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GRATITUDE
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl

Gratitude is the return of good for good. Generally, it is a positive emotion someone un-
dergoes in response to another one’s attention, love, fidelity or any other kind of mate-
rial or immaterial good. Either as an independent object of concern or as associated with
other phenomena, gratitude is of interest for normative ethics, moral psychology and po-
litical philosophy. It also has been discussed in non-philosophical contexts, above all by
anthropologists, sociologists, and more recently psychologists, in the wake of so-called pos-
itive psychology. Gratitude is an important part of common morality. It is firmly anchored
in Christianity and other religious traditions like Judaism, Islam or Buddhism. Among
philosophers, it is contested what its precise meaning, range and implications are. The pres-
ent chapter focuses on a phenomenology of gratitude and does so by addressing the following
questions: What is gratitude? What is its object? On what conditions do people feel and show
gratitude? What inhibits gratitude in situations that prima facie seem to warrant it? What is
the good of gratitude? How should we assess its social and moral significance?

1. Historical and cultural relativity: shifting views of gratitude

and associated clusters of emotions
To a considerable extent, the social and moral significance of gratitude depends on the
status and meaning of gift-giving as part of everyday life and common morality. Relating
to this, far-reaching differences between different epochs and societies suggest themselves
(cf. Mauss 1923; Heyd 1982, 38–48; Komter 2004). Among others, these differences concern
the ( lacking) spiritual, religious or metaphysical underpinning of gift-giving or benevolence
towards human and non-human creatures. They are also due to the respective functions of
gratitude in terms of establishing and strengthening intergenerational bonds and collective
or group identities.
Querying the adaptive function of gratitude in postmodern societies should also take
into account those clusters of emotions and attitudes with which gratitude is linked up
(cf. Klein 1957; Emmons and Shelton 2002, 460; Solomon 2004; Algoe and Haidt 2009).
Compassion, contentment, modesty, humility, kindness, forgiveness or love do not seem
to be among the most cherished dispositional emotions or character traits in highly com-
petitive achievement-orientated societies. The same holds for mindfulness, awe, wonder

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and admiration. It also holds for empathy, which is involved in both giving and receiving of
benefits. Therefore, gratitude has been placed in the class of empathic emotions (cf. Lazarus
and Lazarus 1994). Historical and cultural shifts of meaning and moral assessment also come
to bear on those mind-sets and (pathological) character dispositions that render feelings of
gratitude unlikely or effectively prevent their occurrence (e.g., envy, narcissism, egoism,
haughtiness, hate). Relevant emotions come in degrees and have to be caught in their per-
taining dynamic and dialectics in order to see whether they function as reinforcers or disen-
ablers of gratitude. Pride, for example, can very well go along with gratitude, yet tends to
exclude it as soon as it intensifies and enlarges, transforming itself into an excessive proud of
one’s independence (see Selbständigkeitsstolz, Kolnai 2007, 79). “We wish to be self-sustained.
We do not quite forgive a giver” (Emerson 1923, 12). Humility can help to become sensitive
to a plenty of reasons for being grateful (cf. Hildebrandt 1980; Schwarz 1992; Scheler 2005,
24–32; Snow 2005; Wenisch 2010; McAleer 2012; Roberts 2016). If it degenerates into
self-abnegation and obsequiousness, it is, however, incompatible with authentic gratitude.

2. Elements and accounts of gratitude

Typical cases of gratitude are triadic relations: someone is grateful to x for A. Apart from
this basic form of personal (attribution-dependent or targeted) gratitude, which seems to prevail in
everyday life, there is also a dyadic relation of gratitude. The latter is outcome-dependent, but
attribution-independent and can be designated non-personal gratitude: someone is grateful for A,
for instance, for enjoying physical health, the sight of a captivating landscape or the good
luck that happens in one’s life.
In this chapter, I restrict myself to triadic or personal gratitude, which conceives of grat-
itude as an essentially social emotion that goes beyond an attribution-independent feeling of
appreciation (cf. McCullough et al. 2001, 256; Emmons and Shelton 2002, 460f.; Gulliford
et al. 2013, 297–301; Kristjánsson 2015, 500f.). The aim is to carve out the distinctive fea-
tures of gratitude as a positive emotion, which is different from other positive emotions like
joy, hope, relief or admiration (cf. Roberts 2004, 65). More precisely, I focus on the core
experience of personal gratitude. I do not pretend to cover the entire range of its social impli-
cations. The effects of this restriction need to be kept in mind. When specifying inhibiting
conditions of gratitude, for example, I do not mention institutional factors that thwart grat-
itude. Such factors certainly had to be considered if one took a more encompassing perspec-
tive. What might fill the gap between the personal and the institutional aspects of gratitude
is a closer investigation of the various ways in which gratitude and justice are interrelated, on
the one hand (cf. Solomon 1995; Boleyn-Fitzgerald 2005), and the role of gratitude, taken as
a civic virtue, in moral learning and moral education, especially in citizenship education, on
the other hand (cf. Klosko 1989; White 1999; Jonas 2012).
Investigating gratitude in terms of a triadic relation amounts to considering it as part of
benevolence/gratitude interactions. Accordingly, talk about goods for which someone is
grateful refers to goods conveyed in course of such interactions. For the present purpose, I
use “good,” “gift” and “benefit” interchangeably. When designating gratitude as a positive
emotion “positive” has at least one of the following meanings that prevail depending on the
particular context of speech: “appropriate,” “pleasant,” “positively evaluating,” “conducive
to (mental and physical) health” (cf. Kristjánsson 2013, 173f.). Moreover, it is controversial
among philosophers whether the good whose conveyance calls for gratitude should be inter-
preted in a broad (non-standard cases) or narrow sense (standard cases). Narrowly conceived,
gratitude is a response to beneficence. Broadly conceived, one should also include non-standard

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cases of gratitude to the non-maleficent, that is, those who do not harm you although they
could do so and might have good reasons to do so (cf. Smilansky 1997) and even, though
much more controversial, gratitude to the maleficent, that is, to those who pushed you towards
self-improvement by actually harming you (cf. Boleyn-Fitzgerald 2005).
Gratitude can be conceived either as an occurring emotion (episode-gratitude) or as a disposi-
tion (trait-gratitude) as is the case when it is taken as a human strength or moral virtue said
to increase individual well-being and social cohesion. The present chapter is mainly con-
cerned with episode-gratitude. Without first gaining, a clear grasp on the rational structure
of episode-gratitude one could not understand the meaning and working of trait-gratitude.
The rational structure, however, must not be considered in isolation (see Sections 3.1
and 3.2). Any complete understanding and assessment of gratitude has to take into account
the particular circumstances and modes of acting.
Among the philosophical issues that come along with gratitude, especially in deonto-
logical or virtue ethical contexts (cf. Smit and Timmons 2011; Herman 2012), is whether
one should conceive of benevolence and gratitude in terms of obligations, supererogation,
virtues or imperfect duties (cf. Card 1988; Manela 2015; Carr 2015a). It has been argued that
whether or not beneficent acts count as supererogatory depends on whether they surpass
specific demands of justice. This, again, depends on the presupposed notion of justice as has
been shown, among others, relating to the narrow and wider meaning of justice in A ristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics (cf. Heyd 1982, 42–48). The present chapter cannot enter detailed discus-
sion of these and other special issues although they will be touched on occasionally. The fo-
cus lies on a phenomenology of gratitude.

3. A phenomenological framework for studying gratitude

The main thrust of a phenomenology of gratitude does not lie with taxonomies of various
theoretical accounts of gratitude and relating classificatory issues. It rather aims at clarifying
the phenomenal qualities and the intentional structure of gratitude and, within this framework,
giving an account of its social and moral dimension. For phenomenologists, the feeling qual-
ities cannot be considered separately from the intentional structure of an experience (as is
nowadays usually supposed when referring to so-called “qualia”). The former rather are part
and parcel of the latter. According to its focus on human experience, spelled out in terms
of a variety of different forms of intentional structures, the phenomenological analysis sets
in bottom-up, yet without taking an anti-universalist position. Rather, it refers to tokens
of gratitude experiences, delivers intuition-based in-depth descriptions and thereby tries to
unveil an essential structure, which proves valid for every particular instance of the same
type of experience (cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2018).
If studying emotions proceeds bottom-up in the peculiar manner specified in Edmund
Husserl’s phenomenology, one must be all the more vigilant not to base one’s investigation
on too limited a range of cases (although cases here always function as exemplary cases).
The idea of gratitude we advance, among others, depends on the breadth and variety of
cases we take into account in the first place. For example, there are non-standard cases in
which benefactors severely suffer because they give more than they can do without. Benefi-
ciaries who learn about disproportionate sacrifices for their benefit tend to undergo mostly
negative feelings of gratitude, which are mixed up with feelings of regret, shame or guilt
(cf. Manela 2016).
The intentionalist framework and intuitive-descriptive method distinguishes the
phenomenological approach from empirical (e.g. psychological) investigations dealing with

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statistical or experimental research on gratitude’s intensity, frequency, life-span distribu-

tions or effects on physiological functioning and physical health (cf. Peterson and Seligman
2004, 558–563). Elaborating on the intentional structure of gratitude is meant to demarcate
and define the core experience of gratitude. It does not display the overall role of gratitude
in human flourishing. Neither does it overrule or render unimportant the particular con-
texts and social dynamics gratitude experiences are part of. (For an explanation of how an
intuition-based phenomenological investigation leaves room for considering varying con-
texts and various elements of experiences linked up with a routine practice of shifts of atti-
tudes see Rinofner-Kreidl 2014.) Combining intuitive and attitude-related aspects in one’s
investigation of specific emotions allows for reflectively shaping one’s emotions. Relating
to these general features, a phenomenology of emotion, which follows Husserl’s classical
brand of phenomenology, fits well with those strands of current emotion studies that embark
on moderate cognitivism (see, for instance, the conception of emotions as concern-based
construals, cf. Roberts 2003, 2007, 2013).

3.1 The intentional structure of gratitude

Clarifying the intentional structure of gratitude requires making explicit its cognitive con-
tent. The fact that the beneficiary’s gratitude is a response to another one’s benevolent in-
tention, which is perceived or otherwise immediately grasped, is of crucial importance to
understand what gratitude is and achieves. Gratitude is not merely and not exclusively a
response to the good received. This holds true even on condition that the relevant good
is urgently desired or required, which marks the subject-relative and yet objectively stated
value of the good. (The latter certainly is compatible with stating different degrees of a
particular good’s desirability or requiredness according to persons and circumstances.) The
assumption that gratitude does not only respond to the good received is corroborated if a
benefactor’s serious attempt to convey a good founders. In such cases, it regularly happens
that the beneficiary nonetheless feels and shows gratitude for the benefactor’s willingness
and effort, however futile, to convey the good. This behaviour would be irrational and hard
to understand if the only relevant factor were the value of the good (for her) as well as its
immediate and successful conveyance. Indeed, the benefactor’s kind and friendly intent is
part of the notion of benefit as it reflects common morality. Accordingly, nobody can do a
benefit without knowing that he does. Neither can one do a benefit unwillingly (cf. Seneca
1935, 379–387).
Hence, we may say that the relational (or social) aspect is crucial for gratitude to be
warranted. The benefactor’s intention to convey the good, as noticed by the beneficiary, is a
necessary condition of gratitude to be justified. Gratitude is an appropriate response primar-
ily to another one’s benevolent intention, which is directed to some particular person who
is perceived as needing help or support (cf. Seneca 1935, 401–403). The beneficiary becomes
indebted for a good bestowed on him only on condition that she conceives herself as object
of the benefactor’s goodwill intention. Gratitude therefore is part of a complex intentional
structure that entails recognition of another person, of a specific relation to her and of a
specific good conveyed (cf. Watkins 2014, 42–49). It is not simply a response to a benefit or
good considered as such, that is, in isolation from the mutual intentionality of benevolent/
gratitude interactions. Such an isolating consideration of the good conveyed is tempting only
on condition that the social interaction at issue is reduced to bargaining. Benevolent actions
and grateful responses, however, do not represent exchange relations in terms of commercial
transactions (cf. Simmel 1908). Warding off this misconception amounts to realizing that,

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at this primary level of description, the intended object of gratitude is the good-as-valuable-
for-the beneficiary-according-to-the benefactor’s-intention as the latter is conceived by the ben-
eficiary. Less technically: it is not the good as such (i.e., the good absolutely conceived) but
its meaning here and now for a particular beneficiary that is a relevant factor with regard to the
appropriateness of gratitude. Benefit appraisals therefore vary from individual to individual
(as is the case with benevolence and generosity too). Explaining the respective differences
required going beyond episode-gratitude and investigating trait-gratitude. It also required taking
into account past experiences, current social positions, the dynamics of other-perception and
self-perception, political convictions and other factors in order to fully understand what fuels
or thwarts the respective gratitude dispositions and their connection with episode-gratitude.
Each or all these factors may well undermine the giving and receiving relation. Consider,
for instance, the rule of thumb that the needier a person is the more grateful she will be for
suitable benefits.

The reverse often turns out to be true, however, especially when recipients believe their
needs are unjust or a source of shame. In such a case, the donor may be resented, and the
recipient may feel entitled to what is given.
(Lazarus 1999, 245)

This, again, touches upon the issue of a clustering of emotions, which can turn the positive
value of gratitude into a mixed or ambiguous emotion. It can even engender an altogether
different, mainly negative emotional outlook like resentment, contempt, or hate. There is no
pure and stable intentionality of gratitude responses. They are always entangled in particular
relations and social dynamics, which must be taken seriously in order to understand the eval-
uating character of the many forms of gratitude (cf. Kekes 1981, 299, 302; Blum 2000, 206,
211f., 217). In this vein, a phenomenology of gratitude delivers a thick description. It takes
note of how the various elements of benevolent/gratitude interactions are related to one
another and does not simplify the situation by, first, artificially disentangling and separating
the moments involved and, second, trying to get rid of or objectify circumstantial aspects.
Pondering possible inhibiting conditions of gratitude can pave the way for a more fine-
grained description of gratitude. Given that someone carries out a benevolent action and that
the circumstances do not impair or annul its aim and basic character, what kind of reason
could then block the beneficiary’s impulse to feel and show gratitude? A case in point is that
the beneficiary cannot enjoy the gift or cannot consider it valuable at all. If we exclude the
unlikely case that the benefactor erroneously conceived of the other person as standing in
need of shelter, food, emotional support or whatever, reasons for denying appreciation of
the gift will distribute among the following options. The beneficiary may (a) dislike the
benefactor as a person, independent of her actual gift-giving, due to previous experiences
and interactions. Or she may (b) dislike receiving help from this particular person because,
for example, the benefactor is in love with her but she does not feel the same way. Or the
benefactor who helped her getting out of an embarrassing public scenario turned out to be
a racist or sexist afterwards. Also it might be the case that the beneficiary (c) dislikes the
kind of help or support she is offered because, for instance, she feels forced into an improper
intimate relation with or subservient position to the benefactor. Or the beneficiary (d) be-
lieves that the benefactor would like to be repaid in terms of goods she does not want to give
(e.g., joining the benefactor’s religion). The beneficiary may also be inclined (e) to refute
in general being the addressee of benefaction because she reduces gratitude to and does not
distinguish it from indebtedness, which can be felt as extremely unpleasant and burdening

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(cf.  Schwarz  1992, 25; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994, 122; Watkins 2014, 215f.). Nowadays,
the received view is that gratitude cannot be reduced to indebtedness and should be distin-
guished from it, although a feeling of indebtedness regularly is part of gratitude (cf. Watkins
et al. 2006). A strong feeling of indebtedness can inhibit gratitude. It can also inhibit ac-
knowledging gratitude as a virtuous emotion. An overstatement of indebtedness is probably
also what motivates Aristotle to deny acknowledging gratitude as a virtue, since it would
not be decent and indeed demeaning for the great-minded (megalopsychoi) to show gratitude
(cf. Kristjánsson 2015). Finally, and possibly nourished or increased by (some of ) the afore-
mentioned options (a)–(e), the beneficiary may (f ) have doubts concerning the goodwill of
the benefactor.
The goodwill of the benefactor can be impaired or annulled either from reasons in-
ternal to the present (inter)action or from external reasons. In the latter case, the reasons
that diminish or abolish the benefactor’s (alleged) goodwill can, for example, refer to her
character traits and feeling dispositions. A case in point is what Max Scheler discusses under
the heading of a “pharisaic” attitude and motivation to act. Though this may characterize
an agent’s general attitude and behaviour, it has a remarkable impact on particular instances
of benevolence/gratitude interactions by redefining their intentional structure. Acting in a
pharisaic manner means not to do benevolent acts for the sake of alleviating the beneficiary’s
needs or hardship; rather carrying them out in order to publicly show up as a benevolent
person. The agent of course tries to conceal this selfish motivation or downrightly denies
having it (cf. Scheler 1973, 27, 179f., 182f.). It is an effective disqualifier of gratitude if the
beneficiary views the donor as self-serving. Authentic benevolence and authentic gratitude
are devoid of predominating pharisaic motives. It is, however, misconceived to stipulate a
radical antagonism of pure pharisaism and pure altruism (cf. Hampton 1993). Self-concern,
to some degree, is always involved. Real-life benevolence/gratitude interactions allow for
mixed motives on both sides. Mixed motives do not necessarily hamper or annul the benev-
olent act and its generosity. They are compatible with the normative idea of a benevolence/
gratitude interaction as long as the self-related aspects do not take precedence. Acting phari-
saically does not primarily concern the manner in which the benevolent act is carried out. It
rather concerns the posture or mindset of the alleged benefactor. It therefore represents an at
least semi-external inhibiting condition of gratitude. This being the case, one may argue that
pharisaic benevolence hinders the occurrence of gratitude from contingent reason.
The next step is to query whether there are inhibiting conditions of gratitude referring to
intrinsic aspects of the benevolence/gratitude interaction. Scrutinizing possible intrinsic rea-
sons for inhibiting gratitude helps to get a clearer grasp on the social and moral significance
of gratitude. It also helps to understand the specific “sense of justice” involved in everyday
benevolence/gratitude interactions.

3.2 Adverbial duties and the proper reference of “a sense of justice”

Both in philosophical and psychological literature, gratitude is usually understood as a pos-
itive emotion suited to enhance social cohesion and individual well-being. Given this char-
acteristic, it is disturbing to see how insecure and wavering actual assessments of benevolent
actions and relating responses of gratitude are. Although it is generally assumed that grati-
tude is the proper and warranted response to benevolent actions, the reality of gift-giving
shows an entire range of more or less positive or negative assessments referring to gratitude.
On various occasions, it is considered inappropriate to show gratitude because it would be
insincere, humiliating, obsequious or self-demeaning to do so. Whether or not gratitude is

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warranted in particular cases cannot be determined in advance and in a context-independent

manner. Neither can it be determined without judging upon the correlating benevolent act.
This seems clear and uncontroversial given the fact that gratitude occurs as an emotional re-
sponse. The propriety of the response, at least to a large extent, depends on the propriety of
the originary act of benevolence. Moreover, the relational aspect has to be taken in account
too. Among others, it is relevant with regard to assessing the proper intensity (magnitude)
and expression of gratitude. Whether it is suitable to feel gratitude on a given occasion,
however, first and foremost depends on the propriety of the benevolent act. “Propriety” here
does not merely refer to the occurrence or non-occurrence of gift-giving; or, to the issue
whether, from what reasons and to what extent, the benevolent action was called for at all.
The extended meaning of “propriety” in the present context mirrors the idea that the moral
assessment of gratitude depends on the desirability of the benefit from the beneficiary’s point
of view, the goodwill of the benefactor, the effort she undergoes to give the benefit (e.g., by
deviating from her social roles) and how hard it is for her to relinquish the good herself (cf.
Watkins 2014, 41–51). Yet the effective assessment of gratitude—whether it is justified and
decent to feel gratitude in particular instances of benevolence/gratitude interactions—also
and in a weighty sense depends on what has been designated “duties of manner” or “adver-
bial duties” (cf. Audi 2004, 179–182).
Adverbial duties go beyond the demand that some specific (type of ) action has to be
realized in order to meet certain normatively required achievements. They go beyond the
fulfilment of strict or perfect duties. Adverbial duties refer to the manner in which those ac-
tions are carried out whose performance is suited to meet either perfect or imperfect duties.
(The latter distinction goes back to Kant who defines imperfect duties as duties of personal
discretion: it is up to the individual agent when and to what extent they are fulfilled. On the
contrary, there is a moral demand on every agent to completely fulfil strict or perfect duties.
Cf. Kant 1964, 118–124 [§§ 27–33].) Deontologists and virtue ethicists usually agree that
benevolence is an imperfect duty: the benefactor is not strictly speaking obliged to help the
beneficiary. If she does so, the help is offered not on the basis of another one’s right or enti-
tlement (which does not exist) but on the basis of a voluntary decision and within the limits
of individual discretion. What sense could it make to nonetheless talk about adverbial duties
on these conditions? As “duties” falling on the side of the benefactor, they refer to the right
manner of giving benefits. Though the right manner of giving certainly leaves some latitude
it nonetheless is subject to an invariable constraint of rationality. The respective manner of
giving must not undermine or abolish the very nature of benefaction and, consequently,
must not disenable the beneficiary to feel and show gratitude in a proper manner. Among
Seneca’s many subtle descriptions of the dialectics involved in benevolence/gratitude inter-
actions, we find the following:

Often, I say, the benefit endures, and yet imposes no obligation. If the giver repents of
his gift, if he says that he is sorry that he gave it, if he sighs, or makes a wry face when
he gives it, if he thinks that he is, not bestowing, but throwing away, his gift, if he gave
it to please himself, or, at any rate, not to please me, if he persists in being offensive, in
boasting of his gift, in bragging of it everywhere, and in making it painful to me, the
benefit endures, although it imposes no obligation (…).
(Seneca 1935, 373)

How do adverbial duties of gratitude bear on the issue of justice and its specific weaving into
benevolence/gratitude interactions? If interactions are motivated by justice-based rights or

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entitlements, the agents are brought together on symmetrical terms, at least as far as their for-
mal roles as bearers and “executers” of the relevant rights-based claims are concerned. There
is no debt of gratitude involved. One person is entitled to receive something, and another
person is strictly obliged to give it. Both of them act in accordance with a principle of justice
or a particular application thereof (indictment) which they unanimously acknowledge. In
case of clear-cut justice-based interactions there is no absolute need to pay attention to the
peculiar manner of giving and receiving. The object conveyed is a material thing or im-
material good. To be sure, flaws concerning the manner of giving and receiving may cause
annoyance even on condition that we are dealing with justice-based claims. Yet the crucial
point is that these flaws do not undermine or annul the very nature or normative character
of the relevant act or interaction.
Gift-giving is far more susceptible to variations with regard to the manner in which it is
carried out. This goes hand in hand with other relevant differences that come to light when
this kind of interaction is compared with straightforwardly justice-based interactions. First of
all, gift-giving or benefaction is no strict obligation. The benefactor’s help, if she decides to
offer it, is voluntary and flows from her own initiative. The beneficiary’s gratitude depends
on his understanding that the benefactor acted from goodwill, without any strict obligation
and in the absence of any outer influence or force that determined her to do so. (This reflects
the feeling of undeserved benefit often reported.) Taking benevolence/gratitude interactions
at face value, it is obvious that they rest on an asymmetrical relation: the beneficiary stands
in need of some good, which is conveyed voluntarily and intentionally by the benefactor.
The beneficiary depends on the attentiveness and generosity of the benefactor. The latter
enjoys an opportunity to gain self-esteem as well as social appreciation because she is able
to alleviate the other’s plight. While the benefactor is endowed with property, knowledge,
cultural backing, professional networks or whatever appears useful and desirable, the benefi-
ciary is seriously hampered with regard to her freedom of action. She is unable to satisfy an
urgent need without the help of others, and she perceives herself unable to do so right in the
moment when she is succoured.
It is due to this striking asymmetry, which is more or less strongly felt by the parties in-
volved, that benevolence/gratitude interactions gain a considerable complexity with regard
to their intentional content and social as well as moral significance. Owing to this asym-
metry, it is all the more important to carefully pay attention to the manner of giving and
receiving. More precisely, adverbial duties are crucial with regard to benevolence/gratitude
interactions because they reflect a deeper layer of meaning, which is suited to balance the
prima facie asymmetry of giver and receiver by a more fundamental symmetry. How does
this work?
At first sight, benevolence/gratitude interactions revolve around the conveyed good and
its value for both the giver and the receiver. It is therefore plausible to consider the benefit as
the visible or otherwise immediately present object of concern. However, it is by focusing
on the (missing) fulfilment of adverbial duties that we realize the true range of the experi-
ences at issue. What is at stake goes far beyond the giving and receiving of a benefit. What
is at stake can properly be called the “topic” of benevolence/gratitude interactions, which
does not coincide with their intentional object or prima facie agential character. The topic
announces itself and can be seized (at least by those who are sensitive and attentive to these
qualifications) in the manner in which benefits are conveyed and received. The topic is a
mutually granted, that is, symmetrically “distributed” recognition-respect between the par-
ties involved (cf. Darwall 1977, 2006). Acknowledging the other in the light of this respect
is inevitable as soon as the allocation of social roles (powerful/helpless, rich/poor, generous/

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needy) is realized as built on unstable and contingent grounds. By means of empathic un-
derstanding and imagination, it is conceivable that the roles of benefactor and beneficiary
could be performed the other way round. Recognition-respect does not address the agents
as equipped with their actual social roles. It rather takes them as “naked” human beings who
find themselves in very different situations, striving to get along, to improve themselves, to
live an honourable and worthwhile life. Recognition-respect is inevitable on condition that
the donor and the receiver of a benefit both realize (and know about each other’s insight in)
their shared human vulnerability. This seems to be the ultimate ground of the experience of
gratitude: that the other’s existence must not be denied; that it is urged upon us. Seeing the
other and oneself in the light of plain existence and human vulnerability certainly cannot be
expected from young children, even if they are already able to routinely act as gift-receivers
or gift-donors and are trained to say “thank you.” Becoming sensitive to the existential level of
gift-giving has to be learned. Doing so is part of acquiring the virtue of gratitude. As long as
we restrict ourselves to what is obvious, that is, the asymmetrical relation of giving and receiving we
are inclined to merely tackle with the benefit. Yet its conveyance can occasionally be felt as a
callous demonstration of social imbalance. At this level, it is, however, impossible to under-
stand why it often is so difficult to show an authentic and pure gratitude, which evades the
risk of turning into ambiguous or even clearly negative emotions like envy or hate.
Taking the point of view of deep level recognition-respect, we are able to reevaluate the
above-mentioned case that a beneficiary feels and shows gratitude notwithstanding the fact
that the benefactor’s intention to convey a good has failed. In this case, the beneficiary’s grat-
itude depends on her confidence that the benefactor tried to convey the benefit ultimately
because of the recognition-respect directed towards her. The latter remains untouched by his failure
to convey the good. Conversely, it can be unwarranted and unacceptable to show gratitude
even if the benefit is successfully conveyed, yet the benefaction is used as a means to humil-
iate or denigrate, manipulate or compromise the beneficiary (cf. Lazarus and Lazarus 1994,
119). Due to the deprecating manner of conveying the gift, it has ceased to be a benefit: “A
gift is not a benefit if the best part of it is lacking—the fact that it was given as a mark of es-
teem” (Seneca 1935, 49). Morally assessing gift-giving requires assessing possible inhibiting
conditions in the light of the deep level involvement of recognition-respect. The immediate
starting-point for doing so is the very manner of how the giving and receiving is carried out.
The sense of justice relevant here does not refer to entitlements and obligations. It ad-
dresses the right and decent manner to encounter one’s fellow humans as it is reflected in the
very manner of giving and receiving benefits. This particular sense of justice usually remains un-
expressed. It is primarily given in terms of an emotional awareness of the other’s presence
as it is especially realized in her empathic understanding. The sense of justice involved in
benevolence/gratitude interactions does not stand in need of deliberation or theoretical in-
vestigation in order to be grasped. In particular, it must not be reduced to calculations of a
“debt balance” (cf. Komter 2004, 206f.). It rather reflects the deeper existential dimension
of this kind of interaction and the tacitly shared willingness not to let the obvious asym-
metry between giver and receiver determine their other-perception and self-esteem. There
is no right that underlies this mutual willingness. Neither do the agents have any theory of
human dignity in mind. Yet being engaged in gift-giving the agents can clearly feel their
respective vulnerability, at least if they have reached a mature level of moral perception
(cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2013, 175–181, 186–191). The “object” of gratitude, at this level, is the
experience of sharing their human vulnerability. Correspondingly, deep level ingratitude goes
beyond the ordinary conception of ingratitude, that is, one’s failing to appreciate a “visible”
gift conveyed. It manifests itself as the inability to gain access to the feeling of deep level symmetry

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or existential equality. Let us assume that it is indeed a matter of the agents’ moral matu-
rity whether they become aware of their existential community. We then need to ponder
whether deep level ingratitude (fully) lies within the individual’s responsibility or whether
it is due to unfavourable circumstances of life and bad moral luck. Hence, it is not only the
obvious issue of charity and generosity but also the above-sketched deep level sense of justice
involved in gratitude that leads us back into the more robust political struggles about unequal
distributions of opportunities and favourable circumstances of life. From this point of view,
gratitude ceases to be a mild and calm emotion. It rather presents itself as a burdened virtue
(cf. Tessman 2005), which includes the task to discriminate excessive or misplaced thank-
fulness from virtuous gratitude (cf. Carr 2015a, 2015b). A so-conceived gratitude is bound
within the limits of a precarious life and incessantly on the edge to turn into anger, indigna-
tion, rage or other self-protective emotions and reactive attitudes. Understanding gratitude
in its full complexity also requires seeing it as part of conflicting claims and far-reaching
social dynamics (cf. McConnell 2016; Smilansky 2016).
Let us take stock. In the present section, I submitted that adverbial duties are crucial
because (i) they bring to bear the sense of justice that is involved in benevolence/gratitude
interactions; (ii) if met properly, they can counterbalance the asymmetry between bene-
factor and beneficiary in a way that allows the latter to authentically feel gratitude without
being forced into ambiguous emotions. Adverbial duties are the main reference for defining
enabling and inhibiting conditions of gratitude. (iii) They reflect and render accessible the
deeper meaning layer and overall topic of benevolence/gratitude interactions, that is, mutu-
ally granted recognition-respect.

4. Concluding remarks
Benevolence/gratitude interactions must not be misconceived in terms of merely conven-
tional practices or commercial exchanges. Neither can they be reduced to straightforwardly
justice-based interactions that posit rights or entitlements and corresponding obligations.
Benevolence/gratitude relations hinge upon the benefactor’s voluntariness and genuine and
honest goodwill. They also hinge upon the beneficiary’s capability to ungrudgingly accept
being succoured, to enjoy the good and to freely express her gratitude. All of this can be hard
to realize or can become an inroad for deception and self-deception.
Gratitude does not only strengthen social ties on condition of asymmetrically distrib-
uted social roles, positions and powers. The formative effects of gratitude (cf. Fredrickson
2004) also include the shaping of a virtuous character whose manifestation in an agent’s
emotional responses and actions goes beyond the more superficial aspects of human inter-
action in favour of its existential layers. In giving and receiving gifts in a proper manner the
deep symmetry of mutual recognition-respect “shines through” and thereby counterbal-
ances those destabilizing elements of the social situation that easily bring it about that the
positive feeling of gratitude turns into an ambiguous or thoroughly negative emotion. As
argued above, adverbial duties function as intermediaries between the conspicuously given
benevolence/gratitude interactions and the deeper meaning structure of recognition-respect.
As to the latter, the crucial question is how to treat fellow human beings on conditions of
dependency, which cover both circumstances of life and acquired attachment styles. The
deep level sense of justice involved in everyday benevolence/gratitude interactions therefore
seems to be connected with an inchoate and unarticulated, yet emotionally ingrained sense
of self which amounts to a sense-of-self-as-encountering-the-other or as-bound-up-with-
the-other. The relevant sense of justice is a sense of being human (cf. Roberts 2007, 147).

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The above-sketched phenomenology of gratitude submits a phenomenological explana-

tion of what philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists often have been
stating: that gratitude is a positive emotion, which is apt to strengthen social cohesion and
individual well-being. Yet, it does so in a far more complicated manner than one might have
expected. The accurate meaning, evaluation and effects of gratitude vary according to the
personalities and types of action involved (e.g. being grateful for a good Samaritan’s help;
for having been courageous enough to beat off a rapist’s attack). They also vary according
to the social contexts in which benevolence/gratitude interactions occur. Resulting from its
context-sensitive appearance and against the grain of a commonplace, our emotional prac-
tice does not show gratitude as an overall calm, kind and unequivocally positive emotion.

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