The Past Political History, Current Status Existing Diplomatic and Military

Wrangling and Future Prospect of Hydro Politics in The Eastern Nile Basin:
Between Ethiopia and Egypt.

By Aschale Abie lecturer at Kabridahar University Department of Political Science and

International Relation.

www.aschalweabie@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify the relationships, the diplomatic hegemonic power and the future
prospects of Nile hydro politics between Ethiopia and Egypt. Despite objections from Ethiopia’s
downstream riparian, Egypt, construction has continued, indicating that as Ethiopia establishes itself as
a rising power in the Horn of Africa, Egyptian hegemony increasingly challenged. Ethiopia’s quest for
energy sufficiency to support its development is disrupting the region’s historic balance of power as well
as relations among the Nile Basin countries. In particular, relations between Ethiopia and Egypt have
become increasingly complex. Ethiopia is building a $4 billion dam on the Blue Nile, a tributary of the
Nile River, near the border with Sudan, saying the project is necessary to provide the country with much
needed-electricity. Egypt fears that the dam could stem the flow of the Nile, on which it depends for
approximately 90 percent of its water supply. Several negotiations between the two countries have failed
to make any breakthrough, spurring fears of a military conflict between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

Key words: Diplomatic, Hegemonic power, Hydropolitics, Ethiopia and Egypt

Introduction

Hydro politics is an area of African institutional structure that requires clearer and more forward
thinking policy attention. The Nile basin is the largest international river system in the world.
This river system is composed of two major tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile, which
originate from Lake Victoria (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) and Lake Tana
(Ethiopia), respectively. These two major tributaries converge at Khartoum to form the Main
Nile, which continues to Egypt. The Blue Nile is by far the largest tributary in terms of
contribution to the inflow of water (86%), and the White Nile share is only 14% (Elias, 2009).
The Eastern Nile River Basin is composed of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Because of the
geopolitical status and low contribution to the river, Eritrea and South Sudan are excluded from
the model. The Eastern Nile Basin is a vital part of the Nile Basin system considering that two
(Egypt and Sudan) of the three countries are almost entirely dependent on the river for survival
and the third (Ethiopia) country has potentially exclusive control of the river since the river
originates in its borders. There is an inherent volatile conflict situation waiting until explosion
due to many internal and external factors that persistently aggravate the risks and uncertainty in
the Eastern part of the Nile Basin (Mahsa, 2018). In the history of the Nile basin there has been a
huge effort toward creating hegemony. We can look at this through different historical phases. In
the precolonial phase, nineteenth century Egyptians expanded their territory into upstream Nile
until Sudan. During the colonial period, the colonial powers gave Egypt historical and natural
rights over the Nile. In the postcolonial period the two downstream countries, Sudan and Egypt,
agreed to control the entire Nile with full utilization of its waters. This quest for hegemony has
played very negative role which has become important today (Yacob, 2012). Tensions over the
use of Nile waters have recently increased and no comprehensive agreement to date acceptable to
all Eastern Nile Basin riparian countries exists (Mahsa, 2018)
Past political history

Historically, the two permanent and most important elements in Ethiopian- Egyptian relations
have been religion and water (Yacob, 2007). Egypt and Ethiopia have been in contact for
centuries that back traced to the Axumite civilization period. The introduction of Christianity
into Ethiopia is believed to have strengthened the relations between these two countries, Egypt
and Ethiopia. In this regard, the Alexandrian church had lasting effects on historical
developments of Ethiopia, Later; however, the establishment of Islam in Egypt and the Levant
greatly reduced Aksum’s relations with the major Christian power, the Byzantine Empire
(Ademnur, 2002). The politics of Nile the have greatly influenced the Ethio-Egyptian
relations for a very long time ago. The Nile River has served as the source of tension and
mistrust in the relationship between the two countries (Endalcachew, 2015). Egyptian and
Ethiopian policies in the latter half of the 20 th
century reinforced the power dynamics that had
formed during the colonial period, and access to the Nile continued to play a major role in
domestic and foreign policies. Egypt’s pan-Arab outlook, its decision to construct the Aswan
High Dam, and its support for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia only intensified the
differences between the two countries (Annalina, 2016).
In the fact that Egypt had been trying to control the Blue Nile directly or indirectly, Egypt has
defeated by Ethiopia. Egypt well knows what it has benefited from its previous proxy wars
in Ethiopia. The bottom line is that Egypt may take supporting Ethiopian enemies as a
better option to the already started renewed amicable relations. It may not hesitate to support
all the available anti-Ethiopia forces, the past political history of both countries are especially
Egypt has been followed the politics of conspiracy (Endalcachew, 2015). Historically, both
countries have been using the Nile basin for political purposes. For instance Egypt and Ethiopia
have long struggled to control the Nile. As far back as the 12th century, Ethiopian emperor Amda
Syon threatened to divert the waters unless the Egyptian Sultan stopped persecuting Coptic
Christians. Securing the uninterrupted flow of the Nile waters from the Ethiopian highlands has
therefore been a concern for Egyptian statesmen as far back as medieval times, making it
arguably the oldest continuous and most important foreign policy concern of this ancient state
(Goitom, 2014). Egyptians always dream to control if not to destabilize Ethiopia to their level
best. As historical facts show, during Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia, the then Egyptian
leader Ismail Khedive attempted to control Ethiopia (Kidane, 2018). In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, Egypt's invasion and final conquest of Sudan was largely motivated by its
desire to secure control over the entire Nile system. Muhammad Ali (1769-1849), for instance,
felt that the security and prosperity of Egypt could only be assured fully by extending conquests
to those Ethiopian provinces from which Egypt received its great reserves of water. The
objective of such a conquest was designed to impose Egypt's will on Ethiopia, and either to
occupy it or to force it to give up the Lake Tana area. Khedive Ismail (1863-1879), wanted to
make the Nile an Egyptian river by annexing to Egypt all the geographical areas of the basin
(Daniel, 2019). Although water politics have historically been a central feature of geopolitics in
this region, they have grown particularly tense over the last decades due to the pressures of
population growth, industrialization, and climate change. When Ethiopia diverted the first stretch
of the Nile in May 2013 in anticipation of the dam’s construction, tensions reached
unprecedented heights and led Egyptian politicians to publicly threaten military action. The
ensuing diplomatic drama over the last year or so has led many to question (Goitom, 2014).
Egypt’s full support to organize and train the Eritrean fighters was another historical event in
1961. On June 5, 1980, Anwar Sadat ordered the Egyptian Second Army commander to be ready
for possible operation in the Ethiopian territory (Kidane, 2018).
In 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed an agreement for “the full utilization of the Nile” (Republic of
the Sudan and the United Arab Republic 1959). It effectively allocated the entire flow of the Nile
between the two countries, with 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) going to Egypt and 18.5 bcm
going to Sudan. The agreement was the basis on which Sudan would construct the Roseires Dam
on the Blue Nile and Egypt would construct the Aswan High Dam (AHD) on the Main Nile
Ethiopia, which has never accepted the legitimacy of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement.
However, the 1959 Agreement has actually served Ethiopia’s long-term interests in one
important respect. Although Ethiopia has long claimed a right to use Nile waters, until 2011
there had been no serious challenge to Egypt’s historic rights or to the status quo prevailing in
the Nile Basin that involved the construction of large water storage infrastructure upstream of the
Aswan High Dam (Dale, John and Marc, 2014). Ethiopia has always been Egypt’s recurrent
“water-enemy”, because it has the potential to control more than 85% of the flow of the Nile.
Therefore, relations between these two riparian zones have long been more conflicting than
cooperative (Alexis, 2006). The Nile has two major tributaries: the Blue Nile, originating in Lake
Tana, Ethiopia; and the White Nile, originating in Lake Victoria and the mountains of Burundi,
Rwanda and the DRC. Both the Blue and the While Nile meet at Khartoum in Sudan to form the
main body of the Nile, which then flows through Egypt to the Mediterranean Sea. For decades,
Nile water rights have been the subject of debate the riparian states due to the expansion of
upstream hydroelectric developments, the heavy reliance on Nile waters of downstream
countries, and the historical rights given to downstream countries through colonial-era
agreements. This has resulted in fragile peace amidst a climate of long and unproductive
negotiations, with Egypt and Ethiopia in lead, opposing roles (Hanne and Bruce, 2017).

Diplomatic and military wrangling

Nevertheless, there is a geopolitical paradox among the Nile states. Ethiopia is the source of 86
percent of the Nile water; it has never claimed monopoly over this water, and at the same time
has utilized very little of this resource. On the other hand, Egypt depends on 97 percent of its
water from the Nile, all of which comes from upstream countries. Unfortunately, Egypt claims a
monopoly over Nile waters. Egypt’s position may be borne out of fear and uncertainty, but it is a
legacy of the past and no longer a rational policy (Yacob, 2012). Egypt had a better diplomacy
policy than Ethiopia on the Nile since the British Basel Agreement and the mediation of the US.
Beyond its largest population, Egypt owns a very large well-armed dominant army, vibrant
media, and the strongest industrial base, and it hosts the Arab League. These are not the only
activities that have been taken by Egypt. Many legitimate and illegitimate actions have been and
are still taken by Egypt’s government. Egyptians have focused their policy on the Nile with the
object of thwarting any moves by upstream Ethiopia to divert or arrest the flow of the Nile
(Ademnur, 2002). In fact, diplomatically and militarily Egypt is more dominant than Ethiopia in
the Nile basin. The Ethiopian highland region contributes nearly 86% of the Nile flow, which
rises to 95% during the flood period. This massive upstream contribution undoubtedly confers a
key position to Ethiopia on the management of Nile water. Moreover, Ethiopia is not bound by
any agreement with Egypt and Sudan over the sharing of the river. Thanks to pressure from the
World Bank, Egypt has agreed to bring about a superficial shift in its regional foreign policy
over the Nile water issue. The adverse economic situation and the need for financial support by
the World Bank practically forced Egypt’s decision to express its willingness to cooperate, and
not to explicitly demand a monopoly, over the Nile water (Ashok, 2011). The Nile 2002
Conference Series (1993‐2004) played a pioneering role in bringing together both political and
academic representatives from the Nile riparian to debate hydro political cooperation. However,
it was only in the mid‐1990s, that all Nile riparian were committed to developing a multilateral
cooperative institution that would deal with technical, environmental, developmental and legal
issues (Ana Elisa, 2009). Since concern with the free flow of the Nile has always been a national
security issue for Egypt, as the Blue Nile goes, it has been held that Egypt must be in a position
either to dominate Ethiopia, or to neutralize whatever unfriendly regime might emerge there. As
the late President Sadat stated: “Any action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will
be faced with a firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to war”
(Daniel, 2019). A combination of stronger material, bargaining and ideational power has allowed
Egypt to develop a hydrohegemonic status in the basin vis‐à‐vis the other riparian states and to
maintain the regime that best served its national interests (Mohammed, 2015). Sharing
Transboundary water resources creates both technical and diplomatic challenges, especially
given the historical context where the Nile River was not considered a shared resource. Records
show that the Nile River has historically long been a source of mistrust among riparian’s with
periodic conflict between upper and lower stream countries (Hanne and Bruce, 2017).
Currently, Ethiopia is building a $4 billion dam on the Blue Nile, a tributary of the Nile River,
near the border with Sudan, saying the project is necessary to provide the country with much
needed-electricity. The foreign ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan will hold a new round of
talks in Washington the next week at an invitation from the U.S. administration in an effort to
solve the dispute. William Davison, a senior analyst at the International Crisis group (ICG),
believes that the current tension would not morph into a military conflict between Egypt and
Ethiopia. Davison said the filling period and operation of the dam is the core of the Ethiopian-
Egyptian dispute (Mohammed, 2019). Ethiopia wants to move quickly to expedite maximum
power generation. Egypt is concerned about how the dam will be managed during drought years
and wants the GERD [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam] filled slowly enough that a sufficient
volume of water can flow downstream each year during filling. Egypt also says it wants an office
at the GERD site staffed with its own technicians. Ethiopia and Egypt should be ready to make
significant concessions to avoid a catastrophic escalation in this seemingly intractable dispute
(Addisu, 2020). Direct conflicts have not taken place between Ethiopia and Egypt since the early
19th century, but psychological warfare and mutual suspicion have always shrouded Ethiopian-
Egyptian relations. In the history of the two countries, it has been observed that the Egyptians
aim to keep Ethiopia under constant pressure, so that the latter would not threaten the continued
discharge of the Nile waters. The hard environmental reality is that nature has accorded Ethiopia
the potential command of the most essential headwaters of the Nile, while life in Egypt and
lower Sudan can only sustain a portion of these water resources. During the Ethio-Eritrea war
political conditions, since the eruption of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict two years ago, the role
of Egypt remains in the background with the motivation of supporting and backing Eritrea in its
conflict with Ethiopia. In addition to this, despite the OAU intervention in particular, Ethiopia's
role to bring peace in Somalia has been challenged by Egypt, with the view to establish a puppet
state in order to match Ethiopia. These Egyptian policies reflect on Egypt's permanent interest in
the Nile and the Blue Nile in particular (Elias, 2009). The current challenge to Egypt’s hydro-
hegemony is a consequence of a general shift in the regional geopolitical balance which has been
underway for some years now. Despite these power shifts, alarmist pundits, and even Egyptian
military threats, the prospect for armed confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia is very
unlikely. Such a confrontation would set in motion dynamics that would eventually lead to their
mutual destruction an outcome that serves as a deterrent (Goitom, 2014). The USA had launched
a new mediation attempt at the end of 2019. However, initial hopes of a swift agreement have
not materialized. The longer substantial results are postponed, the more apparent it becomes that
external mediation alone will not suffice to resolve the dispute. In order to defuse the conflict, it
might be necessary for Egypt to compensate Ethiopia for concessions on the GERD. Germany
and its European partners should provide Egypt with financial support for creating a
compensation mechanism (Tobias, Luca and Stephan, 2020).

The future prospects

Ethiopia surprised northeastern Africa in 2011 by announcing its plan to construct the first
hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile. But since Ethiopia was started the Dam Egypt, Ethiopia, and
Sudan become conflict. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan organized a group of experts to review and
assess the potential effects of the dam. The International Panel of Experts made up of ten
members, two from each of the three states and four international submitted their impact
assessment to all three governments in June 2013. The report has not yet been made public, but
Ethiopia claims it concluded that the dam will not cause “significant harm” to any downstream
state (Goitom, 2014). After years of escalating tensions between upstream and downstream
countries of the Nile basin, mainly because of Ethiopia's construction of Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD), a sense of mistrust hangs over the dam’s ultimate use. Preventing
Transboundary water conflicts cannot be realized without forming adequate cooperation in
managing shared waters which through robust and equitable structures and institutions(Mahsa,
2018). Since conflict resolution is a political process to make decisions after a lengthy procedure
of negotiations, cooperation at Transboundary level needs much time, patience and persistence to
have ampler chances to succeed if the drivers and interests of the riparian states are identified,
quantified and shared with the help of diplomatic mechanisms. The nature of cooperative
decision-making at the Transboundary water scale is regarded as a complex system composed
which cannot be forgone without diplomacy among parties to facilitate understanding of actors'
interests by creating a transparent and confident environment (ibid). Egypt and Ethiopia long
running dispute on the GERD USA had tried to negotiation but Ethiopia withdraw herself from
the meeting. The megaproject the largest dam in Africa is designed to power Ethiopia’s
development and her land the country’s emergence as a regional heavyweight. But its
construction has stirred downstream Egypt’s worst fears of a dried out Nile its fierce reaction to
the dam has fueled unprecedented tensions with Ethiopia. Amid frequent saber rattling and
significant naval buildups, the Nile basin has been transformed in the popular imagination, at
least in to the site of what could be the world’s first major Transboundary water war (peter,
2020). If the two countries cannot become an accord or reach an agreement it is not good for
Eastern Africa politics.
Conclusion

The countries of the Eastern Nile Region are Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia. Main rivers of the
Eastern Nile region rise in the Ethiopian Highlands. The international community is concerned
about growing tension in the region of the Nile basin due to conflicting interests concerning the
allocation of Nile waters among three countries of Ethiopia and Egypt. All two Eastern Nile
riparian countries aspire to the goals of economic development, environmental protection, and
poverty alleviation. Ethiopia and Egypt recognize that their economic development is affected by
how they manage their shared water resource, the waters of the Nile River. Both countries must
ensure that their population and economy have sufficient water supplies for human consumption,
food production, industrial growth, and other usages.
In the past, Egypt has established itself as a water hegemony that controls a majority of the water
resources of the region. This status has been recently challenged by developments and alliances
of the upstream countries, increasing the tension between Egypt and Ethiopia. Rivalry over the
Nile River has been one of the most stubborn impediments to peace and stability in the Horn of
Africa, particularly for Ethiopia. For a long-time, Egypt has claimed its historical right to an
annual quota of 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile waters. This claim has threatened Ethiopian
water resources totalling to 86 percent of Nile waters. The need for Ethiopia and Egypt to
reconcile their existing and potential interests with respect to Nile water resources in an equitable
and sustainable manner is evident, yet challenging, especially given their growing populations.
Egypt has for long extremely been dependent on the waters of Nile and Egyptians are 97
percent dependent on the Nile waters. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have held tripartite
negotiations over the Nile for the past ten years. The contention between the three countries has
been over the use of the river and the GERD.  Ethiopia asserts that the GERD will not harm
Egypt but Egypt disagrees. Ethiopia avers that it is only claiming its right to utilize one of its
resources for national development under international law of equitable use of Transboundary
water bodies. Egypt claims its rights under international agreements. Today Ethiopia starting to
sale the electric power from the dam in this result the Egyptian supply of water also minimizes.
For the Egyptian this is not good because Nile is the lifeline the same to that Ethiopia needed the
Nile for the electric power purpose yet both cannot become reach an agreement they going to
war between them.

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