CHAPTER II.

THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
  
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.

Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1), petitioner
 
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of
no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the
welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon
was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute
resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing
an extended opinion." 2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set
forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court
the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be
submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the
Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment
on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment
of  dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous
case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar
of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The
unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional
question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various
pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the
matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be
oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect.
Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases
coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had
been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary,
the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was
discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his
health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of
the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October
23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise
of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession
was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for
contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of  Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is
concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the
bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered
for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

 B.M. No. 1370             May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on
the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be
a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the
IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A
of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray
the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the
cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also
alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status
for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members
from payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are
engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that
his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due
process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to
active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-
members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as
a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to
levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar
program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad
before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from
the practice of law.
 A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
— for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation
of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967
Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one
reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in
other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the
release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no
reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary
to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades
were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the
Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the
bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found
that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law
and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%,
56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971
bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo
and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they
complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or
re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a
resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice  why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the
re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5,
1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents
Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63,
32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-
checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise,
who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law
also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned
by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of
another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the
grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang,
a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the
same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed
to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony,
submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and
answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation
conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C.
Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in
bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and
if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one
in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon
verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same
standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades
 of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with
8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following
additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make
the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1,
2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the
identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the
identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules
and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have
no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me
as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother
any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I
might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and
as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I
was not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35,
rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International
Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two
hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record
was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel
of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had
not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly
low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was
humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been
decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades
(from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and
the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him
the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted
and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered
661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of
the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so
assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman,  as, unless called, I refrained as much
as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me
that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in
the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the
same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted
the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I
recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of
66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to
make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other
subjects. ... 
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject
would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first
meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the
motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and
was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought
back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised
a few points to 75%then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember
correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the
mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in
good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a
total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal.
He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade
that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his
general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall,
Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a
request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded
tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-
evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items,
and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had
totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement,
adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good
faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that — 
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right
to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned
that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations
were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of
this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing
a grade of 61%;
 That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate
I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17,
1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in
direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make
a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation
that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on
the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led
me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis
of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right
now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because
the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the
trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;
that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having
brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law.
As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the
grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is
one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as
would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972,
on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so
buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my
sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number
that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk
of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street
and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and
a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-
Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket
that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought,
whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly
impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even
in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I
first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started
with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is
identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh.
7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo;
and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of
the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my
life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be
recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved
from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I
was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest
of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my
work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As
the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to
pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh.
1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them
aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible
review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases
which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee
agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
 (a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo);
and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15%
with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that
the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622
identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of
57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook
in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in
the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. -------
Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or
notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only
Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the
Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved
to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19,
or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and
that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In
his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never
met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers
necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases;
after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a
situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only
once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to
which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5,
1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which
are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor,
had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution,
which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent,
these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of
Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the
Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of
 their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the
narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy
of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or
answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of
their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and
prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving
separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade
in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-
evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook
is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will
get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code
Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the
identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such
revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission
to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook
in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then
requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial
Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark
and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent
Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and
ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers,
substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely
within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of
310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1
& 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his
failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public
International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's
Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public
International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%,
said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in
just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the
grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number
954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade,
because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent
Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the
correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the
examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent
Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and
also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is
746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 &
3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate
had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is
applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy
of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the
same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of
his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo,
Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent
Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the
meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in
his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper  (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo
to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in
a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code
No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the
examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-
evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of
Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or
less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing
average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took
his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate
such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on
the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination
Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended
solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him
to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.).
Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on
the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as
well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified
by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent
Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust
and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-
calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that
the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook
of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this
was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades
of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under
the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of
7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only
function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general
average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation
to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly
act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his
position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible
fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees
with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which
could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute
good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the
original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more
than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as
claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the
Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation
and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the
notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of
impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him
away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement
of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in
one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the
first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.

B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS
GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S
NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN
THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law
and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were
referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought
to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that
the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and
record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him,
he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law
which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.).
According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela
Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in
evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit
9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p.
4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the
Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the
Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is
not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one
subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which
was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following
the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed
him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs
to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the
Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared
that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to
him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee
failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner
Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the
disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law,
violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the
misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be
said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral,
which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in
Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed
in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the
Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major
subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination
of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the
Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with
one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a
deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and
must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects,
as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious
breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation
that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete
nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to
the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents
that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the
Bar must be ... of good moral 
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to
1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the
supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record —
whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year
1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant
but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used
by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof
of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the
applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character;
for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In
1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application
form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not
been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that
there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth
time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal
cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to
declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused
of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of
Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding
from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in
1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case
in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was
allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well —
settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the
board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon
the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge
would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709
— 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the
license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.'
In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters
tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he
comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were
available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS,
102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised
by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that
case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his
lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a
member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973,
apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the
Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to
order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE
said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable
as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any
precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA
475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People
vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades
of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in
question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and
that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners
made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should
have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have
asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court.
At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee
concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations
could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers
of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection
with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see
also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo:
"... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I
can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the
bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done
before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to
be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of
68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were
deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of
such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p.
33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972,
Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given
the passing grade of 
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant
that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84%
in Remedial Law, if I recall 
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to
make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was
impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier
quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects
do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of
members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the
proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.

V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-
examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend
— a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records
will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon
Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and
deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter
departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang
in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in
that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was
re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous
act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house
and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of
sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however,
respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in
favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage
— P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while
the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received
by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII,
pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and  P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are
not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which
he  filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of
only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of
P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement  was not realized because the transaction
therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo
from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa
is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
 which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even
presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself,
while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or
time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise
was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to
give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-
gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to
the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972  — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in
favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May
of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he
filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his
liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972
could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets,
excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November,
1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the
said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the
acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the
illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of
the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after
Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring
from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of
the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent
Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof
in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
 This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined
that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were
not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this
Court.

B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his
father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine
Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator
and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is
also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the
said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational
Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was
employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ
Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow
up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also
know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans
Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to
the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring
buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the
several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember,
however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in
Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans
Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese
occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having
attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a
member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46,
rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the
Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the
rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US
Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor
in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date
of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the
same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this
Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164
as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY

DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY
LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
 A.C. No. 6313             September 7, 2006
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close
scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions
of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented. 

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer
to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former
classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant,
respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for
her congenital heart ailment. 

At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She
narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the
demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had
progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as
the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit")

categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate 4 of her daughter, he was, in
truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree
to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning
them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her
the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that
he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the
position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga. 

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money
intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against
Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case
against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a
compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and
caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was
able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file
the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was
also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino,
to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that
because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses
were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter. 

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal
thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After
several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When
Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly
offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then
proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00. 

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the
same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her
allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave
her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former
bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the
settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's
fees. 

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies
luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two
consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his
marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant
very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second,
they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to
respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to
2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-
officio  member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his
marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively
helped him in his campaign. 

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved
to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months
passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received
from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged
him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to
look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not
assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to
Atty. Tolentino. 

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly
financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated
only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June
when her alleged fiancé from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again
asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in
need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent.
According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with
the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent
ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character,
putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious
hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house
and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It
signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her
seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's
obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a
stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning 18 ("Motion")
dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March
2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events
that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative
woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that
the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between
them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over
the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court. 

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit
brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. 23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 24 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community.25

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, 26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and
in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we
find otherwise.

Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of financial
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself
who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual
congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering
from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. 29Respondent's
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find
credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow
barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him
there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in
2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several
occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his
friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who
was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent
whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to
change [her] life for the better," 30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of
deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. 31 We are left with the most
logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans
any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her
to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions.
While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino. 

We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that
her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading
a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short
sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not
give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of
Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with
Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to
show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate
or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without
any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent. 

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to
his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father
of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a
settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the case.
Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence. 34 Suspicion, no matter how
strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent
has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.35

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter.
Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00
and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount
of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim for
support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant
insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that
respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more
than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees. 

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued
by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can
keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation.
He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money. 

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this
respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the
parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer
modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose
favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further
reception of evidence solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA test
absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. 36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges
as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. 37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.39

Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour, 41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent
woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the
foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46  respondent was found to have
sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing
out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at
his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge
Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he
sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during
the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such
severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor. 48 Considering further that this is
his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a
FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely. 

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
 A.C. No. 5179

DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on
December 10, 1999.2

Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along
Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly
snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left.4 Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of
respondent's car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board
member of Surigao del Norte.6

According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."7 Respondent's act showed arrogance and
disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct.  8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit, 10 and a letter11 dated October 27, 1999
signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In
her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus,
respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed by
Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina. The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie
Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming
of an elected official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that appropriate
action be taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao
del Norte.

Thank you very much for your attention and more power.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13

Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different
municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14 In his Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the
incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He further alleged that complainant's
reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car. 17 When respondent alighted
from his car to check the damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner. 18 Respondent pushed
complainant on the chest to defend himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against
his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a
traffic officer.20 Both parties agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a
sketch. 21 No traffic officer was present during the incident.22

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio programs by the
Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver. 23 He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was
caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to
complainant.24 Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor.25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the incident during
the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao
City. 26During the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant
was carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did. 27 On the other hand, complainant explained that he went
near respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's car. 28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to
no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.29

Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated October 27, 2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong
Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably
settled by the parties.31

On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report,
and recommendation.32 Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.
(Commissioner De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case
between the parties had already been settled. 34 Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be
the reason why the complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]" 35 The Mandatory Conference was reset to
September 21, 2007.36 In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent
appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case exparte. 38 In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008,
Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice
for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene O.
Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation of
Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit
the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis in the original)

Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping incident. 41 The
slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit
attached to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999
of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and
should be held administratively liable.43 On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
issued the Resolution 44 adopting and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation,
thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.45  (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution 47 dated March 22, 2014. We resolve
whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable. There is sufficient proof to establish
that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened. 48 He stresses complainant's
seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is politically
motivated.49

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with
baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of
misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she
enjoys the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath. 51 Thus, the burden of proof still rests
upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52 In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is
preponderance of evidence, 53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."54
In this case, complainant discharged this burden. During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also adoptedfound that the slapping incident actually
occurred. 55 The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized
Affidavit;56complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit 57 of a traffic aide present
during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number.58 In finding
that complainant was slapped by respondent, 59 Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the
League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded" 60 because of respondent's act of
slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this
finding. The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations.
Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's
credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's
act. It reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance. The purpose of administrative proceedings is
to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court
will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment committed by its officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that disregards
the human dignity of another.1awp++i1 Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"

("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying,
harassment, and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the
nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public,
not to bully them to submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions
to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to
remain officers of the court. 63

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. 64 They are
neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a
matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a
court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65

Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor. 66

As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not
indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are
important in disciplinary proceedings. 67

Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a
finding of administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED.
Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
 CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
  
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer,
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking
relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

A.C. No. 5768               March 26, 2010

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a
baseless suit against him. 

The Facts and the Case

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit1 with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of
law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following
offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition
to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court. 

2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of
public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23,
1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter
was not even a signatory to the document. 

3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing,
Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan,
kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na
rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." 

4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy
with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he
faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines
Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time
record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice.
When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language. 

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:

1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of
libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer’s clients filed a case for
falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
 2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the
waiver document had been falsified.

3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet
was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty.
Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior. 

4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on
December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations that
speak well of his character.

5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their
mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed
this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases. 

In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December 29,
2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting
in serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers.3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the
victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being
drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.4

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the citations
Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed
his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge
for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a
Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit
despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to
it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing. 

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 6 adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year. 

Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the
ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court
referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration. 8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 9 of the Investigating Commissioner that
denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.10

On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-
2008.11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment as a petition for review under Rule 139
of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further,
he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against
appearing in court drunk.13

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding
respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and 

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

The Court’s Ruling

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.14

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically,
in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:

Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the
falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for
he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. 

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and
abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:

1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of documents,
committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for
distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of
his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA
PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view
whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form
a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient
ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions."15

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature
of our legal system.16

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:

Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of
a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He
merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly
made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint
against Atty. Ferrer. 

Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling
na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines
Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty.
Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These
language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it. 

Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was
negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one’s defense.18 So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with.19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the
opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon. 

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.20 Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold. 

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-
809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his
receipt of this Decision.
 A.C. No. 10303               April 22, 2015

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in
CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from
being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2

The Case

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint 3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification;

(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission 4 to the Bar and receipt 5 of his notarial
commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. 6 She also
accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm
Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her
parents-in-law.

Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and
violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited
that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting
clients' interests.9 Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same
administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence"
in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive
language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.

In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007,Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature
were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar.

On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several
notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate
their growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel.
Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and
her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. 15 On this
basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings.16

The IBP Proceedings

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference.17 After this, both
parties were required to submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner
Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting
interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained
several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given
time."19However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively liable for
usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is
not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after
his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.20

Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former
client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend
them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers. 21But
despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be
held liable for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the
Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language
when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings. 22 For violating the Notarial Practice Rules,
Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months
for employing abusive and insulting language.23

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on record fully
supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and
imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if
existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in
its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms
them.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties identified.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide
notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission.

It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public.1âwphi1 Atty.
Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration
date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information. However, he denied
that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial
register and was never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his
signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as
a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have
obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the
expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the
alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document
before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar admission, were stamped
on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before us.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several
offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:

Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year

Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005

Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005

Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005

Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006

Affidavit of Two Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006

Persons

Petition for Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006

Duplicate copy

Affidavit of Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006

Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006

Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006

Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and
provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts
consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary
public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time." 28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of
simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure
that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary
public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial
services on his behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial
acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person,
other than the notary public, should perform it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address and prevent
the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several active notarial registers
in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with
public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each
lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant violation of
Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a
clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."

Representing conflicting interests

The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting
clients' interests.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.1âwphi1

In Aniñon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting
interests between and among his clients.

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.32

Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.33

Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's
client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the
case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected
to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.

The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment of
a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand,
the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno
for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an
examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are
totally unrelated.

There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his services, he
had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any
confidential information which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.

Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the
representation of conflicting interests.

Use of intemperate, offensive and

abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings,
whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
(emphasis supplied)

As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious
extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate
language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:

Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and
the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor
performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)

This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an
officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive personality and to
refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, as attorney for Arcadia Acacio Et. Al., Petitioner, v. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-2217. March 23, 1950.]

In civil case No. 483 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled "Cariño, et al v. Acacio, Et Al.," Atty. Miguel R.
Cornejo was (allegedly) asked by the defendants Acacio to act as their counsel; but for his convenience he requested
his companion, Attorney Palacol, to handle it. The latter entered his appearance and acted accordingly. On May 21,
1948, during the hearing of the case, Cornejo was presented as a witness. Practically all the questions were objected
to by opposing counsel, and the judge, the respondent Bienvenido A. Tan, sustained almost all objections.
Whereupon Attorney Cornejo left the witness stand and approached the attorney’s table asking that his appearance
for the defendants be noted. It was apparent he wanted to say as counsel what he had been prevented from saying
as witness. The respondent judge told him he could not thus appear, there being already one lawyer and no
substitution of counsel had been accomplished in accordance with the rules. 

A few days later, Attorney Cornejo submitted a memorandum in which he said, among other things, that the judge
had unduly favored the plaintiffs, to the extent of advising Attorney Palacol "to fix the case because his position was
hopeless," and that the memorandum was filed as a protest against the "unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous
attitude of the judge." The memorandum further stated that copies thereof had been sent to the Secretary of Justice,
the Supreme Court, and the Office of the President of the Senate. 

In an order dated May 26, 1948, the respondent judge, rejecting the accusation of partiality, stated that in accordance
with his usual practice he had told Attorney Palacol to see if the matter could be settled amicably. Then he required
Attorney Cornejo to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt on four counts, namely, for appearing in
court without being a party or attorney in the case, for using offensive language, for misbehavior in the presence of
the court and for publishing his memorandum before it was submitted and decided by the court. 

Answering the order, Attorney Cornejo expressed doubts that he would be treated impartially because the charges of
contempt had been made by the judge himself, and reiterated his accusation that the judge had unduly anticipated
his opinion on the case in favor of plaintiffs, "demonstrating his over-anxiety to dispatch the case" "indirectly aiding
counsel for the plaintiffs" "insulting and humiliating the undersigned attorney while on the witness stand, etc.." Then
he went on to explain away or rebut the charges made. 

Immediately thereafter Attorney Cornejo repaired to this Court asking for judgment ordering the respondent judge to
admit his appearance as counsel for the defendants in civil case No. 483, to refrain from rendering his decision in
said case until he shall have allowed the petitioner as counsel for defendants to present further evidence, and to stop
all action on the proceeding for contempt of court. 

On June 7, 1948, we required the respondent to answer the amended petition within ten days. We also resolved that
upon the filing of bond by petitioner in the amount of P200 a writ of preliminary injunction will be issued. Such writ
was actually issued on June 15, 1948. 

It appears, however, that on June 5, 1948, the respondent judge decided civil case No. 483. And on June 4, 1948, he
declared Attorney Cornejo guilty of contempt and sentenced him to pay a fine of P100 or in case of insolvency, to
suffer imprisonment for ten days. It also appears that on the same day Attorney Cornejo interposed an appeal, which
was denied by the respondent, on the ground that there is no appeal in the matter of direct contempts. 

In view of these developments and of others to be indicated later on, the petitioner now asks: (1) that the respondent
be required to admit and recognize his appearance as counsel in civil case No. 483, and that the decision in that
litigation be set aside on the ground that defendants were deprived of their right to present further evidence through
the petitioner as counsel, and (2) that the judgment for contempt be reviewed and revoked. 

On the first point it further appears that, as the injunction order proved too late, Attorney Palacol submitted on June
23, 1948, a "petition to set aside judgment or proceeding" seeking relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and that
upon denial thereof he appealed on July 12, 1948 to the Court of Appeals. Wherefore, it is reasonable to expect that
this question will be decided by the Court of Appeals upon a review of the main controversy. Upon this ground, and
partly because petitioner failed to implead the opposing parties in the said civil case No. 483, this portion of the
petition may not be granted in these proceedings. 

On the second point, it is settled that no appeal lies from an order of a superior court declaring a person in direct
contempt thereof. 1 Now, was the submission of the memorandum a direct contempt? The respondent held it was (1)
because Cornejo was not an attorney in the case; (2) because it used offensive language against the court; and (3)
because it was published before it was submitted and decided by the court. Copy of the memorandum is part of the
record before us. It contains the following paragraph:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is further respectfully prayed that this memorandum be taken for a protest against what he believes to be unjust,
hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude or conduct of the presiding Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, of this
Honorable Court in a democratic government where laws shall reign supreme unless the same Judge wants to
sabotage the present administration of the President who is seeking the restoration of public peace and order and the
faith of the people in our Government" 

That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and contemptuous. 2 The judge may have erred in some of his rulings;
but mistakes never justify offensive language. As was said in Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil.,
729:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for
this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution."cralaw virtua1aw library

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies of the memorandum had been furnished "the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, etc.", could rightly be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the court in the exercise of its
judicial functions. 

Omitting reference to the other points, enough has been stated to show that there was no clear abuse of the
respondent’s powers in declaring Attorney Cornejo to be in direct contempt. Petition denied. No costs. 
 CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW.
  
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.

Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be
paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in whole
or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 6290             July 14, 2004

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana
Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be married to
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious
means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, 1 which states
that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and the
National Statistics Office (NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of
marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio 4 and Felicisimo
Tenorio III.5 But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another
date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. 

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination to the public of
a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and
sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome. 

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the
illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to
her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and
her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's
illegal activities and transactions. In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the
charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12
February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon
City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. 

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the dissemination of a libelous
and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the
execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and
reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed
that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship,
as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the
estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the
words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get even with her. She
terminated complainant's employment after receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from
different people with the promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her
promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the
complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The
respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary
service to the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.  During the hearing on 30 August
2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent
would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached
affidavits would constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants. 11  In her Reply, the
complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by
submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a
senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card13 signed by the respondent as
Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's
husband even appeared in court hearings. 

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor allowed her
husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a
representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her
husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office  bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a
certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.14 

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but
when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April
2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to
the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.15 

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a
Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose
out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This
motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San
Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However,
she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1)
the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as
Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos.
20729 – 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the
provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute
the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded. 

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in increasing
the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense
in the future would be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted with modification by
the Board of Governors of the IBP. At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to
Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,16 we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
 interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of
the charges. 

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing evidence. 17 With respect to the estafa
case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet
convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome
of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings. 

We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A
lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of
violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for
compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be
shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 19 Such acts constitute
unauthorized practice of law. In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one.
His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession. 

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers
but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have investments in
her law office.20 That is a blatant misrepresentation. The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is
another proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a
lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the
respondent as Chairperson of the Group. 

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained.
Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the
law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law.21 

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.