Aer 20141734

American Economic Review 2017, 107(3): 714–747
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141734
Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests

for Tasks with Low Promotability†
By Linda Babcock, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund,
and Laurie Weingart*
Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender

segregation in labor markets. We examine the allocation of a task that
everyone prefers be completed by someone else (writing a report,
serving on a committee, etc.) and find evidence that women, more
than men, volunteer, are asked to volunteer, and accept requests to
volunteer for such tasks. Beliefs that women, more than men, say
yes to tasks with low promotability appear as an important driver of
these differences. If women hold tasks that are less promotable than
those held by men, then women will progress more slowly in organi-
zations. (JEL I23, J16, J44, J71, M12, M51)
Despite significant female educational advances, we continue to see gender dif-

ferences in labor market outcomes (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; Bertrand,
Goldin, and Katz 2010). Particularly striking is the persistent vertical gender segre-
gation (Altonji and Blank 1999; Bertrand and Hallock 2001). To better understand
the process by which men and women advance in the workplace, researchers have
begun to examine whether the tasks that they perform at work vary, and whether
such differences contribute to differences in advancement.
Of particular interest is whether, relative to men, women spend less time on tasks
that are likely to influence their performance evaluations (high-promotability tasks)
and more time on tasks that, while benefiting the organization, are less likely to
affect their evaluation and career advancement (low-promotability tasks). For exam-
ple, in industry, revenue-generating tasks may be seen as more promotable than
* Babcock: Heinz College and Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000
Forbes Avenue, BP 319, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 (e-mail: lb2k@andrew.cmu.edu); Recalde: International Food Policy
Research Institute, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division, 2033 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006 (e-mail:
m.recalde@cgiar.org); Vesterlund: Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4928 WW Posvar Hall,
Pittsburgh, PA 15260, and NBER (e-mail: vester@pitt.edu); Weingart: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 (e-mail: weingart@cmu.edu). The first three authors contributed equally to this
project. We thank David Tannenbaum, Craig Fox, Noah Goldstein, and Jason Doctor for giving us permission
to use their data. We thank David Klinowski, Rachel Landsman, Conor Lennon, and Amanda Weirup for superb
research assistance. Participants at seminars and conferences at the University of Zurich, Stanford, Harvard, UCSB,
UCSD, UCLA, CMU, Monash University, University of Adelaide, University of Bonn, University of Pittsburgh,
University of Pennsylvania, and Stockholm School of Economics are thanked for their helpful comments. We thank
the Carnegie Bosch Institute and the NSF (SES-1330470) for generous financial support. Finally, we are forever
grateful to MJ Tocci and Brenda Peyser for inspiring our research on low-promotability tasks. The authors declare
that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.
†
Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141734 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s).
714
VOL. 107 NO. 3 Babcock et al.: Gender differences in tasks 715
non-revenue-generating tasks. In research-oriented universities, research-related

tasks may be considered more promotable than service-related tasks. We find in a
survey of 48 Carnegie Mellon faculty that there is broad agreement that promotion
is more likely when more time is spent on research and less time is spent on service.
Faculty in our survey were presented with four tasks (working on a research paper,
presenting research talks at conferences, serving on an undergraduate curriculum
revision committee, and serving on the faculty senate) and were asked to rank them
by how an assistant professor should best spend 50 additional hours over a semester
to increase the likelihood of promotion. Of those surveyed, 89.6 percent ranked
research paper and conferences as more important than curriculum committee and
faculty senate. While the university benefits from service on faculty senate and on
curriculum review, individual benefits are more limited. The assignments take time
away from research and play a smaller role than research at time of promotion.
Faculty who spend more time on service are disadvantaged relative to those who
spend less time.
Our faculty task-ranking study suggests that there is consensus about what tasks
are more and less promotable, and indeed recent survey evidence from academia
shows gender differences in the allocation of time on tasks that differ in promot-
ability. In a survey of 349 faculty at the University of Amherst, Misra, Lundquist,
and Templer (2012) find that relative to male faculty, female faculty spent 2.45
fewer hours per week on research. Mitchell and Hesli (2013) find, in a sample
of 1,399 political science faculty in the United States, that women advised more
undergraduate students and participated in more department and college-level
committees than men. They conclude that women more than men provide ser-
vice that, while helping the organization, may not help them to advance in their
careers. Finally, Porter (2007) finds in the National Survey of Postsecondary
Faculty (NSOPF) that female faculty spend 15 percent more hours on committee
work than do men.
Task assignments outside of academia are also shown to differ by gender.
Benschop and Doorewaard (1998) find that women employees of a large bank per-
formed fewer developmental tasks than men, and Ohlott, Ruderman, and McCauley
(1994) find, in a sample of professionals, supervisors, middle- and upper-level
managers, that women had fewer challenging and developmental opportunities
(high stakes, managing diversity, and external pressure). In a study of mid-level
jobs De Pater, Van Vianen, and Bechtoldt (2010) show that men, more than women,
evaluate their individual task assignments as challenging, and find that these differ-
ences partially result from managers being more likely to assign challenging tasks
to their male rather than to their female subordinates.
The standard explanations for gender differences in labor market experiences
can help explain differences in task allocations. Differences in ability and pref-
erences as well as discrimination may cause men and women to hold a different
portfolio of tasks in the workplace (e.g., Polachek 1981; Goldin and Rouse 2000;
Black and Strahan 2001). Other explanations for gender differences in the portfolio
of tasks may be that women are more reluctant than men to negotiate (Babcock
and Laschever 2003) and to compete (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003;
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) and thus fail to “lean in” for tasks with high promot-
ability (Sandberg 2013).
716 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MarcH 2017
While recent work has emphasized factors that can distort the allocation of tasks
with high promotability, the objective of the present paper is to examine the alloca-
tion of tasks with low promotability. Rather than treating low-promotability tasks as
the residual of the allocation of more desirable tasks, we examine directly whether
men and women differ in their response to requests to perform tasks with low pro-
motability, whether there are differences in the frequency by which men and women
face such requests, and what factors likely contribute to such potential differences.
Our interest is in low-promotability tasks for which the worker has some discre-
tion and can decide whether or not to perform the task. Consider, for example, an
untenured assistant professor at a research university. She knows that in terms of
promotion, the best use of her time is to focus on her research. What will she do
when asked by her dean to serve on a faculty senate committee? She knows that this
will take a lot of her time, take her away from her research, and is less likely to pro-
duce rewards relative to spending time on research. Yet, important faculty matters
are debated in the faculty senate and the institution is important to the well-func-
tioning of the university. Will her response differ from that of a male colleague with
comparable credentials? Is she more likely than a comparable male colleague to
receive such requests?
Gender differences in the frequency of requests and in the acceptance of requests
for less-promotable tasks may help explain why women advance at a slower rate
than men in the workplace.1 Unless women spend more time at work than do men,
working on less-promotable tasks means that they spend less time on more-promot-
able tasks. The career consequences of accepting a discretionary low-promotability
task may, however, extend beyond the opportunity costs of the assignment itself. In
particular, such assignments may generate lower job satisfaction and in turn reduce
the worker’s commitment and investment in her job.2
In understanding what may give rise to gender differences in the allocation of
low-promotability tasks we examine tasks that individuals prefer be completed yet
prefer be completed by others. Avoiding the task leads to a relative advancement.
We examine first whether men and women differ in their “supply” of such tasks,
and second, whether the “demand” for such tasks differs by gender.3 Examining
1
As tasks with low promotability are important to the organization, one may ask why the completion of such
tasks does not warrant greater compensation. Central to the framework we have in mind is that independent of
worker skills it is preferable for workers to ensure that low-promotability tasks are performed. As an example,
a volunteer for the IRB will always be found among scholars who conduct experiments, because absent such a
volunteer no one will be able to conduct such research. While the performance on low-promotability tasks may
vary, the return to improvements in performance is likely smaller than for high-promotability tasks. Hence with
the low-promotability tasks always being provided, in recruiting, retention, compensation, and promotion, greater
emphasis will be placed on performance of tasks with high promotability (e.g., publications).
2
An example of this phenomenon is provided by Chan and Anteby (2016). They find in a study of TSA employ-
ees that, relative to men, women perform more undesirable tasks, have lower levels of job satisfaction, and develop
more narrow skills sets. These gender differences contributed to lower rates of promotion, lower pay, and higher
rates of turnover for women than for men. Thus the finding that career interruptions and differences in weekly hours
explain differences in salaries for male and female MBAs (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010) need not imply gender
equality if differences in labor market attachment result from differential task allocations.
3
In discussing both the demand and supply of less-promotable tasks we consider tasks for which there is a
request and some discretion over the acceptance of the request. The tasks examined fall between those considered
in the psychology literature on “organizational citizenship behaviors” (OCBs), where individuals on their own
initiate tasks that benefit the organization (e.g., Organ 1988), and those considered in the organizational psychology
literature’s examination of task allocation, where the employee must accept an assigned task (e.g., De Pater, Van
Vianen, and Bechtoldt 2010).
the response to requests to perform low-promotability tasks we report on field evi-

dence that suggests that women more than men accept such requests. Since this
finding may result from men and women having different preferences for the tasks
in question, we next explore this gender difference in a controlled laboratory setting.
Specifically, we conduct multiple experiments where participants in a group are pre-
sented with a task that only one person can undertake. The return from performing
the task is such that the individual will only undertake it if no one else is willing to
do it. Our design captures the incentives members of a group face when asked to
volunteer for a task that each member would prefer another member of the group
to perform (such as writing a report, serving on a committee, organizing an event,
etc.)—all group members want the task to be completed yet the person who under-
takes the task is put at a relative disadvantage.
In our first experiment men and women are anonymously paired in groups. All
members are treated equally and face the same incentives to perform a task. Despite
facing the same incentives we find that women volunteer 50 percent more than men,
and we do not find evidence that the differential is explained by individual charac-
teristics such as risk and altruism. To examine the key driver of the response we use
an experimental manipulation to simultaneously assess the role of preferences and
beliefs. Specifically, in a second experiment we manipulate the gender composition
of groups. The study deviates from the first only by having all participants in the lab
be of the same sex and thus securing that participants know that they are grouped
only with members of their own sex. Results from this same-sex experiment reveal
that men and women are equally likely to volunteer. This response to the gender
composition of the group shows that the willingness to volunteer is not fixed, and
it suggests that the documented gender gap in volunteering likely results from the
belief that women are more likely than men to volunteer. Our third experiment fur-
ther explores the role of beliefs and examines whether women more frequently are
asked to volunteer. Specifically, we add an outside requestor to our initial design
and charge this requestor with the task of asking one group member to volunteer.
Consistent with the belief that women are more likely than men to accept requests,
we find that requestors more frequently ask female rather than male group members
to volunteer. Confirming this belief, women more than men agree to volunteer when
asked to do so. Using two additional experiments we find, as further evidence of the
role played by beliefs, that third parties asked to predict behavior in our first exper-
iment anticipate a higher rate of volunteering for women than for men, and that the
participants’ altruistic preferences are such that they cannot generate the observed
difference in volunteering.
The documented gender differences in volunteering and in requests to volunteer
for low-promotability tasks likely contribute to gender differences in task alloca-
tions, and these differences may create barriers to the advancement of women in
organizations and in society as a whole.
I. Response to Volunteer Requests
We begin by examining whether women more than men volunteer to perform

tasks with low promotability. Finding field evidence that men and women differ
in the frequency by which they volunteer for such tasks, we proceed to examine
volunteering behavior in the laboratory where we can control and manipulate the
incentives individuals face for volunteering.
A. Field Evidence
Each year a large public university sends an e-mail from the chair of the faculty
senate to all faculty members asking them to volunteer to serve on a faculty senate
committee. As seen in our survey, faculty view service on faculty senate as less
promotable than research-related tasks. The responses to these e-mails are therefore
useful in understanding responses to requests to perform low-promotability tasks.
Manipulating the e-mail requests, Tannenbaum et al. (2013) conduct an experiment
to determine how the language in the e-mail affects the probability that a faculty
member agrees to serve on a committee. These researchers kindly gave us access to
their data for the 2012–2013 academic year, consisting of e-mail requests to a total
of 3,271 faculty members, 24.7 percent of whom were female. Faculty responded to
the e-mail in one of three ways: did not respond; declined the request; or volunteered
to join a committee. As these data contain both the faculty member’s response to the
e-mail and their demographic characteristics, we can determine whether, when pre-
sented with a request to do the same low-promotability task, men and women differ
in their likelihood of accepting such requests.
Consistent with the view that service on faculty senate is a low-promotability
task, we see across all faculty that only 3.7 percent volunteered to serve, 4.3 per-
cent responded to the e-mail but indicated that they did not wish to serve, and 92
percent ignored the e-mail. There are, however, gender differences in the response.
Female faculty are significantly more likely than male faculty to volunteer to be on
a committee (7.0 percent versus 2.6 percent, a Fisher’s exact test yields p < 0.001).4
Looking at the results of a probit model for the probability of volunteering, we see in
Table 1 that this gender difference is robust to controlling for faculty rank (assistant
professor is the excluded category), as well as to controlling for being in the medical
school and to being in a STEM related field.
These gender differences in the likelihood of saying yes to a request to serve on
a faculty senate committee translate into higher representation of women on these
committees. For the 2012–2013 academic year we find that although women con-
stituted 24.7 percent of faculty they accounted for 37.5 percent of faculty senate
committee members at the university.5
What is not clear from these field data is why women are more likely than men
to accept such requests. One explanation may be that men and women differ in their
preferences for performing such low-promotability tasks. Women may simply have
4
Failure to respond is treated as declining the request. For non-volunteers we find that women more than men
politely and directly declined the request by return e-mail: 6.1 percent of female faculty and 4 percent of male fac-
ulty directly declined the request, p < 0.05.
5
We collected statistics about the gender composition of faculty senate committees from the university’s w
ebsite.
The faculty gender composition numbers are those in the data from Professors Tannenbaum, Fox, Goldstein, and
Doctor. As another example of gender differences in willingness to volunteer to perform less-promotable tasks
Weingart et al. (2014) find gender differences in the response to perform a one-week diary pilot study. Participation
can be seen as a less-promotable task. With the endorsement of the Pittsburgh Human Resources Association, 539
of their members were e-mailed a request to participate in the study. Of those who were e-mailed, 10.3 percent of
men and 18.7 percent of women agreed to participate (Fisher’s exact test p < 0.01).
Table 1—Probability of Volunteering to Join a Committee (Probit)
(1) (2)
Female 0.034 0.034
(0.000) (0.000)
Associate professor −0.005 −0.004
(0.612) (0.603)
Full professor −0.016 −0.015
(0.063) (0.064)
Emeritus professor −0.033 −0.030
(0.000) (0.000)
Other rank −0.016 −0.014
(0.373) (0.442)
Medical school 0.040
(0.001)
STEM −0.024
(0.018)
Notes: Dependent variable: individual decision to volunteer (1-volunteer, 0-don’t volunteer).

The table presents marginal effects. Assistant professor is the excluded category. Faculty at the
medical school are also in a STEM related field. p-values are reported in parentheses. There are
3,271 participants.
a stronger preference for service work such as serving on a faculty senate commit-
tee. To understand the differential response to requests we next move to the labo-
ratory where we can better control and manipulate the incentives associated with
volunteering and thus can begin to understand why men and women differ in their
response to such requests.
B. Are Women More Likely than Men to Volunteer (Experiment 1)?
To study differences in the propensity by which men and women accept requests
to perform low-promotability tasks, we conduct a laboratory experiment mirroring
the incentives that a small group faces when it is asked to find a volunteer for a task
that everyone is reluctant to undertake (writing a report, serving on a committee,
planning a holiday party, etc.). The setting we have in mind is one where every
member of a committee or group prefers that the task be undertaken, yet everyone
prefers that it be undertaken by someone other than themselves. An individual is rel-
atively better off if the task is done by someone else because it allows that individual
to spend more time on more-promotable tasks.6 After the request for a volunteer is
made to the group, every member waits for a volunteer to step forward, fully aware
that an excessive delay increases the likelihood that an inferior outcome will result
(such as the task not being completed in time or not completed at all). As no explicit
request is made of any one individual, the request is implicit and arises through time
pressure.7
6
There are likely also low-promotability tasks that are not individually rational to undertake.
7
While delay does not carry a monetary cost it may carry a psychological cost. Bliss and Nalebuff (1984)
develop a model with costly delay where individuals decide whether to secure the provision of a binary public good.
Design.—Capturing the incentives described above, our experimental design

is as follows. In each of ten rounds participants are randomly and anonymously
assigned to groups of three. Members of the group are then given two minutes to
make an investment (volunteering) decision. Individual earnings are $1 in the event
that no one invests before the end of the two minutes. If one group member makes
the investment, the round ends, and the individual making the investment secures a
payment of $1.25, while the other two group members each receive $2. The investor
is randomly determined in the event that multiple parties simultaneously invest.
With no cost of waiting, investments will be made in the last second of the round
and the game reduces to one of simultaneous moves. Accounting for the possibility
of ties, the game gives rise to three types of equilibria: a pure strategy asymmetric
Nash equilibria where one individual invests and the others do not; a mixed strategy
symmetric equilibrium where each player invests 23.2 percent of the time; and a
mixed strategy asymmetric equilibrium where one person does not invest and the
two others invest 40 percent of the time. Depending on the equilibrium selected,
the probability that an investment occurs is 100 percent, 54 percent, or 64 percent,
respectively.8
Participants and Procedures.—This and other laboratory studies in this paper

used a computerized interface (z-Tree, Fischbacher 2007) and were conducted at
the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of
Pittsburgh. Participants were recruited from introductory economics classes and
were only informed that they would participate in a study on decision making.
None of the participants had prior experience with studies at PEEL. The experiment
lasted slightly less than an hour. Average earnings from the ten decision rounds
were $16.32.9 Nine sessions were conducted, with between 12 and 21 participants
per session, for a total of 150 participants (82 males and 68 females). Sessions were
roughly gender balanced with the share of women participating in a session ranging
between 33 percent and 53 percent.10 The population was rather homogeneous. The
average age was 18.9 years, with 18 and 19 year olds accounting for 77 percent of
the participants, 74 percent were Caucasian, 87 percent were born in the United
States, and 83 percent were either freshmen or sophomores. None of these charac-
teristics differed significantly by gender.11
The payoff structure corresponds to that of a three-player game of Chicken, Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith
8
and Price 1973), Dragon-Slayer game (Bliss and Nalebuff 1984), or Volunteer’s Dilemma (Diekmann 1985). Note
that any participant’s decision to cooperate immediately solves the coordination problem. Existing experimental
work on the static Volunteer’s Dilemma focuses on the theoretical predictions that group size decreases volunteering
and the probability that no member of the group volunteers (Diekmann 1993; Franzen 1995; Goeree, Holt, and Smith
2017; Healy and Pate 2009; Murnighan, Kim, and Metzger 1993). Recent work has also investigated the distribution
of player types (Bergstrom, Garratt, and Leo 2015) and mechanisms to allow flexible turn taking (Leo 2014).
9
Including a $6 show-up fee secured average earnings of $22.32.
10
The share of females in each session was: 33.3 percent in two sessions, 44.4 percent in two sessions, 47.6 percent
in one session, 50 percent in three sessions, and 53.3 percent in one session. The likelihood that individuals invest is
not affected by this degree of variation in gender composition. Clustering on the individual and controlling for round, a
probit of the individual’s propensity to invest on the share of women in the session reveals a marginal effect of −0.031
( p = 0.921). Furthermore, the marginal effects reported in our central results are not affected by controlling for the
share of women in the session (the coefficient on female is 0.113 rather than the 0.111 seen in Table 2, column 1), nor
is the coefficient on the session share of women statistically significant (coefficient −0.148, p = 0.615).
11
The mean age of men and women is not significantly different (18.99 versus 18.79, two-sided t-test
p = 0.319). Similarly using a Fisher’s exact test there is no significant gender difference in the distribution of age
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated in a pre-marked cubicle, asked
to provide informed consent, and given instructions. These instructions were also
read aloud and explained all procedures of the study, the payoff structure, the ran-
dom matching protocol, and what information participants would receive during
the study.12 We then began the ten round decision phase of the experiment. In
each round participants were anonymously matched in groups of three, with the
stipulation that no one could be paired with the same person twice in a row. Each
group member was shown an individual computer screen that displayed the seconds
remaining in the round and a button that could be clicked if the individual wanted
to invest. The round ended the instant someone in the group clicked the investment
button. Participants waited until all groups had either made an investment decision
or the two minutes passed without an investment being made. At the end of the
ten rounds, participants answered a number of questions to assess individual pref-
erences and personality attributes. A description of the measures and procedures
used to elicit them is provided in online Appendix C. A demographic questionnaire
elicited gender, age, nationality, year in college, and college major. Gender was not
mentioned until the very end of the experiment.
Results.—To characterize behavior in the experiment we first determine whether

groups succeeded in making investments and what the timing was of such invest-
ments. We then ask whether men and women were equally likely to make the
investment.
Over the course of the ten rounds groups succeed in investing 84.2 percent of
the time (SE =1.63). With two-thirds of these investments being made within the
last two seconds of a round, participants largely treated the environment as one of
a war of attrition.13 The likelihood that a group succeeded in making an investment
decreased from 88.4 percent during the first five rounds to 80 percent during the last
five rounds. The per round decrease in the investment rate is significant.14
With four out of five groups securing an investment, the group’s rate of success
exceeds that predicted by the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium success
rate of 54 percent. This raises the question of whether asymmetric play better char-
acterizes behavior and whether certain members of the group more frequently make
the mutually beneficial investment. Of particular interest is whether the likelihood
that the individual invests differs by gender. Figure 1 reveals that women are sys-
tematically more likely than men to undertake the investment.15 Starting in round
one the investment rate by women surpasses that of men. With a sustained differ-
ential over the ten rounds, this results in a substantial difference in the total number
of times men and women invest. Over the ten rounds women on average invest
( p = 0.716), race ( p = 0.681), number of years in the United States ( p = 0.587), years in college ( p = 0.292), or
in choice of major ( p = 0.681).
12
See online Appendix A for instructions and sample decision screens of all experiments.
13
The share of investments made in the last two seconds of a round increases from 57.9 percent during the
first half of the experiment (Rounds 1–5) to 83 percent during the second half (Rounds 6–10). Online Appendix
Table B1 shows the distribution of decision times in Experiment 1.
14
Treating the group as the unit of observation, a probit regression of the probability that a group invests on
round number yields a marginal effect of −0.019, p = 0.001.
15
As we only see the individual making the investment, we cannot compare the individual investment rate with
the equilibrium prediction.
0.5
0.4
Probability of investing
0.3
0.2
0.1
Male
Female
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
Figure 1. Probability of Investing: Experiment 1
3.4 times, whereas men invest 2.3 times. This 48 percent difference in total investment
is statistically significant (two-sided t-test p = 0.003). Figure 2 shows the distribu-
tion of total investments aggregated over the ten rounds by gender. The distribu-
tion for women first order stochastically dominates that for men, and the difference
between the two is significant (a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yields p = 0.020).16
While 61 percent of men invest two or fewer times, only 40 percent of women fall
in this lower investment range.
In Table 2 we estimate the probability that men and women invest in a given round.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual to account for the repeated nature of
decisions. The reported marginal effects confirm the insights from Figures 1 and 2.
Pooling the data from all ten rounds we see in column 1 that participants become
less likely to invest over the course of the experiment and that women are signifi-
cantly more likely to invest than are men. The average investment rate for men is
23 percent and that for women is 11 percentage points higher. Columns 2 and 3
confirm that these results hold both for the first and second half of the experiment.17
C. Why Does the Rate of Investment Differ by Gender?
There are two potential explanations for the gender difference in the investment
rate. First, gender may be a proxy for individual preferences and these differences
16
A Fisher’s exact test yields p = 0.159. The median contribution is two for men and four for women (Wilcoxon
Mann-Whitney rank-sum z = −2.929, p = 0.003).
17
Including a (female × round) interaction reveals a small and insignificant decrease in the gender gap over the
course of the experiment. The marginal effect of the interaction term, corrected to account for the nonlinear nature
of the estimation, is −0.0005 ( p = 0.944) in the column-1 specification. Online Appendix Table B2 shows similar
results when including session dummies. We do not lead with these specifications because session dummies cannot
be included for our single-sex sessions of Experiment 2 given that they perfectly correlate (by design) with gender.
We do not cluster standard errors at the session level either, because the number of clusters (sessions) is small. Score
boot-strapped tests (Kline and Santos 2012) conducted for all models presented in the paper that cluster standard
errors at the session level show similar results. Note also that results are similar when including round dummies
instead of having round enter linearly in the model, and when analyzing only behavior in round 1.
0.25
Male
Female
0.2
Relative frequency
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Total investment
Figure 2. Distribution of Total Investment: Experiment 1
Table 2—Probability of Investing ( Probit): Experiment 1
All rounds Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10 All rounds

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.111 0.107 0.115 0.090
(0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.036)
Round −0.006 −0.009 −0.009 −0.006
(0.052) (0.407) (0.350) (0.050)
Nonconformity −0.021
(0.399)
Risk-seeking −0.018
(0.354)
Altruism 0.023
(0.377)
Agreeable −0.014
(0.661)
Observations 1,500 750 750 1,500
Notes: Dependent variable: individual investment decision (1-invest, 0-don’t invest). The table presents mar-
ginal effects. Standard errors are clustered on the individual. p-values are reported in parentheses. There are 150
participants.
may cause women to invest more than men. For example, women may be more
likely than men to agree to requests to perform non-promotable tasks if they are
more other-regarding and more concerned for the welfare of others (e.g., Eckel and
Grossman 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), if they are more agreeable and
have a greater desire to be liked by the requestor (Braiker 2002), if they have a
greater desire to conform to a norm of accepting such requests (e.g., Santee and
Jackson 1982; Eagly, Wood, and Fishbaugh 1981), if they are more risk averse
(e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2008), and more concerned about the consequences from
d eclining the request (Heilman and Chen 2005).18 Second, differences in beliefs
about whether others will invest can cause women to invest more than men. For
example, both men and women may believe that women are more likely to invest
than men.
Gender Differences in Preferences.—We first explore whether there is direct evi-

dence that preferences help to explain the gender gap in investment rates. After the
experiment, we asked participants a series of questions to elicit measures of risk
aversion, altruism, agreeableness, and nonconformity (see online Appendix C for
the full set of items used to measure these constructs and for the correlation between
these variables and the outcome of interest). While finding significant gender differ-
ences in some of these measures, we see in Table 2 (column 4) that these additional
controls do not eliminate the gender difference in investment rates. The coefficient
on female remains large and statistically different from zero.19
Of course, the results in column 4 do not conclusively rule out that gender is
standing in for individual differences in preferences and attitudes. For example, our
included variables could be measured imprecisely or we might have omitted import-
ant factors in our empirical model.20 To examine what gives rise to the gender gap
in investments we therefore rely on an experimental manipulation for identification.
By slightly changing the experiment we can simultaneously assess whether gender
differences in investment are explained by gender differences in preferences and/
or by beliefs.
Beliefs: Does the Response to Requests Depend on the Gender Composition of

the Group (Experiment 2)?—To manipulate beliefs we conducted a single-sex ver-
sion of Experiment 1.21 That is, instead of inviting close to equal proportions of men
and women to our laboratory for each session, we conducted sessions where only
men or only women participated. The purpose of the single-sex experiment was to
determine whether gender differences in investments are robust to the group’s gen-
der composition or if they are instead influenced by beliefs. If gender differences in
investing are caused by women being more conforming, more altruistic, and more
risk averse, then we would expect to see higher investment rates in all-female ses-
sions than in all-male sessions.22 However, if behavior is influenced by a belief that
women more frequently invest than men, then we would expect the individual rate
See Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Niederle (2016) for reviews on gender differences.
18
19
Including controls for participant age, race, year in school, and whether they were born in the United States
leaves the coefficient on female virtually unchanged, the marginal effect is 0.099 ( p = 0.020).
20
Our elicitation of risk and altruism was improved in Experiments 3 and 4 to mirror the incentives of investing.
These improved measures are predictive of the decision to invest when gender is controlled for, but do not explain
the gender gap (see online Appendix Table B9, which shows the results of a five-round replication of Experiment 1).
21
Examining coordination in the Battle-of-the-Sexes game, Holm (2000) points to the role of a gender-based
focal point. He finds that when males and females are paired with a female, they are more likely to select the action
associated with their preferred equilibrium. This “hawkish” behavior implied that coordination more frequently was
achieved in mixed-sex pairing—thus securing greater efficiency. In our setting the investment can only be made
by one individual, and coordination issues are resolved when investing. Thus the decision not to invest cannot be
justified by it reducing the chance of miscoordination, and we do not find greater efficiency in mixed-sex groups.
22
In our first experiment participants did not know the gender composition of the group they were in. However,
with women being more likely to invest than men we find an insignificantly larger chance that investments are
secured in all-female groups than in groups with at least one male (All-female mean = 0.935, Not-all-female mean
= 0.836, two-sided Fisher’s exact test p = 0.202).
of investments to change in single-sex groups. In particular, when a man moves

from what is likely a mixed-sex trio to knowing that his fellow group members
are all men, he will see his decision to invest as more critical and will increase the
probability that he invests. By contrast when a woman moves from what is likely a
mixed-sex trio to knowing that her fellow group members are all female, she will
see her decision to invest as less critical and will decrease the probability that she
invests.
The recruitment method, instructions, and procedures of these single-sex sessions
were identical to those of the mixed-sex sessions of Experiment 1. One-hundred sev-
enteen undergraduate students were recruited from introductory economics classes at
the University of Pittsburgh and the characteristics of this pool of participants were
similar to those of Experiment 1. Participants were on average 18.7 years old, with
18 and 19 year olds accounting for 83 percent. Seventy-four percent were Caucasian,
91 percent were born in the United States, and 85 percent were either freshmen or
sophomores. We conducted three sessions with all women (n = 66) and three ses-
sions with all men (n = 51). Sessions consisted of between 15 and 24 participants.
With ten rounds we have a total of 390 group decisions.23 Following the procedures
of Experiment 1, gender was not mentioned until the survey at the end of the experi-
ment. Although gender was not mentioned, by looking around the room participants
could see the population from which members of their anonymously drawn groups
would be drawn. Hence, the gender composition of the room could influence the par-
ticipants’ beliefs about the likelihood that other members of their group would invest.
The results are shown below. Pooling first the data from the all-male and all-female
sessions we find aggregate behavior and investment times very similar to those of
Experiment 1. Compared to the 84.2 percent investment rate in the mixed-sex ses-
sions of Experiment 1, we find an investment rate of 80.8 percent in the single-sex
sessions of Experiment 2. The timing of the investments is also similar (see online
Appendix Table B3). Investments were primarily made within the last two seconds
of a round, with this share increasing from 69.3 percent during the first half of the
experiment (Rounds 1–5) to 82.7 percent during the second half (Rounds 6–10).
Furthermore, over the course of the experiment the likelihood that a group invests
decreases from 90.3 percent in the first half to 71.3 percent in the second half. A
probit regression reveals that this decrease in investments over time is significant.24
Next we ask whether these aggregate results mask differences between the
all-female and all-male groups. Of interest is whether the gender gap in the proba-
bility of investing is sensitive to the single-sex setting. Figure 3 displays by gender
the probability that an individual invests in a given round. In sharp contrast to our
results from Experiment 1, we do not find that women are more likely to invest
than men. The average number of investments over the ten rounds does not differ
by gender (mean men = 2.67, mean women = 2.71, two-sided subject-level t-test
23
Average individual earnings from the ten decision rounds were $16.06. Including a $6 show up fee secured
average earnings of $22.06. The mean age of men and women is not significantly different (18.75 versus 18.68,
two-sided t-test p = 0.761). Similarly, using a Fisher’s exact test there is no significant gender difference in the dis-
tribution of age ( p = 0.951), race ( p = 0.879), number of years in the United States ( p = 0.641), years in college
( p = 0.878), or in choice of major ( p = 0.112).
24
Treating the group as the unit of observation, a probit of the likelihood that a group invests on round yields
a marginal effect of −0.038 ( p < 0.001).
0.5
Probability of investing 0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Male Female
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
Figure 3. Probability of Investing: Experiment 2
p = 0.918).25 When the gender composition of the group is known to the partici-
pants there is no evidence that all-female groups fare better than all-male groups.
The success rate is 81 percent for female groups and 80 percent for male groups.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of total investments aggregated over the ten rounds
by gender.26
Verifying the results of Figure 3 we see from the probit models in Table 3 that in
single-sex sessions the decision to invest does not depend on the sex of the partici-
pant. Across all ten rounds, the first five rounds, and the last five rounds, we find that
men and women are equally likely to invest.27 The coefficient on female is small
in magnitude and not significantly different from zero. When the four measures
of individual characteristics are included in the regression (risk aversion, altruism,
agreeableness, and nonconformity) the coefficient on female remains insignificant
(column 4).28
The finding that there is no gender difference in the probability of investing when
participants make decisions in single-sex groups helps explain why differences in
individual characteristics did not explain the gender difference in investing seen in
the mixed-sex experiment. The changes in investment rates between Experiment 1
and 2 suggest that the individual’s behavior is not caused by fixed preferences but
instead depends upon the population from which group members are drawn. This
response to the gender of the other group members is consistent with beliefs about
25
The median contribution is two for men and three for women (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum
z = −0.198, p = 0.843).
26
A Fisher’s exact test for equality of distributions yields p = 0.158. A two-sided variance test provides
p = 0.687.
27
Treating the group decision as the unit of observation, we see in Experiment 2 that, controlling for round, a
probit of group investment on all female generates a marginal effect of 0.016 ( p = 0.680).
28
Similar results are obtained when demographic variables such as race, year in school, and whether the par-
ticipant was born in the United States are included in the regressions. The marginal effect of gender is 0.002
( p = 0.968). The results are also similar when analyzing only behavior in round 1.
0.25
Male Female
Relative frequency 0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Total investment
Figure 4. Distribution of Total Investment: Experiment 2
Table 3—Probability of Investing (Probit): Experiment 2
All rounds Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10 All rounds

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.004 0.005 0.004 −0.002
(0.920) (0.916) (0.935) (0.962)
Round −0.012 −0.015 −0.009 −0.013
(0.000) (0.248) (0.389) (0.000)
Nonconformity 0.038
(0.192)
Risk-seeking −0.050
(0.041)
Altruism 0.035
(0.288)
Agreeable 0.020
(0.614)
Observations 1,170 585 585 1,170
Notes: Dependent variable: individual investment decision (1-invest, 0-don’t invest). The table presents mar-
ginal effects. Standard errors are clustered on the individual. p-values are reported in parentheses. There are 117
participants.
the investment rates of men versus women playing a central role when deciding
whether to volunteer.
Figure 5 summarizes the results of the two group compositions in Experiments 1
and 2. The group’s rate of success is independent of the group being drawn from
a single- or mixed-sex population, and in the single-sex sessions it is independent
of whether the group is all-male or all-female.29 As demonstrated in Figure 6 the
29
The marginal effect of a probit of group investment on single-sex that controls for round provides a coefficient
on single sex of −0.031 ( p = 0.217). The similar provision rates in the mixed- and single-sex sessions suggest that
the completion of low-promotability tasks is unlikely to contribute to performance differences that may arise as
a result of gender diversity. For examples of work on gender diversity and performance see Ali, Kulik, and Metz
(2011); Bear and Woolley (2011); and Woolley and Malone (2011).
Likelihood group invests 0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Mixed
All male
All female
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
Figure 5. Probability Group Invests
0.5
0.4
Probability of investing
0.3
0.2
0.1
Single_M Mixed_M
Single_F Mixed_F
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
Figure 6. Individual Propensity to Invest
individual’s propensity to invest is sensitive to the group’s gender composition. The

dashed lines, Single_M and Single_F, refer to the all-male and all-female sessions
(Experiment 2), respectively. The solid lines, Mixed_M and Mixed_F, refer to males
and females in the mixed-sex sessions (Experiment 1), respectively. Relative to the
mixed-sex results, the individual investment rate decreases for women and increases
for men in single-sex sessions. While women are significantly more likely than men
to invest in mixed-sex sessions, this gender gap is eliminated in single-sex sessions.30
30
Clustering standard errors on the individual and controlling for round, a probit of investing on dummies for
female and single-sex treatment and their interactions secures marginal effect on female of 0.109 ( p = 0.003), on
single-sex of 0.038 ( p = 0.375), on the female-single-sex interaction of −0.106 ( p = 0.066), and on round of
Our results are consistent with the predictions of evolutionary game theory, as it
predicts in a Hawk-Dove game that a symmetric equilibrium will be selected within
a single population, whereas an asymmetric equilibrium is predicted when the play-
ers are drawn from different populations (Maynard Smith 1982). Oprea, Henwood,
and Friedman (2011) confirm this prediction.31 While the group investment rate
observed in our study does not correspond to that predicted in either of the three
possible equilibria, it is easily reconciled with a model where individuals have other
regarding preferences.32
The results regarding gender differences in investing in mixed- and single-sex
groups are intriguing. They document that men and women differ in the propensity
by which they agree to implicit requests in mixed-sex groups, and provide insights
into what drives these differences. When moving from a mixed-sex environment to
a single-sex one, women see a decrease in the need to volunteer, while men see an
increase. This change in behavior suggests that beliefs rather than preferences drive
the gender difference documented in Experiment 1.
II. Are Women Asked to Volunteer More than Men (Experiment 3)?
The studies of how faculty spend their time indicates that women are spending
more time on service tasks than men. While it is possible that Deans and Department
Heads believe women to be more skilled at these tasks than men, an alternative
explanation, suggested by our two first experiments, is instead that they may believe
that women are more likely than men to accept requests to do these assignments.
In a laboratory experiment we can examine whether differences in requests arise
when there are no gender differences in ability. This examination of the demand side
allows us to further assess whether beliefs are likely to drive the gender difference in
volunteering. We conduct a third experiment where we extend our design to include
an outside requestor who, after seeing pictures of the three group members, must
ask one of them to invest. This outside requestor has the incentive to ask the person
he or she believes is most likely to accept the request. Based on our findings in the
first two experiments, we expect that participants will be more likely to ask a woman
than a man to volunteer.
−0.009 ( p = 0.000). The coefficient and standard error on the interaction is corrected to account for the nonlinear
nature of the estimation. In another set of analysis, there is no significant gender difference in mean decision time.
Clustering the standard errors on the individual, an OLS regression of remaining decision time on female and round
reveals a coefficient on female of −5.266 ( p = 0.532) in Experiment 1 and of −6.671 ( p = 0.272) in Experiment 2.
31
Oprea, Henwood, and Friedman (2011) examine investments in a two-person Hawk-Dove game and find that
play converges to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol, while
it moves toward an asymmetric and inequitable pure strategy Nash equilibrium when the participants are assigned
either to be row or column players and interact in a two-population environment. As we do not elicit individual
strategies we are not able to determine whether play converges to a particular equilibrium.
32
Letting π
s , π1 , and π2 denote payoff to self and to the two other group members, respectively, assuming
preferences of the form πs   +  0.148(π1  + π2),predicts a group investment rate of 80 percent in a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium, and of 86 percent in an asymmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where only two of the three
group members invest. The literature on public good provision suggests that concern for payoffs to others is easily
this large.
A. Design
We modify our experimental framework to study the demand side of task allo-
cation. We add a fourth group member, a requestor, who prior to the two-minute
investment round is charged with asking one of the three members of the investment
group to invest. While unable to personally invest, the requestor benefits from the
group’s investment. The requestor receives $1 if no one invests and receives $2
if any member of the investment group invests before the end of the two minute
round. The choices and payoffs of the three members of the investment group are as
in our first two experiments: $1 if no one invests; and if one person invests then the
investor receives $1.25 while non-investors receive $2.
B. Participants and Procedures
We conducted four sessions of Experiment 3. With 20 participants per session

we have choices from a total of 80 participants (37 males and 43 females). Sessions
were roughly gender balanced with the share of women participating in a session
ranging between 50 and 60 percent. Participants were recruited from introductory
classes in the social sciences (economics, political science, and anthropology) and
none of the participants had prior experience with studies at PEEL.33 The average
age was 19.4 years, with 18 and 19 year olds accounting for 68 percent of partici-
pants, 74 percent were Caucasian, 94 percent were born in the United States, and
76 percent were either freshmen or sophomores. With the exception of age none of
these characteristics differed significantly by gender.34
To test whether there are differences in the likelihood of asking a female versus a
male participant to invest, photos were secured of each participant. As participants
entered the lab they were asked to provide informed consent, photos were then taken
one by one on the count of three, and participants were reseated at pre-marked cubi-
cles. We then proceeded with instructions.
Participants were informed that in each round, one person of the four-person
group would be designated the role of “red” player while three individuals would
be designated the role of “green” players and would form an investment group.
The red player was unable to make the investment but was charged with asking one
member of the investment group to invest. Requests by red players were solicited
using the strategy method. After assignment to a group of four, and before learning
who was assigned the role of red or green player, each participant was shown the
photos of the potential investment group and was asked which member they would
ask to invest in the event that they were assigned the role of a red player. Each
33
Note that Experiment 3 is an examination of the demand side and an additional test of the role of beliefs.
Since the design of Experiment 3 differs from that of Experiments 1 and 2, we never compare behavior between the
two types of experiments. Small differences in participant characteristics between the two sets of experiments also
caution against comparing behavior in the two sets of studies.
34
The mean age of men is significantly larger than for women (19.89 versus 18.95, two-sided t-test p = 0.005).
There are minor, but not significant differences in other characteristics. Fisher’s exact tests reveal no significant
gender difference in the distribution of age ( p = 0.168), race ( p = 0.148), number of years in the United States
( p = 0.343), years in college ( p = 0.131), or in choice of major ( p = 0.936). Average earnings from the ten
decision rounds were $17.60. Including a $6 show up fee and two incentivized preference elicitation tasks secured
average earnings of $26.67.
member simultaneously saw the photos of the potential investment group members,
with the order of photos being different for each participant. Once all four members
of the group submitted their requests, photos of the four group members appeared
on the screen indicating the selected role and associated request. The photo of the
red player appeared at the top of the screen, and photos of the three green players
appeared in a row at the bottom of the screen clearly indicating which green player
was asked by the red player to invest. The green player who was asked to invest saw
a message below his or her photo stating “The red player asked you to invest,” while
the two other green players saw the photos with the message “The red player asked
this group member to invest” below the photo of the green player who was asked.
After all participants acknowledged the role assignment and request, the two-minute
investment period began and any green player could invest: both the green player
who was asked and the other green players who were not asked to invest. Mirroring
Experiments 1 and 2, participants learned if an investment was secured, but did not
learn who invested.
For each of the ten rounds, participants were matched in groups of four, using an
algorithm to ensure that participants were not matched with the same individuals
during the first five rounds. While participants for rounds 6–10 can be characterized
as “non-strangers,” it is important to keep in mind that they never learn the invest-
ment decisions of any other participants.
Following the ten rounds of decision making, individual characteristics were elic-
ited. We changed the incentivized risk elicitation task to closely parallel the type of
risk participants experience in the investment task. We also elicited an incentivized
measure of altruism that asks participants to make six binary decisions between two
payoff distributions for group members that reflect the types of payoffs that partici-
pants experience in the investment task (see online Appendix C for details). Finally,
individuals were asked to indicate whether they knew any of the other participants
in the lab. Seeing photos of all the participants in the session they first had to click
on photos of the people they knew or had seen before, then from this subset indicate
whom they had communicated with, and from this remaining subset whom they
were friends with.35
C. Results
Investments occurred rather quickly in Experiment 3: 33.2 percent of investments

were made in the first ten seconds and only 40.1 percent were made in the last two
seconds of the round. The share of early investments is not sensitive to whether
group members are “strangers” (rounds 1–5 where participants had not yet been
paired with each other) or “non-strangers” (rounds 6–10 where participants had
been paired with each other in previous rounds). With 93.5 percent of groups suc-
ceeding in investing in Experiment 3, we find a high level of coordination.36
The central question of Experiment 3 is whether men and women are equally
likely to receive requests from a requestor. That is, when a potential requestor sees
35
52.5 percent of subjects knew at least one other participant in the session. The mean number of participants
individuals report knowing, having communicated with, and being friends with is 1.34, 0.13, and 0.11, respectively.
36
Online Appendix Table B4 shows the distribution of investment times in Experiment 3.
Male
0.15
Female
Relative frequency
0.1
0.05
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Total times asked to invest
Figure 7. Distribution of Strategy-Method Requests per Individual: Experiment 3
photos of the three potential investment group members, does a group member’s
gender help predict whether they are asked?
In using the strategy method to elicit requests, over the ten decision rounds an
individual can at most receive 30 strategy-method requests. Our data reveal substan-
tial heterogeneity in the number of requests participants receive, ranging between
1 to 16 requests. Consistent with participants holding the belief that women are
more likely to invest than men, an individual’s gender is predictive of the number of
requests. Figure 7 shows how the distribution of the total number of strategy-method
requests for women first order stochastically dominates that for men (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p = 0.029). The mean and median number of requests for men are 8.7 and
9, respectively, while for women they are 11.1 and 12, respectively (two-sided t-test
p < 0.01; Wilcoxon Mann Whitney Rank-sum test p < 0.01).
The differences in the number of requests received by men and women are con-
firmed in Table 4 when we control for other observable characteristics. Across
all rounds gender is predictive of the number of requests an individual receives.
Controlling for observable characteristics such as being Caucasian and being some-
one whom participants in the lab are familiar with, we find that on average females
receive 2.5 more requests than males over the ten rounds of the experiment.37 This
difference in requests increases over the course of the experiment. Females receive
on average 0.9 more requests than males during the stranger rounds (rounds 1–5),
while they receive 1.6 more requests during the non-stranger rounds (rounds 6–10).
37
The results are similar when analyzing only behavior in round 1. Given the small age variation and partici-
pant’s likely limited ability to distinguish participants by age we do not control for age. Adding an age control does
not significantly affect the coefficient on the female dummy. Results also do not change when we include individual
measures of preferences and personality attributes as controls (see online Appendix Table B5). The effect of gender
is similar if we instead control for the number of people who reported that they know or are friends with the par-
ticipant. Results from multinomial probits that simultaneously control for the characteristics of all group members
who could be asked to invest are provided in online Appendix Table B6.
Table 4—Requests Received via the Strategy Method (OLS): Experiment 3
Rounds 1–10 Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 2.476 2.521 0.863 0.889 1.613 1.631
(0.070) (0.070) (0.214) (0.214) (0.070) (0.070)
Non-Caucasian −1.307 −1.196 −0.677 −0.610 −0.630 −0.585
(0.114) (0.222) (0.114) (0.114) (0.222) (0.222)
N communicate with in session 2.880 1.709 1.171
(0.000) (0.122) (0.000)
Constant 9.012 8.599 4.714 4.469 4.298 4.130
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80
Notes: Dependent variable: total requests received. N communicate with refers to the number of subjects who
reported the subject as someone they communicate with. p-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at the session level using wild bootstrapping procedures that test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on female
equals zero. There are 80 participants.
Another way of summarizing the differences in requests is to examine mixed-sex

groups where both men and women could be asked to invest. If men and women are
equally likely to be asked then they should be asked a third of the time in mixed-sex
groups. Instead we see a 39 percent chance that a woman is asked and a 27 percent
chance that a man is asked. This 12 percentage point difference is statistically signif-
icant across all rounds and for the first and second half of the experiment (stranger
and non-stranger rounds).38
The finding that women are asked to invest more than men is consistent with the
belief that they are more likely to accept such requests. As evidence that such beliefs
are commonly held we find that both male and female requestors are more likely to
ask female rather than male group members to invest. When a male requestor has
the option of asking either a man or woman to invest, a woman is asked 39 percent
of the time and a man is asked 29 percent. The choice made by a female requestor
is similar as she asks a woman 39 percent of the time and a man 26 percent of the
time.39
Requests have a substantial impact on the individual’s decision to invest.
Participants who are asked to invest have an investment rate of 65.5 percent, while
the investment rate is only 14 percent for those who are not asked to invest. Thus
a requestor can, by asking, significantly increase the likelihood that an individual
invests.40 Absent a request, the investment rate does not differ by gender (both men
and women invest 14 percent of the time). The response to a request, however, does
differ by gender, as the investment rate becomes 51 percent for men and 76 percent
for women. The probit regression in Table 5 confirms that the response to requests is
significant and that the likelihood of agreeing to the request is significantly greater
38
Two-sided session-level paired t-test p = 0.014 for rounds 1–10. Differentiating between stranger and
non-stranger rounds gives p = 0.109 and 0.070, respectively.
39
Controlling for round and clustering standard errors at the individual level, a probit of asking a female to
invest on the gender of requestor provides a marginal effect on female requestor of 0.024 ( p = 0.627).
40
A probit of investment that controls for round and clusters standard errors at the individual level indicates
that being asked to invest increases the probability of investment by 0.515 ( p < 0.001).
Table 5—Probability of Investing (Probit): All Green Players, Experiment 3
All rounds Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10

(1) (2) (3)
Asked to invest 0.382 0.402 0.368
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female −0.010 0.082 −0.108
(0.882) (0.283) (0.226)
Female X asked to invest 0.258 0.245 0.270
(0.005) (0.043) (0.007)
Round −0.003 −0.006 −0.010
(0.643) (0.769) (0.572)
Observations 600 300 300
Notes: Dependent variable: individual investment decision (1-invest, 0-don’t invest). Marginal effects presented in
the table. Standard errors clustered on the individual. p-values reported in parentheses. The coefficient and stan-
dard error on the interaction terms is corrected to account for the nonlinear nature of the estimation. There are 80
participants.
for women than for men. This result holds both for the first and second half of the
experiment.41 Using the improved measures for risk aversion and altruism, we find
that both measures predict the likelihood of investing, but do not reduce the gender
difference in investing (see columns 3 and 6 of online Appendix Table B7). The
net result of women more frequently being asked to invest and more frequently
accepting such requests is of course that the investment rate for women exceeds that
for men. The aggregate investment rate is 37 percent for women and 25 percent for
men.42
III. Explaining the Differential Response by Women and Men: Altruism and Beliefs
Our results demonstrate that, in a mixed-sex group, women more than men per-
form tasks that, while benefiting the collective, place them at a relative disadvan-
tage. The findings in our three experiments are consistent with this gender difference
resulting from a commonly held belief that women more than men will agree to
perform such tasks. Such a belief is consistent with the higher investment rate for
women than men in the mixed-sex groups (Experiment 1); with women investing
less and men investing more when moving from mixed-sex to single-sex groups
(Experiments 1 and 2); and with women more than men receiving requests to invest
and more frequently accepting such requests (Experiment 3).
While our results align well with the belief that women more than men will invest,
we do not directly demonstrate that beliefs differ, nor do we fully rule out that the
gender differences in behavior result from altruistic preferences.43 To explore the
41
The results are similar when analyzing only behavior in round 1. With only 20 realized requests per round
we are however underpowered, and while the coefficient on the female-being asked interaction is the same, the
coefficient is not significant (coefficient 0.260, p = 0.280). Specifications that interact female with all covariates,
include session dummies, and control for individual preferences and personality attributes are presented in online
Appendix Table B7.
42
A probit regression of investment on round and gender with standard errors clustered at the subject level
provides a marginal effect on female of 0.116 ( p = 0.022).
43
While the results from Experiments 1 and 2 are not consistent with altruism varying between men and
women, they are consistent with men and women being more altruistic toward men than women (see Section IIIB).
role of beliefs and altruism we conduct two additional experiments (Experiments 4

and 5). Recruitment and general procedures mirrored those of our initial exper-
iments. One hundred and eighty-nine undergraduates were recruited from intro-
ductory economics classes at the University of Pittsburgh. They were on average
18.5 years old, 90 percent were 18 and 19 years old, 75 percent were Caucasian,
86 percent were born in the United States, and 93 percent were either freshmen or
sophomores.
A. Experiment 4: Is the Investment Rate for Women Believed to Be Higher

Than It Is for Men?
Experiment 4 was used to explore the role of beliefs. To confirm that beliefs
drive investment choices in Experiment 1 we would ideally want to elicit partici-
pants’ beliefs as they make decisions in the same environment as in Experiment 1.
However, as investment decisions are made in real time with the round ending and
all uncertainty being resolved once an investment is made, a strategy method would
be needed to simultaneously elicit beliefs and behavior. Such a modification to our
design is likely to affect behavior (see, e.g., Croson 2000). We instead asked third-
party participants to predict behavior in a representative session from Experiment 1.
We conducted seven sessions of Experiment 4 with 21 participants in each ses-
sion. Participants were asked to perform two different tasks, with the instructions
for each task only being given immediately preceding the task. Task 1 was a five-
round version of Experiment 1 and aimed to familiarize the participants with the
strategic environment. Task 2 asked participants to predict the outcomes in a pre-
vious session of Experiment 1. Participants were informed that another session of
21 individuals had made decisions in a ten-round version of the preceding Task 1,
and they were asked to predict, for ten groups of three, how likely it was that each
member of the group invested. After participants completed these two tasks, we
collected measures of individual characteristics, including improved measures of
risk aversion and altruism that mirror the incentives associated with investing (see
online Appendix C).
With the exception of the smaller number of rounds, the procedures for Task 1 were
identical to that for Experiment 1, and thus should generate similar results. This is
precisely what we find. On average, 92.7 percent of Task-1 groups succeed in invest-
ing, and 63.4 percent of these investments occur in the last 2 seconds.44 Importantly,
the individual investment rates differ by gender. Consistent with our Experiment 1
results, the median number of investments is 1 for men and 2 for women, and the
investment rates for women and men are 35 and 27 percent, respectively (two-sided
t-test p = 0.047).45 A probit regression of the probability of investment on female
and round that clusters standard errors at the participant level shows a positive and
significant coefficient on female (marginal effect of 0.081, p = 0.045) and a n egative
44
Online Appendix Table B8 shows the distribution of investment times in Task 1 of Experiment 4.
45
The corresponding numbers for the first-five rounds of Experiment 1 were a group investment rate of 88.4
percent; 57.9 percent of investments occur in the last two seconds; and investment rates of 35 percent for women
and 25 percent for men. Similar to Experiment 1, the share of females in a session ranged from 0.38 to 0.57.
The share of females in each session was: 38.1 percent in 1 session, 42.9 percent in 1 session, 47.6 percent in 3
sessions, 52.4 percent in 1 session, and 57.1 percent in 1 session.
but insignificant coefficient on round (marginal effect of −0.010, p = 0.319). In

online Appendix Table B9 we present specifications that include the improved mea-
sures of risk and altruism preferences. Closely mirroring the incentives at stake we
see that being more risk averse and more altruistic helps predict investment decisions.
However, consistent with our earlier results these improved controls for preferences
do not help explain the gender gap in the probability of investing.
Having completed Task 1 participants proceeded to Task 2 where, over ten
rounds, they predict how individuals behaved in a previous session of Experiment
1.46 In each round they were shown individual characteristics of three individuals
who formed a group in the corresponding round of the Experiment 1 session. For
each group, participants were informed of each of the three group member’s age,
sex, whether the participant was born in the United States, his or her year in school
(Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior), and choice of major (Business, Social
Science, or Other major). Participants indicated for each group of three players
the probability that four possible events occurred: group member 1 invested; group
member 2 invested; group member 3 invested; and no one invested. The sum of
probabilities had to sum to one.
For robustness we used two different procedures to elicit beliefs over the four
events. The first procedure asked for a probabilistic assessment of how likely the
individual thought each event was and incentivized the elicitation using a binarized
quadratic scoring rule (BQSR). The second procedure asked participants to first rank
the events from most to least likely to have occurred and then assess how likely they
thought each event was to have occurred. Only the ranking task was incentivized.47
For each of the ten rounds, participants were shown a new group of three players for
which they were asked to guess behavior. Between rounds, participants were only
informed whether an investment was made in the group, which corresponded to
the feedback given between rounds in Experiment 1. The specific outcome of who
invested in each round was only learned at the end of the ten rounds, at which point
we calculated the participant’s earnings as a result of their guess and the event that
actually occurred.
While the quadratic scoring rule (Brier 1950) is an incentive compatible elicita-
tion for risk neutral individuals, risk averse individuals have an incentive to report
less dispersed beliefs. To address this concern, Hossain and Okui (2013) build on
the insights of Smith (1961) and Roth and Malouf (1979), and propose instead a
binarized-scoring rule. Rather than having the quadratic score secure a payoff, the
quadratic score generates a chance of winning a high rather than a low fixed prize.48
Depending on the accuracy of their guesses, participants in Experiment 4 received
46
As a representative session we asked participants to predict the behavior of 21 participants in Session 8
of Experiment 1. Participant characteristics and behavior in Session 8 mirrored those of Experiment 1 overall.
Forty-eight percent of participants in that session were female, the average age was 18.29 years old, 76 percent
were Caucasian, 100 percent were either freshman or sophomores, and 90 percent were born in the United States.
Across Session 8 the group investment rate was 79 percent and the investment rates for women and men were 32
and 21 percent, respectively.
47
We conducted four sessions (n = 84) using the BQSR elicitation and three sessions (n = 63) where unincen-
tivized beliefs were elicited after participants provided an incentivized measure of belief rank.
48
In a set of experimental studies, Hossain and Okui (2013) show that the binarized scoring rule secures
reported beliefs that are closer to the true probability than those seen under the standard quadratic scoring rule. A
similar result is provided by Harrison, Martínez-Correa, and Swarthout (2013, 2014) who show that the binarized
quadratic scoring rule induces a shift toward risk neutrality in objective and subjective probabilities. Harrison et al.
either $1 or $2 for the round. Specifically, for the event that occurred in Experiment
1 the quadratic score was used to calculate the individual’s chance to win (CTW) $2
rather than $1. The chance-to-win function was
4
CTW = 100 − 50  ∑   
(1)   (1i  − p i)  2,
i=1
where 1iis an indicator function that acquires the value of 1 when event i occurs
and pi  is the probability a participant places on event i. Participants were given
examples of how this scoring rule worked and were provided a calculator button on
the decision screen that allowed them to compute the chance-to-win for any proba-
bility distribution they entered before finalizing a decision. They were also told that
they had the highest chance of winning $2 if they honestly reported their best guess.
At the end of the ten rounds we calculated the chance-to-win for the round given the
event that actually occurred and the participant’s belief submitted for that event. By
randomly drawing a number between 1 and 100 for each round we then determined
whether the participant won $2. The individual won $2 if the drawn number was less
than or equal to the individual’s chance-to-win for the event that occurred. We did
this for each of the ten rounds.
The elicited beliefs under BQSR correspond to the observed group investment
rate and its sensitivity to the number of women in the group. While informed that
participants in the original experiment did not know who they were grouped with,
individuals nonetheless predict that the groups’ investment rate increases monotoni-
cally with the number of women in the group. The elicited investment rate starts at
0.87 in all-male groups and increases to 0.94 in all-female groups.49 The sensitiv-
ity to the number of women in a group reflects that participants expect women to
invest more than men. In mixed-sex groups participants tended to attach the great-
est chance of investing to a female participant. Eliminating observations where a
man and a woman are tied for being most likely to invest, we find in groups with
one female and two males (1F2M) that women were thought most likely to invest
47.1 percent of the time, in groups with two females and one male (2F1M) the cor-
responding number was 75.3 percent. If men and women were thought to be equally
likely to invest, those numbers would be 33.3 and 66.6 percent, respectively. The
observed beliefs were significantly higher in both cases (subject-level two-sided
t-test p = 0.008 for 1F2M, and p = 0.004 for 2F1M).50
The elicited point estimates of the third-party beliefs reveal that women are
thought to be more likely to invest than men. The expected probability of investment
is 0.287 (SE 0.004) for men and 0.308 (SE 0.004) for women.51 As seen in Table 6,
a regression of the probability of investment that clusters standard errors at the
subject guessing level reveals that women are thought to be 2.3 percentage points
(2015), however, show no difference in reported probabilities when eliciting subjective probability distributions
over continuous events that are discretized into ten possible outcomes.
49
This response to gender composition is significant. An OLS regression of the guessed probability of group
investment rate on the number of females in a group that clusters standard errors at the subject guessing level pro-
vides a coefficient on the number of females in a group of 0.021 (SE 0.006, p = 0.001).
50
Similar results are obtained when using a multinomial probit model. See online Appendix Table B10.
51
Removing cases where participants report three-way ties (13 percent) for the three group members investing,
the reported chance that a man and woman invests changes to 0.292 (SE 0.004) and 0.314 (SE 0.004), respectively.
Table 6—Linear Probability of Investing on Group Member Characteristics (OLS): All Groupsa
Experiment
BQSR-belief 1-behavior Rank-belief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group member female 0.022 0.023 0.111 0.112 0.015 0.019
(0.018) (0.025) (0.004) (0.005) (0.034) (0.015)
Group member age 19+ −0.027 −0.030 0.009
(0.071) (0.591) (0.627)
Group member US born −0.039 −0.021 −0.017
(0.022) (0.678) (0.337)
Group member sophomore+ 0.015 0.034 −0.016
(0.260) (0.553) (0.334)
Group member business major −0.002 −0.059 −0.000
(0.832) (0.298) (0.976)
Group member other major 0.002 −0.043 0.009
(0.821) (0.383) (0.231)
Round −0.000 −0.000 −0.006 −0.006 −0.000 −0.000
(0.738) (0.740) (0.054) (0.054) (0.774) (0.776)
Constant 0.288 0.324 0.265 0.322 0.274 0.285
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,520 2,520 1,500 1,500 1,890 1,890
Notes: Dependent variable: individual investment decision (1 = invest, 0 = don’t invest). Standard errors are clus-
tered at the subject level. p-values are reported in parentheses.
a
The gender gap in beliefs presented in Table 6 is robust to including round fixed effects in the regressions.
more likely to invest than a man with the same demographic characteristics other than
gender. Columns 3 and 4 report the corresponding probabilities from Experiment 1
and reveal that while the average investment rate mirrors that observed, under BQSR
the anticipated gender gap in investment rates is smaller than the 11.2 percentage
point differential observed in Experiment 1.
While third parties anticipate the direction of the gender gap in investment rates,
they fail to predict the magnitude of the difference. There are several potential expla-
nations for the quantitative difference. First, it is not easy to calculate an individual’s
observed investment rate. Imagine, for example, that a participant expects that each
member invests 33 percent of the time. As only one participant can invest at a time
this belief corresponds to an observed individual investment rate of 23.5 percent.52
Second while the BQSR elicitation is incentive compatible, the chance-to-win func-
tion is very flat at high beliefs. Thus individuals may prefer to report probabilities
that are less dispersed than their true belief, because such a report substantially
increases the chance-to-win on events that are seen as less likely.53
52
Since a participant cannot invest if another participant has already chosen to invest, the observed individual
investment rate is (1 − (1 − 0.33)3)/3.
53
For example, submitting a belief ( p1  , p2  , p3  , p4  ) = (1.0, 0, 0, 0) would create a chance to win of (1.0, 0, 0, 0)
in the case that each event occurred. However, a less extreme belief of ( p1  , p2  , p3  , p4  ) = (0.60, 0.20, 0.20, 0) would
secure corresponding chances to win of (0.88, 0.48, 0.48, 0.28). This less extreme belief only slightly reduces the
chance to win in the event that group member 1 invests, while increasing substantially the chance to win in the event
that one of the three other events occurred. The flatness of the incentives under BQSR implies that an individual,
who correctly believes that there is a 12 percentage point gender gap in the investment frequency, in expectation
Concerned that the incentives presented under BQSR caused participants to report
probabilities that were less dispersed than their actual beliefs we also ran three ses-
sions using a dual elicitation procedure. Participants ranked the four possible events
from most to least likely and then reported how likely they thought each event was
to have occurred. Only the elicitation on rank was incentivized.54 The probabilistic
assessments under this dual procedure also secured a statistically significant gender
gap in predicted investment rates. The investment rate is on average believed to be
0.273 (SE 0.003) for men and 0.288 (SE 0.004) for women.55 As seen in Table 6,
columns 5 and 6, a regression of the elicited probability of investing that clusters
standard errors at the subject guessing level reveals that women are thought to be
1.9 percentage points more likely to invest than a man with the same demographic
characteristics. A gender difference is also found when examining the elicited ranks.
Looking at strict rankings and thus removing observations where there are ties in
the probabilities we find that the mean rank assigned to men is 2.241 (SE 0.048)
and that assigned to women is 2.116 (SE 0.049).56 These elicitations are further
evidence that participants believe women to be more likely to invest than men.
Across two different elicitation procedures we find that participants believe that
women are more likely than men to invest. While the elicited beliefs show a gap in
investment rates that is smaller than that observed in Experiment 1, such differences
in expectations may nonetheless perturb a greater than expected response in behav-
ior. Furthermore, the elicited beliefs may not fully capture the beliefs participants
held in the experiment as elicited beliefs frequently differ from the beliefs consistent
with observed behavior. For example Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008, p. 731)
find inconsistencies between the actions individuals take and their belief statements,
and argue that “we need to be cautious when evaluating elicited beliefs to under-
stand action choices.” Similarly, in discussing the role of subjective survey data,
Bertrand and Mullianathan (2001) argue that people may not be good at forecasting
their behavior or understanding why they did what they did. While the magnitude
of the differences in the probability that a man and a woman invests is smaller than
that observed in Experiment 1, the finding that men and women are believed to have
different investment rates may be sufficient to secure that it influences equilibrium
selection and in turn cause women to more frequently invest than men.
would lose $0.003 by falsely reporting probabilities consistent with the elicited 2 percentage point gender gap
(assuming equal investment rates within gender and a 10 percent chance that no one invests).
54
Participants were paid $2 if the reported rank 1 event occurred, $1.5 if the rank 2 event occurred, $1 if the
rank 3 event occurred, and $0.50 if the rank 4 event occurred. Participants were told that earnings were maximized
by choosing a ranking that reflected the events they thought most likely occurred. The unincentivized probabilities
elicited under this procedure do not show greater variation in the reported beliefs. The frequency of three-way ties
in the probability that group members invest increases from 13 percent under BQSR to 30 percent under Rank.
55
This difference is significant in a two-sided t-test by subject ( p = 0.025). Removing the 30 percent of cases
where participants report three-way ties between the three group members investing, the reported chances that a
man and woman invests change to 0.276 (SE 0.004) and 0.297 (SE 0.006).
56
Two-sided subject-level t-test p = 0.046. Restricting attention to mixed-gender groups p = 0.043 (mean
men = 2.234, SE = 0.054, mean women = 2.100, SE = 0.053). Our focus on strict rankings considerably reduces
our sample size, but restricts attention to cases where the rankings have meaning. Using the elicited beliefs to
construct comparable ranks from the BQSR reported beliefs, we find a mean rank for men of 2.240 (SE 0.044) and
for women of 2.041 (SE 0.043). Restricting attention to mixed-gender groups, the mean rank for men is 2.261 (SE
0.052) and for women is 2.036 (SE 0.046).
B. Altruism (Experiment 5)
Much economic research has been done to investigate whether men and women
differ in their altruistic preferences. Although the empirical evidence is somewhat
mixed (see e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), women are commonly thought to
be more altruistic than men. Such a conviction is consistent with the behavior seen in
Experiments 1 and 3, and with the elicited beliefs in Experiment 4. However, it is not
consistent with the behavior seen in Experiment 2. If women are more altruistic than
men then the aggregate investment rate should be higher in the all-female sessions
than in the all-male sessions of Experiment 2.57 The differential individual response
in the mixed- versus single-sex session may, however, result if a ltruism varies by
the beneficiary’s gender. If participants are more generous toward men than women,
then women would give less in all-female groups compared to m ixed-sex groups,
and men would give more in all-male groups compared to mixed-sex groups. While
such male-recipient favoritism can explain our results, existing empirical evidence
is not consistent with such a preference. Boschini, Muren, and Persson (2012) con-
duct Dictator games in both mixed- and single-sex groups and find that the transfers
by both men and women are insensitive to the sex of the recipient.58 As our setting
differs from that of the standard Dictator game, we conduct an additional experi-
ment (Experiment 5) to determine whether in a setting similar to that of our invest-
ment game we find that generosity varies with the gender of the decision maker and
of the other members of the group.
To assess the impact of beneficiary’s gender on altruistic transfers, 42 undergrad-
uates participated in Experiment 5. At the beginning of the experiment, each partic-
ipant provided their demographic information. Mirroring the procedures employed
in Experiment 4, participants were in each of ten rounds paired in groups of three
and were provided demographic information (age, sex, born in the United States,
year in school, and major) of the other group members. They knew that they would
never be paired with the same participant twice in a row. For each of ten rounds par-
ticipants were asked to make six decisions that result in payoffs to themselves and to
the other two group members. Specifically, they were asked whether they preferred
57
The aggregate investment rate in Experiment 2 was 80 percent in all-male sessions and 81.4 percent in
all-female sessions (two-sided Fisher’s exact test p = 0.796). As an additional assessment of altruism we also
examine the improved altruism measure included at the end of Experiment 3. While eliciting altruism over the
domain of interest, this measure did not provide evidence that women are more altruistically inclined than men
(mean altruism men = 3.432, SE 0.231; mean altruism women = 3.209, SE 0.168; two-sided t-test p = 0.429). A
description of this incentivized altruism measure is provided in online Appendix C.
58
Evidence that participants are not more altruistic toward men than women can also be seen in the investment
decisions of Experiment 3. A probit model of the investment decision shows that the gender of the requestor has
no effect on the likelihood that individuals invest using the same specification as column 1 in Table 6 (the marginal
effect of the coefficient on female requestor is −0.018 p = 0.660).The insensitivity to the requestor’s gender is also
seen in single-sex groups of Experiment 3. In all-male groups a probit of investing on a dummy for female requestor
that clusters standard errors at the subject level secures a marginal effect of 0.100 ( p = 0.697) for those asked to
invest and of −0.050 ( p = 0.764) for those not asked to invest. The results are similar for the all-female groups
where the marginal effect of the dummy for female requestor is −0.079 ( p = 0.633) for those asked to invest and
of −0.032 ( p = 0.699) for those not asked to invest. Further evidence that participants are not more altruistic
toward men than women is seen from the gender of the person who is asked to invest not influencing the decision
to invest early by other group members. That is, when a man rather than a woman is asked to invest the remaining
participants are no more likely to invest within the first 10 seconds of a round (a probit of investing that clusters
standard errors at the individual level provides a marginal effect on female of −0.008, p = 0.578) or within the first
20 seconds of a round (the marginal effect on female in the same model is −0.001, p = 0.943).
Table 7—Payoffs Associated With Each Decision: Experiment 5
Option A payoffs Option B payoffs

Group Group Group Group
Decision You member 1 member 2 You member 1 member 2
1 $1.25 $2.00 $2.00 $1.00 $1.00 $1.00
2 $1.25 $2.00 $2.00 $1.20 $1.05 $1.20
3 $1.25 $2.00 $2.00 $1.40 $1.10 $1.40
4 $1.25 $2.00 $2.00 $1.60 $1.15 $1.60
5 $1.25 $2.00 $2.00 $1.80 $1.20 $1.80
6 $1.25 $2.00 $2.00 $2.00 $1.25 $2.00
the payoffs associated with an option A or B, with the set of possible payoffs shown
in Table 7.
Option A corresponds to the payoffs that result from the participant making
the generous investment decision in the original investment game (Experiments 1
and 2): $1.25 for themselves and $2.00 for each of the two other group members.
Option B by contrast corresponds to the payoffs that result from the participant not
investing and instead taking the gamble that Group member 1 invests with a certain
probability. Moving from decision 1 through 6 the probability of Group member 1
investing increases in 20 percentage point increments from 0 for decision 1 to 100
percent for decision 6. A more generous participant will delay the point at which
he or she switches from choosing option A to B.59 We measure the “switch point”
for preferring payoffs for other group members versus oneself, where later switch
points reflect greater altruism toward other group members, especially toward
Group member 1. Participants knew that for each round and for each group, one
group-member’s decision would be randomly chosen and implemented.
The key results of interest are shown in Table 8. Focusing on the last point at
which men and women switch from Option A to B we see that the mean switch
point is approximately Decision 4. That is, the average participant is willing to take
the gamble of another participant investing when the chance that Group member 1
invests is perceived to be at least 60 percent. Looking at the differences in switch
points we find, consistent with Experiment 2, that there is no evidence that women
are more likely to choose a later and more altruistic switch point than men. Whether
looking at the decision associated with the first or last switch, men chose to switch
at a later decision and are thus making decisions that are more generous toward the
other group members (two-sided subject-level t-test p = 0.016 for the first switch
point, p = 0.472 for the last switch point).
Next we ask if there is evidence of greater generosity toward male group mem-
bers than female group members. We see first that decisions are no more generous
when an individual is faced with two male group members rather than with two
59
Note that individuals who are more concerned about efficiency also will delay the switch point. Research
shows that men are relatively more concerned about efficiency (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), which may result in
men selecting a later switch point. Greater concerns for efficiency would predict greater investments in Experiments
1–4. Our new altruism measure thus encompasses both elements (generosity and efficiency).
Table 8—Mean Decision Where Participant Switches from Option A to B
Full sample
Subsample with
First switch point Last switch point one switch point
Decision maker
Male 3.542 (0.100) 4.185 (0.097) 3.898 (0.100)
Female 2.638 (0.104) 3.925 (0.138) 3.099 (0.114)
Group members
2 Males 2.988 (0.120) 4.137 (0.129) 3.518 (0.126)
2 Females 3.148 (0.197) 4.066 (0.215) 3.542 (0.206)
Group member 1
Male 3.081 (0.098) 4.073 (0.104) 3.549 (0.104)
Female 3.388 (0.120) 4.106 (0.124) 3.742 (0.121)
Observations 420 420 327

Participants 42 42 27
Notes: Later switch points suggest greater altruism toward other group members, especially
Group member 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
female group members (two-sided subject-level paired t-tests p = 0.822 for the first
switch point, p = 0.895 for the last). Similarly we do not find that participants are
more generous when the individual who is more influenced by the decision maker’s
selfish choice is male. That is, when Group member 1 is male we do not find that our
participants select a later switch point than when Group member 1 is female (two-
sided subject-level paired t-test is p = 0.795 for the first switch point, p = 0.632 for
the last).
In summary, the literature on other regarding behavior and the results from
Experiments 3 and 5 suggest that the gender difference in investing seen in
Experiments 1 and 2 is not driven by women being more altruistic than men, nor by
participants being more generous toward men than women.
IV. Conclusion
Much research has been conducted to understand gender differences in the labor
market. We add to this literature an understanding of differences in the allocation of
tasks that while helping the group, place the individual performing the task at a rela-
tive disadvantage (low-promotability tasks). In a series of studies we find consistent
evidence that women, more than men, perform such tasks. The difference arises
both from demand and supply as women more than men are asked to perform such
tasks and more frequently accept requests to perform such tasks.
On the supply side, we report on field and experimental studies. The field data
show that relative to men, women are significantly more likely to respond favorably
to requests to undertake a task with low promotability. While this field evidence
helps motivate our research question, it does not help determine why a gender gap
in willingness to engage in low-promotability tasks exists. Turning to the laboratory
we conduct five experiments to determine whether gender differences in the propen-
sity to volunteer arise when incentives are better controlled, and to determine what
drives such differences.
Our experimental design mirrors the incentives that group members face when
asked to find a volunteer for a task that they prefer another group member under-
takes. In our first two experiments all group members face the same implicit request
to volunteer. In Experiment 1, when both men and women are present in the lab, we
find that women are 50 percent more likely than men to volunteer. While there is no
evidence that this gap is driven by differences in preferences, we use an experimen-
tal manipulation to simultaneously evaluate whether it results from preferences or
beliefs. Our Experiment 2 uses a single-sex rather than a mixed-sex subject pool.
Interestingly, the gender gap in volunteering is eliminated when participants know
that they are paired only with members of their own sex. Thus, an individual’s will-
ingness to volunteer is not fixed and responds to the gender composition of the group.
We interpret the differential response to the single-sex environment as evidence
that the gender gap documented in Experiment 1 is not driven by preferences but
rather by the belief that women are more likely than men to volunteer. Both men and
women are less likely to volunteer when there are more women in the group. This
response to gender composition is consistent with the belief that women more than
men will volunteer.60
By directly examining the demand side of the problem our Experiment 3 further
investigates the role of beliefs. We examine whether women more frequently are
asked to volunteer than men. Modifying our design to add a requestor who can ask
one other participant to volunteer, we show that women are asked to volunteer more
than men, and that women are asked more by both men and women. The difference
in requests is consistent with the belief that women more than men accept such
requests. Confirming the role of beliefs we find that women respond more favorably
to these directed requests than do men. While requests increase volunteering for
both men and women, the increase for women is substantially larger.
Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 shed additional light on the extent to which beliefs
and/or altruism drive the gender difference in volunteering. Replicating our initial
result we find in Experiment 4 direct evidence that women are expected to volunteer
more than men. Along with the findings in Experiment 5 we argue that the gender
difference in volunteering is driven not by preferences but rather by the belief that
women more than men will volunteer.
In examining the allocation of tasks with low promotability, our analysis is
focused on a simple laboratory setting where decisions are anonymous, group size is
small, and behavior can largely be characterized as being one-shot. While such a set-
ting mirrors the allocation of some low-promotability tasks, it is of interest in future
work to extend the analysis to non-anonymous settings that allow for the possibility
of reputation building. The field evidence from industry and academia suggest that
the differences documented here may extend to such environments, and the evi-
dence from Experiment 3 shows that when individuals are not anonymous women
are more likely to be asked to invest and to accept such requests. Initial gender
differences may become self-reinforcing in repeated interactions if they strengthen
60
In addition to shedding light on why men and women differ in their response to the mixed-sex sessions,
the results from Experiment 1 and 2 point to the environment in which we may expect differences in willingness
to volunteer to be severe. In particular, women may be more likely than men to volunteer in male-dominated
environments.
the belief that women more than men will agree to perform less-promotable tasks.
Furthermore, initial gender differences in task allocations may perpetuate them-
selves if the resulting productivity differences that arise when women spend less
time than men on more-promotable tasks may make it appear to be more efficient to
allocate less-promotable tasks to the seemingly “less-productive” women. Finally,
future research could examine how our results extend to group sizes that are larger
than those examined here. For some tasks, group sizes could be quite small (e.g.,
needing a full professor in an academic department who conducts lab experiments
to be on the IRB) whereas for other tasks it might be quite large (e.g., needing a
representative for a faculty senate committee). It is possible that increases in group
size would decrease volunteering overall (as found in prior research), though gender
differences may remain, as seen in the field study on faculty senate committees.
In our research we find that, relative to men, women are more likely to volunteer,
more likely to be asked to volunteer, and more likely to accept direct requests to
volunteer. These results suggest that the allocation of tasks with low promotability
may differ even when there are no gender differences in ability and preferences. The
resulting differences in task allocations can create barriers to the advancement of
women in organizations and in society as a whole.
While the gender difference in volunteering and in requests to volunteer is dis-
turbing, it is important to note that the decision to perform such tasks is not made
in error. If no-one else will volunteer it is, in our setting, individually rational to do
so even if it places the individual at a relative disadvantage. From the organization’s
perspective it may, however, be an error to let the acceptance of low-promotability
tasks be discretionary. If performance on high-promotability tasks is more import-
ant than performance on low-promotability tasks, then organizations should prefer
to have the latter performed by those who are least able to perform tasks with high
promotability.
In improving the allocation of tasks it is promising that differential request and
acceptance rates appear to be influenced by beliefs. This suggests that small inter-
ventions can help reduce the differences in allocations of less-promotable tasks. In
particular, beliefs may be perturbed by awareness of these differences so that doc-
umenting differences and pointing out the resulting inequities (and potential ineffi-
ciencies) may help alter the expectation that women more than men will volunteer.
Further, in modifying the mechanisms by which we assign tasks we may also be
able to reduce the effect of these differences. With homogeneous skills it may be
preferable to encourage turn-taking or to enforce random assignment, rather than to
ask for volunteers. By understanding the forces that cause gender differences in task
allocation it may be possible for managers to alter beliefs and the mechanisms used
to assign low-promotability tasks, and this in turn may help improve the advance-
ment of women.
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American Economic Review 2017, 107(3): 714–747

Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests

Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender

Despite significant female educational advances, we continue to see gender dif-

non-revenue-generating tasks. In research-oriented universities, research-related

the response to requests to perform low-promotability tasks we report on field evi-

I. Response to Volunteer Requests

We begin by examining whether women more than men volunteer to perform

Table 1—Probability of Volunteering to Join a Committee (Probit)

Notes: Dependent variable: individual decision to volunteer (1-volunteer, 0-don’t volunteer).

B. Are Women More Likely than Men to Volunteer (Experiment 1)?

Design.—Capturing the incentives described above, our experimental design

Participants and Procedures.—This and other laboratory studies in this paper

Results.—To characterize behavior in the experiment we first determine whether

Figure 1. Probability of Investing: Experiment 1

C. Why Does the Rate of Investment Differ by Gender?

Figure 2. Distribution of Total Investment: Experiment 1

Table 2—Probability of Investing ( Probit): Experiment 1

All rounds Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10 All rounds

Observations 1,500 750 750 1,500

Gender Differences in Preferences.—We first explore whether there is direct evi-

Beliefs: Does the Response to Requests Depend on the Gender Composition of

of investments to change in single-sex groups. In particular, when a man moves

Probability of investing 0.4

Figure 3. Probability of Investing: Experiment 2

Relative frequency 0.2

Figure 4. Distribution of Total Investment: Experiment 2

Table 3—Probability of Investing (Probit): Experiment 2

All rounds Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10 All rounds

Observations 1,170 585 585 1,170

Likelihood group invests 0.8

Figure 5. Probability Group Invests

Figure 6. Individual Propensity to Invest

individual’s propensity to invest is sensitive to the group’s gender composition. The

B. Participants and Procedures

We conducted four sessions of Experiment 3. With 20 participants per session

Investments occurred rather quickly in Experiment 3: 33.2 percent of investments

Figure 7. Distribution of Strategy-Method Requests per Individual: Experiment 3

Table 4—Requests Received via the Strategy Method (OLS): Experiment 3

Rounds 1–10 Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10

Another way of summarizing the differences in requests is to examine mixed-sex

Table 5—Probability of Investing (Probit): All Green Players, Experiment 3

All rounds Rounds 1–5 Rounds 6–10

Observations 600 300 300

role of beliefs and altruism we conduct two additional experiments (Experiments 4

A. Experiment 4: Is the Investment Rate for Women Believed to Be Higher

but insignificant coefficient on round (marginal effect of −0.010, p = 0.319). In

Observations 2,520 2,520 1,500 1,500 1,890 1,890

Table 7—Payoffs Associated With Each Decision: Experiment 5

Option A payoffs Option B payoffs

Table 8—Mean Decision Where Participant Switches from Option A to B

Observations 420 420 327

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but insignificant coefficient on round (marginal effect of −0.010, p = 0.319). In