EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-
Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required
to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted
for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be
known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of
the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'.
...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations
of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of
the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group
of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment
of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the
respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay
a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It
is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration
of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less
real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of
the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect
the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power
will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in
the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial
A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC April 11, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRA
TED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8292
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA and NASSER
MARAHOMSALIC, Complainants,
vs.
ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C. ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR.,
EVERGISTO S. ESCALON, and REYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Court, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), resolves
this matter of the election of the Executive Vice-President (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for the 2011-2013 term.
This administrative matter was triggered by the Petition for Intervention filed by petitioner-intervenor
IBP-Southern Luzon Region (IBP-Southern Luzon), seeking a declaration that the post of EVP-IBP for
the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it is qualified to field a candidate for the said
position.
This matter comes at the heels of the controversies resolved by the Court in its December 4, 2012
Resolution regarding the application of the rotation rule in determining which chapter of the IBP-
Western Visayas region (IBP-Western Visayas) was qualified to field a candidate for the position of
governor. In the said resolution, the Court clarified that the rotation rule was one by exclusion. Similar
to this recently resolved controversy, the present dilemma calls for the application of the rotation
system at the national level.
The Factual Antecedents
To understand the nature of the controversy and the issues presented for resolution, an examination of
the structure of the IBP and its history is in order.
In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated 1 to elevate the standards of the legal profession, to improve
the administration of justice and to enable it to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.2 Governing the IBP was the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), consisting of the governors
from each of the nine (9) geographic regions of the archipelago, 3 namely: Northern Luzon, Central
Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern
Mindanao, and Western Mindanao.4 The governors of the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the House of
Delegates which consists of members duly apportioned among the chapters of each region. 5
At the helm of the IBP is the IBP National President (IBP-President),6 who is automatically succeeded
by the EVP. When the Philippine Bar was first integrated, both the IBP-President and the EVP were
elected by the IBP-BOG from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, 7 with
the right of automatic succession by the EVP to the presidency for the next succeeding full term. The
presidency rotated among all the nine regions in such order as the IBP-BOG had prescribed.8 Both the
IBP-President and the EVP held a term of one (1) year, with the presidency rotating from year to year
among the regions.9
On November 1, 1974, the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that the IBP-President and the EVP be
chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on
a rotation basis.10 It was also provided that the IBP-President and the EVP hold office for a term of two
(2) years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their
successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.11
Later, several amendments in the IBP By-Laws were introduced, among which were the provisions
relating to the election of its national officers. In Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 9, 1985, the Court
approved the recommendation allowing the IBP-President, the EVP and the officers of the House of
Delegates to be directly elected by the House of Delegates.12
Unfortunately, history recalls that this mode of electing the IBP national officers was marred with
unethical politicking, electioneering and other distasteful practices. Thus, on October 6, 1989, the
Court in Bar Matter No. 491, dated October 6, 1989, ordered: 1] the annulment of the just concluded
national elections; 2] the abolition of the system of election of national officers by direct action of the
House of Delegates; 3] the restoration of the former system of having the IBP-President and the EVP
elected by the IBP-BOG from among themselves, with right of succession by the EVP to the presidency
and subject to the rule that "the position of Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions;"13 4] the holding of special elections for the election of the first set of IBP-
President and EVP;14 and 5] the appointment of a caretaker board to administer the affairs of the IBP
pending the holding of special elections.15
In the same Bar Matter No. 491, the Court ordered the amendment of Section 47, Article VII of the IBP
By-laws, to read:
SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive
Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as
much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. (As amended pursuant to Bar Matter No.
491)
The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The
Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions.16 [Emphasis supplied]
Following the rotation system just ordered, the following individuals representing the different regions
of the IBP served as IBP-President:

1. Eugene Tan (Capiz) Western Visayas January 28, 1990-April 199117

2. Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. Central Luzon April 1991-June 30, 1991

(Pangasinan)

3. Mervin Encanto Greater Manila 1993-1995

(Quezon City)

4. Raoul R. Angangco Southern Luzon 1995-1997

(Makati)

5. Jose Aguila Grapilon Eastern Visayas 1997-1999

(Biliran)

6. Arthur Lim Western Mindanao 1999-2001

(Zambasulta)

7. Teofilo Pilando, Jr. Northern Luzon 2001-2003

(Kalinga Apayao)

8. Jose Anselmo Cadiz Bicolandia 2003-2005

(Camarines Sur)

On January 27, 1999, in Velez v. de Vera,18 reasoning that the rotation system applied only to the
EVP, the Court considered the election of then EVP Leonard De Vera (De Vera), representing the
Eastern Mindanao region, as one completing the first rotational cycle and affirmed the election of
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Salazar) of the Bicolandia region as EVP. The Court explained that the
rotational cycle would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera, representing Eastern
Mindanao as IBP-President. For having misappropriated his clients funds and committing acts inimical
to the IBP-BOG and the IBP in general, De Vera was removed as governor of Eastern Mindanao and as
EVP, and his removal was affirmed by the Court.
Thus, Salazar became IBP-President for the 2005-2007 term with Feliciano Bautista (Bautista) of
Central Luzon as EVP. The term of Salazar was the start of the second rotational cycle. Bautista
eventually succeeded to the IBP presidency with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Vinluan) as his EVP.
In 2009, however, the national and regional IBP elections were again tainted with numerous
controversies, which were resolved by the Court in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,19 in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:
1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A. Marohomsalic
as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western Visayas Region and Western Mindanao
Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;
2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term is hereby
ORDERED to be held under the supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of
this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being allowed to represent
and vote as duly-elected Governors of their respective regions;
3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and
Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their
actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April 25, 2009
and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any
subsequent election. While their elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer
be annulled as this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of
IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and, therefore, barred from succeeding as
IBP President for the 2009-2011 term;
4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI
and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as contained in the Report and Recommendation
of the Special Committee, dated July 9, 2009, are hereby approved and adopted; and
5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall
continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.
SO ORDERED.
Attempts to seek reconsideration of the Courts resolution were denied by the Court in its Resolution,
dated February 8, 2011.20
Despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,21 which recognized the operational fact that the rotation was
from the position of President to that of the EVP, Section 47 was not immediately amended to reflect
the official position of the Court. It was only amended through the December 14, 2010
Resolution.22 Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws now reads:
Sec. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive
Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a
strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5)
Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall
also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and
disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
In the special elections that were held thereafter, Roan I. Libarios (Libarios), representing IBP-Eastern
Mindanao Region, was elected EVP and he later on succeeded as president.
On April 27, 2011, the IBP-BOG, acting on the letter of then Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Fortunato) of
IBP-Western Visayas requested that the Court provide guidance on how it would proceed with the
application of the rotational rule in the regional elections for governor of IBP-Western Visayas.23
On December 4, 2012, the Court issued a resolution24 addressing the issues with respect to the
election of governor for IBP-Western Visayas. In clarifying that the rotational rule was one by
exclusion, the Court explained that in the election of governor of a region, all chapters of the region
should be given the opportunity to have their nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those
chapters that had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle would be completed,
all chapters of a region, except the chapter which won in the immediately preceding elections, could
once again have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region. The chapter
that won in the immediately preceding election, under the rotational cycle just completed, could only
vie for the position of governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.
The Current Controversy
Earlier, on July 27, 2012, IBP-Southern Luzon filed its Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the
Attached Petition In Intervention25 and the subject Petition In Intervention,26 seeking a declaration that
the post of EVP for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it be qualified to nominate
a candidate for the position of EVP for the 2011-2013 term.
The Petition in Intervention was, in turn, opposed by Fortunato,27 who insisted that IBP-Western
Visayas was the only region that could vie for the position of EVP for the 2011-2013 term.
In the December 4, 2012 Resolution, the Court deferred its action on the intervention sought by the
IBP-Southern Luzon and required the IBP-BOG to submit its comment.28
In its Comment, dated January 2, 2013, the IBP-BOG prayed that the "IBP-Southern Luzon be allowed
to nominate a candidate for EVP for the 2011-2013 term, without prejudice to the right of other
regions except IBP-Eastern Mindanao, to do the same."29
The opposition of Fortunato to the subject petition in intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon was joined by
his successor, Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano), Gov. Manuel L. Enage, Jr. of IBP-Eastern Visayas,30 and the
members of the House of Delegates of IBP-Western Visayas.31 Nasser A. Marohomsalic
(Marohomsalic),32 one of the original parties in this case, Gov. Leonor Gernoa-Romeo33 of IBP-
Bicolandia, and the IBP-BOG34 likewise filed their respective comments.
Position of IBP-Southern Luzon
In support of its bid to qualify in the election for EVP for the 2011-2013 term, IBP-Southern Luzon
takes the following positions:
In view of the Courts resolution to bar its representative, Vinluan, from succeeding as IBP-
President for the 2009-2011 term, the IBP-Southern Luzon was effectively deprived of its right
to the IBP presidency.35
With the election of Eugene A. Tan as IBP-President (January 29, 1990-April 1991), IBP-
Western Visayas should no longer be allowed to field a candidate in the forthcoming election for
EVP.36
As he was just elected on January 5, 2013, Ubano cannot be considered qualified to seek the
position of EVP cum IBP-President due to his lack of experience.37
Position of IBP-Western Visayas
For its part, IBP-Western Visayas advances the following arguments in support of its position that it is
the only region qualified to field a candidate for EVP for the 2011-2013 term:
The Petition in Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon should not be entertained as it would be
contrary to Section 2, Rule 19, it being filed following the finality of the December 14, 2010
Resolution of the Court.38
With the term of current IBP-President Libarios coming to an end, IBP-Western Visayas is the
only region left qualified to field a candidate for EVP, pursuant to the December 14, 2010
Resolution of the Court.39
The IBP Southern Luzon had already taken its turn in the rotation system following the
election of Vinluan as EVP (2007-2009) and Raoul R. Angangco (Angangco) who also served as
EVP during the 1995-1997 term.401wphi1
The election of Eugene Tan cannot be considered as part of the current rotation as he was
elected following the special elections held as a result of the October 6, 1989 Resolution of the
Court.
Synthesized, the core issues that must be addressed for the resolution of the Court are the following:
A. Whether the motion for intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon can be allowed and admitted.
B. Whether the first rotational cycle was completed with the election of Atty. Leonard De Vera.
C. Whether IBP-Southern Luzon has already served in the current rotation.
D. Whether the IBP-Western Visayas has already served in the current rotation.
The Motion for Intervention Should be Allowed and Admitted
There is no dispute that the Constitution has empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning "the integrated bar."41 Pursuant thereto, the Court wields a continuing power of supervision
over the IBP and its affairs like the elections of its officers. The current controversy has been
precipitated by the petition in intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, praying that the election of the EVP
for the 2011-2013 term be opened to all and that it be considered as qualified to field a candidate for
the said position.
In the exercise of its continuing supervisory power, the Court is allowing the matter to be raised as an
issue because it has not yet been squarely settled, as will be pointed out later on.1wphi1 Moreover, it
is not only an exercise of its constitutional and statutory mandated duty, but also of its symbolic
function of providing guiding principles, precepts and doctrines42 for the purpose of steering the
members of the bench and the bar to the proper path.
It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar matter to be specific, where
technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact, in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry
of judgment. Where there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not come into play. On
several occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases and modified its decisions that had
long attained finality in the interest of justice. A recent example is Talens-Dabon v. Judge
Arceo,43 where the Court lifted the ban against the disqualification of the respondent from re-
employment in government. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,44 the Court granted clemency so the respondent
could transfer to a higher position. In Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita v.
Masamayor,45 the respondent was given judicial clemency for her past administrative offenses so she
could apply for a lateral transfer.
At any rate, granting that technical rules are strictly applied in administrative matters, the Court can
exercise its power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation
if and when justice requires it. "The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final." 46
The First Rotational Cycle Already Completed
As earlier recited, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws was amended in the December 14, 2010
Resolution47 of the Court to read as follows:
Sec. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive
Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a
strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5)
Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall
also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and
disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
From the above, it is clear that the amendment was effected to underscore the shift of the rotation
from the position of president to that of EVP. The purpose of the system being to ensure that all the
regions will have an equal opportunity to serve as EVP and then automatically succeed as president.
As previously mentioned, in Velez,48 the Court stated that the rotation system applies to the election of
the EVP only and considered the service of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao
region, as having completed the first rotational cycle. For said reason, the Court affirmed the election
of Salazar of Bicolandia as EVP. The Court explained that the rotation cycle with respect to the
presidency would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera as IBP-President. The
specific words used in Velez49 were:
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic
succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the
position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with
respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47
of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as
IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was
completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP
Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains,
however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to
the IBP Presidency.
The notion that the ruling in Velez50 should not be considered at all by the Court because it is barred by
the Omnibus Motion Rule deserves scant consideration. It may have been earlier overlooked, but the
Court is not barred from motu propio taking judicial notice of such judicial pronouncement, pursuant to
its continuing supervisory powers over the IBP.
The Second Rotational Cycle
While there may have been no categorical pronouncement in Velez that the second rotational cycle
started with the election of Salazar as EVP, it cannot be denied that it was so. With the Velez
declaration that the election of De Vera as EVP completed the first cycle, there can be no other
consequence except that the term of EVP Salazar commenced a new rotational cycle. From the
records, it appears that the following had already served as EVP in the Second Rotational Cycle:

1. Jose Vicente Salazar Bicolandia 2005

2. Feliciano M. Bautista Central Luzon 2005-2007

3. Rogelio Vinluan Southern Luzon 2007-2009

4. Roan L. Libarios Eastern Mindanao 2009-2011

As there were only four (4) regions which had served as EVP, there are still five (5) other regions
which have not yet so served. These regions are:
1. Northern Luzon
2. Greater Manila Area
3. Eastern Visayas
4. Western Visayas
5. Western Mindanao
Needless to state, Western Visayas is not the only region that can vie for EVP for the 2011-2013 term.
This answers the query of Fortunato.
With respect to IBP-Southern Luzon, following the ruling in Velez,51 it is clear that it already had its
turn to serve as EVP in the Second Rotational Cycle.
The Special Committee failed to take into account the Velez ruling
In arriving at its December 14, 2010 Resolution,52 the Court then was confronted with limited issues.
Among those were: 1] the validity of the election of Nasser A. Marohomsalic as governor of the IBP-
Western Mindanao Region; 2] the validity of the election of Manuel M. Maramba as governor for the
Greater Manila Region for the term 2009-2011; 3] the validity of the election of Erwin M. Fortunato as
governor for Western Visayas Region for the term 2009-2011; and 4] the validity of the elections for
EVP for the 2009-2011 term presided by then IBP-President Bautista. The four issues were intertwined
since the validity of the elections presided by IBP-President Bautista was questioned on the alleged
lack of quorum, as it was attended by Marohomsalic, whose own election was then also being
questioned.
With those limited issues resolved, the Court directed that special elections should be held for the
election of EVP for the remaining 2009-2011 term "to heal the divisions in the IBP and promote unity
by enabling all the nine (9) governors-elect to elect the EVP in a unified meeting called for that
purpose."53 In ordering the special elections to be conducted, the Court took into account the report of
the Special Committee as follows:
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National Secretariat, shows
that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine (9) terms
(1991-2009):
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan) --- Central Luzon ------- 1991-1993
Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) -------- Manila --------------- 1993-1995
Raoul R. Angangco (Makati) ------------- Southern Luzon ----- 1995-1997
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) ----------- Eastern Visayas ---- 1997-1999
Arthur D. Lim (Zambasulta) ------------- Western Mindanao--1999-2001
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga-Apayao)-Northern Luzon --- 2001-2003
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) Bicolandia ---------- 2003-2005
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) Bicolandia -----2005-Aug 2006
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay) ---------- Bicolandia ---- Aug. 2006-2007
Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan) ----- Central Luzon ------ 2007-2009
Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn
as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had two
(2) terms already.
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern Mindanao
Region should be elected as Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term. The one who is not
chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term. Afterwards, another rotation
shall commence with Greater Manila in the lead, followed by Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western
Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central Luzon, and either Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao
at the end of the round.54
Apparently, the report of the Special Committee failed to take into account the ruling in Velez55 that
the service of then EVP Leonard De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, completed the
first rotational cycle.
Thus, it committed two inaccuracies. First, it erroneously reported that "only the governors of the
Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice
President." Second, it erroneously considered Central Luzon and Bicolandia as having had two terms
each in the First Rotational Cycle, when their second services were for the Second Rotational Cycle.
The unfortunate fact, however, is that the erroneous statements of the Special Committee were used
as bases for the recommendation that "either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the
governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice-President for the 2009-
2011 term."
Worse, they were cited by IBP-Western Visayas as bases to oppose the Petition in Intervention of IBP-
Southern Luzon, arguing that it would be contrary to Section 2, Rule 19, it being filed following the
finality of the December 14, 2010 Resolution56 of the Court.
At any rate, the statement of the Court in its December 14, 2010 Resolution 57 that "only the governors
of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice
President," did not pertain to the lis mota of the case. Thus, it did not settle anything so as to be
deemed a precedent-setting ruling. Those statements, therefore, could not be considered as
overturning, vacating and setting aside the ruling in Velez 58 that the service of then EVP De
Vera completed the first rotational cycle.
The election of Eugene Tan As IBP President
Much has been said about the election of Eugene Tan as IBP-President. IBP-Southern Luzon argues
that with his election and service as IBP-President from January 29, 1990 to April 1991, the IBP-
Western Visayas should no longer be allowed to field a candidate in the forthcoming elections for the
EVP.59 IBP-Western Visayas counters that his election could not be considered as part of the current
rotation as he was elected following the special elections held as a result of the October 6, 1989
Resolution of the Court. It has also been argued that he merely served as Interim President.
As Velez60 declared that the election of EVP De Vera completed the first rotational cycle, it could only
mean that all regions had their respective turns in the first rotational cycle. Thus, in this second
rotational cycle, issues as to the nature of his election and service as IBP-President during the First
Rotational Cycle are inconsequential.
At any rate, Eugene Tan could not be considered as an interim president. It was Justice Felix Antonio
who was designated by the Court as Interim Caretaker until the election of the IBP-President by the
elected IBP-BOG. The election of the new President and Executive Vice-President was directed by the
Court itself and in no way can it be said that they served on an interim basis. Besides, at that time,
under Section 47, the rotation concerned the presidency only. Section 47 was ordered to be amended
only in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,61 despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,62 which recognized
the operational fact that the rotation was from the position of President to that of EVP.
If Eugene Tan served only up to April, 1991, it was not because he served merely in the interim. He
served up to that time only because he resigned. As reflected in Bar Matter No. 565, dated October
15, 1991, Tan resigned as IBP-President when he was charged by several staff members of the IBP in
a letter-complaint to the Chief Justice, with favoritism or discrimination in the hiring of officers and
employees in the IBP and with extravagant and irregular expenditure of IBP funds. The Court found the
acts of Eugene Tan as constituting grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office, which
would have warranted his removal from office. Considering that he had earlier tendered his resignation
as IBP-President and his term of office already expired on June 30, 1991, the Court imposed on him
the penalty of severe censure only.63
Moreover, in A.M. No. 491, the Court stressed that: "One who has served as President of the IBP may
not run for election as EVP-IBP in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regionsshall have completed; whereupon the rotation shall begin anew."
Rotation by Exclusion
As clarified in the December 4, 2012 Resolution of the Court, the rotation should be by exclusion. In
said resolution, it was stated:
Resolution of the Court
Re: IBP-Western Visayas Region
After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments raised by the parties involved, the
Court finds wisdom in the position of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, that
at the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie for the governorship for
the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-
ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the rotation."
Stated differently, the IBP-BOG recommends the adoption of the rotation by exclusion scheme. The
Court quotes with approval the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on this score:
6. After due deliberation, the Board of Governors agreed and resolved to recommend adherence to the
principle of "rotation by exclusion" based on the following reasons:
a) Election through "rotation by exclusion" is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule
prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be
excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full
rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again
entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.
b) Election through a "rotation by exclusion" allows for a more democratic election process. The
rule provides for freedom of choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which
assures that every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.
c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election based on the same order
as the previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice which
is crucial to a democratic process is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie for election
at every turn as the entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the order in
the previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom
of choice, which is the bedrock of any democratic election process.
d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the Supreme Court may have adopted
in AM No. 09-5-2-SC, involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous election for
GMR may not be controlling, not being one of the principal issues raised in the GMR elections.
7. Thus, applying the principle of rotation by exclusion in Western Visayas which starts with a new
rotation cycle, all chapters (with the exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the
Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt
any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the
rotation.
The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by succession scheme. Through the rotation
by exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve as Governor at
any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a chapter has already served in the new
cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter remains in
the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court "the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with,
and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot."
Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the chapters shall have the equal
opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon, so as no chapter
shall serve consecutively. Every winner shall then be excluded after its term. Romblon then joins the
succeeding elections after the first winner in the cycle.64
As stated therein, it would be without prejudice to the regions entering into a consensus to adopt any
pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle, provided each region would have its turn in the
rotation.
As noted by the Court in its December 4, 2012 Resolution, there is a sense of predictability in the
rotation by the pre-ordained scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections will be
more genuine, as the opportunity to serve at any time is once again open to all, unless, of course, a
region has already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the
case where only one region remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court "the rotation
rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as
expressed through the ballot."65
The December 14, 2010 Resolution
That the Court, in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,66 ordered the election of the EVP-IBP for the next
term based on the inaccurate report of the Special Committee, is a fact. That cannot be erased. As a
consequence thereof, Libarios of IBP-Eastern Mindanao is now the IBP President. He, however, is part
of the second rotational cyclebecause 1] in Velez67 it was categorically ruled that the service of then
EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, completed the first rotational cycle; and
2] he could not be part of the first rotational cycle because EVP de Vera of the same region had already
been elected as such.
It is to be noted that in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,68 the Court did not categorically overturn
the ruling in Velez.69 It merely directed the election of the next EVP, without any reference to any
rotational cycle.
To declare that the first rotational cycle as not yet completed will cause more confusion than solution.
In fact, it has spawned this current controversy. To consider the service of current president, Libarios,
as part of the first rotational cycle would completely ignore the ruling in Velez. 70
The Best Option: Open to All Regions
How then do we treat the turns of those who had already served in the second rotational cycle? Shall
we treat them as anomalies? As aberrant developments, as Justice Brion puts it?
A remedy is to reconcile the conflicting decisions and resolutions with nothing in mind but the best
interest of the IBP. It appears from the pleadings, however, that the differences are irresoluble.
To avoid the endless conflicts, confusions and controversies which have been irritably plaguing the IBP,
the solution is to start another rotational round, a new cycle, open to all regions. At any rate, all
regions, after the election of Libarios, would be considered as already having its turn in the presidency.
This is not to detract from the fact that under Section 47, as amended, and from the pertinent rulings,
the position of EVP-IBP is the one being actually rotated, but as stated in the December 14, 2010
Resolution,71 it will enable the IBP "to start on a clean and correct slate, free from the politicking and
the under handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so long."
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws should be further amended
Whatever the decision of the Court may be, to prevent future wranglings and guide the IBP in their
future course of action, Section 47 and Section 49 of the IBP By-laws should again be amended. Stress
should be placed on the automatic succession of the EVP to the position of the president. Surprisingly,
the automatic succession does not appear in present Section 47, as ordered amended by the Court in
the December 14, 2010 Resolution. It should be restored. Accordingly, Section 47 and Section 49,
Article VII, are recommended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. Election of National President Executive Vice President. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Governors
shall be ex-officio Vice President for their respective regions.
The Board of Governors shall elect the President and Executive Vice President from among themselves
each by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Upon expiration of the term of the President, the
Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed as President.
Each region, as enumerated under Section 3, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, shall have the
opportunity to have its representative elected as Executive Vice-President, provided that, the election
for the position of Executive Vice President shall be on a strict rotation by exclusion basis. A region,
whose representative has just been elected as Executive Vice President, can no longer have its
representative elected for the same position in subsequent elections until after all regions have had the
opportunity to be elected as such. At the end of the rotational cycle, all regions, except the region
whose representative has just served the immediately preceding term, may be elected for another
term as Executive Vice-President in the new rotational cycle. The region whose representative served
last in the previous rotational cycle may be elected Executive Vice-President only after the first term of
the new rotational cycle ends, subject once more to the rule on exclusion.
The order of rotation by exclusion shall be without prejudice to the regions entering into a consensus
to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each region will have its turn in
the rotation.
A violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and
disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
SEC. 49. Terms of office. - The President and the Executive Vice-President shall hold office for a term
of two years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until
their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by
the Executive Vice President, and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President,
the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. His
tenure as such shall not be considered a new turn in the rotation.
In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of the Executive Vice President, the Board of
Directors shall elect among the regions qualified to be elected as Executive Vice President to serve the
unexpired portion of the term or period of disability.
In the event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive
Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired
portion of the term or during the period of disability. Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all
other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office
at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.
u>Creation of a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs
To further avoid conflicting and confusing rulings in the various IBP cases like what happened to this
one, the December 14,2010 Resolution and Velez,72 it is recommended that the Court create a
committee for IBP affairs to primarily attend to the problems and needs of a very important
professional body and to make recommendation for its improvement and strengthening.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to:
1] GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In
Intervention;
2] DECLARE that the election for the position of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be open to
all regions.
3] AMEND Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws to read as recommended
in the body of this disposition.
4] CREATE a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
 EN BANC
B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE
2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other
has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries
to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications,
as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and
appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take
the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken
lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing
them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity
 is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection
with his application for admission to the bar."5
As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling
is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he
signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled
thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
"attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the
2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the
form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against
the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of
his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the
use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in
Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a
contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence,
may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
 admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn
task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from
the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise
live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish
the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office
is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take
the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom
until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same
is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral
character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted
on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment,
filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at
Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under
Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law
studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable
future for them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife
(Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application,
he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from
taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in
filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral
character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and
"abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said
"Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was
"legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and
declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar
examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was
"single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my
status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He
further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and
communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed
Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me
assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the
affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to
his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended
me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his
 wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with
the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter
addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath
stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force
myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage
contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code,
among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an
affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised
Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had
"attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take
away from me even (sic) you go to any court."According to Complainant, although the letter was
unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-
A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who
has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to
disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the
reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of
the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant
because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the
recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant
failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making
inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite
suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's
lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he
should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false
statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outrightfrom taking the Bar Examinations
as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only
because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that
marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting
of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that
all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil
Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly
performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in
Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph
1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings
before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p.
21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to
admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid.,
pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to
such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1),
in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab
initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so
as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the
reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he
advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply
with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with
Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to
take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so
and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant
in order to serve his purpose. Inso doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well
as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled
to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them
(Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his
actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification
for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to
show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers ofan attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
 [B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1 2003.
RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's Oath, Caesar Z.
Distrito, petitioner.)
Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of Attorneys dated April 22,
2002 filed by Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar Examinee.
The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Singcang
Airport, BacolodCity.On September 18, 1999, an Information for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Function under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code[1]cralaw was filed against him which read:
That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being the President of the Bacolod City
Sangguniang Kabataan Federation, a government agency, did then and there under pretense of official
position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously preside over
the special session of the said Federation, in violation of the aforestated law.[2]cralaw
The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations [3]cralaw and passed the
same.He could not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the Roll of Attorneys pending the
resolution of the above-mentioned case.
On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter[4]cralaw from a certain Mr.
Benjie Montinola informing the said office that there were other cases filed against the petitioner which
were not duly disclosed in the latter's petition to take the bar examinations, to wit:
1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999, docketed as
B.C.I.S. 99-6735 and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Bacolod;
2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC, Bacolod, in which
an adverse decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered;
3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC, Bacolod.
Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) member, knowing fully well that he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer before the
Supreme Court nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys Mr. Montinola further averred:
The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned criminal and civil case
filed against him in his application form despite his personal knowledge of the same when he applied
for the Bar Exams sometime in 2001, is tantamount to PERJURY and that should be acted upon by your
respectable office to protect the integrity of our present lawyers who will be our future Prosecutors,
Judges, Justices or even High Ranking Cabinet or Government Officials or even President of our
country.
The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member before a
testimonial dinner tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and witnessed not only by it's
Officials, present members and honored guests but by thousands of Television viewers not only in
Bacolod City but the whole of Western Visayas if not the whole country, despite also of his personal
knowledge that he is not qualified to do so for the same reason above-stated, is tantamount to
IMPERSONATION that should be properly acted upon by the said body who will be furnished a copy of
this information and to also protect their integrity and to avoid similar incident that may happen in the
future for lack of proper screening.
Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the decision in Civil
Case No. 26837.
On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine Angelie M. Espinosa,
then SK Federation President of Bacolod City, which read:
Your Honor:
May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath in view of the
pending criminal case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name the nomenclature atty.?Such is
the case of Mr. Caesar Z. Distrito , SK Federation, Bacolod City Vice-President whopassed the bar last
May 2002, but has not taken his oath due to the pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4,
Bacolod City for Usurpation of Power charge against him by the undersigned.
Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang Panglungsod committee
hearing dated June 21, 2002 where the petitioner's name appeared to have been signed, along with
the word "Atty."
On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod, rendered a
decision acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 99609. [5]cralaw Attached thereto was a certified true copy
of the decision in the said criminal case and a certificate of finality of judgment. [6]cralaw The OBC
informed the petitioner of the above-mentioned charges and required him to comment on the same.
In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his petition to take the
2001 bar exams, the criminal case for usurpation of authority or official function was the only pending
case against him at the time.He did not mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos. 99-6735 and 6736 for Violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in his petition because he was of the honest belief that it was no longer necessary for him
to do so, considering that the cases had long been settled and dismissed without even reaching the
arraignment stage.[7]cralaw The said criminal cases apparently stemmed from the debts of some 50
fish vendors at Magsungay Village.The petitioner's father, as the punong barangay, had guaranteed the
same in order to help the fishermen.But as the drawer of the two checks, the complainant filed the
action against the petitioner when the debts remained unpaid.
As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary loans that he, along
with other barangay officials and employees, obtained from Fil-Global Credit and Asset Management
Inc. and SWIP Lending Corporation on January 13, 2000 and August 22, 2000, respectively, when he
was Barangay SK Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly deducted from his salary the payment for
the said loans until such time when he completed the payment to Fil-Global on January 31, 2001 and
for SWIUP Lending on April 30, 2001.The barangay treasurer thereafter issued a certification of
complete payment.[8]cralaw When the petitioner came back to Bacolod after the bar exams, he was
surprised to learn that their barangay officials and employees were facing cases for sum of money filed
by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending because apparently, their payments were not duly remitted.He
received summons only on October 22, 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the MTCC, Bacolod City.The
finance officer and the treasurer promised to settle everything, but they failed to do so until their term
expired on August 15, 2002.After the decision was rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid the
plaintiffs in the said cases, as evidenced by official receipt nos. 8169 [9]cralaw and
9019[10]cralaw issued by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending respectively datedMay 7, 2003.Thereafter, an
order of satisfaction of judgment[11]cralaw was correspondingly issued by the court in civil cases
26837[12]cralaw and 27447.[13]cralaw
Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation[14]cralaw was sent to him by the IBP
Negros Occidental Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial excellence awarding
ceremonies, but that there was no mention of any induction ceremony.Considering the he in fact
successfully passed the bar examinations and was being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend
the occasion.He admitted that during the occasion, all those who just passed the bar exams were
called for the induction of new members, and that he was left with no choice but to join the others
onstage when his name was called.However, the petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP
in the dark, as he in fact informed them of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he
did not sign any document that night.
The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the complainant in the
Letter-complaint dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie Montinola awas a non-existing
person who cannot claim to be a "guardian of proper civi[c] responsibility" considering that he is not
even a registered voter of Bacolod City and that he could not be located in the address given, as
indicated in a Certification issued by the Commission on Elections, Bacolod City [15]cralaw and the Office
of the Barangay Council of Barangay Singcang Airport.[16]cralaw
Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the same in the
attendance sheet in a committee hearing of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He reasoned
that he was of the notion that a bar passer can be called "Attorney," and that what is only prohibited is
to practice law, such as appearing in court and notarizing docunments without the requisite oath-
taking before the Supreme Court and signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in fact executed an
affidavit of desistance[17]cralaw to attest that there was indeed no misrepresentation on his part.
The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may have committed.
On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation:
Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases against herein
petitioner, he may now be admitted as a member of the Bar.
Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO be now allowed to
take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees. [18]cralaw
There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the determination of which
would materially affect the fate of the present petition:
First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of two other civil
cases filed against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his petition to take the 2001
bar examinations.
Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new lawyers,
when he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no authority to do so as yet.
The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and prospective applicants
to the bar.
The petitioner's non-disclosure of a
Criminal case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and two other civil cases filed
against him, albeit already dismissed
at the time of the filing of his petition
to take the 2001 bar examinations.
The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include cases that had
already been dismissed.[19]cralaw This, the Court cannot quite fathom.As stated by Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant, Ma. Cristina B. Layusa:[20]cralaw
The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to take the Bar
Examination, the following is written clearly:
"Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case against you and attach
pertinent documents:____________________________."
If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his pending case for
Usurpation of authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said instruction is written in the middle of the
form, so if petitioner had not really read the same, he was not mindful of what he was doing which
should not be the case of a Bar applicant.
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar, to wit:
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the
sound discretion of the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character, fit and proper to practice law.[21]cralaw The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.[22]cralaw
It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known.Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality.The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as
it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[23]cralaw
Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two other cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money which were filed against him, in
his petition to take the bar examinations.He should have known that the said petitionis not to be taken
lightly as it is made under oath.The petitioner, in so doing, violated Rule 7.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[24]cralaw which requires of every applicant candor and truthfulness.Every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine the applicant's moral
character.[25]cralaw The petitioner should have realized the implication of any omission on his part,
even if inadvertently made.
In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26]cralaw the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order," and considered the same
an offense involving moral turpitude.The erring lawyer was consequently suspended from the practice
of law.
In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not even reach the
arraignment stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the same as it was
a material fact which could affect his application for admission to the bar.
It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false statement in his
application is not of good moral character.[27]cralaw The concealment or withholding from the court of
the fact that an applicant has been charged with or indicated for an alleged crime is a ground for
disqualification of the applicant to take the bar examination, or for revocation of the license to practice,
if he has already been admitted to the bar.If what the applicant concealed is a crime which does not
involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that
makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer.It should be noted that the application was made under
oath, which he lightly took when he made the concealment.[28]cralaw
The petitioner's attendance and
participation in an IBP testimonial
dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a plain and simple
testimonial dinner for successful bar examinees that included an awarding ceremony for judges.It was
only later when he discovered that the program was actually a testimonial for new
lawyers.[29]cralawHowever, a perusal of the invitation [30]cralaw sent by the IBP to the petitioner
reveals that there was an express mention that the affair was for new lawyers, to wit:
Dear Atty. Distrito:
The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of Excellence to
Outstanding Judges and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for new lawyers on June 28, 2002,
7:00 P.M., at the Ballroom-A, Business Inn, Lacson Street, Bacolod City.
In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I am inviting you to
attend said after being one of the new members of the Bar.Please come in formal attire.
Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.
The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe that he attended an affair, believing
in good faith that it was meant for those who recently passed the bar, when the invitation he himself
attached to his petition states otherwise.The petitioner's forthrightness and candor with the Court leave
much to be desired.
The petitioner's admitted use of the
Appellation "Atty." When he had no
Authority to do so as yet.
The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow himself to
be called an attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the required examination or
has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. [31]cralaw The Court shall thereupon admit the
applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be
entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the
clerk of court, which certificates shall be his authority to practice. [32]cralaw The clerk of the Supreme
Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person
admitted when he receives his certificate..[33]cralaw
The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in the Roll is
the last act that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the right to call himself
"attorney".Continued membership in the IBP and regular payment of membership dues and other
lawful assessments that it may levy are conditions sine qua non to the privilege to practice law and to
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[34]cralaw
The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect contempt of
court.[35]cralawThe Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's Oath for grave
misconduct, such as calling himself and "attorney" and appearing as counsel for clients in courts even
before being admitted to the bar. [36]cralaw Although the evidence in this case does not include that the
petitioner actually engaged in the practice of law, the fact is that he signed in an attendance sheet as
"Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well that he was not yet admitted to
the bar.[37]cralaw
Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to become a
member of the bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the moral requirements
before he can be admitted to the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court is hereby DENIED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 7472 March 30, 2010
LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago,
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having
been suspended by the Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office
address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty.
De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore,
prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No.
355-0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty.
De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate
disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She,
however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman,
docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the
suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16,
2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she
was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC,
Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from
practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the
directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due
deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme
Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in
Zambales, which "gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of
law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked." Acting on the said
motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) Respondents Urgent Motion for
Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6) months
(sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards as proper is
NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have
SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001
as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which
she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The
complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the
complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De
Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1)
Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which
reads:
 2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay
[nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang
Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October
10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong September 26, 2005
at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session
ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No.
042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan
vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw
pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma.
Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang
(2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista
noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c)
isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito
ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking
personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de
Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na
nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new matters
raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution
dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According to her, the resolution should be the "final nail
to the coffin of this case."
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBCs reply to an
inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios. 1 Therein,
the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic, following the
pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus
and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al.
and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his
compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more
than six months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated
in the Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is
necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. 2
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that
he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court,
after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the
order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was
unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to
resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC
for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC
recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of
suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.1avvphi1
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.3Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the
Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its
Bar, to withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring
lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and
right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in the
matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or
her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order
of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
 EN BANC
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency 1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law
on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and
forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts;
maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the
Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law
should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the
orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the
legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client
can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession
and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the
same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We
cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past
experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December
17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of
the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify
the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion 3 praying that his
license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En
Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that
Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed
grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the
blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development
Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his disbarment
was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Courts
compassion and mercy.6He sought the Courts forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but
at the same time, questioning the Courts finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his appeal
proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the
Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc once
again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more than
three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any
immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the
subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor
to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it
had already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance
and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Courts consideration, and vowed that he will no
longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance
and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of
law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to
maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the
courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for
reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3,
2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality. 16 On July 18,
2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the
Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now
become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5)
and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded
from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility
as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made
whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his
disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his
petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a
certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his
family are dedicated parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors
to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to
the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so
only as a matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. 23 Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. 24 The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy
of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or
her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated
an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For Christ,
Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked
as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who
were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator
and had continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the
Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to
1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed
to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial
clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Courts decision. According to him, he has long
expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect
on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his
mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time
and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character
reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active
member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his
affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary
Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage
Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his
conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate
Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which gave
him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the
fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court
also notedthat he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing
his religious and social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and
Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia
committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered
the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to
practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyers sincere admission of
guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in
falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after
considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty.
Antiniws disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged
inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government
institutions, and members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his
disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and
more importantly, the disbarred attorneys sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found guilty of
gross misconduct.1wphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law mostly the same grounds
on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we
granted the respondents motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondents earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed
as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we
are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5)
years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondents
misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondents reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt.1wphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and
to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit
proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the
respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we
stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court
is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its
feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when
the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and
deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law
stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.