BONGALONTA V. CASTILLO, ET AL.

,
CBD CASE NO. 176, 20 JANUARY 1995
FACTS:
 Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the
Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.

 The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for
estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action,
where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece
of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty.
Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

 During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a
sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against
the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In
this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary
responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a
judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due
time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

 It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and
the same IBP receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by
Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the
satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.

 After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings
and recommendations:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
 Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The complaint
against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING:
 The Court agreed with the foregoing findings and recommendations. The practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation, for
this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in

violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty.

IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF

ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLON

Doctrine: par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the
Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

“SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.—Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension
of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.”
 The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these
words of the Court Rule:

‘SECTION 1. Organization.—There is hereby organized an official national body to be

known as the ‘Integrated Bar of the Philippines,’ composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.”

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

“SEC. 9. Membership dues.—Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court.

FACTS:
 Respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

 November 29, 1975 - the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

 January 21, 1976 - the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

“. . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.”
 January 27, 1976 - Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter.

 February 23, 1976 - reiterated his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him
 March 24, 1976 - IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors submitted a joint reply after
they were required by the court.

 June 3, 1976 – Set for hearing.

 After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution

Issues:
1. Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
2. Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
3. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
4. Whether the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.

Ruling:
1. Compelling a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the constitutional
freedom to associate but the only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the payment of annual
dues which is not violation of the Constitution; Compulsion upon a lawyer if any justified by
exercise of police power of the State.

Reasons:
 To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate.
 He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
 legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program—the lawyers.
 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.

2. Provisions of the Court Rule requiring payment of membership dues by lawyers not violative
of the Constitution; The 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the Supreme Court from
requiring lawyers to pay reasonable membership fees; Nature of membership fees.

Reasons:
 We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power
the respondent acknowledges—from requiring members of a privileged class such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong.
 It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

3. Enforcement of penalty provisions for non-payment of membership dues not a deprivation of

due process; Reasons; Practice of law in the courts subject to regulation and inquiry;
Practice of law is not property right but mere privilege

Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power
to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce
its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege,13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4. The Supreme Court has power and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys; Court’s jurisdiction provided for in the 1973 Constitution.
It is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES
B.M. NO. 1370, 9 MAY 2005

NATURE/KEYWORDS No exemption from payment of IBP membership dues; IBP fee is

imposed as a regulatory measure

DOCTRINE Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the

IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of,
or the type of practice, the member is engaged in

SALIENT n/a
PROVISION/S

FACTS This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Arevalo, Jr. He is a
member of the Philippine Bar and he claims that he mandated to
pay the IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine
Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of
one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
 Meanwhile, IBP contended that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included
in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of
the IBP; that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues as requested by respondent. What is allowed is
voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. Finally, it
asserted that Arevalo could have informed the secretary of the IBP
of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP
could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped.

ISSUE(S) WON the petitioner (Arevalo) is entitled to exemption from payment

of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of
law?

RULING(S) NO. Arevalo is not entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law. 

IBP is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to

be members. It is organized by or under the direction of the State.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in
its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of his annual dues.

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the

Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar — which power required members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership

in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of,
or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before
he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of

 IBP dues is DENIED.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: (if any)

 ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER:
 He claims that annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as
equal protection clause and the due process clause.
 The dues is oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is
without income derived from his law practice.
 His removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation
of property right without due process of law. 
 Lastly, he claims that nonpractice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither
injurious.

REYES V. NIEVA
A.C. NO. 8560, 6 SEPTEMBER 2016
FACTS:
 Complainant works at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as an
Administrative Aide on a Job.
 Sometime in January 2009, she was reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary
under the supervision of respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary.
 Complainant notice that during office hours, respondent would often watch ”pampagana”
videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films.
 Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her
hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. He even offered her a cellular phone and load
necessary load for their private communication.
 In the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing
that respondent might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her
officemates to accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent’s arrival and
seeing that complainant had companions, he just told complainant and the other two (2)
office staff to lock the door when they leave.
 On the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her on her cellular phone, asked if
she received his text message, and told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at
the office. Respondent then placed his hand on complainant’s waist area near her breast
and started caressing the latter’s torso.
 Respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocket. In the morning of the same day, while complainant and respondent were left alone in
the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant’s arm, and uttered
“let’s seal it with a kiss,” then attempted to kiss complainant.
 This prompted complainant to thwart respondent’s advances with her left arm, raised her
voice in order to invite help, and exclaimed “wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo
magagalit, sir may asawa ako.” Complainant immediately left the office to ask assistance
from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative case against
respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI).
 Complainant alleged that she was traumatized and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to
be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression. Eventually,
complainant filed the instant complaint.

 In his defense, respondent denied all of complainant’s allegations. He maintained that as a

79-year old retiree who only took a position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very
unlikely for him to do the acts imputed against him, especially in a very small office space
allotted for him and his staff.

 In a Resolution 18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board)
unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. As such, respondent
was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

 The IBP Board referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
study, evaluation, and submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP
Board.

 The director adhere to the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as
it is supported by the evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the
previous IBP Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and should therefore, be set
aside. In this light, the current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated August 10, 2014
setting aside the previous IBP Board’s Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed the
administrative complaint against respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Ruling:
Yes.

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The provision instructs that “[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.”

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xx xx
Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Good moral character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be
defined as “what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.”

Such requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely:

(a) to protect the public;
(b) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(c) to protect prospective clients; and
(d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character
is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer’s bounden duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity, and the legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted
positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that “as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the
bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.” Consequently, any errant
behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

An excerpt of transcript shows that IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that
respondent did not perform the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript proves that
there was indeed a period of time where complainant and respondent were left alone in the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which gave respondent a window of opportunity to carry out
his acts constituting sexual harassment against complainant.

More importantly, records reveal that complainant’s allegations are adequately supported by a
Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation dated April 13, 2009 stating that the onset of her psychiatric
problems – diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression –
started after suffering the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent. 
In the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence “means evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.”

Complainant has established her claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion – that is, that respondent had harassed her and
committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine, respondent
should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,

Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

ARNADO V. ADAZA
A.C. NO. 9834, 26 AUGUST 2015
FACTS:
 In March 15, 2013, Arnado called the attention of the SC to the practice of Adaza of
indicating “MCLE application for exemption under process” in his pleadings filed in 2009-
2012, and “MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a pleading filed in 2012.
Arnado informed the SC that he inquired from the MCLE Office of the status of Adaza’s
compliance and received a Certification from the MCLE Executive Director that Adaza did
not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850 for the periods: First Compliance
Period (April 15, 2001 – April 14, 2004); Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 – April
14, 2007); and Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 – April 14, 2010). Also, his
application for exemption from MCLE requirement on 2009 was denied by the MCLE
Governors on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in
law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. In his Comment, Adaza stated that he
was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. Adaza then
 enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for
about 50 years.

He stated:
1) that he was the first outsider of the SC whom president Cory offered a seat as Justice of the
SC but refused the intended appointment because he hid not like some of the Cory crowd;
2) That he almost single-handedly handled the case of Cory in canvassing of the results in the
1986 snap elections, discussing constitutional and legal issues which finally resulted to
EDSA I revolution;
3) That he was one of the two lead counsels of Senator MDS in the national canvassing for
President, the other counsel being the former Justice Serafin Cuevas;
4) The he handled the 1987 and 1989, as well as the 2003 Coup cases;
5) That he filed a case in the SC contesting the constitutionality of 2010 national elections;
6) That he filed a case together with another lawyer in the SC on the constitutionality of the
Corona impeachment;
7) That he has been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as
Governor of Misamis Oriental, Commission of Immigration and senior member of the
Opposition in the regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and
Constitutional Amendments;
8) That he was the leading Opposition member Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election
Law;
9) That he was the leading member of the Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the
debate in the complaint for impeachment against President Marcos;
10) That he has been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from
the MCLE. He also further claimed that he had written five books. The OBC recommended
that Adaza be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of noncompliance with
the MCLE requirements. It further recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
six months. 

ISSUE:
WON Adaza administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements?

RULING:
 Yes. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education
“to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law”.

 Arnado’s letter covered Adaza’s pleadings filed in 2009 – 2012, which means he also failed
to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period (April 15, 2010 –
April 14, 2013). According to the MCLE Governing Board, Adaza’s application for exemption
covered First and Second Compliance Periods, but did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period.

 The application for exemption was denied on January 2009, however, the MCLE Office
failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption of Adaza, and only informed him
in its letter dated October 1, 2012 when it received inquiries from complainants.

 Clearly, Adaza had been remised in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter
No. 850. But the MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on Adaza’s
application for exemption on January 14, 2009, it took the office three years to inform Adaza
of the denial of his application.

 Hence, during the period when respondent indicated “MCLE application for exemption under
process” in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on
his application for exemption.

 However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still
took Adaza one year to file a motion for reconsideration.

 After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Adaza still took, and still taking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of MCLE.

 In addition, when Adaza indicated “MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in
a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

 Adaza’s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(1)REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as

the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November
2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the
IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF

TELESFORO A. DIAO, v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, Petitioner.

Facts:
 Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar in 1953
 Two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.

Solicitor-General submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of
attorneys, Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre- legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially in the following
particulars:
 a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom

Diao answer: Practically admits the first charge; but he claims that although he had left high
school in his third year, he entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification
Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his
return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of
3rd and 4th year high school.

Issue: Whether or not Atty Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law?

Ruling: YES
 The Court have serious doubts about the validity of his claim because respondent failed to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school official

 Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate 19401941 of such college. Now,
asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April 1949, he says he
was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.

 Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
2nd semester of 1948-1949 six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.

 And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules
provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to
the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education." (italics on
"previous")
 Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due
to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar.
 Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.

 The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is
not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of
legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days.

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O.

AILES, Respondent.

CAPTIO MAXIMINO NOBLE III, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES,

N RESPONDENT.

2015-07-01 | A.C. No. 10628

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS  This is a disbarment case dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant
Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes
(Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

 Maximino alleged that in 2010, Atty. Orlando, filed a complaint for

damages against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo),
whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein.

 In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-

12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-0008689 / Issued on
March 10, 2008." 

 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint,
Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his
IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance, not just the second.
 Meanwhile, in 2011, Maximino learned that Marcelo filed grave threats
and estafa case against Orlando. 

 When Maximino was furnished a copy of said complaint, he found out that
through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming
that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees.

"x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with
his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court
records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial
stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot
of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."

 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate

Services of Counsel in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximino… 

"x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants
in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law
practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional
fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services
reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss
x x x"… 

 as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo

for his signature.
 
 Insulted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with
violation of Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for the
disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.

 Orlando, in his defense, denied the charges against him and claimed
that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a
ground for disbarment.

 Orlando said that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and

Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo
when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case.
 
 He insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages
sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and
were uttered in good faith.
  Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo
against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation and after voluntarily
entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of said crime. 

IBP Report and Recommendation

 The IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case

against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance
requirement is not a ground for disbarment.

 The IBP Commissioner neither found any violation of the CPR so

gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on the part of
Orlando, since the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, was
done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be
published. 

 The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP

Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case
against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. 

 Maximino moved for reconsideration which was however denied.

 Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
RULING NO.  The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards
of legal proficiency and morality.

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and

candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
 Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

 Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should

always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.

 In Buatis Jr. v. People, the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words
"lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a
letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious
which effectively maligned his integrity.

 In this case, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly because
those were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as
evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid).

 Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in

the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and
purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected
Maximino.

 As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect

in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to
whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for
Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client. 

 With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court

agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for
MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his
brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment.

FALLO WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of
violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED
that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely. 

SO ORDERED.
TOLOSA vs. CARGO

Facts:
 Complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint seeking the disbarment
of respondent District Citizens’ Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed
that respondent had been seeing his (complainant’s) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house
and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that his wife left his conjugal home and went to
live with respondent.

 Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a “Comment and/or Answer” denying
the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant’s wife had been
seeing him but that she had done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in
view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant]
against her), much as complainant’s mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of
respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the” continuous quarrels
between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious)
that the latter sustained from the former.

 Complainant filed a Reply to respondent’s “Comment and/or Answer” and made a number of
further allegations, to wit:
a) That complainant’s wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;
b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant’s wife last
May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;
c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she
had refused to do so;
d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living
although she had no means of livelihood; and
e) That respondent was paying for his wife’s house rent.

 Respondent filed a Rejoinder denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating that
he (respondent) had merely given complainant’s wife the amount of P35.00 by way of
financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
 The Solicitor General found that complainant’s charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that
the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:

i. Respondent’s failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant’s suspicion and/or

jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.
ii. Priscilla’s being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend
and former client of respondent.
iii. Respondent’s failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his
differences with complainant.
iv. Respondent’s failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant
and Priscilla’s brothers
v. Respondent’s interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the
FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant.
 
Issue: Whether or not respondent failed to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct
required as the member of the bar.

Held: 
YES. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to
show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant’s wife or was otherwise
guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon Respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply
with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and
officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him
that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.

CAMPOS V. JUDGE ELISEO M. CAMPOS

A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1761, FEBRUARY 8, 2012

FACTS:
 This is a complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed by complainants
against respondent, former Presiding Judge of the MTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.

 Complainant Aida and respondent were married in 1981 and had two children, complainants
Alistair and Charmaine. In 2008, respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, alleging that he and Aida were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.

 For his part, respondent is a homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he
imagined he was with another man, while his wife had affairs with other men as a result of
his homosexuality.

 To her defense, Aida denied the allegations and filed for legal separation. According to her,
respondent wanted their marriage annulled so that he could marry another woman with
whom he was having a relationship. In the meantime, a separate case was pending against
the respondent, to which a certain parcel of registered land might be taken from the their
property in the event of loss. Facts show that the title to such land was kept by respondent
in his drawer.

 When respondent could not find the title in his usual place for safekeeping, he sought the
advice of the Register of Deeds who told him to execute the affidavit of loss, to which he did.
Respondent then registered the title but in the name of Alistair, a minor at that time.

ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of immorality, dishonesty, and serious misconduct?

HELD: NO, respondent is not guilty of immorality, dishonesty and serious misconduct but only
simple misconduct. The complainants failed to present any proof of respondent’s alleged
relationship with another woman, so as to justify a charge for immorality. There was no
evidence presented that respondent engaged in scandalous conduct that would warrant the
imposition of disciplinary action against him. However, the Court reminded respondent of the
judge's duty to conduct himself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As such, he must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice.

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.

ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc.,
respondent is the lawyer of a certain Norcio, who filed criminal cases against complainant for an
allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social
networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. He called petitioner a quack doctor
and imputed that she has payola budget and would pay the DOJ, the media. He also called for a
Boycott of the products of the clinic and called it names.
 intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical
practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause
 allegedly threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and
without proof
 some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women
 were made with the object to extort money from her

Petitioner filed the said complaint to the IBP.

Respondent claimed that the complaint was filed against his constitutional right to privacy and
his exercise of his right to freedom of speech specially the quoted statements were posted in his
personal facebook account and that it only is availble to his group of friends which the petitioner
does not belong to.

IBP-CBD Findings & Recommendation: Respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his
posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Also, the
criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for
insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged
crimes against Norcio had not been established. Suspension for a period of one (1) year from
the practice of law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

IBP BG adopted and approved the IBP CBD recommendation. On a motion for reconsideration,
IBP BG partially granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6)
months suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations of the verified complaint.

RULING: Yes. Respondent’s defense is untenable.

The latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features
of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the
subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, selfserving, thus deserving scant consideration.

Also, freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.
Every person exercising them is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. It may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult
others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

Violations:
 Rule 7.03
 Rule 8.01 -A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
  Rule 19.01 -A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as
long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor… Good conduct is
not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers'
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which-albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their profession-would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them”
Court upheld the recommendation of IBP CBD.

DISPOSITION: Guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

FELIPE SALCEDOvs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ

In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J.
FRANCISCO.

FACTS:
 Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged
contemptuous paragraph in his motion for reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage
to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out
power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the
 judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our
utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely
that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of “sakdalism” and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice.

 The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt,
giving him a period of ten days for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from
regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated
them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to
him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES.

Any attorney who is an officer of the court is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and
to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him a high privilege, not a right of
being what he now is: a priest of justice.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should
do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for
him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and
respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.

That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there be due
administration of justice.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY
ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. ATTYS.
RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R. MORTA,

Facts: Atty. Chavez the private legal counsel of Eliseo Osorno- the accused while Attys Lazaro
and Morta were the legal counsel of the private complainant of the said criminal case. Atty
Chavez appeared before the court to seek cancellation of arraignment of the criminal case as
their party filed Petition for Review before DOJ a day before the hearing. Citing the filing of
Petition for Review Atty. Chavez moved for suspension of the arraignment for a period of 60
days pursuant to Rule 116 Section 11 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, however the
same was denied by the court and proceeded to Soriano’s arraignment. In such instance, Atty
Chavez filed Motion for Inhibition for presiding Judge of the criminal case on the grounds that
the Judge was biased against its client. The respondents filed a vehement opposition for
inhibition instead alleged the complainant of antedating the petition for review. A counter
complaint-affidavit was filed by Atty Chavez’s party attaching a copy of the petition review
motion bearing DOJ stamp and sought disbarment complaint against the respondents.

Issue: W/N attys Lazaro and Morta be disbar?

Held: In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct
subsequently their pleadings contain the accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a
petition before the DOJ. As lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of
Professional Responsibility. This obligation includes the duty to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional colleagues, including opposing counsel
thus their action violated Canons 8 and 1O of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in
offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof is privileged. While lawyers may
enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for privileged statements made in their pleadings,
they remain subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the
observance of their duty as members of the legal profession.

The use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty of disbarment
yet Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to use only respectful
and temperate language in the preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect in dealing
with their professional colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

LIKONG V. LIM
A.C. NO. 3149, 17 AUGUST 1994
FACTS:
 Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap
pension checks which she regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US
pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is
fully paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her
pension checks from the post office.

 About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed the post office that she
was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina. Respondent
Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B.
Aumentado appeared for Cerina.

 Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel,
to allow the Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They likewise entered into a compromise
agreement without the participation of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it
was stated that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they agreed that
the amount would be paid in monthly installments.

 Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented
from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised
by Atty. Lim that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that:

a) this could only jeopardize the settlement;

b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer;
c) respondent was assisting her anyway;
 d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign;
e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event
respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that she was prevented
from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of
mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without authority,
assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat.

 Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her and it was upon her request
that he made the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first instructed Cerina
to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she
could not pay his attorney's fees.

 The compromise agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerina‘s debt to Yap

and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for violating Rule 8.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, constituting malpractice and grave misconduct.

RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her the
reasonsenumerated in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform
opposing counsel of the compromise agreement.

Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment
of Cerina by her counsel.Instead, even assuming that she was really abandoned by her
counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the
execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly and patently disadvantageous and
prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal
profession.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty

SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately
upon his receipt of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent’s personal record as attorney and member
of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

IN RE: SORIANO, G.R. NO. L-24114, 30 JUNE 1970

DOCTRINE
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by
a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted
annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial
processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts
of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory
belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate.

FACTS:
Clemente M. Soriano entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Marcelino Tiburco et,
al after one year and eight months after the decision in the case of PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias,
Tiburcio, et. al has been final. Atty. Soriano is in effect asking this Court to exhume this case
from the archives. 

His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to
show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance
at such a late date.
 
Based on his explanation, he said that respondent Tiburco went to him and engage his
professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case, and the case entitled "Varsity
Hill sv. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano et. al" 

Atty. Soriano relied upon Tiburcio's statement and a mutual acquaintance, Atty's Dalangpan's
assurance, that both cases are still pending in the Court. And so, Atty. Soriano prepared a
letter-contract, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional-services in the two cases in
consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares out of the 430 hectares involved in the two
cases. **The bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated is present in
the terminated case** 

ISSUE: WON Atty. Clemente Soriano should face disciplinary action regarding entering as a
counsel in a final and decided case? 

RULING: 
Yes, the Court find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss (lacking care or attention to duty; negligent:)
and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case (made an
event bad/undesirable by asserting his self in this case) 

Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the
conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he
should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. Atty.
Soriano’s entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the
respondents in effect sought to pre-empt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the premier
control over the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he
exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being
convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did
he make mention of such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are
plainly mere afterthoughts. 
In addition, he also failed to communicate with Atty. Doria, the counsel for the respondents in
the Varsity Hill case. He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills
case before accepting the said case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. If he
had been more careful in his acctions, he would have known that the present case PHHC and
UP v. Tiburcio et.al) has already reached final judgement. 
Atty. Sorianp also claimed that his clients (respondent) complained to him about having been
left out in the cold by their former layer. He should not have relied on the assurance of Atty.
Dalangpan and should have pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court. It is
quickly and easible accessbile from his office and if he were situated in the province, he could
have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the

performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable
negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession,
were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the
apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he
is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar
act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. 

Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the
appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino
Tiburcio, Et. Al.

DALLONG-GALICINAO V. CASTRO
A.C. NO. 6396, 25 OCTOBER 2005

Facts: Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private
practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire
whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC.
Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case. Complainant replied that the record
had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the CA decision should first be
presented. To this respondent retorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a
copy?” Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he
represents. Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant
explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent
yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office
and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”)

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable.

Decision: Yes. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the
parties to represent them, Atty. Castro has no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Although the penalty should be tempered since Atty. Castro apologized and Atty. Dallong-
Galicinao accepted it. This is not to say that Atty. Castro should be absolved of his actuations.
Atty. Castro is ordered fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that any similar
infractions shall be dealt with more severely
His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar incentives to the clerk of court was not only ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainant’s
subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.

The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter
accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his
actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if
they repent afterwards.

TEK BENG V. DAVID, A.C. NO. 1261, 29 DECEMBER 1983

FACTS:
In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby Tan
Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan
Tek Beng 50% of the attorney’s fees collected as the latter’s commission. Atty. David also
agreed not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the latter’s consent.
The agreement went sour due to allegations of double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng
denounced Atty. David before the Supreme Court but did not seek the enforcement of their
agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers” Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term “malpractice”.

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. “The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional”.

On the agreement to divide the attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division of fees for
legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility.

On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied by Beng directly: The
professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities
and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of
his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client”

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this

decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.