awe.
2. As I've m entioned in my discussion of impassibility, I don’t believe
: \y.. y b q • ty Ly )
th at God is a stone pillar. God does respond to us, though how God does
so rem ains a m ystery to me. The issue of petitionary prayer comes to
m ind, and once again Lewis proves helpful. Lewis com m ents th a t “any
petition is a kind of telling. If it does not strictly exclude the belief that
God knows o u r need, it at least seem s to solicit His atten tio n .” The
form ula “H ear us, O Lord” comes to m ind. Does God really need to be
rem inded to listen to us? Does God need to be inform ed? Lewis replies,
i HvAlh- 'CF
“But we cannot really believe th a t degrees of attention, and therefore

of inattention, and therefore of som ething like forgetfulness, exist in
j- f
the Absolute Mind. I presum e th a t only God's attention keeps m e (or

anything else) in existence at all.”
vi W '
So if in petitionary prayer we are not trying to grab God’s attention,

‘ Y : " b 'r
w hat are we doing? Lewis believes th a t "our whole conception of, so to

call it, the prayer-situation depends on the answer.” So w hat is going on
in prayer? In answ ering this question, Lewis writes th at though God’s
knowledge of us “never varies, the quality of our being known can.” How
so? Well, in an “ordinary” sense, God knows lots of things as things:
C hris: F urther Thoughts on Some Divine A ttributes 147
“earthw orm s, cabbages, and nebulae,” am ong others. Lewis believes

that God’s knowledge of us includes this kind of ordinary knowledge but
can clearly go beyond this, depending on how we respond to God. W hen
we becom e “aw are of the fact” of God’s knowledge of us and “assent
w ith all our will to be so known, then we treat ourselves, in relation to
God, n ot as things b ut as persons. We have unveiled. Not th at any veil
could have baffled this sight. The change is in us. The passive changes
to the active. Instead of m erely being known, we show, we tell, we offer
ourselves to view.”
It would be presum ptuous on our part to “put ourselves thus on a per
sonal footing w ith God,” if it were not God “who gives us th at footing.”
“For,” as Lewis rem inds us, “it is by the Holy Spirit th a t we cry ‘Father.’
By unveiling, by confessing ou r sins and ‘m aking know n’ our requests,
we assum e the high ran k of persons before Him. And He descending,
becomes a Person to us. But I should not have said ‘becom es.’ In Him
there is no becom ing. He reveals Him self as a Person.” Lewis's thoughts
provide fertile ground for future discussion and lead to my next point.
3. God is, I w ould argue, intensely relational, as seen in the eternal
love shared by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Both the Cappadocians and
Augustine seem to be in agreem ent here (although I know th a t there
is controversy today regarding Augustine’s position). How divine rela-
tionality and hum an relationality are related, though, rem ains an area
w here m uch work needs to be done. How do we know God is a person?
He has revealed him self to us as such. Hence, there is som ething in me
as a person that corresponds to God as person, though I have no reason
to believe that the congruence is exact. As Lewis says, “the Person in
Him—He is m ore th an a person—m eets those who can welcome or at
least face it. He speaks as T w hen we truly call him ‘Thou.’ (How good
Buber is!)”
Having said this, however, Lewis is quick to com m ent, I think rightly,
that speech concerning an “I-Thou” relationship w ith God “is, no doubt,
anthropom orphic; as if God and I could be face to face, like two fellow-
creatures, w hen in reality He is above m e and w ithin me and below
me and all about me. That is why it m ust be balanced by all m anner
of m etaphysical and theological abstractions.” Thus, the need for dis
cussions and debates such as ours! N either the abstractions nor the
anthropom orphism s, however, are the literal truth. “Both are equally
concessions; each singly m isleading, and the two together m utually cor
rective. Unless you sit to it very tightly, continually ‘Not thus, not thus,
neither is this Thou,' the abstraction is fatal. It will m ake the life of lives
inanim ate and the love of loves im personal.”
4 .1 have affirm ed com patibilistic freedom in the past. I’m less settled
in this area in the present. Perhaps there is a way to com bine the best
aspects of both understandings of hum an freedom . I need to read m ore

deeply in the Eastern fathers and in the Orthodox theology th at is rooted
in the patristic tradition if I’m to m ake greater sense out of this issue.
5. God is eternal, i.e., tim eless. This seem s to me to be an essential
aspect of w hat it m eans for God to be creator. That is, tim e, space, and
m atter are all aspects of the created order. I’m trying to stay on top of the
current debate concerning God’s relationship to tim e, and I am listening
particularly to Alan Padgett and W illiam Lane Craig.
6. If I choose to affirm m iddle knowledge or God’s sim ple foreknowl
edge of the actions of libertarian free agents, can I not say th at God’s
m eticulous providence includes the actions freely chosen by hum an
beings? Do I necessarily have to affirm "general" rath e r th an “m eticu
lous” providence?
7. The future is definite, either because God has determ ined the
future or because God tim elessly sees all th a t will happen in history.
I’m still rum inating on this issue.
8. I am m oving in the direction of foreknowledge based on God’s
tim elessness, rath e r th an foreknowledge based solely on God’s foreor
dination of all things.
Having said all this, it rem ains unclear to m e in w hat way the open
ness model is significantly im proving on past m odels for understanding
God’s providence. There are two distinguishing m arks of the openness
model. First, a rejection of divine tim elessness based on biblical texts
th at present God as changing his m ind, growing in knowledge, griev
ing over the actions of hum an beings, reevaluating p ast decisions, etc.
Second, a rejection of exhaustive divine foreknowledge based on one
principal philosophical argum ent: tim eless foreknowledge is useless for
God since God cannot change w hat he foresees h u m an beings doing. It
is contradictory to say th at God foresees w hat will actually happen and
to also say th a t God changes it to m ake it not happen. This response
w ould render God’s foreknowledge incorrect.
Food for thought, b u t this letter is already long enough. I’ll be in
touch soon.

Chris
30 John: Classical Theism
Dear Chris,
Thanks so m uch for your last letter. I appreciate the fact th a t you are
a theological pilgrim still on the journey. I consider m yself a pilgrim
as well. Since I agree w ith m ost of w hat you said I will only add some
rem arks to see if I can further the discussion.
My earliest theological teachers held diverse theological positions, so
I was not inculcated into one stream of thought. In sem inary my teach
ers were, like yours, steeped in the W estern tradition of Augustine and
Calvin—they had little appreciation of the E astern fathers, Arm inius, or
Wesley. Later I transferred to a L utheran sem inary w here I was exposed
to Luther, Bonhoeffer, Barth, Pannenberg, and the like. So I’ve had quite
an eclectic m ix of teachers.
However, I think I’d have to say th at throughout my education I've
always leaned tow ards the Eastern fathers, Arminius, and Wesley regard
ing free will. None of these people m inim ized our enslavem ent to sin
o r the effects of sin on our wills and m inds. W ithout the gracious help
of the Holy Spirit enabling us to u n derstand the gospel and encourag
ing us tow ard faith, none of us w ould come to Christ. Though m any of
the people I draw from did not use the term “prevenient grace,” they
affirm ed the concept. In my The God Who Risks I cite som e studies by
E astern O rthodox theologians th at say just this. Going in this direction
is not semi-Pelagian, b u t it does affirm a form of synergism (but only
after grace). For m onergists such as Calvin, we do n ot cooperate w ith
divine grace, for God gives us everything, including “ou r” faith.
149
You m ention th at J. I. Packer is an infralapsarian rath e r th an a supra-

lapsarian. That is, he rejects the notion th at God first ordained some
individuals to salvation and then ordained the fall into sin in order to
bring about a state of affairs needing redem ption. Instead, he affirms
th at God allowed the fall into sin and then ordained to elect som e for
salvation. You are correct in saying th a t this implies th a t God “responds”
to sin ra th e r th a n decreeing it. In his great w ork on predestination,
Louis B erkhof rails against infralapsarians (e.g., such as Packer) for
conceding too m uch and contradicting classical theism . The problem ,
he says, is th at saying th a t God responded to hum an sin m eans th at God
is conditioned or affected by creatures. This flies in the face of strong
im passibility and im m utability—m aking God dependent on creatures,
forcing God to react to them .
Berkhof m aintains th a t Reform ed theology denies any conditionality
in God—God is not affected by us. Of course, other R eform ed theo
logians disagree. Jam es Daane, for instance, says, "classical, creedal
R eform ed theology is not an unconditional theology. . . . E lection in
Reform ed thought is God’s gracious response to a sinful w orld.” Karl
B arth w rote, “If ever there was a m iserable anthropom orphism , it is
the hallucination of a divine im m utability w hich rules out the possibil
ity th at God can let him self be conditioned in this or th at way by his
creature.” This kind of Reform ed theology w arm s the A rm inian heart. A
point typically unnoticed by my critics is how m any R eform ed thinkers
I draw on in The God Who Risks. I’m not against Reform ed theology;
ra th e r I am in conflict w ith all form s of theological determ inism , most
of w hich are based on classical theism .
Classical theism affirm s strong im m utability, impassibility, sim plic
ity, and m eticulous providential control and rejects libertarian freedom
in hum ans (please refer to the chart included in letter 25). The logical
im plications of this set of beliefs result in doctrines such as uncondi
tional election, irresistible grace, th at everything th at happens (includ
ing sin) is exactly w hat God intends to happen, and th a t ou r prayers
never affect God. Calvin and other classical theists understood this verv
well, so if Packer and others do not w ant all these im plications, thev
will have to modify or reject som e of the divine attributes affirm ed by
classical theism . I welcome such changes!
You are attracted to such changes especially as they im pact our prayer
life, b ut you w orry about the n a tu re of true h u m an freedom . Let me
com m ent first on prayer and then on freedom . There are various kinds
of prayer th at both classical and freewill theists can agree on. However,
w hen it com es to impetratory prayer, only freewill theists can coherently
affirm it. Im petratory prayer m eans th at God does som ething because
we asked, som ething th at God w ould not have done had we not asked.
John : Classical Theism 151
“You have not because you ask n o t” (Jam es 4:2). This particu lar type
of prayer entails th at God responds to ou r requests—God is, in some
things, influenced by us. Classical theists u n derstand th at this m eans
th at God w ould be dependent on hum ans for som e things, and since
they believe th a t God cannot be dependent on us for anything, this type
of prayer does not happen. Instead, our prayers of request are simply
God's m eans (tools) by w hich he brings about w hat he had previously
ordained to accom plish. O ur prayers are m eaningful for classical th e
ists, but they are n ot im petratory—they never affect God.
Does this m ean that we are to "put ourselves on a personal footing with
God?” Are we to give God advice? As one critic asked me: "Who do you think
you are to advise God w hat to do?” In his book The Divine Conspiracy, Dal
las Willard has a very good chapter on prayer in which he defends the same
view I do. He admits that some views of petitionary prayer degrade God.
For instance, those that think we can get whatever we w ant if we just use
the correct words. However, against the critic who asks “Who do you think
you are to speak to God that way?” Willard claims that this is not against
God’s honor. To suppose that “because of the interchange God does what
he had not previously intended, or refrains from something he previously
had intended to do, is nothing against God’s dignity if it is an arrangement
that he him self has chosen." I don’t claim that God is obligated to listen to
my prayers or take my wishes into account. However, God has adopted me
in Christ and invited me to “make my requests known” and to ask what we
will in Jesus’ nam e (Phil. 4:6; 1 John 5:14-15; John 14:13-14). We cannot
force God to do our bidding but, incredibly, God elevates us to dialogue with
himself. Biblical characters such as Abraham, Moses, and Elijah reasoned
with God—even argued—and God approved of this because God desires
dialogue rather than a monologue. This is solely of God's choosing; we in
no way force ourselves on God. If God wants to be flexible in his relations
with us, that is his choice, and as Willard concludes, “It is not inherently
‘greater’ to be inflexible.”
I think you agree w ith this b u t you w orry th a t this synergism runs
counter to true hum an freedom: we are truly free only w hen we are in
proper relationship with God. Outside of being properly related to God
we are in bondage. Let m e suggest an old theological distinction that m ay
be of service. We have “form al” freedom to choose m any things, but as
sinners we do not have “m aterial” freedom —the freedom to properly love
God. That is, we have libertarian freedom but we have m isused it in sin
and so find ourselves unable to be in proper relationship w ith God (m ate
rially unfree). In grace, the Holy Spirit enables us to begin the process of
reconciliation. We are now given the opportunity to use our libertarian
(formal) freedom to live out the m aterial freedom of a new life in Christ.
Because of the grace of God we are brought into the sacred dance of the
Holy Trinity and, after we learn to dance, we are to teach others the same
(except on evangelical college campuses, of course. Ha!).
While I’m on the subject of libertarian freedom, let me answ er one of
your questions. You ask w hether you can affirm both libertarian freedom
and m eticulous providence. Sorry, but you can’t (unless you w ant to con
tradict yourself). Meticulous providence m eans th at God guarantees that
everything that occurs is precisely w hat God intends to occur. God’s will is
never thw arted in anything, no m atter how m inute. Libertarian freedom
m eans th at we have the ability to do things that God does not w ant us to
do (such as sin). Thus, God’s will can, for some things, be thw arted. Fol
lowing C. S. Lewis we could say th at God takes risks if he creates us with
libertarian freedom. However, if God exercises m eticulous providence
then God does not take risks of any kind. You see, m eticulous providential
control and libertarian freedom are incompatible.
You are also w orried w h eth er this view of God m akes us too
“chum m y” w ith God, rendering him a “tam e lion.” Like you, I love those
lines from Lewis’s The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe. Of course the
C hristian God is not “safe.” He w ants to redeem and transform even
aspect of ou r lives, society, and the created order affected by sin. Such
transform ation is not safe, but it is for our well-being.
The opposite problem, as you point out, is turning God into such an
abstraction that we lose both the concept of divine love and the personhood
of God. I believe that this happens in a num ber of religions. In some forms
of Hinduism, for instance, Brahm an is considered neither to love nor not to
love, for God is abstracted beyond the category of the personal. The same is
true for certain Buddhist understandings of Nirvana, where the ultimate real
ity is totally beyond hum an language. The same problem arises in Plato’s and
Aristotle’s conceptions of highest being. W hen you try to attain that which is
beyond all hum an language and thought, you find the impersonal silence.
Unfortunately, m any of these detrimental ideas have entered into Christian
theology, shaping our understanding of God. My thesis is that many classi
cal theists come perilously close to losing the Christian God who loves. Even
though all Christian classical theists have affirmed that God is personal and
that God loves us, their formulations often leave us with impoverished under
standings of God. I do not disagree with all aspects of classical theism, but
I do want to correct certain points that I believe have had a negative impact
on Christian thought and practice.
Well, th a t is all for now. I look forw ard to hearing from you again.
May God bless you in ail that you seek to do for him,
John
31 John: Biblical Texts Supporting
□pen Theism
Hi, Chris,
I thought it w ould be helpful to provide an overview of the kinds of

biblical texts proponents of openness use as evidence for ou r position.
1. The Bible portrays God as authentically responding to his people’s
petitions. W hen God called Moses to be the one to lead the Israelites out
of Egypt, Moses gave God several reasons why he was inadequate for
the task. In response, God attem pted to satisfy M oses’ felt needs. At one
point God seem s to switch to Plan B by allowing Aaron to do the public
speaking instead of Moses. God is flexible. God had the prophet Isaiah
announce to King H ezekiah th at he w ould not recover from his illness.
However, H ezekiah prayed and God responded by sending Isaiah back
to announce th a t God had changed his m ind, H ezekiah w ould recover
and not die (2 Kings 20).
In the New Testam ent, Jesus is said to heal a paralyzed m an because
of the faith of his friends (M ark 2:5). He responded to the faith of this
sm all com m unity by granting th eir request. People’s faith, or lack of
it, deeply affected Jesus and his ministry. M ark says th at Jesus could
not perform m any m iracles in N azareth due to the lack of faith on the
part of the people in the com m unity (6:5-6). It is not th at their unbelief
completely tied God’s hands, but it did seriously alter w hat Jesus would
have done had they been m ore receptive to his message. Not only did
153
the response of the com m unity affect w hat Jesus did, it also disturbed
him, for "he was am azed at their unbelief” (6:6). Oftentimes, w hat God
decides to do is conditioned on the faith or unbelief of people. As James
says, we have not because we ask not (4:2).
2. The Bible portrays God as being affected by creatures and as some
times being surprised by w hat they do. Genesis 6:6 says th at God was
grieved because hum ans continually sinned. Why w ould God grieve if
God always knew exactly w hat hum ans were going to do? It m akes no
sense to say th a t a tim eless being experiences grief. The biblical writ
ers, w hen describing G ods speeches, use w ords such as “perhaps” and
“m aybe.” God says “perhaps” the people will listen to my prophet, and
"maybe” they will tu rn from their idols (e.g., Ezek. 12:1-3; Jer. 26:2-3).
Furtherm ore, God m akes utterances like, “I f you repent then I will let
you rem ain in the land” (Jer. 7:5). Such "if” language—the invitation
to change—is not genuine if God already knew they would not repent.
Classical theism has a very difficult tim e w ith this. Since God specifically
ordains everything th at happens, God is in total control as to how the
people will respond. Why would God use conditional language since God
is the one in control of w hether the people repent or not? It seems then
th at such utterances were disingenuous on God’s part.
Moreover, God says, "I thought Israel w ould re tu rn to m e b u t she
has n ot” (Jer. 3:7; cf. 32:35). God also planted cultivated vines and did
not expect th at they would produce “wild grapes” (Isa. 5:1-4). In these
texts God is explicitly depicted as not knowing the specific future. God
gave King Zedekiah two possible courses of action w ith the outcom e
of each (Jer. 38:17-23). It does not seem from the text th a t the future
was as yet determ ined. If God knew it was determ ined, then why give
Zedekiah options? Similarly, God repeatedly sent Elijah to call King
Ahab to repentance, b u t the king refused to do so. Was God playing a
cat-and-m ouse gam e w ith Ahab? If God foreknows from the m om ent
he gives the invitation th at it will be pointless, then God is holding out
a false hope. On the o ther hand, if God is genuinely inviting the people
to change, then the future is not yet definite.
Scripture m entions occasions w here God “consults” w ith certain
people of faith in deciding the course of action God will take. God does
this w ith A braham concerning judgm ent on Sodom (Gen. 18), and with
Amos regarding judgm ent on Israel (Amos 7). God, in freedom , decides
not to decide w ithout consulting these figures of faith or, in the case
of Moses (Exod. 32), to decide to change his decision in response to
M oses’ intercession. Finally, God asks questions regarding an indefi
nite future. God agonizes over w hat to do w ith his sinful people (Hosea
6:4; Jer. 5:7). W hen God asks, “W hat am I going to do w ith you?” God
is seeking a response from the people. God desires dialogue, for if the
Jo h n : Biblical Texts S upporting Open Theism 155
people will join in dialogue, reconciliation is yet possible. By asking

such questions God puts a choice before the people and judgm ent is
not yet inevitable.
3. The Bible portrays God as testing people in order to discover w hat they
will do. In addition, God tests people to find out how they will respond.
God puts Abraham to the test and says, “Now I know th a t you fear m e”
(Gen. 22:12). God puts the people of Israel to the test to find out w hat
they will do (Exod. 15:25; Deut. 13:3). After the sin with the golden calf
God told the people, “Put off your ornam ents th at I m ay know w hat to
do w ith you” (Exod. 33:5). Why test them if God eternally knew w ith
certainty exactly how the people w ould respond? One could say the
testing was only for the benefit of the people, since it added nothing to
God’s knowledge, but th a t is not w hat the texts them selves say. Unless
we have good reasons for overriding the texts w hy not go w ith w hat
they teach?
4. The Bible portrays God as changing his m ind— altering his plans— as
he relates to his creatures. God announced his intention to destroy the
people of Israel and start over again w ith Moses, b u t Moses said th at he
did n ot w ant that, and so God did not do w hat he had said he was going
to do (Exod. 32). It is not th at God had to do w hat Moses w anted. Rather,
it is th a t Moses had becom e a “friend” of God such th at God values
w hat Moses desires. Som etim es God m ade prom ises th a t were stated
in unconditional term s, yet God changed his m ind due to h u m an rebel
lion. For instance, God had prom ised Eli th at his descendants w ould be
priests forever in Israel. B ut after the horrible exploitation of the priestly
office by his sons, God changes his m ind and rem oves the line from the
priesthood (1 Sam. 2:30). A nother illustration of this occurs w ith King
Saul. God’s original plan was to have Saul and his descendants as kings
forever in Israel (1 Sam. 13:13). In other words, there w ould have been
no Davidic kingship. Later, however, due to Saul’s sin, God changes his
m ind and rejects Saul and his line (1 Sam. 15:11, 35). Though Sam uel
and Saul plead w ith God to change his m ind back to the original plan
and go w ith Saul and his sons, God declares th at he will not change his
m ind again on this m atter (1 Sam. 15:29). If God always knew th a t he
was never going to have Saul’s line be kings, was God deceitful?
God changing his m ind is an im portant them e in the Old Testam ent,
for the expression is used of God around three dozen tim es. Moreover,
the statem ent th at God can change his m ind is added to the great sum
m ary of the divine nature given to Moses (Exod. 34:5-7). God was said
to be com passionate, gracious, longsuffering, and abounding in loving
kindness and truth. This is a sort of creedal form ula about God. It is no
small m atter th a t this creedal statem ent is enlarged to include "and one
who changes his m ind” (Jonah 4:2; Joel 2:13). Change of m ind is placed
right alongside graciousness as a key descriptor of God.
One m ay try to explain all of these texts about divine change of m ind
in term s of law. That is, if the people sin then God threatens punishm ent.
B ut if the people repent of their sin th en God w ithdraw s the threatened
punishm ent. This w ould m ean th at God did not really change his m ind
at all, since it only am ounts to God saying th at his punishm ents are con
ditioned on w hat hum ans do, and since God knows w hat they will do,
God was never going to punish the people in the first place. It only “looks
to us” like God changed his m ind, but God in fact did nothing of the sort.
This is the way Calvin, for instance, understands these texts. Why does
he th in k God cannot change his m ind? Interestingly, Calvin does not
provide a scriptural reason. Rather, he appeals to Plato’s philosophical
argum ent th a t any sort of change in God w ould only be a change for
the worse. Change of m ind is a change, so it w ould be a change for the
w orse and th at w ould imply im perfection in God.
R eading S cripture in the light of philosophical argum ent is legiti
m ate, b ut I do not find this argum ent convincing enough to reinterpret
the three dozen texts th a t say th a t God changes his m ind to m ean that
God does not change his m ind. Moreover, not all passages about God
changing his m ind can be explained by their being conditioned on w hat
hum ans do. Som etim es God changes his m ind even though the Israel
ites do not change their sinful behavior (Judges 10; H osea 11). God can
change his m ind if he w ants to, w hether we change o r not.
It is no accident th at brilliant classical theists such as Aquinas and
Calvin said th a t God could not change his m ind, was never affected by
our prayers, never grieves, cannot suffer, does not test us in ord er to
find out w hat we will do, and th at term s such as “perhaps,” “m aybe,”
“if,” and “expectation” do n o t apply to God. Such notions sim ply do
not m ake sense if God is tim eless, im m utable in all respects, and has
exhaustive definite foreknowledge. This is why Jo n ath an Edw ards said
th a t intercessory prayer has no effect on God. Rather, it is only “as if
God were moved by the prayers of his people.” Of course God cannot be
m oved by ou r prayers! W ho w ould think such foolish thoughts? W hat
kind of being do you think God is? Do you w ant to reduce God to hum an
proportions by believing th at God actually responds to o u r prayers?
If affirm ing th at God can be grieved, respond to ou r prayers, test us,
and interact w ith us in tim e is reducing God to hum an proportions, then
so be it. I am guilty as charged. However, I really don’t think I’m reducing
God at all, for I believe this is the way God actually is and there simply
is no greater God. The sorts of texts I’ve cited are ju st a sam pling and
are not intended to be an exhaustive list. I just w anted to sum m arize the
types of Scripture passages th at open theists use to arrive at our view. This
Jo h n : Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism 157
certainly does not prove our case. It simply shows how we are reading
Scripture. I’m trying to help you see the "m ethod in our m adness.” Not
that you will agree w ith me, but I hope th at you can understand how this
view makes sense to me.
In previous letters you have asserted th a t this understanding of God
is out of harm ony w ith the church fathers. I don’t think it is—at least,
not totally. I will w rite another letter on that.
Shaiom,
John
32 Chris: Biblical Texts Supporting
□pen Theism
Dear John,
Thanks for the letter laying out in succinct form how openness theo
logians read key biblical texts. I found this letter to be quite helpful,
though it should be no surprise th at I disagree on a n um ber of points.
Indeed, it’s probably fair to say th at I think the weakest link in the open
ness argum ent is its exegesis. We’ve already discussed in som e detail the
story of Hezekiah, the question of w hether Judas was destined to betray
Jesus or not, and the testing of Abraham in Genesis 22. In this letter I
hope to m ake a com m ent o r two on other im portant texts on w hich the
viability of the openness m odel seem s to depend.
U ndergirding the question of how we interpret specific texts, how
ever, is a constellation of broader theological questions and issues that
I think affects both how we read the Bible and the exegetical conclu
sions we reach. F or instance, as you ponder Genesis 6:6 (God’s grief
over hum anity’s continuing sin) you ask, “Why w ould God grieve if God
always knew exactly w hat hum ans w ere going to do? It m akes no sense
to say th at a tim eless being experiences grief.”
I’m not so sure. Does exhaustive divine knowledge of past, present,
and future events logically dem and th a t God can’t experience grief over
these events? Why are God’s tim eless knowledge and the possibility
of divine grief necessarily incoherent? It seem s th a t your argum ent
158
C hris: Biblical Texts S upporting Open Theism 159
assum es the im possibility of reconciling a divine response of grief on

the one han d and God always know ing th a t evil and suffering w ould
characterize hum an history on the other. B ut why can grief be coher
ently related only to events th a t surprise God w hen they happen? Even
on a hum an level, it seem s th at our experience of grief is not restricted
to events or occurrences th a t we did not know were going to occur.
Think, for example, of past events in h u m an history. I know there
is a difference betw een “past” events and tim elessness itself, but there
are som e sim ilarities betw een the two. Past events are irreversible,
irrevocable, and unchangeable, a perm an en t aspect of h u m an expe
rience. Though my knowledge of the p ast is deficient, the past as an
irreversible, unchanging reality can easily produce grief w ithin me.
For instance, the h o rro r of the H olocaust is a p erm anent p a rt of my
intellectual landscape. I m ust have first learned about H itler and the
concentration cam ps w hen I was seven or eight, b u t for as long as I can
recall, this inform ation has been p a rt of who I am. As a past event, the
H olocaust is irreversible. Once I heard of its occurrence, I always knew
it was “going to happen.” This knowledge, however, still produces deep
sadness w ithin me.
Now if this is true on a hum an level, it also seems to be true of God.
If God possesses exhaustive, tim eless knowledge of the past, present,
and future, there is no logical reason why he could not experience grief,
particularly since God is a personal being w ho experiences love, joy,
com passion, etc. For the em otion of grief seem s no m ore dependent
on being surprised th an any other em otion. Indeed, the constancy and
certainty th at exhaustive knowledge entails w ould only accentuate the
level and quality of divine sadness and divine love.
I stress this because you seem to be arguing th a t God’s knowledge
m ust be lim ited and tim e-bound if divine grief is to be genuine. I don’t
see why this m ust be the case. In other words, I disagree w ith the state
m ent you m ake in The God Who Risks th a t grief is solely a tem poral
word. Time-bound creatures tem porally experience the object o f grief.
But your argum ent th a t grief itself is therefore tem poral transfers the
tem poral experience of creatures to the very nature of grief. Yet if tim e
less experience is possible at all, there is nothing intrinsically incoherent
about tim eless experiences including grief.
I like the way you use the verb “portrays" in your discussion of various
biblical texts, i.e., "The Bible portrays God as being affected by crea
tures and as som etim es being surprised by w hat they do.” You're right.
The Bible does contain texts such as these. The question then becomes,
"What do biblical w riters m ean to com m unicate by such a portrayal?” I
think the openness m odel is forcing all of us to think through this ques
tion m ore carefully. This is a good thing. We m ust investigate carefully
w hat biblical w riters m ean w hen they speak of God changing his m ind.
The openness m odel contends th at divine repentance texts teach th at
God’s om niscience is not exhaustive, at least regarding the future. God
changes his m ind as God's knowledge of the future changes, i.e., God's
knowledge base increases as the future moves into the present and God
responds accordingly.
The following propositions, based on your exegesis of key texts, seem
to be included in the openness model:
1. God exists in tim e ra th e r th an outside of tim e.

2. God possesses perfect knowledge of the past, present, and those
aspects of the future th a t God has ordained will come to pass. The
rest of the future rem ains unknow n for God, precisely because
there is nothing for God to know. The boundaries of tim e are as
binding on God as on o ther creatures.
3. God’s om niscience m ust be defined as God’s knowledge of those
things th a t can actually be known. Hence your advocacy of “pre-
sentism .” God's knowledge of the past and present is perfect. Yet
God’s knowledge is constantly increasing as the future moves into
the present.
I hope I’ve represented your position fairly. If I haven’t, I'm sure you’ll
let m e know! My response to the openness m odel of om niscience is one
of dissatisfaction. H ere’s why. Suppose God acts in the present on the
basis of w hat God believes will happen in the future. However, God errs.
W hat God thought w as to occur in the future has not taken place. For
instance, God thought free agent A was going to do X, b u t A actually
does Y. Hence, God's act or response in the present to w hat he thought
free agent A was going to do is incorrect. This divine action, unfortu
nately, is now w ritten in cem ent. Thus, we end up in the unfortunate
position of affirm ing God’s present exhaustive knowledge of God’s own
m istakes, m istakes m ade on the basis of God’s own decision to lim it his
knowledge of significant aspects of the future.
My thoughts tu rn to Isaiah. W hat distinguishes God from all hum an
idols, Isaiah argues, is God’s w ondrous om niscience. "Rem em ber this
and consider, recall it to m ind, you transgressors, rem em ber the form er
things of old; for I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is
no one like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient
tim es things not yet done, saying, ‘My purpose shall stand, and I will
fulfill my intention,’ calling a bird of prey from the east, the m an for my
purpose from a far country. I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass; I
have planned, and I will do it” (Isa. 46:8-11).
Chris: Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism 161
Your response to this text from Isaiah runs as follows: “God declares
'the end from the beginning’ (Isa. 46:10) can be interpreted h arm oni
ously w ith either divine foreknowledge or the present-know ledge m odel
defended here. It all depends on the content the in terpreter gives to the
expression. I th in k God is declaring the 'end’ (exile an d restoration)
before it happens. B ut this does not entail exhaustive foreknowledge,
only the ability of God to bring it about.”
Your explanation is reasonable b u t not, I think, terribly helpful for
the openness model. How so? For God to bring about the exile and res
toration, surely God is going to have to violate the freedom of at least
som e people. As you p ut it, “Som etim es God sim ply discloses w hat God
is going to do irrespective of creaturely decision. God can bring some
things about on his own if he decides to do so (Isa. 46:9-11). But this
does not require foreknowledge, only the ability to do it. M any of the
biblical predictions com m only cited as requiring foreknowledge actu
ally only require foreordination. . . . God foreknows w hat he determ ines
to do.”
It seems to me th at you are incorporating aspects of a different m odel
of God's sovereignty and providence th a t don’t align well w ith the open
ness m odel but are necessary if you are to account adequately for all
the biblical data. For example, in The God Who Risks you describe the
different types of relationships God can choose to have w ith “hum an
personal agents” and em ploy Vincent B rum m er’s two types of "games”
for describing m odels of God’s sovereignty.
In gam e one, “God, a personal agent, creates h u m an personal agents
and establishes rules w hereby both parties in the gam e m ay say yes or
no to each other. In this gam e God m akes the initial move by saying yes
to us, loving us, and desiring a relationship of m utual love. It is now our
tu rn to respond to God’s move, and we m ay respond w ith either a yes
or a no.” Gam e one, then, is based on w hat you argue is required for a
"relationship of m utual love.” That is, love cannot be coerced and can be
rejected. In game two, "hum ans do exactly w hat God decrees they will
do. God determ ines, directly o r mediately, all th a t happens. In gam e 2,
if God says yes to hum anity, then hum ans still have to say yes or no to
God, b u t o u r ‘response’ is caused by God." Hence, gam e two is based
on w hat you describe as "causal relations.”
The relationship betw een these two m odels is confusing to me. Game
one appears to be the m odel th a t best represents the openness view.
Yet you yourself allow for God to play gam e two a t key ju nctures in
the biblical narrative, such as the exile and restoration of Israel. If so.
how is love also operative at these junctures, at least from an openness
perspective? If, as you p u t it, "God . . . does not w ant to dance alone,
dance w ith a m annequin, o r hire som eone who is obligated to dance
w ith him ,” how can God ever play gam e two and still exercise relational
love at the sam e tim e? Every tim e God foreordains som ething to occur
involving hum an m oral agents, love m ust be absent from God’s action,
at least from an openness perspective. Yet, I w ould argue, it is divine love
th a t m otivates every act of divine foreordination. I’d like to see openness
theologians explain m ore clearly how both m odels coherently relate to
one another. In addition, how does God’s love m anifest itself according
to the rules of game two?
Perhaps causal relationships can also be relational. As I’ve stated in
earlier letters, if I saw my child happily running in the direction of an
oncom ing train, my love w ould m otivate me to intervene immediately,
w hether my child w anted me to or not. The openness model, w ith its
heavy reliance on reciprocity for genuine love to be exercised, doesn’t
allow enough room for the various m anifestations of divine love pres
ent in salvation history. I agree th a t reciprocity often m anifests itself
in relationships of love, but at certain specific points, especially w hen
“rescue” is involved, love moves beyond reciprocity while still rem ain
ing deeply relational.
F u rth er on in your letter you com m ent th a t the Bible "portrays God
as testing people in order to discover w hat they will do.” You th en ask:
“W hy test them if God eternally knew w ith certainty exactly how the
people w ould respond? One could say the testing was only for the benefit
of the people, since it added nothing to God’s knowledge, b u t th a t is not
w hat the texts them selves say. Unless we have good reasons for overrid
ing the texts, why not go w ith w hat they teach?” Good question.
I believe the following considerations w eigh strongly in favor of
considering the divine-repentance texts as instances of divine accom
m odation, God “lisping to us,” to use Calvin’s phrase.
First, and by far the m ost im portant consideration in favor of divine
accom m odation, is th at the openness m odel’s rejection of accom m oda
tion necessarily leads to the assertion th a t not only is it possible for God
to err, b u t th a t God has erred in the past, errs in the present, and will
continue to m ake m istakes in the future. God m akes m istakes, as you
have argued, because God is in tim e rath e r th an tim eless, and knows
only the past and present exhaustively. As you p ut it, "Though God’s
knowledge is coextensive w ith reality in th at God knows all th at can be
known, the future actions of free creatures are not yet reality, and so
there is nothing to be know n.” God’s tem porality, God’s choices, and the
nature of libertarian freedom com bine to necessarily lim it the extent
of God’s knowledge. God can think I am going to act in a given fashion
in the future b u t be dead wrong. Hence, God has m ade m istakes in the
past, is continuing to m ake them in the present, and is bound to err in
the future. The predication of divine error is the inevitable outcom e of
C hris: Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism 163
the openness m odel, or of biblical teaching if the openness m odel is

correct.
You acknowledge in The God Who Risks th a t the "notion th a t God
could be dism ayed or w rong about anything m ay not sit well w ith some
people” and attem pt to am eliorate this difficulty by qualifying w hat you
m ean by error. "Using the term m ore loosely, we m ight say th a t God
w ould be m istaken if he believed that X w ould happen (for example,
Israel in Jerem iah's day w ould come to love him ) and, in fact, X does
not come about. In this sense the Bible does attribute some m istakes
to God.”
Your exegesis, particularly of the divine repentance texts, has led you
to this conclusion. I contend th at any theological m odel th a t predicates
God erring in the past, present, and future because of lim ited knowledge
is ipso facto fatally flawed. In a word, if the result of openness exegesis
is the predication of error of God and a drastically revised und erstan d
ing of God himself, then these are sufficient reasons for asking w hether
one has in terpreted the biblical text well. I’m deeply troubled by the
assertion th a t God has m ade m istakes in the past and will do so in the
future, b u t underlying m y aversion to divine error is significant biblical
testim ony th at m ust be included in the construction of a viable m odel
of God's om niscience and providence, including texts such as Isaiah
46. That is, I don’t think I’m speaking out of a biblical and theological
vacuum at this juncture.
God is “perfect in know ledge” (Job 36:4; 37:16). I realize th a t you
m ight argue th at God’s knowledge possesses a kind of perfection. Per
haps God’s om niscience is as perfect as tim e-bound knowledge can be.
Yet key biblical texts unreservedly proclaim th a t God’s plans and pur
poses, including Christ’s cross and his role as the paschal lam b of God,
have been form ed “before the foundation of the w orld” (1 Peter 1:18-20;
Eph. 1:4). Peter com m ents th at his readers "were ransom ed from the
futile ways inherited from [their] ancestors . . . w ith the precious blood
of Christ, like th at of a lam b w ithout defect o r blem ish. He was destined
before the foundation of the world, b ut was revealed at the end of the
ages for your sake.” Paul w rites th at God "chose us in Christ before the
foundation of the w orld to be holy and blam eless before him in love”
(Eph. 1:4). The w riter of Revelation speaks of people whose nam es have
"not been w ritten from the foundation of the w orld in the book of life
of the Lam b th at was slaughtered” (Rev. 13:8). W hat is one to do w ith
texts such as these, all of w hich speak of decisive acts of God taken
before “the foundation of the w orld”? I believe the openness perspective
produces fairly th in exegesis in response to these and other significant
texts th a t appear to underm ine the openness m odel. Let m e provide
som e examples from The God Who Risks:
1. As we've already discussed, you don’t believe Judas actually betrayed

Jesus, a conclusion based on a questionable definition of para-
didonii and heavily dependent on the idiosyncratic exegesis of
W illiam Klassen. You write "it is clear th at Judas is not betraying
Jesus and th a t Jesus is not issuing any prediction of such activity.”
As I’ve w ritten before, I think the portrayal of Judas you provide
is highly optim istic, particularly in light of John’s com m ent that
after Judas received the piece of bread at the Last Supper, “Satan
entered into him ” (John 13:27).
2. W hat are we to m ake of Jesus’ request in the G arden of Gethse-
m ane th a t the F ather “rem ove this cup”? I believe Christ's request
reflects his genuine hum anity and the fear he deeply felt as his trial
and crucifixion drew near. You, on the other hand, believe Jesus
is seeking “to determ ine the will of God. Jesus wrestles w ith God’s
will because he does n ot believe th at everything m ust happen
according to a predeterm ined plan.” I don’t agree. From Caesarea
Philippi on, Jesus had been insistent th at he “m ust undergo great
suffering, and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests, and by
the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again. He said
this quite openly” (M ark 8:31-32). Indeed, w hen Peter tries to
m odify Christ’s prediction, Jesus brands the attem pt as demonic.
Why, then, w ould Jesus in the G arden of G ethsem ane still be
attem pting to determ ine the F ather’s will? The F ather’s will had
already been revealed to him and he knew th a t this w ould include
the crucifixion.
Thus I'm less th an convinced by your argum ent th a t the “incarnation

was planned from the creation of the w orld,” b u t not the cross. A funda
m ental aspect of the incarnation was the cross itself. Can we really say
th at in G ethsem ane “Jesus is in the canoe heading for the falls. There is
yet tim e to get over to shore and portage around the falls. Jesus seeks to
determ ine if th at option m eets w ith his F ather’s favor. B ut the canyon
narrow s even for God.” I don’t think so. W here w ould we be left if Jesus
h ad m ade it to shore or found portage from the falls of the crucifixion?
We w ould be left in our sin, separated from God, lost for eternity.
You com m ent th a t the “notion th a t the cross was not planned prior to
creation will seem scandalous to som e readers.” I think you’re right. Yet
your exegesis is plausible if God does not genuinely know the future or
has n ot foreordained the cross. The level of plausibility is the question.
You write: “Perhaps God knew the possible outcom es (w hat m ight hap
pen if sin did come about or did not come about) and planned a different
course of action in each case. E ach one included the incarnation, but it
took on a different rationale depending on w hich case cam e about.”
Chris: Biblical Texts S upporting Open Theism 165
I think you’re underestim ating the strong predictive elem ent in the
Old Testam ent concerning the cross. In The God Who Risks, for instance,
you m ention Isaiah 53 only once in passing. The New Testam ent writers,
however, refer to this text directly or allude to it as they m ine the riches
of the cross and analyze its grounding in prophetic literature (cf. John
12:38; 1 Cor. 1:18; M ark 9:12; Heb. 4:15; John 1:10; M att. 8:17; M att.
26:66; Acts 8:32; 1 Peter 1:19; M att. 27:57; 1 Peter 2:22; 2 Cor. 5:21; Gal.
3:13; Rom. 6:9; Eph. 1:5; Jo h n 17:3; 1 John 2:1; Rom. 5:18; Phil. 2:9;
Col. 2:15; M ark 15:28; Luke 23:34). One of the m ost striking instances
is Philip s interaction w ith the E thiopian eunuch. The eunuch specifi
cally asks Philip “about w hom ” Isaiah is w riting in Isaiah 53. Philip's
response? “Then Philip began to speak, and starting w ith this Scripture,
he proclaim ed to him the good news about Jesus” (Acts 8:35).
I’d like to add a final thought on the biblical portrayal of God test
ing people. If, as I’ve argued, God does not test people in order to find
out how they will respond—w ith an accom panying change in his own
m ind—why does God allow such providential testing to occur? At least
one reason for God’s testing is to aid in the process of ch aracter for
m ation. John Chrysostom believed th at God desires to transform the
h u m an soul into “a serviceable condition for virtue” and does so in the
present life through his providential ordering of each individual’s life,
w ith accom panying testing. For example, Chrysostom w rites th at the
"present life is a w restling school, a gym nasium , a battle, a sm elting
furnace, and a dyer’s house of virtue.” T hrough divine providence God
“w orks” the soul, “m elts it, and delivers it over to the testing of trials.”
Why? “In order to strengthen those who have lost heart and who have let
them selves go, in order th at those who have already been tested m ight
be even m ore approved and unconquered by the plots of the dem ons and
the snares of the devil,” and thus “com pletely w orthy for the reception
of the good things to com e.”
Chrysostom illustrates this testing and cleansing process in his exege
sis of the story of the paralytic let dow n th rough the roof and subse
quently healed by Jesus. God allowed the m an to suffer for an extended
period, not o ut of negligence, cruelty, or ignorance, but rath e r as "a sign
of the greatest care for his welfare." “For as a gold refiner having cast
a piece of gold into the furnace suffers it to be proved by the fire until
such tim e as he sees it has becom e purer: even so God perm its the souls
of [hum an beings] to be tested by troubles until they becom e pure and
tran sp aren t and have reaped m uch profit from this process of sifting:
w herefore this is the greatest species of benefit.”
Chrysostom is confident th a t God knows how long the m etal m ust
rem ain in the fire to be thoroughly cleansed. God will not allow it to
rem ain in the fire “until it is destroyed and b u rn t up.” Thus, we can know
in the m idst of our trials and testings th at "when God sees th at we have
becom e m ore pure, he releases us from ou r trials so th at we m ay not
be overthrow n and cast dow n by the m ultiplication of ou r evils.” This
cleansing is only one of the reasons Chrysostom posits for God’s testing,
b u t I think it is a helpful one. Got to run.

Chris
33 John: Openness and Tradition
H i r h r i< ?
I have som e brief rem arks about your last letter, and then I w ant to
discuss a topic we’ve touched on several tim es: the role of tradition in
theology. First, you are correct th at one can experience grief again and
again based on the m em ory of an event. The issue is w hether a tim eless
being can experience changing em otions. You say, "If tim eless experi
ence is possible at all.” A tim eless consciousness has an unchanging
experience, n ot changing experiences based on responses to hum ans,
for th at im plies th at God experiences tim e. A tim eless deity does not
have different experiences at different times.
Second, you raise the issue w hether presentism im plies th a t God
"errs.” God errs, according to you, if "what God thought w as to occur
in the future has not taken place.” W hat if God thought Saul o r Israel
w ould obey him in specific instances b u t they disobeyed? The Scripture,
of course, says exactly that. Even proponents of divine tim elessness
have a problem here because God sent a fam ine expecting Israel to put
away h er idols b u t she did not. How could God tim elessly know they
w ould not repent and still intend for them to repent? I don’t believe God
is m aking an "error” w hen he w ants som ething to happen b u t it does
not. The only way to avoid this issue is to say th at God sent the fam ine
and never intended for the people to repent. In other words, you have
to affirm m eticulous providence and reject all form s of freewill theism .
This is precisely why scholastic Calvinists have ham m ered on Armin-
167
ians, because freewill theism im plies th a t God som etim es fails to get
specifically w hat he wants. If you think th at traditional A rm inianism
overcom es this problem because it affirm s God’s tim eless knowledge
of all future actions, you are wrong. The reason is this: God cannot
use knowledge of w hat he knows will occur to m ake it not occur. For
instance, God cannot use his knowledge of Israel’s not repenting at a
specific tim e as a basis for doing things for them in previous tim es so
th a t they will, in fact, repent. That w ould imply th at w hat God foreknew
w ould not happen so he really didn't foreknow it.
According to the open view, God’s decisions and actions will be
the w isest decisions and actions th a t are possible u n d e r the circum
stances—th a t is w hat perfect w isdom m eans. This does n ot m ean, how
ever, th at God’s actions always have their intended results. If we believe
the Bible we will have to say th a t som etim es people failed to respond
as God w anted them to. God w anted Saul to be obedient b u t he was
not—th at is the risk God took in giving us freedom , but it is certainly not
an error on God's part. At the end of your letter you say th at God knows
ju st how m uch to test us to produce w hat God w ants in us. If this m eans
th a t God does not give us m ore th an we can handle, th en fine. B ut if it
m eans th a t everything God intends to produce in us comes about, then
you are affirm ing m eticulous providence. In this case, God then tested
Saul b u t never intended for Saul to be obedient, since whatever happens
is w hat God w anted produced. God never intended to produce obedi
ence in Saul. Clearly, I reject the notion th at God never w anted Saul to be
obedient. Rather, God w anted Saul’s obedience b u t God did not receive
it. However, this does not constitute an error on God’s part.
Also, I said th at for God to be m istaken or hold a false belief it would
have to be the case th a t God "declared infallibly th at som ething would
com e to pass and it did not. God w ould never be m istaken so long as he
never said th a t X (for example, Adam will not sin) w ould infallibly come
to pass and it did not." God will not definitely believe th at som ething will
occur unless it is certain to occur. If an event is not certain to occur, then
God knows the degree of probability th a t it will happen. B ut God will
not hold probabilities as absolutely certain and in order for God to be
in error, God’s knowledge of the probability of the event w ould have to
be wrong. However, I deny th at God’s knowledge of probabilities is ever
wrong, so I deny th a t God errs.
Let me move on to the role of trad itio n in doing theology. On sev
eral occasions you have suggested th a t openness theology significantly
m odifies the trad itio n al view. I w ould like to m ake som e com m ents
about traditions and the nature of heresy. It is claim ed th a t we do not
agree w ith “th e” tradition. Well, w hat m ight “the” tradition refer to? Is
there a single tradition in church history regarding creation, anthropol
Jo h n : O penness and Tradition 169
ogy, original sin and its transm ission, Christology, atonem ent, salvation,
ecclesiology, eschatology, and the nature of Scripture? Clearly, there is
not. Just think of all the ink—and, unfortunately, blood—th a t has been
spilled over these topics. However, one m ight say, “Hold on, Sanders,
you know very well w hat we m ean—the traditional doctrine of God and
providence.” B ut I contend th at there never has been a single doctrine
of God or view of providence in the church. To speak of "the traditional”
view of sovereignty as m eticulous providence is to ignore the actual
tradition! The u n d erstanding of providence p u t forth by Augustine
and others has always been contested by others in the church. M illard
Erickson says th at the history of Christian thought on the doctrine of
God is not uniform . From early on issues such as divine imm utability,
impassibility, the content of divine om niscience, and the nature of sov
ereignty were debated. There is no single old m odel of God.
One of the claim s m ade against open theists is th a t we are “revision
ist" theologians. It is tru e th at we are attem pting to revisit som e (not
all) com m only accepted attributes of God and correct them in light of
Scripture. Now, we m ay be incorrect in our conclusions, but the attem pt
to im prove w hat has gone before us is certainly p a rt of our P rotestant
heritage from the R eform ation—a period of incredible revisions m ade
in doctrines an d practices. The R eform ers th o u g h t th a t the process
of reform ation is never com plete (semper reformancla). The history of
theology is filled w ith people who m ade attem pts to revise and improve
w hat had been said before them . Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin,
Arm inius, and Wesley were “revisionists” in this sense. Jam es Oliver
Buswell Jr., form er president of W heaton College, proposed m ajor revi
sions in classical theism when he rejected the doctrines of divine tim eless
ness, immutability, impassibility, and pure actuality. “We should,” he says,
“shake off the static ideology w hich has come into Christian theology
from non-Biblical sources.” I am trying to follow Buswell’s advice.
M any of the m ost vociferous evangelical critics of open theism claim
they are defending “the traditional view of God.” Yet, at the sam e tim e,
they m ake significant m odifications to the traditional view! The follow
ing Calvinist critics of openness m ake som e rath e r shocking revisions to
the divine nature. R onald N ash says th a t the traditional understandings
of pure actuality, divine simplicity, and im passibility m ust be rejected,
im m utability m ust be m odified so th a t "hum an beings can m ake a dif
ference to God,” and he has serious doubts about divine tim elessness
as well. Bruce W are revises the traditional doctrine of im m utability and
says th a t God enters into reciprocal relations w ith us (yet, he also holds
th a t God exercises m eticulous control over all we do). Wayne G rudem
criticizes the W estm inster Confession for accepting the “unbiblical”
notion th at God is “w ithout passions.” M illard Erickson surveys recent
evangelical theologians and claim s th at “the trad itio n al doctrine of

im passibility is not the current one” am ong contem porary evangelicals.
Erickson him self sees the problem s w ith m any of the traditional a ttri
butes and attem pts to m ake som e needed revisions. Few evangelicals
today, even conservative Calvinists, are genuine classical theists.
These thinkers are to be com m ended for the courage to revise aspects
of conventional theism in light of Scripture and philosophical argu
m ent. They are definitely revising classical theism , since Aquinas and
Calvin certainly w ould not agree w ith these revisions. The great clas
sical theists read th eir Bibles and concluded th a t God did n o t have
changing em otions, o r suffer, or respond to creatures. Nonetheless, it
is really wonderful to see these sorts of reform s being pursued by con
servative Calvinists. It does an A rm inian heart good. Frequently in this
debate, open theists are m ade to look like they are the only ones doing
the revising. O ur critics posture as defenders of the tradition affirm ing
Vincent’s M onitor: “w hat has been believed always, everywhere, and
by everyone.” They w ant people to think th at they sim ply believe w hat
everybody has always believed—and all the while they are revising the
tradition in ways th at w ould be unrecognizable to the great classical
theists! Moreover, they m ake these revisions while condem ning open
theists for flaunting tradition!
The issue is not w hether we should revise conventional theism . Rather,
the question is w hat specific revisions we should m ake and w hether these
revisions are faithful to Scripture and logically coherent. Open theists
argue th a t it is logically incoherent to affirm both th at God is tim eless
a n d also say th at God responds, suffers, and grieves, since these are
tem poral term s. It is incoherent to say th at God is a God of m eticulous
providence w ho ensures th a t everything happens exactly as he intends
and th at God is saddened by w hat we do. The great classical theists of
yesterday and today understand these logical problem s, w hich is why
they w ould not m ake the revisions th at these evangelical Calvinists
today are m aking. It is my belief th at they m ake these revisions in spite
of logic, because they know th a t the m ajority of evangelicals believe
th a t God responds to us, m ay be influenced by ou r prayers, and is sad
dened w hen things go badly. One of my form er pastors believed th at our
prayers of petition never affected w hat God decides to do. However, he
w ould never clearly say th a t to the congregation! Small wonder, since
they would have been aghast. M any of these theologians know th at their
old views of God ju st w on’t sell in the evangelical m arketplace and so
they try to infuse divine responsiveness and openness to creatures into
their old views. Though I applaud these theologians for m aking needed
revisions, I believe they will either have to retu rn to a m ore robust clas
John: Openness and Tradition 171
sical theism or m ake even m ore revisions in the direction of open theism
if they wish to be logically consistent.
Proponents of openness theology do revise certain aspects of the tra
ditions but certainly not all. We have no desire to keelhaul the tradition.
In fact, all of us, including open theists, are shaped by various traditions
th a t inform ou r reading of Scripture, how we pray, as well as ou r w or
ship. Traditions are helpful but not necessarily perfect, and this raises
the question of the extent to w hich any of us are allowed to disagree w ith
those who have gone before us. Of course, none of us can accept all of
the tradition, since it is too diverse. We do take sides on issues such as
infant baptism , w hether clergy have to be male, and the form of church
governm ent. Hence, in som e respects all of us have to sift through the
history of Christendom , selecting those doctrines and practices we w ant
to h an d on as well as those we either reject o r modify.
That is precisely w hat open theists are doing. We are sim ply trying
to m ake the ancient relational m odel of God and his creatures m ore
coherent. Just as R eform ed theology has sought to m ake the Augus-
tin ian trad itio n m ore logical, so we are trying to m odify the freewill
tradition. Hence we see ourselves in continuity w ith previous theolo
gies. Even on the issue of divine om niscience we see continuity. In the
freewill tradition, divine foreknowledge was used to explain how God
could eternally elect individuals to salvation w ithout rem oving th eir
libertarian freedom . God sim ply foresaw th a t they w ould exercise faith
in Jesus and elected them on the basis of th a t knowledge. Open theism
is in this freewill (Arminian) tradition b ut w ants to reform it so th a t it
is m ore biblically faithful and rationally coherent.
It is tru e th a t until the tw entieth century there have not been m any
w ho could be labeled open theists. Although there have been m any in
the freewill tradition who have m odified the divine attributes of im pas
sibility and im m utability, not m any have taken up our understanding
of foreknowledge (presentism ). However, even this is not w ithout prec
edent. Calcidius, a late-fourth- to early-fifth-century C hristian writer,
w rote an influential com m entary on Plato’s Timaeus and a lengthy tre a t
m ent against fatalism in w hich he affirm s the theory of presentism .
In the M iddle Ages Jewish w riters discussed how the kinds of biblical
texts open theists appeal to should be interpreted. Two very respected
thinkers, Ibn E zra and Gersonides, disagreed w ith the m ajority and held
the open view of the future. Andrew Ramsay, one of Wesley’s contem po
raries, held th at God chooses not to know w hat we will do in the future.
Adam Clarke, a fam ous eighteenth-century biblical com m entator, u ti
lized presentism . It has been defended in various form s by the M ethod
ist circuit rid er Billy H ibbard; W. T. Brents, a giant of the R estoration
movem ent; the R om an Catholic Jules Lequyer; and L. D. McCabe, who
w rote two lengthy volum es on presentism in the nineteenth century,

supporting it from Scripture.
In the tw entieth century this trickle of support has tu rn e d into a
rath e r substantial flow. Biblical scholar Terence Fretheim has published
num erous studies detailing th a t this understanding of om niscience is
tau g h t in the Old Testam ent. Among theologians one finds it in the
w orks of Greg Boyd, Clark Pinnock, Jo h n Polkinghom e, and Jurgen
M oltm ann. Among C hristian philosophers there are so m any th at
reject divine tim elessness and affirm presentism th a t I will only list
a few: R ichard Sw inburne, J. R. Lucas, Keith Ward, Peter Geach, and
William Hasker. Respected spiritual w riters such as Dallas W illard and
R ichard Foster affirm presentism . W illard believes th a t for God to have
personal relationships w ith us, he can n o t know w hat creatures w ith
libertarian freedom will do. He writes: “I too was raised in a theology
th a t presents God as a great unblinking cosm ic stare, w ho m ust know
everything w hether he w ants to or not.” From this brief list it is clear
th a t presentism is affirm ed by a wide array of thinkers who are consid
ered orthodox.
Some, however, claim th a t the idea th a t God does n o t know w ith
absolute certainty all th at we will do in the future is not orthodox—it
is “heretical.” The evangelical critics of open theism are fond of quot
ing Tom O dens rem ark th at presentism is a heresy. W hat Oden seems
to m ean is only th at it was n ot the predom inant view in the first eight
centuries of the church. He does not m ean by "heresy” th at open theists
should be expelled from Christian fellowship. W hen asked about this
Tom said, “W hen I use the w ord ‘heresy’ I m ean th a t the discussion now
begins, not th at it is finished.” Well, th a t is certainly not w hat the Cal
vinists cited above m ean by the term! They m ean a teaching for which
a person w ho affirm s it is dam nable. H eretics are those w ho should be
cast out of all Christian com m unities. Though they can't rem ove us from
all C hristian com m unities, they are certainly trying very h ard to kick us
out of evangelicalism; using unseem ly tactics to do so.
On w hat basis is openness classified as heresy? One possible ground
for condem ning openness is to claim th a t it conflicts w ith the teachings
of som e of the seven ecum enical councils. However, none of the C oun
cils discussed the issue of om niscience and foreknowledge. If open the
ism is going to be condem ned on the basis of the Councils it will have to
be done on the basis of im m utability and impassibility. The definition of
the first Council of Nicea says, “The holy catholic and apostolic church
anathem atizes those who say: ‘There was w hen he was not’. . . and those
who assert t h a t . . . he is m utable or liable to change.” That is, the Son of
God cannot experience change because he is fully God. The definition
of the Council of Chalcedon reads: “[The Synod] expels from the priest
John: O penness and Tradition 173
hood those w ho dare to say th a t the G odhead of the Only-Begotten is

passible/capable of suffering.” Anyone who says the divine Son can suf
fer or w ho mixes the two natures is heretical. Openness asserts th at the
divinity of the Son is capable of suffering, so openness seems to conflict
w ith these two councils. However, we need to tread carefully here. There
are questions as to precisely w hat these w riters m eant by “m utable” and
"passible.” Did they m ean change in any respect or only change in the
being of God? Did they m ean th a t God could not experience changing
em otions and could not be affected by creatures? If they m eant th at the
being of God does not change, then open theists are not anathem atized
and are not heretics. If, however, they m eant th a t God does not change
in any respect and thus can have no em otions and is incapable of being
grieved, then open theists are indeed heretics. B ut then, so are Wayne
Grudem , R onald Nash, and Bruce W are am ong others.
Moreover, if we m ust affirm all th a t the seven ecum enical councils
said, th en w hat are we to do w ith, for instance, this assertion from
Second Nicea: "Following the royal pathw ay and the divinely inspired
authority o f our holy fathers [em phasis m ine] and the traditions of the
Catholic Church, we define w ith all certitude and accuracy t h a t . . . the
venerable and holy im ages are to be set up in the holy churches of God
. . . in houses and by the roadside . . . im ages of . . . Jesus Christ, our
undefiled Lady, the theotokos, of the honorable angels and of all saints
and holy m en. . . . In accordance w ith ancient pious custom , incense
and lights m ay be offered to images, as they are to the figure of the
precious and life-giving cross, to the book of the Gospels and to other
holy objects.” There is so m uch in these adm onitions for P rotestants
in general and B aptists in p articular to choke on as to w arrant a theo
logical H eim lich m aneuver (Ha!). The Council declares th a t we are to
perform these practices, b u t it is clear th a t m ost of us do not. On w hat
grounds do we reject the authority of this Council? It claim s th at the
holy fathers were “divinely inspired”! Were they divinely inspired about
divine imm utability, impassibility, and the veneration of icons? Most
P rotestants don’t th ink so.
David Wells, professor of theology at Gordon-Conwell Seminary,
asserts th at the Creeds are often wrong. He says, for instance, th at the
Nicene Creed contains Origenist concepts and th at Chalcedon conferred
on M ary the title “M other of God.” The council said th a t this teaching
was to be held inviolable, so Wells is rejecting the inviolable teaching of
the seventh ecum enical council. Is Wells a heretic? M ust we follow the
canons of the seven councils? If so, then the following apply to us: we are
to stand, not kneel w hen praying on the Lord’s day; a w om an under the
age of forty cannot becom e a deaconess and if, after becom ing one, she
“despises the grace of God” and m arries, she shall be anathem atized: if
you do not salute the icons you are anathem atized; if you do not accept
the gospels and the holy relics of the m artyrs you are anathem atized;
Jews who convert m ust put away all Jew ish custom s including the Sab
b ath or they m ust not be allowed to take com m union. Are those who
do not follow all the teachings of these seven councils heretics? If one
claim s th a t open theists are heretics for conflicting w ith certain ele
m ents in the seven ecum enical councils—and it is n ot certain th at we
are in conflict—then we are in good com pany w ith Luther, Calvin, and
m any others.
In the history of the church, the w ord heresy has been used for a very
large n um ber of views. W hat Protestant belief was not labeled hereti
cal w hen it was first proposed? John Eck, the theologian selected to
cham pion the Catholic cause against Luther, repeatedly calls L uther and
other Protestants “heretics.” Eck asserts that the "Church as the pillar
of truth, w ith Christ as leader and the Holy Spirit as teacher, does not
err.” Eck drips w ith sarcasm w hen he says how fortunate the Church
is to have L uther to correctly interpret the Scriptures to us, since the
Church has been in error for m ore th an a thousand years. In response
to open theism , Gerald Bray reproduces the argum ents of John Eck: “It
is hard to believe th a t in the late-tw entieth century a few radicals have
arrived at a tru th w hich has escaped generations of sincere searchers.”
I find it discom fiting th at evangelicals w ould use such anti-Protestant
argum ents to label other evangelicals “heretics.” Remember, people died
for "heresies” such as believers’baptism , separation of church and state,
refusal to take oaths, and the priesthood of all believers.
Though not all branches of evangelicalism like to use the H-bom b
on those w ith w hom they disagree, th a t branch of evangelicalism that
gave rise to neo-evangelicalism frequently threw heresy bom bs at one
another. B. B. W arfield called the holiness and pietistic understanding
of providence heretical because they led to faith-healing m ovem ents.
M achen called prem illennialism "a very serious heresy.” Van Til called
Gordon Clark a heretic, and Clark was tried for heresy at W heaton Col
lege. E. J. Carnell called fundam entalists “cultic,” “sectarian,” and “her
etics.” Evangelicals have dem onized other evangelicals over evolution,
charism ata, m egachurches, w orship styles, w om en in m inistry, iner
rancy, and different views of the m illennium . J. I. Packer and Charles
Colson have been accused of giving up the gospel because they signed
a statem ent w ritten by evangelicals and Catholics.
Todays enem y th at m ust be destroyed is open theism . It is as though
som e believe th at if you confess w ith your m outh the Lord Jesus and
believe in your heart th a t God has exhaustive definite foreknowledge of
all future events, then you will be saved. M ust we believe divine tim e
lessness, im m utability, and im passibility as well? To m ake this move
John: Openness and Tradition 175
is to confuse biblical C hristianity w ith ou r developed theories about

specific aspects of the faith. A theory of om niscience has never been the
touchstone of orthodoxy. It does n ot appear in any of the ecum enical
councils. We are saved by the grace of God m anifested in the atone
m ent and resurrection of Jesus Christ, not by theories about divine
foreknowledge o r eternality. We m ust never confuse w hat C. S. Lewis
called “m ere Christianity” w ith our theologies. Certainly, ou r doctrines
m ake a difference in the ways we practice ou r Christianity—they are
im portant. B ut a doctrine of foreknowledge is not p a rt of the core of
the C hristian faith.
Presently, there is a strong call by evangelicals to “retu rn to the trad i
tion.” Personally, I believe this is sorely needed. Evangelicals are far too
ignorant of the Christian heritage. There is m uch we can retrieve from
the traditions th at will enrich ou r w orship and our theology. However,
this “retu rn ” to "the” tradition m ust not assum e th at there is a single
tradition. The Christian theological heritage is and has been m ultiform .
We should be careful of any naive retu rn th a t fails to scrutinize the
traditions. As I dem onstrated above, evangelicals sim ply cannot accept
w hat some consider essential aspects of the tradition. Finally, labeling
open theists heretics because they don’t line up w ith the m ajority view
regarding om niscience does not settle this issue, because all Protestants
are heretics by th a t criterion. Nobody likes to be called a heretic, for it
places you in som e unsavory company. On the other hand, being labeled
a heretic places you in some excellent com pany as well!
Sincerely,
John
34 Chris: Tradition and Theology
Dear John,
I’m eager to discuss the issue of trad itio n w ith you and w here the
openness m odel m ight fit or not fit into the church’s history of biblical
and theological reflection. But before I deal directly w ith the issue of the
openness m odel and tradition, I w ant to present my own understanding
of w hat tradition is and how it functions w ithin the church. In a recent
essay, Stan Grenz and John Franke provide a helpful definition of the
C hristian tradition. They w rite th a t the Christian tradition is “the his
tory of the interpretation and application of canonical Scripture by the
C hristian comm unity, the church, as it listens to the voice of the Spirit
speaking th ro u g h the text.” Hence, the C hristian trad itio n is surely
related to the church, Scripture, and the Spirit.
Grenz and Franke continue, “M ore specifically, we m ight define the
C hristian tradition as the ongoing historical attem pts by the Christian
com m unity to explicate and translate faithfully the first-order language,
symbols and practices of the Christian faith—by m eans of the interac
tion am ong community, text and culture—into the various social and
cultural contexts in w hich the com m unity has been situated.” Thus,
tradition is not “static" but grows and develops. Key issues in under
standing traditio n include:
1. The issue of authority.

2. The authenticity of development, i.e., how does the church deter
m ine w hether a theological m odel is a valid, authentic development
of the tradition or a distortion?
176
Chris: Tradition and Theology 177
Both authenticity and authority are key issues for understanding and
identifying the Christian tradition, precisely because the concept of tra
dition "denotes,” as D. H. W illiams puts it, “the acceptance and handing
over of God’s Word, Jesus Christ (tradere Christum), and how this took
concrete form s in the apostles’ preaching (kerygma), in the Christ-cen
tered reading of the Old Testam ent, in the celebration of baptism and
the Lord’s Supper, and in the doxological, doctrinal, hym nological and
creedal form s by w hich the declaration of the m ystery of God Incarnate
was revealed for our salvation.”
Tradition, then, includes the faithful passing on or handing over of the
gospel from generation to generation in a form that speaks faithfully and
relevantly to each new generation of the C hristian community. Inherent
in the concept of tradition is the confidence th at the gospel of God's sav
ing act in Christ can be appropriated, understood, and com m unicated
clearly, faithfully, and correctly across the years. Included here, Grenz
and Franke note, w ould be "the narrative of God’s redem ptive activity,”
“the basic teachings,” and the “practices” of the early C hristian com
munity, a body of teaching and practice the church is called to faithfully
pass on from generation to generation.
M ore particularly, how is tradition related to theology itself? I like
Grenz and Franke’s description of tradition as the “herm eneutical con
text for theology.” That is, tradition offers a “herm eneutical trajectory”
for theological reflection and construction, a trajectory com posed of
“the history of w orship,” "the history of theology,” and "classic th eo
logical form ulations and sym bols.”
Among other things, the history of theology dem onstrates th a t some
theological m odels have failed in their attem pts to represent the gospel
well. That is, in Grenz and Franke’s words, the history of theology p ro
vides the Christian com m unity “w ith a record of som e of the failures of
past efforts th a t have em erged over the course of tim e.” Indeed, these
failed m odels have played a vital role in helping the church to under
stand m ore clearly w hat teaching is in line w ith the gospel and w hat
teaching doesn’t fit. As you point out, this sifting process of discerning
tru th from erro r generally takes a long period of testing, although I
w ould expect the tim e involved in analyzing a theological m odel to be
shorter in our age th an in past eras, simply because we have m ore help
available to us from the past.
Theological m odels have been judged as heresy in the past, and
there is no reason to believe th a t heresy cannot erupt in the present.
But we m ust be quite careful in understanding w hat heresy is and how
the church judges a m odel to be heretical. Grenz and Franke are quite
helpful at this point: "The C hristian com m unity did not sim ply receive
orthodox belief and pass it on in a static fashion. Rather, throughout
its history the com m unity has struggled to determ ine the content and
application of orthodoxy in ways th at are faithful to the canonical nar
ratives. This process grew through the challenges presented by those
w hose teachings w ere eventually deem ed heretical.”
Perhaps a closer look at the early church w ould help at this juncture.
Exactly w hat is heresy? Tertullian (a third-century African church father
later identified as a heretic by some!) argued th at heresy could be identi
fied by its divergence from apostolic teaching and doctrine. He describes
a distinct paradigm of revelation and authority.
First, Jesus in his earthly m inistry "declared w hat he was, w hat he
had been, w hat was the F ath ers will w hich he was carrying out, w hat
was the conduct he laid dow n for hum ankind: all this he declared either
openly to the people or privately to the disciples.”
Second, Tertullian explains th at Jesus “chose twelve leading ones to
be his close com panions, appointed as leaders of the nations.” These
m en proceeded to plant churches throughout the M editerranean Basin
and in doing so “published the sam e doctrine of the sam e faith.” These
churches, founded by apostles who had in tu rn been selected by Jesus
as his authoritative representatives and interpreters, were all p art of one
connected plant o r vine. Indeed, Tertullian contends, new er churches
"borrow ed the shoot of faith and the seeds of doctrine” from those
previously planted. It is this shared seed, a dissem ination of com m on
apostolic life and doctrine, th a t identifies a church as "apostolic, as
being the off-spring of apostolic churches. Every kind of thing m ust
needs be classed w ith its origin. And so the churches, m any and great
as they are, are identical w ith th at one prim itive Church issuing from
the Apostles, for thence they are all derived. So all are prim itive and
apostolic, while all are one.”
I think Tertullian s m etaphor of apostolic teaching as seed sown by the
church is an im portant one. The C hristian tradition surely has grown
and developed over the centuries, and a reform ing of the tradition has
occasionally occurred. The crucial question for any proposed theo
logical model, though, is w hether the m odel contains the biblical “DNA”
contained in the apostolic in terpretation of C hrist’s person and work
and other key theological loci. Thus, we can have a theological model
such as the Trinity accepted by the church as orthodox, though we never
ru n across the w ord “Trinity” in the Bible. The church recognized the
“DNA” for a Trinitarian m odel as present in the Scripture, though the
precise m odel of the Trinity took years to develop and test. To expand
the m etaphor, heresy is a theological m odel th at the church determ ines
to contain defective or m u ta n t "DNA.” O rthodox theological m odels
are like oak trees th at have sprouted from acorns. The m ature tree is
a natural, healthy developm ent of the biological blueprint contained
C hris: Tradition and Theology 179
w ithin the acorn. H eretical models, on the other hand, resem ble weeds
th at have erupted in a field w here one expected lush grass. There will
usually be enough “DNA” in a faulty m odel to w arrant its testing by the
church to determ ine its authenticity. If the m odel is finally determ ined
to be heretical, however, it is because the church determ ines it to be a
distortion of the tru th rath e r th an a genuine representation. The genetic
pattern of the gospel has som ehow been distorted or m utated.
W hat specifically characterizes heresy? For Tertullian a t least, heresy
is teaching th at can be identified by its diversity and contrariety. That
is, as Tertullian puts it, "it originates neither from an apostle nor from
an apostolic m an; for the Apostles w ould not have diverged from one
an o th er in doctrine; no m ore w ould the apostolic m an have put out
teaching at variance w ith th at of the Apostles.”
Irenaeus (a second-century bishop) also em phasized the im portance
of apostolic teaching and tradition in the propagation of the gospel and
particularly stressed the im portant role bishops played in preserving
and protecting apostolic truth. "By ‘knowledge of the tru th ,’” Irenaeus
writes, “we m ean the teaching of the Apostles; the order of the Church
as established from the earliest tim es throughout the w orld.” Irenaeus
contends th a t the "distinctive stam p of the Body of C hrist” is “preserved
through the Episcopal succession: for to the bishops the Apostles com
m itted the care of the church w hich is in each place, w hich has come
down to ou r own tim e.” Heresy can be identified, Irenaeus believes, by
the willingness of the heretic to proclaim a m essage “th a t he him self
has discovered by him self—or ra th e r invented.” W hen the heretic is
presented w ith the tradition derived "from the Apostles, and w hich is
preserved in the churches by the successions of presbyters, then they
oppose tradition, claim ing to be w iser not only th an the presbyters but
even th an the Apostles, and to have discovered the tru th undefiled.”
Irenaeus explains th a t in distinction from the heretic—a theological
m averick of sorts—the genuinely “talented theologian . . . will not say
anything different from these beliefs (for ‘no one is above his teacher’):
nor will the feeble dim inish the tradition.”
Heresy, then, is the propagation of a position o r perspective th a t runs
against the grain of apostolic teaching and tradition. It is frequently
linked to specific personalities, precisely because at the core of heresy
is often an individual’s choice to advocate and prom ote a teaching that
the church cannot discover in or reconcile w ith the teaching of the
apostles and hence does not accept as orthodox or "lining u p ” w ith the
pattern of the gospel. Athanasius (a fourth-century bishop) com m ents
th a t heresy is often m arked by the nam e of its teacher, specifically
because it is th a t teacher’s unique doctrine th at sets a group ap art from
the church at large.
I think th at evangelicals face a significant problem w hen it comes to

identifying “heresy.” It w ould be nice to think th a t all we have to do is
tu rn to the pages of Scripture and all will becom e clear regarding the
viability of a theological model, b u t things are n o t so easy. Why? How
are evangelicals to determ ine com m unally the m eaning of Scripture
itself? For instance, I ran across a com m ent of R ichard John N euhaus
in First Things regarding the m ost recent m eeting of the Evangelical
Theological Society and the debate th at occurred there concerning the
openness model. N euhaus observed th a t “evangelicals are inclined to
launch questions from scratch and dem and knock-dow n proofs from
explicit biblical passages. In the absence of a M agisterium , or authori
tative teaching office, this m akes for lively argum ents.” W here does
authority ultim ately reside in the evangelical world?
Thom as How ard explores the question of authority in a recent article
in w hich he discusses the distinguishing m arks of the church. W hile
m any evangelicals m ight feel uncom fortable w ith the need for creeds
and councils, H ow ard highlights the difficulty of adjudicating th eo
logical questions and issues on the basis of the Bible alone. “The great
difficulty here,” H ow ard writes, “is th at Eutychius and Sabellius and
Arius got th eir notions straight out of the Bible as well. W ho will arbi
trate these things for us? W ho will speak w ith authority to us faithful,
all of us rushing about flapping the pages of ou r w ell-thum bed New
Testam ents, locked in shrill contests over the two natures of Christ or
baptism o r the Lord’s Supper or the m ystery of predestination?” One
could ju st as well add “o r the nature of God or God’s relationship to the
future!”
The issues of authenticity and authority, I think, will continue to
pressure the evangelical consciousness, and rightfully so. That is, w hat
process and m ethodology possess the inherent authority w ithin evan
gelicalism to judge w hether a theological m odel such as openness is an
authentic developm ent of the C hristian tradition o r an ab erran t m u ta
tion? Of course, all evangelicals would argue the Bible is a fundam ental
resource for determ ining the viability and trustw orthiness of a theo
logical model, b ut the Bible as understood by whom ? Reform ed theo
logians and churches? Freewill Baptists? Independent Bible churches?
Chris Hall? John Sanders?
H ow ard writes, “W hen a crucial issue arises—say, w hat we should
teach about sexuality—w ho will speak to us w ith a finally authoritative
voice? The best we can do is to get Christianity Today to ru n a sym po
sium , w ith one article by J. I. Packer plum ping for traditional morality,
and one article by one of ou r lesbian fem inist evangelicals (there are
some), showing th a t we have all been w rong for the entire 3,500 years
since Sinai, and th at w hat the Bible really teaches is th at indeed hom o
sexuals m ay enjoy a fully expressed sexual life. The trouble here is th at

J. I. Packer has no m ore authority th an ou r lesbian friend, so the m es
sage to the faithful is ‘Take your pick.’”
The thoughts of Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Athanasius I have draw n
on in this letter indicate how differently early C hristians ap p ear to
approach the issue of authority. H ow ard com m ents th at “the faithful
in those early centuries were certainly aw are of a great Babel of voices
am ong the Christians, teaching this and teaching th a t on every conceiv
able point of revelation. B ut the faithful were also aw are th at there was a
body th a t could speak into the chaos and declare, w ith serene and final
authority, w hat the faith th at had been taught by the apostles w as.”
Is it tru e th a t evangelicals have only one authority, the Bible, for adju
dicating theological tru th and error? I think Clark Pinnock is correct in
observing th at Protestants and evangelicals have th eir own interpretive
traditions th at aid them in m aking sense of the Bible and in distinguish
ing tru th from error. B oth the Catholic and Protestant traditions, P in
nock argues, have a threefold understanding of authority:
1. The prim ary authority is the Bible itself.

2. The second level of authority addresses “the problem s of inter
p retation and m isinterpretation.” H ere operate, in the Catholic
tradition, for instance, the “'rule of faith' and other official docu
m ents that could stand as the key to the interpretation of the Bible.”
The Apostles’ Creed and the Nicene Creed would be included here.
I w ould also add at least the first four ecum enical councils. In
the P ro testan t w orld we have authoritative traditions such as
the Form ula of Concord, the Belgic Confession, and the Thirty
Nine Articles. Even w ithin seem ingly autonom ous bodies such
as independent Bible churches, interpretive trad itio n s such as
dispensationalism have played a prom inent role in how Christians
interpreted the Bible.
3. The third level of authority encompasses "church office and insti
tution.” In the R om an Catholic Church the papacy and the Magis-
terium possess the authority “to stand guard over the Scripture and
the tradition.” Pinnock helpfully rem inds us th at Protestants have
their own institutions and offices, and although they do not view
these as infallible, they clearly see God’s hand in their organizations,
churches, and denom inational histories.
How might my thoughts on tradition and authority inform my responses

to the openness model? For one thing, I’m not as skeptical as you seem
to be regarding the existence of a “trad itio n ” th a t we can look to for
guidance and direction in our theological work. I think we can discern
a consensus in the tradition regarding a nu m b er of central core them es

and issues: the deity of Christ, the Trinity, the genuine hum anity of
Christ, the deity of the Holy Spirit, the universal character of hum an
sinfulness, and so on. Yes, it did take the church a n um ber of years to
think through and form ulate these doctrines, b u t we can discern a cen
tral, solid core to the tradition.
The openness m odel offers two significant challenges to the tra d i
tio n s understanding of God’s natu re an d providence. First, the open
ness m odel argues th a t God knows only the past, present, and those
aspects of future events th at God has foreordained will occur. Second,
the openness m odel contends th a t God can m ake m istakes on the basis
of God’s lim ited knowledge of the future actions of h u m an free agents.
N either of these propositions finds significant, weighty support in the
history of C hristian exegesis no r in the com m unal dogm atic decisions
of the church. The figures you m ention as supporting the openness
m odel—Calcidius, Andrew Ramsay, Adam Clarke, Billy H ibbard, W. T.
Brents, Jules Lequyer, and L. D. M cCabe—are w orth listening to but
are not major, authoritative figures in the history of Christian exegesis.
They represent a m inority opinion th at the church has never accepted
as authoritative. You are right in observing th at a wide range of perspec
tives on providence have been debated in the history of the church, but
very few C hristian exegetes and theologians have supported the open
ness perspective. Why? The lim itations the openness m odel places on
God’s om niscience and its predication of divine error weigh too heavily
against the acceptance of the model. Even E astern fathers such as John
Chrysostom (fourth century), fathers who support strongly the concept
of libertarian freedom , refuse to accept the idea th a t God’s knowledge
is potential rath e r th an actual, or th a t God can m ake m istakes. I believe
Chrysostom w ould argue th at God does know w hat free h u m an beings
are going to do before their free will is exercised, though he also believed
th a t God's knowledge and providence itself w ould in m any ways rem ain
incom prehensible to us. The fathers as a whole were willing to live w ith
the incom prehensibility of God’s providence in a m anner th at openness
theologians dispute.
For instance, in your letter certain phrases repeatedly show up:
“logically coherent,” “logically incoherent,” “logically consistent,” “m ore
coherent,” "more logical,” “m ore biblically faithful and rationally coher
ent." It’s fair for you to accentuate the need for logical consistency in
theological reflection, b ut I believe that the attem pt to encom pass provi
dence w ithin a consistently coherent, rational fram ew ork necessarily
leads openness advocates dow n a blind alley: "presentism ” and the
predication of divine m istakes.
God’s providential ordering of h u m an history is incom prehensible.

Incom prehensible in w hat sense? Providence is beyond o u r present
capability to com prehend and explain coherently. Both the complexity
of h u m an affairs and the lim ited revelation God has provided to help
us u n derstand providence clearly place boundaries on ou r attem pts to
explicate rationally God’s governance and ordering of h u m an life. At
tim es, as I have argued in earlier letters, we will have to affirm logically
contradictory tru th s as we think about providence, thinking thoughts
side by side in a sense, m uch like biblical w riters do. If the revelation
God had given us about providence and tim e was com plete ra th e r than
lim ited, I w ould argue differently. For the present, however, we m ust
rest content w ith lim ited knowledge and occasional incoherence. The
alternative provided by the openness m odel is logically consistent but
results in such a radical reshaping of the doctrine of God, particularly
in its insistence th a t God m akes m istakes, th a t it m ust be seriously
questioned.
This is n ot to say th a t the openness m odel is heretical. T hat is an
issue the church has yet to adjudicate, and m uch m ore discussion and
debate are necessary. I w ould like to see E astern Orthodox and R om an
Catholic scholars m ore fully involved in the discussion. Their insights
w ould add m uch to the mix, especially on issues of ecclesiology and
authority and the relationship of these two concepts to the construction
of theological models.
As I’ve already stated in this letter, the evangelical understanding of
au thority m akes it quite difficult for evangelicals as a com m unity to
identify heretical ideas. As you have pointed out in your letter, evangeli
cal scholars are pretty m uch free to advocate a wide variety of opinions,
as long as their ideas can be show n to have a biblical basis. W hether
it is a Jam es Oliver Buswell Jr., R onald N ash, David Wells, or John
Sanders, each has room in the evangelical ten t to advocate his ideas, a
situation th a t is both positive and negative. This freedom of expression
is positive because it continually forces evangelicals back to Scripture
and should result in fruitful exegetical insights. It is negative in th a t it
encourages the individualism th a t has plagued evangelical exegesis and
theology for years. The result is a reading of Scripture th at can be highly
idiosyncratic and frequently divorced from the insights th a t historically
inform ed, consensual exegesis has to offer.
W hen evangelicals do attem p t to identify heresy, they often do so
w ith the use of second- or third-level authorities, rath e r th an by sim ply
relying on Scripture itself. This should not surprise us. I’ve already com
m ented in this letter th a t second- and third-level authorities are neces
sary for effectively adjudicating theological issues. Evangelicals, though,
tend to be blind to their use of second- and third-level authorities, while
sim ultaneously em ploying these very authorities in attem pts to distin

guish orthodoxy from heresy. As you’ve noted, B. B. Warfield, M achen,
and Carnell have all had their own ideas about w hat was orthodox and
w hat was heretical—perspectives inform ed by both their reading of the
Bible and the second- and third-level authorities th a t com posed their
interpretative grid. As far as I can tell, you have just as m uch right to
call your theological opponents heretics as they you, on the basis of an
evangelical understanding of authority alone.
Indeed, the lack of a com m unally recognized authority w ithin evan
gelicalism beyond the Bible itself fuels the insecurity, shortsightedness,
intolerance, and m ean-spiritedness th a t often m arks evangelical theo
logical discussion and debate. H ence the pressing need for evangeli
cals to im m erse them selves m ore broadly and deeply in the Christian
trad itio n as a whole, particularly in its consensual core. At present I
am hopeful th at evangelicals are increasingly aw are of the need for a
m uch m ore thorough grounding in the consensual tradition of Chris
tian exegesis and theology. Apart from grounding in this authoritative
core, the evangelical love of Scripture and insistence on its fundam ental
au thority will increasingly be underm ined. As David Lyle Jeffrey has
observed in a recent Books and Culture essay, “Loss of authority of the
Church, de jure, has led inexorably, on these lines, to the de facto loss of
authority of Scripture. . . . W hen an insistence on absolute in terpreta
tive independence is coupled, as increasingly it is, w ith an alm ost stag
gering loss of biblical literacy am ong its cham pions, th en the actual
authority of Scripture can becom e so negligible as to m ake any claim
to a biblical foundation either com ic or tragic, depending on your point
of view.” Amen.
With warm regards,

Chris
35 John: Can We Question
Theology?
Dear Chris,
W riting back and forth w ith you has been a great learning experience.
You have sharpened m y thoughts, to say the least. I w ant to say th a t I
appreciated your rem ark th at you are not completely “settled” in all your
views. N either am I. Regarding the authority of traditions you are m uch
closer th an I to the R om an Catholic approach. I rem em ber you telling
one of m y classes th a t you were “Catholic light” (Episcopalian). Ha! As
an aside, I agree th at the traditions teach th a t God does not m ake m is
takes and open theism affirms th at God does not m ake m istakes (you are
not reading m e correctly here). You and I hold a great m any traditional
teachings in com m on and neither of us is challenging the core of the
gospel. Yet, both of us are thinking through subsidiary issues. Both of
us believe it is all right to challenge som e accepted beliefs. Doing this,
however, m akes som e people nervous. My experience in church life is
th at m any people feel guilty if they question w hat they have been taught.
We don’t typically m odel theological reflection in congregational life.
Instead, we teach people the “correct” doctrines and give anyone who
asks questions a h ard time.
W hen I was in college my pastor at the tim e was teaching our Sunday
school class. One day I asked him how he knew that God knew everything
we would do in the future. He replied, “That is a stupid question and should
185
not be asked!” Instead of being put off by his response, I realized that my
pastor was afraid of the question. Unfortunately, he had not been taught
how to think theologically. He had been taught to m em orize the correct
beliefs rather than how to work through theological issues. Hence, he had
to try to intim idate m e into submission. Though m ost pastors are not so
blunt, I feel that the attitude embodied in his response is fairly typical—we
don't need to rethink anything because we already have it all figured out.
Som etim es I’ve been told th at we m ust sim ply have the “faith of a
child” and not try to think about ou r beliefs. However, w hen children
are being illogical do we consider th a t a good thing? Does God ask us to
be closed m inded in order to be spiritual? I don’t m ean to imply th a t we
will u n derstand everything or have it all figured out. B ut I don’t believe
it is w rong to try to und erstan d ou r faith. As Saint Anselm (eleventh
century) p u t it: “Faith seeks understanding.”
Theology is and always has been a reform ing enterprise. Augustine
(fourth century), for instance, was ra th e r radical in changing some
long-established views. A quinas’s (th irteenth century) theology was
vehem ently denounced in his day for being innovative. Today, we tend
to forget th a t such stalw arts of the faith were indeed reform ing w hat
w ent before them and were innovative in a num ber of ways. We forget
this because m any of th eir views are now taken for granted. The sam e
pattern is true for Luther, Calvin, and the Anabaptists. They were con
sidered "radicals” in their day for calling into question certain beliefs
th at were sim ply taken for granted. M any people today feel th a t we are
questioning God if we challenge beliefs about impassibility, im m utabil
ity, and foreknowledge. B ut we are not. Rather, we are questioning the
theologies developed by fallible h u m an beings.
This does not m ean th at we take th eir views lightly. We m ust have
good reasons for going against them , and open theism seeks to provide
such reasons. O ur critics m ay respond th a t it seem s too unlikely that,
for instance, the understanding of om niscience held by so m any people
w ould need m odification. I don’t deny th at it is unlikely. B ut other doc
trinal changes th a t have occurred in church history w ere also unlikely.
W ho could have predicted th a t a significant doctrine th a t had stood in
the W estern church for about th irteen hun dred years w ould be over
tu rn ed in ju st a few decades? I’m speaking about the long-established
belief th at young children th a t died unbaptized were dam ned. This was
Augustine’s view and it becam e the predom inant view in the West. The
only m odification it received for quite som e tim e was the notion th at
such children did not suffer pain in hell. Yet in the early eighteenth
century this view was so thoroughly repudiated th a t nearly all W estern
Christians today believe th at such children are saved, not dam ned. How
unlikely was that? Today, m y students find it h ard to u n derstand how
Jo h n : Can We Q uestion Theology? 187
anyone could have believed th a t children who died unbaptized were

dam ned. I have to show m y students th a t the theologians who held this
position had reasons to support their view. Of course, we no longer find
their reasons persuasive.
My point in bringing this up is just to observe that theology always has
been a reforming activity. It is not wrong to attem pt to improve our beliefs—
though this does not guarantee that our reforms will be correct. The fact
that we cannot guarantee correctness produces anxiety in m any Chris
tians. This is especially so among evangelicals, for m uch of their theological
“m ethod” is hitched to the philosophical wagon known as “strong foun-
dationalism.” I was taught this approach in seminary. It lay behind what
we did in herm eneutics and apologetics courses as well as in m any of the
courses in biblical studies. The m ain idea of strong foundationalism is that
you m ust have an absolutely certain starting point (foundation) in order to
construct your theology (the building) or else you fall into relativism.
Think of a ten-story building. If you are on the tenth floor and som e
body comes along and begins underm ining your foundation or even
tam pering w ith any of the floors beneath you, it m akes you nervous.
One of the problem s with the approach of strong foundationalism is that
any weakness under you threatens the security of everything above it.
My professors at a highly respected evangelical sem inary w orried inces
santly about relativism and liberalism and they w anted their students to
be im m une from such views. Hence they sought to provide us w ith abso
lutely certain interpretations of Scripture and theological form ulations.
Let me illustrate this from an experience in one of my seminary courses.
My advisor, w hom I greatly admired, taught hermeneutics. He proposed a
detailed m ethod based on supposedly objective criteria by which to inter
pret the Bible in order to arrive at unquestionable interpretations of the
text. One day I asked, “If I use your m ethod will I arrive at the meaning, the
whole meaning, and nothing but the meaning so help my grammatical-syn
tactical analysis?” After some hesitation he replied, “Yes.” I then asked why
two professors, in the same departm ent at this seminary, using the same
method, arrived at different interpretations of some key biblical passages.
My professor, who was both sm art and witty replied, “Oh, John, th at’s
easy—depravity!” The house cam e down w ith laughter. It was a great
retort. Afterwards, however, I asked him why both professors could not
be depraved and th at even if only one was depraved, how he determ ined
which one. Because sin affects our supposedly objective criteria, we do
not arrive at an absolutely certain m ethod for interpreting the text.
Again, this m akes m any evangelicals extremely anxious, since they
believe there are only two options—absolute certainty o r relativism .
Though I don’t believe th at strong foundationalism and relativism are
the only options on the epistem ological m arket, m any evangelicals do.
H ence they sim ply have to have certainty of the correctness of their
views—they have to be right. This, in my opinion, leads som e of them
to develop a “dem on of rightness.” They act as though it is im possible
for them to be w rong on theological m atters, for they tend to conflate
their own understanding w ith God’s. They are deeply threatened when
anyone questions th eir beliefs and they tend, like my form er pastor, to
strike out at the one asking the questions.
As you know, som e extrem ely vicious rem arks have been m ade about
open theists. In fact, you are the one who pointed out to m e th a t in a
book w ritten against open theism one of the authors said he was pray
ing th a t God would “destroy” b oth the “iniquity” of open theism as well
as the open theists them selves. In such an environm ent, constructive
dialogue is impossible. Your approach is so different. Yes, we disagree
strongly on som e m atters b u t it does not keep us from loving one
another and trying to learn from each other.
You also know th at some of these same folks have put in thousands of
hours of work trying to get open theists fired from their colleges or kicked
out of their denom inations. Som etimes they have resorted to power poli
tics and distorting our views. You were present at one such power play
and it was an ugly affair. You m ay w onder w hat keeps me going in the face
of unceasing opposition. It is not because I desire controversy. Rather, it
is because I am trying to serve the church of our Lord Jesus. Here is w hat
a pastor wrote me recently after reading my book, The God Who Risks. "I
don’t think I’ve been so excited about walking w ith God in a VERY LONG
TIME. The notion th at God cared w hat people of faith THOUGHT and
FELT (and could possibly care w hat I THINK) has kind of, well, blown
me away. I’ve prayed m ore in the last few days th an I have in a while.
Suddenly I’m thinking—w hat if God DOES care w hat I think? W hat if it
DOES m ake a difference w hether or not I pray for these people or that
situation.” Another person, who was drifting into “som ething like Gnostic
m ysticism,” said th at The God Who Risks “brought me back into a closer
relationship w ith God. I just w anted to let you know how m uch God used
th at book to do battle w ith various other 'idols of the theatre’ th at were
keeping me from em bracing the idea of a personal God.” I receive several
such letters every week, so I am convinced th at God is using my work.
It is encouraging to know th at w hat we are doing helps God’s people. I
know, Chris, th at people all over the world are helped by your speaking
and writing and I pray that God will continue to work through you.
Blessings,
John
36 John: Dialogical Virtues
Dear Chris,
I’ve been thinking about w hat I call "dialogical virtues.” T hat is,
ethical issues in the way we handle our intellectual inquiries and how
we discuss ou r disagreem ents. You a n d I have w itnessed w hat are,
unfortunately, rath e r typical tactics used by conservative evangelicals
engaged in the openness debate in an attem pt to silence their opponents.
Nam e-calling and guilt by association are two of the favorite tactics. For
instance, openness theology has been labeled Socinianism and Pela-
gianism by som e of evangelicalism ’s m ost esteem ed scholars. Perhaps
this is not so bad, however, since the very sam e accusations were m ade
against Arminius him self by proponents of the same b rand of Calvinism.
A letter w ritten in A rm inius’s day says th a t w ith incredible zeal "some
persons accuse this m an of schism and others of heresy, som e charge
him w ith the crim e of Pelagianism and others bran d him w ith the black
m ark of Socinianism .” Socinus denied the Calvinistic understanding of
predestination, the resurrection of the body, the Trinity, the full deity of
Jesus, and the atonem ent of Jesus. Hence, it is easy to see why Arm inius
was Socinian—both rejected Calvinistic predestination! Ha! It seem s
th a t if you have one point in com m on w ith another view, then your view
can be labeled as th a t other view. Socinus rejected exhaustive definite
foreknowledge, so som e believe it is fair to label openness Socinian
ism. B ernard R am m called these tactics "bad-m outhing” and said that,
1S9
unfortunately, evangelicals practice them all too often instead of doing

solid scholarly work.
This sam e guilt-by-association move is m ade w hen openness is
claim ed to be process theology because both views have a couple of
points in com m on. A form er professor of m ine quotes a rem ark in one
of ou r books th a t openness and process agree on a p articu lar point.
He th en says th a t this rem ark proves th a t open theism derives from
process theism! Of course, having a point in com m on does not prove
dependency, so I w rote my form er professor about this error in logic. He
responded th at he was right and th a t was that! Those w ho claim open
ness is sim ply process theology need to read w hat process theologians
are saying about openness. David Ray Griffin, a prom inent process theo
logian, says th a t he cannot stom ach open theism any m ore th an he can
classical theism because openness is just too sim ilar to the classical view
and thus not w orthy of God. Open theism is a hot potato being tossed
back and forth betw een classical and process theists. Nobody w ants us.
The sons of openness have now here to lay ou r heads.
Those who play w ith these rhetorical w eapons typically do not notice
th a t those w eapons can be turned back on them selves. W hat if we were
to say th at both Islam and Calvinism affirm ed m eticulous providence,
so Calvinism is really Islam? Again, since astrologers and classical the
ists both believe the future to be exhaustively definite, classical theism
is dependent on astrology! Of course Calvinists w ould rightfully cry
“foul.”
It is said th at we are “m aking God in our own im age.” We could turn
this around, however, and claim th at the God of m eticulous providence
is really in ou r image, since th at God typifies the ideal W estern m ale—in
control and not relying on anyone else. This God exemplifies the Pla
tonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic understandings of h u m an perfection.
It has even been suggested th a t the reason I becam e an open theist is
due to a psychological im balance—I did not deal properly w ith personal
tragedy. Again, I can just as easily tu rn this attem pted psychoanalysis
back on m y critic by suggesting th at a deep-seated insecurity leads him
to fashion an all-controlling God. W hat is sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.
At this point I w an t to highlight som e contrasts I see betw een the
w ork of m em bers of two academ ic societies: the Society of Christian
Philosophers (SCP) and the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS).
M em bers of the SCP typically build up their opponents’ position until
they arrive at w hat they consider to be the strongest case for the other
view before they criticize it. Evangelical theologians, on the other hand,
tend to highlight the w eakest argum ents of th eir opponents or m ake a
big deal about statem ents th a t are tangential to the m ain point.
John: Dialogical Virtues 191
A nother problem is a serious lack of im agination in our critics in th at

they fail to th ink of ways in w hich we m ight answ er th eir criticism s.
My A rm inian students are unim aginative w hen they fail to see how
Calvinists m ight answ er the objection “Why bother to evangelize if it is
already determ ined who will be saved?” The job of the professor is to
m ake them aw are of possible answers. At ETS, critics of open theism
m ake it seem as though we are ju st plain stupid. In contrast, m em bers
of the SCP com m only try to come up w ith helpful suggestions for how
their opponents could handle their objections.
A nother p o in t of concern is th a t at tim es o u r critics state as fact
w hat is clearly a falsehood. For example, it is distressing w hen critics
state th a t we say th a t the being of God changes. No texts of ours are
cited to su p p o rt this an d no arg u m en t is given th a t we really believe
this. It is sim ply stated as fact. In our w ritings we have repeatedly said
th a t God can change in will, em otions, a n d thoughts, b u t not in his
essential nature. On several occasions I have w ritten the au th o rs as
well as the publishers concerning this error. To date I have received
no replies, and one of the a u th o rs—a very respected evangelical th eo
logian—has m ade the sam e accusation in p rin t again. I am not sug
gesting th a t m em bers of the SCP are perfect, b u t these tendencies are
one of the reasons th e ir jo u rn al is held in incredibly high regard. If
you a tten d an SCP conference you will h e a r spirited debate, b u t you
will see th a t they care ab o u t th e ir o p p onent an d th e integrity w ith
w hich they p u rsu e th eir debates. Unfortunately, I believe evangelical
theological debate falls seriously sh o rt here. A couple of years ago a
friend of Tom O den’s atten d ed ETS for the first tim e and after several
sessions asked, “W hy is there so m uch anger am ong the m em bers of
this society? They don’t ju st disagree w ith one another, they hate each
o th er” (by the way, the issue was n o t openness).
B ruce W are and Thom as Schreiner w arn, “O ur hearts are in d a n
ger of being captivated by a negative spirit if we find ourselves draw n
tow ard attacking the views of others.” We need to learn how to carry
on a debate w ithout knee-jerk reactions th a t dem onize the other. Ter
rance Tiessen’s w ork dem onstrates th at a Calvinist can state the open
view w ithout caricature and criticize it w ithout using caustic rhetoric.
On several occasions R eform ed evangelicals have engaged m e in public
discourse, exemplifying civility and a w illingness to w restle w ith the
issues. Unfortunately, I find this all too rare regarding any controversial
topic in evangelical theology.
If we are to improve we need to practice the intellectual virtues. Avery
helpful study of them is found in Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually
Virtuous by Jay Wood of W heaton College. W hen dialoging on various
issues there are virtues we can cultivate in the p ursuit of truth. Honesty,
integrity, empathy, teachableness, persistence, precision, articulateness,

and foresight are som e of the virtues discussed by Wood. The following
questions highlight som e of these virtues. Am I willing to learn from
others w ithout being an intellectual pushover? Have I come to the point
w here I can understand why som eone w ould take a different position
from my own? Do I, as a theological educator, talk too m uch and listen
too little? Do I reflect before I speak or am I m ore interested in m aking
my next point? Am I on a pow er trip—do I sim ply w ant to control w hat
others are allowed to think? W hen we discuss issues around the table,
is it the m ost aggressive person who “w ins”? W hat are we m odeling to
o u r students and the church? Are we really equipping people for the
process of theological reflection or are we only teaching them how to
eviscerate fellow Christians?
One very im portant dialogical virtue is the ability to state the other
person’s view in such a way th at the other person w ould say, "Yes, th at is
my position.” Nicholas W olterstorff recites the following to his students
once a week:
Thou must not take cheap shots. Thou must not sit in judgment until
thou hast done thy best to understand. Thou must earn thy right to dis
agree. Thou must conduct thyself as if Plato or Augustine, Clement or
Tertullian, were sitting across the table—the point being that it is much
more difficult (I don’t say impossible) to dishonor someone to his face.
You and Terry Tiessen have argued w ith m e about divine providence
in respectful ways. Moreover, we have prayed for one an o th er’s fam
ily situations. It is tough to dem onize som eone w hen you are praying
for them . Yes, we disagree on som e im portant theological m atters but
m ore im portantly, we share a com m on life in Jesus Christ. Bruce Ware
says, "Calvinists and A rm inians have m ore points of agreem ent than
disagreem ent in th eir respective soteriologies.” I agree b u t find it disap
pointing th a t Ware does not show this sam e attitude w hen criticizing
open theism . Som eone looking in on the openness debate from outside
evangelicalism would see a lot m ore agreem ent betw een the respective
positions th an disagreem ent.
A nother virtue to inculcate is hum ility. N one of us has the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing b u t the truth. This side of the eschaton
we only "know in p a rt” (1 Cor. 13:12). Calvin said th a t no theologian
is m ore th a n 70 percent correct. T hat m ay be generous. All of us are
finite and we m ust never forget the noetic effects of sin on our research,
reasoning, and theological form ulations. We need epistem ic hum ility
and we need one another, for the w isdom of God is shared in the body
of Christ. I adm it th at open theism m ay tu rn out to be a footnote in his-
Jo h n : Dialogical Virtues 193
torical theology. We m ay be wrong, b u t it takes tim e to investigate and

debate theological proposals. Look how long it took the early church to
w ork through the issue as to w hether Jesus had two wills or only one.
Com m itted C hristians held various positions. Som e w anted to short-
circuit the debate and sim ply exile their opponents by political control.
However, in its better m om ents the church allowed debate to w ork its
slow way forw ard over decades and even centuries before the church
cam e to official positions, and the church was stronger, not weaker, for
the debate.
At the SC PI have observed spirited debate on im portant m atters and
then w atched the debaters go have coffee together. They recognize th at
th eir com m on heritage in Jesus C hrist is greater th an our differences.
The other option is to politicize the discussion and claim th a t ou r par
ticular version of evangelical Christianity is the only way to protect the
gospel. M ark Noll and Alister M cG rath call on evangelical theologians
to explore new areas and to develop responses to the m any issues raised
today. However, at least a p a rt of the scandal of the evangelical m ind
is the fear m any evangelical theologians have of investigating certain
topics because they are afraid of losing th eir jobs. M any evangelical
institutions only allow professors to teach doctrine, not to do theology.
One prom inent evangelical historian has told m e th at m ost of the bright
est evangelical m inds of the past thirty years have gone into philosophy
instead of theology because they see w hat the gatekeepers of evangelical
orthodoxy do to those w ho question the status quo. Presently, evan
gelicalism is w itnessing the resurgence of a fundam entalist spirit—a
m eanness of heart and a draw ing of narrow doctrinal boundaries. This
saddens me greatly, for I do not find such m essengers bearers of "good
new s.” If we are going to overcom e the scandal of the evangelical m ind,
we are going to have to stand up to these individuals, point out their
unseem ly tactics, and practice the dialogical virtues.
Your friend,
John
37 Chris: Learning and Virtue
Dear John,
I think this is going to be my last letter, a t least for this book. I w ant
to respond briefly to your thoughts both on the role of questioning and
reform ing the tradition and on the dialogical virtues. As I read through
your last two letters it becam e clearer to m e th at you have experienced
an aspect of the evangelical w orld th a t I am less fam iliar with. I'm refer
ring specifically to the lack of freedom you have encountered in asking
questions and receiving viable and convincing answers. I did experience
som e of this resistance w hen I was a young believer attending the Light
and Pow er House, a Jesus People Bible school in West Los Angeles.
One of the m ain teachers at the school was an individual w ho has since
becom e well know n as an a u th o r and TV teacher. I soon realized th at
there were som e questions this m an did not welcome, particularly ques
tions regarding biblical prophecy. He didn’t like questions th at seriously
threatened his detailed interpretation of the end tim es. Questions th at
appeared to undercut a dispensational perspective on biblical prophecy
were likely to m eet steep resistance. I think th at this resistance to deep
probing of his views was related to the foundationalist perspective you
m entioned. If theological or biblical probing effectively pulled one or
two blocks out of his prophetic system, the entire structure was liable
to fall.
I have not m et this kind of resistance to questions from other key
m entors in my life. For example, W ard Gasque, J. I. Packer, and Tom
194
Chris: L earning and Virtue 195
Oden have all w elcom ed questions and occasional disagreem ent and
debate in my interactions w ith them . None of them felt the need to
handle m e w ith kid gloves, and I’m sure I em erged bruised from some
discussions! The bruises came, though, not from ignoring or deflecting
my questions, b u t from debating and answ ering them robustly. Just
knowing th a t I could ask the questions I needed to ask was m ore than
w orth the bruises I received. In fact, I rem em ber tim es in my doctoral
w ork at Drew w hen Tom w ould ask the questions I was dying to pose,
and by doing so he let m e know it was fine to ask w hatever I needed to
ask. The freedom to explore and ponder was invaluable to me.
I'm not sure I’d describe theology as “a reform ing enterprise.” Theology
occasionally perform s this function, b u t I think its norm ative role is
m ore one of passing on the tradition faithfully and exploring carefully
and creatively how the Christian tradition is applicable and relevant for
new cultural contexts. Doesn’t Roger Olson see the history of theology
as the interaction betw een the traditionalists and the reform ers in his
recent historical theology? Perhaps ou r correspondence reflects this
kind of paradigm . In addition, if we do attem pt to reform the tradition it
is essential th at we understand w hat the tradition actually is teaching.
I’m in full agreem ent th at all theologians and the church at large need
to continue to cultivate and n u rtu re the dialogical virtues th at Jay Wood
discusses. Name-calling, guilt by association, and bad-m outhing accom
plish very little in the long run. W hat we all struggle w ith is learning to
listen well to another person’s position. I love the m axim of Nicholas
W olterstorff you related in your last letter. It's too easy to take cheap
shots. We too quickly criticize before understanding our opponent’s
position well. We m ust earn the right to disagree by im m ersing ourselves
in the position we find problem atic. It is m uch m ore difficult to dishonor
som eone to his face. I, like you, am attracted to forum s w here ideas can
be discussed openly, vigorously, fairly, honestly, and empathetically.
Well, I suppose we need to draw ou r correspondence to a close, at
least for now. K now th a t you rem ain in my thoughts and prayers.

Chris
Chris and John: Postscript
Does God have a future? We take different views on this issue. Chris
tends to side w ith the m ore traditional outlook th at God does not expe
rience tim e and so w ords such as past and future cannot be applied to
God. John, on the o th er hand, believes th a t God does have a future,
since God experiences tim e w ith us. T hroughout o u r letters we have
tried to bring out som e of the im plications of these different views,
since this topic intersects w ith a wide array of subjects. We have dis
cussed specific biblical passages as well as how we go about interpreting
them . Theological topics such as the attributes of God, God’s relation
to the world, and the natu re of h u m an understanding of God have been
addressed. We have also covered how these issues relate to the Christian
life—especially prayer. Also, the role of tradition in theology has been
discussed along w ith the question of reform ing theology. Som e of these
topics were brought up in several letters, while other topics th at perhaps
should have been covered were not. W riting letters back and forth has
m ade for som e uneven coverage and we have in no way finished, b u t for
us the conversation has been both helpful and enjoyable.
W hile som e of the topics we have discussed are easy to com prehend,
others are extremely difficult. We hope that, at the least, ou r readers now
u n derstand th a t this issue is not a sim ple one w ith an open-and-shut
case for one side. Anyone w ho believes this m atte r is sim ple and easily
settled has not understood the problem s. Putting forth a few biblical
proof texts does not end the discussion, for people on different sides of
this debate are seriously engaged w ith Scripture. It is fine to come to a
conclusion on this m atter and take a position, but please do not think
those people stupid who take a different view.
197
198 Chris and John: Postscript
We have carried on a theological discussion attem pting to th ink the

issue through together. That last w ord is very im portant, for we have
done it together, as a joint effort, rath e r th an as a contest betw een us. We
w rote these letters into a book for several reasons. First, the debate over
openness theology is a hot topic am ong contem porary N orth Am erican
Christians and it needs to be discussed and reflected on. Questions m ust
be asked, answ ers given, and follow-up questions asked. The editors of
Christianity Today have stated th a t it is their desire th at this discussion
continue, and they chastise those attem pting to cut off the conversation.
The discussion can be carried forw ard in books, m agazines, academ ic
journals, scholarly societies, as well as in local congregations and col
leges. This book is sim ply one p art of this larger process.
In o u r search for tru th we definitely need one another. The two of us
have benefited greatly from the dialogue. We feel th a t we have learned
a lot through the process. Both of us have had to rethink som e of our
statem ents as well as try out som e new thoughts. In fact, both of us have
been “experim ental” at tim es, trying out different ideas or explanations.
We have sought to allow each other the freedom to think out loud, know
ing th a t we m ay be expressing som ething th a t ju st w on’t w ash—b u t we
don’t know it w on’t w ash until we try it. Both of us are searching for the
tru th and view the other as an aid in this endeavor. We w rote this book
in order to serve God and the C hristian com m unity as theologians. We
have tried to provide som e insight and clarity in this debate. O ur hope
in allowing others to read our letters is th a t other C hristians will be
helped to live m ore m eaningful and devout lives.
Aside from the content of the debate we see a great need for m odeling
how to carry on theological debate in irenic and loving ways w ith those
w ho hold positions different from ou r own. This is especially needed in
evangelicalism, w here congregations split over m inuscule points of dif
ference. Though evangelicalism is, and always has been, a phenom enon
of diverse theological perspectives, there has been a repeated tendency
to attem pt to narrow the m ovem ent theologically. Attem pts have been
m ade to dem arcate the boundary over prem illennialism , the Rapture,
and the like. D iscussing issues is fine, b u t all too often evangelicals
have resorted to pow er politics, nam e-calling, th reats of exclusion,
and o ther unseem ly tactics in order to “w in.” Insecure people tend to
w ant to short-circuit debate and get th eir way by o ther m eans. It is a
sad testim ony w hen a friend of ours, w ho is frequently asked to debate
atheists and proponents of other religions on university cam puses, says
he would rath e r debate these folks because he finds m uch m ore honest
w restling w ith issues and even love am ong th em th an am ong fellow
evangelicals.
Chris and John: Postscript 199
We desire to m odel a m ore excellent way. Last N ovem ber \\v held
a series of discussions on this topic at John's college. At timesAve.disy
agreed sharply w ith one another, yet we did not let th a t get in the way of
our love for one another no r of the shared com m itm ent th at we have in
Christ. Afterwards, m any students and pastors w ho attended said th at
they h ad never seen two evangelicals disagree on significant m atters
while displaying love and humility. In April, John was invited to discuss
openness at another college w ith som e professors w ho disagreed w ith
him. Several hundred students as well as m any pastors attended. Again,
the m ost frequent com m ent m ade by people in the audience was not
about the content b u t about the atm osphere of the discussion. They
were deeply im pressed th a t the presenters could speak to one another
civilly while disagreeing theologically. Evidently, the reason these two
discussions stand out in the m inds of the listeners is th at this sort of
exchange happens so seldom in evangelical circles. We desire to see the
process of theological debate w ithin evangelicalism im prove and have
sought to m odel how to do it (though we don’t profess to carry this out
perfectly).
In part, we are able to carry on our discussion this way because we
share a num ber of com m itm ents. We believe th a t any theological p ro
posal m ust fit well w ith Scripture and assist the church in its worship
and service to ou r Lord Jesus Christ. Both of us believe th a t we should
seek to preserve the insights produced by the C hristian com m union
over the centuries while at the sam e tim e recognizing th a t theology is
produced by hum ans and so should be open to reform . We need not fear
exam ining issues from various perspectives. If our position is true it will
hold up. If it is only partially true or even false, we w ant to know th at
so we can m ake the necessary changes. Also, we affirm th a t the process
of debating proposed reform s takes tim e, decades o r m ore, and so we
should be w ary of those who w ant to cut off discussion. Moreover, we
see constructive theological debate as a sign of vitality, not decline, in
evangelicalism. In fact, it is absolutely essential if we are to overcom e
w hat M ark Noll has called "the scandal of the evangelical mind."
Nevertheless, in the m idst of discussing ou r differences we both w ant
to highlight o u r com m on C hristian identity. Too often we forget the
incredible am ount of faith and practice we have in com m on. If we think
of Christian beliefs as a set of concentric circles, the sm allest circle at the
center represents the core beliefs and values of the Christian faith. The
next largest circle symbolizes very im portant, b u t n ot core doctrines.
As the circles expand we come to lesser issues and greater theological
diversity am ong C hristian com m unities. Of course, various Christian
com m unities disagree over exactly w hich doctrines should be placed in
w hat circles. That is, we don’t all agree as to the content of each circle.
200 Chris and John: Postscript
However, both of us affirm th a t som e doctrines are m uch m ore im por

ta n t th an others. Both of us affirm the center or core of the Christian
faith expressed, for example, in the Apostles’ Creed. Moreover, b oth of
us share a great m any other beliefs in the outer circles. Clearly, we dis
agree on som e im portant m atters. However, we believe th at Christians
can hold different theological beliefs and still w ork together to fulfill
God’s purposes. We desire to live out the m otto “In essentials unity, in
nonessentials liberty, in all things charity.”
Though we b o th affirm the L ordship of C hrist neith er of us has
a corner on the tru th . We see the need for a generous orthodoxy th a t
allows—even calls for—serious theological debate. We are saddened
by those who establish them selves as the defenders of God, m anifest
ing a visceral reaction tow ard anyone who disagrees w ith them . Such
evangelicals tend to tu rn every theological issue into “the battle for” this
and "the battle for” that. N ot surprisingly, the title of a new book against
openness is The Battle for God. In our letters we have disagreed sharply
at tim es b u t we have not viewed ou r endeavor through the m etaphor
of “battle.” We do not see the need to conquer or even slay one another
intellectually.
Rather, we see ourselves as having a conversation am ong believers.
During our conversation we have tried to practice “dialogical virtues.”
We have attem pted to tre a t each other fairly, honestly, charitably, and
forthrightly. We have tried to accurately state w hat the o ther person
believes. We have tried to enter into each other’s perspective w ith em pa
thy to discern why the other thinks this particular point im portant. That
is, w hen we objected to som ething the other h ad said, we sought to
discover w hat m atter of im portance it is th at the other person believes
we are sacrificing. Are we giving som ething up th a t sim ply should not
be given up?
The rhetoric against open theism is often m ean-spirited and filled
w ith caricatures. We have tried to avoid this. The issues raised are
im p o rtan t and they affect som e of the ways in w hich we live out the
C hristian life—how we think of prayer, for example. W hile som e see
open theism as a m ovem ent of the Holy Spirit, others view it as a scourge
th a t will destroy churches. Given such polar perspectives, the discussion
needs to continue. B ut let it continue in the fram ew ork of the dialogical
virtues. Let us be virtuous in dealing w ith one another’s ideas—treating
them w ith respect even while asking significant questions. In essence, in
o u r letters we have tried to em body in ou r dialogue the p rophet M icah’s
adm onition th a t the Lord requires us to treat each o ther justly, to love
mercy, and to walk hum bly w ith our God (6:8).
Appendix: Summary Definitions
Note: Cross-references to the glossary are indicated by small caps (e.g.,

Augustine ).
C lassical Theism
Classical theism is an influential school of thought th at interprets the

divine attributes in a p articular way th at differs from the interpretation
given them by open theism . These differences lead to disagreem ents on a
range of theological issues as well as to divergent readings of scriptural
texts. According to classical theism divine perfection m eans th at God
is absolutely independent of creation, n ot needing it in any respect.
The m otivation for this view arises out of a particu lar conception of
perfection as applied to God. T hat is, if it is good to have qualities
such as knowledge, will, power, and love, then w hat m ust a being th at
is perfect in these qualities be like? It is argued th at God is perfect in
the sense th a t there can be no possible im provem ent or potential for
change since any change in God could only be a change for the worse.
From this conception of God a family of attributes arise: God is simple ,
immutable, impassible , timeless , necessary, pure act, om nipresent, omni
scient , om nipotent, and wholly good. Together, these com bine to affirm
th at there is no change of any kind in God n o r is God dependent upon
anything o ther th an God. S implicity m eans th a t there is no genuine
differentiation in God. God is identical w ith God’s properties such th at
God does not have, for instance, om nipotence and omniscience as dis
tinct parts. As pure act, God has no potential for change of any kind, as
201
202 Appendix: Sum m ary Definitions
this w ould m ean God was less th an com plete. As immutable , God can
not change in any respect including thoughts, intentions, or em otions.
Being impassible , nothing external to God, such as creatures, can affect
God in any way. God is timeless in th at there is no before or after for
God, only an eternal present.
It is clear then th at a timeless and wholly immutable being cannot
change whatsoever, including changes in thoughts, will, o r em otions.
Augustine said: "Only w hat does not only not change b u t also cannot
at all change falls m ost truly . . . u n d er the category of being” (On the
Trinity 5.2-3). If God w ere passible (affected by creatures) th en God
w ould be changeable and less th an self-sufficient. So God cannot be
affected o r influenced in any way by creatures. God has no em otions.
Moreover, our prayers serve as instrum ents by w hich God brings about
w hat God has ordained, but our prayers never affect w hat God has eter
nally willed to bring about. It is im possible th a t our prayers have any
influence on God’s decisions. Many classical theists, however, do claim
th at God responds to our prayers and thus are at pains to explain how
a com pletely changeless God can respond to a tem poral event.
Since the divine plan is unchanging, God exercises meticulous provi
dence by specifically ordaining each and every event to occur. God
tightly controls everything so th a t w hatever happens is exactly w hat
God w anted to happen. God has a m eticulous blueprint for everything
th at happens in history, so evil and suffering are ordained by God for
good reasons th a t rem ain hidden from us. The divine will cannot fail or
be thw arted in any detail. God never takes risks. In salvation, this leads
to the doctrines of unconditional election and irresistible grace. God’s
decision to save an individual cannot be dependent in any way upon
hum ans, as th at w ould deny the doctrines of immutability, impassibility,
and self-sufficiency.
There can be no change in God's knowledge from before to after. Con
sequently, omniscience m ust include exhaustive definite foreknowl
edge of future contingent events (hum an actions). The entire future is
com pletely definite or certain for God. God knows the future as w hat
will actually happen, not as w hat possibly m ight happen. God knows
the future as certain, because God determ ines w hat the future will be.
God’s knowledge of w hat we will do in the future cannot be causally
dependent upon us, since th at w ould m ean God was not impassible or
self-sufficient.
Finally, m any classical theists affirm compatibilistic freedom for
hum ans in th a t you are free so long as you act on your desires, but
your desires are determ ined. In this conception of freedom God can
perfectly guarantee th a t hum ans do exactly w hat God desires in each
and every situation.
Appendix: Sum m ary Definitions 203
Open Theism
Open theism is a view of God th at defines the divine attributes in ways

significantly different from classical theism . According to open theism ,
in the act of creating, God freely opened up to a wide array of future
possibilities based on how the free creatures God m ade w ould react to
the divine love. The m otivation for this view arises out of the notion th at
the triune God created hum ans w ith the ability to experience divine love
and to love in return. The m em bers of the Trinity have always shared a
dynam ic love and desire to share th a t love w ith creatures. Open theists
believe th a t God experiences rich reciprocal relations w ith creatures.
N um erous consequences follow from this conception.
It is thought th a t a God who experiences our love, o r lack of it, in
dynam ic relationships cannot be timeless or completely unchangeable.
Hence, God is everlasting in th a t God experiences duration in ongoing
relationships w ith creatures. God is not tim eless , for there is a recipro
cal give-and-take betw een God and creatures in history. Also, though
open theists believe th at God is perfect , immutable , and omniscient ,
they do not define these in the sam e way as classical theists do. God is
perfect in th a t the divine character (love, wisdom, and holiness) is com
plete and incapable of im provem ent. But unlike classical theists, open
theists believe th at God has the potential for change in som e respects.
For instance, God perfectly relates to creatures in ongoing dynam ic
interaction. F or God to fail to change in relation to us as the relationship
changes w ould be less th an perfect. Thus, though the divine nature is
immutable , God can change in thoughts, will, and em otions. Unlike us,
God cannot be forced to react o r suffer. God can, however, voluntarily
choose to enter into such relationships and be passible . Consequently,
God can be influenced and affected by w hat we do as well as by our
prayers.
Along w ith Arm inians , open theists believe th a t God has given
h u m an s libertarian freedom and elicits o u r free cooperation w ith
God’s plans. This m eans th a t hum ans can accept or reject God’s initia
tives. God takes the risk th at God’s desires m ay be thw arted in som e
cases—we m ay not do w hat God desires. Hence, evil is allowed but not
desired by God, and election to salvation is dependent upon hum an
response to divine grace. This does not underm ine God’s self-sufficiency,
since God has chosen to be dependent upon hum ans for som e things.
Though God's existence is independent of creation, God’s decisions and
actions do not have to be unaffected by creatures. It cannot be said th at
everything th at happens is intended by God, for God has chosen to exer
cise general providence rath e r th an meticulous providence . God has
204 Appendix: Sum m ary Definitions
chosen n ot to tightly control everything th a t happens and so, at tim es,

God's will for us m ay be thw arted. Som etim es God alone decides w hat
shall be, b u t m ost often, w ith regard to hum an action, God initiates and
solicits ou r cooperation.
The future is not a b lueprint b u t a journey w hose course is set by
both God and hum ans as we travel together in history. Consequently,
for both God and creatures, the future is partly open rath e r th an com
pletely settled or definite. On this point open theism departs significantly
from traditional Arminianism and its belief in simple foreknowledge .
According to sim ple foreknowledge, God previsions all future contin
gent events and so knows w hat definitely will happen, not m erely w hat
m ight happen. Open theists believe th a t God is open to the future, a
view sometim es called presentism . In the open-future view, divine omni
science m eans th a t God knows infallibly all the past and present and
those aspects of the future th a t are determ ined to occur (such as those
th at God has unilaterally ordained to come to pass). This m eans th at
God knows future h u m an free choices as possibilities ra th e r th a n as
certainties. God knows the range of possible choices available to us and
the likelihood of each possible choice. God knows, for instance, th at
a t a future tim e Susan will face three options and God knows w hich
option she is likely to choose. God does not, however, know w ith abso
lute certainty (as actual) w hich option she will choose until she selects
it. This m eans th at the future is partly open o r indefinite and partly
closed or definite and God knows the future as it really is, as both defi
nite and indefinite. Though open theists affirm th a t God is omniscient
(i.e., knows all th at can be known) and has com plete foreknowledge of
all fixed truths, they disagree w ith classical theists concerning w hat is
knowable (future hum an free choices) and w hether the future is totally
definite, containing no possibilities o r alternatives. Clearly, this is the
m ost controversial aspect of the openness model.
In ad d itio n to having d ifferen t u n d e rsta n d in g s o f perfection , immu
tability, a n d omniscience fro m classical theists, o p en th eists reject th e
d o ctrin e s of divine simplicity, impassibility, a n d pure actuality.
Notes
ANF Ante-Nicene Fathers

NPNF* Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series
NPNF^ Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series
Letter 2 Chris: My Pilgrimage

15 What is perhaps Stanley Grenz, R e n e w in g th e C enter: E va n g e lic a l T h eology in a
P o st-T h e o lo g ic a l E ra (G rand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 162.
16 the intruding of rationalistic J. I. Packer, E v a n g e lis m a n d th e S o v e r e ig n ty o f G o d
(Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1961), 16.
16 God’s incomparable way Thom as Oden, T he L iv in g G o d (System atic Theology
1; San Francisco: H arp er & Row, 1987), 69.
Letter 4 Chris: Abraham and the Sacrifice of Isaac

21 God genuinely does not know W alter B rueggem ann, G e n e s is (Atlanta: John
Knox, 1982), 187.
22 The answer is to be found Jo h n Sanders, T h e G o d W h o R is k s : A T h e o lo g y o f
P ro v id e n ce (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1998), 52-53.
22 three fundamental problems Bruce Ware, G od's L e sser Glory: T he D im in is h e d
G o d o f O p en T h e is m (W heaton, 111.: Crossway, 2000), 68-73.
22 p resen t know ledge of Abraham’s Ware, G od's L e sser Glory, 67.
23 What open theists claim Ware, G o d ’s L e sser G lo ty, 73.
24 thrown out against us Origen, G e n esis H o m ily 8; quotation from Origen, H o m i
lies o n G e n e s is a n d E x o d u s (trans. R onald E. Heine; F athers of th e C hurch 71;
W ashington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 143.
24 when the true Isaac Caesarius of Arles, S e r m o n 84: O n A b r a h a m a n d H is S o n
I s a a c ; quotation from C aesarius of Arles, S e r m o n s , vol. 2 (trans. Mary M. Mueller;
Fathers of the C hurch 47; W ashington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1964), 17.
205
206 Notes
Letter 6 Chris: Judas’s Betrayal and Peter’s Denial

28 your interpretation of the Judas narrative Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 98-99.
29 secular Greek sources H eniy George Liddell and R obert Scott, A G reek-E n g lish
L e x ic o n , revised by H enry S tuart Jones (9th ed. w ith supplem ent; Oxford: Claren
don, 1968), 1308. ”
Letter 7 John: Judas’s Betrayal and Peter’s Denial

30 Methodist proponent of openness Lorenzo McCabe, D iv in e N e sc ie n c e o f F u tu re
C o n tin g e n c ie s a N e c e ss ity (New York: Phillips & H unt, 1862); idem , T he F o re k n o w l
edge o f G o d (Cincinnati: C ranston & Stowe, 1887).
Letter 8 Chris: Implications of Open Theism

32 thread dangling from a sweater Cf. Nicholas W olterstorff, “Does God Suffer?"
M o d e m R e fo r m a tio n 8.5 (Sept. 1999): 47.
Letter 10 Chris: Openness and the Problem of Good and Evil

38 perfect knowledge of what David H unt, “The Sim ple-Foreknowledge View," in
D iv in e F o rekn o w led g e: F o u r V iew s (ed. Jam es K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy; Downers
Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2001), 53.
Letter 12 Chris: Antinomies and Logic

43 a colleague of mine M aterial for this c h ap te r w as supplied by Phil Cary via
private e-mail correspondence.
45 the use of antinomy W illiam Lane Craig, “The M iddle-Knowledge View,” in
D iv in e F o rekn o w led g e: F o u r V iew s (ed. Jam es K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy; Downers
Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2001), 119-43.
Letter 13 John: Antinomies and Logic

47 Though I discussed Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 34-37.
47 criticizes his fellow Calvinist Paul Helm, T he P ro v id e n c e o f G o d (Downers
Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1994), 61-66.
48 God determines everything Packer, E v a n g e lis m a n d the So vereig n ty o f G od.
Letter 14 Chris: Logic and M etaphor

51 the words are Wilson’s Douglas W ilson, “M etaphor in Exile," in B o u n d O nly
O n ce: T h e F a ilu re o f O pen T h e is m (ed. Douglas W ilson; Moscow, Idaho: Canon,
2001), 31-51.
51 many people will be shocked Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s ,11.
52 metaphors have the peculiar Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 15.
52 if a concept is contradictory Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 17.
52 we are concerned David Kelley, T h e A rt o f R e a s o n in g (2d ed.; New York: N orton,
1994), 72; quoted in Wilson, “M etaphor in Exile,” 35.
53 Metaphor calls up many W ilson, “M etaphor in Exile," 36.
53 to escape the rules Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 36-37.
53 The limits of my language W ittgenstein quotation from W ilson, "M etaphor in
Exile,” 41.
53 It is only if Ayer quotation from Wilson, “M etaphor in Exile,” 41.
Notes 207
53 the use of metaphors Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 38.

54 If God decides Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 38.
Letter 15 John: M etaphor and Interpretation

57 Among these is the work George Lakoff and M ark Johnson, M e ta p h o r s W e L iv e
B y (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
57 The metaphorical and anthropomorphic Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 15.
58 hard literal core Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 25.
Letter 16 Chris: Impassibility, Immutability, and the Incarnation

61 impassibility is the most dubious Clark Pinnock, R ichard Rice, John Sanders,
William Hasker, and David Basinger, T he O p e n n e s s o f G o d (Downers Grove, 111.:
InterVarsity, 1994), 118.
62 The mystery of Christ Cyril quotation from Christopher A. Hall, L ea rn in g Theology
w ith th e C h u rc h F a th ers (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2002), 82.
Letter 17 John: Impassibility, Immutability, and the Incarnation

65 Wayne Grudem, for instance Wayne Grudem, S y s te m a tic T heology (Grand R ap
ids: Zondervan, 1994), 165-66.
65 the traditional doctrine of impassibility M illard Erickson, G o d th e F a th er
A lm ig h ty : A C o n tem p o ra ry E xp lo ra tio n o f th e D iv in e A ttrib u te s (Grand Rapids: Baker,
1998), 155.
65 But God is not a stone F or references an d fu rth er discussion, see Sanders, G od
W h o R is k s , 142-47; and idem , "Historical Considerations," in Sanders, T h e O p e n
n e ss o f G o d (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1994), 72-76.
65 God cannot be forced See Sanders, O p e n n e s s o f G od, 76.
68 So the God who becomes W illiam Placher, J e s u s the Sa vio r: The M e a n in g o f J e s u s
C h rist fo r C h ristia n F a ith (Louisville: W estm inster John Knox, 2001), 37.
Letter 18 Chris: Impassibility and Prayer

71 What do such texts Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 69.
72 comes from Paul Helm Paul Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” in G o d a n d Tim e:
F o u r V iew s (ed. Gregory E. Ganssle; D owners Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2001), 80-84.
Q uotations from this article appear thro u g h o u t this letter.
Letter 19 John: Impassibility and Prayer

79 real change Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity," 82.
79 should appear to act Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” 82.
Letter 20 Chris: Impassibility and Ontology

82 Clark understands the Greek Clark Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M over: A T heology
o f G od's O p e n n e s s (D idsbury Lectures 2000; Carlisle, Cum bria: Patem oster/G rand
Rapids: Baker, 2001), 7.
82 openness model will help Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o v er, 9.
83 must be criticized Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o v er, 8.
208 Notes
83 borrowed from Weinandy’s The W einandy q uotations th ro u g h o u t the rest of

this letter are from Thom as G. Weinandy, “Does God Suffer?” F irst T h in g s 117 (Nov.
2001): 35-41.
Letter 21 John: Thomism

87 Aristotle’s interest lies See Sanders, O p e n n e s s o f G o d , 65-66.
91 To be G od R obert Jenson, T he T riune Id e n tity : G o d a c c o r d in g to th e G o sp el (Phila
delphia: Fortress, 1982), 85.
Letter 22 Chris: The Revelation of God in Jesus

96 Now he does not want L uther quotation from T hom as Oden, T he W ord o f L ife
(System atic Theology 2; S an Francisco: H arp er & Row, 1989), 184.
96 honest money changer Athanasius’s illustration is found in Oden, W ord o f Life,
178.
96 expressions used about His A thanasius q u o tatio n from Oden, W o rd o f Life,
178.
96 The honest money changer Oden, W o rd o f L ife, 178.
96 As for the words Cyril of Alexandria quotation from Oden, W o rd o f L ife, 178.
97 teaching about the supreme nature John IV quotation from Oden, W ord o f L ife,
179.
97 model of p erich o resis Q uotation about p e ric h o r e s is from Oden, W o rd o f L ife,
182.
97 examples do not have Jo h n of D am ascus quotation from Oden, W o rd o f L ife,
183.
97 If I believe L uther quotation from Oden, W ord o f L ife, 184.
98 It was in one nature John of D am ascus q u otation from O den, W ord o f L ife,
185.
98 Wherefore, the Lord of Glory John of D am ascus quotation from Oden, W ord
o f L ife, 185.
98 He hungered Gregory of N azianzus quotation from Oden, W o rd o f L ife, 185.
99 As what is fitting Leo quotation from Oden, W o rd o f L i fe, 341.
99 What is God in Christ N ovatian quotation from Oden, W ord o f L ife, 340.
99 died according to the assumption A mbrose quotation from Oden, W ord o f L ife,
340.
99 He it was who suffered A thanasius quotation from Oden, W o rd o f Life, 340.
99 Christ, while being two natures John of D am ascus quotation from Oden, W ord
o f L ife, 340.
100 For God in his own nature L uther quotation from Oden, W o rd o f L ife, 341.
Letter 23 John: How Do We Know What God Is Like?

104 a book on divine impassibility See Sanders, O p e n n e s s o f G od, 76.
104 a treatise on God’s anger See Sanders, O p e n n e s s o f G od, 76.
Letter 24 Chris: The Church Fathers on Impassibility

107 cold, as it were H arold O. J. Brow n q u otation from C hristopher A. Hall, R e a d in g
S c rip tu r e w ith th e C h u rc h F a th ers (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1998), 178.
108 It is the ch u rch R obert Jenson quotation from Hall, R e a d in g S c rip tu r e w i th the
C h u rc h F a th ers, 194.
Notes 209
109 For he does not C hrysostom quotation from Hall, L e a rn in g T h eology w ith the
C h u rc h F a th ers, 184.
109 the forces and passions Prestige quotation from Hall, L e a rn in g T heology w ith
th e C h u rc h F a th ers, 184.
110 has as its chief characteristics R oberta Bondi, To L o v e a s G o d L o ves: C o n v ersa
tio n s w ith th e E a rly C h u rc h (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 58.
110 passions blind us Bondi, 2o L o v e a s G o d L o v e s, 65.
110 For if the wrath of God Chrysostom , A n E x h o r ta tio n to T h eo d o re a fte r EEs Fall
1.4; quotation from NPNF^ 9.93.
111 The prophet says this Chrysostom , O n th e P ro v id e n ce o f G o d 6.3; quotation
from C hristopher Alan Hall, J o h n C h ry so s to m 's “O n P ro vid en ce": A T r a n sla tio n a n d
T h eo lo g ica l h ite r p r e ta tio n (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1991).
I l l I have given these examples Chrysostom , O n th e P ro v id e n ce o f G o d 6.8.
I l l Do you see how Chrysostom, O n th e P ro v id e n ce o f G o d 6.5-6.
113 There is an issue Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o v er, 33.
113 Ftuman beings are said Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o ver, 33-34.
113 God loves to draw near Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o v er, 34.
113 It is possible that God Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o v er, 34.
114 The only persons we encounter Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o ver, 34.
114 As human subjectivity Pinnock, M o s t M o v e d M o v er, 35.
Letter 25 John: The Western Fathers and Impassibility

119 But our God is not a stone Ju stin Martyr, F irst A p o lo g y 28.
119 Why do contemporary evangelical theologians See, for instance, Ronald Nash,
T he C o n c ep t o f G o d (G rand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 105, 114.
119 this is the most questionable aspect H. P. Owen, C o n c ep ts o f D eity (New York:
H erder & Herder, 1971), 150.
119 The d o ctrin e th a t G od G ordon Lewis, “Im passibility of G od,” in E v a n g e lic a l
D ic tio n a ry o f T h eo lo gy (ed. W alter Elwell; G rand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 553.
120 But how art thou compassionate Anselm, P ro slo g iu m 8.
120 Why did the ancients Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” in P h ilo so p h y a n d
th e C h ristia n F a ith (ed. T hom as M orris; N otre Dame: U niversity of N otre Dame
Press, 1988), 209-20.
121 Once you pull on the thread W olterstorff, "Does God Suffer?” 47.
Letter 26 John: Scripture on Imm utability and Foreknowledge

125 Scripture does not contradict itself Helm, P ro v id e n ce o f G od, 51-52.
126 theological reductionism Helm, P ro v id e n ce o f G o d , 52.
127 God is not a frozen automaton W alter Kaiser, "Our Incom parably G reat God,”
C o n ta c t 32 (2002): 13.
128 They claim that we Greg Boyd, G o d o f the P o ssib le: A B ib lic a l I n tr o d u c tio n to the
O pen V iew o f G o d (G rand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 13-15, discusses this.
Letter 27 Chris: Omniscience and Foreknowledge

132 based on his exhaustive knowledge Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 131.
132 the possibility that God Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 132.
132 Omniscience may be defined Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 194.
133 nonconsensual control Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 240.
134 God’s incomparable way of knowing Oden, L iv in g G od, 69.
210 Notes
134 For God knows all things Clement of Alexandria, S tr o m a ta 6.17; quotation from
ANF 2.517.
134 And foreseeing the particular Clem ent of Alexandria, S tr o m a ta 6.17; quotation
from ANF 2.517.
134 For in one glance Clem ent of Alexandria, S tr o m a ta 6.17; quotation from ANF
2.517.
134 many things in life Clem ent of Alexandria, S tr o m a ta 6.17; quotation from ANF
2.517.
134 Let human voices Augustine, O n th e P s a lm s 147.9; qu o tatio n from NPNF*
8.667.
134 the infinite consciousness of God Oden, L iv in g G od, 70.
135 knew all things before John of Damascus, E x p o s itio n o f th e O r th o d o x F aith 2.10;
quotation from NPNF^ 9.28.
135 appeal to the judgment Hilary, O n th e T rin ity 9.59; q u o tatio n from NPNF^
9.175.
135 Jesus Christ knows Hilary, O n th e T rin ity 9.59; quotation from NPNF^ 9.176.
135 Jesus knew from the beginning Hilary, O n th e T rin ity 9.59; q u o tatio n from
NPNF^ 9.176. The rest of the H ilary quotations in this p aragraph are from the sam e
work.
Letter 29 Chris: Further Thoughts on Some Divine Attributes

146 I shall feel rather nervous C. S. Lewis, T h e L io n , th e W itch a n d th e W ardrobe
(New York: M acm illan, 1950), chap. 8.
146 any petition is a kind C. S. Lewis, L e tte rs to M a lc o lm : C hiefly o n P rayer (New
York: H arcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), 20. All of the Lewis quotations throughout
the rest of this letter can be found on pages 20-22 of this sam e work.
Letter 30 John: Classical Theism

149 I cite some studies Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 312 n. 120.
150 Louis Berkhof rails Louis Berkhof, S y s te m a tic T heology (3d ed.; G rand Rapids:
E erdm ans, 1946), 118-25.
150 classical, creedal Reformed theology Jam es Daane, “Can a M an Bless God?”
in G o d a n d th e G o o d (ed. Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes; G rand Rapids: E erd
m ans, 1975), 166.
150 If ever there was a miserable anthropomorphism Karl B arth, C hi irch D o g m a t
ics (trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thom as F. Torrance; Edinburgh: Clark,
1961), 3/4.108-9.
151 good chapter on prayer Dallas Willard, T h e D iv in e C o n sp ira cy: R e d isc o v e rin g
O u r H id d e n L ife in G o d (San Francisco: H arper San Francisco, 1998), 253.
Letter 31 John: Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism

156 intercessory prayer has no effect Jo n ath an E dw ards, “The M ost H igh a Prayer-
H earing God,” in T h e W o rks o f J o n a th a n E d w a rd s (2 vols.; Edinburgh: B an n er of
Truth, 1974), 2:115-16 (em phasis mine).
Letter 32 Chris: Biblical Texts Supporting Open Theism

161 God declares Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 130.
161 Sometimes God simply discloses Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 130-31.
Notes 211
161 God, a personal agent Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 209.
161 does not want to dance Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 210-11.
162 Though God’s knowledge is Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 198.
163 notion that God could be dismayed Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 133.
164 it is clear that Judas Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 99.
164 to determine the will of God Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 100.
164 incarnation was planned Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 100.
164 Jesus is in the canoe Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 100-101.
164 notion that the cross was not planned Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 101.
164 Perhaps God knew Sanders, G o d W h o R is k s , 102.
165 present life is a wrestling school Chrysostom, O n th e P ro v id e n ce o f G o d 21.1.
165 Through divine providence God Chrysostom, O n th e P ro v id e n ce o f G o d 21.3.
165 For as a gold refiner Chrysostom, O n th e P a ralytic L e t D o w n th r o u g h th e R o o f
1; quotation from NPNF* 9.212.
165 until it is destroyed Chrysostom, O n the P a ralytic L e t D o w n th ro u g h th e R o o f 2;
quotation from NPNF^ 9.212.
Letter 33 John: Openness and Tradition

168 That would imply I've explained this in depth in my G o d W h o R is k s , 200-206.
169 shake off the static ideology Jam es Oliver Buswell Jr., A S y s te m a tic T heology o f
th e C h ristia n R e lig io n (G rand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962), 1.56.
169 human beings can make a difference N ash, C o n c ep t o f G od, 105, 114.
169 Ware revises the traditional doctrine Ware, G o d ’s L e sser G lory, 164.
169 Grudem criticizes the Westminster Confession G rudem , S y s te m a tic T heology,
165-66.
170 the traditional doctrine of impassibility M illard E rickson, G o d th e F a th e r
A lm ig h ty : A C o n te m p o ra ry E x p lo r a tio n o f th e D iv in e A ttr ib u te s (G rand Rapids:
Baker, 1998), 155.
172 I too was raised Willard, D iv in e C o n sp ira c y , 244-45.
173 the Creeds are often wrong David Wells, “Reflections about Catholic Renewal
in Evangelicalism ,” in T he O r th o d o x E va n g e lic a ls: W h o T h ey A re a n d W h a t T hey Are
S a y in g (ed. R obert W ebber and D onald Bloesch; Nashville: T hom as Nelson, 1978),
214.
174 Church as the pillar of truth John Eck, E n c h ir id io n o f C o m m o n p la c e s: A g a in s t
L u th e r a n d O th e r E n e m ie s o f th e C h u rch , Ford Lewis Battles trans., (G rand Rapids:
Baker, 1979), 10.
174 It is hard to believe Gerald Bray, T he P erso n a l God: I s th e C lassical U n d e rsta n d in g
o f G o d T en a b le ? (Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster, 1998), 4.
Letter 34 Chris: Tradition and Theology

176 the history of the interpretation Stanley Grenz and Jo h n Franke, “Theological
H eritage as H erm eneutical Trajectory: Toward a N onfoundationalist U nderstand
ing of the Role of Tradition in Theology,” in A n c ie n t a n d P o s tm o d e rn C h ristia n ity :
P a le o -O rth o d o x y in th e T w e n ty-first C entury: E s s a y s in H o n o r o f T h o m a s C. O den (ed.
K enneth Tanner and C hristopher A. Hall; Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2002),
228.
176 More specifically Grenz and Franke, “Theological H eritage as H erm eneutical
Trajectory," 228.
177 the acceptance and handing D. H. Williams quotation from G renz and Franke,
"Theological H eritage as H erm eneutical Trajectory,” 228.
212 Notes
177 the narrative of God’s redemptive activity G renz an d Franke, "Theological

H eritage as H erm eneutical Trajectory," 229.
177 hermeneutical context for theology G renz an d Franke, "Theological H eritage
as H erm eneutical Trajectory,” 230, 233.
177 with a record Grenz and Franke, “Theological H eritage as H erm eneutical Trajec
tory," 232.
177 The Christian community G renz an d Franke, “Theological Heritage as H erm e
neutical Trajectory,” 232.
178 declared what he was Tertullian q u otation from Hall, L e a rn in g T h eology w ith
th e C h u rc h F a th ers, 28-29.
178 chose twelve leading Tertullian quotation from Hall, L e a rn in g T h eology w ith the
C h u rc h F a th ers, 28-29.
179 it originates neither from Tertullian q u o tation from Hall, L e a r n in g T h eo lo g y
w ith th e C h u rc h F a th ers, 29.
179 knowledge of the truth Irenaeus q u otation from Hall, L e a rn in g T h eology w ith
179 heresy is often marked A thanasius quotation from Hall, L e a rn in g T h eology w ith
180 evangelicals are inclined R ichard Jo h n N euhaus, “W hile W e're At It,” F irst
T h in g s 123 (May 2002): 77.
180 The great difficulty here Thom as H oward, “Recognizing the Church: A Personal
Pilgrim age and the Discovery of Five M arks of the C hurch,” in A n c ie n t a n d P o st
m o d e r n C h ristia n ity : P a le o -O rth o d o x y in th e T w e n ty-first C en tu ry: E s s a y s in H o n o r
o f T h o m a s C. O d en (ed. K enneth Tanner and C hristopher A. Hall; Downers Grove,
111.: InterVarsity, 2002), 133.
180 When a crucial issue H oward, “Recognizing the C hurch,” 133-34.
181 the faithful in those early centuries H oward, "Recognizing the C hurch,” 134.
181 threefold understanding of authority Clark Pinnock, T racking th e M aze: F in d in g
O u r W ay th ro u g h M o d e rn T h eology fr o m a n E v a n g e lic a l P ersp ective (San Francisco:
H arper & Row, 1990), 35-43.
184 Loss of authority David Lyle Jeffrey, “H ouses of the Interpreter: Spiritual Exege
sis and the Retrieval of Authority,” B o o k s a n d C u ltu re 8 (M ay/June 2002): 30.
Letter 36 John: Dialogical Virtues

191 Our hearts are in danger Thom as S chreiner an d B ruce W are (eds.), S till S o ver
eign: C o n te m p o ra ry P ersp ectives o n E le c tio n , F o rekn o w led g e, a n d G race (abridged
ed.; G rand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 16.
191 a Calvinist can state the open view Terrance Tiessen, P ro v id e n ce a n d Prayer:
H o w D o es G o d W o rk in the W orld? (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2000), chaps.
4-5.
191 A very helpful study Jay Wood, E p is te m o lo g y : B e c o m in g In te lle c tu a lly V ir tu o u s
(Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1998).
192 Thou must not take cheap shots Q uoted by John W ilson, "Thou Shalt N ot Take
Cheap Shots,” B o o k s a n d C u ltu re 5.5 (Sept.-O ct. 1999): 3.
192 Calvinists and Arminians Ware, “Effectual Calling and Grace,” in S till So vereig n ,
204.
193 call on evangelical theologians M ark Noll, T he S c a n d a l o f th e E v a n g e lic a l M in d
(G rand Rapids: E erdm ans, 1994); Alister M cGrath, E v a n g e lic a lis m a n d th e F u tu r e
o f C h r istia n ity (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1995).
Notes 213
Chris and John: Postscript

198 that this discussion continue See “Do Good Fences Make Good B aptists?”
Christianity Today 44 (Aug. 7, 2000): 36.
200 title of a new book N orm an Geisler and Wayne House, The Battle for God (G rand
Rapids: Kregel, 2001).
Glossary
Am brose (339-397) Bishop of M ilan frequently described as one of

the seven great doctors or teachers of the church. A significant
source for early C hristian views on the Trinity, incarnation, and
sacram ents of the church.
anthropom orphism Applying a h u m an characteristic to God (e.g.,
the arm of the Lord or God changed God’s m ind).
antinom y Affirming th at two different tru th s th at appear
contradictory are, nonetheless, both true. For example,
METICULOUS PROVIDENCE and LIBERTARIAN FREEDOM.
Arianism Teaching related to the Alexandrian presbyter Arius. Arius
appears to have taught th at while the Son was the highest, m ost
exalted creation of God, the Son was still a creature. To use a
phrase frequently attributed to Arius, “There was a tim e w hen he
[the Son] was not.”
Arm inianism School of theology based on the teaching of Jam es
Arminius. Against strong Calvinism , it affirm s th a t God’s
election to salvation is based upon God’s foreknowledge of
who will freely believe. Hence, at least some of God’s decisions
are dependent upon hum an choices. See also synergism and
general providence .
A thanasius (300-373) Bishop of Alexandria and ardent opponent
of Arianism . U nder the leadership of Athanasius, the C ouncil
of N icea declared the Son to be hom oousios (of one substance)
w ith the Father.
A ugustine (354-430) The greatest theologian am ong the W estern
church fathers. Augustine's ideas have deeply influenced the
215
216 Glossary
W estern C hristian tradition in both its Catholic and P rotestant

stream s. Augustine was deeply rooted in the Platonic tradition,
and the question rem ains w hether Augustine's Platonic
background too deeply influenced his understanding of G ods
providence and God’s relationship to t i m e .
B asil the Great (330-379) One of the three great C appadocian
theologians, along w ith G regory of N azianzus and Gregory
of Nyssa. Basil’s w ork on the Holy Spirit and on the six
days of creation (Hexaemeron) are to be particularly noted.
All E astern fathers (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus,
J ohn C hrysostom ) adv o cated w h a t w ould la te r b e k n o w n as
libertarian freedom .
Caesarius o f Arles (470-542) Bishop, m onastic leader, and writer.
Calvinism School of theology based on the teaching of John Calvin.
Com m only used of those who believe, contrary to Arminianism ,
th at God unconditionally chooses certain persons for salvation.
It affirm s meticulous providence in th at none of God’s decisions
are dependent upon creatures. See also monergism and
unconditioned .
classical th eism See Appendix.
Clem ent o f Alexandria (150-215) Alexandrian Christian
leader particularly know n for his Paidagogos (Instructor) and
Strornateis (Miscellanies).
com m u n icatio id io m a tu m Latin for “com m unication” or "sharing”
of attributes. That is, w hatever we say about C hrist’s hum an
nature or divine nature is to be attributed to the person of the
Son. It is in the hypostasis of the Son th at the union w ith hum an
nature takes place. Hence, we can speak of the Son suffering in
the h u m an natu re th a t the Son has assum ed and redeem ed.
com p atibilism Also know n as soft-determ inism . Belief th a t hum an
freedom and divine determ ination of all things are com patible.
H um an decisions are considered to be free if they are chosen
w ithout any external force or coercion. The person is free if
she does w hat she desired to do; and since God determ ines the
h u m an desires, divine determ inism and hum an freedom are
com patible.
Council o f C halcedon (451) The fourth ecum enical council after
N icea (325), Constantinople (381), and E phesus (431) at w hich
the relationship betw een C hrist’s h u m an and divine natures was
debated. The council ended by presenting the theological m odel
of Christ as one person w ith two natures, divine and hum an.
Glossary 217
Council o f N icea (325) The first great ecum enical council at which
the Son was declared to be hom oousios (of one substance) with
the Father.
Cyril o f Alexandria (375-444) Bishop of Alexandria and one of
the key theologians involved in the form ulation of christological
doctrine in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Particularly
know n for his extended debate w ith N estorius over the
expression theotokos (Mary as the “G od-bearer” o r “M other of
God”).
dignum Deo Latin for w hat is “dignified” to ascribe to “God.” It is
not fitting to ascribe hum an lim itations to God.
divine perfection See p e r f e c t io n , d i v in e .
d ocetic A heresy th at denies th a t Christ was fully hum an. It
em phasizes the divinity over the creaturely nature of Christ.
econom ia See o ik o n o m ia .
electio n God’s choosing or predestining people for salvation.
The dispute betw een A r m in ia n is m and C a l v in is m is w hether
G ods election is dependent upon h u m an choices ( m o n e r g is m
and s y n e r g is m ). A nother issue is w hether God’s election is of
individuals or is “corporate” (Israel and the church).
Enlightenm ent Period during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries am ong W estern intellectuals. Generally, they believed
tru th should be settled on the basis of hum an reason ra th e r th an
by appeals to authorities such as the Bible or the church.
everlasting The view th at God exists forever through tim e rath er
th an in a t i m e l e s s state. God experiences succession or duration
and works w ith us through tim e.
exegesis Deriving m eaning out of a text or understanding w hat the
a u th o r m eant.
foreknow ledge The belief, generally understood, th a t God knows
everything th at shall occur, including everything th at hum ans
will do in the future. The debate in this book is w hether
divine foreknowledge is exhaustively definite (i.e., settled) or
w hether som e of God’s foreknowledge is definite while som e
of it includes w hat m ay possibly happen (i.e., maybes). Both
views agree th a t God knows all th a t can be know n about the
future. The dispute is over w hat can be known. See also s i m p l e
FOREKNOWLEDGE.
foundation alism A theory of knowledge th at dem ands an
absolutely certain starting point or foundation on w hich to build
knowledge. If the foundation is questionable, then all the rest of
ou r knowledge is questionable as well.
218 Glossary
freew ill th eism An interpretive tradition th a t affirm s l ib e r t a r ia n

f r e e d o m , such as A r m in ia n is m and o p e n t h e i s m .
general providence View th a t God established the overarching
rules by w hich creation w ould operate and allows them a good
deal of autonomy. God does n ot m eticulously control every detail
of our lives, so God takes risks th at we m ight not do w hat God
desires.
Gregory o f N azianzus (329-390) Also know n as Gregory the
Theologian. One of the three great C appadocian theologians,
along w ith B a s il t h e G r e a t and Gregory of Nyssa. Particularly
know n for his five theological orations, in w hich Gregory
responds in detail to A r ia n christological positions.
Gregory Thaum aturgus (210-270) Bishop of Neocaesarea.
Perhaps best know n for his eulogy for O r i g e n , the great
Alexandrian exegete.
H ellen istic Of or relating to the ancient Greek culture and
language.
h erm eneutics The study of how texts should be interpreted.
H ilary o f P oitiers (315-367) Bishop chiefly know n for his great
w ork On the Trinity.
im m utability The inability to change or develop. W hen applied to
God, theologians disagree w hether God is unchangeable in all
respects ( c l a s s ic a l t h e i s m ) o r whether, though G ods character
is unchanging, God can change in em otions, thoughts, and will
( o p e n t h e i s m ).
im passibility The notion th a t God is unaffected by w hat happens
in creation. God does not experience sorrow, suffering, or other
changing em otional states, for the blessedness of God's life is
wholly independent of creatures. Moreover, ou r prayers never
influence God. See also p a s s i b l e .
im petratory Receiving som ething because one asked for it.
in d eterm inistic freedom See l ib e r t a r ia n f r e e d o m .
in se Latin for “in itself.” For instance, w hat God is like ap art from
any relation to God’s creatures?
Irenaeus (115-202) Bishop of Lyons and lifelong opponent of
gnosticism . Best know n for his w ork Against Heresies.
John Chrysostom (347-407) Bishop of Constantinople from 398.
Two of Chrysostom ’s works are particularly relevant to the
current debate over the nature of divine p r o v i d e n c e : On the
Incomprehensibility o f God and On the Providence o f God.
John o f D am ascus (died 749) E astern m onk and theologian.
Jo h n ’s best know n work, Fount o f Knowledge, contains his well-
know n An Exact Exposition o f the Orthodox Faith.
Glossary 219
Justin Martyr (died ca. 165) Early C hristian apologist and martyr.
Lactantius (250-325) Latin C hristian apologist.
Leo (400-461) Bishop of Rom e from 440 to 461. Also know n as Leo
the Great. A particularly influential figure in the form ulation of
christological doctrine. Insisted, against Eutyches, th at Christ
had two natures, one divine and one hum an.
libertarian freedom Also called indeterm inistic freedom since it
is not com patible w ith the idea th at God determ ines all things.
H um ans are free if they have the ability to do otherw ise than
they did in a p articular situation despite the influences of
upbringing and culture. C ontrary to c o m p a t ib il is t ic f r e e d o m ,
hum ans are not free if they sim ply do w hat they desire in a
specific situation. Rather, they m ust have been able to desire
som ething else.
m etaphysics The study of reality. It addresses issues such as
freedom and determ inism , space and tim e, and w hat is
necessary.
m eticu lou s providence Also called specific sovereignty. The
view th a t God tightly controls everything th a t happens such
th a t nothing happens except w hat God specifically intends to
happen. C ontrary to g e n e r a l p r o v id e n c e , God takes no risks
because hum ans do precisely w hat God w ants them to do in
every situation.
m idd le know ledge Also know n as M olinism, after the sixteenth-
century Jesuit who developed this view. God not only knows
w hat will actually occur in the future, God knows w hat hum ans
w ould do u n d er any hypothetical situation. For instance, God
knows exactly w hat you w ould be like and all the decisions you
w ould m ake if, say, you had been raised in a different culture.
M olinism See m id d l e k n o w l e d g e .
m onergism Greek for “one worker.” The belief th at salvation is
exclusively the w ork of God w ithout the h u m an will adding
anything. See s y n e r g i s m .
N ovatian (m id-third century) Latin presbyter best know n for his
w ork On the Trinity.
oikon om ia Greek for “economy.” God’s relationship to all created
reality and particularly God’s redem ptive act in the sending of
the Son to redeem hum anity.
om n iscien ce Literally, “all-knowing,” indicating th at God knows
everything th a t is knowable o r all truths. The dispute is
over w hat is knowable. Does God know all things as definite
certainties ( c l a s s ic a l t h e i s m ) or does God know som e things
220 Glossary
as definite and som e things as indefinite possibilities ( o p e n

See also f o r e k n o w l e d g e .
t h e is m )?
on tological difference The idea th at God, as creator, is
significantly different from creatures. The issue is exactly how
different God is from hum ans, given th a t we are created in the
im age of God.
op en future See p r e s e n t i s m .
op en th eism See Appendix.
Origen (181-251) The m ost prolific and perhaps m ost controversial
early C hristian exegete. Best know n for his advocacy of allegory
as a legitim ate interpretive tool,
p assib le The ability to be affected by som eone else. See also
IMPASSIBILITY.
P elagianism The teaching of a fourth-century m onk who
supposedly taught th at hum ans could live free from sin w ithout
the aid of divine grace and thus m erit salvation,
perfection, divine The idea th at there can be no possible
im provem ent in the divine nature. C l a s s ic a l t h e is m adds that
there cannot be any p o t e n t ia l for change, for any change in God
could only be a change for the worse. O p e n t h e is m rejects this
addition, holding th a t God changes perfectly in relating to us.
perich o resis Greek for “m utual indwelling” or interpenetration
of the persons of the Trinity. That is, the Son is always in the
Father, the F ather in the Son, the Son in the Spirit, and so on.
One person of the Trinity, as B arth puts it, is always in the other
two.
potentiality Used by Aristotle and Thom as Aquinas to refer to the
ability to change. For instance, an acorn is potentially a tree
o r a baseball bat. According to these thinkers, creatures have
potentiality but God does not. See also p u r e a c t u a l it y .
p resen tism Som etim es applied to the view of o m n is c ie n c e held by
o p e n t h e i s m . Perhaps a better term w ould be "open future.” It is
the belief th a t God knows all the past and present and th at p art
of the future th at is determ ined as definite certainties, b u t God
does not know all th a t creatures w ith l ib e r t a r ia n f r e e d o m will
do in the future as definite. Rather, God knows these actions as
possibilities and probabilities. See also f o r e k n o w l e d g e .
p rocess th eology A tw entieth-century school of thought th at
holds th a t God and the universe are coeternal and necessarily
dependent upon one another. God cannot exist w ithout a
world. Process theology denies om nipotence, creation out of
nothing, God’s ability to act unilaterally in creation, and a final
consum m ation of history.
Glossary 221
providence See g e n e r a l p r o v id e n c e and m e t ic u l o u s p r o v i d e n c e .

pure actuality Used by Aristotle and Aquinas to refer to the
inability to change in any respect. A being th a t is purely actual is
one th at is com pletely fulfilled, having no potential for becom ing
any different th an it now is. God has no p o t e n t ia l it y .
R eform ed A theological tradition deriving from John C a l v in and
Ulrich Zwingli em phasizing the glory of God. The Reform ed
tradition is quite broad and not lim ited to those w ho affirm
m e t ic u l o u s p r o v i d e n c e . A n um ber of Reform ed theologians are,
for instance, o p e n t h e i s t s .
sem i-P elagian The attem pt to find a m iddle ground betw een
P e l a g ia n is m and A u g u s t in e 's m o n e r g is t ic understanding of
salvation. The h u m an will, though w eak in sin, can respond to
God. Som etim es applied to A r m in ia n is m .
sim ple forekn ow led ge The view th a t God sim ply previsions all
of hum an history at once b u t th a t this knowledge does not
determ ine w hat will happen. Rather, God foresees w hat we will
freely do. This is the traditional A r m in ia n view as opposed to
C a l v in is m , w here God knows the future because God determ ines
all the future.
sim plicity God’s essence is an indivisible unity. Though we speak
as though God has various characteristics such as om nipotence
and im m u t a b il it y , God actually has none of them , for God, unlike
us, is not com posed of parts.
Socinian ism H eretical teaching th at denied Jesus’ divinity and
atoning work.
soft-determ inism See c o m f a t ib il is m .
sp ecific sovereignty See m e t ic u l o u s p r o v i d e n c e .
synergism Greek for "working together.” The idea th at God and the
hum an will cooperate in conversion. The h u m an will can accept
o r reject divine grace for, contrary to m o n e r g is m , grace is not
irresistible.
Tertullian (born ca. 160) Early C hristian apologist and
controversialist.
theologia Greek for “true knowledge of God.”
theophany A visible or audible appearance of God.
Thom ism School of thought based on the teaching of Thom as
Aquinas. Thom as said God is the first cause, unchangeable in all
respects, p u r e a c t u a l it y , i m p a s s i b l e , and t i m e l e s s .
tim elessn ess Used synonym ously w ith eternity, eternalist, and
atem porality. Contrary to the view th a t God is e v e r l a s t in g ,
tim elessness asserts th at God does not experience tim e,
succession, or duration. Rather, God exists in an eternal present
222 Glossary
or now w ithout change or any before and after. All of God’s

knowledge and decisions are eternal,
tran scen d en ce God is “above” and independent of creation.
Though God is involved in the creation, God is not a creature,
u n con d ition ed The idea th at God is not influenced or affected by
creatures. All of God’s decisions and actions are based solely on
God’s will and independent of w hat we do. See also im p a s s ib il it y
and m e t ic u l o u s p r o v i d e n c e .
G od vs.
3 1898 00032 5209
"From the confused and often angry debates concerning 'the'open God' has emerged
this remarkable exchange of letters. The discussion is lucid and probing in its explo
ration of issues and charitable in its spirit—a model of how theological differences
should be discussed."
—NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, author of Divine Discourse
"An excellent model of how biblically oriented theologians should handle their dis
agreements."
—DAVID NEFF, editor, Christianity Today
"In the debate over open theism, it seems that the polemicists talk past one another. In
this book, we have a real dialogue, one in which the participants address one another
knowledgeably and specifically. It is a valuable contribution to the debate."
—JOHN M. FRAME, Reformed Theological Seminary
"A model of irenic debate. Not only will readers learn a great deal about open theism
and the doctrine of God in general, but they will also learn how it is possible for
evangelicals to discuss their disagreements respectfully and constructively. This is
must reading for anyone interested in open theism or concerned about the present
state of evangelical theology."
—ROGER E. OLSON, Baylor University
"In this readable and interesting volume, Chris Hall and John Sanders let us look into
their letterbox and learn from their theological debate.-They provide us with a model
of serious yet respectful theological discussion. The book is an excellent introduction
to this contemporary issue in the doctrine of God."
—ALAN G. PADGETT, Luther Seminary
"A remarkable book born out of the authors' friendship as well as their shared passion
for theological truth. In addition to providing an engaging and accessible overview of
the issues and questions at stake, they admirably display the virtues of Christian theo
logical discourse: the vigorous pursuit of truth in a context'characterized by humility,
charity, and mutual respect."
—JOHN R. FRANKE, Biblical Theological Seminary
JOHN SANDERS (Ph.D., U niversity of South Africa) is professor of religion

a n d theology at H u n tin g to n College. He is the a u th o r of The God W ho Risks
and coauthor of The Openness o f God. CHRISTOPHER A. HALL (Ph.D., Drew
University) is associate professor of biblical and theological studies at Eastern
University. The au th o r of Learning Theology with the Church Fathers, he is an
editor at large for Christianity Today.
Cover im age © Steven Puetzer/Photonica
MM Baker Academic
j B r j H v A Division of Baker Book House Co

Christopher A. Hall, John Sanders - Does God Have A Future - A Debate On Divine Providence-Baker Academic (2003)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Christopher A. Hall, John Sanders - Does God Have A Future - A Debate On Divine Providence-Baker Academic (2003)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Does God

Published by B aker Academic

Printed in the U nited States of America

All rights reserved. No p a rt of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

Library of Congress C ataloging-in-Publication D ata

Chris and John: W hat This Book Is—and W hat It Is Not 7

1. John: How I Came to the Open View 11

25. John: The W estern Fathers and Im passibility 117

Chris and John: Postscript 197

fundam entally disagrees w ith the openness model, I know th a t Chris

W hen I was in high school one of my brothers was killed in a m otor­

Let me sum m arize the perspective I now hold—the so-called open­

nite (open). God’s knowledge of the future contains knowledge of w hat

Your fellow servant In Jesus,

level of suffering I observed in countries such as Indonesia and India

their conclusions. W hile the interpretive tradition of the church is not

1. God’s knowledge of the world is infinite. Hence, God in relation­

Let me know w hat you think.

With warm greetings,

central a teaching as salvation. I w ould have thought th a t som eone such

Second, as a result of the test, God now knows th at A braham fears

o r the au th o r of Hebrews com m enting on this text, they focus on Abra­

With warm greetings,

there is no uncertainty as to w hat A braham will do and so God’s test is

Your fellow servant,

How about your interpretation of Judas’s betrayal of Jesus? I would

Second, you argue th a t “paradidomi does not m ean ‘betray’” to the

Regarding my interpretation of Judas’s sin and Peter's denial, please

Looking forward to your next letter,

W hat are the im plications of the openness position for o u r under­

th at God will m ake m istakes, however unintentionally. How can God

With warm greetings,

No theological position, including my own, is free of difficulties. Som e­

Your fellow follower of Jesus,

I'm sitting at my desk, thinking of the problem of evil, and listening

1. How does presentism and the overall openness position allevi­

edge w ould enable God to intervene quite effectively in the vast

grants us freedom and th a t God guarantees th a t everything we will do is

1. In the first group are merely verbal contradictions. Included here

nom ena. In addition, physicists appear perfectly capable of speak­

th a t is conceptually satisfying, coherent, and faithful to the biblical text.

With warm greetings,

S o n y for my tardiness in responding. As you know there are some

to the problem of divine sovereignty and h u m an freedom . H elm and I

account of h u m an freedom because it holds th a t divine determ inism

In the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,

I w ant to develop som e of the ideas I m entioned in my last letter con­

lood morning. Chris.

It is a beautiful Saturday m orning here and it was w onderful to

sin of the world. B ut actually Jesus is a h u m an and not a physical lam b

I noted a num ber of studies on m etaphor th at have shaped my think­

1. Your claims are indefensible.

These expressions m ap ou r conception of w ar onto the activity of

m ake sense of God’s relationship to Israel. Conceptualizing God as

God is ontologically different from creatures, we cannot speak about

¥dur fellow servant,

Or so it would seem. Yet the church fathers, m edieval theologians such

it is so incredibly w onderful.” How so? “For God was in hum anity. He

Som e pastors in the denom ination th at owns my college are upset

both seek to serve ou r Lord but neither of us believes th at the kingdom

One of the problem s is your incorrect conclusion th a t if God can

"univocal” understanding in m ind. Ha! Do these verses teach th a t God

God is im m utable. But I think you go too far in saying th a t everything

W hen I was in high school one of my brothers was killed in a m otor

Let me sum m arize the perspective I now hold—the so-called open

1. God’s knowledge of the world is infinite. Hence, God in relation

o r the au th o r of Hebrews com m enting on this text, they focus on Abra

W hat are the im plications of the openness position for o u r under

No theological position, including my own, is free of difficulties. Som e

1. How does presentism and the overall openness position allevi

nom ena. In addition, physicists appear perfectly capable of speak

I w ant to develop som e of the ideas I m entioned in my last letter con

I noted a num ber of studies on m etaphor th at have shaped my think

Can we describe God’s relationship to the w orld and the characteris

Is there a way to settle such disputes? Is there a neutral herm eneu

people? If so, is God in these specifically future cases willfully vio

I contend th a t God’s knowledge of the future is perfect and exhaus