CANONS 7-9

1. In re Edillon
(A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978])

Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?

Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom
to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the
lawyers. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as
a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient
to state then that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction
was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to
remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

2. B.M. No. 1370 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP
Dues May 9, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:  Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the
amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service
then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with
the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US.
The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status
as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP
annual membership.

HELD:  NO.  The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory
measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The
compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless
whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP
membership fee dues is denied.
 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon: o Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. o But we must
here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
 As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails
the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
 WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-
2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that
failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

3. GARCIA vs. BALA

Facts:
 On April 8, 1999, Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed a Letter-
Complaint against Atty. Rolando S. Bala.
 They alleged that he failed to render a legal service contracted -- the preparation of a
petition for review that he was to file with the CA in connection with their case in
Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB).
 Moreover, he refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for the purpose.
 Finally, he hurled invectives at them when they asked him for a copy of the petition
that he claimed to have filed.
 The respondent to comment on the Complaint.
 He failed to comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be heard.
 The referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
 The IBP found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 Despite due notice, he neither submitted a position paper nor appeared at any of the
hearings called by the Commission. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of
complainants’ evidence.
 IBP recommended that respondent should be reprimanded and suspended from the
practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within thirty days from his
receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest from the filing of the
present Complaint with the Court.

Issue: 1) Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 18.02, 18.03 and 18.04. YES.
2) Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 7. YES.

Ruling:
 The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.
 Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence.
 Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. A client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to
rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
 Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the
correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly assured them that
the supposed petition had already been filed.
 Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there
was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore
negligent.
 Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent
purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them on the appeal, and misled them as
to his whereabouts. Moreover, he uttered invectives at them when they visited him for an
update on the case.
 (Rule 18.04) Accordingly, complainants had the right to be updated on the
developments and status of the case for which they had engaged the services of
respondent. But he apparently denied them that right.
 (Canon 7) Furthermore, for using unsavory words against complainants, he should also
be sanctioned. Lawyers may be disciplined -- whether in their professional or in their
private capacity -- for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.
 He ignored the directive for him to file his comment, just as he had disregarded the
IBP hearing commissioner’s orders for the conduct of hearings, submission of
documentary evidence and position paper. Never did he acknowledge or offer any excuse
for his noncompliance.
 Clearly, his conduct manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. Despite the fact
that his profession and honor are at stake, he did not even bother to speak a word in his
defense.
 Apparently, he has no wish to preserve the dignity and honor expected of lawyers and
the legal profession. His demeanor is clearly demeaning.

4. In Re: Ramon Galang

FACTS:  Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling fact that the grade
in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another,
before the bar results were released this year and that there are grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects that underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to release of
results.
 The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five
subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law
and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954, Ramon Galang,
underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the
respective examiner concerned. Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement
admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject
upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
 The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations.
 Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to
the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-
evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because
of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political,
Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
 An investigation conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang, was charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same university. Confronted
with this information, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
 It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF
Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s
statement of assets and liabilities were not taken up during the investigation but were examined
as parts of the records of the court.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating
Galang’s exam notebooks.
2.) Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his
pending case.
HELD: 1.) YES. o It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to
individually re-examine the grades of Galang to help him pass even without the authority of the
Court. A.C. No. 1163 In Re: Ramon Galang August 29, 1975 o All respondents Bar examiners
candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question
upon the misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good
faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any
consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly that indeed the examiners made
the re-evaluation in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever. But the favorable re-
evaluations made by the examiners were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation
and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. o It should be stressed that once the bar
examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. The Bar
Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it
by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees
and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. o The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for
valuable consideration. There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may
be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court. 2.) YES. o Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his
oath. o That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of
his license to practice law is well — settled. Furthermore, respondent’s persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some
of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he
finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify
thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case
up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
 Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar
must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this
resulted him to revoked his license.
 The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession,
which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3)
a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles The determination
of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion.
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed
of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman A.C. No. 1163 In Re: Ramon Galang August 29,
1975 and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with
one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar
Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar
Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must
always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose
position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with
the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be
strictly adhered to.
 It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the
Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior
authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
 WHEREFORE, in Administrative Case No. 1162, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo is hereby
disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys; and in Administrative Case
No. 1163, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is hereby likewise disbarred and
his name also ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duty to the LEGAL PROFESSION- Upholding the

integrity of the Profession

5. Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

7 SCRA 475 (1963)

FACTS:

Diao was admitted to the Bar and after two years later, Martinez charged him
with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar examination, that
he had the requisite academic qualifications. The Solicitor General
investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of
attorneys because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in
this court, he had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required
academic requisite prescribed by the Department of Private Education.
Particulary the petitioner (1) did not complete his high school training; (2)
never attended Quisumbing College and (3) never obtained a diploma.

Diao admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in
his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which according to him is equivalent to a
high school diploma and upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school
hence no certification from proper officials to effect the equivalence was
presented to substantiate the claim. Moreover, the court found the second
charge clearly meritorious that Diao never obtained his diploma from
Quisumbing College and yet his application for examination represented him
as an A.A. graduate. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949 stating that he was erroneously certified, due
to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Analyzing the petitioner’s claim to have acquired the AA degree at Arellano
University would also disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing
that he began his law studies six months before obtaining the Associate in
Arts degree, then he was not qualified to take the bar exam as required by the
Rule and must affirm under oath by applicant “ That previous to the study of
law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education as prescribed bt Department of Private Education”

ISSUE:
WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not
completing pre-law requirements?

HELD:
NO. Plainly Diao was not qualified to take the bar exam such that his
admission to the bar was under pretense that he had acquired pre-legal
education, a requirement before one could take the bar exam. In so, such
admission under pretense shall be revoked and the fact that he passed the
Bar exam is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of
legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name thus was
stricken out from the Rolls of Attorneys required to return his lawyer's
diploma within thirty days.

6. TOLOSA vs. CARGO

A.M. No. 2385 | March 8, 1989

Facts:

 Complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint seeking the
disbarment of respondent District Citizens’ Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant’s) wife
Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that his
wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a “Comment and/or Answer”
denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that
complainant’s wife had been seeing him but that she had done so in the course of
seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted
marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her), much as complainant’s
mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife
and mother as to what to do about the” continuous quarrels between affiant and his
wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter
sustained from the former.
 Complainant filed a Reply to respondent’s “Comment and/or Answer” and made a
number of further allegations, to wit:

(a) That complainant’s wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;

(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant’s wife
last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;

(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that
she had refused to do so;

(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was
living although she had no means of livelihood; and

(e) That respondent was paying for his wife’s house rent.

Respondent filed a Rejoinder denying the further allegations of complainant, and

stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant’s wife the amount of
P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.

The Solicitor General found that complainant’s charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General
found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:

1. Respondent’s failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant’s suspicion

and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.

2. Priscilla’s being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a

friend and former client of respondent.

1. Respondent’s failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his
differences with complainant.

2. Respondent’s failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving

complainant and Priscilla’s brothers

3. Respondent’s interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the
FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant.

Issue: WON the respondent should be suspended

Held: NO.

Ratio: The record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had
indeed been cohabiting with complainant’s wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for
failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from
the members of the Bar and officers of the court.  As officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards.

Dispositive: The Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct

unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that
continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the
future.

7. LIM SE V. ARGEL
Facts:
Lim Se and Benito Lim were leasing from Chiombon, through her attorney-in-fact San Pedro, the
ground floor, mezzanine, and basement of the Venancia Building in Baguio City from 1965 to
1970. When the lease expired, Lim Se leased the same premises from the Estates of Reyes, Sr.
from 1971 to 1973.
An interpleader action was filed by Lim Se and the other tenants against San Pedro and the Estate
to determine to whom rentals will be paid; the Court ruled in favour of the Estate.

From 1974 to 1977, Lim Se and his son Benito leased the premises from the Estate. The New Life
Café and Restaurant was operated by Benito on the premises.

Meanwhile, Bulatano, who claimed to have purchased on December 9, 1970 the said building
from Ocampo, who allegedly bought it from Chiombon, filed an action for the recovery of rentals
and damages from the Estate, Lim, Ocampo and Remedios for their occupancy of the building. He
also filed a case in the Caloocan City Branch of CFI of Rizal to recover possession against Ocampo
and San Pedro. Ocampo and San Pedro thus instituted a third party complaint against Lim Se and
Benito to vacate the premises. Lim Se and Benito opposed due to improper venue (there was a
stipulation in the contract that in case of a suit, it should be filed in the City of Baguio, which was
denied.

A summary judgment was granted in favour of Ocampo and San Pedro, in which Lim Se and
Benito were ordered to vacate the premises. Lim Se and Benito appealed while Ocampo and San
Pedro asked for a writ of execution. Lim Se and Benito also filed an MR and to hold the case in
abeyance, which was denied. The summary judgement was declared final and executory, the
appeal not having been perfected.
A writ of possession instead of the usual writ of execution was issued by the Branch Clerk of
Court, in which the City Sheriff was ordered to take possession of the premises occupied by Lim,
to eject them and anybody claiming under them and to deliver the possession to Ocampo and San
Pedro.

Sheriff Par then delivered the writ to Lim and issued an ultimatum that they should remove all
their properties from the premises within two hours.

Petitioners are claiming that the writ was enforced in a most cruel and oppressive manner and
that the Court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in rendering a
summary judgment in the ejectment case (the third party complaint). After a bond was given by
petitioners, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, directing the Sheriff to place
petitioners in possession of the premises from which they had been ousted.
Atty. Adaza, a lawyer who never appeared in the lower court and acted independently of both San
Pedro’s and Ocampo’s lawyers, filed a motion to lift the injunction.

Issue: W/N Atty. Adaza should be cited for contempt.

Held: Yes.
Atty. Adaza’s characterization of the mandatory injunction as “unjust and a miscarriage of justice”
and as devoid of factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolution of
the Court as if it were a pleading of the adversary which he could assail in unrestrained or
abrasive language. His unjustified and disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious
derogatory implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or contempt in
facie curiae.

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

8. LIKONG, ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the
latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.

On September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L.

Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment,
assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United States
government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states
that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a
special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her pension
checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently
prepared and notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
About three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special power of attorney,
complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the special power
of attorney preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City
post office, As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages
against complainant. He was represented by Atty Lim the respondent in the case.

On July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the
pension checks, wherein Cerina was not represented by her counsel, same with Aug 1985
where a compromise agreement were entered into by Cerina and Yap, Atty Lim wasn’t there
to represent her client.
With this, petitioner filed a complaint for disbarment, based on the following allegations:

* complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two
(2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself
despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the same.

* Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to consult
her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she
would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was
assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to
sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event
respondent already took care of everything;

* Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;

* Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent complainant and

connived in her defeat;

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that YES, the respondent was guilty of MISCONDUCT under
the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 9 which states that “Negotiations
with opposite party. A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate
or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law”, and Canon
1.01, 8.02 and 15.03.

Such acts of the respondent constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they
likewise prevent justice from being attained. Respondent was suspended from the practice of
law for 1 year.

9. ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

FACTS:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private
practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to
inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the
MCTC.  Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case. 
  Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented.  To this respondent
retorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?”   Complainant
replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents.
Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant
explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered,
respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then
returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!”  (“Vulva of your mother, you
woman!”) 
  Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of
the case in view of the respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven
already.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

RULING:
Respondent is fined the amount of 10,000 with a warning.
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation
that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted
to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right to
impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of
encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.
  His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court
was not only ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of
the complainant’s subordinates.  For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized   to   the   complainant   and  
the   latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved
from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say
and do even if they repent afterwards.