BLE

Elizabeth Catolos Vs. Atty. Teresita Capacillo A.C. No. 7950. March 13, 2019 Resolution

FACTS: Petitioner was the lessee of Spouses George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim). Their
lease contract covered a property where petitioner's restaurant was located. However, six
months after the lease contract was executed, Spouses Lim refused to accept petitioner's
tender of payment of rent. This prompted petitioner to file a civil case for enforcement or
rescission of the contract before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Respondent and her
father, Atty. Alfonso Capacillo, allegedly acted as counsels for Spouses Lim.

On June 3, 2007, petitioner claimed that respondent, accompanied by two policemen, forcibly
ejected her employees from the leased premises despite the absence of a valid court order.
Additionally, petitioner alleges that respondent, on June 6, 2007, led a team of men in removing
the signage of her restaurant, again without any court order.

These two incidents prompted petitioner to seek the disbarment of respondent before the IBP.

According to Investigating Commissioner Hababag, the lease contract has been validly
terminated by Spouses Lim and petitioner was not able to show how respondent was involved in
drafting or enforcing the lease contract. The IBP Board of Governors subsequently adopted and
approved Investigating Commissioner Hababag' s report and recommendation.

Petitioner then filed this petition to assail the IBP’s dismissal of her disbarment complaint. After
receiving respondent's comment on the petition, we resolved to refer the case back to the IBP
for another investigation, report, and recommendation.

Issue: W/N respondent acted as counsel for spouses Lim?

Ruling: Yes. There is substantial evidence to show that, indeed, respondent acted as counsel
for Spouses Lim. Respondent has consistently denied being the legal counsel for Spouses Lim,
and has gone so far as to state that she "did not and do not participate in the affairs of the
Capacillo Law Office," the firm representing Spouses Lim which is owned and managed by
respondent's father. Records disclose, however, that all the pleadings submitted by respondent
in this case were prepared by the Capacillo Law Office. Respondent also had access to all
documents, including pleadings and letters, prepared or filed by the Capacillo Law Office on
behalf of Spouses Lim.

Respondent is enjoined to represent her clients with zeal but only within the bounds of the law
(Canon 19). In particular, every lawyer is required to employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client (Canon 19.01). This, respondent failed to heed. By
forcibly ejecting petitioner's employees and removing the signage of petitioner's business,
respondent took the law into her own hands.

In Areola v. Mendoza, 21this Court reminded that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means not
honorable, fair and honest, which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion
to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Teresita Capacillo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year, effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with a stem warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. (RCBI Bohol vs
Florido, same circumstances, the penalty imposed is 1 year)
TANHUECO vs DE DUMO, AM No 1437, April 25 1989

FACTS:

Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for his refusal
to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as a
counsel in certain collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may
be able to collect from debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of
what he may be able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not turn over
the P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s fee.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not De Dumo committed a professional misconduct
2. Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive

HELD:

1. Yes. Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client,

constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. x x x When respondent
withheld and refused to deliver the money received by him for his client, the deceased
complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, he breached the trust reposed upon him. The claim of the
respondent that complainant had failed to pay his attorney’s fees is not an excuse for
respondent’s failure to deliver any amount to the complainant. It is of course true that under
Section 37 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, an attorney has—–“a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.” The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on
moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his duty promptly to
account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.

2. Yes. De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of
the total amount due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because
he took advantage of his client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states
that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to be
unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of the
court has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties, and hence,
the fees should be subject to judicial control.

Thus, De Dumo is suspended from the practice of law for six months and the attorney’s
fee is reduced to 15% of the total amount collected by him. He is also ordered to return the P
10, 200.00 net amount of the P 12, 000.00 he collected and entitled of 15% attorney’s fee in
case he made any other collection from Tanhueco’s debtors.
STAT CON
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO P. DE LEON,
Respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department

of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140,
which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. Thereafter, and for
more than nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001,
when he failed to receive his monthly pension.

Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire
under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having
the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits
provided thereunder.

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be
compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from
2001. The CA granted the petition. Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the
Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS argues that
the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform
an act that is contrary to law.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in granting the petition for mandamus?

HELD: This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44
years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly
pension, but found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance.
This is a situation that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are
in the class of social legislation. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in
favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.

RA 8291 “SECTION 13-A. Conditions for Entitlement. — A member who retires from the
service shall be entitled to the retirement benefits in paragraph (a) of Section 13 hereof:
Provided, That:
(1) he has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) he is at least sixty (60) years of age at the time of retirement; and
(3) he is not receiving a monthly pension benefit from permanent total disability.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO P. DE LEON,
Respondent.

Doctrine: Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree
because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even
comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach
aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security,
and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws
are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their
humanitarian purpose.

Facts: Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ in
1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140,
which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. The
application was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine years,
respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to
receive his monthly pension.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS HEREOF BY
THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, AND TO REPEAL COMMONWEALTH
ACT NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIX

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3783

AN ACT REORGANIZING THE PROSECUTION DIVISION AND THE DEPORTATION BOARD OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FIXING THE COMPENSATION OF CERTAIN
PERSONNEL THEREIN.

RA 4140

"Section 2-A. The rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of chief state prosecutor,
assistant chief state prosecutors and chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board shall be the same as
those prescribed for judges of courts of first instance; the rank and qualifications for appointment to
the position of state prosecutors and trial attorneys of the Deportation Board shall be the same as
those prescribed for provincial fiscals.

Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not
qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices
and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle
respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Thus, GSIS stopped the
payment of respondent’s monthly pension.

He sent several letters to the GSIS which went unanswered. The GSIS finally wrote him
a reply which stated that: he has chosen to retire and in fact have already retired under
a different law, Republic Act No. 910, more than fifteen (15) years ago. There is nothing
in the GSIS law which sanctions double retirement unless the retiree is first re-employed
and qualifies once again to retire under GSIS law. In fact, Section 55 of Republic Act
No. 8291 provides for exclusivity of benefits which means that a retiree may choose
only one retirement scheme available to him to the exclusion of all others.

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be
compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly
benefits from 2001. He also asked that GSIS and the DBM be ordered to pay him
damages. The CA GRANTED his petition. 

GSIS assails the decision of the CA before the SC.

Issue: WON respondent should continue receiving monthly pension and monthly
benefits from GSIS.

Held. YES. This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving
office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a
regular monthly pension, but found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without
means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries out for the proper
application of retirement laws, which are in the class of social legislation.

In stopping the payment of respondent’s monthly pension, GSIS relied on the

memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel’s opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under
R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent
was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant
retirement law. This is flawed logic. 

Respondent’s disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910
does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any
other existing retirement law.

Respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire under P.D. No. 1146, since this
law provides for higher benefits, and because the same was the latest law at the time of
his retirement in 1992.

To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS
mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A.
No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondent’s claim, in
substitution of R.A. No. 910. In this way, GSIS would be faithful to its mandate to
administer retirement laws in the spirit in which they have been enacted, i.e., to provide
retirees the wherewithal to live a life of relative comfort and security after years of
service to the government. Respondent will not receive — and GSIS is under no
obligation to give him — more than what is due him under the proper retirement law.

Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the
government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.

In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that
employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of
the terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate
service to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of
emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service.
Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of
their lives in the service of their country.

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under
pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become
due as provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can
deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without
notice and opportunity to be heard.

It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No.
910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court.

One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioner’s
interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to
administer the government’s retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS
personnel knew what they were doing. 

Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be

prejudiced by the same.1avvHis right to receive monthly pension from the government
cannot be jeopardized by a new interpretation of the law. 

GSIS’ argument that respondent has already been enormously benefited under R.A.
No. 910 misses the point. 

Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the
employer, and are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life,
lessening the burden of having to worry about his financial support or upkeep. A
pension partakes of the nature of “retained wages” of the retiree for a dual purpose: to
entice competent people to enter the government service; and to permit them to retire
from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor,
but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.

Surely, giving respondent what is due him under the law is not unjust enrichment. 

As to conversion, respondent himself admitted that, if the DBM had not suspended the
payment of his pension, he would not have sought any other law under which to receive
his benefits. The necessity to “convert” was not a voluntary choice of respondent but a
circumstance forced upon him by the government itself.
AMORA, JR. VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ARNIELO S.

OLANDRIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time,
Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in 2007
and in 2007. Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before
the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC
was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora
merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo
Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public,
Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League
of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running
for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn
COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the
imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific
wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

 (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of
this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it
specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the
COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify
a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to
personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this
regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He
said that according to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the
requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew
each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter,
but they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not
proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

GRANTED.
Sps. Gauvain Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97973,
January 27, 1992

FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a

review on the decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals –
sustaining the right of private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land
sold to petitioners. It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands
acquired through free patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB;
developed it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP
foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such
property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe
filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted the
claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA, alledging,
among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the five-year period
in foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and
instead relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which
was applied retroactively. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding

the foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v.
Angeles and instead applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v.
IAC?

HELD: Yes.

REASONING:

At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still
the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at
bar. However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in
1988 thereby rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the
Supreme Court sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that
though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the
Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided””. Moreover,
the Court emphasized that “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the
Belisario ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the
contrary. CA erred in its decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such
decision was reversed and set aside.