II – Sources of Obligations

1. Law – imposed by the law itself

Art. 1158

Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined
in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the
precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.

2. Contracts – stipulation of parties

Art. 1159

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1305

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds

himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service

3. Quasi-Contracts – arising from lawful, voluntary, and unilateral acts and

which are enforceable to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of the another.

Kinds:

A. Negotorium gestio –

Art. 2144 - 2153

Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or

management of the business or property of another, without any power from the
latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its
incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in
a position to do so.

This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances:

(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;

(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.

In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404
regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern.

In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be
applicable. (1888a)

Article 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence
of a good father of a family, and pay the damages which through his fault or

1
negligence may be suffered by the owner of the property or business under
management. The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity
according to the circumstances of each case. (1889a)

Article 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of
his duties, he shall be liable for the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the
direct obligation of the latter toward the owner of the business. The
responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be solidary, unless the
management was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger.
(1890a)

Article 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event: (1) If
he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark
upon; (2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner; (3) If he fails
to return the property or business after demand by the owner; (4) If he
assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)

Article 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save property or
business from imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for
fortuitous events: (1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management; (2)
If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the
management. (n)

Article 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the business
produces the effects of an express agency, even if the business may not have
been successful. (1892a)

Article 2150. Although the officious management may not have been expressly
ratified, the owner of the property or business who enjoys the advantages of the
same shall be liable for obligations incurred in his interest, and shall reimburse
the officious manager for the necessary and useful expenses and for the
damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the management had for
its purpose the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit
may have been derived. (1893)

Article 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and there has
been no imminent and manifest danger to the property or business, the owner is
liable as under the first paragraph of the preceding article, provided: (1) The
officious manager has acted in good faith, and (2) The property or business is
intact, ready to be returned to the owner. (n)

Article 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts which he
has entered into with third persons, even though he acted in the name of the
owner, and there shall be no right of action between the owner and third
persons. These provisions shall not apply: (1) If the owner has expressly or
tacitly ratified the management, or (2) When the contract refers to things
pertaining to the owner of the business. (n)

Article 2153. The management is extinguished: (1) When the owner repudiates
it or puts an end thereto; (2) When the officious manager withdraws from the

2
management, subject to the provisions of article 2144; (3) By the death, civil
interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the owner or the officious manager. (n)

B. Solutio Indebiti –

Art. 2154 – 2163

Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. (1895)

Article 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application

of a doubtful or difficult question of law may come within the scope of the
preceding article. (n)

Article 2156. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due, he may
recover if he proves that it was not due. (n)

Article 2157. The responsibility of two or more payees, when there has been
payment of what is not due, is solidary. (n)

Article 2158. When the property delivered or money paid belongs to a third
person, the payee shall comply with the provisions of article 1984. (n)

Article 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall pay legal
interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits received or
which should have been received if the thing produces fruits. He shall
furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from any
cause, and for damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it is
recovered. (1896a)

Article 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a thing certain
and determinate shall only be responsible for the impairment or loss of the same
or its accessories and accessions insofar as he has thereby been benefited. If he
has alienated it, he shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum.
(1897)

Article 2161. As regards the reimbursement for improvements and expenses

incurred by him who unduly received the thing, the provisions of Title V of Book
II shall govern. (1898)

Article 2162. He shall be exempt from the obligation to restore who, believing in
good faith that the payment was being made of a legitimate and subsisting
claim, destroyed the document, or allowed the action to prescribe, or gave up
the pledges, or cancelled the guaranties for his right. He who paid unduly may
proceed only against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard to whom the
action is still effective. (1899)

Article 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if

something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered;
but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made
out of liberality or for any other just cause. (1901)

3
 C. Other Quasi-Contracts

Art. 2164 – 2175

Article 2164. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give
support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same
from the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and without
intention of being repaid. (1894a)

Article 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person, without the
knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give support to the deceased,
said relatives shall reimburse the third person, should the latter claim
reimbursement. (1894a)

Article 2166. When the person obliged to support an orphan, or an insane or

other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the latter, any third
person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this article apply
when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly
refuses to support him.

Article 2167. When through an accident or other cause a person is injured or

becomes seriously ill, and he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to
give consent to a contract, he shall be liable to pay for the services of the
physician or other person aiding him, unless the service has been rendered out
of pure generosity.

Article 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other calamity, property is
saved from destruction by another person without the knowledge of the owner,
the latter is bound to pay the former just compensation.

Article 2169. When the government, upon the failure of any person to comply
with health or safety regulations concerning property, undertakes to do the
necessary work, even over his objection, he shall be liable to pay the expenses.

Article 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous event, movables separately

pertaining to two or more persons are commingled or confused, the rules on co-
ownership shall be applicable.

Article 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of lost personal property
shall be governed by articles 719 and 720.

Article 2172. The right of every possessor in good faith to reimbursement for
necessary and useful expenses is governed by article 546.

Article 2173. When a third person, without the knowledge of the debtor, pays
the debt, the rights of the former are governed by articles 1236 and 1237.

Article 2174. When in a small community a majority of the inhabitants of age

decide upon a measure for protection against lawlessness, fire, flood, storm or
other calamity, any one who objects to the plan and refuses to contribute to the

4
expenses but is benefited by the project as executed shall be liable to pay his
share of said expenses.

Article 2175. Any person who is constrained to pay the taxes of another shall be
entitled to reimbursement from the latter.

4. Acts or omissions punishable by law – they arise from civil liability which
is the consequence of a criminal offense.

Art. 1161 –

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal
laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. (1092a)

5. Quasi – Delicts – arise from damage caused to another through an act or

omission, there being fault or negligence, but no contractual relation exists
between the parties.

Art. 1162 –

Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of

Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws. (1093a)

Art. 2176 –

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2177 –

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.(n)

Distinction between crimes and quasi-delicts

BASIS DELICTS QUASI-DELICTS

INTENT Criminal/ malicious Negligence
INTEREST Affects public interest Affects private interest
LIABLITY Criminal and civil Civil
PURPOSE Punishment Indemnification
COMPROMISE Cannot be compromised Can be compromised
GUILT Proved beyond Preponderance of
reasonable doubt evidence
LIABILITY OF PERSON Subsidiary Primary and direct
RESPONSIBLE

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Civil liability from fault of others – Art. 2180

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (1903a)

Family Code, Art. 219 –

Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not
apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed
by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Civil liability arising from crime

6
 Art. 1161 -

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal
laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. (1092a)

Cases

Barredo vs Garcia (1942)

FACTS:
 May 3, 1936 1:30 am: road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis
 The carretela was overturned and its passenger Faustino Garcia
(16 years old boy) suffered injuries from which he died two days
later
 Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap
 he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at high
speed
 criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI
 CA affirmed CFI: he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of 1 year and 1 day to 2 years of prision correccional. The
court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. 
 March 7, 1939: parents Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario brought
an action in the CFI of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla 
 Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau
of Public Works available to be public and to himself
 Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code
 defense: liability of Barredo is governed by the
RPC>liability is only subsidiary (no civil action against the
driver Fontanilla Barredo cannot be held responsible in
the case)
 CFI awarded damages for P2,000 plus legal interest 
 CA: reduced the damages to P1,000 w/ legal interest 
 Applied Article 1903: applicable only to those (obligations)
arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law
 by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision
of his servant or employee
ISSUE: W/N the parents may bring separate civil action against Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer 

7
HELD: YES. CA Affirmed.
 quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from delict or crime
 Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.

CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for
any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons
subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent,
but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom
properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and
in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:

8
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under
their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the
majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons
using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or,
if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always
to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and
proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit
of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed.

9
 Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed."
  Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and
the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal
act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs
the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former
are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while
the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of
the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

Penal Code Civil Code
minors and
other persons
incapacitated persons
subsidiary (articles
direct (article 19) direct(Art. 1903) 
20 and 21)
 same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
 interpretation of the words of article 1093 "fault or negligence not
punished by law"
 consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code
 The acts to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. 
 But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
same code. 
 A typical application of this distinction may be found in
the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment,
that to the passengers out of the contract for passage,
while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
negligent act itself.
 Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
 exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a

10
 family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in
article 20 of the Penal Code
 distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
 Rationales:
1. Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life
2. to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
3. It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall
upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director
4. not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress

Mendoza vs Arrieta

Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on Certiorari of the

Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint
for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and
Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized
as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three-
way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.
As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar
and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The case

11
against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of P1,604.00,
by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and
bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz.
The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No.
SM-228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the
amount of P8,890.00.
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-
owner-driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the
left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound
for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had
jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was
bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of
the accident was adopted by truck-driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck
driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left
towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a
policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his
jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya causing him to
be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's
car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V,
Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion: LLpr
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused
Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crim. Case No.
SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and
to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as
actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
"Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the
offense charged in Crim. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio,
and his bond is ordered cancelled.
"SO ORDERED." 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between
Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been
bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner
awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya
but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter
being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for
indemnification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner
Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum,

12
allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was
entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An
Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed
the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore-
mentioned Motion to Dismiss. On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought
before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due
course. prcd
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent
Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for
liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the
New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an
express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action;
otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule
111 . . ." 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the
order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the
issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the
rule." 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition
before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required
jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.

The Complaint against truck-owner Timbol

We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12,
1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge
sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the
latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against
jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of
action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-
owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered
by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to
a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a
final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on
the merit; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present.
However, we agree with petitioner that there is no identity of cause of action
between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the

13
fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for
damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-
owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the
owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused
Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo
Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228." 4 And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability
arising from criminal negligence under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et
al.: 5
"The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still
more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable
to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code."
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is
based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint, to wit:
that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao,
Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his
(petitioner's) lane and collided with his car; That the sudden swerving of
Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie
Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck in
the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the
collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20
and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses
and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action
must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the
owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or
omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of
skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in
driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with
petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict,
respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit
against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. prcd
"Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter."

14
 But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-
owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the
institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of
Court, which says:
"Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs.
Florido, 7 said:
"As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view
that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon
quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding
for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . .
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . .
and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule
stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment
of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which
do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.' . . ."
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio
Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no
reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of
Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not
substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner
failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil
action based on quasi-delict. LibLex

The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar

15
 The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability
coexists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or
reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion
that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana, as evidenced by
his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need
for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his
action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No.
SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action be. Noteworthy is the basis
of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded
by the trial Court in this wise:
"In view of what has been proven and established during
the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held liable for having
bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused
Rodolfo Salazar.
"Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by
Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by
Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the
jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court believes
that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held liable for the
damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car." 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of
the case, jeep-owner driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages
sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist." Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of
action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of t he Rules of
Court 10 which provides:
"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all
cases not included in the preceding section the following rules
shall be observed:

xxx  xxx  xxx

16
 (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. . . ."
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear
from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based
upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no
longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil
Code quoted hereunder:
"Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. . . .
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based
upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence
of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground."
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned,
therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971
dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds. LLphil
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil
Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and
respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and
February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against
respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PSBA vs CA (1992)

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of

Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools
academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death.
This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate
officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on
the victim. 

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no
cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not
cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their
motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the
appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 

17
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
 
RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not
really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. 

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the
rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to
be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However,
this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is
absolved form liability. 

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with
the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This
includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. 

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence,
the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words,
a contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Amadora vs CA

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon while
in the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the semester
ended. He was there to submit a graduation requirement in Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the
herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the CC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the
high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.

18
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD,
ED and AF.

On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all
the defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already
ended.

ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case

HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the dean
of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice
 

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

xx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be

liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all  schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as
an exception to the general rule.
As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under Art.
2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools

19
of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of establishments of arts
and trades” should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”

But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last paragraph.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not
only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if
his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of
the student under him regardless of the student’s age
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may
be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under
the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself
from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting
the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents
and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?

This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof,
and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released
altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is
in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in

pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should
be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

20
NOTES:
The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for
students between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the
fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer
tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of
arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed  to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets
of their craft. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who
were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic
school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract
of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In
its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges
in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.

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