Case Title: Foodbev International v.

Ferrer
Case Number: G.R. No. 206795
Date of Decision: September 16, 2019

Parties: Foodbev International Unlimited Company and Foodbev International Management Services Ltd. (petitioners) v. Jose P.
Ferrer, et al. (respondents)

Nature of the Case: This case involves a labor dispute between Foodbev International and several of its employees who were
members of a union. The employees alleged that the company engaged in unfair labor practices, including union busting,
discrimination, and constructive dismissal.

Facts:
In 2008, several employees of Foodbev International formed a union. Shortly thereafter, Foodbev engaged in a series of actions
that the employees claimed were intended to undermine and ultimately dissolve the union. These actions included transferring
union members to different branches or companies, conducting written examinations on union members, inquiring about
employees' loyalty to the union as a factor in determining transfers, and terminating union officers and members. The employees
filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which ruled in favor of Foodbev. The employees then
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which overturned the NLRC's decision and ruled in favor of the employees. Foodbev
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in overturning the NLRC decision.
2. Whether or not Foodbev engaged in unfair labor practices, including union busting, discrimination, and constructive
dismissal.
3. Whether or not Foodbev is liable for the termination of one of its employees due to gross negligence.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court found that the CA did not commit a reversible error in overturning the NLRC decision. The CA's
findings were based on the record and were in accordance with the law and jurisprudence.
2. The Supreme Court found that Foodbev engaged in unfair labor practices, including union busting, discrimination, and
constructive dismissal. It pointed out that for constructive dismissal to exist, there must be a cessation of work due to
circumstances that render continued employment impossible, unreasonable or unlikely. These circumstances may
include a demotion in rank, a diminution of pay and other benefits, or acts of clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by the employer. When the working environment becomes so hostile that it forces the employee to give up
their employment or position, there is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set
by the employer. In this case, the Court found that the series of unfair labor practices committed by Foodbev, including
the transfer of the union president to a provincial branch to isolate him from the union and the termination of union
members and officers, had created a hostile working environment that convinced them to sacrifice their employment,
thus amounting to constructive dismissal. The Court noted that Foodbev did not offer Eroles a specific position, rank,
or salary when they asked him to resign in exchange for a job in Greentech, and failed to acknowledge his years of
service in the company. This put Eroles in a difficult situation where he had to choose between staying in Foodbev and
risk suffering the ire of management, or transfer to Greentech with an unspecified position and salary and forego his
years of service at Foodbev, making it clear that the company did not make a sincere effort to provide job security for
Eroles.
3. The Supreme Court found that Foodbev was liable for the termination of one of its employees due to gross negligence.
The Court noted that the employee in question had admitted in his affidavit that he was responsible for supervising the
technicians who were terminated along with him. This admission, combined with Foodbev's targeting of union
members, indicated that the termination was a form of union busting.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, finding that Foodbev engaged in unfair labor practices and was liable
for the termination of one of its employees. The Court ordered Foodbev to pay damages and back wages to the affected
employees, and ruled that the legal interest due on the monetary judgments would be 6% per annum from the time of finality
until satisfaction.
CASE DIGEST: Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Union-NFL v. Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc.
G.R. No. 186605, [November 17, 2010], 649 PHIL 629-646

FACTS:
Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Union-NFL (CABEU-NFL), a registered labor organization, claimed to
be the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc. (CAB). It requested
to bargain collectively with CAB but was turned down. Subsequently, more than 90% of the workers
affiliated with CABEU-NFL disassociated themselves from the said organization, and formed the Central
Azucarera de Bais Employees Labor Association (CABELA). CAB then negotiated and concluded a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with CABELA, which CABEU-NFL opposed.

CABEU-NFL filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against CAB, alleging that the latter violated its duty
to bargain collectively under Article 253 of the Labor Code, and consequently committed an act of unfair
labor practice prohibited under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code. In response, CAB filed a petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) over the
complaint for Unfair Labor Practice. The CA gave due course to CAB’s petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not service of the copy of the petition for Certiorari to CABEU-NFL’s counsel was
sufficient.
2. Whether or not CAB failed to indicate CABEU-NFL’s name and address in its petition.
3. Whether or not CAB committed forum shopping when it filed its petition in the CA.
4. Whether or not CAB was guilty of acts constituting unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain
collectively.

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court held that service of the copy of the petition for Certiorari to CABEU-NFL’s
counsel was sufficient, as provided under Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court.
2. The Court found that CAB did indicate both the name and address of CABEU-NFL in its petition,
and the indication that CABEU-NFL could be served with court processes through its counsel was
substantial compliance with the Rules.
3. The Court ruled that there was no identity of issues or causes of action between CAB’s petition in
the CA and the other cases pending before the same court, as CABEU-NFL failed to demonstrate
any similarity in the causes of action between the said cases and the present case.
4. The Supreme Court held that CAB was not guilty of acts constituting unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain collectively, as there was no showing that CAB was motivated by ill will, bad
faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety
resulted. Furthermore, CAB believed that CABEU-NFL was no longer the representative of the
workers and wanted to foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming
majority of its rank and file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with
CABELA, another union in the bargaining unit. The filing of the complaint for unfair labor practice
was also deemed premature inasmuch as the issue of collective bargaining was still pending
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

The petition was denied.

Case Title: Dinoyo v. Undaloc Construction Company, Inc., G.R. No. 249638, [June 23, 2021]

Facts:
This case involves a labor dispute between the construction company Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. and its workers, who
filed a complaint for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, salary differentials, separation pay, and damages.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the workers, but Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. appealed the decision to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). While the appeal was pending, the company transferred some of its motor vehicles to
another corporation, Cigin Construction & Development Corporation, allegedly to frustrate the execution of the judgment award
in favor of the workers.

The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter's decision, but Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. and its officers, Spouses Cirilo and Gina
Undaloc, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the NLRC's decision, ruling that Cigin Construction &
Development Corporation could not be held liable for Undaloc Construction Company, Inc.'s debts because they were separate
legal entities.
The workers then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of separate legal
personalities and disregarding the corporate veil of Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. and Cigin Construction & Development
Corporation.

Issues:
1. Whether the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity can be applied to hold Cigin Construction & Development
Corporation and its responsible officers solidarily liable with Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. for the monetary
claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter.
2. Whether the respondents employed a ruse to evade their legal obligations to the petitioners.
3. Whether the respondents acted in bad faith.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Court held that the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity can be applied to hold Cigin Construction & Development Corporation and its responsible officers solidarily liable
with Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. for the monetary claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter. The Court found that
there was evidence establishing the scheme employed by the respondents to avoid their legal obligations, including the
transfer of motor vehicles registered under the name of Undaloc Inc. to Cigin Corp. while its appeal remained pending.
2. The Court also held that the respondents employed a ruse to evade their legal obligations to the petitioners. The Court
observed a pattern adopted by the officers of Undaloc Inc., particularly Cirilo and Gina, of creating run-away companies
every time their companies are embroiled in labor cases to deliberately circumvent the law and evade their obligations
to their employees.
3. Moreover, the Court found that the respondents acted in bad faith. The Court noted that Undaloc Construction, a sole
proprietorship construction business of Cirilo during the 1990s, was abruptly closed following the decision of the Court
in another labor case. Undaloc Inc. was incorporated in 2000 but was also stopped operating after the Labor Arbiter's
decision awarding the monetary claims of Dinoyo, et al. and while these decisions were on appeal. The Court questioned
the underlying motive of the responsible officers, Sps. Undaloc, in incorporating a new family corporation to operate
the same construction business while the appeal of Undaloc Inc. remained pending.

Therefore, the Court adjudged Cigin Construction & Development Corporation, Spouses Cirilo A. Undaloc and Gina P. Undaloc
solidarily liable with Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. to pay the monetary claims due to the petitioners based on the
computations of the Labor Arbiter in various decisions.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court's decision in Dinoyo v. Undaloc Construction Company, Inc. emphasizes the importance of
honoring legal obligations and avoiding schemes to evade such obligations. The Court's application of the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate entity highlights the need to prevent the use of separate corporate personalities as an instrument to commit
injustice. This case serves as a reminder to corporations and responsible officers that they cannot use the corporate veil as a
shield to evade their legal obligations to their employees, especially in cases of unfair labor practices. The Court will not hesitate
to apply the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction to prevent the separate personalities of corporations from being
used as an instrument to commit injustice.
Title: Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc. v. Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc.
G.R. No. 237036, [July 8, 2020]

Parties:
Petitioners: Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc. (APRI), Aboitiz Power Corporation (APC)
Respondents: Brizuela, et al., Aboitiz Power Employees' Union-Association of Special Rank and
File Employees (APEU-ASRE), et al., Aboitiz Power Employees' Union (APEU), et al.

Facts:
Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc. (APRI) implemented a redundancy program which resulted in the
termination of several employees. The affected employees, through their unions, filed
complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the
termination of employees was illegal, and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the decision of the LA. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.
Dissatisfied, the affected employees filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of APRI's Redundancy Program;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of the dismissal from employment
of petitioners' officers and members; and
3. Whether or not CA erred in discounting unfair labor practice in the form of union busting
against APRI and the other respondents.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court affirmed the findings of the LA, NLRC,
and the CA that the termination of employees due to the redundancy program was legal
and valid. Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment under
Article 298 of the Labor Code. The employer must prove its good faith in abolishing the
redundant positions and the existence of fair and reasonable criteria in the selection of
employees who will be dismissed from employment due to redundancy. The fair and
reasonable criteria may include, but are not limited to, less preferred status, efficiency,
and seniority.
2. The Court found that APRI complied with all the requisites for a valid implementation of
the redundancy program. APRI showed its good faith in abolishing the redundant
positions, and the Right-Sizing Program study in which the redundancy program was
based showed fair and reasonable criteria used by APRI in determining redundant
positions.
3. The Court also found no substantial evidence to support the claim of unfair labor practice
in the form of union busting against APRI. To prove the existence of unfair labor practice,
substantial evidence has to be presented.

In conclusion, the Court affirmed the rulings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA. The unanimous
findings of these three tribunals are binding upon the Court.
CASE DIGEST: ADAMSON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION V. ADAMSON UNIVERSITY G.R. No.
227070, [March 9, 2020]

FACTS:
Petitioner Orestes Delos Reyes was a faculty member and president of Adamson University Faculty and
Employees Association (AUFEA). Delos Reyes was charged with gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior
for uttering abusive language to a minor female student without provocation. An impartial body created by
the University President investigated the complaint and found Delos Reyes guilty. Thus, Adamson University
dismissed Delos Reyes from employment. AUFEA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Adamson
University alleging that the dismissal was intended to bust the union.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice, and the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The Court of Appeals denied AUFEA's petition for
certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal of Delos Reyes was valid;
2. Whether Adamson University committed unfair labor practice.

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of Delos Reyes was valid. The Court held that an employer
has the right to dismiss an employee for gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior. The Court
further stated that the longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his
responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in
the company.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Adamson University did not commit unfair labor practice. The Supreme
Court explained that an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, but not every unfair act or
decision constitutes unfair labor practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248 of the Labor
Code. The prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice essentially relate to the workers' right to
self-organization. Thus, an employer may be held liable under this provision if its conduct affects in
any manner the right of an employee to self-organize. In the case at hand, petitioner's dismissal, which
was caused by his personal acts, does not constitute unfair labor practice as provided under the Labor
Code. Dismissing him was not meant to violate the right of the university employees to self-organize,
nor was it meant to interfere with the Union's activities. Additionally, petitioner failed to prove that
the proceedings were done with haste and bias.

The Court emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss an employee is valid as long as it is done
in good faith and without malice. In this case, the Court found no bad faith on Adamson University's part in
dismissing Delos Reyes.

Accordingly, the Petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the dismissal was affirmed.

CONCLUSION:
The case of Adamson University Faculty and Employees Union v. Adamson University emphasizes that
employers have the right to dismiss employees for gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior. The case
also reinforces the management's prerogative to regulate all aspects of employment according to its discretion
and judgment. Lastly, the case reminds us that the burden of proving unfair labor practice falls on the party
alleging it and that the totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining whether such an act
was committed.