Aurangzeb

and his
Deccan Policy
(r.1658 – 1707)


C10 Internal Assignment
Name - Md Naseer
UG II, Semester IV
Registration no - 21106160050
Roll no.- HIST050
Department of History
Paper name - History of India VI (c.1605-1750)
Paper code – HIST-C10
Course Instructor - Dr. Sajjad Alam Rizvi
 The sixth Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb, is renowned for his
imperialistic approaches and rigid commitment to Islamic law. During his rule,
he set out on a mission to increase and bolster the empire's holdings, which
resulted in numerous conquests across various regions of India. His Deccan
Policy, an aggressive drive to conquer southern India in order to attain his
ultimate objective of consolidating the Mughal Empire under his supreme rule,
was one of his most important initiatives. A much more comprehensive
political, theological, and economic strategy that would solidify Aurangzeb as
India's absolute ruler lay behind his conquest of the Deccan region.

The goals of Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy included strengthening
the Mughal Empire's control over the area, highlighting Mughal dominance,
putting an end to the political opposition from Muslims and Hindus, and
reducing the authority of the Deccan's local leaders. The Mughal Empire's
security and continued existence would be guaranteed as well as a
considerable boost in money as a result of the conquest of the Deccan.
Beginning in 1681, Aurangzeb's Deccan War saw the Mughal army initially
succeed until coming to a standstill against the Maratha Confederacy, a
formidable and well-coordinated force of Hindu warriors from Maharashtra. 1

The nearly 26-year-long battle was a disastrous military
undertaking for the Mughals, depleting their resources and revealing their
weaknesses. Significant instability and uprisings were caused by Aurangzeb's
religious intolerance toward Hindus and Deccan Muslims, making it difficult for
the Mughals to maintain dominance in the area. Aurangzeb persevered in his

1 Chandra, Satish. 2016. Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals. Part 2, Mughal Empire (1526-1748).

New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications

effort to conquer the Deccan despite the obstacles. He undertook extensive
efforts to crush the rebellion, punishing the rebellious lords harshly, razing
their forts, and stealing their riches. Aurangzeb's meticulous and well-planned
strategy contributed to the Mughal army's victory in numerous engagements
against the powerful Maratha armies. However, brutality and intolerance
toward other religions also plagued Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy.

He led to the destruction of numerous Hindu temples and the
persecution of non-Muslims, which strengthened the resistance to Mughal
rule. The Mughal Empire had collapsed by the early 1700s as a result of
Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy, and the government had become weak as a result
of the vast and varied regions they had taken over. Multiple regional powers
frequently attacked the Mughals, and the empire was ultimately destroyed by
the British in the 19th century. Divergent viewpoints on the achievements and
shortcomings of Aurangzeb's leadership have sparked a contentious discussion
about the Deccan Policy's legacy. 2

A massive military operation designed to increase the Mughal
Empire's control over the Deccan region was known as Aurangzeb's Deccan
Policy. The Mughal Empire was ultimately damaged by the policy's harshness,
intolerance, and religious persecution, which finally led to the empire's
destruction. The Deccan Policy of Aurangzeb serves as a constant reminder of
the complexity of empire-building, with its political, social, economic, and
religious components, which still have an impact on the politics and culture of
the Indian subcontinent today.3

2 Ibid
3 Ibid

The First Phase (1658-68)

The Deccan policy, an aggressive campaign designed to subdue
the southern kingdoms and solidify Mughal dominance over the whole Indian
Subcontinent, characterized the first ten years of Aurangzeb's leadership. His
Deccan Policy would influence both the fortunes of the Mughal Empire and the
course of his reign, bringing about both its apogee and eventual fall. Shah
Jahan personally abandoned the contract of 1636, which stipulated that the
Mughals would never conquer Bijapur and Golconda in exchange for his
withholding help for the Marathas and giving up one-third of the territories of
Ahmednagar state. Golconda and Bijapur were in danger of disappearing in
1657–1658.

The Nizam Shah's domains, which had been ceded to Bijapur in
1636, had to be surrendered, and Golconda had to pay a hefty compensation.
After becoming emperor, Aurangzeb had to deal with two issues: convincing
Bijapur to give up the lands that had been given to it by the treaty of 1636, and
Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj's growing authority. Kalyani and Bider had been
safely enclosed in 1657. In 1660, Parenda was obtained through bribery. Adil
Shah's unwillingness to cooperate infuriated Aurangzeb, who gave Jai Singh the
command to punish both Adil Shah and Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. Jai Singh
was a wise political figure.4

It would be foolish to confront both of these fools at once, he
advised Aurangzeb. Twenty years later, Aurangzeb eventually agreed with Jai

4 Ibid
Singh's conclusion that the Maratha problem could not be resolved without a
forward policy in the Deccan. The emperor would need to be present during
the lengthy and arduous campaign to conquer the Deccan, as well as vast
army. But Aurangzeb couldn't afford to leave on a far-off campaign as long as
Shah Jahan was still Alinejad Singh's Bijapur campaign in 1665 was doomed to
failure given his meagre resources. The campaign re-enacted the Deccani
states' united front against the Mughals since Qutb Shah dispatched a sizable
force to support Bijapur. 5

Guerrilla tactics were used by the Deccanis to lure Jai Singh to
Bijapur while destroying the countryside to prevent the Mughals from
obtaining supplies. Because he had not brought siege guns, Jai Singh
discovered that he had no way to attack the city and that he could not take the
city by force. Jai Singh did not conquer any new land during the Deccani
campaign Singh's death was hastened by his failure to succeed and
Aurangzeb's criticisms; he passed away in 1667.The Mughals used bribery in
1668 to force Sholapur's capitulation. The strengthening of Mughal control in
the area and successful military expeditions were the defining features of
Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy's initial stage.6

The mounting unhappiness among the Hindu population and
the financial pressures on the Mughal treasury were two signs of the policy
changes, though. The second phase of the program, which lasted for more
than two decades and was characterized by defeats, betrayal, and a final

5 Ibid
6 Richards, John F. “The Mughal Empire,” March 18, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511584060
dismantling of the Mughal Empire, was driven by Aurangzeb's unshakable
determination to conquer the Deccan. Thus, the first stage was complete.

The Second Phase (1668-84)

After Ali Adil Shah's death in 1672, Bijapur experienced rapid
internal decay, creating a new circumstance. Aurangzeb had three possibilities
given his belief that Shivaji was unreliable and ambitious, and that it was
impossible to come to a firm accord with him:(i) to adopt a policy of strict
neutrality towards the Deccan states, even if it implied Shivaji's conquest or
dominance of Bijapur, either alone or in alliance with Golconda; (ii) to attempt
to shore up Bijapur against Marathas incursions, even against its wishes, by
finding a dependable instrument or faction at the Bijapur court to support this
policy, and if possible, to persuade Golconda to join though never seriously
considered due to its impossibility, the first option's adoption may not have
been as detrimental as the others after all. 7

Even though one of the Deccan's stable and prosperous states,
Bijapur, was ruled by the Marathas, the Mughals might not have been
significantly harmed by this. However, the developments starting in 1656, the
character of the Mughal state, and Aurangzeb's desire for a forceful strategy—
including, if necessary, annexation—prevented a strategy of masterly
inactivity. When Aurangzeb was eventually persuaded, based on his own
experience, that the Deccan states would never join forces with him to utterly

7 Ibid
smash the Marathas, he drifted to the second option until finally abandoning it
in favour of the third in 1684.8

During this time, the ascent to power of Madanna and
Akhanna in Golconda was a novel factor. After Abul Hasan's accession in 1672,
Madanna Pandit, a Teleg brahman who had served as Saiyid
Muzaltar9 ,secretary and personal assistant, was named wazir and Bestwaby.
These two brothers practically held power in Golconda from 1672 until the
state's dissolution in 1687. The brothers pursued a strategy of attempting to
forge an alliance between Golconda, Biapur, and Shivaji. Due to his
dissatisfaction with these meagre victories, Diler Khan, Aurangzeb's lieutenant,
took over as Bahadur Khan's leader.

Diler Khan reversed Bahadur Khan's strategy of siding with the
Deccani party and Bijapur against the Afghans. Diler Khan listened to Bahlol
Khan's eloquent argument in favour of a combined attack on Golkonda and
subsequently jointly destroying Shivaji. The Golconda expedition, however,
was a disgraceful failure (1677) that did nothing but forward Madanna and
Ahhanna's strategy of forging a cohesive front of Deccani strength against the
Mughals.

Mandanna and Shivaji had already signed a subsidiary
agreement in which Mandanna promised Shivaji a yearly payment of 15,000
huns for the realm's defence’s Mughal-Bijapur invasion in 1677 also failed as a
result of Mandanna and Akhana's strong leadership. Diler Khan nevertheless

8 The Deccan states like Bijapur and Golconda was supported by the Marathas against Emperor Aurangzeb and

would never join hands with him

9 He was the Wazir of Golconda
made another attempt to seize Bijapur in 1679–1680.Due to a lack of planning
and resources, he was unable to defeat the combined forces of the Deccani
rulers.10

Later, Aurangzeb came to fear the idea of conquering the two
Deccani states because he understood that it would take a long time, require a
sizable army and a large amount of wealth, and require the placement of a
brave prince in charge of operations to settle the ongoing conflict between
Mughal commanders—a risky situation he fervently wished to avoid. He wasn't
ready to go to the deccan in person either. Thus, this time period was primarily
marked by a lack of consistent policy.

The Third Phase (1684-87)

By 1684, Aurangzeb had come to the conclusion that annexing
one or both of the Deccani states altogether was the only way to accomplish
his goals. In order to feed the imperial army with food, grant the Mughal
soldiers unfettered access to his realm, and provide a detachment of 5000–
6000 cavalry for the battle against the Marathas, Aurangzeb called on the Adil
Shah as a vassal. Additionally, he demanded the expulsion of Sharna Khan, the
prominent Bajpur noble who opposed the Mughals. Now, an open rupture was
unavoidable. Adil Shah requested assistance from Golconda and Sambhai, and
both responded quickly. Even the combined troops of the Deccan states,
especially when led by the Mughal emperor himself, could not stand against
the Mughal army's complete might. Before Bijapur fell (1686), it had been

10 Ibid
under siege for 18 months, with Aurangzeb being present during the last few
weeks. 11

The earlier failures of Jai Singh (1665) and Diler Khan (1679–
80) are well justified by this. After Bijapur's fall, a campaign against Golconda
was unavoidable. There were too many "sins" committed by the Outb Shah to
be forgiven. He had granted the unbelievers Madanna and Akhanna absolute
power and had frequently aided Shivaji. His most recent "treachery" involved
defying Aurangzeb's warning and dispatching 40,00 soldiers to aid Bijapur.
Despite fierce resistance, the Mughals had taken control of Golconda by 1083.
12

In exchange for a sizable stipend, the ceding of some
territories, and the removal of Mandanna and Akhanna, the emperor had
consented to pardon the Qutub Shah. Qutub Shah Had sins and Akhanna were
killed in the streets after being taken there in 1686.However, the Qutub Shahi
monarchy was not able to be saved by this crime. After Bijapur fell, Aurangzeb
made the decision to make amends with the Qutub Shah. Early in 1687, the
siege began, and after more than six months of fighting, the fort was
abandoned due to betrayal and corruption. Even though Aurangzeb had
succeeded, he soon realized that his problems hadn't ended with the
destruction of Bijapur and Golconda.13

The Last Phase (1687-1707)

11 Ibid
12 Following the downfall of Bijapur, a campaign against Golconda was inevitable. In 1685, despite stiff

resistance, the Mughals had occupied Golconda.

13 Ibid

Aurangzeb was free to concentrate all of his forces against the
Marathas when Bijapur and Golconda fell. The new Maratha ruler, Chhatrapati
Sambhaji Maharaj (son of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj), not only invaded
Burhanpur and Aurangabad but also sent a challenge to Aurangzeb by
providing refuge to the latter's rebellious son, Prince Akbar. Prince Akbar was
treated oddly passively by Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj, who invested his
energy in a pointless conflict with the Portuguese and the Sids on the coast.
Prince rushed into Mughal territory in 1686 but was repelled.

Prince Akbar, discouraged, took to the sea to flee to Iran, where
he sought refuge with the Iranian king. A Mughal troop unexpectedly arrived at
Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj's covert location at Sangameshwar in 1689. As a
rebel and an infidel, he was executed after being paraded before Aurangzeb.
This was unquestionably a serious political oversight on the part of Aurangzeb,
historians have noted. By settling with the Marathas, he could have put an end
to his invasion of Bijapur and Golconda. He not only blew this opportunity by
killing Chhatrapati Sambhai Maharaj, but he also gave the Marathas something
to fight for.

The Maratha sardars were free to pillage the Mughal domains
since there was no centre of support. After being anointed king, Rajaram,
Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharai's younger brother, had to flee when the
Mughals assaulted his palace. Rajaram took refuge at Jinji on the east coast,
where he carried on the struggle against the Mughals. Similar to how the
Maratha rebellion moved from the west to the east coast. After 1690,
Aurangzeb focused on adding the wealthy and vast Karnataka tract to the
empire. Aurangzeb steadfastly refused to negotiate with the Marathas
between 1690 and 1703. At Jinji, Rajaram was under siege, but the siege lasted
a very long time. Jini fell in 1698, but Rajaram, the crown prince, managed to
flee.

As Maratha opposition increased, the Mughals experienced a
number of devastating setbacks. Many of the Marathas' forts were taken back,
and Rajaram was able to return to Satara. Aurangzeb dragged his frail, worn-
out body from one fort's siege to another from 1700 to 1705. On the other
hand, the Mughal army suffered a terrible toll from floods, sickness, and the
roving Maratha bands. All of these eventually cause the nobles and the army to
become apathetic and disaffected. 14

Numerous jagirdars struck covert agreements with the Marathas,
promising to pay Chauth in exchange for the Marathas not disturbing their
jagirs. Aurangzeb began talks with the Marathas in 1703. He was ready to free
Shahu, the mother and son of Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj who had been
taken prisoner at Satara.Shahu's unique status was acknowledged by
Aurangzeb, who was willing to grant him the swarajya of Chhatrapati Shivaji
Maharaj and the right of sardeshmukhi over the Deccan.
To receive Shahu, more than 70 Maratha sardars actually
gathered. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb abruptly changed the plans because he was
unsure of the Maratha's motives. By 1706, Aurangzeb had come to the
conclusion that his attempt to seize every Maratha fort was pointless.15 While

14 Ibid
15 From this point of time, the Marathas could be called the real rulers of the Deccan as the power was

concentrated in their hands.

an ecstatic Maratha army hovered nearby and attacked the survivors, he
slowly made his way back to Aurangabad.

When Aurangzeb passed away in Aurangabad in 1707, he left
behind an empire that was utterly disorganized and in which all of the empire's
different internal issues were reaching a boiling point. This eventually caused
the Mughal Empire to fall.
No matter how one looks at it, it is obvious that Aurangzeb's policy of
expanding Mughal power across the Deccan was a huge and ambitious effort.
Although some of Aurangzeb's forebears had established some influence
there, it was Aurangzeb who made the Deccan the main focus of his rule.

A rebellion led by Prince Shah Shuja, one of Aurangzeb's
brothers, served as the impetus for his first expedition into the Deccan.
Aurangzeb perceived Shuja's exile to the Deccan and establishment of his own
court as a challenge to his authority. He oversaw an effort to put an end to the
uprising and conquer the Deccan for the Mughals. Aurangzeb conducted a
number of expeditions in the Deccan over the course of several decades, but
faced into opposition from the local authorities and Maratha rebels.
In order to facilitate Mughal control of the area, Shah erected
a new capital at Aurangabad and constructed a network of forts and roadways.
He also put into place policies that alienated a large portion of the Hindu
people in the area by promoting Islam and restricting non-Muslim rituals.
Aurangzeb tried his best, but he was eventually unable to completely conquer
the Deccan.

 Particularly the Marathas proved to be a powerful foe, and it
was challenging to subdue them due to their disorganized organization and
guerrilla tactics. Other fronts of conflict for the Mughal Empire included
pressure from the burgeoning British East India Company and northern
rebellions.

The Deccan policy of Aurangzeb might be considered as a long-
term contributing reason to the Mughal Empire's demise. The expense of
managing a sizable army and a huge area depleted the empire's resources and
added to its financial instability. Additionally, alienating many of the empire's
subjects, the policy of religious repression fuelled social and political unrest.
Additionally, the Deccan policy's goals were not ultimately met.
Despite having some degree of success, the Mughals were
never able to completely subdue the Marathas or incorporate the Deccan into
the imperial system. In the end, it became clear that the Mughal presence in
the Deccan was transient and unsustainable. In summary, Aurangzeb's Deccan
strategy was a large and ambitious project that had wide-ranging effects on
the Mughal Empire. Although it can be argued that it was necessary for the
empire to grow and become more powerful, by depleting its resources and
alienating its people, it also played a role in its decline. In the end, the Deccan
policy failed to accomplish its goals, and the Mughal presence in the area
turned out to be transient and unsustainable.




 Bibliography

• Chandra, Satish. 2016. Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals.

Part 2, Mughal Empire (1526-1748). New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications.

• Richards, John F. “The Mughal Empire,” March 18, 1993.
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511584060.


• Husain, Zakir. “PROBLEMS OF THE DECCAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE
LAST DECADE OF AURANGZEB’S REIGN — Based on Explorations in the
Inayat Jung Collection of the National Archives.” Proceedings of the
Indian History Congress 61 (2000): 330–44.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/44148109.,

• Richards, J. F. “The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan.” The Journal of Asian
Studies 35, no. 2 (February 1976): 237–56.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2053981.

• Moosvi, Shireen. “THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE DECCAN—Economic
Factors and Consequences.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress
43 (1982): 365–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44141249.