ENSCO 107 Report of Survey

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Report of Survey
JACK-UP RIG - ENSCO107
Survey Dates: April – May 2016
ModuSpec and WEST Engineering Services are now Lloyd’s Register Energy - Drilling
LRDIS Australia Pty Ltd
Level 1, 503 Murray Street
Perth WA 6000
Australia
Tel. No. +61 8 9318 7350
Website: www.lr.org/drilling
ABSTRACT
Project title Report of Survey – ENSCO107
Order no.
Client name Report author(s)
As a result of a survey conducted from April to May 2016 on the ENSCO107, while the unit was
working in Singapore.
This report specifies what has been inspected/tested and in what manner. For the deficiencies
noted a list of recommendations is provided. Where required, photos are provided to clarify the
deficiencies noted.
Release Date of issue Reviewed by Approved by Reason for update
Disclaimer:
Lloyd's Register Group Limited, its affiliates and subsidiaries and their respective officers, employees or agents are,
individually and collectively, referred to in this clause as 'Lloyd's Register'. Lloyd's Register assumes no responsibility and
shall not be liable to any person for any loss, damage or expense caused by reliance on the information or advice in this
document or howsoever provided, unless that person has signed a contract with the relevant Lloyd's Register entity for the
provision of this information or advice and in that case any responsibility or liability is exclusively on the terms and
conditions set out in that contract.
The statements made herein are subject to the disclaimer of liability printed on page 3 of this report.
Report of Survey – ENSCO107 3 of 212

1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Note: The numbering system in this report corresponds with the LRDIS survey programme and
numbers which are omitted apply to equipment which was not reviewed during this survey.
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... 4
2.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Unit Data ................................................................................................................................ 8
2.3 Scope of Work ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.4 Applicable Standards and References ................................................................................... 8
2.5 Equipment Rating ................................................................................................................... 9
3.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 17

3.2 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 17
3.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 19
3.4 End-of-Inspection Meeting Document .................................................................................. 22
4.0 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 23
5.1 DRILLING EQUIPMENT ...................................................................................................... 41

5.2 Drawworks............................................................................................................................ 41
5.1.2 Disk Brake (Universal).......................................................................................................... 43
5.3 Rotary Table ......................................................................................................................... 44
5.2.1 Hydraulic-Driven Rotary Table ............................................................................................. 44
5.4 Top Drive System ................................................................................................................. 44
5.7 Crown Block ......................................................................................................................... 46
5.8 Travelling Block .................................................................................................................... 46
5.10 Drilling Instrumentation ......................................................................................................... 47
5.11 Derrick .................................................................................................................................. 48
5.12 Casing Stabbing Board ........................................................................................................ 50
5.13 Tuggers and Sheaves .......................................................................................................... 52
5.13.1 Man-Riding Winches ............................................................................................................ 55
5.16 Ezy-Torq ............................................................................................................................... 56
5.17 Pipe-Handling Equipment .................................................................................................... 57
5.17.1 Tongs ................................................................................................................................... 57
5.17.2 Slips and Dog Collars ........................................................................................................... 57
5.17.3 Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30) ............................................................................................ 58
5.17.4 Elevators .............................................................................................................................. 61
5.17.5 Elevator Links ....................................................................................................................... 62
5.17.6 Master Bushings ................................................................................................................... 62
5.17.9 Fingerboards ........................................................................................................................ 62
5.17.12.4 Casing Stabbing Arm ........................................................................................................... 68
5.17.12.5 Cherry Picker........................................................................................................................ 69
5.18 Iron Roughneck .................................................................................................................... 72
5.19 Pipe-Racking System ........................................................................................................... 74
5.19.1 Drill Floor .............................................................................................................................. 75
PAGE |4} of 212 Peport of Survey – ENSCO107

5.19.8 Rotating Mousehole .............................................................................................................. 75
5.19.10 Hydraulic Power Unit ............................................................................................................ 76
5.20 Drill String ............................................................................................................................. 77
5.21 Drilling Subs.......................................................................................................................... 78
5.22 Fishing Tools ........................................................................................................................ 78
6.1 MUD SYSTEM ...................................................................................................................... 79

6.2 Mud Pumps .......................................................................................................................... 79
6.3 Shale Shakers (General) ...................................................................................................... 85
6.4 Mud Cleaner ......................................................................................................................... 85
6.5 Desilter.................................................................................................................................. 85
6.6 Desander .............................................................................................................................. 85
6.5.1 Brandt Hydrocyclone ............................................................................................................ 85
6.7 Degasser .............................................................................................................................. 86
6.6.2 Brandt ................................................................................................................................... 87
6.8 Centrifugal Pumps ................................................................................................................ 87
6.9 Mud Agitators........................................................................................................................ 87
6.10 Mud-Mixing System .............................................................................................................. 89
6.10.1 Trip Tank System.................................................................................................................. 90
6.10.2 Flow Line System ................................................................................................................. 90
6.10.3 Casing Fill-Up Line ............................................................................................................... 91
6.10.4 Base Oil System ................................................................................................................... 91
6.10.5 Reverse-Circulating Line ...................................................................................................... 92
6.10.6 High-Rate Mixers .................................................................................................................. 92
6.11 Standpipe Manifold and Rotary Hoses ................................................................................. 93
6.11.1 Cement Manifold................................................................................................................... 94
6.12 Bulk Air System and Tanks .................................................................................................. 96
6.13 Cementing Unit ..................................................................................................................... 99
8.1 MARINE EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................................... 101

8.2 Ballast System .................................................................................................................... 101
8.1.1 Bilge System ....................................................................................................................... 101
8.3 Overflow and Vent Checks ................................................................................................. 104
8.4 Watertight Integrity and Compartments .............................................................................. 104
8.5 Mooring System .................................................................................................................. 106
8.6 Registration and Classification General Requirements ...................................................... 108
8.5.2 Review of Other Documentation ......................................................................................... 109
8.7 Communication Equipment................................................................................................. 109
8.8 General Operations ............................................................................................................ 111
8.9 Jacking System ................................................................................................................... 114
9.1 POWER PLANT ................................................................................................................. 123

9.2 Diesel Engines .................................................................................................................... 123
9.1.1 General ............................................................................................................................... 123
9.1.3 Caterpillar Engines ............................................................................................................. 123

9.1.7 Fuel and Lubrication Oil Centrifuges .................................................................................. 124
9.2 Emergency Generator Set.................................................................................................. 125

9.2.1 Emergency Power Supply .................................................................................................. 126
9.2.2 Electricity Provided for at least 18 hrs ................................................................................ 126
9.2.3 Electricity to be Provided for at least 0.5 hrs ...................................................................... 127
9.3 Air Compressors / Air System ............................................................................................ 127
9.3.1 Air Receivers ...................................................................................................................... 128
9.4 Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning ..................................................................................... 128
9.4.1 Air-Conditioning Systems ................................................................................................... 128
9.5 Seawater Service Pumps and Systems ............................................................................. 131
9.5.1 Piping Systems .................................................................................................................. 131
9.6 Crane and Power System .................................................................................................. 132
9.7 Watermaker ........................................................................................................................ 137
9.8 Potable Water System ........................................................................................................ 138
10.0 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT............................................................................................... 140

10.2 Main Generators ................................................................................................................. 140
10.3 Main Transformer ............................................................................................................... 140
10.4 Converters (SCR and Variable-Frequency Drives) ............................................................ 142
10.5 Main Switchboard ............................................................................................................... 143
10.6 Emergency Switchboard .................................................................................................... 145
10.7 DC Motors .......................................................................................................................... 146
10.7.1 Megger Testing................................................................................................................... 148
10.8 AC Motors........................................................................................................................... 148
10.8.1 Megger Testing................................................................................................................... 150
10.9 Motor Control Centres ........................................................................................................ 150
10.10 Lighting System (Main)....................................................................................................... 153
10.11 Lighting System (Emergency) ............................................................................................ 154
10.12 Electrical Outlets ................................................................................................................ 154
10.13 Cables and Cable Trays ..................................................................................................... 155
10.14 Batteries, Battery Chargers and UPS ................................................................................. 159
10.15 Alarm Systems: Fire, Gas and General.............................................................................. 160
10.16 Navigation Lights and Foghorns......................................................................................... 162
10.17 Communication: Telephone and PA System ...................................................................... 163
10.18 Electric Welding .................................................................................................................. 165
10.19 Earthing and Earth Bonding ............................................................................................... 166
10.20 Hazardous Areas................................................................................................................ 168
10.21 Drilling Automation and Control.......................................................................................... 181
10.22 Miscellaneous Items ........................................................................................................... 182
11.1 SAFETY EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................................... 186

11.2 Fire Control ......................................................................................................................... 186
11.1.1 Automatic Fire Detection System ....................................................................................... 186
11.1.2.1 CO2 system ........................................................................................................................ 187
11.1.3 Extinguishing Arrangements in Machinery Spaces ............................................................ 188

11.1.4 Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems (Water and Foam) ........................................................ 188
11.1.4.1 Fire Hose Stations .............................................................................................................. 190
11.1.4.2 Fire Main ............................................................................................................................. 191

11.1.4.3 Automatic Sprinkler Systems .............................................................................................. 193
11.1.4.5 Deluge System ................................................................................................................... 193
11.1.5 Portable Extinguishers and Fire-Fighting Equipment.......................................................... 193
11.1.5.1 Fireman’s Outfits ................................................................................................................. 194
11.1.5.2 Fire-fighting Equipment Plans ............................................................................................ 194
11.1.6 Foam System for Helideck.................................................................................................. 194
11.2 Survival and Life Saving ..................................................................................................... 195
11.2.1 Lifeboats ............................................................................................................................. 195
11.2.1.1 Release Mechanism ........................................................................................................... 196
11.2.2 Life-Raft Stations ................................................................................................................ 197
11.2.2.1 Life-Raft Launching Davits ................................................................................................. 197
11.3 Gas Detection ..................................................................................................................... 197
11.3.1 H2S Gas Detection ............................................................................................................. 199
11.3.2 Portable Gas Detectors ...................................................................................................... 199
11.4 Helicopter Operations ......................................................................................................... 199
11.4.1 Helideck and Markings ....................................................................................................... 199
11.4.2 Helicopter Landing-Area Equipment................................................................................... 201
11.5 Drilling Facilities Safety ...................................................................................................... 202
11.5.1 Protective Clothing .............................................................................................................. 203
11.5.2 Hazardous Areas ................................................................................................................ 203
11.5.4 Dangerous Machinery ........................................................................................................ 203
11.6 First Aid and Sickbay .......................................................................................................... 204
11.7 Emergency Procedures Manual ......................................................................................... 204
11.7.1 Alarm and Public Address System ..................................................................................... 204
11.8 Lifting and Handling ............................................................................................................ 204
11.8.1 Independent Lifting-Gear Inspections ................................................................................. 204
11.11 Housekeeping ..................................................................................................................... 204
11.11.1 Walkways and Railings ....................................................................................................... 204
11.11.2 Decks and Stairways .......................................................................................................... 209
12.0 MAINTENANCE SYSTEM.................................................................................................. 211
13.1 SPARE PARTS .................................................................................................................. 212
APPENDICES
1. Equipment Run Hours

2. Daily Reports
3. Attachment A4 General Drilling Unit Acceptance Inspection Requirements
4. Ensco 107 Level 1 Rig Inspection 160515
5. Meg Readings
6. Open Work Orders

2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Unit Data
Jack-Up: ENSCO107
Owner: ENSCO PLC
Built: 2006
Performance: Water depth 400 feet
Drilling depth: 30,000 feet
Location: Singapore
Inspection dates: 27 April – 16 May 2016
LRDIS references: PAU1411.1 - TS/CD/sn/RC/rt/THJ
2.2 Scope of Work
In accordance with the instructions received, Lloyd’s Register Drilling Integrity Services (LRDIS)
attended the jack-up rig, ENSCO107, to complete a condition survey of the primary drilling
equipment, mud system, well control equipment, marine equipment, power plant, electrical
equipment, safety equipment, maintenance system and spare parts.
The purpose of this survey was to determine the general condition and state of maintenance of the
equipment, in order to minimize downtime caused by mechanical breakdown during drilling
operations and to ensure that the equipment is maintained in safe working order.
The survey was conducted in good faith, but the inspection of individual items of equipment was
subjected to time and operational constraints imposed by rig operations at the time.
2.3 Applicable Standards and References
The criteria which have been used as reference during this survey are internationally recognized
standards, local legislative requirements, client’s safety and operating standards, the original
equipment manufacturer’s maintenance and operating specifications and accepted oilfield operating
and safety practices.

2.4 Equipment Rating
The Equipment Rating (ER) is a unique system to:

• measure the condition of an individual rig,
• compare the inspection results of an individual rig with the industry average for this particular
type of rig, worldwide or in a specific area,
• visualize the strengths and weaknesses of an individual rig,
• benchmark the safety and maintenance standards of an individual rig against other rigs or
against the results of previous inspections,
• use as a risk analysis tool to proactively prevent accidents and downtime.
The added value of the ER system is that it visualizes and measures the present condition of a rig
and its equipment. The ER allows a direct comparison of a rig with other rigs of the same type (jack-
ups with jack-ups etc.) located in a predefined area or worldwide.
A series of bar charts representing the inspection results of the rig is included in the final inspection
report. These bar charts are only applicable to the scope of work as stated in section 2.2.
The ER is presented as an average figure for the entire rig (chart 1) and for each individual section of
the inspection programme (chart 3).
A low ER is an indication that steps must be taken, for instance:

1. address the recommendations made in the report,
2. effect structural improvements to the maintenance management system,
3. conduct a recheck after the recommendations made in the report have been addressed.
The following charts are included in the inspection report:
Chart 1: Rig Average Inspection Rating

In comparison with an industry average, this chart shows:
• the percentage of the LRDIS inspection programme which was completed for the rig,
• the average ER for the entire rig.
Chart 2: Percentage Inspected

This chart shows the percentage inspected for each section of the rig in comparison with the average
coverage during an inspection.
Chart 3: Detailed ER Results

This chart indicates how the rig is rated from a maintenance and safety-qualitative point of view, in
comparison with an industry average for this type of rig for each individual section of the inspection.
Chart 4: Detailed Critical Rating

This chart shows the percentage of critical non-conformances identified for each section of the
inspection programme in comparison with the industry average. This chart is an important indication
of the risk to encounter a fatality or serious accident on the rig, and the possibility of environmental
damage caused by the rig.
Chart 5: Detailed Major Rating

This chart shows the percentage of major non-conformances identified for each section of the
inspection programme in comparison with the industry average. It is an important indication of the
risk to encounter major equipment damage and/or operational downtime of the rig.

Chart 6: Detailed Minor Rating
This chart shows the percentage of minor non-conformances identified for each section of the
inspection programme in comparison with the industry average. It is an important indication of the
risk of lost-time incidents and it visualizes the overall safety and maintenance standards on the rig.
Note: Charts 4, 5 and 6 indicate the probability for the rig to encounter accidents and operational
downtime measured against the industry average. These charts are very important indicators to
establish whether or not the rig is capable of operating in a safe and reliable manner.
Validity of the ER
The ER is valid for the duration of one year after completion of the initial inspection.
If a recheck is conducted and completed within four months after the completion of the initial
inspection, only the non-satisfactory and non-inspected items will be checked again. The ER is then
valid for all equipment items which were inspected and found satisfactory during the initial inspection
as well as during the recheck.
Revalidation of the ER must be completed within a year after completion of the initial inspection. An
extension is possible for a maximum of three months after the expiry date so as to establish the
revalidation of the ER, provided that:
• the inspection is completed within this three-month period,
• the inspection is requested prior to the initial expiry date.

2.4 Equipment Rating; Chart No. 1






3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.1 Executive Summary
LRDIS was requested by Company XAustralia Pty Ltd to conduct a full conditional survey, with the
intention of an obtaining the acceptance of the ENSCO107 self-elevated drilling Mobile Offshore
Drilling Unit (MODU). At the time of the survey, the ENSCO107 was located quayside at the Keppel
Fels Shipyard in Singapore.
The rig was in a warm-stack-type situation with minimal services and equipment available, and with
minimal crew available on board. The personnel on board at the time of the survey included the
Offshore Installation Manager (OIM), Barge Engineer, Mechanic, Night Electrician, for the first week,
and the Night Electrician for the second week.
Due to limited resources, equipment unavailability and the incapacity to safely run equipment with
appropriate supervision, it was not possible to complete a full conditional survey at this time. It
became quite apparent that to conduct a full conditional survey and acceptance of the installation as
a whole, it was going to have to be conducted in several stages. Therefore, the majority of this Stage
One inspection was visual along with the verification of documentation.
Opportunities where it was possible to see equipment operating and functioning were taken,
although these may not have been within the actual drilling type parameters or with all the associated
and integrated equipment. The final stages of this acceptance process would involve the
capacity to run all the equipment, in or in an ‘as near as possible’ situation that would represent or
simulate the actual campaign requirements. This would be conducted in a series of Integrated
Acceptance Tests (IATs), once the equipment was ready for full functionality and operations. The
focus of this preliminary stage of the overall acceptance was to highlight the requirements, to ensure
the equipment was at a safe and reliable state of readiness for operations.
The main power and generation systems were seen to be well presented. The Silicon Controlled
Rectifier (SCR) Room was maintained in a clean and tidy manner, and the consumable spares and
the electricians’ hand tools were stored in dedicated lockable storage lockers. The internal cabinets
and panels were seen to be dirt and dust free, with all the appropriate protective covers in place.
There were no visual indications that the systems had been tampered with via jumper wires or non-
approved additional wiring to the systems. The accessible areas of the main buss were visually
inspected, to identify any obvious anomalies or discolorations on the bus bars, which would indicate
hot spots, unsatisfactory connections or the overloading of the system with excessive or short circuit
currents. There was no evidence of the above occurring, although LRDIS has recommended a
thermographic survey be conducted, as there was no knowledge of this having being performed in
the past. It was suggested that this could be conducted during the IAT process and final
acceptances, when the equipment would be running with higher workloads. This should indicate any
anomalies present within the systems.

The Motor Control Centre (MCC), Local Equipment Room (LER) and emergency switchboard were
also seen to be well presented, with all the appropriate electrical safety equipment being considered.
There was rubber matting on the floors, electrical rescue equipment, 1000V insulating gloves, rescue
hook and arc safe face shields throughout. The panels and cubicles were easily identifiable and well
labelled. All the circuit breakers and isolation switches had the capacity to be locked out by padlocks
or similar lockout clamps. This process was seen and verified with various types of electrical isolation
procedures being conducted through the Ensco Permit to Work System. All isolations were seen to
have a minimum of two padlocks at the point of isolation, to ensure double safety was in place, with
verifications being conducted by at least two disciplines, which included one electrician.
The Ex hazardous areas drawings did not identify the two overboard lines and the emergency choke
and kill discharge lines. Also there was no detail of the gas group and temperature class for the
equipment to comply with. There were two types of Ex hazardous area zones throughout the
installation - a Zone 1 area and a Zone 2 area. There were no Zone 0 areas around the rig.
The electrical equipment installed within these zones was to be designed and certified for the
installation within these areas. There were several items of equipment within these areas, which
either did not have legible identification tags or they were missing identification completely. Although
this equipment may appear to have been Ex type approved, there was no way of telling without
some identification or traceability. The Ex hazardous area equipment is manufactured with close
design clearances and tolerances of their flame paths, spigots and assembly points, which require
routine periodical maintenance and inspections.
It was apparent that some of these routine periodical maintenance inspections and checks had not
been conducted and they were overdue. Due to the nature of the operations and potential gas
releases whilst this equipment is operating, it is critical that these routine inspections, checks and
maintenance be carried out. LRDIS understands that a lot of this equipment is not readily accessible
during drilling operations, as it may not be possible to get the opportunity to shut the equipment
down for this maintenance work to be conducted. This shipyard stay would be the opportune time to
conduct this overdue maintenance to the Ex rated equipment, with the focus being on the top drive,
ventilation fans and agitator motors.
Heavy scale was observed on most of the pipework systems throughout the rig. It was having a
significant impact on the sea water systems with numerous leaks. The low pressure mud system had
been considerably affected with many patches and bandages installed. The same conditions were
noted with the drainage systems, the drill water system, rig air, bulk air and the potable water system
to some extent. Many areas of these systems had been marked for change out some time ago, and
now required a thorough assessment and replacement process.

Much of the drill floor equipment could not be operated to verify functionality. This was because the
drilling line had been removed in preparation for corrective actions to be completed on the crown and
travelling block. The top drive had been partially disassembled, and it was positioned on the lower
dolly rail stops. This prevented the operation of the top drive, iron roughneck and the verification of
the torque capacity of the hydraulic catheads.
The API RP 8B: 2014 inspection requirements for some of the equipment were either out of date or
they were no longer being conducted, which included the rotary table critical load path items.
There were a number of items of concern within the derrick structure. Some of these were being
actively addressed, such as the bent beam at the crown and the fingerboard secondary retention
chains and shackles. The remaining areas of concern were the derrickman’s escape arrangement
and the condition of the hydraulically-controlled monkeyboard. LRDIS were made aware that there
was an extensive work scope relating to the derrick that was to be completed.
The hydraulic systems on the rig were generally in need of attention, whether that was due to the
corrosion of the end fittings or the condition of the hoses. This related to the deck and under
cantilever cranes, skidding system, the derrick work basket/ casing stabbing board, the
monkeyboard and the jacking and fixation systems.
Proposals were in place for the top end overhauls on three of the five main generator Caterpillar 3516
engines. It was decided that all the verification testing of the generator safety devices and
shutdowns would be conducted after the overhauls. This was to be performed prior to conducting the
load sharing, power limit, phase back and load shedding tests, when substantial loading demands
could be applied to the system. It is important to ensure the generator blackout prevention tests are
conducted. This is to confirm that the reaction time of the power generation system can deal with
load change, without blacking out the rig or overloading the generators or engines. These tests would
normally be conducted during the IAT of the rig and its systems.
The jacking system was visually in an unsatisfactory condition, particularly from a hydraulic
perspective and also from a corrosion viewpoint. There was a plan to complete a major inspection of
the system by Keppel Fels whilst at the shipyard. However, this had not commenced prior to the
surveyor’s departure. The opportune time for LRDIS to inspect and assess the jacking system would
be during this major inspection and overhaul activity. This is considered a necessary part of the
assurance process, and it provides a level of confidence in the integrity and operational readiness of
these systems.
3.2 Conclusion
The inspection of the ENSCO107 was conducted from 27 April through to 16 May 2016, while the rig
was located quayside in the Keppel Fels shipyard in Singapore. The construction of the ENSCO107
was completed in 2006. Therefore, the rig had been in continuous operation for ten years. The rig
was considered to be of a more traditional arrangement in that there were very few automated
systems.

The overriding theme during the conditional survey generally related to the considerable amount of
corrosion on the handrails and piping, and to a lesser extent to the equipment and fittings. Overall
this had a significant impact, and it was in some way linked to a large portion of the discrepancies
identified in the following report.
The preservation process of the equipment and assets throughout the installation required attention
in order to make them more effective and efficient. Although the maintenance sections within this
survey were not covered, it was clear that there were shortfalls within the Ensco maintenance, stock
controls, ordering, purchasing and/or procedures. Somewhere within the process, this limited the
effective upkeep of the various components and equipment rig-wide. LRDIS recommends a focused
audit should be conducted on all the maintenance and spare parts systems, procedures and
processes. This would assist in identifying the short comings, which has restricted the compliance of
some of the equipment with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) specifications, company
policy and/or safety case.
The rig itself was noted to be structurally solid and relatively corrosion free. The corrosion related
more to the equipment, pipe work and walkways and the associated supporting structures.
A large number of the issues highlighted were being addressed, or they were to be addressed during
the shipyard period, although most of these projects had not commenced prior to the surveyors’
departure. The rig personnel were actively correcting issues wherever the parts were immediately
available and could be completed. Progress was slow due to the very limited number of personnel
and resources available on board.
To complete the assurance process and ultimately achieve satisfactory final acceptance, further
verification, testing and inspection would be required. Ideally this would be conducted at key times
during the overhaul and re-installation stages of the equipment, thus providing the necessary
confidence of the equipment and system integrity. The outstanding critical and major equipment
requiring verification included the jacking and fixation systems, Blow Out Preventer (BOP) and well
control equipment, drilling systems and equipment, power generation and power management.
The integrated acceptance testing procedures and parameters need to be constructed in a manner
to effectively prove all the systems and equipment. This would involve a series of tests, which are
normally broken into separate tests, so as not to hinder other areas of testing.
These tests are as follows:
1. Tubular handling tests

2. Low pressure and high pressure mud pump endurance.
3. Power generation and power management.
4. Jacking and fixation testing.
5. BOP Well control function testing

LRDIS would like to thank the Operations Team from the ENSCO107, who were involved with the
inspection of the rig. Assistance was provided whenever possible given the limited number of
personnel assigned to the rig. The attending surveyors appreciated the time that was provided. All
personnel were accommodating in locating and providing information to complete the inspection.
16 May 2016

3.3 End-of-Inspection Meeting Document
Date of meeting: 11 May 2016

Name Title
Customer Representative: Trevor Moo D&C Superintendent
Rig Staff: Cory Wiliford OIM

Iain Kennedy Rig Manager
Bentley Curry Barge Engineer
Hayden Fowlie Driller
Andrew Mackenzie Mechanic
LRDIS Surveyor(s): Tony Shea LRDIS Electrical Surveyor

Chris Dixon LRDIS Mechanical Surveyor
Note: The signed end-of-inspection meeting document is kept on file in the applicable LRDIS office
and a copy can be provided upon request.

4.0 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations in this report are defined as follows:
Critical recommendations
Critical recommendations are based on shortcomings which may lead to loss of life, a serious injury
or environmental damage as a result of inadequate use and/or failure of equipment.
Major recommendations
Major recommendations are based on shortcomings which may lead to damage to essential
equipment or have a detrimental effect on the drilling operation as a result of inadequate use and/or
failure of equipment.
Minor recommendations
Minor recommendations are based on shortcomings which may lead to a situation that contributes to
an incident or to circumstances in which the required standards of operation are not met.
5.0 Drilling Equipment
Rotary Table:
Provide the Category III and Category IV inspection details for the load
path components of the rotary table.
5.2.1.1 Major
Refer to: API RP 8: 2014 Table 1 Periodic Inspection and Maintenance,
Categories and Frequencies.
Top Drive System:

Verify within the top drive software to confirm the previous top drive
issues have been resolved. Ensure the settings on the debug monitor
have the top drive AC motor RTDs being monitored with the ‘abort
value’ ‘T’ value returned back to the original OEM settings. Review the
5.3.1.1 Major
"Reference SONo. 3664165 and SONo. 3738454 for additional
information and details on this issue". Verify through endurance testing
that the dolly retract system and RTDs are operational without any
issues or faults throughout the system.
Protect the top drive from damage caused by the interference or contact
5.3.1.2 Minor
with the block hang off line.
Verify the condition of the oil in the top drive gearbox, as the previous
5.3.1.3 Minor
sample indicated that action was required due to high water content.
Crown Block:
Provide the inspection report and Certificate of Conformance on
5.7.1.1 Minor
completing the repair of the crown block assembly.

Travelling Block:
5.8.1.1 Minor
completing the repair of the travelling block.
Derricks:
Install a toe board behind the ladder arriving at the monkeyboard, to
prevent personnel from placing a foot into an open hole. Consideration
5.11.1.1 Critical
must be given to the placement of the gates and toe board relative to
the other.
Repair the mast ladder safety cage that provides access to the elevated
5.11.1.2 Critical
work basket (several deformed bars were seen).
Install additional height handrails for the ladders providing access to the
5.11.1.3 Critical
monkeyboard in the lowered position.
Install suitable secondary retention sling for the inertia reel used for the
ladder between the monkeyboard and the crown. The sling installed had
5.11.1.4 Critical been identified for replacement as it had been marked red. The
condition and status of the sling was not available until viewing from the
crown.
Install suitable secondary retention for the CCTV cameras in the derrick.
This should capture the gearbox and the lens on the body. The CCTV
5.11.1.5 Critical
slings witnessed only capture the bracket and they were in an
unsatisfactory condition.
Replace the two-part screw gate shackles used for the fingerboard
5.11.1.6 Critical
safety chains.
Replace the bent bracing beam at the crown level on the starboard side
5.11.1.7 Major of the derrick. This had also been highlighted in the OES inspection
reports.
Repair or replace the heavily-scaled sections of the horizontal bracing.
These were located at the monkeyboard level directly behind the ladder
5.11.1.8 Major
under the walkway, and the horizontal brace behind the ladder leading
from the monkeyboard level to the crown.
Install suitable self-closing gates in the derrick. A number of the gates
5.11.1.9 Major witnessed failed to fully close, as they were fouling on other gates or
parts of the structure and handrails
Place an additional barrier at the derrick escape exit door to ensure that
personnel are adequately prepared, prior to opening the door and prior
5.11.1.10 Major
to committing to the escape. This could be a safety chain on the inside
of the door and a handrail on the outside of the door.
Modify the derrick escape door opening arrangement so that the door
5.11.1.11 Major opens inward. If the door were to be affected by wind, this could pull a
person out, prior to making the commitment to step off the platform.

Casing Stabbing Board:
Complete an inspection of the Casing Stabbing Board, including some
5.12.1.1 Major form of NDE, prior to use. The board had not been used for some time
and no inspection records were reviewed.
Tuggers and Sheaves:

Reduce the air pressure to the yellow drill floor air hoist. The pressure
was witnessed at 100 psi rather than the 90 psi maximum, as per the
hoist manufacturer. Pressures higher than the specified maximum limit
5.13.1.1 Critical
will result in an over pull situation.
Status: Closed
Comment: Completed during the survey.
Replace the worn brake band on the red drill floor air hoist. The friction
5.13.1.2 Major material had been worn away at the toe of the band, resulting in metal to
metal contact between the band and the brake surface.
Move the pressure indicator so that the pressure can be read for the
blue drill floor air hoist. The gauge face was obscured by the protective
5.13.1.3 Minor barrier in front of the hoist.
Status: Closed
Man-Riding Winches:
Repair or replace the leaking pressure regulator for the man-riding
winch located under the cantilever. Once repaired, ensure that all the
pressures for all the man-riding winches are set to the required
5.13.1.1.1 Major
maximum 90 psi.
Status: Closed
Label the man-riding winches on the drill floor and under the cantilever
clearly with the text MAN-RIDING ONLY.
5.13.1.1.2 Minor
Status: Closed
Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30):

Replace the damaged hydraulic supply and return hoses on the PS-21
power slips. There was a potential for equipment failure and possible
5.17.3.1.1 Major injury to personnel, if the hoses were to part during operation.
Status: Closed
Closed: Completed during the survey

Elevators:
Carry out the elevator inspections (six-monthly and annual, including a
complete disassembly) and an NDT inspection of the hinges and pins,
5.17.4.1.1 Critical or provide the in-date certification.
Fingerboards:
Install guide track roller secondary retention to capture the roller, if the
5.17.9.1.1 Critical shaft were to part. Based on the height and weight, if the guide roller
were to part, it had the potential to cause a serious injury.
Cherry Picker:
Replace all the hydraulic hoses that display scale and corrosion for the
5.17.12.5.1.1 Major
hose end fittings on the elevated work basket.
Replace the heavily corroded hydraulic fittings on the elevated work
5.17.12.5.1.2 Major
basket.
Replace the hose and modified fittings for the telescopic cylinder with
the correct hard pipe and fittings, as per the OEM original delivery. The
5.17.12.5.1.3 Major
hard pipe had parted in the past and it had been replaced with a
temporary repair.
Replace the Ultra Violet (UV) affected and deteriorating hydraulic hoses
5.17.12.5.1.4 Minor
on the elevated work basket.
Rotating Mousehole:
Install an information placard at the control valve for the rotating
5.19.8.1.1 Minor
mousehole indicating the rotation direction for the operating handle.
Drill String:
5.20.1.1 Major Provide the drill string inspection report for review.
Drilling Subs:
5.21.1.1 Major Provide the drilling sub inspection report for review.
6.0 Mud System
Mud Pumps:
Inspect the relief valve vent line from MP No.2 and repair or replace as
6.1.1.1 Critical necessary. There was a leaking corrosion related blister on the vent line
above the pump room telephone.

The pulsation dampener needs to undergo a 10-yearly internal
inspection and hydrostatic test procedure.
6.1.1.2 Critical
Refer to: API 510: 2009 Section 6.4 Risk-based Inspections Sub-
section 6.4
Periodically remove the mud pump pressure relief valves and subject to
6.1.1.3 Major calibration checks.
Refer to API RP 576: 2009 Section 6 Inspection and Testing
Replace the broken U Clamp restraining the MP No.2 relief valve vent
line. All the high-pressure piping (including the pressure relief valve
6.1.1.4 Major vent) is to be properly supported.
Status: Closed
Repair the broken hinges for the guards over the pony rod wells to
6.1.1.5 Minor
restore the integrity of the protection guards.
Repair or replace the leaking seawater cooling supply and discharge for
6.1.1.6 Minor mud pump No.1. The pipe work was displaying numerous leaks due to
the heavy pipe scaling.
Desilter:
Implement some additional surface preservation to improve the service
6.4.1.1 Minor life of the desilter pump and to protect the pump from the weather and
operating environment.
Brandt Hydrocyclone:
6.5.1.1.1 Minor life of the desander pump and to protect the pump from the weather and
Degasser:
Repair the float-operated valve on the inboard vacuum degasser tank.
6.6.1.1 Major Status: Closed
Replace the defective vacuum gauges on both the degasser units.
6.6.1.2 Minor Status: Closed

Centrifugal Pumps:
Replace the broken degasser feed pump suction gauges for degasser
pumps No.1 and No.2.
6.7.1.1 Minor
Status: Closed
Mud Agitators:
Complete the fabric maintenance of the agitators, as these were
6.8.1.1 Minor
showing significant surface corrosion.
Mud-Mixing System:
Refit the operating handles on all the valves in the mud, drill water and
6.9.1.1 Major
seawater systems that were missing these handles.
Trip Tank System:

Replace the leaking and heavily scaled trip tank pump pipe work
6.9.1.1.1 Major
between the trip tanks and the drill floor.
Standpipe Manifold and Rotary Hoses:

Verify that the safety slings fitted to the high pressure hoses are
6.10.1.1 Critical correctly installed with a minimum of slack in the wire, to reduce the
effect of shock load, if the hose or connection were to fail.
Investigate the extent of damage to the outer skin of the high pressure
mud hoses in use, and carry out the necessary repairs.
Refer to: API RP 7L A2: 2006 Appendix A Recommended Practice for
6.10.1.2 Critical
Operating Limits, Inspection, Care and Use of Cement Hose, Drilling
Mud Vibrator and Jumper Hose, and Rotary Hose and Phoenix Beattie
Inspection guidelines for HP drilling and production hoses rev. 1
Inspect the rotary hose that are more than three (3) years old and
pressure-test them as per the OEM recommendations.
The hoses installed were approximately 10 years old.
6.10.1.3 Minor Refer to: API RP 7L A2: 2006 Appendix A Recommended Practice for
Inspection guidelines for HP drilling and production hoses rev. 1.
Cement Manifold:
Ensure that the safety slings fitted to the high pressure cement hose are
correctly installed, with a minimum of slack in the wire. This is to reduce
6.10.1.1.1 Major
the effect of shock load, if the hose or connection were to fail.
Refer to API 7L A2: 2006 Section A7 Safety clamps

6.10.1.1.2 Major Replace the cement hose safety sling shackles with items that are
certified for use. The items installed had been identified for replacement.
Bulk Air System and Tanks:

Conduct an investigation in to the source of the salt crystals forming on
6.11.1.1 Minor the drain valve from the bulk air dryer. Correct the cause and verify if
any damage has occurred.
Cementing Unit:
Consider shutting off the fuel supply to the Halliburton cement unit from
6.13.1.1 Critical a remote and safe area.
MODU Code: 2001 Chapter 9 Fire Safety Section 9.10.3
Properly secure the safety relief vent line for the Halliburton cement unit
6.13.1.2 Critical
surge tank.
Install a safety sling (complete with brackets) to the Halliburton cement
6.13.1.3 Critical
unit chiksans.
Provide records for the annual wall thickness tests of the high pressure
6.13.1.4 Major
piping.
Provide calibration certificates for the instrumentation, chart recorders
6.13.1.5 Major
and relief valves. Halliburton to action.
Ensure that test certificates are available for the Halliburton cement unit
6.13.1.6 Minor
high-pressure lines.
8.0 Marine Equipment
Ballast System:
Make the necessary repairs to the capillary tubes for the tank gauging
8.1.1.1 Minor
system. These were noted to have a number of patches.
Bilge System:
Complete the outstanding corrective maintenance orders for the OWS.
8.1.1.1.1 Major The corrective maintenance items were for the stainless steel tubing
and the oil concentration meter (PPM indicator).
Repair the faulty bilge well high level indicator in the mud pump room,
sensor 9P-1.
8.1.1.1.2 Minor
Status: Closed

Provide supporting evidence for the bilge alarm arrangement complying
with MODU Code 2001 Chapter 8.7 Alarm system Section 8.7.1.4. This
states "that when in the marine mode, activate an audible and visual
8.1.1.1.3 Minor alarm on the navigating bridge for any situation which requires action by
the officer on watch or which should be brought to his attention." The
arrangement as viewed provided indication in the Engine Control Room,
but not on the Navigation Deck/ Jacking Control Room.
Watertight Integrity and Compartments:

Repair the corroded sections of pipe work penetrating through all the
8.3.1.1 Major watertight bulkheads, so as to maintain the watertight integrity of each
compartment.
Repair the door open indication of the watertight door at Auxiliary
8.3.1.2 Minor
Machinery Starboard Aft.
Repair the watertight door indication for door No.1, as this was not
8.3.1.3 Minor
indicating on the panel in the Jacking Control Room.
Repair the door open indication of the watertight door for the exit from
8.3.1.4 Minor
the accommodation to the main deck starboard.
8.3.1.5 Minor
Mooring System:
Complete the necessary maintenance on the anchor winches, to
8.4.1.1 Minor
address the corrosion issues with the fastenings.
Registration and Classification General Requirements:

Provide the in date Certificate of Class. The extension certificate viewed
8.5.1.1 Minor
had expired in April 2016.
Provide the in date Certificate of International Load Line. The certificate
8.5.1.2 Minor
viewed had expired in April 2016.
Provide the in date IMO MODU Code Safety Certificate. The certificate
8.5.1.3 Minor
Provide the in date I.S.P.P. (International Sewage Pollution Prevention)
8.5.1.4 Minor
Certificate. The certificate viewed had expired in April 2016.
Review of Other Documentation:

Have a third party complete an annual inspection of the CO2
8.5.2.1.1 Minor extinguishing systems. The previous inspection was completed in
February 2015.
Provide the annual inspection report and certificate for review of the
8.5.2.1.2 Minor
lifeboat davits. The previous inspection had expired in April 2016.
Provide the class survey report for review once completed. The previous
8.5.2.1.3 Minor
survey had indicated its expiry in April 2016.

General Operations:
Complete the maintenance necessary to return the starboard loading
8.7.1.1 Major
station back into a serviceable condition.
Ensure that all the relevant loading hoses are installed and the details
8.7.1.2 Minor
captured in the Hose Register prior to operations.
Conduct fabric maintenance for the port loading station to remove any
8.7.1.3 Minor
scale.
Jacking System:
Address the extensive corrosion evident on all the jacking and fixation
8.8.1.1 Major
system components.
Replace the deteriorated hydraulic hoses on the jacking and fixation
8.8.1.2 Major systems. The hoses viewed had serious corrosion of the end fittings,
and also cracks in the outer sheath revealing the integral wire braid.
Replace the deteriorating hydraulic hoses on the cantilever skidding
8.8.1.3 Major system. Some had corroded end fittings, and the hoses in the drag
chain were worn exposing the integral braid.
Overhaul the hydraulic isolation valves for the jacking and fixation
8.8.1.4 Major system, as these were seized when reviewed. Replace any missing
handles.
Overhaul the hydraulic supply isolation valves for the cantilever skidding
8.8.1.5 Major
system, as these were seized when reviewed
8.8.1.6 Major Repair or replace the broken high pressure leg jetting drain valves.
9.0 Power Plant
Fuel and Lubrication Oil Centrifuges:

Replace the pilot solenoid for the three way valve for the fuel oil purifier
9.1.7.1.1 Major
No.2.
Emergency Generator Set:

Verify the belt tightness for the radiator fan. A check could not be
9.2.1.1 Minor
performed during the inspection as the fan was disassembled for repair.
Air Compressors / Air System:

Repair the leaking cooling water supply to the rig air compressors. The
9.3.1.1 Minor leaking pipework was located on the bulkhead behind compressors No.
1 and 2.
Consider the installation of an air dryer that is suitably rated to the
9.3.1.2 Minor
system capacity for the rig air system.

Air-Conditioning Systems:
Repair the air conditioner drains on the LER roof top air conditioner
9.4.1.1.1 Minor
units. Both A/C drains were broken with pooling on the LER roof top.
Repair the HVAC system for the Level 4 port side accommodation and
9.4.1.1.2 Minor
office areas.
Repair the water leaks to the indoor evaporator unit on the Level 3
9.4.1.1.3 Minor Starboard side accommodation, as it had a blocked drain, with water
pooling in the unit and running onto the floor around the unit.
Clean out the HVAC rooms on each floor as these were becoming junk
9.4.1.1.4 Minor
storage areas and creating fire hazards.
Seawater Service Pumps and Systems:

Ensure that all the raw water pumps are available before the start of the
9.5.1.1 Major
Company Xcontract.
Piping Systems:
Make the necessary repairs to the seawater system piping in the Mud
9.5.1.1.1 Major Pit Room for filling the mud pits. There was a significant number of
leaking pipe within this space.
Repair the bandaged and leaking seawater line in the Mud Pump Room
9.5.1.1.2 Major
starboard side.
Repair the leaking seawater line in the heavy tool store above the aft
9.5.1.1.3 Major
access door.
Repair the leaking seawater line in the Auxiliary Machinery Room
9.5.1.1.4 Major
Starboard forward above the sewage treatment unit.
9.5.1.1.5 Major Replace the leaking seawater line supplying the sanitary water pumps.
Complete the necessary repair to the drill water supply pipe work rig
9.5.1.1.6 Major wide, as there were a significant number of leaking sections of pipe
work.
Crane and Power System:

Inspect and clean or replace the brake band on the port forward crane
9.6.1.1 Critical
boom hoist, as this was indicating oil contamination.
Inspect and clean or replace the brake band on the port aft crane boom
9.6.1.2 Critical
hoist, as this was indicating oil contamination.
Inspect and clean or replace the brake band on the starboard crane
9.6.1.3 Critical
Install a grating or other protection to the crane overhead windows to
9.6.1.4 Critical prevent debris from falling onto the operator.
Refer to: API Spec 2C: 2004 Section 12.2. Windows
9.6.1.5 Critical Install a cover over the emergency stop buttons on each of the cranes.

Repair the various hydraulic system oil leaks on the port forward crane
9.6.1.6 Major
hydraulic systems.
Repair the various hydraulic system oil leaks on the port aft crane
9.6.1.7 Major
hydraulic systems.
Repair the various hydraulic system oil leaks on the starboard crane
9.6.1.8 Major
hydraulic systems.
Replace the damaged and leaking hoses and fittings on the Forum
9.6.1.9 Major
Oilfield 7500lbs jib crane on the cantilever.
Rectify the fault on the port aft crane main hoist brake, as the hydraulics
9.6.1.10 Major
were chattering or pulsing when releasing.
Replace to their original stowage positions the emergency hand pumps
9.6.1.11 Major required for emergency load lowering, outside of the crane cabins
adjacent to the hydraulic control valves.
Replace the emergency lowering instructions for the port aft and
9.6.1.12 Major starboard cranes externally on the rear cabin bulkhead, adjacent to the
cabin entry door.
Replace the perished refuelling hose for the port forward crane. If the
9.6.1.13 Major hose were to part or leak, fuel would be spilt onto the main deck below,
causing a hazard to personnel and/ or the environment.
9.6.1.14 Minor Repair the radiator leak on the port aft crane.
Address the corrosion issues on the Forum Oilfield jib crane slewing
9.6.1.15 Minor
motor and the pivot arm.
Install an aircraft warning lamp and confirm that all boom lights are
9.6.1.16 Minor working on the starboard crane, on completing the installation of the
new slip ring assembly.
9.6.1.17 Minor Repair the port forward crane A-Frame obstruction light.
Watermaker:
Replace the modified and leaking high pressure pipework on the
9.7.1.1 Major reverse osmosis water maker from the high pressure pump to the
membrane housings.
Reinstall the missing diffuser for the multimedia filter on the reverse
9.7.1.2 Major
osmosis water maker unit.
Replace the membranes for the reverse osmosis water maker, as the
9.7.1.3 Major unit has not been preserved prior to the long term shutdown. This will
have resulted in the permanent contamination of the membranes.
Consider the installation of a booster heater to maintain the heat in the
9.7.1.4 Minor evaporator section of the waste heat water maker. This is to achieve
satisfactory evaporation rates.
Potable Water System:

Conduct repairs to the potable water pipe work to eliminate leakage
9.8.1.1 Major from the system. There were numerous leaks on the system requiring
attention.

9.8.1.2 Major Conduct the necessary repairs to the shower and basin mixing units, to
provide suitable water temperature control to prevent scolding.
10.0 Electrical Equipment
Converters (SCR and Variable-Frequency Drives):

Install protective guards or keep these cabinets locked with a special
tool or key. The VFD panel main contactors and cables to the AC
10.4.1.1 Major
motors were seen to be unprotected inside the VFD cabinets. These
cabinets did not require the use of a key or special tool to gain entry.
Conduct a thermographic inspection of the rig’s 600VAC main bus bar,
10.4.1.2 Minor 480VAC Motor Control Centre (MCC), SCR bays and AC VFD drives.
This could be conducted with loaded systems during the IAT.
Emergency Switchboard:
Conduct current injection tests of the main circuit breakers and thermal
10.6.1.1 Critical
overloads throughout the emergency generator switchboard.
Investigate and rectify the location of the water entry around the exhaust
fan area in the Emergency Generator Room above the switchboard, as
10.6.1.2 Major
water was pooling on the matting in front of the switchboard and
corroding the switchboard panel and could cause an electrocution.
Conduct a thermographic inspection of the emergency generator
10.6.1.3 Minor
switchboard.
DC Motors:
Conduct a major service on all the DC traction motors by removing the
rust scale build-up inside the blower intakes and motor enclosures, Free
10.7.1.1 Major
all the brushes in their holders, clean the commutator slots and polish
the commutators.
Install filter material over the mud pump blower intakes, to minimise
10.7.1.2 Minor
foreign particles entering the motor enclosure.
AC Motors:
10.8.1.1 Major Ensure that the AC motors are not excessively painted or corroded.
Review the swelling mounting plates on the forward leg jacking system
hydraulic pump electric motor. There was a build-up of corrosion
10.8.1.2 Major
between the electric motor mounting plates and the base plate, which
was lifting the motor off its mounts.
Investigate the cause of the low insulation resistance readings in the
10.8.1.3 Major drawworks No.1 AC drive motor and cables. There have been some
ongoing concerns with the low readings within this circuit.
Install the missing bolts on the mud pump 3A blower terminal box.

Motor Control Centres:
Carry out a full current injection test (five-yearly special survey) on all
10.9.1.1 Critical
the main breakers and thermal overloads.
Conduct a thermographic survey of all the busbars and electrical
10.9.1.2 Critical
connections.
Investigate and clear the ground faults on both the 480VAC main buss
10.9.1.3 Major
sections A and B.
Lighting System (Emergency):

Identify and mark the emergency lighting fixtures with a distinctive mark
10.11.1.1 Minor or red ‘E’.
Refer to: IEC 61892-6: 1999-02 Section 11.4, Emergency Lighting
Cables and Cable Trays:

Inspect the cable trays throughout the installation and replace or repair
10.13.1.1 Critical
the extremely corroded sections.
Secure the top drive cables appropriately from out of the service loop
10.13.1.2 Major
and along to the derrick mounted junction box.
Ensure that all the unused electrical cables are either removed or
10.13.1.3 Major
terminated appropriately and recorded in a register.
Secure and provide adequate protection to the trip tank volume sensor
10.13.1.4 Minor
cables on the cantilever pipe deck.
Review the use of non UV protected type cables used around the rig in
the outdoor areas. The Rignet satellite CAT-5 communications cable
10.13.1.5 Minor was not of an outdoor type with the complete degradation of the outer
sheath. Sections of the grey control cables had started perishing with
braiding visible.(Transverse drag chain)
Alarm Systems: Fire, Gas and General:

Investigate the volume of the PAGA alarms and announcement in the
10.15.1.1 Critical change room and around the starboard main deck area, once the
speaker has been repaired.
Secure the manual call point appropriately at the starboard aft jacking
10.15.1.2 Minor
leg.
Investigate the visible fluid damage to the manual call point on the port
10.15.1.3 Minor
main deck.

Navigation Lights and Foghorns:
Ensure the following navigation lamps are operational and working prior
to leaving port - the main starboard lamp, standby forward anchor light,
10.16.1.1 Major standby aft anchor light and all the standby NUC lamps.
Status: Closed
Install a permanent warning plate next to the Navigation Lighting Panel,
to warn the operator not to energise the panel, when the unit is carrying
10.16.1.2 Minor
out drilling operations.
Refer to: MOM 13.8 Navigation Lighting System.
Communication: Telephone and PA System:

Repair or replace the disconnected PAGA speaker on the starboard
main deck outside the change room.
10.17.1.1 Critical
Status: Closed
Replace the broken PAGA Gai-tronics unit at the monkeyboard, and
10.17.1.2 Critical provide the extension numbers for the talkback system at the
monkeyboard.
Electric Welding:
Remove the short welding lead connected directly to the structure being
used for a ground Return (No.2). When utilising the welding outlets
10.18.1.1 Major around the rig, ensure that two leads are used. One for the hand piece
and one for the work. There is a high risk of damaging the electrical and
electronic equipment.
Earthing and Earth Bonding:

Ensure all the grounding connections and equipotential bonding points
10.19.1.1 Major are serviced periodically to maintain their electrical integrity. Include this
in the Preventative Maintenance System’s work orders.
Relocate the iron roughneck earth bonding point from the handrail on
Level 1 on the derrick to a major structure on the derrick or point, which
10.19.1.2 Major
connects directly through to the hull by appropriate bonding straps. (Ex
equipment).
Verify that all the cable support systems (such as suitcases and cable
10.19.1.3 Minor
trays) have been grounded.

Hazardous Areas:
Conduct periodic routine maintenance on the Ex hazardous area
equipment prior to the next operation. This has not been conducted
routinely, as per the Ensco policy. This was possibly due to ongoing
operations. IEC 60079.17: 2009 Electrical installations inspection and
10.20.1.1 Critical
maintenance, 4.3 Inspections, 6 Inspection schedules. (Ensco Policy:
EX EQUIPMENT HAZARDOUS AREA MAINTENANCE STRATEGY
PR-CO-AM-007 Close inspection-6 monthly, Detail inspection-25%
annually).
Amend the hazardous area drawings to reflect the installation of the
10.20.1.2 Major potential hazardous gas release points of the port and starboard over
board lines.
10.20.1.3 Major potential hazardous gas release points of the choke and kill emergency
discharge lines under the starboard side drill floor.
Consider having the hazardous area gas group and temperature class
ratings included on the hazardous area drawings. This is to identify the
10.20.1.4 Major minimum standards the equipment must comply with. This information
must be readily available in either the design specifications or as
installation philosophy.
Provide Ex certificates (Compex) for the electricians and ETs working
10.20.1.5 Major
on the hazardous area equipment.
Remove all the unused cable glands on the junction boxes from
previously installed equipment, if not further required. (JB above slug
10.20.1.6 Major pit)
Status: Closed
10.20.1.7 Major Repair the cable gland termination on the top drive RLA solenoid valve.
Replace the damaged diffuser on the fluorescent light fixture on top of
10.20.1.8 Major
the third party deck Shaker House roof top.
Replace the damaged Ex hazardous area light fixture at the heli
10.20.1.9 Major
refuelling station.
Provide the Ex certification for the agitator motors throughout the Pit
10.20.1.10 Major
Room.
Access the Pit Room fan motors and record the motor details, and
10.20.1.11 Major conduct a detailed inspection and service throughout each motor and
their associated equipment.
Replace the missing terminal box cover bolts on both the degasser
motors and the desilter electric motor.
10.20.1.12 Major
Status: Closed
Remove the unused intrinsically safe junction box on the Pit Room aft
10.20.1.13 Major wall if not being utilised, as there were cover bolts missing and 16
unused open cable glands.

Replace the deteriorated jointing rubbers on the drawworks intake
10.20.1.14 Major
ducting. This is in an Ex Zone 2 hazardous area.
Set up the HVAC and pressurisation systems for the driller’s cabin and
the Mud Pit Room. Both these area pressure differential alarm systems
10.20.1.15 Major
were not working. Ensure the doors are self-closing once the HVAC
systems are operational.
Remove the electrical tape that has been installed over the Ex motor
cable glands on the shakers, desilter and degasser. It is acceptable to
10.20.1.16 Major
used grease type tapes with one layer for protection over the flame
paths and cable glands.
Install the missing transit blocks between the Mud Pit Room and the
Mud Lab.
10.20.1.17 Major
Status: Closed
Replace the unused open transit blocks between the Pit Room and the
Pump Room.
10.20.1.18 Major
Status: Closed
Adjust the cable tray that catches the starboard entry door to the Pit
10.20.1.19 Minor
Room. These doors must be self-closing.
Install notification signage of entering a hazardous area to the Mud Pit
10.20.1.20 Minor
Room from the starboard side entry point.
Miscellaneous Items:
Service the forklift batteries, top up with water and conduct a deep cycle
10.22.1.1 Major charge. 80% of the batteries were low on water. Ensure this is included
in the PM system.
Verify if the NOV Hawkeye remote access license is current and
10.22.1.2 Minor
whether the system will be available.
Install the drop safe mesh to all the lighting fixtures throughout the
10.22.1.3 Minor
derrick and remove the old redundant slings.
Maintain the Test and Tag procedures for all the portable electrical
10.22.1.4 Minor
equipment and leads.
11.0 Safety Equipment
CO2 System:
Repair the door latches on the door entry to the SCR Room from the
Electrical and Mechanics Workshop to enable the doors to self-close.
11.1.2.1.1.1 Minor The SCR Room had a fixed firefighting CO2 release system, which
would be diluted with the CO2 escaping into the office and workshop
areas.

Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems (Water and Foam):
Replace the piping and test valves to the accommodation fixed
11.1.4.1.1 Critical firefighting sprinkler systems, as these were seen to be heavily corroded
throughout.
Fire Hose Stations:

11.1.4.1.1.1 Minor Replace the missing fire hose from fire station No. 20.
11.1.4.1.1.2 Minor Replace the missing valve wrench from fire hose station No. 2.
Fire Main:
Inspect the fire main pipe work above the Alfa Laval plate type water
11.1.4.2.1.1 Major maker, as there was evidence of pin hole leaks. Replace the pipe work
as necessary to maintain the integrity of the fire system.
Repair or replace the corroded fire main elbow supplying fire station 11
11.1.4.2.1.2 Major
on the main deck port forward stairway.
Repair or replace the corroded fire main pipework supplying fire station
11.1.4.2.1.3 Major
21 on Level 2 of the port forward stairway.
Foam System for Helideck:

Repair or replace the corroded heli deck foam system drain located
11.1.6.1.1 Major
under the Skum tank platform.
Portable Gas Detectors:

Ensure that all the portable gas detectors on-board have their current
11.3.2.1.1 Minor
calibration certifications. (Minimum of two units)
Helicopter Landing-Area Equipment:

Ensure that all the helideck safety equipment is in certification and
available with the following: Minimum of 2 dry powder extinguishers with
a total capacity of 45kg, carbon dioxide extinguishers with a total
11.4.2.1.1 Major capacity of not less than 18 kg or equivalent. One of these extinguishers
should be so equipped as to enable it to reach the engine area. The
testing of the foam extinguishing system would also be required, prior to
accepting a helicopter on deck.

Drilling Facilities Safety:
Install a protective barrier around the caustic mixing unit to prevent the
problems arising from caustic dust. The entry into the Sack Room was
11.5.1.1 Minor directly opposite the caustic mixing unit. Personnel entering that space
may not be aware or be properly attired. The risk is that personnel
entering could come into direct contact with caustic soda.
Dangerous Machinery:
Replace the fan cowlings on all the jacking system hydraulic unit electric
11.5.4.1.1 Critical motors, as they were all severely corroded, leaving the rotating cooling
fan exposed.
Walkways and Railings:

Identify, repair or replace the damaged handrails throughout the
installation to the minimum safety standard. There were many handrails
11.11.1.1.1 Major
throughout the installation with heavy corrosion and permanent damage.
Many areas had already been identified for replacement.
Replace the missing hook for the safety chain at the forward jacking leg
11.11.1.1.2 Minor
starboard chord lower access.
Check and replace all the missing screw down securing washers on the
11.11.1.1.3 Minor
outdoor fibreglass reinforced plastic grating.
Install a more appropriate access platform with handrails between the
main deck and cantilever, for use when the cantilever is in the park
11.11.1.1.4 Minor
position. Currently there were two free standing steps which were not
secure or providing handrails.
Decks and Stairways:

Extend the Lad-Saf system to gain access to the Local Equipment
Room (LER) roof top. It does not extend past the upper deck allowing
11.11.2.1.1 Major
the user to align the ladder and stand behind the gate, prior to removing
the Lad-Saf.

5.0 DRILLING EQUIPMENT
5.1 Drawworks
The drawworks installed on the ENSCO107 was a National Oil Varco (NOV) Automated Drawworks
System - Model ADS 10DT. This particular model was furnished with 3 AC drive motors, which had
the capacity to provide regenerative braking. There were also two spring-applied and an air-applied
multi-plate, fail safe, Eaton disc brake assemblies mounted outboard of the gearboxes, on either side
of the drum assembly. These supplied dynamic braking assistance to the resistive braking of the AC
Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) motors during hoisting/lowering operations, and applied static
braking during the emergency stop and parking operations.
Each brake assembly consisted of a single air-cooled and three water- cooled brake discs and
associated friction pads. The lebus screw on the drilling line drum was grooved for 1.75 inch wire
rope.
The drawworks could not be functioned during the surveyor’s attendance, as the drilling line had
been spooled back onto the drill line storage reel. Therefore, the inspection was limited to a visual
one only. This spooling was in preparation for removing the travelling block, deadline sheaves,
fastline sheaves and crown block assembly for overhaul.
None of the safety features were tested during this inspection. Once the travelling system is
reinstalled, a review of the operational status of the unit can be completed. The overall visual
condition of the unit was good. A number of air hoses were being replaced at the time of the
inspection.
5.1
B’ Brake assembly from the off
driller’s side.

5.1
Gearbox B’ from the rear.
5.1
The drawworks data plate

5.1
Drawworks viewed from the rear -
off driller’s side.
5.1
Driller’s side view of the
drawworks
5.1.2 Disk Brake (Universal)
The park and emergency brakes installed for the NOV Automated Drawworks System - Model ADS
10DT, were Eaton water and air-cooled, air and spring-applied, multi plate disc brakes. There were
two of these brakes installed, one on either end of the drawworks drum shaft outboard of the input
drive gearboxes.
There were a couple of small air leaks on the Eaton brake assemblies, which were being resolved
during the inspection period on the rig. Whilst these had minimal impact on the operation of the unit,
the air leaks would cause the braking system to pulse slightly, and would therefore increase the rate
of wear on the friction surfaces.

5.2 Rotary Table
5.2.1 Hydraulic-Driven Rotary Table
The rig was furnished with a Varco BJ 495 RST (Rotary Support Table). This had an opening 49.5
inches, and a static load capacity of 1000 short tons (908 metric tons), and a maximum operating
speed of 24 rpm. The table was hydraulically-driven by three integral hydraulic motors driving a
single main gear. The table could be locked into position using the linear lock cylinder, and there was
also a locking pawl. The rotary table was provided with an automatic greasing system. However, it
was reported that this was not used, and the PS-21 slips and the rotary table were manually
greased.
The rotary table was functioned, and the unit operated quietly and without any unusual noises. The
bushing locks were in good condition as were the master bushings. The support beams under the
drill floor were in a satisfactory condition. Some additional fabric maintenance would be beneficial to
reduce the effects of corrosion. The Category III and IV inspection details were not available at the
time of the inspection.
Rotary Table Recommendation:

Provide the Category III and Category IV inspection details for the load
path components of the rotary table.
5.2.1.1 Major
5.3 Top Drive System
A review of the downtime log for the top drive revealed that there could still be some unresolved
issues within the top drive control systems. There were a couple of downtime recorded instances
with regards to the Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs). They are motor temperature sensing
devices installed within the top drive electric AC motor.
The drilling package on the Rig was fitted with a Varco TDS 8SA top drive, Ser. No.
TDS8SM02L036; this had an integrated swivel and was powered by an 1150 hp AC motor. The pipe
handler fitted was a PH-100 pipe handler. In February 2014 the unit was sent to NOV Singapore to
have the main shaft, main bearing and seals on the Rotating Link Adapter (RLA) changed. The RLA
was pressure tested prior to installation onto the main shaft. The pipe handler was not part of the
scope of repair.
The top drive was not able to be tested during this inspection period as it was partially disassembled,
the PH-100 pipe handler had been removed as had the elevator links, rotary hose, saver sub and the
upper and lower IBOPs.
The historical oil sample reports indicated a continuous problem with oil condition related to water
ingress. The cause was reported to be through the top main seal, however the latest report which
appeared to have been completed after the repairs to the seal were conducted indicated that the
condition of the oil was still an issue.

The work order notes stated that there appeared to have been a ground fault within the control cable
for the dolly retract sensor signal, which was giving a false reading to the RTDs, telling the system
the top drive motor was overheating. The system was operated in maintenance mode for a period of
time and then in the debug monitor, where the ‘abort value’ for the RTDs was changed to T (true),
telling the system to ignore the RTD value (TD AC motor temperature readings). The notes finished
with, "Next step will be to troubleshoot the dolly retract. Reference SONo. 3664165 and 3738454 for
additional information and details on this issue."
LRDIS recommends the settings on the debug monitor be verified to demonstrate the RTDs are
being monitored with the ‘abort value’ ‘T’ value returned back to the original OEM settings. The
"Reference SONo. 3664165 and SONo. 3738454 for additional information and details on this issue"
should be reviewed. Through endurance testing the dolly retract system and RTDs should be
verified, to ensure they are operational without any issues or faults throughout the system.
Information regarding the dolly retract system was made available, prior to leaving. It stated, "24
October 2014 Shaun / Mark Calibrated dolly retract and test system. Tested good on 31 Oct, 2014.
There was no further report of the software changes being returned to the original OEM settings.
LRDIS recommended checking the software and conducting an endurance test to prove these
systems were reliable and stable.
There were deep groove wear marks on the back of the top drive dolly upper cross frame brace.
These wear marks appeared to have been formed by the dolly rubbing against the travelling block
hang off line, each time the top drive passed. The hang off line at some point in time may not have
been sufficiently secured to the back of the derrick. The cause should be identified and rectified to
stop any contact with any items.
5.3
Wear marks on the top drive dolly
upper cross frame

Top Drive System Recommendations:
Verify within the top drive software to confirm the previous top drive
issues have been resolved. Ensure the settings on the debug monitor
have the top drive AC motor RTDs being monitored with the ‘abort
value’ ‘T’ value returned back to the original OEM settings. Review the
5.3.1.1 Major
"Reference SONo. 3664165 and SONo. 3738454 for additional
information and details on this issue". Verify through endurance testing
that the dolly retract system and RTDs are operational without any
issues or faults throughout the system.
Protect the top drive from damage caused by the interference or contact
5.3.1.2 Minor
with the block hang off line.
Verify the condition of the oil in the top drive gearbox, as the previous
5.3.1.3 Minor
sample indicated that action was required due to high water content.
5.7 Crown Block
The crown block assembly was not inspected at the time of the survey, as the assembly was to be
removed and made ready for transportation to the NOV repair facility in Singapore. The block
assembly had been previously inspected by NOV in November 2015, which identified that three
sheaves in the crown block and two fast line sheaves required replacement. The block was intended
to be completely dismantled and inspected and returned with the appropriate certification and
Certificates of Conformance (COC).
Crown Block Recommendation:

5.7.1.1 Minor
completing the repair of the crown block assembly.
5.8 Travelling Block
The Shaffer 750 ton travelling block assembly (Ser. No. 20010791-201) was not inspected at the
time of the survey, as the block had been made ready for transportation to the NOV repair facility in
Singapore. The block assembly had been previously inspected by NOV in November 2015, which
identified that two sheaves required replacement. The block was intended to be completely
dismantled and inspected and returned with the appropriate certification and COC.

5.8
The travelling block located on the
catwalk
Travelling Block Recommendation:

5.8.1.1 Minor
completing the repair of the travelling block.
5.10 Drilling Instrumentation
The drilling instrumentation was not verified during the inspection period. This could not be
completed due to the rig having a number of systems unavailable. The systems required for
operating the rig efficiently were installed, i.e. Monitoring of the drilling equipment, string weight, pit
volumes, etc. Verification should be completed once the rig systems are re-instated, particularly as
the rig has been idle for some months.
5.10
ENSCO107 drilling
instrumentation.

5.11 Derrick
The derrick on the vessel was a Woolslayer and it was rated for 1,500,000 lbs (750 short tons) static
load on 14 lines.
Structurally, the derrick on the vessel appeared to be sound, with minimal corrosion evident on the
majority of the horizontal and vertical beams. There were three sections, where heavy scaling was
present. These were located at the monkeyboard level directly behind the ladder under the walkway,
and the horizontal brace behind the ladder leading from the monkeyboard level to the crown, and
also adjacent to the Mud Gas Separator on the starboard aft leg of the derrick. The derrick was a
galvanised steel bolted and welded derrick. During the last derrick inspection, performed by OES
Oilfield Services Group in October 2015, 25% of the structural bolts were checked for the correct
torque.
Whilst the third party drops inspections are being routinely conducted as recommended, there
appears to be little action when it comes to the follow up of the corrective actions. The format used
by the preferred inspection provider (OES) was to produce a running corrective action list. This list
was then added on to each subsequent visit and the corrected items closed. The reports provided for
review were completed in March 2015 (Non Destructive Examination (NDE) of the drilling equipment
and various lifting gear) and October 2015 (DROPS Inspection), within these DROPS reports there
were 261 corrective actions with the overwhelming majority being classified as critical. The actual
status at the time of survey was reported as being 159 open items (as per the 2015 OES Drops
Inspection Corrective Action Tracker provided on 07 May 2015). It was reported that a third party was
being engaged to address the outstanding items on the register.
Overall, the ladder cages and ladders were physically in good condition, with the exception of the
ladder cage for the ladder providing access to the elevated work basket. This cage appeared to have
suffered an impact resulting in a number of bent braces. This needs to be repaired to restore the
integrity of the cage.
The retention for the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras for the monkeyboard and the
stabbing board did not suitably restrain both the gearbox and the lens on the body. The condition of
the restraints was also unsatisfactory and these required replacement.
A number of the gates installed for the derrick walkways failed to self-close. These were either
fouling on other gates due to being placed too closely together, or they were fouling on sections of
the structure and handrails. It was mentioned that these may be replaced with more suitable units.
The chains installed to restrict access to the monkeyboard did not provide the same level of
protection as the fixed sections of the handrails. These had been installed in such a manner that the
chains were only at knee height, and therefore they were not 42 inches (1070mm) as specified in
API RP 54: 1999 Reaffirmed March 2007

The derrick escape system arrangement was reviewed and it was noted that there were
opportunities to improve the safety of the system as witnessed. The system being used was the
Sellstrom Escape Rite Controlled Descent Device 1000 Series. This consisted of a protective box
mounted onto the forward port leg of the derrick at the monkeyboard level. This contained the
escape line and harnesses pre-rigged to an eye bolt. The unit had not been installed as identified on
the manufacturer’s speciation identified on the system box. This indicated that the unit was to be
installed 7 ft. above the floor level.
The space surrounding the ladder opening to the monkey board level was not surrounded by a
suitable toe board. The space was large enough for a foot to pass and therefore posed a significant
injury hazard to personnel. When installing a toe board consideration must be given to the
relationship between the swinging gates and the toe board so as not to create an additional trip
hazard when using the ladder for egress to and from the monkey board level.
Each of the pipe racking fingers had been fitted with a safety chain, as mentioned in section 5.11 of
this report; these chains were noted to be poorly sized relative to the shock load placed upon them if
one of the fingers were to part and drop. The small stainless steel screw gate shackles used were
also not appropriately sized and would potentially part if the full weight of a finger were to be placed
upon them. There was new chain and shackles located in the heavy tool store that was to be
installed as part of the derrick renovation work scope. The latches were also fitted with safety slings;
these were in a satisfactory condition.
The escape door was adjacent to the port forward leg of the derrick at the monkeyboard level. Given
that the escape system would be used in an emergency, it would be safe to assume there would be
some level of confusion and anxiety. They were limited barriers in place to prevent personnel from
opening the door, prior to attaching themselves to the escape line. Consider placing an additional
barrier prior to the derrick escape exit door, to ensure that personnel are adequately prepared prior
to opening the door. If the door were to be affected by wind this could pull a person out, prior to
making the commitment to step out of the doorway. The door should be modified so that it opens
inward, therefore moving the person away from the exit, this would also simplify the addition of a
handrail. This handrail would also provide a smooth rounded edge for the rope to run over rather
than over the sharp edge of the door frame.
Derrick Recommendations:
Install a toe board behind the ladder arriving at the monkeyboard, to
prevent personnel from placing a foot into an open hole. Consideration
5.11.1.1 Critical
must be given to the placement of the gates and toe board relative to
the other.
Repair the mast ladder safety cage that provides access to the elevated
5.11.1.2 Critical
work basket (several deformed bars were seen).

Install additional height handrails for the ladders providing access to the
5.11.1.3 Critical
monkeyboard in the lowered position.
Install suitable secondary retention sling for the inertia reel used for the
ladder between the monkeyboard and the crown. The sling installed had
5.11.1.4 Critical been identified for replacement as it had been marked red. The
condition and status of the sling was not available until viewing from the
crown.
Install suitable secondary retention for the CCTV cameras in the derrick.
This should capture the gearbox and the lens on the body. The CCTV
5.11.1.5 Critical
slings witnessed only capture the bracket and they were in an
unsatisfactory condition.
Replace the two-part screw gate shackles used for the fingerboard
5.11.1.6 Critical
safety chains.
Replace the bent bracing beam at the crown level on the starboard side
5.11.1.7 Major of the derrick. This had also been highlighted in the OES inspection
reports.
Repair or replace the heavily-scaled sections of the horizontal bracing.
These were located at the monkeyboard level directly behind the ladder
5.11.1.8 Major
under the walkway, and the horizontal brace behind the ladder leading
from the monkeyboard level to the crown.
Install suitable self-closing gates in the derrick. A number of the gates
5.11.1.9 Major witnessed failed to fully close, as they were fouling on other gates or
parts of the structure and handrails
Place an additional barrier at the derrick escape exit door to ensure that
personnel are adequately prepared, prior to opening the door and prior
5.11.1.10 Major
to committing to the escape. This could be a safety chain on the inside
of the door and a handrail on the outside of the door.
Modify the derrick escape door opening arrangement so that the door
5.11.1.11 Major opens inward. If the door were to be affected by wind, this could pull a
person out, prior to making the commitment to step off the platform.
5.12 Casing Stabbing Board
The rig was furnished with a fixed level casing stabbing board, which was 35' above the drill floor.
This was reported as being rarely utilised. Casing stabbing was generally performed using the
hydraulic work basket (See Section 5.12.5 of this report), or using a third party stabbing arm. At the
time of the inspection, there was no stabbing arm installed.

5.12
Fixed height casing stabbing
board.
The casing stabbing board itself was in good condition. However, the winch for lowering the platform
into position had been removed from the pedestal. This prevented the platform from being lowered.
The unit when viewed was being held back into the housed position with a wire rope sling. The
platform was not lowered during the inspection.
5.12
The casing stabbing board
secured to the handrail.
The platform consisted of two sections, a main platform mounted to the derrick structure, and a
smaller platform that pivoted out to the aft of the drill floor.
As the stabbing board was not in use, the NDE had not been completed. If the board was to be used,
it would be prudent to have the assembly inspected prior to use, and some form of NDE completed.

Casing Stabbing Board Recommendation:
Complete an inspection of the Casing Stabbing Board, including some
5.12.1.1 Major form of NDE, prior to use. The board had not been used for some time
and no inspection records were reviewed.
5.13 Tuggers and Sheaves
The inspection of the drill floor air hoists was commenced. There were three equipment hoists and
two man-riding hoists.
The bases for each of the equipment hoists underwent NDE in October 2015. This was completed by
OES. No issues were identified at the time this inspection was performed.
The red hoist manually applied band brake friction material had worn through to the metal brake
band. This will have reduced the braking capacity and holding ability of the hoist, and thus a
reduction in safety of the unit. The manual brake was in addition to the automatic braking system.
5.13
Worn brake band on the red drill
floor air hoist.
The blue air hoist functioned correctly when operated. The hoist was fitted with suitable guarding,
and it was fitted with an automatic braking system that relied on air pressure to release. The air
pressure indicating gauge required adjustment, as the face of the gauge was obscured by the
protective barrier installed in front of the hoist.

5.13
Blue drill floor air hoist
5.13
Obscured gauge face for the blue
air hoist.
The yellow air hoist on the drill floor functioned correctly when operated. The hoist was fitted with an
automatic braking system and it was suitable guarded. The pressure was witnessed at 100 psi rather
than the 90 psi maximum, as per the hoist manufacturer. Pressures higher than the specified
maximum limit will result in an over pull situation. The pressure needs to be reduced at the regulator.

5.13
Yellow drill floor air hoist.
5.13
Yellow drill floor air hoist air
pressure gauge.
Tuggers and Sheaves Recommendations:

Reduce the air pressure to the yellow drill floor air hoist. The pressure
was witnessed at 100 psi rather than the 90 psi maximum, as per the
hoist manufacturer. Pressures higher than the specified maximum limit
5.13.1.1 Critical
will result in an over pull situation.
Status: Closed
Replace the worn brake band on the red drill floor air hoist. The friction
5.13.1.2 Major material had been worn away at the toe of the band, resulting in metal to
metal contact between the band and the brake surface.

Move the pressure indicator so that the pressure can be read for the
blue drill floor air hoist. The gauge face was obscured by the protective
5.13.1.3 Minor barrier in front of the hoist.
Status: Closed
5.13.1 Man-Riding Winches
There were three Ingersoll Rand FA150KGIMR model man-riding hoists installed on the rig. Two
were installed on the drill floor and one under the cantilever starboard side. In general the winches
were in good condition. Inspections had been completed in October 2015. This included the NDE of
the winch supporting bases by OES. The OES report highlighted that the wires for each of the
winches were unsatisfactory. They have been replaced since this particular inspection.
This particular model was furnished with two automatic brakes - one was via the multi plate friction
clutch and the other was a conventional failsafe band brake. Both these were spring-applied and air-
released.
The outstanding items identified was that the driller’s side drill floor hoist shut off valve needed
replacing, with a quick acting ball valve rather than the gate valve installed, at the time of the
inspection. This valve was also noticed to be leaking through the valve stem. The air pressure
regulator for the hoist under the cantilever was leaking air, which indicated damaged internal seals.
5.13.1
The driller’s side man-riding hoist
isolation valve.
The bases for each of the man-riding winches underwent NDE in October 2015. This was completed
by OES. No issues were identified at the time this inspection was performed.

Man-Riding Winches Recommendations:
Repair or replace the leaking pressure regulator for the man-riding
winch located under the cantilever. Once repaired, ensure that all the
pressures for all the man-riding winches are set to the required
5.13.1.1.1 Major
maximum 90 psi.
Status: Closed
Label the man-riding winches on the drill floor and under the cantilever
clearly with the text MAN-RIDING ONLY.
5.13.1.1.2 Minor
Status: Closed
5.16 Ezy-Torq
The rig was furnished with two Varco HC 26 Hydraulic Catheads. The Hydraulic Catheads were
controlled from the driller’s controls. These were cycled through their stroke range, however, it was
not possible to test the line pull due to the position of the top drive. No leaks were noted and the
cylinders operated smoothly. The wire ropes were in a visually good condition. It was reported that
these were changed on an annual basis.
5.16
Off driller’s side breakout cathead.

5.16
Driller’s side make up cathead.
5.17 Pipe-Handling Equipment
The rig had established lifting and handling procedures in place. These were highlighted to all the
crew members on a regular basis, and also as part of any pre-job toolbox meeting. Work instructions
were reviewed prior to all the lifting operations along with a Job Safety Analysis (JSA).
5.17.1 Tongs
The rig was furnished with a number of manual tongs and these were in good condition, with the
previous inspection reports available for review. The previous inspections had been completed by
OES in March 2015. There were spare units available in the heavy tool store that appeared to have
not been used since the last inspection. The tongs on the drill floor would require inspection, prior to
commencing operations, as the previous inspection had been completed more than twelve months
earlier.
5.17.2 Slips and Dog Collars
The rig was furnished with a number of sets of manual slips and dog collars, for the various pipes and
casing available. These were inspected on a regular basis and subjected to periodic NDE, which
had been completed by OES in March 2015. The items in use would be due for re-inspection prior to
the commencement of operations. Overall the slips were in good condition.

5.17.2
The manual drill pipe slips in the
heavy tool store.
5.17.2
The manual slips and dog collars
on the drill floor.
5.17.3 Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30)
The rig was furnished with two PS-21 slip assemblies. One set was reviewed on the rig floor, and
these had been refurbished and presented in good condition. The actuating cylinders had been
replaced as had the hydraulic distribution block.

5.17.3
PS-21 Power Slips on the rig floor.
5.17.3
Slip actuation cylinder
The auto grease function of the PS-21 slips was installed but it not being used. The operators were
manually greasing the slips at regular intervals whilst in use.

5.17.3
The rotary table and PS-21
hydraulic control manifolds.
The second set of PS-21 power slips was located in the heavy tool store on Machinery Deck level 1,
and these were in need of some attention. The supply and return hydraulic hoses required
replacement. Externally the equipment needed some additional preservation. However, internally the
inserts and dies were noted to be in good condition. During the inspection period, the damaged hoses
were replaced.
5.17.3
The PS-21 power slips in the
heavy tool store.

5.17.3
The perished hydraulic hoses on
PS-21 in the heavy tool store.
5.17.3
New hoses installed on the PS-21
hydraulic manifold.
Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30) Recommendation:

Replace the damaged hydraulic supply and return hoses on the PS-21
power slips. There was a potential for equipment failure and possible
5.17.3.1.1 Major injury to personnel, if the hoses were to part during operation.
Status: Closed
Closed: Completed during the survey
5.17.4 Elevators
The air-operated BJ elevators not functioned, as they had been removed as part of the preparations
for removing the crown assembly.

The previous inspection was completed by OES in March 2015, and this was for a Category III
inspection. The annual Category IV inspection had not been carried out in October 2015, when OES
revisited. The October report indicated that only the elevator links were subjected to an inspection.
The Category IV inspection requires the completed disassembly of the various elevator assemblies
for NDE, and for the measurements to be recorded for the wear items, i.e. Hinge pin tolerances,
hinge tolerances, taper wear tolerances.
Elevators Recommendation:
Carry out the elevator inspections (six-monthly and annual, including a
complete disassembly) and an NDT inspection of the hinges and pins,
5.17.4.1.1 Critical or provide the in-date certification.
5.17.5 Elevator Links
The elevator links were previously inspected by OES in October 2015. These should be re-inspected
every six months for a Category III inspection, and every 12 months for a Category IV inspection.
Visually the links appeared to be in good condition.
5.17.6 Master Bushings
The master bushings were installed at the time of the inspection, and there were replacement bowls
in the heavy tool store. The bushings and bowls were all in good condition, with the inspection
reports completed by OES available for review.
5.17.9 Fingerboards
The fingerboards were visually inspected, and overall these were in a satisfactory condition with very
little noted corrosion. The fingerboards were manually operated, as it was a manually operated
derrick with no pipe racking machinery.
Each of the pipe racking fingers had been fitted with a safety chain, as mentioned in Section 5.11 of
this report. These chains were noted to be unsatisfactorily sized, relative to the shock load placed
upon them, if one of the fingers were to part and drop. The small stainless steel screw gate shackles
used were also not appropriately sized, and they would potentially part if the full weight of a finger
were to be placed upon them. There was new chain and shackles located in the heavy tool store,
which was to be installed as part of the derrick renovation work scope. The latches were also fitted
with safety slings, and these were in a satisfactory condition. (See Recommendation 5.11.1.6)
The monkeyboard was a hydraulic unit that could be lowered to the casing fingers or raised to the
fingerboard level. When viewed, the monkeyboard was at the fingerboard level, with the casing
fingers in the raised position. The hydraulic controls, manifolds and pipe work were in an
unsatisfactory condition and required maintenance. The system was displaying extensive corrosion.
The hydraulic shutoff valve had a missing handle, hydraulic shut off valve handle affecting access to
the ladder. The hydraulic supply and return pipe work also had excessive scale that required
attention.

5.17.9
The monkeyboard hydraulic
control system
5.17.9
Corroded fittings on the filter
assembly.

5.17.9
The manifold mounted hydraulic
shut-off valve.
5.17.9
Heavy scaling on the hydraulic
supply/ return pipe work.

5.17.9
The missing hydraulic isolation
valve handle.
5.17.9
Corroded fittings and perished
hydraulic hose.

5.17.9
Corroded lower fitting on the
accumulator assembly.
5.17.9
Heavy scaling on top of the
accumulator cylinder.

5.17.9
Corroded fittings, hose end fittings
and directional control valve.
5.17.9
Screw gate shackle and corroded
chain on the casing fingerboard.

5.17.9
Single acting and non-rated spring
clip and corroded chain on the
casing fingerboard.
5.17.9
Lower inside forward guide track roller for the
monkeyboard.
Fingerboards Recommendation:
Install guide track roller secondary retention to capture the roller, if the
5.17.9.1.1 Critical shaft were to part. Based on the height and weight, if the guide roller
were to part, it had the potential to cause a serious injury.
5.17.12.4 Casing Stabbing Arm
No casing stabbing arm was installed.

5.17.12.5 Cherry Picker
The Maritime Hydraulics derrick work basket was visually inspected and the previous third party
inspection records were reviewed. The third party inspections were being completed on a six-
monthly basis by OES.
They also included the NDE of the critical load carrying components that could be accessed without
disassembly. The records indicated that the previous load test had been carried out during
installation.
The hydraulic system on the unit was in an unsatisfactory condition. The OES reports indicated that
the condition of the hoses had been identified in October 2013, and a corrective action had been
raised at that inspection. The hoses were displaying signs of deterioration and cracks in the outer
casings of the hoses were evident. The end fittings of all but a limited few were seriously corroded,
and they were due for replacement before they failed. The fittings in the hydraulic cylinders, control
manifolds and distribution blocks were also severely corroded.
5.17.12.5
Corroded fittings and hoses into
the distribution manifold.

5.17.12.5
Corroded fittings on the slew
motor.
5.17.12.5
Corroded fittings and valves.

5.17.12.5
Corroded fittings and hoses.
The hydraulic hard line for the telescopic cylinder had corroded and failed in the past. Therefore, a
temporary repair had been implemented by replacing the hard line with a hydraulic hose, and this
had included the manufacturing of a fitting to complete the installation.
5.17.12.5
Damaged hard line for the
telescopic cylinder.

5.17.12.5
Modified hydraulic fitting.
Threaded fitting welded onto the
hydraulic tube.
The unit was not tested during the inspection due to the unsatisfactory state of the equipment, and
the recommendation that the unit be fully serviced by the OEM. The LRDIS surveyors recommend
that the unit be either replaced or completely overhauled and recertified by the OEM, prior to further
operation. The derrick work basket was for personnel man-riding operations, and as such it should
be maintained in the highest possible condition similar to that of the man-riding hoists.
Cherry Picker Recommendations:

Replace all the hydraulic hoses that display scale and corrosion for the
5.17.12.5.1.1 Major
hose end fittings on the elevated work basket.
Replace the heavily corroded hydraulic fittings on the elevated work
5.17.12.5.1.2 Major
basket.
Replace the hose and modified fittings for the telescopic cylinder with
the correct hard pipe and fittings, as per the OEM original delivery. The
5.17.12.5.1.3 Major
hard pipe had parted in the past and it had been replaced with a
temporary repair.
Replace the Ultra Violet (UV) affected and deteriorating hydraulic hoses
5.17.12.5.1.4 Minor
on the elevated work basket.
5.18 Iron Roughneck
The NOV AR 3200 iron roughneck located on the drill floor was in a mechanically good condition.
The unit was only a couple of years old and presented in a condition reflective of its age in service.
The hoses were in good condition as was the structure of the unit. The unit could not be fully
functioned due to the ongoing drill floor operations (removal of the crown).
The iron roughneck could be positioned to service both the well centre and the fox hole.

5.18
NOV AR3200 iron roughneck Data
Plate.
5.18
Iron Roughneck with incorporated guidance
tracks.

5.18
Pipe spinning wrench. Make and break upper
and lower jaws.
5.19 Pipe-Racking System
The racking of the tubulars was a manually performed activity. The rig was not furnished with a
hydraulic racking system. The monkeyboard could be raised and lowered between the drill pipe
fingerboards and the lower casing fingerboards. There were two small pull back winches installed at
the upper fingerboards. Both these winces were in good condition.
5.19
Monkeyboard level.

5.19.1 Drill Floor
The drill floor was generally in good condition. The area was clear and relatively well maintained.
The drill floor working surface was fitted with non-slip matting. The working area under the top drive
and surrounds was identified as a red zone, and therefore any personnel entering the drill floor had
to inform the driller upon entry.
5.19.8 Rotating Mousehole
The rotating mousehole was driven via an air motor. The directional control was determined by the
position of the control valve mounted on the forward wind wall. There was no placard to establish
that the correct direction had been selected. The mousehole was operated in both directions and it
was seen to function correctly.
5.19.8
Rotating mousehole
5.19.8
The rotating mousehole direction
control lever.

The mousehole sock was not installed at the time of the inspection. This was located in its stowage
on the starboard side of the cantilever pipe deck. The sock and landing collar were found to be in
good condition.
5.19.8
The rotating mousehole sock
Rotating Mousehole Recommendation:

Install an information placard at the control valve for the rotating
5.19.8.1.1 Minor
mousehole indicating the rotation direction for the operating handle.
5.19.10 Hydraulic Power Unit
The hydraulic power unit installed on the rig was manufactured by NOV and the Model No. was HP-
45Q. This was designed to provide hydraulic power to the drill floor and derrick equipment, and also
to the cantilever and drill floor skidding systems. The unit consisted of four pumps each with the
following outputs - 3000 psi, 2850 psi, 2700 psi, 2550 psi.
The unit was in a satisfactory condition. There was some evidence of minor leakage. However, the
hydraulic hoses were intact. The oil sample reports for the previous two years were provided for
review. These indicted that the oil was maintained in a good condition with all the reports returning
normal results.

5.19.10 Hydraulic Power Unit.
5.20 Drill String
The drill string (Grant Prideco) had been previously inspected in July 2015. This was indicated by the
stencilling on the tubular, and also by the white contrast paint used with The Magnetic Particle
Inspection (MPI) on the tool joints. The stencilling indicated that the standard for the inspection of the
tubular was DS-1 Cat 4. The report could not be provided prior to the Surveyor’s departure.
5.20
Inspection stencilling. DS 1 - CAT
4.
There were a number of joints that had been identified for disposal, and these had been marked red
for easy identification.
Drill String Recommendation:

5.20.1.1 Major Provide the drill string inspection report for review.

5.21 Drilling Subs
The lifting caps had been inspected by OES in March 2015, and this included the full MPI of the
threaded section and the lifting point.
No previous inspection records were reviewed for the drilling subs. There were indications that the
inspections had occurred in a similar fashion to that of the drill string. The report could not be
provided prior to the surveyor’s departure, therefore the standard of inspection was not clarified.
Drilling Subs Recommendation:

5.21.1.1 Major Provide the drilling sub inspection report for review.
5.22 Fishing Tools
The equipment could not be inspected due to time constraints and the ongoing rig operations.

6.0 MUD SYSTEM
6.1 Mud Pumps
The rig was furnished with three Varco Lewco W 2215 mud pumps with a 15" stroke, and a
maximum of 110 strokes per minute. The maximum rated output was 7500 psi. The pumps had seen
very little activity for the 12 months prior to the inspection.
An internal inspection of the pumps was completed. There was minimal evidence of main and pinion
gear wear, no corrosion was evident, and all the lock and safety wiring was in place and it was
properly installed. The power end oil had the appearance of being in good condition with no evidence
of moisture ingress. There was no condensation evident on the internal components. Overall, the
power end condition of the pumps was very good.
6.1
No. 1 Mud Pump

6.1
No. 2 Mud Pump
6.1
No. 3 Mud Pump
The fluid ends were South West modules. Based on the hours of the valves and seats the following
valves were removed for inspection: The No.1 Port Left discharge - 1156 hrs and the No.3 Starboard
Right suction - 1612 hrs. The modules were in good condition with no evidence of washout or pitting
of the sealing faces or the seats.

6.1
The No. 1 Mud Pump Port Left
Discharge
6.1
The No. 3 Mud Pump Starboard
Right Suction
The relief valve vent line for MP No.2 had a damaged restraining U Clamp. The clamp appeared to
have broken off in the past. Generally, the restraint of the vent line would be considered critical.
However, in this instance, if there was to be a shock load on the vent line, the direction of force
would push the vent line against the supporting beam, directly adjacent and to which the vent line
was already secured to.

6.1
The MP No. 2 relief valve vent
line.
6.1
The MP No. 2 broken vent line
restraining clamp
The restraining clamp for the mud pump No.2 relief valve vent line was replaced during the survey
period. However, when inspecting to close out the repair of the restraining clamp, it was noticed that
the vent line was leaking from a corrosion related blister. On this basis the overall condition of the
pipe work was dubious.

6.1
The leaking relief valve vent line
from MP No. 2.
There was no documentation indicating that the pulsation dampeners for the mud pumps had been
recertified at a 10 yearly interval. The mud pumps were put into service in 2005, however, some of
the dampeners were manufactured as early as 2002. The details of the pulsation dampeners had not
been captured in the Pressure Vessel Register, therefore, this may have attributed to the dampeners
being overlooked for inspection.
6.1
Lewco pulsation dampener.

6.1
The pulsation dampener data
plate.
The mud pump pressure relief valves were identified in the contents of the Pressure Relief Valve
Register held on board the rig. However, the details of the relief valves had not been entered in the
relevant section.
Mud Pumps Recommendations:

Inspect the relief valve vent line from MP No.2 and repair or replace as
6.1.1.1 Critical necessary. There was a leaking corrosion related blister on the vent line
above the pump room telephone.
The pulsation dampener needs to undergo a 10-yearly internal
inspection and hydrostatic test procedure.
6.1.1.2 Critical
Refer to: API 510: 2009 Section 6.4 Risk-based Inspections Sub-
section 6.4
Periodically remove the mud pump pressure relief valves and subject to
6.1.1.3 Major calibration checks.
Refer to API RP 576: 2009 Section 6 Inspection and Testing
Replace the broken U Clamp restraining the MP No.2 relief valve vent
line. All the high-pressure piping (including the pressure relief valve
6.1.1.4 Major vent) is to be properly supported.
Status: Closed
Repair the broken hinges for the guards over the pony rod wells to
6.1.1.5 Minor
restore the integrity of the protection guards.

6.2 Shale Shakers (General)
The ENSCO107 was furnished with NOV VSM 300 shale shakers. The shakers had been installed
approximately twelve months prior in 2015, and had seen little service. Overall, the shale shakers
were in structurally good condition. There was no visual evidence of cracks within the supporting
structure or the screen beds. The shakers were located above the main deck on the starboard aft
side of the rig. This area was furnished with a wind wall to offer some protection from the weather.
6.3 Mud Cleaner
The rig was furnished with a NOV Brandt VSM300 shale shaker and NOV Brandt 24/3 mud cleaner.
This unit consisted of the shale shaker, 24 x 4" desilter cones and 3 x 12" desander cones. The unit
had seen very little service since its installation in approximately 2014. The overall condition was
very good and it was indicative of the light duties placed upon the unit.
6.4 Desilter
The rig was furnished with a dedicated desilter pump. This was a Halco 2500 Supreme with an 8"
suction line, 6" discharge line and 14" impellor. The internal condition of the pump was not
confirmed, however, there were no indications of previous pump leakage. The pump was located on
the main deck, adjacent to the desander pump. In this location, the pump was exposed to all the
weather conditions. To improve the service life of the pump, some additional surface preservation
should be implemented.
As identified in Section 6.3 of this report, the desilter unit consisted of twenty four 4 inch cones.
These were inspected and noted to be clear of previous debris, with little to no evidence of wear. In
general, the unit was considered to be in good condition.
Desilter Recommendation:
6.4.1.1 Minor life of the desilter pump and to protect the pump from the weather and
6.5 Desander
The rig was furnished with a dedicated desander pump. This was a Halco 2500 Supreme with an 8"
suction line, 6" discharge line and 14" impellor.
6.5.1 Brandt Hydrocyclone
The rig was furnished with a dedicated desander pump. This was a Halco 2500 Supreme with an 8"
suction line, 6" discharge line and 14" impellor. The internal condition of the pump was not
confirmed, however, there were no indications of previous pump leakage. The pump was located on
the main deck, and as such it was exposed to all the weather conditions. To improve the service life
of the pump, some additional surface preservation should be implemented.
As identified in Section 6.3 of this report, the desander unit consisted of three 12 inch cones. These
were inspected and noted to be clear of previous debris, with little to no evidence of wear. In general,
the unit was considered to be in good condition.

Brandt Hydrocyclone Recommendation:
6.5.1.1.1 Minor life of the desander pump and to protect the pump from the weather and
6.6 Degasser
The rig was furnished with two Brandt DG10 vacuum degassers. The outlets from the vacuum pumps
were routed to a safe area. The vessels had no obvious indications of leakage or serious
corrosion. The three way valves were checked, with the inboard degasser valve not functioning
correctly. This had come free from the float shaft, and the other unit (outboard) three- way valve was
free to move. The vacuum gauges on both of the degasser units indicated vacuum without the
equipment being run. Therefore, both the gauges were removed and identified as defective.
6.6
Brandt DG-10 Vacuum Degassers
The degassers could not be functioned during the inspection period due to challenges with the fluid
disposal. The sand traps were empty during the inspection, and as there were no isolation points
within the system, it was not possible to pull a vacuum within the vacuum vessels.
Degasser Recommendations:
Repair the float-operated valve on the inboard vacuum degasser tank.
6.6.1.1 Major Status: Closed
Replace the defective vacuum gauges on both the degasser units.

6.6.2 Brandt
The pumps supplying the degasser units were Halco 2500 Supreme centrifugal pumps, and these
were furnished with butterfly valves on the suction and discharges. The damaged guard on pump
No.2 has been identified in Section 11.5.4 of this report. The defective suction gauges have been
identified in Section 6.7 of this report.
6.6.2
Location of the degasser pumps
forward of the cuttings ditch.
6.7 Centrifugal Pumps
Not all the pumps could be tested due to the difficulty in disposing of water in the harbour. All the
centrifugal pumps on the facility were fitted with mechanical seals and as such required fluid to be
able to run. Visually, there was no indication of leakage from the seals, and the pumps in general
presented well. A test on all of the pumps should take place once fluid can be transferred into the
various mud pits and tanks.
Centrifugal Pumps Recommendation:

Replace the broken degasser feed pump suction gauges for degasser
pumps No.1 and No.2.
6.7.1.1 Minor
Status: Closed
6.8 Mud Agitators
Each of the eight mud pits was furnished with a Brandt VMA-25 vertical agitator, and the slug and pill
pits were furnished with Brandt VMA-7.5 vertical agitators. These were not operated as there was no
fluid in the mud tanks, and as they were in the shipyard, the disposal of fluid was problematic and it
could not be simply discharged. Whilst a tank entry was not performed, the paddles and lower spigot
bearings could be viewed from the tank entry. These were noted to be intact and in a satisfactory
condition. The Corrective Action Register indicated that the No.8 agitator had a noisy gearbox, and
the corrective action was indicating as still being ‘open’.

For the issues identified with the electrical system for the agitators, see Section 10.20 Hazardous
Area of this report.
6.8
The agitator for mud tank No. 2
6.8
The agitator for mud tank No. 3

6.8
The agitator paddle and lower
spigot bearing.
Mud Agitators Recommendation:

Complete the fabric maintenance of the agitators, as these were
6.8.1.1 Minor
showing significant surface corrosion.
6.9 Mud-Mixing System
There were numerous valve handles missing from various systems interacting with the mud mixing
system, i.e. Mix and transfer system, sea water system, drill water system.
Overall, the pipe work was in a very unsatisfactory state and required significant remedial action, and
much of this had been previously identified by ENSCO. The true scope of the work was not known,
and it was believed that once the repair activities began, additional issues would become apparent.
Each of the eight mud pits was furnished with a Brandt VMA-25 vertical agitator, and the slug and pill
pits were furnished with Brandt VMA-7.5 vertical agitators. These were not operated as there was no
fluid in the mud tanks and as they were in the shipyard, the disposal of fluid was problematic and it
could not be simply discharged. Whilst a tank entry was not performed, the paddles and lower spigot
bearings could be viewed from the tank entry. These were noted to be intact and in a satisfactory
condition.
For the issues identified with the electrical system for the agitators, see Section 10.20 Hazardous
Area of this report.
Mud-Mixing System Recommendation:

Refit the operating handles on all the valves in the mud, drill water and
6.9.1.1 Major
seawater systems that were missing these handles.

6.9.1 Trip Tank System
The rig was furnished with two trip tank pumps and two trip tanks these were 39 barrels each but
were usually configured and operated with the equalizing valve open. There was also a stripping
tank with a 5.5 barrel capacity. These were all located on the starboard inboard side of the cantilever
aft of the BOP HPU
Each of the trip tanks were furnished with a single tank volume sensor, and provision for an
additional and separate third party sensor. With the equalizing valve open the sensor provided
indication of the individual tank volumes but also combined to provide total volume. Using this
method it was possible to reference each of the sensors against the other to provide an indication of
sensor health and accuracy
Most of the associated pipe work to and from the tanks and pumps had been identified as no longer
serviceable and had been programmed to be replaced. There were numerous patches from previous
repairs and also a large number of pipe bandages.
Trip Tank System Recommendation:

Replace the leaking and heavily scaled trip tank pump pipe work
6.9.1.1.1 Major
between the trip tanks and the drill floor.
6.9.2 Flow Line System
The flow line from the diverter to the open mud trough under the drill floor was 14 inches in diameter,
and it was furnished with a 14 inch full trunion type ball valve. A flow indicator was also fitted after
the valve and prior to fluid entering the mud trough.
6.9.2
Flow line from the diverter to the
mud trough
The flow from the mud trough could be diverted to pass over the gumbo box, or directly into the mud
trough on the starboard side of the cantilever. From the cantilever the mud flowed to the shaker
header box.

6.9.2
Mud trough to the gumbo box or
cantilever mud trough.
6.9.2
Cantilever mud trough
6.9.3 Casing Fill-Up Line
The casing could be filled via a casing filling line, and this was supplied from the trip tank pumps. In
the event that both the pumps were not available, the casing could be filled via the same line, but
fed from the mix and transfer pumps. The trip tank pumps were the normal method so that volumes
could be more closely monitored.
6.9.4 Base Oil System
The Base Oil Transfer pump was located in the Mud Pump Room. The pump was in a good
serviceable condition.
The associated suction, delivery and transfer pipe work was in a visually good condition, and there
was no evidence of paint blisters or serious corrosion evident externally.

6.9.4
Base Oil Pump
6.9.5 Reverse-Circulating Line
The rig had the capacity for reverse circulation. A line was permanently installed under the rig floor,
to connect the choke and kill manifold via the cement manifold to the mud manifold. Some of the
installation had been completed using Chiksan connections.
6.9.6 High-Rate Mixers
There were two high rate mixers installed on the mud pits allowing the ability to mix on mud pits No.5
(water-based) and No.8 (oil-based).
6.9.6
Mud Pit No. 5 High Rate Mixer

6.9.6
Mud Pit No. 8 High Rate Mixer
6.10 Standpipe Manifold and Rotary Hoses
The standpipes and manifold were in a generally good condition. The thickness testing records were
available for review, and they identified that there was an ongoing inspection regime in place. The
previous inspection was completed by OES in March 2015.
The rotary and jumper hoses were installed in September 2011, there were no inspection records
indentifying that the hoses had been inspected according the manufacturers (Phoenix Beattie)
recommendations. The cantilever jumper hoses had suffered from abrasion and worn through the
outer casing of the hoses, in some places exposing the re-enforcing wire braid.
The hose safety slings had not been correctly installed, there was excessive slack in the wire rope
slings. If the hose were to fail catastrophically the shock load applied to the sling may be in excess of
the rating of the sling resulting in a failure of the safety sling.
Standpipe Manifold and Rotary Hoses Recommendations:

Verify that the safety slings fitted to the high pressure hoses are
6.10.1.1 Critical correctly installed with a minimum of slack in the wire, to reduce the
effect of shock load, if the hose or connection were to fail.
Investigate the extent of damage to the outer skin of the high pressure
mud hoses in use, and carry out the necessary repairs.
Refer to: API RP 7L A2: 2006 Appendix A Recommended Practice for
6.10.1.2 Critical
Inspection guidelines for HP drilling and production hoses rev. 1

Inspect the rotary hose that are more than three (3) years old and
pressure-test them as per the OEM recommendations.
The hoses installed were approximately 10 years old.
6.10.1.3 Minor Refer to: API RP 7L A2: 2006 Appendix A Recommended Practice for
Inspection guidelines for HP drilling and production hoses rev. 1.
6.10.1 Cement Manifold
The cement manifold, hoses and Halliburton cement unit were rated for 15000 psi SWP, and it was
indicated that the cement hoses were tested to 10000 in 2011. The surface BOP was rated to 10000
psi. Therefore, the system itself was being tested to the maximum rating of the lowest pressure rated
component, that being the BOP, without taking into consideration the rating or capacity of any
conductor.
In total there were five hoses in the system, and the certificates were available for review. They
indicated that the hoses were put into service in March 2006, and that the last pressure test had
been performed to 10000 psi in September 2011.
The installation of the safety sling on the cement hose in the derrick required adjustment, as there
was significant slack in the sling. The slack should be reduced to an absolute minimum to reduce the
effects of shock loading.
The shackles securing the sling to the hose clamp, and the sling anchor appeared to have been
condemned, as they had been painted red.
The hoses under the cantilever had a number of repair patches to the outer sheath. These were
necessary as the hoses were rubbing on the hose support high points. Ideally the hose should be
supported over the entire length.

6.10.1
The cement hose safety sling.
6.10.1
The cement hose clamp and
shackles.

6.10.1
The cement hose anchor and
shackle.
Cement Manifold Recommendations:

Ensure that the safety slings fitted to the high pressure cement hose are
correctly installed, with a minimum of slack in the wire. This is to reduce
6.10.1.1.1 Major
the effect of shock load, if the hose or connection were to fail.
Refer to API 7L A2: 2006 Section A7 Safety clamps
Replace the cement hose safety sling shackles with items that are
6.10.1.1.2 Major
certified for use. The items installed had been identified for replacement.
6.11 Bulk Air System and Tanks
The rig was furnished with a single bulk air compressor and desiccant dryer. The dryer vessel
appeared to have small pin hole leaks. These were identified by the rust staining and small pin holes
on the sides of the vessel.
There was also a build-up of salt crystals around the drain, indicating that seawater could be entering
into the system. Further investigation ought to be conducted to determine the source of the seawater
contamination, and the extent of possible damage to the bulk air system. The oil analysis reports
also supported the finding that sea water was entering the system with high Na (Sodium) levels.
Over a period, this will eventually cause issues with the air end of the compressor.

6.11
Possible pin hole leak in the bulk
air dryer.
6.11
Possible pin hole leak in the bulk
air dryer.

6.11
Salt crystals around the drain
valve for the bulk air dryer.
The rig had the capacity to supply bulk air from the rig air system via a pressure reducing station.
This consisted of two twin reduction diaphragm pressure reducers. The pressure relief valve had
been tested and set to 49 psi. The relief valve was identified in the Pressure Relief Valve Register.
6.11
Rig air to the bulk air reducing
station.
Bulk Air System and Tanks Recommendation:

Conduct an investigation in to the source of the salt crystals forming on
6.11.1.1 Minor the drain valve from the bulk air dryer. Correct the cause and verify if
any damage has occurred.

6.13 Cementing Unit
The Halliburton Cement Unit was visually inspected. The unit was not tested or functioned in any
way due to the absence of any Halliburton Cementing personnel on the rig. The status of the
maintenance or periodic inspections and certifications was unknown, and no documentation was
known to be available on the rig. This information would need to be provided from Halliburton.
There were no remote fuel shutoff valves or isolations installed between the engines and the fuel
tank. MODU Code: 2001 Chapter 9 Fire Safety Section 9.10.3; states, "Every oil fuel suction pipe
from a storage, settling or daily service tank situated above the double bottom should be fitted with a
cock or valve capable of being closed from outside the space concerned, in the event of a fire arising
in the space in which such tanks are situated. In the special case of deep tanks situated in any shaft
or pipe tunnel, valves on the tanks should be ' fitted but control in the event of fire may be effected by
means of an additional valve on the pipeline or lines outside the tunnel or tunnels".
6.13
Cement unit fuel tank. Blue lines
service engines.
Each of the relief valves installed on the unit was fitted with vent lines that directed the discharge
away from the operating personnel. However, the vent line fitted to the relief valve installed on the
surge tank was not secured. The vent line in this case was a flexible hose, and in the event of a
discharge from the relief valve, the hose had the potential to become an uncontrolled hazard.

6.13
Unsecured vent line hose on the
cement surge tank.
There were no safety slings installed on the Chiksans® linking the cement unit to the cement
manifold. The manufacturer, provides two ranges of temporary pipe restraint and clearly understands
the increased level of safety these provide in the "what if" situation.
Cementing Unit Recommendations:

Consider shutting off the fuel supply to the Halliburton cement unit from
6.13.1.1 Critical a remote and safe area.
MODU Code: 2001 Chapter 9 Fire Safety Section 9.10.3
Properly secure the safety relief vent line for the Halliburton cement unit
6.13.1.2 Critical
surge tank.
Install a safety sling (complete with brackets) to the Halliburton cement
6.13.1.3 Critical
unit chiksans.
Provide records for the annual wall thickness tests of the high pressure
6.13.1.4 Major
piping.
Provide calibration certificates for the instrumentation, chart recorders
6.13.1.5 Major
and relief valves. Halliburton to action.
Ensure that test certificates are available for the Halliburton cement unit
6.13.1.6 Minor
high-pressure lines.
COMPANY XAUSTRALIA PTY PAU1411.1 Release 01

LTD
Report of Survey – ENSCO107
8.0 MARINE EQUIPMENT
8.1 Ballast System
The ballast/ preload system could not be operated as the dumping of ballast water was not possible,
whilst the rig was at the quayside. Visually, the system appeared to be in good condition. There was
some programmed work to be completed on the tank gauging system, and this would need to be
verified once complete.
The capillary tubes for the level sensors had a number of patches in the Auxiliary Machinery Room
Starboard Forward. Once these have been repaired or replace the ballast system should then be
able to be tested.
The Marine Operating Manual (MOM) provided the necessary standard operating instructions
relating to the marine and drilling operations.
Ballast System Recommendation:

Make the necessary repairs to the capillary tubes for the tank gauging
8.1.1.1 Minor
system. These were noted to have a number of patches.
8.1.1 Bilge System
The bilge alarm system was inspected. There were 14 bilge wells in the main hull of the facility, and
each was fitted with a sensor to indicate a high bilge level. The alarm panel was located in the
Engine Control Room, and this provided with both an audible and visual alarm. If the Engine Control
Room was not attended, then there was a flashing light installed in the Engine Room, and also on
the main deck.
When testing the bilge level indication of the 14 available alarms, 13 were found to be fully operable,
with one requiring attention. The faulty level sensor was located in the Mud Pump Room (sensor 9P-
1). Within this compartment there were three bilge wells in total - all having sensors.
There were two electrically-driven bilge pumps, and these were located in the Auxiliary Machinery
Room Starboard Aft and the Auxiliary Machinery Room Port Aft. In addition to the electrically-driven
pumps, there were two air-driven diaphragm pumps. The pumps were in a satisfactory condition.
PAU1411.1 Release 01 COMPANY XAUSTRALIA PTY

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8.1.1
Port Aft bilge pumps.
8.1.1
Starboard Aft bilge pump.
The rig had two RWO Water Technology Oily Water Separators (OWS), and these were not
operated while at the quayside. Visually the units needed some fabric maintenance. There was also
indication from the Corrective Maintenance Work Orders that both the units required new piping, and
one of the units (No.2 OWS) required a replacement oil concentration meter.

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8.1.1
OWS control panel and oil
concentration meter.
8.1.1
OWS No. 2
Bilge System Recommendations:

Complete the outstanding corrective maintenance orders for the OWS.
8.1.1.1.1 Major The corrective maintenance items were for the stainless steel tubing
and the oil concentration meter (PPM indicator).

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Repair the faulty bilge well high level indicator in the mud pump room,
sensor 9P-1.
8.1.1.1.2 Minor
Status: Closed
Provide supporting evidence for the bilge alarm arrangement complying
with MODU Code 2001 Chapter 8.7 Alarm system Section 8.7.1.4. This
states "that when in the marine mode, activate an audible and visual
8.1.1.1.3 Minor alarm on the navigating bridge for any situation which requires action by
the officer on watch or which should be brought to his attention." The
arrangement as viewed provided indication in the Engine Control Room,
but not on the Navigation Deck/ Jacking Control Room.
8.2 Overflow and Vent Checks
Overall the vents were in good condition, and spark resistant gauze was installed on the fuel vents,
and each was contained within a spill bund. There was some surface corrosion evident that would
require some attention in the near future.
8.3 Watertight Integrity and Compartments
There was a water door light indication panel for the doors on and below the main deck situated in
the Jacking Office. This was a combined water tight doors and machinery remote monitoring panel.
The panel displayed an indication for door "open" status with a red light indication for the following
doors:
• W.T. Door No.3 Port Aft Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.9 Port Aft Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.21 Port Aft Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.5 Stbd Aft Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.6 Stbd Fwd. Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.7 Stbd Fwd Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.2 Port Sack Storage Room
• W.T. Door No.11 Port Sack Storage Room
• W.T. Door No.10 Port Fwd Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.12 Stbd Aft Aux. Mach. Room
• W.T. Door No.4 Heavy Tool Room
• W.T. Door No.8 Heavy Tool Room
• W.T. Door No.22 Quarters Port Aft Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.23 Quarters Port Aft Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.24 Quarters Fwd Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.25 Quarters Stbd Aft Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.26 Quarters Stbd Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.27 Quarters Stbd Fwd Main Deck
• W.T. Door No.1 Mud Pump Room
When tested, not all the doors displayed the correct position indication. Additionally, the system did
not self-cancel when the doors were returned to the shut position, without intervention from an
operator at the indication panel.

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When a door open alarm was indicated, the operator must acknowledge the alarm. Then once the
door has been closed, the operator must reset the alarm panel to extinguish the indication.
Therefore, the system did not provide accurate door position indication, i.e. Door open position, door
shut position.
Remotely at each of the doors there was a flashing amber light to indicate a door open status, and
some of these were noted as not operating correctly. The doors themselves were in good condition
with appropriate seals and latching mechanisms in place.
8.3
Watertight door closed indication.
The integrity of the water tight boundaries was in a generally good condition. There was some scope
for improvement relating to the corrosion of the service pipe work passing through the bulk head, as
this could have an impact on the watertight integrity of the associated bulkhead. If the line were to
part, then there would be direct communication between the isolated compartments.

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8.3
Mud Pump Room starboard bulkhead.
Watertight Integrity and Compartments Recommendations:

Repair the corroded sections of pipe work penetrating through all the
8.3.1.1 Major watertight bulkheads, so as to maintain the watertight integrity of each
compartment.
Repair the door open indication of the watertight door at Auxiliary
8.3.1.2 Minor
Machinery Starboard Aft.
8.3.1.3 Minor
Repair the door open indication of the watertight door for the exit from
8.3.1.4 Minor
the accommodation to the main deck starboard.
8.3.1.5 Minor
8.4 Mooring System
A visual inspection of the mooring winches indicated that they were in need of maintenance. There
was serious degradation of the fastenings of the gearbox covers between the motor and gearbox,
and also the main and pinion gearbox cover. The fastenings for the level wind chain drive idler gear
were also heavily corroded.
Of the four winches installed, the starboard aft winch was noted to be in a satisfactory condition. This
winch had been repaired in recent times and presented as such.

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8.4
Starboard aft anchor winch.
8.4
Typical condition of the motor to
the reduction gearbox cover
fastenings.

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8.4
Port forward anchor winch.
8.4
Port forward anchor winch outer
gear case cover. Level wind drive
output shaft from the gearbox
starboard forward gearbox.
Mooring System Recommendation:

Complete the necessary maintenance on the anchor winches, to
8.4.1.1 Minor
address the corrosion issues with the fastenings.
8.5 Registration and Classification General Requirements
A review of the appropriate certification held on board was completed. Whilst copies of the relevant
class and regulatory bodies were present, a number of the certificates were identified as having
expired, or they would expire prior to the commencement of the proposed contract between
Company Xand the ENSCO 107 Jack-up drilling rig. These were proposed to be renewed prior to
commencement. However, at the time of the review, this could not be positively confirmed.

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Registration and Classification General Requirements Recommendations:
Provide the in date Certificate of Class. The extension certificate viewed
8.5.1.1 Minor
had expired in April 2016.
Provide the in date Certificate of International Load Line. The certificate
8.5.1.2 Minor
Provide the in date IMO MODU Code Safety Certificate. The certificate
8.5.1.3 Minor
Provide the in date I.S.P.P. (International Sewage Pollution Prevention)
8.5.1.4 Minor
Certificate. The certificate viewed had expired in April 2016.
8.5.2 Review of Other Documentation
A review of the additional documentation indicated that there were some minor non-compliances
regarding certification expiry. It was reported that these would be completed prior to the
commencement of the contract, as they were required by Class (ABS) and therefore Insurance.
These were also part of the acceptance of the Safety Case submittal.
Review of Other Documentation Recommendations:

Have a third party complete an annual inspection of the CO2
8.5.2.1.1 Minor extinguishing systems. The previous inspection was completed in
February 2015.
Provide the annual inspection report and certificate for review of the
8.5.2.1.2 Minor
lifeboat davits. The previous inspection had expired in April 2016.
Provide the class survey report for review once completed. The previous
8.5.2.1.3 Minor
survey had indicated its expiry in April 2016.
8.6 Communication Equipment
The Radio Room was located within the Jacking Control Room, which was outside any hazardous
area. The systems required by Class had been installed and maintained. As the rig was quayside,
and had minimal operating crew on board, there was no designated Radio Operator. The equipment
was switched on and it was in an operational condition.

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8.6
Radio Room
The black Motorola GP328 marine band handheld two-way radios were in good condition, and these
were suitably rated for operation in a hazardous area. The yellow ICOM GMDSS VHF marine
transceiver IC-GM1600E was not rated for use in a hazardous area. The orange JOTRON TR20
GMDSS VHF marine transceiver was also not rated for use in a hazardous area.
8.6
Motorola GP328 Marine radio.

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8.6
JOTRON TR20 Marine radio.
8.6
IC-GM1600E Marine radio.
8.7 General Operations
There were two loading stations on the rig. They were located on the port and starboard sides of the
rig. The port side loading station was the primary loading station, and the starboard loading station
had not been used in some time, with its condition indicating the lack of use and maintenance.
The port loading station was in need of fabric maintenance to address the heavy scale issues, and it
also required the replacement of the test valve for the potable water take on. The starboard loading
station would require significant repairs to return it to service, as there was significant scale,
particularly on the end fittings and valves.
A number of the loading hoses were not connected on the port loading station, and these would
need to be confirmed prior to entering into operations. There were no hoses installed at the
starboard loading station.

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8.7
Port loading station.
8.7
Port loading station.

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8.7
Starboard loading station.
8.7
Starboard loading station.
General Operations Recommendations:

Complete the maintenance necessary to return the starboard loading
8.7.1.1 Major
station back into a serviceable condition.
Ensure that all the relevant loading hoses are installed and the details
8.7.1.2 Minor
captured in the Hose Register prior to operations.
Conduct fabric maintenance for the port loading station to remove any
8.7.1.3 Minor
scale.

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8.8 Jacking System
The jacking system installed on the ENSCO107 was of OTD manufacture with 12 pinions per leg.
The overall condition of the system was difficult to ascertain, as it was not possible to conduct a
suitable jacking trial. The intention would not be to jack the rig to the top of the legs, but it would be
worthwhile to perform a trial that would to some extent prove some level of reliability of the system.
The appearance of the equipment was unsatisfactory and not reflective of effective maintenance
having been conducted.
The system itself had heavy scaling on many of the components that made up the jacking and
fixation system. The hydraulic hoses, pipe work and valves were in an unsatisfactory condition. The
isolation valves were seized in the open position, and some had missing valve handles preventing
isolation in an emergency.
There were a number of corrective maintenance items still remaining open relating to the jacking
system and also the fixation system. These were leaking gearboxes, damaged locking cylinders and
leaking seals and also a jammed or seized jack screw.
The jacking system was proposed to be completely inspected by KFels. Given the reviewed
condition of the jacking system, it would be prudent to have a representative monitor the work scope
and review the findings, and provide comments during the inspection and repair process.
Corrosion was also an issue on the leg jetting system, and the leg jetting drain valves were all noted
to be in an unsatisfactory state of repair, and appeared no longer functional. The valves would either
need to be replaced or repaired to return the system integrity. The leg jetting system was considered
part of the high pressure mud system.
8.8
JC-1 Jacking motors and
gearboxes.

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8.8
Typical corrosion of the jacking
and fixation system.
8.8
Typical deterioration of the
hydraulic hoses.

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8.8
Fixation chock lock pin.
8.8
Lock pin mounting bracket.

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8.8
Hydraulic isolation valves - one
missing handle.
8.8
Crosshead assembly positioning
cylinder.

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8.8
Leg jetting on forward leg.
8.8
Forward leg jetting drain valve.

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The cantilever skidding system was visually inspected. Due to the location of the rig and limited
personnel on board the system was not functioned. The two cylinders on the starboard side were
indicating signs of outer seal failure, but the two cylinders on the port side presented in better
condition.
The control panel itself was in a satisfactory condition. The general condition of the cylinder hoses
was that the end fittings had surface scale, which may have compromised the integrity of the hoses.
The hoses in the drag chain had suffered from abrasions, and hence they should be inspected and
certified for continued use. The main isolation valves behind the control console for the supply of
hydraulic fluid to the cylinders were seized in the open position.
8.8
Aging hose end fitting.
8.8
Aging hose end fitting.

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8.8
The starboard aft skidding cylinder
showing piston seal leakage.
8.8
Cantilever skidding control
console.

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8.8
Port aft cantilever skidding
cylinder.
8.8
Hydraulic shut off valves for the
cantilever skidding system.
Jacking System Recommendations:

Address the extensive corrosion evident on all the jacking and fixation
8.8.1.1 Major
system components.
Replace the deteriorated hydraulic hoses on the jacking and fixation
8.8.1.2 Major systems. The hoses viewed had serious corrosion of the end fittings,
and also cracks in the outer sheath revealing the integral wire braid.
Replace the deteriorating hydraulic hoses on the cantilever skidding
8.8.1.3 Major system. Some had corroded end fittings, and the hoses in the drag
chain were worn exposing the integral braid.

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Overhaul the hydraulic isolation valves for the jacking and fixation
8.8.1.4 Major system, as these were seized when reviewed. Replace any missing
handles.
Overhaul the hydraulic supply isolation valves for the cantilever skidding
8.8.1.5 Major
system, as these were seized when reviewed
8.8.1.6 Major Repair or replace the broken high pressure leg jetting drain valves.

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9.0 POWER PLANT
9.1 Diesel Engines
9.1.1 General
The general condition of the five Caterpillar 3516 diesel engines was satisfactory. The engines were
fitted with automatic shutdowns, as prescribed by regulations. This included the air combustion
shutoff valves (Rig Saver). They were routinely tested as part of the maintenance system, and also
verified periodically during the Class (ABS) certification inspections by the attending Classification
Surveyor.
The starting method for all the engines was via air starters, and the air supply for this was from the
rig air system.
The phase back arrangement for the rig when shedding load was that all three mud pumps would be
ramped down, and then the Top Drive RPM. However, this could not be confirmed.
The engine crank case explosion reliefs were so arranged that they would not pose a risk to
personnel who might be adjacent. They were low down on the engines at knee height and directed
back toward the engines.
The cooling water system for the engines was via three elevated radiators on the main deck port
side. The cooling system was a combined system for all five of the engines. Therefore, there was
some risk that cross contamination could occur. There was some evidence of previous water
leakage from the cooling water system, although when inspected, there were no apparent leaks at
the time.
There was some evidence of minor exhaust blow by. This was identified as a carbon build up on the
exhaust lagging. This was minor and only worth monitoring. The mechanics were aware and they
were monitoring this for any significant change. The exhaust lagging was in good condition, with all
the hot surfaces being adequately covered.
The lube oil sample for each of the engines was taken on a regular basis and sent for analysis. The
historical details were provided for review, and these indicated that the oil was in the normal range.
It was planned for three of the engines to undergo a top end rebuild based on hours, prior to
commencement of the rig departing from Singapore to commence operations for Chevron.
9.1.3 Caterpillar Engines
The engine pressures and temperatures for the engines running during the course of the inspection
period (15 days) were periodically reviewed. There were abnormities when viewed.
For the engine and turbo running hours see the Machinery running hours – See Appendix 01

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9.1.7 Fuel and Lubrication Oil Centrifuges
There were two Alfa Laval MMB 305S 11 model fuel oil purification units. Only one of the units was
operating as the other unit was waiting on a solenoid repair. The operating unit (No. 1) was noted to
be operating correctly, and there was a shut down and alarm in the event the unit lost the water seal.
This would also raise an alarm in the Engine Control Room on the alarm panel. The second unit had
not been operable for some months. It was indicated that the replacement solenoid had been
requisitioned in September 2015.
9.1.7
Fuel oil purifier No.1
9.1.7
Fuel oil purifier No.2
Fuel and Lubrication Oil Centrifuges Recommendation:

Replace the pilot solenoid for the three way valve for the fuel oil purifier
9.1.7.1.1 Major
No.2.

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9.2 Emergency Generator Set
Function testing of the engine was not possible at the time of the inspection, as the radiator fan had
been removed. Ensco was awaiting replacement bearings for the fan pedestal.
Blackout and dual starting systems testing are to be conducted once the generator engine is
operational.
9.2
Emergency Generator
9.2
The emergency generator cooling
fan bearing block removed
Emergency Generator Set Recommendation:

Verify the belt tightness for the radiator fan. A check could not be
9.2.1.1 Minor
performed during the inspection as the fan was disassembled for repair.

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9.2.1 Emergency Power Supply
A visual inspection of the emergency generator was performed. Overall the engine was in a good
condition, however, it was not possible to perform any function test. The radiator fan had been
removed in preparation for a new bearing for the support pedestal. The testing of the generator
should be completed during the integration acceptance tests.
9.2.2 Electricity Provided for at least 18 hrs
The emergency generator switchboard was seen to be in a good condition, with all the services well
labelled and readily identifiable. All expected emergency services were seen to be available from the
switchboard, with rubber insulation matting installed in front of the switchboard as required. The
dedicated diesel fuel tank had sufficient capacity to run the generator engine, and supply sufficient
electrical power for a minimum of 18 hours as required.

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Approved and certified by:
Unit Classification: ABS, A-1, Self-Elevating MODU

IMO Certification: American Bureau of Shipping (IMO MODU 1989)
9.2.3 Electricity to be Provided for at least 0.5 hrs
The emergency generator was not available for function testing at this stage of the survey.
The installation had sufficient battery backup and UPS systems for the critical safety systems, which
were required by class to remain operational for the 30 minute period.
See also Section 10.14 for other battery and UPS system requirements.
9.3 Air Compressors / Air System
The rig was equipped with three Quincy QSI-500 rotary screw type compressors. Compressor No.1
was an air-cooled unit with power supply from the emergency switchboard. Compressors No.2 and
No.3 were water cooled, this being supplied from the sea water circulating and cooling system. The
bulk air compressor was a Quincy QSLP-100 and it was also a sea water cooled unit. Further details
of this system are contained in Section 6.11 of this report.
Overall the compressors were in a serviceable condition, however, compressor No.2 had cautionary
levels of Sodium (Na) identified in the previous oil sample records. Compressor No.3 had previous
cautionary levels of Sodium (Na). However, the most recent oil sample indicated a normal oil
condition.
There was only the one air dryer installed on the rig, and this was part of the bulk air system. Details
of this are contained in Section 6.11 of this report. There was no air dryer installed for the rig air
system. However, there were water separators installed prior to the air oil lubricators for each piece
of equipment that was dependant on the rig air system. Generally rigs working in areas of high
humidity, such as those operating in the NWS (North West Shelf) would have an air drying system in
addition to the individual water separators. This may be either a desiccant-based or a refrigerant-
based system.
There was some leakage noted from the sea water supply pipework to compressors No.2 and No.3.
Details are provided in Section 9.5.1 Piping Systems of this report.
Air Compressors / Air System Recommendations:

Repair the leaking cooling water supply to the rig air compressors. The
9.3.1.1 Minor leaking pipework was located on the bulkhead behind compressors No.
1 and 2.
Consider the installation of an air dryer that is suitably rated to the
9.3.1.2 Minor
system capacity for the rig air system.

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9.3.1 Air Receivers
There were a total of five air receivers used for providing volume to the rig air system in various
locations around the rig. These were all in a visually good condition. Previous inspection for wall
thickness testing had been performed. The most recent inspection was completed by OES in March
of 2105.
Each of the air receivers was furnished with a relief valve. These were arranged such that the
discharge would not pose a direct risk to personnel in the vicinity, should the relief valve lift and
release. Each vessel was fitted with its original data plate, and these indicated that the vessels were
at least ten years old. The reviewed inspection regime would satisfy the requirements of an ASNZS
3788: 2006 Pressure Equipment – In-service Inspection.
9.4 Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning
The freezer and chiller units were not inspected during this survey period.
9.4.1 Air-Conditioning Systems
The Heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) evaporation units throughout the
accommodations were six Viking Airtech units:
Model: VLP-4.8-DX
Power: 460V/3Ph/60Hz
Refrigerant: R134A
Capacity: 117 ton
The HVAC condenser units installed on the accommodations rooftops were six Carrier type:
Model: 38AKS034-F601
Refrigerant: R134A
These six Viking / Carrier systems were newly installed in 2014, and they were all in ‘as new’
condition. They were all fitted with filter material across the front evaporator cores, to protect the new
cores from getting clogged and plugged. This filter material was being changed out on a routine basis
as per the maintenance systems PM schedules.
Each individual HVAC unit was fitted with a Germitrol UV air sterilisation system to control any
introduced bacteria. There were both toxic and combustible gas detection systems installed on each
of the accommodations fresh air intakes. The accommodation HVAC systems were observed to shut
down upon an active command from the fire panel. The fire damper controls were seen to be
activating as expected.

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9.4.1
Accommodations HVAC unit on
Level 4
It was noted that some of these HVAC rooms throughout the accommodation were being utilised as
junk storage areas. The build-up of rubbish and junk should be checked to see that it is not
overcoming in these areas, as they become a fire hazard and extra fuel for potential fires.
9.4.1
The accommodation’s HVAC
rooms used as storage areas
The HVAC systems for the Level 4 port side accommodation, office areas and the HVAC system for
the galley were not operational. Ensco advised a Refrigeration Mechanic had been contacted to
assess these systems. The systems were running, but there were no cooling effects.
The indoor evaporator unit on the Level 3 starboard side accommodations had a blocked drain, with
water pooling and over flowing from the unit and running onto the floor and surrounding area.
There were two independent air conditioning systems for the Local Equipment Room (LER), which
were also newly installed in 2014. They were manufactured by the Carrier Corporation.

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Model: 50TC-D14A2F6A0A0A0
Refrigerant: R410A
Capacity: 40.9Kw
9.4.1
LER air conditioning system on the
LER rooftop
These systems had a manufacture date of February 2014 and they were in good condition, with no
anomalies to note on the actual units. The drains on the LER roof top condenser units were both
broken and not connected, with water pooling on the roof top.
9.4.1
The LER roof top A/C drains were
not connected
The freezer and chiller units were not checked during this survey round.

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Air-Conditioning Systems Recommendations:
Repair the air conditioner drains on the LER roof top air conditioner
9.4.1.1.1 Minor
units. Both A/C drains were broken with pooling on the LER roof top.
Repair the HVAC system for the Level 4 port side accommodation and
9.4.1.1.2 Minor
office areas.
Repair the water leaks to the indoor evaporator unit on the Level 3
9.4.1.1.3 Minor Starboard side accommodation, as it had a blocked drain, with water
pooling in the unit and running onto the floor around the unit.
Clean out the HVAC rooms on each floor as these were becoming junk
9.4.1.1.4 Minor
storage areas and creating fire hazards.
9.5 Seawater Service Pumps and Systems
The rig’s seawater service was supplied via the deep well submersible pumps, once the rig was
elevated. These were located at each of the jacking legs. These pumps were not individually tested.
There was a corrective action item for replacing the deep well pump No.2, as this appeared to have
a flooded motor.
An inspection throughout the seawater system pipe work was completed. A considerable amount of
work was required to be completed to repair a significant amount of leaking pipework, the worst of
which appeared to be in the Mud Pit Room. It was indicated to the attending surveyors that much of
this had been identified and it was to be completed during the shipyard period, prior to commencing
the Company Xoperations. There were several areas which may not have been included within this
original scope. A full assessment is required to be conducted in all the areas.
Seawater Service Pumps and Systems Recommendation:

Ensure that all the raw water pumps are available before the start of the
9.5.1.1 Major
Company Xcontract.
9.5.1 Piping Systems
The general condition of a lot of the pipe work on the rig was unsatisfactory and in need of
replacement. There were numerous leaks across all the fluid and air systems. An initial assessment
had been conducted by the ENSCO personnel, and this had identified a significant scope for pipe
replacement, although a full detailed assessment is required.
Piping Systems Recommendations:

Make the necessary repairs to the seawater system piping in the Mud
9.5.1.1.1 Major Pit Room for filling the mud pits. There was a significant number of
leaking pipe within this space.
Repair the bandaged and leaking seawater line in the Mud Pump Room
9.5.1.1.2 Major
starboard side.
Repair the leaking seawater line in the heavy tool store above the aft
9.5.1.1.3 Major
access door.

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Repair the leaking seawater line in the Auxiliary Machinery Room
9.5.1.1.4 Major
Starboard forward above the sewage treatment unit.
9.5.1.1.5 Major Replace the leaking seawater line supplying the sanitary water pumps.
Complete the necessary repair to the drill water supply pipe work rig
9.5.1.1.6 Major wide, as there were a significant number of leaking sections of pipe
work.
9.6 Crane and Power System
Port Forward Crane

Make: Favelle Favco
Model: 7.5/10K
Serial No.: Crane 1198, Pedestal – 1227
Date of manufacture: August 2004
Port Aft Crane

Make: Favelle Favco
Model: 7.5/10K
Serial No.: Crane 1197, Pedestal – 1197
Starboard Crane
Make: Favelle Favco
Model: 7.5/10K
Serial No.: Crane 1227, Pedestal - 1198
The three cranes were inspected and functioned through their range of motions. With the exception
of the main hoist on the Port Aft crane, there were no identified deficiencies relating to the operation
of the units. The issue with the Port Aft crane was there was some evidence of the main hoist brake
band hydraulics chattering or pulsing when releasing. Further investigation of the cause was
required. The brake did still appear to be engaging fully on the braking surface of the main hoist
drum.
Also noted was that a number of the brake bands appeared to have oil or grease contamination of
the friction material. This was not on the full circumference, however, should it continue there would
be significant loss in braking effectiveness. These should be inspected more closely and it should be
determined if they need to be replaced or cleaned.
The cranes were all found to have all of the relevant inspection documentation, to certify them for
continued use. The annual and five-yearly inspections and load test had been performed in October
2015. The inspection was completed by an ABS surveyor, and copies of the certificates were
provided for review. The lattice booms on all three cranes had previously been identified as
unsatisfactory, and they were replaced with new booms prior to the inspection. However, the crane
cabins, A frames and engine compartments were displaying signs of some much needed corrosion
management.

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The crane ratings were as follows:
Main Hoist at minimum radius (10 metres) 45.4 tons
Main Hoist at maximum radius (36 metres) 11 tons
Auxiliary Hoist all radius 10 tons
It was also identified that there were numerous hydraulic oil leaks across all three cranes, and many
of these were directly related to the unsatisfactory condition of the hydraulic hoses. There were
indications on many of the hoses of pin hole leaks and fluid migration, hose abrasion, leaking oil
between the hose end fitting and hose, which significantly increased the risk of hose failure and/ or
fluid injection injuries.
Each crane was furnished with a Robway Crane Load Instrumentation RCI-4000IS load indication
system. The power from these was supplied directly from the crane power system generated from
the engine, and not from the rig supplied power. Each unit displayed all the details correctly and
could be verified using the mechanical indication systems. The limit switches for the boom luff and
the main and auxiliary upper and lower limits were tested, and they functioned correctly.
The starboard crane electrical system, (air conditioning unit, UHF radio, PAGA, lighting and camera
system) were not functioning at the time of the inspection. This was due to the slip ring assembly
having been removed and utilised on the port crane. The slip ring assembly from the port crane had
failed catastrophically. The power for the crane system was not affected by the loss of the slip ring
assembly.
9.6
Slip ring assembly removed from
the port crane
There was no aircraft warning beacon installed on the starboard crane boom tip. LRDIS was advised
that a new unit had been ordered in October 2015, and they were awaiting its arrival for installation.
The overhead windows installed in each of the crane cabins were not fitted with a grating or other
protection, as required in API Spec 2C: 2002.Specification for Offshore Pedestal Mounted Cranes.
These are there to prevent debris from falling onto the operator.

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The emergency hand pumps required for emergency load lowering were not stowed in their
respective stowage outside of the crane cabins, adjacent to the hydraulic control valves. The
emergency lowering instructions for the port aft and starboard cranes were not installed. These were
originally installed externally on the rear cabin bulkhead, adjacent to the cabin entry door.
The final section of ladder access to the port aft crane and starboard crane was noted to be
overhanging the vertical section. It is generally accepted that a ladder at no point shall overhang the
person climbing the ladder. This is in reference to AS 1657: 2013 Fixed platforms, walkways,
stairways and ladders - Design, construction and installation, API RP 54: 1999 Reaffirmed March
2007 Section 9.3 Ladders, Stairways and Platforms
The port forward crane re-fuelling hose was noted to be perished at the shut-off valve on the crane
pedestal platform. If the hose were to part or develop a leak, there would be a resultant fuel spill on
the main deck below. This poses both a risk to personnel in the vicinity, and also the potential for an
environmental incident depending on the severity of the spill (See Figure 9.6).
9.6
Perished re-fuelling hose on the
port forward crane pedestal.
The radiator for the port aft crane was noted to have indications of leakage. The water level in the
radiator for the port aft crane was lower than the baffle plate of the top tank. The level was not low
enough to initiate a low level alarm.
The access to the port aft and starboard cranes was assessed. The only means of escape from
these cranes was via the single access ladders, therefore, there was no secondary escape means
from these cranes. Consider installing stairs as a primary access and exit method, with the ladders
as a secondary escape.

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The overhead beam cranes under the cantilever were in the process of being replaced. The units
installed at the time of the inspection were the old 75 ton MOS cranes. These were to be replaced
with new cranes of the same make and model. As these were reported to be replaced, they were not
inspected. However, there were previous inspection records completed by OES on their earlier
attendances at the rig.
Just prior to the surveyors’ departure, it was noted that the new/ refurbished replacement units had
arrived and were landed on the main deck. To prolong the life of the units, it would be advisable to
preserve the exposed and fastenings, pins, lock nuts and washers, etc. with a softseal type product
which should be periodically applied.
9.6
New 75 ton MOS crane
A visual inspection of the Forum Oilfield 7500lbs crane was conducted, and numerous hydraulic
leaks were witnessed on the unit. These were coming from leaking fittings and hydraulic hoses. The
hydraulic hoses needed to be replaced, as many were leaking from the end fittings around the base
of the hose. These would indicate that there was oil migration, and therefore more than likely a
separation of the integral layers of the hose assembly, which would have weakened the hose. The
slewing and pivot/ knuckle drive motor gearbox assemblies were also in need of fabric maintenance,
to address the corrosion evident.

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9.6
Forum Oilfield 7500lbs jib crane
Crane and Power System Recommendations:

Inspect and clean or replace the brake band on the port forward crane
9.6.1.1 Critical
Inspect and clean or replace the brake band on the port aft crane boom
9.6.1.2 Critical
hoist, as this was indicating oil contamination.
Inspect and clean or replace the brake band on the starboard crane
9.6.1.3 Critical
Install a grating or other protection to the crane overhead windows to
9.6.1.4 Critical prevent debris from falling onto the operator.
Refer to: API Spec 2C: 2004 Section 12.2. Windows
9.6.1.5 Critical Install a cover over the emergency stop buttons on each of the cranes.
Repair the various hydraulic system oil leaks on the port forward crane
9.6.1.6 Major
hydraulic systems.
Repair the various hydraulic system oil leaks on the port aft crane
9.6.1.7 Major
hydraulic systems.
Repair the various hydraulic system oil leaks on the starboard crane
9.6.1.8 Major
hydraulic systems.
Replace the damaged and leaking hoses and fittings on the Forum
9.6.1.9 Major
Oilfield 7500lbs jib crane on the cantilever.
Rectify the fault on the port aft crane main hoist brake, as the hydraulics
9.6.1.10 Major
were chattering or pulsing when releasing.

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Replace to their original stowage positions the emergency hand pumps
9.6.1.11 Major required for emergency load lowering, outside of the crane cabins
adjacent to the hydraulic control valves.
Replace the emergency lowering instructions for the port aft and
9.6.1.12 Major starboard cranes externally on the rear cabin bulkhead, adjacent to the
cabin entry door.
Replace the perished refuelling hose for the port forward crane. If the
9.6.1.13 Major hose were to part or leak, fuel would be spilt onto the main deck below,
causing a hazard to personnel and/ or the environment.
9.6.1.14 Minor Repair the radiator leak on the port aft crane.
Address the corrosion issues on the Forum Oilfield jib crane slewing
9.6.1.15 Minor
motor and the pivot arm.
Install an aircraft warning lamp and confirm that all boom lights are
9.6.1.16 Minor working on the starboard crane, on completing the installation of the
new slip ring assembly.
9.6.1.17 Minor Repair the port forward crane A-Frame obstruction light.
9.7 Watermaker
The rig was furnished with two water purification units. There was a reverse osmosis unit installed in
the Engine Room, manufactured by the Specific Equipment Company, and an evaporative plate type
water maker manufactured by Alfa Laval. Neither of the water makers could be operated as the rig
was quayside.
The reverse osmosis unit was not in a condition to be operated. One of the multimedia filters had
been bypassed due to a damaged internal diffuser, and the replacement item was of the incorrect
size. The membranes were reported to have been installed in the unit approximately two years ago.
When a reverse osmosis unit is shut down for an extended period, they need to be preserved prior to
shutting down to protect the membranes. This was not completed, and as such all four of the
membrane cartridges will need to be replaced, prior to starting the unit again. There were numerous
indications that the high pressure stainless steel delivery pipe work had been leaking previously.
Reverse osmosis units should never be used when there is the likelihood of oil-contaminated water.
The RO (Reverse Osmosis) membranes can be permanently fouled by petroleum products that may
pass through the pre-treatment system. In water with high silt content as the filters and RO
membranes can be plugged by colloidal solids carried to the sea by large rivers and along
coastlines, especially after a storm.
Where there is water containing chlorine and bromine, or other oxidizing chemicals, they will damage
the membranes. Bio-fouling by microorganisms, such as algae, bacteria and fungi have the ability to
reproduce and form a biofilm on the membrane surfaces. And where there are high concentrations of
organics, these are usually humic substances, which are absorbed onto the membrane surface,
causing the irreversible loss of water flow through the membrane. All of these conditions are present
within the Singapore harbour.

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The Alfa Laval unit had not been operated for some time - potentially 2 years. The unit relied on
waste heat from the engine cooling system, to generate the heat required to flash off the seawater
entering in the unit. When the unit was in the cooler region of New Zealand, the water temperature
was too low, and insufficient heat was generated for the unit to function correctly. These units are
frequently supplied with booster heaters, to maintain the correct operating temperature, even for use
in more tropical regions with higher ambient seawater temperatures.
It was reported that the plate stacks for the evaporator and the condenser sections had been
replaced in the past 12 months. However, the unit had not been operated since changing the plates.
The area around the water maker indicated that there were or at least had been a number of
seawater system leaks. As the unit could not be operated, the verification of the extent of leakage
was not completed.
The condition of the combined air/ brine ejector was also not verified, as this required flushing
seawater into the system to draw a vacuum on the vessel. This function test of the unit would need
to be completed early in the tow passage, upon departure from Singapore.
Watermaker Recommendations:
Replace the modified and leaking high pressure pipework on the
9.7.1.1 Major reverse osmosis water maker from the high pressure pump to the
membrane housings.
Reinstall the missing diffuser for the multimedia filter on the reverse
9.7.1.2 Major
osmosis water maker unit.
Replace the membranes for the reverse osmosis water maker, as the
9.7.1.3 Major unit has not been preserved prior to the long term shutdown. This will
have resulted in the permanent contamination of the membranes.
Consider the installation of a booster heater to maintain the heat in the
9.7.1.4 Minor evaporator section of the waste heat water maker. This is to achieve
satisfactory evaporation rates.
9.8 Potable Water System
The potable water system consisted of two centrifugal pumps, hydrophore, two water heaters, UV
steriliser and associated pipe work, to deliver potable water to the various areas of the rig. There
were numerous leaks coming from the system, in particular near the UV steriliser, potable water
pumps and heaters.
The hot water coming from the showers and basin taps in the accommodation was unpredictable,
and generally the water temperature ranged from Hot to Scolding. This could have been an issue
with the mixing units and internal leakage.

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Potable Water System Recommendations:
Conduct repairs to the potable water pipe work to eliminate leakage
9.8.1.1 Major from the system. There were numerous leaks on the system requiring
attention.
Conduct the necessary repairs to the shower and basin mixing units, to
9.8.1.2 Major
provide suitable water temperature control to prevent scolding.

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10.0 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
10.2 Main Generators
Make Caterpillar
Model SR4B
Serial numbers 1-5 9XZ00734, 9XZ00618, 9XZ00617, 9XZ00616, 9XZ00614
Arrangement number 253-2039
Voltage 600
KVA 1835
KW 1285
There were five main generators on board. They were all caterpillar SR4B units installed in the
Generator Room on the lower deck. The main generator No.5 was observed running for the duration
of this survey. LRDIS had requested to have an internal inspection of the generators to check the
main and exciter winding condition for swelling, creepage, grime build up, connections, heater
operating or any other anomalies of the stator and armature.
LRDIS usually conduct a detailed inspection of the rotating diode assemblies, as these have a
tendency to show early signs of deterioration and loose components, which lead to catastrophic
failures of the exciter assembly. This was not possible due to the shortage of personnel on board at
the time of the survey. The generator intake screens had filter material installed to the external air
intakes to the generators. They were showing signs of minimising soot and oils into the enclosures.
The generator engine controls were Woodward EGCP2 type controllers. None of the engine
shutdowns or generator safety was tested at this stage of the acceptances, as there were insufficient
loads available to conduct any load sharing or power limit testing. It was expected these tests would
be scheduled prior to conducting the Integration Acceptance Tests at a later date, when the systems
and loads were available, and there were sufficient crew numbers present to monitor the operations
safely.
10.3 Main Transformer
The two main 600/480VAC, transformers were manufactured by Offshore marine and Power
Automation, which were installed in the Generator Room. Both units were 2000KVA air-cooled, dry
type, fully enclosed units. They had individual temperature controls installed on each unit, with an
alarm going back to the monitoring panel. The units were not opened or internally inspected.
The transformers were not megger tested during the survey, as there was no electrician on board
during the days, and only a limited work scope was available for the night shift, as they were working
alone. LRDIS requested and received a list of the last megger readings of all the equipment on
board. It was noted there were no transformers records to indicate that they had been tested. There
were no regular routine megger tests being conducted on any of the installation’s transformers.

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10.3
Two 600/480VAC, 2000KVA
transformers
There were three of the small power and lighting transforms installed in the Emergency Generator
Room. These included the 480/208VAC - 300KVA, 480/230VAC - 30KVA, 480/120VAC - 20KVA
transformers. These transformers were not opened up for an internal inspection or any insulation
resistance checks done. The records were also unavailable for review. The systems presented well
with no indication for concerns.
10.3
480/208 and 480/230 VAC
transformers in the Emergency
Generator Room.

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10.4 Converters (SCR and Variable-Frequency Drives)
There were four SCR bays installed in the SCR Room above the electrical and mechanics workshops
on the lower deck. Those four SCR bays supplied the DC power for the three mud pumps
in the Pump Room, with the assignments being preselected from the driller’s Flex Workstation touch
screens in the driller’s cabin. A review of the assignment selections showed there was full redundancy
available across all the mud pumps. Also there was the option to run each mud pump on at
least two SCR bays, thus providing full pump availability, with one SCR bay being offline or out of
action. An internal visual inspection showed all live components and busbar were well covered and
protected from touch.
10.4
The SCR and VFD available
assignments
The system had four Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) units installed in the Local Equipment Room
(LER), which was located above the drill floor on the port side and it presented in a very tidy and
clean condition. The system supplied the AC variable frequency power to the three AC drilling drive
motors on the drawworks (DW) and to the one pancake AC drive motor installed on the top drive.
The assignments were preselected from the driller’s Flex Workstation touch screens in the driller’s
cabin.
It was noted there was no redundancy for the DW motors 1 or 3. Meaning if VFD-1 failed, then DW-1
AC drive motor would not be available for use, and if VFD-4 failed then DW3 Ac drive motor would
also not be available for use. There was no history available for the major failures or equipment down
time from the VFD systems.
10.4
VFD and SCR drive assignment
screen at the driller’s Flex
Workstation.

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Mostly the live equipment and components throughout the VFD bays were well guarded with
protective covers in place, although the main busbars connected to the AC drive motor contactors
were seen to be open to the touch, and not sufficiently covered. These live components were inside
the VFD cabinet, but the doors were not locked or did not require the use of a special tool or key for
entry. Even though this area was a restricted area, with only authorised personnel allowed access, it
was not kept locked. LRDIS recommended that protective guards should be installed, or these
cabinets should be locked by means of a special tool or key.
10.4
Showing the live unprotected bus
bar inside the VFD panels
Converters (SCR and Variable-Frequency Drives) Recommendations:

Install protective guards or keep these cabinets locked with a special
tool or key. The VFD panel main contactors and cables to the AC
10.4.1.1 Major
motors were seen to be unprotected inside the VFD cabinets. These
cabinets did not require the use of a key or special tool to gain entry.
Conduct a thermographic inspection of the rig’s 600VAC main bus bar,
10.4.1.2 Minor 480VAC Motor Control Centre (MCC), SCR bays and AC VFD drives.
This could be conducted with loaded systems during the IAT.
10.5 Main Switchboard
The main switchboard was an M&I 600VAC, 6300Amp, 60Hz rig specific built installation. There
were five generator bays with full synchronising capabilities to have all units online at once, if
required. The system had an auto synch system for synchronising the generators with the main
buss, prior to putting them online.
There were four SCR bays for supplying the DC rectified power to the three mud pumps, which was
via the preselected assignments from the driller’s controls pending load requirements and system
configurations. The system also supplied individual 600 VAC supply feeds to the four VFD AC drive
units, which were installed in the LER above the drill floor. This was the main 600VAC supply for the
AC drawworks motors and top drive. Again this was assigned by the driller from the driller’s
workstation controls pending load requirements and system configurations.

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10.5
The Main Switchboard
identification plate and
assignments
Customer: ENSCO
Equipment: 600V SWITCHGEAR
Model: DC-04-600
Customer P.O.: 186913K
Project no.: S-783-A04
Creation Date: 4 June 2003
Circuit Breakers from the main 600v Bus:

Main Generator
Make: MAGNUM DS
Model: Gen1 – 5 C-H/MDS8323WEA-2552ANAA4NMNNAX
Maximum Amps 3200AF
Sensor Plugs
600/480VAC transformers A & B 2500A
Make MAGNUM DS
Model XFMR A&B C-H/MDS8203WEA-2052NMNA2NMNNAX
Maximum Amps 2000AF
Sensor Plugs 2000A
VFD Drives 1 - 4
Make MAGNUM DS
Model VFD 1 - 4 C-H/MDS8163WEA-1652NMNA2NMNNAX
Maximum Amps 1600AF
Sensor Plugs 1600A
SCR Drives 1 - 4
Make MAGNUM DS
Model SCR 1 - 4 C-H/MDS8163WEA-1252NMNA2NMNNAX
Maximum Amps 1600AF
Sensor Plugs 1600A

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10.6 Emergency Switchboard
The emergency generator and switchboard were located on the accommodation’s roof top Level 5.
The system was a Controle Mesure Regulation (CMR) designed integrated MCC module, which was
seen to be well presented, clean and tidy with all the services well labelled and readily identifiable.
All the expected safety critical systems and emergency services were seen to be available from the
switchboard. The system had the capabilities to back feed the main 480 VAC busboard in the SCR
Room with the appropriate interlock systems. The emergency generator blackout start was not
tested at the time of the survey due to the emergency generator engine not being operable.
The cooling fan pedestal block was disassembled and awaiting repair. There was rubber insulation
matting installed in front of the switchboard, as required.
10.6
The emergency generator
switchboard 480 VAC
It was noted one day after heavy rains that there was water pooled on the rubber matting in front of
the switchboards. There were also signs of corrosion across the top, and down the front side of the
switchboard, directly below the exhaust fan. It was not possible to determine the exact location from
where the water was entering, although it was expected to have come from either inside or around
the edge of the exhaust fan ducting.

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10.6
Corrosion and signs of water entry
onto the emergency generator
switchboard
Emergency Switchboard Recommendations:

Conduct current injection tests of the main circuit breakers and thermal
10.6.1.1 Critical
overloads throughout the emergency generator switchboard.
Investigate and rectify the location of the water entry around the exhaust
fan area in the Emergency Generator Room above the switchboard, as
10.6.1.2 Major
water was pooling on the matting in front of the switchboard and
corroding the switchboard panel and could cause an electrocution.
Conduct a thermographic inspection of the emergency generator
10.6.1.3 Minor
switchboard.
10.7 DC Motors
An internal inspection was conducted throughout the mud pump DC motors, as it was noticed that all
the DC motors had a build-up of rust and scale inside the motor enclosures. Scale was forming on
the inside of the intake blower duct, and it was then being forced down into the traction motor
enclosures. The metallic rust scale build up within the DC motor enclosure must be removed, before
it causes any issues or damage to the motor internal rotating components, brush gear, stator
windings or commutator.

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10.7
The rust scale build up from inside
the mud pump DC motors
The commutator brushes were seen to be in a good condition with sufficient length, although several
brushes were tight and seized inside the brush holders. This was obviously from the limited use the
motors had had over the last 12 months, as they were left sitting in the holders with a build-up of dust
and scale content. All the brushes were observed to be within their wear limit indicators.
The commutator surfaces were seen to be in a fair condition with minimal grooving, arcing or pitting
to the surface, although the commutator slots had carbon build up and they were overdue for
cleaning. The commutator slots required a thorough clean prior to any flashing over occurring
between the segments.
10.7
The mud pump 3A commutator
and brushes requiring servicing

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LRDIS recommends that all the mud pump DC traction motors should be cleaned out with the brush
gear made free. The commutator slots should be cleaned and the commutator polished. These tasks
would be expected to be conducted at a major service within the Preventative Maintenance (PM)
system work orders. The PM history records for the mud pump DC motors were requested at the
time of the inspection, although these had been received for review during the survey period. LRDIS
also recommended that filter material should be installed over the blower intakes, to minimise any
smaller foreign particles entering the motor enclosures.
DC Motors Recommendations:
Conduct a major service on all the DC traction motors by removing the
rust scale build-up inside the blower intakes and motor enclosures, Free
10.7.1.1 Major
all the brushes in their holders, clean the commutator slots and polish
the commutators.
Install filter material over the mud pump blower intakes, to minimise
10.7.1.2 Minor
foreign particles entering the motor enclosure.
10.7.1 Megger Testing
The megger test reports from June 2015 for the six DC, GE 752 traction motors installed on the mud
pumps were all within the acceptable levels.
The mud pump insulation resistance readings from June 2015 are as follows:
MUD PUMP 1 MOTOR 1 18 MΩ

All the internal motor heaters were observed to be operational, whilst the motors were not being
operated.
10.8 AC Motors
There were three GE drilling drive AC motors installed on the drawworks. These drives were
powered from the VFD units installed within the LER installed above the drill floor. There were four
VFD units for redundancy to operate the three AC motors. The available assignment selections are
shown below. These were the only possible combinations, which were preselected by the driller from
the driller’s workstation.

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Make General Electric Drilling drives
Model GEB22-A2, 5GEB-A2, 5GEB22-A5
Serial nos 1-3 YY05100005, TT03110257, RR12040110
Rating Continuous
Voltage 587
Amps 1120
RPM 800
Shaft Horsepower 1150
10.8
The VFD and SCR assignment
selection available
The electrical equipment megger readings were reviewed. It was noted that the drawworks AC motor
No.1 had a low insulation resistance reading of 1.5MΩ. Although this was not below the minimum
acceptable level of 1 MΩ as per IEEE Standard 45, this was considered to be at a concerning low
level for ongoing operations. The previous work order for the DW No.1 AC motor was requested and
reviewed. According to the work order notes (CRM_3853825 / SHOREW01636577) dated 21-Dec-
2014, the insulation resistance reading of the motor was 0.1MΩ, which was well below the minimum
acceptable level.
Further investigations are required to determine the cause of the low reading. According to the work
order notes, there appeared to be an outstanding issue that was not resolved and it is still ongoing.
LRDIS recommends a thorough investigation and tests should be conducted until the fault is
identified, and the insulation resistance readings are returned to an acceptable level. This system is
within the drill floor Zone 2 hazardous area on an operationally critical piece of equipment.
The jacking system AC motors were seen to be in an unsatisfactory state with high levels of
corrosion and scale over the motors, with all the fan cowls requiring replacement. This is further
explained in the Safety Section.
It was noticed that the motor feet mounting plates for the forward leg jacking system hydraulic unit
were heavily corroded, which was lifting the motor mounts up from the hydraulic unit base plate. The
motor was required to be removed and serviced, with the foundations repaired, preservations
conducted and the motor reinstalled with a new fan cowling. Further inspections on all the jacking
system Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) systems showed that the electrical motor fan cowlings were all
heavily corroded, and they required a full replacement. This has been further recommended in
section 11.5.4 Dangerous Machinery

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10.8
The swelling mounting plates on
the forward leg jacking system
hydraulic pump electric motor
AC Motors Recommendations:
10.8.1.1 Major Ensure that the AC motors are not excessively painted or corroded.
Review the swelling mounting plates on the forward leg jacking system
hydraulic pump electric motor. There was a build-up of corrosion
10.8.1.2 Major
between the electric motor mounting plates and the base plate, which
was lifting the motor off its mounts.
Investigate the cause of the low insulation resistance readings in the
10.8.1.3 Major drawworks No.1 AC drive motor and cables. There have been some
ongoing concerns with the low readings within this circuit.
Install the missing bolts on the mud pump 3A blower terminal box.
10.8.1 Megger Testing
Due to their only being one electrician for a short period of the survey, no megger tests were
conducted.
10.9 Motor Control Centres
The MCC was an M&I 480 VAC system, which was located in the SCR Room in the lower hull. The
MCC panels were split into two sections (A & B) with a tie breaker in the middle, to allow the two
buss sections to be isolated. This allowed the 480VAC buss to be arranged as a split buss or as a
common buss configuration, to allow supply from either transformer across all the services.
The MCC panel power supplies came from two independent 600/480VAC transformers (A & B),
which were located inside the Engine Room and they supplied each MCC buss accordingly. Whilst
the two transformers could supply the MCC as a closed common buss, it was not recommended to
be conducted for lengthy periods other than changing over transformers, as the combined
transformer output supply availability would exceed the MCC short circuit currents. This was
discussed with the Night Electrician.

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The MCC cubicles were seen to be well presented with all the cubicles being easily identifiable and
in a clean state.
10.9
The 480 VAC Motor Control
Centre
10.9
Showing a typical MCC cubicle
There were ground faults being indicated on both the 480VAC A & B main buss sections in the SCR
Room. Both the ground fault indication meters were showing faults around 1MegΩ, with alarms
being activated on the monitoring panels in the Radio Room bridge and the Mechanics Workshop.
LRDIS was advised that attempts had been made to locate these faults, but they were not
successful.

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LRDIS understands that ground faults can be hard to find at times, and recommends strongly that
they be cleared at the soonest possible time, once activated. Numerous ground faults will complicate
the fault finding process and compile the hazards associated. Ground faults in the system can cause
a potentially fatal situation, due to the nature of the electrical system and its relationship to the ship's
hull. Basically there was no ground fault protection on these circuits, and this did not provide the
personnel with any protection against electrocution. These systems are designed to just provide
indications and not isolations. Further investigation must be conducted to find these ground faults,
and they should be addressed as soon as possible.
10.9
The ground fault meter showing a fault situation
on the 480VAC buss
LRDIS was advised that the electrical systems thermographic survey and the 5-yearly current
injection tests had not been conducted, and that they were due. These tests are conducted to ensure
the systems have not deteriorated over the last five years, and that the protective devices continue to
operate as designed. The thermographic survey is intended to identify any loose connections or hot
spots throughout the busbar and switchgear.
Motor Control Centres Recommendations:

Carry out a full current injection test (five-yearly special survey) on all
10.9.1.1 Critical
the main breakers and thermal overloads.
Conduct a thermographic survey of all the busbars and electrical
10.9.1.2 Critical
connections.
Investigate and clear the ground faults on both the 480VAC main buss
10.9.1.3 Major
sections A and B.

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10.10 Lighting System (Main)
The rig lighting was a combination of fluorescent fixtures for general lighting on the decks, derrick
and throughout the hull. Metal halide type fixtures were utilised for the flood lighting of the open deck
areas. All the areas were seen to have sufficient lighting, although an official lighting survey had not
been conducted.
10.10
A typical metal halide flood light
The derrick lights were all Ex rated fluorescent type fixtures throughout. There appeared to be
sufficient lighting throughout the rig, although the monkeyboard level was not visited at night.
Several of the derrick lights around the crown block water table area and the monkeyboard sections
were not working. These were expected to just require replacement tubes. There were a few lights
requiring cleaning within the wind walls of the monkeyboard, as they had been sprayed with a
considerable amount of mud over time.
10.10
The monkeyboard light fixture
requiring cleaning and repair

LTD
All the lighting fixtures were seen to have a form of secondary retention installed. Although Ensco
were in the process of changing out all the fixtures to have the Drop Safe mesh containment system
installed.
10.11 Lighting System (Emergency)
There were a variety of emergency lights that either relied on a remote battery back-up or
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) type system, to maintain the lighting after the emergency
generator was shutdown, or they had integrated batteries within the actual lighting fixture.
The emergency lighting fixtures were not identifiable from the normal lights. IEC 61892-6 section
11.4, Emergency Lighting requires all emergency lighting fixtures to be distinguishable or identifiable
from other normal lighting fixtures.
LRDIS recommends that the emergency lights should be identified with a distinctive mark on them,
which makes them easily identifiable from the regular light fixtures.
10.11
A typical lighting fixture on the
emergency UPS
Lighting System (Emergency) Recommendation:

Identify and mark the emergency lighting fixtures with a distinctive mark
10.11.1.1 Minor or red ‘E’.
Refer to: IEC 61892-6: 1999-02 Section 11.4, Emergency Lighting
10.12 Electrical Outlets
There were various voltages and power outlet pin configurations throughout the rig. Mostly the small
power was from the American style 120 VAC outlets, although there were also 208 VAC and 230
VAC outlets.
There were no Residual Current Devices (RCD) installed on the power and lighting circuits
throughout the rig. These RCD units provide protection for personnel from electric shock.

LTD
It was identified that there were portable Residual Current Circuit Breaker (RCCB) devices available,
which were to be utilised whilst using electrical power tools and portable equipment around the rig.
These devices are designed to isolate fault currents and the power source from the portable
equipment, in order to provide personal protection during a failure whilst using the equipment.
10.12
Portable RCCB protective devices
for the portable power tools
10.13 Cables and Cable Trays
There were numerous unused cables that had been disconnected and left throughout the rig. It was
suspected that most of these cables were from the previous installations, which have since been
removed from the rig, although the cables were left in the system. These cables must either be
removed completely or terminated appropriately in a junction box and recorded in a register.
The predominant areas of unused cables were throughout the mud process Ex areas, within the Mud
Pump Room and port aft stairway from the main deck to the lower deck. It was expected these were
previous third party installations.

LTD
10.13
Unused cables above mud pump
No.1
Many cable trays throughout the installation were seen to have been badly corroded with complete
rungs or supports missing. There were some areas observed where the cables were actually
supporting the cable tray. LRDIS recommends that an assessment should be conducted and all the
damaged cables tray sections should be replaced. The major areas of concerns were at the point of
weldment, where these areas had not been prepared properly prior to painting, and throughout the
highly corrosive areas of the Pit Room and Shaker House.
10.13
The damaged cable tray to be
replaced near the forward leg
The control cable to the dirty oil stop start station located in the Engine Room was identified to be
rubbing on the cable tray. The electrical cable outer protective sheath had worn through to the
braided protection, where it was noted corrosion had commenced within the cable braiding.

LTD
10.13
Replace the damaged control
cable to the dirty oil stop/start
station as the braiding was
corroding
There was a damaged cable for the break glass fire alarm on the port side main deck (505-FA-11Q),
with water coming from inside the cable. There were also signs of fluid damage inside that same
break glass manual call point.
10.13
The damaged fire alarm cable with
water inside the port main deck
(505-FA-11Q)
The top drive cables leading into the service loop at the monkeyboard level were seen unsecured to
the cable tray appropriately or they were not protected from the sharp edges on the cable tray. This
was due to the cable being run on the back side of the cable tray and fed through the tray. This
would eventually cut into the cable insulation causing severe damage and reduce the lifetime of the
cable, thus creating downtime.

LTD
10.13
The top drive electrical cable lying
on the sharp steel edge of the
cable tray
10.13
The top drive electrical cables not
secured appropriately
The top drive cables between the service loop and the derrick mounted junction box were not
secured or supported appropriately. The cables were seen to exit the service loop without any
support, with one cable slung over the rest of the loop without cable ties or securing (See figure 7),
and the other hanging by its own weight bending over at the entry sock, without being supported
appropriately.

LTD
10.13
The top drive cables entering the
service loop were not supported
appropriately
Cables and Cable Trays Recommendations:

Inspect the cable trays throughout the installation and replace or repair
10.13.1.1 Critical
the extremely corroded sections.
Secure the top drive cables appropriately from out of the service loop
10.13.1.2 Major
and along to the derrick mounted junction box.
Ensure that all the unused electrical cables are either removed or
10.13.1.3 Major
terminated appropriately and recorded in a register.
Secure and provide adequate protection to the trip tank volume sensor
10.13.1.4 Minor
cables on the cantilever pipe deck.
Review the use of non UV protected type cables used around the rig in
the outdoor areas. The Rignet satellite CAT-5 communications cable
10.13.1.5 Minor was not of an outdoor type with the complete degradation of the outer
sheath. Sections of the grey control cables had started perishing with
braiding visible.(Transverse drag chain)
10.14 Batteries, Battery Chargers and UPS
There were numerous battery backup/UPS systems installed throughout the whole installation.
There was a Masterguard 120VAC storage battery system for the emergency lighting around the rig.
This system was installed in the Radio Equipment Room and it consisted of 20 x 40AH C20 sealed
lead acid batteries.
The PAGA system had a 10KVA Emerson Network Power UPS system, which was also installed in
the Radio Equipment Room.
There was also an independent 48VDC UPS power system installed in the Radio Equipment Room,
which was specifically for the critical safety equipment fire detection, gas detection and Emergency
Shut Down (ESD) systems within the Radio Room.

LTD
The radio and navigation systems battery UPS were installed on the emergency generator roof top.
The BOP control system’s UPS was located in the LER.
Maintenance records were not reviewed and drawdown tests were not conducted throughout these
systems during this stage of the survey. These systems required drawdown tests conducted, to
prove that the required equipment will remain operational for their expected duration, after an
Emergency Generator shutdown:
1. Emergency lights with battery back-up (60 minutes)
2. Floodlights that are directed at the areas of water into which lifeboats are launched (30
minutes)
3. Helideck perimeter and obstacle lights (30 minutes)
4. Public Address/General Alarm system (30 minutes)
5. Telephone system (30 minutes)
6. Radio equipment for external communication (30 minutes)
7. Drilling Communication system (30 minutes)
8. BOP Control system (2 hours)
9. The obstruction lights and foghorns are designed to remain operational for at least 96 hours
after Emergency Generator shutdown.
10. The aircraft warning lights located on top of the three legs were designed to remain in
operation after Emergency Generator shutdown, since they were powered by solar energy
with a self-contained storage battery.
All the battery systems that were inspected were seen to be in visually good condition, although their
performance cannot be guaranteed unless a drawdown test is conducted.
10.15 Alarm Systems: Fire, Gas and General
The Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) systems were observed to be operational throughout
the rig. The paging system was tested from various locations and used extensively throughout for the
duration of the survey. Telephone lists were located at all stations - both inside and out.
The general alarm and announcement override was proven during a fire muster and abandon rig
drill, with the system proving to function as expected, although the system was noted to be quiet in
the locker room, and at the starboard main deck area outside the change room. It was also noted
that the speaker in that area had the cable cut and taped at both ends with electrician’s tape, which
was later rectified.
The fire panel was tested by smoke detector activation in the living quarters. It immediately closed
all of the accommodation’s fire dampers, and shutdown all the accommodation’s HVAC units, with
the time down sequence commencing for the alarms. The system was a totally manual system as
further shutdowns of equipment were conducted manually after assessing the situation.
The PAGA fire and gas external equipment on the open decks that would stay live powered after a
final ESD were seen to be of the appropriate Ex rating for the Zone 2 hazardous area locations. The
maintenance records relating to the maintenance this equipment were not reviewed.

LTD
There was fluid damage noted inside one of the manual call points on the port forward main deck.
This required checking as there was also water coming from the inside of the associated control
cable at the bulkhead penetration.
10.15
Fluid damage to the manual call
point on the port main deck
The break glass manual call point at the starboard aft jacking leg had become loose, and it was only
secured by one screw and required repairing.
10.15
Secure the break glass call point
at the starboard jacking leg

LTD
Alarm Systems: Fire, Gas and General Recommendations:
Investigate the volume of the PAGA alarms and announcement in the
10.15.1.1 Critical change room and around the starboard main deck area, once the
speaker has been repaired.
Secure the manual call point appropriately at the starboard aft jacking
10.15.1.2 Minor
leg.
Investigate the visible fluid damage to the manual call point on the port
10.15.1.3 Minor
main deck.
10.16 Navigation Lights and Foghorns
The ENSCO107 had the following navigation lights installed to meet the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) regulatory requirements:
A. One port sidelight, red colour, 112.5º, 3-nautical mile visibility.

B. One starboard sidelight, green colour, 112.5º, 3-nautical mile visibility.
C. One stern light, white colour, 135º, 3-nautical mile visibility, installed on the LER roof top.
D. One aft anchor Light, white colour, 3-nautical mile all round visibility, installed on the LER
roof top.
E. One forward anchor light, white colour, 3-nautical mile all round visibility, installed on the
forward signal mast on the Radio Room roof.
F. Three main Not-Under-Command (NUC) lights: two red and one white, 3-nautical mile all
round visibility, installed on the forward signal mast on the Radio Room roof.
G. One navigation lighting panel was installed in the Jacking Control/Radio Room, to control the
operation of the navigation lights. The Navigation Lighting Panel was provided with two
power feeders from two separate sources, as per regulatory body requirements.
H. One 120VAC supply from the 208/120VAC main lighting switchboard power supply.
I. One 120VAC supply from the 208/120VAC emergency lighting switchboard power supply.
The navigational system was tested to verify the functionality of the main lights and the standby
lighting systems, on both the mains power and the emergency power. It was noted that there were
several issues with some of the navigation lamps. The following lamps were seen to not function -
the main starboard lamp, standby forward anchor light, standby aft anchor and all the standby NUC
lamps. These items were all repaired prior to the end of the survey.
The Marine Operations Manual (MOM) states in section 13.8 Navigation Lighting System, 1.
"Navigation lights are used only when the unit is in transit. These light fixtures are not suitable for
operation in hazardous areas. A permanent warning plate is installed next to the Navigation Lighting
Panel to warn the operator not to energise the panel when the unit is carrying out drilling operations."
No warning plate was installed at the panel.

LTD
Navigation Lights and Foghorns Recommendations:
Ensure the following navigation lamps are operational and working prior
to leaving port - the main starboard lamp, standby forward anchor light,
10.16.1.1 Major standby aft anchor light and all the standby NUC lamps.
Status: Closed
Install a permanent warning plate next to the Navigation Lighting Panel,
to warn the operator not to energise the panel, when the unit is carrying
10.16.1.2 Minor
out drilling operations.
Refer to: MOM 13.8 Navigation Lighting System.
10.17 Communication: Telephone and PA System
The rig telephone and communications systems, which are commonly known as the PAGA, were
manufactured by Gai-Tronics. The main systems controllers were the Gai-Tronics, Elemec systems
controllers, which were installed in the dedicated PAGA cabinet in the Radio Equipment Room.
There were a total of three zones throughout the rig, which were spread over seven separate ‘series
300’ amplifiers. There was full redundancy for all the zones through two independent channels A and
B. The system had dual power supplies from the emergency generator switchboard and the main
switchboard, with a dedicated UPS. The system status was healthy with no faults identified.
The system consisted of Ex hazardous area compliant handset units, which were utilised on the
open decks and lower hull areas as required, with non Ex type desktop units installed in all the
offices and accommodation areas. The system was seen to be operational throughout the rig during
general paging and alarms.
The fire panel integration to the PAGA system was proven to operate as required with the alarm
being raised through all areas from fire detector activation. Announcements could be placed after
the alarms were silenced. A spot check was conducted on the status lighting system, which was also
seen to function as expected from the public address and general alarms.
One of the speakers for the PAGA on the starboard main deck egress walkway outside the change
room had the cable cut. This had been taped off at each end with electrical tape. This was a critical
safety piece of equipment which had been removed from service and not replaced. LRDIS
recommends that the speaker should be repaired or replaced in working condition, with the volume
checked and set. This unit was later replaced and connected during the survey.

LTD
10.17
The disconnected PAGA speaker
on the starboard main deck
Two forms of communication systems were installed at the monkeyboard level of the derrick. There
was a Gai-Tronics Ex hazardous area PAGA handset installed, although the hand piece had been
broken and the unit was out of service. There was also a talk back system installed, although no
extension numbers for calling back to the driller’s cabin were available. Therefore, the unit was not
tested. LRDIS recommends the extension numbers for the talkback system should be installed at
the monkeyboard and the PAGA Gaitronics handset replaced.
10.17
Showing the PAGA system at the
monkeyboard out of service
Communication: Telephone and PA System Recommendations:

Repair or replace the disconnected PAGA speaker on the starboard
main deck outside the change room.
10.17.1.1 Critical
Status: Closed

LTD
Replace the broken PAGA Gai-tronics unit at the monkeyboard, and
10.17.1.2 Critical provide the extension numbers for the talkback system at the
monkeyboard.
10.18 Electric Welding
There were two IDEALARC DC-600 type electric welding machines installed in the Mechanics
Workshop. These two systems were connected directly to the rig-wide installation integrated welding
systems, with service outlets installed throughout the rig. Each service outlet had two plug-in
receptacles for connecting both the welding leads, both the hand piece and the work.
It was noted that one of the outlets at the forward leg had a short lead coming directly from the work
receptacle, and this was connected directly at the hull. If the ground return is connected, and has a
bad connection, there is a high risk that the return currents could travel back through the electronic
and electrical equipment, which can cause severe damage to the equipment. These systems were
only setup to utilise the two lead principles.
10.18
Electric welding machines
connected to the rig-wide
distribution system

LTD
10.18
Structure return welding has a
high risk of damaging the electrical
and electronic equipment
Electric Welding Recommendation:

Remove the short welding lead connected directly to the structure being
used for a ground Return (No.2). When utilising the welding outlets
10.18.1.1 Major around the rig, ensure that two leads are used. One for the hand piece
and one for the work. There is a high risk of damaging the electrical and
electronic equipment.
10.19 Earthing and Earth Bonding
The earthing and bonding connections were observed to be well populated throughout the
installation, although it was noticed that they were not being maintained. There was excessive
corrosion around many of the equipment grounding and equipotential bonding points. These
connection points were not being serviced at periodical or routine intervals. Effectively these are
electrical connections and they must be serviced accordingly, to maintain their electrical integrity.
LRDIS recommends that all the grounding and bonding points should be maintained and included in
the Preventative Maintenance System.

LTD
10.19
Maintain all the earth bonding
connections
10.19
Maintain all the equipotential
bonding points
Review the grounding location for the Varco AR 3200 iron roughneck, as it was located on the
handrail in the derrick at Level 1. This section was not directly connected to the main rig structure by
weld or appropriate equipotential bonding. The connection from the handrail to the derrick main
structure showed signs of corrosion.

LTD
10.19
Iron roughneck earth bonding to
the handrail
Earthing and Earth Bonding Recommendations:

Ensure all the grounding connections and equipotential bonding points
10.19.1.1 Major are serviced periodically to maintain their electrical integrity. Include this
in the Preventative Maintenance System’s work orders.
Relocate the iron roughneck earth bonding point from the handrail on
Level 1 on the derrick to a major structure on the derrick or point, which
10.19.1.2 Major
connects directly through to the hull by appropriate bonding straps. (Ex
equipment).
Verify that all the cable support systems (such as suitcases and cable
10.19.1.3 Minor
trays) have been grounded.
10.20 Hazardous Areas
The hazardous areas and equipment on board the ENSCO107 had all been assessed according to
the available ENSCO107 Safety Case SC-ASIA-E107 Rev.001, Part 4 - Annex D. It states the
electrical equipment for hazardous areas on the rig will comply with IMO MODU 1989 Chapter 6,
Section 6 in its entirety - Electrical installations in hazardous areas. The hazardous area
classification had been zoned according to the IMO MODU 1989 Chapter 6, Section 2 in its entirety -
Classification of hazardous areas.
Megawatts Engineering Services Pte Ltd had conducted a Hazardous Area site survey on the
ENSCO107 at Keppel FELS, in Singapore from 18 to 28 February 2014. The survey updated the Ex
registry and identified the Ex equipment specifications, along with the remedial measures required
for Ensco to maintain the installation to comply with the minimum international standards for
electrical equipment located in potentially explosive atmospheres.
LRDIS requested the review of an updated working copy of the remedial work being conducted on
the Ex equipment as specified by Megawatts. A final updated working copy was not available at the
time of the survey, as there was no Rig Electrician on board.

LTD
The maintenance records of the Ex hazardous area equipment was requested for review, to confirm
if the periodic routine maintenance checks and inspections were being conducted accordingly. These
were not available, although it was evident that the equipment was due for a close and detailed Ex
specific inspection. Ensco Policy: Ex Equipment Hazardous Area Maintenance Strategy "PR-CO-
AM-007" states that close inspections shall be conducted six-monthly, with detailed inspections -25%
annually.
There are also some good guidelines for Ex hazardous area inspections listed in the IEC standard -
IEC 60079.17: 2009 Electrical installations inspection and maintenance, 4.3 Inspections, 6
Inspection schedules. LRDIS recommends that detailed maintenance inspections should be
conducted on all the Ex equipment prior to future operations, as per the above IEC 60079.17
standards and Ensco policy.
The top drive Ex hazardous area equipment was clearly lacking the routine periodic Ex inspections
as required. This was also highlighted in the previous Megawatts survey conducted in February
2014. Most of the solenoids, sensors, proximity switches, cables and junction boxes were covered in
heavy black oily residue. The whole top drive electrical installation required a thorough clean along
with an electrical service. This equipment tends to lack the required attention during drilling
operations due to the nature of its location and constant use. This shipyard Special Periodic Survey
(SPS) would be the ideal time to go through the whole system to minimise any downtime, once on
contract.
10.20
The top drive Ex hazardous area
equipment covered in black oily
grime
One of the control cables for the Rotating Link Adapter (RLA) solenoid valve on the top drive was
identified as having been pulled out of the cable gland.

LTD
10.20
RLA control cable on the top drive
pulled out of gland
All the agitator electrical motors in the Pit Room had their name plates either heavily corroded or
painted over, which made the certification details impossible to read. These name plates served as a
form of certification for the equipment, along with the equipment’s actual Ex hazardous area
certificate, with a form of traceability between the motor and the certification. These certificates were
not available upon request at the time of the survey.
10.20
Painted and illegible agitator name
plate

LTD
10.20
Agitator name plate not legible
The cable penetration transit between the Pit Room and the lab had two of the transit blocks
removed. This created a direct opening between the Ex Zone 1 area of the Pit Room and the safe
area in the mud lab. These transit areas must be filled, and if cables are passed through there in the
future, this must be done with approved sealing transit blocks. This was later closed throughout the
survey.
10.20
Transit blocks removed between
the Pit Room and the Mud Lab
There were three unused cable entries in the transit between the Pit Room and the Pump Room.
These were probably from the removal of cables from a previous installation on the last campaign,
which were required to be filled or blocked. This was later closed throughout the survey

LTD
10.20
Unused openings in the transit
between the Pit Room and the
Pump Room
A visual inspection was conducted throughout the hazardous areas around the Shaker House and
mud process areas, which identified several concerns. There were disconnected electrical cables
which had been cut and left or taped with electrical tape. It was believed that these cables were from
some previous installations or possible third party equipment, which was not installed on the rig any
more. These cables were required to be identified, confirmed isolated and either removed completely
or appropriately protected and recorded into a register.
There were also several junction boxes which had open cable glands. Again it was expected that
these were service supplies to a previous installation, which had since been removed from the rig.
These also were required to be either removed or an appropriate blank installed to cover the
opening.
10.20
The unused cables in the Shaker
House to be removed

LTD
There was a damaged diffuser on the fluorescent light fixture on top of the third party deck Shaker
House roof top. This light fixture was inside the Ex hazardous area of the Shaker House roof top and
required it’s Ex integrity maintained.
10.20
Damaged lighting fixture on the
Shaker House roof top
Many of the Ex hazardous area equipment cable glands had been wrapped in electrical tape. This
was not acceptable as it changes the pressure piling performances of the cable glands and
equipment, if there is to be an incident within the equipment. LRDIS recommends that the electrical
tape should be removed and a layer of grease tape should be installed. IEC standards allow one
layer of grease tape for environmental protection to flame paths and cable glands. Several areas had
used grease tape over the flame paths.
10.20
Remove the electrical tape and
install grease tape to the cable
glands

LTD
The desilter, desander and degasser motors were missing one of the four mounting screws for the
terminal box covers. This will impair the Ex integrity of the Ex rated equipment and they must be
replaced. This was later closed throughout the survey.
10.20
The missing terminal box cover
bolts on the desilter, desander and
degasser motors
The starboard access door into the Pit Room was catching on the overhead cable tray, which was
holding the door open. These doors must be self-closing. LRDIS recommends adjustments should
be made to the end of the cable tray, to stop the door from catching and being held open.
10.20
The starboard access door to the
Pit Room held open by a cable
tray
The facility status lights located on the drill floor were missing two of the cover screws, and required
replacing to maintain their Ex hazardous area integrity.

LTD
An area inspection of the Pit Room exhaust fan Zone 2 areas on the main deck was conducted. It
was identified that neither of the two supply fans or the two exhaust fans or their associated control
gear had been maintained or serviced, according to any routine periodic inspections or maintenance
program. The Hazardous Area Equipment Register did not have any details of the motor specifics or
maintenance history. These systems were required to be accessed, with the name plate details
recorded, and a detailed inspection and service should be conducted on each ventilation fan motor
and their associated equipment for the Pit Room.
10.20
Mud Pit Room supply fan 3B
10.20
Mud Pit Room exhaust fan motor
requiring service
The area pressurization systems for the Pit Room and the driller’s cabin were not operable, and they
could not be tested at the time of the LRDIS survey.

LTD
The gas detection system was a Drager Safety ACE V8000 series, which was installed in the Radio
Room bridge, with Bartec BDT-5 repeater controllers located in the driller's cabin and the OIM's
office. The system had 38 active channels, which included 19 combustible and 19 toxic gas sensors.
All the channels were seen to be in operation with no sign of any areas being inhibited.
10.20
Gas detection panel in the Radio
Room
The gas detector calibration records and detector head service dates were not available or reviewed
during the survey. The gas detector units were required to be serviced routinely, as per all Ex
equipment.
10.20
Gas detectors to be included in the
Ex Maintenance Program
The gas detection system was not tested during the LRDIS survey due to insufficient resources.

LTD
A review was conducted across the hazardous area drawings, where it was noted that the gas group
and equipment temperature class had not been included. These should be included on the
hazardous area drawings to identify what the minimum rated gas group and temperature class the
equipment must comply with. Although the requirement was not to have it identified on the actual
drawings, they were to be readily available and detailed through the design specifications or system
philosophy. Neither of these documents was available for review at the time of the survey. Therefore
it was recommended to have them on the Ex hazardous area drawings for personnel to easily
identify.
It was also noted on the hazardous area drawings that the port and starboard diverter overboard
vent lines and the choke and kill manifold emergency discharge lines below the starboard side drill
floor, were not included on the hazardous area drawings (E107-MOM-10). These potential hazardous
area gas release points should be amended to the hazardous area drawings. NOPSEMA
have also recommended that these choke and kill lines should be extended out past the perimeter of
the drill floor.
10.20
C&K emergency discharge and
over boards not on the hazardous
area drawings
Due to the driller’s cabin being located inside the hazardous Ex Zone 2 area of the drill floor, the
cabin had an over pressurisation system installed. This was to minimise the possibility of hazardous
gases migrating into the driller’s cabin (Safe area).
There were concerns with the design of the access/egress doors to the driller’s cabin opening
outwards. The concern of having these doors opening outwards places the over pressurisation
against the door latch and not the actual gas tight seal. This would also make the door very hard to
close, and ultimately lead to the loss of pressurisation with a failure of the door latch. Ensco had
advised there were plans to have these door openings changed to have the doors opening inwards.

LTD
10.20
Showing the driller’s cabin door
opening outwards
The driller’s over pressurisation system was seen to be functional and maintaining an over pressure
of approximately .2 inches of water, with comparison to the drill floor open atmosphere. This was
acceptable, although the low pressure alarms were not active, and they did not appear to be
powered up. These systems must be operational and verified, prior to drilling operations
commencing.
10.20
Driller’s cabin pressurisation alarm
panel
The three drawworks AC drive motors had their cooling air drawn from a safe area out of the drill
floor zoned area. The cooling air intake ducting had flexible rubber joints installed between the
sections of the duct. This rubber was deteriorated with cracks and holes. Due to the nature of the
cooling air entering, a potentially heated motor and the potential of causing sparks, the cooling air
must not contain an explosive gas. Therefore, the cooling air intake duct must be sealed
appropriately, whilst passing through the Ex Zone 2 hazardous area of the drill floor.

LTD
10.20
Cracked and deteriorated
drawworks intake duct rubber
jointing material
Hazardous Areas Recommendations:

Conduct periodic routine maintenance on the Ex hazardous area
equipment prior to the next operation. This has not been conducted
routinely, as per the Ensco policy. This was possibly due to ongoing
operations. IEC 60079.17: 2009 Electrical installations inspection and
10.20.1.1 Critical
maintenance, 4.3 Inspections, 6 Inspection schedules. (Ensco Policy:
EX EQUIPMENT HAZARDOUS AREA MAINTENANCE STRATEGY
PR-CO-AM-007 Close inspection-6 monthly, Detail inspection-25%
annually).
10.20.1.2 Major potential hazardous gas release points of the port and starboard over
board lines.
10.20.1.3 Major potential hazardous gas release points of the choke and kill emergency
discharge lines under the starboard side drill floor.
Consider having the hazardous area gas group and temperature class
ratings included on the hazardous area drawings. This is to identify the
10.20.1.4 Major minimum standards the equipment must comply with. This information
must be readily available in either the design specifications or as
installation philosophy.
Provide Ex certificates (Compex) for the electricians and ETs working
10.20.1.5 Major
on the hazardous area equipment.
Remove all the unused cable glands on the junction boxes from
previously installed equipment, if not further required. (JB above slug
10.20.1.6 Major pit)
Status: Closed

LTD
10.20.1.7 Major Repair the cable gland termination on the top drive RLA solenoid valve.
Replace the damaged diffuser on the fluorescent light fixture on top of
10.20.1.8 Major
the third party deck Shaker House roof top.
Replace the damaged Ex hazardous area light fixture at the heli
10.20.1.9 Major
refuelling station.
Provide the Ex certification for the agitator motors throughout the Pit
10.20.1.10 Major
Room.
Access the Pit Room fan motors and record the motor details, and
10.20.1.11 Major conduct a detailed inspection and service throughout each motor and
their associated equipment.
Replace the missing terminal box cover bolts on both the degasser
motors and the desilter electric motor.
10.20.1.12 Major
Status: Closed
Remove the unused intrinsically safe junction box on the Pit Room aft
10.20.1.13 Major wall if not being utilised, as there were cover bolts missing and 16
unused open cable glands.
Replace the deteriorated jointing rubbers on the drawworks intake
10.20.1.14 Major
ducting. This is in an Ex Zone 2 hazardous area.
Set up the HVAC and pressurisation systems for the driller’s cabin and
the Mud Pit Room. Both these area pressure differential alarm systems
10.20.1.15 Major
were not working. Ensure the doors are self-closing once the HVAC
systems are operational.
Remove the electrical tape that has been installed over the Ex motor
cable glands on the shakers, desilter and degasser. It is acceptable to
10.20.1.16 Major
used grease type tapes with one layer for protection over the flame
paths and cable glands.
Install the missing transit blocks between the Mud Pit Room and the
Mud Lab.
10.20.1.17 Major
Status: Closed
Replace the unused open transit blocks between the Pit Room and the
Pump Room.
10.20.1.18 Major
Status: Closed
Adjust the cable tray that catches the starboard entry door to the Pit
10.20.1.19 Minor
Room. These doors must be self-closing.
Install notification signage of entering a hazardous area to the Mud Pit
10.20.1.20 Minor
Room from the starboard side entry point.

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10.21 Drilling Automation and Control
The driller’s automations and controls were conducted through the NOV Amphion Flex Workstation,
which consists of three user friendly touch screens, one Weight On Bit (WOB) meter, two joystick
controllers, two switch control panels and a chair for all the controls and the functioning of the NOV
drilling package. The Amphion system allowed the integration and interface to the operator for all the
NOV tools, systems and their monitoring processes. This included the drawworks control system
(ADS-10D), top drive (TDS8), Rotary Support Table (RST), power slips (PS21), mud pumps and all
the drilling instrumentation.
The electronic field sensors and device information were all relayed to the V Data Acquisition unit (V-
DAQ), which acts as an Electronic Drilling Recorder (EDR) and Pit Volume Totalizer (PVT). All the
systems interface to the RigSense application, which is through the client and server networks.
These networks were a combination of both copper and fiber optic, pending on the distance and
location of the network switches. The Multi Tool Controller (MTC) cabinet, which housed the
workstation and network controllers, was located in the LER above the drill floor.
The drilling equipment was not operated or functioned during this survey, as the blocks were
unstrung in preparation to remove the crown block cluster. These systems and controls were to be
proven during the IAT.
As part of the warm stack process, each of the mud pumps was run at approximately 12 spm for 15
minutes. The pumps were circulating through the slug pit, and back through the bleed off line, with
no irregularities. The system was verified through the screens and touch panels. The system was
seen to be function accordingly with no system or network faults.
10.21
Driller’s control NOV Flex
Workstation
The limited driller’s systems and controllers that were available were seen to be communicating as
expected, with no network or system faults observed. A full operational function test was to be
conducted as part of the IAT.

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It was not possible to determine if the NOV Hawkeye remote access license was currently active.
10.22 Miscellaneous Items
Most of the portable equipment throughout the installation had the test tags installed, showing there
was a program in place. The retest dates of the portable equipment were seen to be out of date.
Ensure the test and tag program is resumed at the soonest time, as personnel were still using this
equipment. Ensure that all the fixed and portable electrical equipment has been included in the Test
and Tag program.
10.22
The Test and Tag program had
been suspended
It was noted there was a large percentage of lighting fixtures requiring the approved secondary
retention drop safe mesh to be installed. There was a box of drop safe mesh systems ready to be
installed throughout the derrick on the lights and beacons. Where the drop safe mesh systems have
been installed on equipment, the old redundant rusty slings and the shackles were required to be
removed, as these old slings and shackles were creating a DROPS hazard within themselves.
Derrick lighting was seen to be in a change out process, with the combination of various secondary
retention safety sling methods being utilised. The securing methods showed (see the picture below)
that non-compliant spring clips were being utilised, and the safety slings manufactured on site that
were loosely wrapped around a vertical lighting fixture, would allow the fixture to slide straight
through the loosely fitted sling.

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10.22
Non-compliant non-locking spring
clip
10.22
Loosely wrapped lighting fixture
There were numerous instances where excessively corroded beam clamps securing equipment and
cable trays that required replacement were noted. The adjustable casing stabbing board had a
proximity sensor at the upper limit, which had a heavily corroded mounting bracket, beam clamp and
safety sling. This type of installation required attention and or replacement.
The top drive upper limit hard stop proximities were not secured appropriately, and were seen to be
leaning into the top drive dolly, which was making contact each time it passed, showing wear marks
on the proximity housing. The two top drive upper limit proximities required a review of the whole
mounting arrangement.

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10.22
The top drive upper limit hard stop
proximities were not secured
appropriately
There was a Hyster Yardmaster electrically-powered 2.5 W.L.L. forklift in the Sack Room. The unit
presented well with the flashing warning light and reversing alarm seen to be operational. The
emergency battery disconnect was tested and it functioned accordingly. The batteries were of the
lead acid cell types.
10.22
Hyster electric powered forklift
Miscellaneous Items Recommendations:

Service the forklift batteries, top up with water and conduct a deep cycle
10.22.1.1 Major charge. 80% of the batteries were low on water. Ensure this is included
in the PM system.
Verify if the NOV Hawkeye remote access license is current and
10.22.1.2 Minor
whether the system will be available.

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Install the drop safe mesh to all the lighting fixtures throughout the
10.22.1.3 Minor
derrick and remove the old redundant slings.
Maintain the Test and Tag procedures for all the portable electrical
10.22.1.4 Minor
equipment and leads.

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11.0 SAFETY EQUIPMENT
11.1 Fire Control
11.1.1 Automatic Fire Detection System
The fire detection display panel was a Siemens/Model CT-11 Modular, microprocessor-controlled fire
detection system, with 16 different zones used on a combined loop-wired system network.
The main controller was installed in the Radio Room with a repeater panel installed in the OIM’s
office. The system was seen to be stable with no faults, inhibits or zones isolated. The smoke
detector heads were a Siemens Type DO1101A-Ex.
The auto activation signal and integration with the fire damper and Emergency Shut Down (ESD)
panels was confirmed to be operational.
11.1.1
The fire detection monitoring
control panel
11.1.1
The fire detection system area
zones

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See Section 10.15 for further information.
11.1.2.1 CO2 system
There were four independent CO2 units installed throughout the installation, with a central bank CO2
system located in the aft/stbd aux machinery room for the Generator Room and the SCR room
protection. Additionally, there were individual CO2 systems for the Emergency Generator Room,
Paint Locker and Galley Hood protection.
There was a concern with regards to the SCR CO2 release system.
Due to the nature of the CO2 being a heavier than air gas, the CO2 concentrated gas would cascade
down the forward and aft access stairways to the adjoining doors of the mechanical and electrical
workshop and office spaces. It was noted that the doors from the workshop and office did not close
automatically, as the door latch would hang-up on the door frame. This would allow the CO2
concentrated gas to escape into the workshop and office spaces, creating a dilution effect of the
CO2 gas from the SCR room. LRDIS recommends the door latch be repaired to allow the doors to
self-close upon entry and exit. Signs have been placed on the doors leading into the CO2 release
areas of the SCR Room and generator rooms. This was to notify personnel to vacate via the Mud
Pump Room in the event of a release.
The CO2 activation instruction stated that all doors should be closed. These doors had auto closing
units on them so they should work. These doors were not gas tight doors, so it is important to
monitor the sealing and closing gaps of these doors.
11.1.2.1
CO2 unit for the Emergency
Generator Room

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CO2 System Recommendation:
Repair the door latches on the door entry to the SCR Room from the
Electrical and Mechanics Workshop to enable the doors to self-close.
11.1.2.1.1.1 Minor The SCR Room had a fixed firefighting CO2 release system, which
would be diluted with the CO2 escaping into the office and workshop
areas.
11.1.3 Extinguishing Arrangements in Machinery Spaces
The drilling installation was well populated with portable fire extinguishing systems in all the
machinery areas, deck spaces and switchboard rooms as required, where there were no fixed
firefighting or extinguishing systems. These were set out as per the Fire Plan.
These portable extinguishing units were physically seen to be in good condition, although the last
inspection dates were mostly February 2016. All the units would require the inspection process to be
reinstated, prior to starting drilling operations.
11.1.3
Portable extinguisher inspection
records
11.1.4 Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems (Water and Foam)
The units of accommodation were all equipped with a fixed firefighting sprinkler system. The sensing
bulb activation temperatures were 155 °F and 286º F for the galley. The sprinkler system was
activated by two means, which were a water flow indicator (Pressure drop) and the alarm valve.
These activated the alarms and a response from the operator was then required to start the fire
water pump(s).

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11.1.4
The sprinkler system alarm
activation system
The fixed firefighting system sprinkler test/drain valve associated piping in the accommodation was
heavily corroded, and it was not operable for testing or draining. The pipe work appeared to be in
danger of leaking or blowing out. To repair this piping the whole fixed fire-fighting system per level
will have to be isolated. LRDIS recommends these sections should be identified and repaired
appropriately.
11.1.4
Replace the accommodations
sprinkler system test valves and
piping

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11.1.4
The fixed firefighting sprinkler
system pipe work in the
accommodation
Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems (Water and Foam) Recommendation:

Replace the piping and test valves to the accommodation fixed
11.1.4.1.1 Critical firefighting sprinkler systems, as these were seen to be heavily corroded
throughout.
11.1.4.1 Fire Hose Stations
Prior to the departure of the rig a complete review of the fire system should be completed. This is to
ensure that all the firefighting equipment has been inspected at the required intervals and that all the
equipment are in the correct locations. The previous third party inspection was completed in
February 2015 by Marine Fire Services, New Zealand. There was also a hose missing from fire
station 20, which needed to be replaced along with a valve wrench.
11.1.4.1
Fire hose station No. 20 was
missing a fire hose

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Fire Hose Stations Recommendations:
11.1.4.1.1.1 Minor Replace the missing fire hose from fire station No. 20.
11.1.4.1.1.2 Minor Replace the missing valve wrench from fire hose station No. 2.
11.1.4.2 Fire Main
The rig was furnished with two fire pumps. These were located in the auxiliary machinery spaces on
the port and starboard side aft on Machinery Deck Level 2. Both the fire pumps presented in good
working order, and there was no evidence of leakage from the mechanical seals.
A visual inspection of the fire main was conducted. Overall, the fire main appeared to be in good
condition within the machinery spaces below the main deck. There was evidence of previous pipe
work having been replaced around the Helideck and the main deck. There was some evidence of pin
hole leaks on the discharge pipe work in the port aft machinery space, above the Alfa Laval plate
type water maker. There were also some sections of the pipework port forward of the accommodation
that required attention due to excessive corrosion of the pipework.
11.1.4.2
Evidence of leakage from the fire
main above

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11.1.4.2
Evidence of pin hole leaks on the
fire main
11.1.4.2
Corroded fire main pipework - Fire
Station 11

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11.1.4.2
Corroded fire main pipework - Fire
Station 21
Fire Main Recommendations:

Inspect the fire main pipe work above the Alfa Laval plate type water
11.1.4.2.1.1 Major maker, as there was evidence of pin hole leaks. Replace the pipe work
as necessary to maintain the integrity of the fire system.
Repair or replace the corroded fire main elbow supplying fire station 11
11.1.4.2.1.2 Major
on the main deck port forward stairway.
Repair or replace the corroded fire main pipework supplying fire station
11.1.4.2.1.3 Major
21 on Level 2 of the port forward stairway.
11.1.4.3 Automatic Sprinkler Systems
The accommodation was protected by an automatically-released sprinkler system. The system

utilised frangible bulbs and was supplied from the fire main. The accommodation sprinkler system
was divided into zones, and each zone was isolated via a section valve.
The inspection of the system was limited as there was no access. The system was mostly hidden
within the wall panelling. There were no apparent leaks in the system, however, the test drains were
noted to be in an unsatisfactory condition due to corrosion. If the pipe work were to start leaking, this
could inadvertently trigger the system and possibly cause false alarms.
11.1.4.5 Deluge System
Not inspected.
11.1.5 Portable Extinguishers and Fire-Fighting Equipment
These systems were not inspected in detail as the portable extinguishers were all due for routine
inspections.
The fireman's locker appeared to be well populated with all the essential equipment being supplied
and in good condition. A thorough check was required according to the detailed equipment list.

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11.1.5.1 Fireman’s Outfits
The equipment was not available for inspection.
11.1.5.2 Fire-fighting Equipment Plans

11.1.6 Foam System for Helideck
The rig was equipped with a Skum foam system for the helideck and heli-refuel station. Three
monitors were positioned at the perimeter of the helideck, which could be locked into place or moved
as required.
The helideck foam system also previously supplied the fixed nozzle deluge system above the heli
refuelling system and tanks, although this has since been decommissioned due to excessive
corrosion within the piping. There were also two foam hose stations provided on the platform area at
the aft end of the helideck.
This system was not functioned and would require a full round of testing and repairs for acceptance.
Extensive corrosion of the foam system drains for the helideck was noted, with seized valves and
other sections of the system also requiring attention. If a heli refuel system were to be installed, the
protection systems for the fuel storage tanks and the fuel delivery system would need to be
completely overhauled, as the pipework installed at the time of the inspection was considered to be
beyond repair. A new system would obviously be required to be commissioned.
11.1.6
The helideck foam system drain
Foam System for Helideck Recommendation:

Repair or replace the corroded heli deck foam system drain located
11.1.6.1.1 Major
under the Skum tank platform.

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11.2 Survival and Life Saving
This section was not completed as it was quickly noticed that due to the rig being in a warm stack
situation, most of the systems and equipment were either not in current certification, or they had
been put away in protective storage.
This section requires a complete inspection, once all the equipment and systems are laid out and
available, as per the fire control and lifesaving drawings. (E107-F-ENG-001 Fire Control and Life
Saving).
11.2.1 Lifeboats
The rig was furnished with six Jiangyin Norsafe lifeboats. Lifeboats No.1, No.2, No.3, and No.4 had
completed a 5-yearly inspection in August 2015. They were due again for an annual inspection by an
authorised service engineer in August 2016. Lifeboats No.5 and No.6 had been installed on the
facility in 2014 and they were due for annual inspection in April 2016.
The original 56 person capacity of the boats was based on 75 kg average weight per person. The
capacity was re-evaluated using 82 kg per person and the boats recertified for 41 persons. This
required that two additional boats be installed to provide adequate escape facilities from the rig at full
capacity.
With maintenance pennants installed, each of the lifeboats was started and run briefly using each of
the starting batteries. Each boat started without hesitation, and the propeller shafts rotated without
issue and the steering was free to cycle. Internally the boats were in good condition and they were
suitably maintained, according to the weekly and monthly maintenance requirements from the
manufacturer. The boats were lowered a few feet and then raised back in the stowage position to
confirm the operation of the davit winches, and the raising of the upper level interlocks. The manual
raising handle interlocks were also randomly verified.
The 5-yearly lifeboat davit inspection had been completed in April 2015, and they were due for
annual inspection by an authorised service engineer in April 2016 according to the records provided.
The lifeboats boats were lowered into the water and run again to test the sprinkler/ deluge system.
The sprinkler/ deluge system operated correctly for each of the vessels. Whilst the boats were in the
water, the release hooks and pennant wires remained engaged.

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11.2.1
Lifeboat No. 2 being lowered into
the water
11.2.1
Lifeboat sprinkler/ deluge system
activated
11.2.1.1 Release Mechanism
The release mechanisms installed on each of the six lifeboats were of NORSAFE manufacture.
These had the capacity for both on and off load release. During a normal controlled release, an off-
load release of the hook would be performed, which would require activation from the hydrostatic
release interlock, before the davit pennants would release. Should it be necessary to complete an on
load release where the release hooks were still carrying the load of the boat, it was possible to
override the hydrostatic interlock. The release mechanisms had been inspected in April of 2015 and
they were due for annual inspection.

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11.2.2 Life-Raft Stations
11.2.2.1 Life-Raft Launching Davits
The rig life-raft davits (Schat-Harding, ARH23) were located adjacent to the port and starboard
loading stations. The davits underwent five-yearly inspection in April 2015, and the inspections were
completed by Global Davit GmbH in accordance with the Solas III/20 and MSC. 1/Circ 1206
requirements. The davits were in suitable condition for continued use.
11.3 Gas Detection
The fixed gas detection system was a DRAGER ACE V8000 control panel, located in the radio and
jacking control room. The control panel was a continuously monitoring system and it was self-
monitoring. It was designed to detect faults within the detector loops. The system was integrated with
the Gai-Tronics PAGA system to give visual and audible warnings around the rig.
11.3
The main gas detection panel in
the Radio Room
There was one repeater panel installed in the driller’s cabin (Bartec BDT 5) and another installed in
the OIM's office (Bartec BDT 5). The main gas detection control panel provided alarms at two
abnormal levels of gas concentration for toxic and combustible gases.

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11.3
The gas detection repeater panel
The alarm state set points were as follows:

1. Low HC alarm at 20% LEL
2. High HC alarm at 60% LEL
3. Low H2S alarm at 10ppm
4. High H2S alarm at 50ppm
The gas detectors were installed in pairs of one combustible gas (HC) and one toxic gas (H2S)
sensor. They were installed in the typical areas where gases were likely to be present.
One set on the drill floor, flow line, mud trough, trip tank, Shaker House, degasser pump area, Mud
Pit Room (stbd & Port), Pump Room, Texas deck, gumbo box and cement pump. Also, there were
HC and H2S gas sensors installed in each of the accommodation’s HVAC fresh air intake vents.
11.3
A typical HC and H2S gas detector
arrangement

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11.3.1 H2S Gas Detection
See Section11.1.3 Gas Detection for further detail, as the fixed gas detection system monitors for
both HC and H2S gasses.
11.3.2 Portable Gas Detectors
The rig had six MSA ALTAIR 4X portable gas detectors available on-board. Each unit was a
continuously monitoring device with audio and visual alarms. These units were of a robust
construction with a battery check facility and a low battery alarm. There was also a MSA Galaxy 2
combination bump tester, calibration and charger station, which was located in the Radio Room for
testing of the machine prior to use. The MSA galaxy 2 also had a calibration function for calibrating
the portable devices. The details of the calibration period for these portable units were not checked
at this stage. The last calibration certificates were supplied, showing all the units were over six
months since the last calibrations had been performed.
Model: MSA-ALT4X
Serial Nos: 264695, 265171, 265972, 265052, 265072, 265087
11.3.2
MSA Galaxy 2 combination
charger, calibration and bump
tester.
Portable Gas Detectors Recommendation:

Ensure that all the portable gas detectors on-board have their current
11.3.2.1.1 Minor
calibration certifications. (Minimum of two units)
11.4 Helicopter Operations
11.4.1 Helideck and Markings
A visual inspection of the helideck lighting systems was conducted across the landing area. The
perimeter lighting fixtures were of the appropriate low profile, delineated, Omni-directional green
Light Emitting Diode (LED) type fixtures, which were designed to be only visible from on or above the
landing area. These fixtures were seen to be equally spaced at intervals approximately three meters

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around the perimeter of the landing area. All lights were operating as expected with no anomalies to
note.

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All the flood lighting was seen to be functional, and it appeared to provide adequate lighting for night
operations. This was checked in the shipyard with other reflective and overhead lighting on the
helideck. There may be concerns for dark spot effects towards the centre of the helideck, which may
need further verification, if night operations are to be a conducted.
The windsock and its lighting were seen to be operational.
The rig did not have the red flashing ‘Warn off’ lights installed. It utilised the crossed arms stance on
the helideck, if a helicopter was approaching. The rig also had communications available for direct
communication with the pilot.
Other installation requirements, which were not required for operations in Australia, but are worth
mentioning, as they are required for operations in other countries and the North Sea. CAP 437
Standards for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas, Require the center "H" to be lit, red flashing
warning lights to be installed to warn off approaching helicopters and the centre TD/PM was also
required to be lit. Although CAP 437 would like to see these systems adopted globally, there is no
indication at this time that these will come into effect in the near future.
11.4.1
The ENSCO107 helideck at night
11.4.2 Helicopter Landing-Area Equipment
This section required the verification of the equipment and systems once everything was certified
and available. This is because the rig was in warm stack and some of the safety equipment had
been put away for safe storage, and the certifications had lapsed. All appropriate systems should be
tested and verified, prior to receiving a helicopter on deck.

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Helicopter Landing-Area Equipment Recommendation:
Ensure that all the helideck safety equipment is in certification and
available with the following: Minimum of 2 dry powder extinguishers with
a total capacity of 45kg, carbon dioxide extinguishers with a total
11.4.2.1.1 Major capacity of not less than 18 kg or equivalent. One of these extinguishers
should be so equipped as to enable it to reach the engine area. The
testing of the foam extinguishing system would also be required, prior to
accepting a helicopter on deck.
11.5 Drilling Facilities Safety
The proximity of the caustic mixing unit to the adjacent egress door between the Auxiliary Machinery
Room Port Forward and the Sack Room was considered a hazardous situation for personnel. As it
was not possible to see if the mixing unit was in use before entry into the Sack Room, when opening
the door, the change in pressure and air disturbance could disturb the caustic on the mixing table.
The caustic mixing unit was also directly adjacent to the designated pathway. The installation of a
solid protective barrier would provide some protection to personnel entering the space or passing by
the unit.
11.5
Caustic mixing unit
PAU1411.1 Release 01
202 of 212 Report of Survey – ENSCO107
11.5
The proximity of the caustic mixing
unit to the walkway and entry to
the Sack Room
Drilling Facilities Safety Recommendation:

Install a protective barrier around the caustic mixing unit to prevent the
problems arising from caustic dust. The entry into the Sack Room was
11.5.1.1 Minor directly opposite the caustic mixing unit. Personnel entering that space
may not be aware or be properly attired. The risk is that personnel
entering could come into direct contact with caustic soda.
11.5.1 Protective Clothing

11.5.2 Hazardous Areas

11.5.4 Dangerous Machinery
There was a heavily corroded broken fan cowling on the forward leg jacking systems hydraulic unit
electric motor. This left the rotating cooling fan unguarded, causing a hazard. LRDIS was advised
that there was a spare fan cowl on board ready for replacement. This job was given high priority.

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11.5.4
The broken fan cowling on the
forward leg jacking system
hydraulic pump electric motor
Dangerous Machinery Recommendation:

Replace the fan cowlings on all the jacking system hydraulic unit electric
11.5.4.1.1 Critical motors, as they were all severely corroded, leaving the rotating cooling
fan exposed.
11.6 First Aid and Sickbay
The equipment could not be inspected as there was no Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) or
medical personnel present.
11.7 Emergency Procedures Manual
The equipment was not available on the rig site at the time of the survey.
11.7.1 Alarm and Public Address System
Refer to section 10.15 Alarm systems:

11.8 Lifting and Handling
11.8.1 Independent Lifting-Gear Inspections
The equipment were not available for inspection.
11.11 Housekeeping
11.11.1 Walkways and Railings
Many handrails throughout the installation had been damaged by excessive corrosion. Most areas
had already been identified throughout the installation. The damage was so wide spread that it was
difficult to identify the many areas where the damage was noted independently in this report. A
complete rig-wide assessment should be carried out.
Ensco had commenced identifying the damaged handrails and marking them for replacement. This
was an ongoing job with the sheer volume and the extent of damage increasing. All the handrails
must be returned to the minimum safety standard with ongoing maintenance, to stop further areas
from becoming damaged.
11.11.1
Identify and repair all the damaged
handrails throughout the
installation
11.11.1
Severely corroded handrail
sections requiring repairs

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11.11.1
A damaged handrail and potential
DROPS
There were also some areas of concern identified amongst the stairs and walkways, which had
sustained some heavy corrosion. These areas should be identified, repaired and replaced as
required.
11.11.1
Repair or replace the corrosion
damaged walkways and steps
There were many outdoor areas throughout the rig, where the fiberglass reinforced plastic grating
had become loose. It was noticed that the fixing screws had corroded and fallen off. This left many
sections of the grating unsecure and loose. A thorough inspection was required to be conducted
throughout the rig, and all the grating needs to be secured and the missing fixings replaced.
11.11.1
The missing fiberglass reinforced
grating fixings
11.11.1
The fiberglass grating screw down
fixings - corroded and missing
There was a missing hook for the safety chain at the forward jacking leg starboard chord lower
access.

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11.11.1
Missing hook on the safety chain
to the forward leg starboard chord
lower access
The access between the main deck and the cantilever, when in the park position, was via two
independent steps. These steps were not secured to the deck or grating, and they did not provide
any handrail support. LRDIS recommends installing a more appropriate access platform with
handrails between the main deck and cantilever. Personnel were observed to be traversing up and
down these steps without anything to hold onto to stop them from falling or tripping.
11.11.1
Access to the cantilever from the
main deck without handrails
Walkways and Railings Recommendations:

Identify, repair or replace the damaged handrails throughout the
installation to the minimum safety standard. There were many handrails
11.11.1.1.1 Major
throughout the installation with heavy corrosion and permanent damage.
Many areas had already been identified for replacement.
Replace the missing hook for the safety chain at the forward jacking leg
11.11.1.1.2 Minor
starboard chord lower access.
Check and replace all the missing screw down securing washers on the
11.11.1.1.3 Minor
outdoor fibreglass reinforced plastic grating.
Install a more appropriate access platform with handrails between the
main deck and cantilever, for use when the cantilever is in the park
11.11.1.1.4 Minor
position. Currently there were two free standing steps which were not
secure or providing handrails.
11.11.2 Decks and Stairways
There was a Lad-Saf fall protection climbing system installed to gain access to the Local Equipment
Room (LER) roof top. It was noted that the Lad-Saf system did not extend sufficiently past the upper
deck for the user to alight from the ladder, prior to removing the Lad-Saf fall protective device. The
current setup proved challenging to remove the Lad-Saf, whist still standing on the ladder three
rungs from the top. Similar conditions were observed throughout the derrick and rig. A review of the
Lad-Saf systems utilised throughout the rig should be conducted.
11.11.2
The Lad-Saf system installed for
access to the LER roof top

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11.11.2
Showing the top of the Lad-Saf
system below deck height
Decks and Stairways Recommendation:

Extend the Lad-Saf system to gain access to the Local Equipment
Room (LER) roof top. It does not extend past the upper deck allowing
11.11.2.1.1 Major
the user to align the ladder and stand behind the gate, prior to removing
the Lad-Saf.
12.0 MAINTENANCE SYSTEM
Not inspected. To be conducted during the next stage of the acceptance process.

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13.0 SPARE PARTS
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ENSCO 107 Report of Survey

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ENSCO 107 Report of Survey

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JACK-UP RIG - ENSCO107

Survey Dates: April – May 2016

Release Date of issue Reviewed by Approved by Reason for update

Report of Survey – ENSCO107 3 of 212

1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... 4

3.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 17

4.0 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 23

5.1 DRILLING EQUIPMENT ...................................................................................................... 41

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6.1 MUD SYSTEM ...................................................................................................................... 79

8.1 MARINE EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................................... 101

9.1 POWER PLANT ................................................................................................................. 123

Report of Survey – ENSCO107 5 of 212

9.2 Emergency Generator Set.................................................................................................. 125

10.0 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT............................................................................................... 140

11.1 SAFETY EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................................... 186

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11.1.4.2 Fire Main ............................................................................................................................. 191

12.0 MAINTENANCE SYSTEM.................................................................................................. 211

13.1 SPARE PARTS .................................................................................................................. 212

1. Equipment Run Hours

Report of Survey – ENSCO107 7 of 212

2.2 Scope of Work

2.3 Applicable Standards and References

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The Equipment Rating (ER) is a unique system to:

A low ER is an indication that steps must be taken, for instance:

The following charts are included in the inspection report:

Chart 1: Rig Average Inspection Rating

Chart 2: Percentage Inspected

Chart 3: Detailed ER Results

Chart 4: Detailed Critical Rating

Chart 5: Detailed Major Rating

Report of Survey – ENSCO107 9 of 212

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Report of Survey – ENSCO107 11 of 212

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Report of Survey – ENSCO107 13 of 212

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These tests are as follows:

1. Tubular handling tests

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Report of Survey – ENSCO107 21 of 212

Date of meeting: 11 May 2016

Rig Staff: Cory Wiliford OIM

LRDIS Surveyor(s): Tony Shea LRDIS Electrical Surveyor

PAGE |4} of 212 Peport of Survey – ENSCO107

The recommendations in this report are defined as follows:

5.0 Drilling Equipment

Top Drive System:

Report of Survey – ENSCO107 23 of 212

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Tuggers and Sheaves:

Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30):

Report of Survey – ENSCO107 25 of 212

6.0 Mud System