Zhuran You - A G Rud - Yingzi Hu - The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education - A History-Palgrave MacMillan (2018)

The Philosophy
of Chinese Moral
Education
A History
Zhuran You, A.G. Rud, and Yingzi Hu

The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education
Zhuran You • A. G. Rud • Yingzi Hu
The Philosophy
of Chinese Moral
Education
A History
Zhuran You A. G. Rud
School of Teacher Education College of Education
Shaoxing University Washington State University
Shaoxing City, Zhejiang, China Pullman, WA, USA
Yingzi Hu
Office of the Provost
Shaoxing University
Shaoxing City, Zhejiang, China
ISBN 978-1-137-56433-7 ISBN 978-1-137-56434-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018944261
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
Cover image © IMAGEMORE Co, Ltd./ gettyimages
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Nature America,
Inc. part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY 10004, U.S.A.
To build the heart for heaven and earth, to teach morality to the populace, to restore
the lost doctrines of the past sages, and to open up eternal peace for the world.
Zhang Zai, 1020–1077 CE
v
Foreword: China Is Always China
My purpose in this foreword is to provide a broad context for English-

speaking readers of this interesting and unique book, The Philosophy of
Chinese Moral Education: A History, by Zhuran You, A. G. Rud, and
Yingzi Hu. I begin with a confession: I am not a China scholar. Over the
past several years, I have had many Chinese young adults in university
courses; I have sponsored several visiting scholars. As a philosopher of
education, in student and faculty interactions and in preparation for teach-
ing and lecturing in China, I have become a committed student, enthusi-
astic to learn about the country, its culture, and its people, and especially
its importance in today’s world. The audience for the foreword is those
unfamiliar with Chinese moral education and whose interest arises from
increasing contact with China and the Chinese. One theme unites several
sub-themes: China is always China. Each sub-theme begins with a sum-
mary statement followed by a brief discussion largely based in my own
recent experiences and interests.
Sub-theme One
China is experiencing a twenty-first-century revolution that is a part of the
lives of all of us. Everyone must take account of the vast presence of the
Chinese people and the nation’s international economic and political power.
A useful set of essays for university undergraduates begins with this

statement.
vii
viii Foreword: China Is Always China
China is about superlatives. It has the largest population, the fastest-grow-

ing economy, the most cell phones, Internet users, new car sales, and air
pollution of any country in the world. It is producing high-speed trains,
freeways, urban sprawl, supercomputers, foreign aid projects […] and much
else at stunning speed. (Gamer, 2017, p. xi)
The faculties and students with whom I have interacted are representative
of a significant segment of China’s population. This is the nation’s middle
classes, involved in migration to urban centers, and the country’s gigantic
building boom and sprawl. The special status of the Beijing and Shanghai
regions is interesting: there is a preference for student places at universi-
ties, and exceptions, as far as I can tell, from some national educational
mandates. A principal focus for middle-class parents is that their children
to go to college, and university students supported by their parents inter-
nalize this desire through seeking graduate degrees, especially abroad. An
interesting question concerns the separation between rural and urban,
more privileged and less so, in immense population groups.
In addition to the internal demographics in the country, as a modern
nation China may already be the most powerful twenty-first-century inter-
national superpower, eclipsing the USA and Russia. In US news, China
appears virtually every day. Much of our attention to China, let’s face it,
has become politicized. Behind this, however, are actual events and influ-
ences. One set of events is economic, having to do with trade, investment,
and other monetary practices. Another set of events is cultural, with the
intermingling of peoples around education and tourism. A third set of
events raises serious concerns, especially for someone like me, who remem-
bers fears of nuclear war from her childhood. American relations with
North Korea are tied to our relations with China: bellicosity in all corners
is not the answer.
Sub-theme Two
Nations and cultures perpetuate themselves through education, which is
both formal in schooling and informal in everyday life. While there are simi-
larities in informal socialization in China and the USA, it is important to
recognize distinctions between societal orders, and the roles of schooling in
moral education.
ix
The most important idea in comparing moral education in the USA and
China concerns how schooling and the curriculum are organized. The
USA has a federal system, with schooling the purview of states and with-
out a central ministry for education. The history of moral education in
America indicates an intermingling of school, home, and religious institu-
tions. Initially, morality was “taught” though early years literacy; school
discipline has always been a site of moral education as well (McClellan,
1999). In recent years, a privately sponsored character education move-
ment has been mandated by states. Philosophers of education have been
critical of this movement because its pedagogy seems artificial and ineffec-
tive. Many Americans do believe that moral instruction starts at home and
at “church”. The value of family and home is a shared value of China and
the USA, although each is related to quite different schooling systems.
China’s moral education is part of a national curriculum, with recent
efforts being made to bring diversity and inquiry into classrooms, espe-
cially at the elementary level. This reflects new directions in recognizing
the nation’s many minorities and includes social organization and ele-
ments such as rituals as part of moral education. Importantly, new curricu-
lum efforts are still part of a unified culture even as it is undergoing change.
Most important, the USA has no national curriculum. Interestingly, there
are important differences between Chinese and US curricula at the sec-
ondary level. In US civics courses, the political order is taught but other-
wise morality is part of the hidden curriculum. In China under the central
state, separate courses are present for moral education, political or ideo-
logical education, and education in social development. Continuity
between tradition and modern change is exemplified in central rituals
emphasizing the role of the family, and a collective social order. A great
example is the “New Year” period when millions go home to honor family
members and ancestors. Even the USA’s Thanksgiving holiday, since it
does not entail a spiritual element, is not a counterpart to this.
Sub-theme Three
Confucian thought is central to Chinese culture and is the basis for a unify-
ing identity, a Chinese mind, and a Chinese culture (De Mente, 2009).
Other unifying factors are written language and a centrally sponsored politi-
cal and educational social order. Again, differences between China and the
USA are significant.
x Foreword: China Is Always China
The several issues in this significant sub-theme require discussion. First, in

China there are over 50 minorities with spoken languages whose popula-
tions cannot speak directly to one another. However, schooling in which a
national written language is taught does mean that ethnic groups, largely
in separate geographical regions, can communicate. But this also means
that the dominant ethic group, the Han, makes up a huge majority of the
population and has national control. All sorts of interesting questions are
raised in comparing China with the USA in terms of ethnic diversity. In
my own thinking, there does appear a similarity in the teaching of standard
English in American schools. However, I am uncertain whether a unifying
culture today can be identified as “American”. The recent politics of blue
and red states and of what seems a very divided society belie the idea that
there is one culture. In terms of the USA’s Latino/a population, the
country may well become a bilingual nation.
Before turning to Confucianism, another unifying factor in understand-
ing China is membership of the Communist Party. Because of the particu-
lar history of the USA, Americans are always curious about the party and
Chinese politics. From the era of Mao, children have learned political
identity through youth associations such as The Young Pioneers. Students
are selected for inclusion and advancement and may ultimately join the
party. Voting in local elections takes place in various institutions, including
university departments. Once beyond this direct level, representation
seems diffuse.
A third distinction between China and the USA is the basis for a national
culture; in China, this is Confucianism, which has no American counter-
part today. In the USA’s national history, the early dominance of a general
Protestantism perhaps had such a role, but no longer. In reading about
China, an initial question concerns whether Confucianism is a religion, a
secular religion, or something else. Here, pointedly, China is always China.
Thus this volume presents a view of Confucianism within moral educa-
tion, an integration of culture, education, and politics. Several ideas are
significant. A first is the role of the collective in China, in which individuals
are who they are in relation to the group; it is traditionally a society based
on “family”, clan, and state. A second is the emphasis within Confucianism
of virtue and character as these concepts are integral to individuals within
collectives. A third idea which I have found important is that society is
ruled by morality and not ultimately by law. The Philosophy of Chinese
Moral Education presents the background history of these ideas and their
evolution into contemporary morality. Particularly interesting is a concept
of the “culture of family and state”.
xi
Sub-theme Four
Given differences in between eastern and western history and culture, and
especially for native English speakers and those who are American, reading
this book is a welcome opportunity. As readers we need to take its content
on its own terms, which gives us much to think about.
As a transition to the text, the book’s introduction offers an initial synthe-

sis of what the Chinese philosophy of moral education entails. The authors
do mention elements of the Western philosophy of education but their
larger purpose is not comparative. In the latter, moral education derives
from fields that are themselves distinct: disciplines of philosophy and psy-
chology, epistemology, ethics, moral theory, and political theory, virtue
and principled ethics. Distinctly separate in Chinese philosophy is meta-
physics, the asking of key questions arrived at through argument. The
Chinese system is uniquely relational, extending beyond human relations
to the universe.
To cement the theme of this foreword and prepare the reader for the
chapters that follow, I will close with a small philosophical exercise. Readers
are welcomed into this text with the concept of moral cultivation. To the
eyes of a native English speaker, cultivation, especially as connected to
education, seems unusual. This uniqueness seems especially different to an
American reader—whose nation and language have anglophone origins.
In “English” roots, from the early eighteenth century cultivation has been
associated with farming and gardening, especially the deep and careful till-
ing of the soil in husbandry agriculture. The Oxford dictionaries add two
other subordinate meanings, betterment of a skill or quality, and lastly,
refinement, good education as connected to being “cultured”. The
English origins are largely biological—and not metaphysical or spiritual;
importantly, they do not typically refer to persons. An individual is not
cultivated; membership in a culture is not cultivated. It is noted, however,
that one definitional source incorporates a sentence referring to monks
acquiring skills in meditation.
In considering cultivation, there might be resonance with a particular
American philosophy—that of the pragmatist John Dewey and his concep-
tion of growth. Dewey was the quintessential American philosopher in the
decades before and after the beginning of the twentieth century, and his
writings migrated worldwide. Dewey did visit China in the second decade
of the twentieth century and is known to have influenced a particular
xii Foreword: China Is Always China
political moment in Chinese history and a corresponding philosophy of

education. Most important, there is strong contemporary interest in
Dewey among Chinese educational scholars. For Dewey, growth leads to
more growth, and a suggestion has been made that a shared metaphysics
exists between Dewey’s view and Confucianism. My sense, however, is
that Dewey’s Darwinian evolutionary roots are stronger than another
interpretation that connects American and Chinese meanings with a
German concept of human cultivation in Bildung.
Readers, it is now time to turn to Chinese moral education. The authors
offer a sophisticated and complex treatment of its history. It is vital to
understand this history for gaining insight into contemporary China and
the people with whom many of us have a new and exciting interaction. I
have spent some thought in considering how to read the volume. My clos-
ing suggestion, in attempting to read the book on its own terms, is to
remember that China is always China. Further, some may use the book for
detailed study and its content surely provides this possibility. Some others
should read this as an introductory volume, to be read as a unique and
valuable story that can lead to further explorations across contemporary
cross-cultural understanding.
Lynda Stone
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC, USA
References
De Mente, B. L. (2009). Bridging Cultural Barriers in China, Japan, Korea &
Mexico. Cultural-Insight Books.
Gamer, R. E. (2017). Preface. In Eds. R. E. Gamer and S.W. Toops. Understanding
contemporary China (5th ed.) (p. xi). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
McClellan, B. E. (1999). Moral education in America: Schools and the shaping of
character from colonial times to the present. New York: Teachers College Press.
Acknowledgments
The book was sponsored by the Professor’s Starting Grant of Shaoxing

University (20155018). We would like to thank Professor You Huanmin
at Hunan Normal University and Dr. Xinran Lehto at Purdue University
for their advice and encouragement.
xiii
Contents
1 Introduction of the Philosophy and the Book 1

Why the Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education? And Why
History? 2
What Is Included? And Why Is It Important? 6
What Are the Ground Rules and Structure of the Book? 8
References 11
Part I The Conceptual Origin and the First Flowering 13
2 The Heart of Tao Is Subtle: The Emergence

of the Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education 15
The Background of Chinese Moral Education Philosophy 16
Cultural Background: The Culture of Family and State 16
Political Background: The Dynasty Transition 19
Philosophy of Moral Education at the Beginning of the Zhou
Dynasty 21
Philosophy of Moral Education in The Book of Changes 21
Jizi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 24
The Duke of Zhou’s Philosophy of Moral Education 25
References 32
xv
xvi CONTENTS
3 High Mountains of Admiration: The Philosophy of Moral

Education of the Confucian Big Three 35
Confucius’ Philosophy of Moral Education 36
An Overview 36
Political Purpose 38
Methodology and the Spiritual Core 39
The Concept Cluster in Confucius’ Moral Education 41
Contrast Between the Superior Man and the Inferior Man 43
Rites and Music for Moral Education 44
Moral Self-Cultivation 46
The Influences of Confucius’ Philosophy of Moral Education 47
The Philosophies of Moral Education of Mencius and Hsun Tzu 50
Mencius’ Philosophy of Moral Education 51
Human Nature for Moral Cultivation 51
Benevolence and Righteousness 52
Approaches to Cultivating the Superior Man 54
Hsun Tzu’s Philosophy of Moral Education 56
On Heaven’s Role in Moral Education 57
On Human Nature 58
On Rites 58
Perspectives on Righteousness Versus Personal Gain 60
The Ways of Moral Education 60
The Impacts of Mencius and Hsun Tzu’s Philosophies
on Later Generations 61
Conclusion and Discussion 61
References 63
4 The Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought:

The Philosophy of Moral Education in the Spring
and Autumn and Warring States Periods 65
Philosophy of Moral Education in Taoism 65
The Philosophical Thought of Lao Tzu on Moral Education 66
The Approaches to Moral Education of Chuang Tzu 70
The Impacts of Philosophy of Moral Education in Taoism 73
The Philosophy of Moral Education in the Legalist School 74
The Philosophy of Moral Education of Guan Zhong and His
Followers 74
Han Feizi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 76
Mo Tzu’s Philosophy of Moral Education 79
Conclusion 82
References 84
CONTENTS
xvii
Part II The Era of Conflict, Adaptation, and Integration 85
5 Confucianism’s Ascent to State Orthodoxy:

The Philosophy of Moral Education in the Western Han
Dynasty 87
The Political Background of the Philosophical Renaissance 88
Jia Yi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 90
Cosmological Frameworks in Jia Yi’s Philosophy of Moral
Education 91
Moral Education as a Method of Governance 92
Jia Yi’s Methods of Moral Education 93
Jia Yi’s Perspectives on Moral Education for Princes 95
Conclusion 96
Dong Zhongshu’s Philosophy of Moral Education 97
Cosmology in Dong Zhongshu’s Philosophy of Moral
Education 98
Foundation of Dong’s Philosophy: Three Grades of Human
Nature 101
The Relationships Between Moral Cultivation and Politics 102
Content and Teaching Materials of Moral Education 104
Dong Zhongshu’s Approaches to Moral Education 106
Conclusion 107
References 108
6 Farewell to Migrating Geese: The Philosophy of Moral

Education in a Time of Rebellion 111
Wang Chong’s Philosophy of Moral Education 112
Wang Chong’s Philosophical Cosmology 112
Human Nature and Its Implications for Moral Education 114
Purpose and Methods of Moral Education 115
The Study of Xuan in the Wei-Jin Dynasties 117
Wang Bi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 119
Wang Bi’s New Ontology for Mingjiao 120
Wang Bi on Human Nature and Emotion 121
Ji Kang’s Philosophy of Moral Education 122
Ji Kang’s Philosophical Cosmology and Ideas on Human
Nature 122
Ji Kang’s Criticism of Mingjiao 124
Ji Kang’s Approaches of Moral Education 125
xviii CONTENTS
Guo Xiang’s Philosophy of Moral Education 127

The Independent Evolution of Human Nature 127
Comments on Guo Xiang’s Idea of Mingjiao and Nature 129
Conclusion 129
References 131
7 Promoting Morality for Ultimate Liberation:

The Philosophy of Moral Education in Religious Taoism
and Buddhism 133
Morality and Immortality: The Philosophy of Moral Education
in Religious Taoism 134
Ge Hong’s Philosophy of Moral Education 135
Ge Hong’s Cosmology 136
Ge Hong’s Concepts Concerning Moral Education 136
Morality and Enlightenment: The Philosophy of Moral
Education in Buddhism 140
Implications of Buddhism’s Cosmology for Moral Education 140
Hui-yuan’s Philosophy of Moral Education 142
Hui-yuan’s Defense of Why Monks Do Not Bow
Down Before Kings 143
Hui-yuan’s Cosmology and Ontology 145
Hui-neng’s Philosophy of Moral Education 146
Hui-neng’s Concepts About Moral Cultivation 147
Hui-neng’s Approaches to Moral Education 149
Qi-song’s Philosophy of Moral Education 153
Conclusion 156
References 158
Part III The Era of Full Development and Transformation 161
8 Flying Dragons in the Sky: The Philosophy of Moral

Education in the School of Principle of Neo-
Confucianism 163
Zhou Dunyi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 166
Zhou Dunyi’s Cosmology 166
Zhou Dunyi’s Conceptual Framework of Moral Education 167
Contents
xix
Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Moral Education 170

Zhang Zai’s Ontology 170
Zhang Zai’s Philosophical Discussion of Moral Education 171
Conclusion 174
The Cheng Brothers’ Philosophy of Moral Education 175
The Cheng Brothers’ Ontology 175
The Cheng Brothers’ Philosophical Discourse on Moral
Education 177
Chu Hsi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 180
Chu Hsi’s Cosmology 181
Chu Hsi’s Conceptual Framework for Moral Education 183
Chu Hsi’s Approaches of Moral Education 185
Chu Hsi’s Ideas on School Moral Education 187
References 191
9 My Heart Is the Universe: The Philosophy of Moral

Education in the School of Mind of Neo-Confucianism 193
The Six Classics Are My Footnotes: Lu Jiuyuan’s Philosophy
of Moral Education 194
Cosmology and Ontology in Lu Jiuyuan’s Philosophy 194
Sudden Enlightenment and Moral Education 196
Lu Jiuyuan’s Approaches to Moral Education 198
Conclusion 200
The Goose Lake Meeting: Philosophical Debates Between
Chu Hsi and Lu Jiuyuan 201
Analysis of the Philosophical Debate 202
After the Goose Lake Meeting 204
The Extension of Innate Knowledge: Wang Yangming’s
Philosophy of Moral Education 206
The Heart as the Origin of the Heavenly Principle 207
The Doctrine of Innate Knowledge 209
Unity of Knowing and Acting 211
Wang Yangming’s Moral Education Methods and Practice 213
Wang Yangming’s Philosophical Contribution and Influence 214
References 215
xx Contents
Part IV The Era of Crises, Learning, and Regeneration 217
10 From Practical Learning to Chinese Substance

and Western Utility: The Philosophy of Moral Education
in an Era of Crises 219
The Philosophy of Moral Education in the Era of Practical
Learning 219
Wang Fuzhi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 221
Metaphysics and Moral Cultivation 221
Moral Education, Righteousness, and Gain 223
Epistemology and Moral Education 224
Discourse on Moral Education 225
Huang Zongxi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 226
Huang Zongxi’s Ontology 226
Practical Learning for the State 227
Huang Zongxi’s Discourse on Moral Education 228
Gu Yanwu’s Philosophy of Moral Education 230
Ontology and Human Nature 230
Practical Learning for Serving the State 231
On Moral Cultivation 232
The Era of Chinese Substance and Western Utility 234
The Idea of Chinese Substance and Western Utility 234
Context of Chinese Substance and Western Utility 234
Zhang Zhidong on Chinese Substance and Western Utility 236
Moral Education Based on Chinese Substance and Western
Utility 238
Interpenetration of Chinese Substance and Western Utility 239
The Perspective of the Early Reformists 239
The Idea of the Late Reformists 240
Conclusion 242
References 243
11 When East Met West: The Philosophy of Moral Education

at a Historical Turning Point 247
Introduction 247
Chen Duxiu’s Philosophy of Moral Education 249
Criticism of Teaching About Rites in Confucianism 249
Reconstruction of the Chinese People’s National Character 251
Chen Duxiu’s Goals and Approaches to Moral Education 251
CONTENTS
xxi
Liang Shuming’s Philosophy of Moral Education 254

Consensus and Discordance with Chen Duxiu 254
Philosophical Foundations of Liang Shuming’s
Moral Education 255
Liang Shuming’s Philosophical Discourse
on Moral Education 256
Conclusion 259
Cai Yuanpei’s Philosophy of Moral Education 259
The Sources and Ideas of Cai’s Philosophy 260
Cai’s Philosophical Discussion of the Two Worlds 260
Cai’s Discourse on Moral Education 261
Conclusion 263
Tao Xingzhi’s Philosophy of Moral Education 264
The Sources of Tao’s Philosophy and Its Transformation 265
Moral Education Implications of Life Education Theory 267
References 270
12 The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education

for the Twenty-First Century: Challenges, Regeneration,
and Significance 273
Recapitulating the Characteristics of the Philosophy of Chinese
Moral Education 273
The Impact of the Philosophy on Chinese Culture 275
The Contemporary Moral Crisis and the Prospect
of Regeneration 279
The Imperative and Feasibility of Philosophical Regeneration 280
The Conceptual Renewal 282
Implications for Current Chinese Moral Education 286
Philosophical Significance for Today’s World 288
References 291
References 293
Index 303
CHAPTER 1
Introduction of the Philosophy and the Book
The idea of the philosophy of Chinese moral education that gives rise to
this book is based on two observations: first, there was exclusive and ample
philosophical discussion of moral cultivation in ancient China;1 second,
this represents a unique historical and cultural phenomenon. While the
former endows it with the basic properties of philosophy and moral educa-
tion, the latter indicates its broader connotations with respect to cultural
history. In light of these dynamics, we contend that the philosophical sys-
tem is grounded in ancient Chinese social, political, and economic set-
tings, and thus should be understood by connecting it to these historical
complexities, which is essential for characterizing the primary theme of
this philosophy, namely education to ensure proper human relations.
For a country with thousands of years of uninterrupted civilization such
as China, philosophical discussions on moral education for appropriate
human relations, as well as the relevant educational activities, played a key
role in strengthening the social order and stabilizing the state. The ancient
Chinese believed that it was the individual’s moral character and values that
mostly decided his or her behavior and that it was the morality of the rulers
and the people as a whole that determined the rise and decline of the coun-
try; this is also true in today’s world. That said, our goal in exploring the
historical process of this philosophy is to shed light on its unique ideas about
education and universal values for moral development and social prosperity.
From a cultural perspective, the book is not just an inquiry into phi-
losophy or history, but also a comprehensive and systematic exploration of
© The Author(s) 2018 1

Z. You et al., The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_1
2 Z. YOU ET AL.
the core and essence of Chinese culture. The fortunes of philosophy are
closely tied to the characteristics of the Chinese people and their modes of
thinking. On the one hand, the ancient Chinese tended to perceive the
world holistically (Zhang, 1999), relying less on logical causality or con-
crete analysis and more on intuition; they discussed the issue of moral
education through a metaphysical lens. On the other, with its meaning for
political rule, philosophical discussion related to moral education was so
widespread that it grew and prospered to form a comprehensive system of
philosophy in China; this in turn has strongly influenced how people
think, what they believe and value, and how they act in human relations,
politics, religions, and the arts. Thus, an investigation into the philosophy
provides a key to deciphering Chinese culture.
This grand philosophical trend, though a powerful force in history, has
not been explicitly defined and widely recognized—partly because it was
set out in ambiguous and esoteric treatises in ancient Chinese culture and
partly because of its intertwined relationships with traditional Chinese eth-
ics, metaphysics, and political thinking. Most of the relevant scholarly
works today tend to discuss ethics and moral education separately, and few
have examined them from the angle of philosophical frameworks and con-
cepts related to moral education. The predominant role of moral cultiva-
tion in traditional philosophy and the absence of literature on this,
nonetheless, have made it necessary to conduct a systematic study of the
philosophy of moral education in Chinese history, helping to define and
expand this particular area of knowledge.
This philosophical inquiry is much needed in an era of globalization,
when cross-cultural understanding has become essential for encouraging
international collaboration and reducing the clash of civilizations. The his-
tory of philosophy of Chinese moral education, with its roots in
Confucianism and other Chinese philosophical schools, can yield fresh
insights into the orientation of Chinese values and social norms through
the lens of moral cultivation. The book is unique as it is the first to deal
specifically with this important subject, lending support to cultural
exchange in relation to values and education between East and West.
Why the Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education?

And Why History?
Before discussing the organization of this book, we need to examine the
legitimacy of the philosophy of Chinese moral education. Worldwide, the
philosophy of moral education is still an underdeveloped field with scant
INTRODUCTION OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND THE BOOK 3
literature. Frankena (1958) and Kohlberg (1971, 1981) wrote articles or

books on the philosophy of moral education, bringing new insights from
moral philosophy into the field of education. Dai (2004) defined the phi-
losophy of moral education as a discipline studying moral education in an
integrated way, suggesting that it is the integrative function of moral phi-
losophy on education that determines the need for establishing a philoso-
phy of moral education, while de Ruyter and Miedema (2012) summarized
their edited book as a commitment to clarifying the philosophy of moral
education. This relative lack of literature might have reflected a concern
among academics over the independence of this strand of philosophy from
moral philosophy and the philosophy of education more generally.
The traditional philosophy of moral education in China, nonetheless,
provides a special case to validate this area of knowledge because of its
unique cultural niche and philosophical characteristics, as well as the
extremely important role that moral education has played in Chinese his-
tory. There are several ideas we can use to support this claim: first, ancient
Chinese philosophy centers on ethics and education in virtue; second, tra-
ditional Chinese education is intrinsically a moral education, and the tradi-
tional Chinese philosophy of education is essentially a philosophy of moral
education; and third, traditional Chinese philosophy involves abundant
metaphysical concepts and epistemological topics that are closely tied to or
devoted to the purpose of moral education—all have enabled the philoso-
phy of Chinese moral education to become a complete and independent
field of study, including not just the moral education dimension in ethics,
but also connected frameworks in metaphysics and epistemology.
First of all, traditional Chinese philosophies can be essentially perceived
as moral philosophies centering on teaching morality and self-cultivation
(Deng & Yin, 2015; Wu, 1999). This was well described by a famous phi-
losopher, Wang Fuzhi: “all discourses about Tao [Truth] are to teach
people [to be moral]” (Wang, 1996, p. 458). Almost all the philosophical
schools in ancient China focused on discussing how to develop appropri-
ate human relations through moral cultivation, which aimed at maintaining
social order. Confucianism concerns teaching the virtues and nurturing
harmonious human relations, Taoism stands for maintaining a quiescent
attitude in relationships among people and maintaining the harmony
between man and nature, while Buddhism helps to promote a peaceful
mind, offering the promise of eternal happiness. The Mohists advocated
fostering universal love and an altruistic spirit, while the Legalists called
for the regulation of human relations through the enforcement of law.2
4 Z. YOU ET AL.
Working together, they constituted the main body of Chinese moral phi-
losophy and pursued the end of moral cultivation from differing
perspectives.
These philosophical schools, in reality, are freighted with concepts
focusing on moral education. Confucianism, for instance, is a philosophy
of moral cultivation and social practice (Peng, 2010). The central doctrine
of the ‘Three Guiding Principles’ in Confucianism, namely promoting vir-
tue, refreshing oneself, and reaching the state of moral perfection, is also
the guidance for the moral self-cultivation of scholars, who in turn would
help build good customs in society by realizing the ideal of rule by moral-
ity. In this sense, Confucianism is not just a virtue ethics, but also a phi-
losophy of moral education. This argument is bolstered by the fact that
most Confucian philosophers, such as Confucius and Mencius, were also
great educators. Many of their philosophical discussions were recorded by
their students during their teaching. Indeed, their ideas were often the
products of conversations and exchanges between teacher and students,
enriching their philosophy with implications for a wide-ranging and deeply
held moral education.
Next, traditional Chinese education over the past several thousand years
is essentially a form of moral education as it centers on people’s moral
development (Cui, 1999). Wang Yangming, a great philosopher in the
Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 CE), stated that the chief goal of school edu-
cation was to cultivate students’ morality (Wang, 2011). In fact, most
Chinese schools, private or official, were not designed to teach concrete
and detailed knowledge or practical skills, but to teach moral truth. Thus,
the philosophy of education in ancient China was, in essence, a philosophy
of moral education. Unlike the modern philosophy of education, which
tends to underscore cognitive theory and scientific inquiry, the traditional
Chinese philosophy of education concentrates on discussing the heart,
human nature, the heavenly principle,3 and moral perfection, as well as
elaborating on the corresponding approaches for moral development.4
Furthermore, there are intrinsic bonds between concepts of metaphys-
ics, epistemology, and moral education in ancient Chinese philosophy.
While cosmology and ontology serve as the basis and direction of moral
cultivation, moral education principles and approaches in turn are firmly
situated within metaphysical discourses. For instance, it would be impos-
sible to truly understand Lao Tzu’s following of nature, Chu Hsi’s investi-
gation of the world to understand moral truth, or Wang Yangming’s
extension of innate knowledge without connecting these to their respective
cosmological frameworks and ontological concepts about the substance

and operation of the universe. Epistemology too plays an important role in
illuminating moral education because of its emphasis on exploring the
nature of moral knowledge and its intertwined association with metaphys-
ics: it deals with achieving moral education-related knowledge such as the
“Tao” (the Way) and enquires into the relationships between the Tao and
morality, body and mind, and knowing and acting; it defines the basic fea-
ture of morality as relational and interactive, not only in human relations
but also between the universe and humans (Rošker, 2014), highlighting
the active role of learners in moral knowledge acquisition.
It is worth noting that traditional moral education in China is essen-
tially a form of moral self-cultivation underscoring an individual’s auton-
omy and initiative, which further justifies the inclusiveness of the
philosophy of moral education. As the responsibility for moral develop-
ment was usually laid upon the shoulders of each individual, the moral
agents needed to understand the cosmological and ontological frame-
works so as to have the right attitude and motivations in their own moral
cultivation. In other words, metaphysics and epistemology became indis-
pensable parts of the philosophical discussion of moral education because
they helped scholars clarify the rationales and legitimacy for choosing
these educational contents and approaches, and thus for consciously fol-
lowing the moral principles. There is therefore a compelling need to inves-
tigate moral education from a philosophical perspective, including not just
ideas about moral education, but also an integrated understanding of
metaphysical frameworks, ethical principles, and epistemological beliefs;
these constitute a complete philosophical system that we call the philoso-
phy of Chinese moral education.
Though closely related to and sometimes overlapping with ethics, the
philosophy of moral education is not equivalent to ethics. Aside from
including the components of metaphysics and epistemology, the philoso-
phy differs from ethics in concentrating on the subject of moral education.
Although ethics encompasses extensive moral principles, frameworks, and
logic that can contribute to the teaching of morality, its core mission is to
seek moral truth, which limits its impact on moral education. The philoso-
phy of moral education, on the other hand, is a focused study of these
philosophical concepts as related to moral cultivation. Such an inquiry can
revitalize ethical principles through placing them in the setting of moral
education, highlighting its intention, approaches, and the value of educa-
tion. This is particularly true in our case given that traditional Chinese
6 Z. YOU ET AL.
philosophy was not confined to academic discussions about ethical issues

but was often used as a philosophy of life for people to consciously guide
their own daily behavior, learning, and reflection.
We should also note that this philosophical discussion is perfectly situ-
ated in the Chinese historical process and that the development process of
the philosophy per se constitutes a complete history. Contrary to the per-
spective that holds history as secondary and of only incidental importance
to philosophy, we suggest that history in the philosophy of Chinese moral
education is of paramount significance—the philosophy is a product of
history and therefore should be understood by putting it back in its his-
torical context. Due to the long and continuous history of the philosophy,
we choose to present it by conducting an in-depth examination of the
philosophy of moral education of the key figures in each of the historical
stages. These philosophers are usually famous scholars who inherited and
developed the philosophies of the previous eras, and thus a thorough
investigation of their ideas sheds light on what the mainstream concepts
were during a certain time period and how they evolved in response to the
social crises. In fact, the history of this philosophy is almost a record of the
Chinese history of culture, education, and politics, and can thereby pro-
vide us with insights about the transformation of these subjects.
What Is Included? And Why Is It Important?

This book defines the philosophy of Chinese moral education through
history as the developmental process of a special philosophical system that
centers on Confucian moral cultivation, supplemented by moral education-
related frameworks, concepts, and approaches from a variety of other phil-
osophical schools and religions, such as Taoism, Mohism, Legalism, and
Buddhism. While the moral education dimension in Confucianism consti-
tutes the mainstay of this philosophy, other schools play an important role
in challenging, complementing, and enriching this mainstream philoso-
phy. Using a historical perspective, the book delineates a dynamic process
of the philosophy in relation to politics and the economy. Thanks to the
importance of this philosophy in Chinese culture, the book helps readers
understand not only the ideas and concepts concerning moral education
in different philosophical schools, but also the Chinese characteristics and
mindsets that were influenced and shaped by the philosophy and the rel-
evant practice of moral education.
Specifically, the book examines cosmological and ontological concepts

such as the ‘Supreme Ultimate’, the heavenly moral principle, qi (chi), and
the interaction between heaven and man, as well as discussing heart-based
and human relations-oriented psychology and epistemology. It presents a
methodology for the doctrine of the mean as the guidance for people’s moral
development. It elaborates on philosophical debates over the innate inclina-
tions of human nature, righteousness versus gain, substance and utility, and
Tao and utensil, and expounds moral education principles such as benevo-
lence, rites, credibility, reciprocity, faithfulness, filial piety, and compassion. It
discusses moral education approaches such as meditation, eliminating desires,
wordless teaching, sudden enlightenment, acquiring knowledge through
investigation, heart-to-heart transmission, the unity of acting and knowing,
cultivating good customs, and practical learning, and analyzes the rationales
for moral education that are based on differentiated love or karmic retribu-
tion. Finally, it tracks the developmental trajectories of these moral education
frameworks and concepts. How did they affect moral education at different
points in time? How did they develop or change over time? How did they
impact on Chinese culture and the character of the Chinese people?
A book such as this can contribute to a deep and thorough understand-
ing of Chinese culture through the lens of moral education philosophy.
Due to their complexity and vagueness, traditional Chinese philosophies
are widely perceived as difficult to comprehend. The perspective of moral
education, lying at the heart of Chinese ideologies, helps rearrange and
interpret the conceptual frameworks of various philosophies, shedding
light on their propositions, sense-making, interrelationships, and functions
against the Chinese social and historical background. As such, an explora-
tion of these traditional philosophies can clarify the core values of Chinese
culture and answer important questions related to people’s beliefs, atti-
tudes, behaviors, and norms, as well as the mechanisms of Chinese educa-
tion, politics, and society. These inquiries also help explain traditional
cultural and social phenomena such as grand unification,5 the marriage of
politics and education, the integration of family and state, rule by morality,
the hierarchical social structure, Confucianism’s partial role as a religion,
the sense of interdependence in human relations, and guanxi as social net-
working in China, as well as what role the philosophy played here.6
It is particularly noteworthy that the book proposes the concept of
“the culture of family and state” and its core components of “the family-
roots sentiment” and “the isomorphism between family and state” (see
Chap. 2 for details). This cultural framework is used to help readers
8 Z. YOU ET AL.
understand the geo-political, social, and economic contexts, and the emo-
tional and psychological foundations in ancient China that gave rise to the
emergence of the philosophy of moral education. Another implication of
introducing the concept is that it provides the cultural basis for the renewal
of this traditional philosophy in the postmodern era, which will be dis-
cussed in the concluding chapter.
From a historical and cultural perspective, the book may give an answer
to the question of why China has been able to survive and prosper for so
long. The key is that cultural identification rather than ethnicity is the
foundation of the civilization; stated differently, the identity of a Chinese
is determined not by race, consanguinity or the place of birth, but by his
or her acceptance of mainstream Chinese culture. In this sense, the phi-
losophy of moral education, with its powerful influence on ideology and
education, played a crucial role in incorporating diverse peoples and creat-
ing the vigorous and resilient civilization of ancient China.
In addition to exploring the above social and cultural frameworks at a
macro level, the book attempts to clarify other, more concrete questions
regarding the Chinese people’s characteristics. For example, how were the
Chinese people’s national characteristics formed? How has the traditional
philosophy of moral education helped to shape Chinese characteristics
such as filial piety, courtesy, respecting superiors and conforming to
authority, taking a holistic view, inclusiveness, face-saving, hard work,
valuing education, keeping a low profile, and conciliation? Answering
these questions will help readers better understand the cultural and educa-
tional functions of the philosophy of moral education in China.
What Are the Ground Rules and Structure

of the Book?
To sum up, the book is designed to incorporate and integrate knowledge

in a variety of fields: it traces the historical journey of Chinese ideology
concerning moral education from its emergence to modern times; it
includes relevant philosophical discussions from different schools; it sum-
marizes and analyzes ideas about human relations, man and nature, and
people’s moral development; and in so doing, it identifies the philosophy’s
influence on Chinese social and political systems and people’s life atti-
tudes, as well as discussing the future trend of this special belief and edu-
cational system.
In order to distinguish this philosophy from others, ground rules are

set for selecting philosophies of Chinese moral education. With regard to
the moral concepts in metaphysics and moral philosophy, only the dimen-
sions that are directly linked to or significantly influenced moral education
are selected. Four criteria are applied, as follows. The authors selected the
philosophies that are rich in moral education values and implications,
chose metaphysical thought that represented the logical development of
the philosophy of moral education in each historical phase, picked out
philosophical schools and religions that fitted or catered to the social, eco-
nomic, or political needs at that time and that were thereby endorsed by
the government for moral education purposes, and singled out the moral
philosophies that led to large-scale educational activities and produced
educational results in history.
Next, instead of offering a static history, the book organizes its content
based on the dynamic perspectives of interaction and transformation.
While ‘interaction’ refers to the conflicts and mutual learning between or
among different philosophical schools in terms of their relation to moral
education concepts, ‘transformation’ denotes the philosophy’s historical
development and alteration. Put differently, the study is conducted in two
dimensions simultaneously: it sorts out materials by dynasty (the horizon-
tal dimension) and interprets the development of key concepts through-
out history (the vertical dimension). Meanwhile, although bringing
together different schools, the philosophy in this book is not a mosaic
picture formed by assembling different philosophies regarding moral edu-
cation, but rather an organic process of incorporation and integration
among these different sections. In following this path, the book provides
readers with a novel and holistic landscape of the philosophy of moral
education in China as well as its historical trajectory.
To clarify the process, the book divides the history into four parts. The
first addresses the emergence of the philosophy of Chinese moral education
in the early Zhou Dynasty and the boom period of “the Contention of a
Hundred Schools of Thought”. The second part discusses its further devel-
opment from the Han Dynasty to the Tang Dynasty, when Confucianism
became the state orthodoxy for moral education after gaining political sup-
port, and when religions endeavored to adopt Confucian moral principles.
The third part covers the major development of the philosophy of Chinese
moral education in the Song Dynasty and the Ming Dynasty when the two
branches of Neo-Confucianism, the School of Principle and the School of
Mind, emerged and flourished while assimilating ideas from Taoism and
10 Z. YOU ET AL.
Buddhism. The fourth part deals with the turbulent changes from the Qing
Dynasty to the modern era, characterized by practical learning in the early
Qing Dynasty, the advocacy of combining Chinese ‘substance’ with Western
‘utility’ in the late Qing Dynasty, and the criticism of the traditional phi-
losophy and the introduction and adaption of Western philosophies in
China in the early twentieth century. In addition to the main body of the
book, a concluding section discusses the philosophy’s impact on the
national mentality and cultural characteristics of contemporary Chinese
people, examines the consequences of the decline of the traditional philoso-
phy of moral education in present-day China, and reflects on the prospect
for the regeneration of this philosophy in a postmodern era, as well as
exploring its philosophical significance for today’s world.
Notes
1. Moral cultivation is a dynamic process of moral education unique in ancient
China which emphasizes nurturing and fostering people’s moral growth in
life through creating benign environmental influences, teaching/learning
moral principles, and developing right attitudes and affections. For scholars,
it is more about self-cultivation and conscious choice; for the mass of the
people, it is more about learning from or being influenced by good
examples.
2. Legalism and Mohism are two famous philosophical schools thriving during
the Spring and Autumn Period (770–475 BCE) and the Warring States
Period (475–221 BCE) in Ancient China.
3. The heavenly principle is Confucian jargon denoting that the moral princi-
ple is the law of the universe and that the moral truth is as lofty as heaven.
4. The notion of the heart (xin) in traditional Chinese philosophy, often trans-
lated as “the heart-mind”, does not just refer to the physical heart in charge
of emotions, but also the cognitive center of perception, understanding,
intuition, conscience, and rational thought, and is therefore critical to moral
education. Some philosophers even suggest that it embodies the heavenly
moral principle and is the substance of the world.
5. Grand unification is a traditional ideological perspective in Chinese culture;
it contends that every region of ancient China belongs to the country
headed by the king or emperor and should not be separated—the idea can
be traced back to the patriarchal clan system. Besides territory, the idea also
indicates a trend toward unification in politics, thought, and the economy.
We believe that the philosophy of moral education considerably reinforced
this idea.
6. Guanxi refers to connections in the personalized social networks of influ-

ence in China, highlighting the exchange of favors and affections. It is con-
sidered important for people’s career success as it works as a variant form of
personal social capital.
References
Cui, Y. (1999). On Liang Shuming’s Eastern and western cultures and their philoso-
phies: Reconstruction of Chinese traditional philosophy of education. Academic
Journal of Zhongzhou, 3, 62–65.
Dai, M. (2004). The integrity of moral education and philosophy of moral educa-
tion. Journal of Jiangxi Normal University, 2, 111–117.
de Ruyter, D. J., & Miedema, S. (2012). Introduction: A commitment to clarity
in philosophy of moral education. In D. J. de Ruyter & S. Miedema (Eds.),
Moral education and development (pp. 1–10). Dordrecht: Springer Science &
Business Media.
Deng, M., & Yin, W. (2015). A new exploration of Huang Zongxi’s moral phi-
losophy. Studies in Ethics, 2, 27–32.
Frankena, W. K. (1958). Toward a philosophy of moral education. Harvard
Educational Review, 28(4), 303–313.
Kohlberg, L. (1971). The philosophy of moral education. New York, NY: Harper &
Row.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages and the idea
of justice. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.
Peng, H. (2010). On the Confucianization of ethics in Buddhism and Taoism.
Journal of Xihua University (Philosophy & Social Sciences), 2, 14–18.
Rošker, J. (2014). Epistemology in Chinese philosophy. In The Stanford encyclope-
dia of philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-
epistemology/
Wang, F. (1996). Complete works of Cuanshan. Changsha: Yuelu Publishing
House.
Wang, Y. (2011). Collected works of Wang Yangming. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient
Books Publishing House.
Wu, Z. (1999). Discussion on the traditional implications of moral self-cultivation
on nurturing modern personalities. Jiangsu Social Sciences, 1, 156–162.
Zhang, X. (1999, April 2). A brief discussion on the holism in traditional Chinese
culture. Guangming Daily, p. 7.
PART I
The Conceptual Origin and the First

Flowering
CHAPTER 2
The Heart of Tao Is Subtle: The Emergence

of the Philosophy of Chinese Moral
Education
To many, the first emergence of the philosophy of moral education in

China seems more like a legend than a reality as its debut is documented
in the words of legendary figures in a few ancient books. It originated, in
essence, along with the most ancient Chinese philosophy during a time
between the Shang Dynasty (c. sixteenth century–c. eleventh century
BCE) and the Western Zhou Dynasty (c. eleventh century–771 BCE) as
many concepts and frameworks in the earliest Chinese philosophical dis-
course contained rich implications for moral education and were used for
the purposes of moral cultivation. Understanding these concepts is essen-
tial because they were the origins of philosophies such as Confucianism
and Taoism, which in turn provided the primary philosophy of moral edu-
cation throughout Chinese history.
Such philosophical ideas and discussions, to be specific, were presented
mainly in the adages of legendary sage kings such as Yao, Shun, and Yu,
the ideas of Jizi, and the official admonitions from the Duke of Zhou—all
were recorded in the earliest books of China, namely The Book of History,
The Book of Changes (I Ching), The Book of Rites, and The Classic of Poetry.
Although they appear esoteric, abstruse, and obscure, the metaphysical
discourse laid the groundwork and set the tone for the philosophy of
Chinese moral education for the next three millennia.
The 16-word maxim of Yu the Great,1 for instance, embodied these
characteristics: the maxim was recorded in The Book of History, marking
the first philosophical discussion upon the basis and method of moral cul-
tivation in Chinese history; it has been extolled as a mind-to-mind or

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_2
16 Z. YOU ET AL.
heart-to-heart transmission of the essence of Chinese culture. It states:

“the human heart is perilous, and the heart of Tao is subtle; to understand
the heart of Tao requires concentration and perseverance, and sincerely
following the doctrine of the mean” (Jiang & Qian, 1990, p. 43). The first
two lines portrayed human nature (the heart) as unstable and the ultimate
truth of the world, the “Tao”, as profound and holy.2 While the former
referred to people’s acquired nature, the latter indicated their original,
uncontaminated state. The last two lines specified that the mission of
moral cultivation was to transform the perilous human heart and restore
the heart of truth by sincerely concentrating on learning and by following
the right path of avoiding the extremes.
This 16-word maxim had abundant implications for moral education.
First, for the sake of ensuring good governance, the problems and unreli-
ability of acquired human nature needed to be fixed and restored to its
original nature, as guided by moral truth, namely Tao, which highlighted
the necessity of moral cultivation and the integration of moral education
and politics. Second, instead of relying solely on cognition or reasoning,
the moral truth of Tao was often transmitted by the heart-mind (Nan,
2007), illustrating the special method of Chinese traditional moral educa-
tion through intuition, inspiration, and emotion. The unique approach of
the heart-to-heart transmission of the truth had been showcased by the
transmission of the maxim from King Yu the Great to King Tang, to the
Duke of Zhou, to Confucius, and then to Mencius; these people were not
taught in person as they were not contemporaries but through the under-
standing of the heart. Last, but importantly, it provided later philosophers
with the concepts and themes for discussions of moral education, for
example, the concepts of the heart, Tao, human nature, the doctrine of
the mean, and concentration and sincerity in learning, with the result that
almost all philosophical concepts related to moral education in
Confucianism and Taoism can be traced from here.
The Background of Chinese Moral Education

Philosophy
Cultural Background: The Culture of Family and State
The need to fully understand the nature and rationale of the philosophy
requires us to visit and examine its cultural background in ancient China,
particularly its origin with respect to geopolitical factors and socio-
THE HEART OF TAO IS SUBTLE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY… 17
psychological patterns. For this purpose, we propose the concept of the

culture of family and state, which includes three dimensions: the family-
roots sentiment provides the spiritual sustenance and emotional foundation;
family-based human relations represent the main content; and the family–
state continuum is the sublimation and ideal. In terms of politics and social
mentality, this is best presented as an isomorphism between family and state.
The family is at the center because it is both the roots of every indi-
vidual and the cornerstone of the country. Historically, the Chinese people
had developed such a strong psychological and emotional attachment
toward the family that they consciously or unconsciously regarded it as
their spiritual root, which we term the family-roots sentiment in this book.
This cultural inclination is characterized by a centripetal force of family
upon individuals just like roots upon leaves, a basic feature of a root-like
network of human relations, and the derived cultural characteristics such
as collectivism, conformity, and interdependence developed in the patriar-
chal clan society of ancient China.
For the sake of clarifying this cultural complexity, we use the theory of
geographic determinism to explain the formation of the patriarchal clan
society in China, which presumably gave rise to the family-oriented senti-
ment, the human relation-oriented mentality, and the bonds of affection
between family and state. Ancient China was located in an enclosed geo-
graphical region surrounded by insurmountable plateaus, seas, and des-
erts, making it a relatively safe place for the development of agricultural
civilization (Song, 1985). Such an intensely populated agrarian society
tended to place great emphasis on stability; the old male family/clan
members were greatly venerated because of their invaluable knowledge
and experience in farming.
It was in this social environment that the ancient state of China took
form. It came into being directly from the family/extended family to clan,
tribe, and allied tribes, and finally to the state; in other words, the state was
made up of a collective of families and clans, and the state leaders were
usually the heads of the most powerful of these. Thus, unlike ancient
Greece, the destruction of the clan society in China, particularly the foun-
dation of human relations on blood ties, was not completed during the
process of national formation, which made ancestor worship a strong pres-
ence throughout Chinese history (You, 2001) because people believed it
was the ancestors of the family who had granted them the power to thrive
or even rule the country. This helps explain why the Chinese people view
the relationship between family and state as integrated and tend to be
infatuated with their family roots.
18 Z. YOU ET AL.
Based on these ideas, we propose that there is a culture of family and

state ingrained in Chinese society, providing the cultural soil and the value
basis for the emergence and flourishing of a philosophy of moral educa-
tion. This culture regards family blood ties as the roots—the most impor-
tant form of human relations, with a strong affective attachment that
could be extended to a more wide-ranging family-like social network.
Besides relations based on blood ties, it also includes non-biological rela-
tionships between relatives by marriage, teachers and disciples, classmates,
fellow-townsmen, colleagues, and other acquaintances; these form an
intertwined human network of social capital like twisted tree roots or a
spider’s web. The same cultural orientation had helped develop people’s
psychological and emotional affiliation to the state as well. In the culture,
the Chinese were inclined to view the state as an enlarged family, namely a
continuity and expansion of one’s own family. The consciousness of the
family–state continuum or integration was so deeply rooted in the Chinese
people’s minds that the country was turned into an abstract cultural sym-
bol similar to the family; this has often been sublimated into a form of
spiritual support for the people throughout history.
The influence of this culture of family and state was omnipresent and
significant in ancient China. With respect to politics, it harmonized with the
idea of a grand unification of the country and a cultural mindset highly valu-
ing power and status. In terms of cultural orientation, it contributed to the
national character, which seeks commonality and values integration. In
terms of the attitude to life, it focused on this world rather than a hereafter,
as indicated by a preference for morality over religion. Social, political, and
business undertakings relied on an exchange of favors in interpersonal net-
works (guanxi)—though these might evoke concerns about fairness or
public interest. Finally, in terms of education, it placed great emphasis on
moral education as the key to undergirding family life and political rule.
The philosophy of Chinese moral education was grounded in this native
culture. The moral principle of filial piety, for instance, could be traced
back to the custom of worshiping ancestors and respecting the old. The
concepts of morality, benevolence, and righteousness also stemmed from
this culture: they were developed and used to teach people the right way
to deal with complex human relations based on consanguinity and the
related social networks. The teaching of the filial piety-faithfulness integra-
tion was in effect to meet the need of consolidating the family–state con-
tinuum. The moral education approaches to rites and music, moral
self-reflection, and investigating to know, in turn, also served the purposes
of regulating human relations and maintaining the social order.
From a deeper perspective, the essence of the philosophy was to recon-

cile interests through regulating human relations; more specifically, it
aimed at teaching people to consciously observe moral codes so as to
coordinate the interests of complex relationships within family, in various
social connections, and between the family and the state. The individual’s
moral development, therefore, was essential to optimize the management
of both family and state, namely, to reduce internal friction and maintain
stability in ancient China. In this sense, the rationale that gave rise to this
philosophy, as Mencius put it, was that “the foundation of the world is the
country, the foundation of country is the family, and the foundation of the
family is individual people” (Mencius & Yang, 1981, p. 167). The moral
cultivation of these “individual people” therefore was of utmost impor-
tance to the world.
We should note that although the philosophy of Chinese moral educa-
tion embodied the characteristics of the family-roots sentiment, as a phi-
losophy mostly based on the family–state perspective, it had endeavored to
balance self-interest/sectional interests and the general good, and even to
go beyond the narrow scope of the former by promoting noble moral
character. This feature was fully reflected by the two Confucian creeds of
caring for relatives (qinqin) and honoring people of virtue (zunxian).
While caring for relatives allowed people to extend love to others, honor-
ing people of virtue helped to limit nepotism (Yu, 1996). These creeds
actually extended people’s affection toward family to the state or even to
the world, so that “when the Great Tao is practiced, the world is for the
public; people with virtue and ability are chosen and used” (Hu & Chen,
2012, p. 110) and all unfortunate people are provided for. As such, it was
no longer a family-centered ideology but became a philosophy for build-
ing a harmonious world for mankind.
Political Background: The Dynasty Transition

The philosophy of moral education in China most likely took form at the
beginning of the Zhou Dynasty when the tumultuous regime change from
the Shang Dynasty to the Zhou Polity occurred. This dynasty shift marked
the full establishment of the patriarchal clan society in China, which is a
key to deciphering the origin and the intrinsic features of the philosophy.
The Shang Dynasty was the second dynasty in Chinese history and the first
with archaeological evidence of written language (inscribed on animal
bones and tortoise shells). The dynasty lasted for more than five hundred
20 Z. YOU ET AL.
years before being replaced by the kingdom of Zhou. It was the sudden
collapse of the kingdom of Shang that may have triggered the need for
moral education, facilitating the emergence of a philosophy of this.
From a cultural-political perspective, the cause of dynasty transition is
related to the belief system of Shang. People in the kingdom of Shang had
strong superstitions about “Tian” or “heaven”, blindly worshiping various
gods and ghosts. For the rulers of Shang, “Shang Di” or “God” was a
mysterious and powerful deity whose will—“Tian Ming” or “the mandate
of heaven”—could determine the fortune of people and even the fate of
the country. However, “God” was so unpredictable and capricious that the
punishment or rewards he sent the people were utterly dependent on his
mood (Ke, 1993). Put differently, “God” in Shang culture was not an
embodiment of morality, but a moody divinity evoking fear and horror.
Pleasing “God”, therefore, was the priority of the royal family. The nobles
of Shang frequently offered human sacrifice—mainly from slaves and pris-
oners captured in war. To the Shang ruling class, slaves were not human
beings and could be sacrificed at will. As long as “God” was happy, their
kingdom had the blessing of the mandate of heaven.
However, the once-invincible kingdom was overthrown almost over-
night by the allied troops of vassal states led by Zhou, when the slaves in
Shang’s troop revolted and joined the fight against Shang in a key battle
called “Muye” (c. 1046 BCE). The incident taught the rulers of Zhou an
important lesson: it was people’s support instead of God’s will that even-
tually determined the fate of a country. This was why the small vassal state
of Zhou was able to replace the giant kingdom of Shang. As a result, the
rulers of Zhou transformed the arcane idea of the mandate of heaven into
a concept rich with implications for moral education, declaring that the
mandate was not dependent on God’s moods, but was tied to “De” or
“Morality”. Only a state with good morals would have God’s favor and
thus the mandate of heaven to rule over the whole country. This ideologi-
cal transformation highlighted the significance of cultivating morality
among both rulers and the common people, giving rise to the emergence
of the philosophy of moral education in ancient China.
Philosophy of Moral Education at the Beginning

of the Zhou Dynasty
As noted above, the early philosophy of moral education was mostly a

brainchild of exemplary scholars and statesmen such as Jizi and the Duke
of Zhou, who had experienced and reflected on the collapse of the Shang
Dynasty and pondered the laws of the universe and human society to come
up with new philosophical ideas. Moral education was an essential part of
their philosophical thinking due to its critical role in stabilizing the coun-
try; this is discussed in detail in the following section.
Philosophy of Moral Education in The Book of Changes

The Book of Changes (I Ching), one of the oldest classics in China, was
widely regarded, perhaps mistakenly, as a book of divination. But the book
was more than a text for prophecy and fortune-telling; it contained pro-
found ideas and mysterious concepts that became the source and origin of
ancient Chinese philosophy (Chen, 2013). For instance, the book indi-
cated that it had recorded the celestial signs as esoteric symbols to reveal
the secret of the world. In a book of commentary on it, Confucius anno-
tated the symbols as follows. Initially, the Supreme Ultimate (taiji) gave
birth to “Two Opposites”, which in turn generated “Four Phenomena”,
which in turn produced “Eight Trigrams” (Huang & Zhang, 2004),
marking the mode of creation and the development of the cosmos, and
giving direction to our daily behavior. These concepts should be carefully
examined as they embraced values for moral education and paved the way
for the development of the philosophy of moral education in Confucianism
and Taoism in subsequent ages.
First, The Book of Changes noted that nature had four characters, namely
“Yuan”, “Zhen”, “Li” and “Heng”, which referred to creation, cultiva-
tion, facilitation, and fortification respectively, embodying the characteris-
tics of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Later scholars like Confucius
suggested that the four characters were compatible with the four moral
principles of “benevolence”, “rites”, “righteousness”, and “uprightness”
which should be followed by the superior men or “junzi” in their own
moral cultivation (Liu, 1998).3 The four virtues, along with other charac-
ters such as candidness, integrity, tolerance, and incorruptness, were essen-
tial in helping the superior man succeed in life.
22 Z. YOU ET AL.
Another important concept rich in implications for moral education in

The Book of Changes was “qian” or modesty, namely being humble in
human interactions and putting others before oneself. The book noted
that modesty was a critical virtue that the superior men should possess in
their work, interaction, and conversation, or when undertaking important
task, and that its practice would bring auspicious results. Not pursuing
modesty is like a dragon flying too high (Huang & Zhang, 2004); it will
regret this due to the lack of room for improvement and the difficulty of
sustaining the height. Superior men should use the principle of modesty
or humbleness to promote their own moral development (Anonymous,
1980). They were expected to be unassertive and prudent both in public
and in solitude, and this was a key to evaluating their characters. The idea
had deeply influenced the characteristics of Chinese people, to the extent
that they developed a cultural inclination toward humbleness and tended
to keep a low profile in social interactions.
It is noteworthy that the commentaries on The Book of Changes included
many concepts such as the Supreme Ultimate, Yin and Yang, and “change”,
which laid the cosmological foundations for the ancient Chinese philo-
sophical system. For example, the concept of the Supreme Ultimate signi-
fied the great primal beginning of the universe. The concept of Yin and
Yang, the main emblem of duality, indicated two opposite attributes of the
universe developed from the chaotic beginning. The concept of “change”
characterized the law of motion of the universe as shifting ceaselessly. Even
though the ideas might not contain a direct meaning for moral education,
these three concepts, along with that of “the Five Elements” posited by
Jizi, constituted the primary cosmological structure in ancient philosophy,
which was utilized by later philosophers such as Dong Zhongshu and
Zhou Dunyi to build their metaphysical frameworks and provide a philo-
sophical rationale for their propositions relating to moral education.
More importantly, the moral development of the superior man was a
central theme in commentaries on The Book of Changes. Nearly half of the
explanations of the 64 divinatory symbols in these books mentioned the
superior man’s moral development. One divinatory symbol states that
“heaven is in motion vigorously, thus the superior man should strive for
self-improvement” (Anonymous, 1980, p. 18). The same source says
“the Earth is receptive and supportive, therefore the superior man can
bear the utmost responsibility with a breadth of character” (Anonymous,
1980, p. 14). These two famous maxims encouraged the Chinese people
of subsequent generations to strive for moral self-cultivation through

learning from the spirit of the natural world; they were adopted by
Tsinghua University as its motto in the hope of encouraging its students
to develop those moral virtues.
In addition, the commentary books utilized the concepts of Yin and
Yang, Tao, human nature, and the mandate of heaven to explicate the origin
and rationale of moral education. The books noted that “the law of motion
of Yin & Yang was called Tao or the Great Way. People obtained goodness
from Tao, which was accomplished through cultivating human nature”
(Song, 1990, p. 312). In this comment, morality could be perceived as an
endowment from heaven that was included in human nature, and moral
education was believed to be a process to retrieve or recover this divine gift.
Human nature, a product of the universe’s motion, had accordingly deter-
mined the path for moral education; this became a central theme for discus-
sion in the philosophy of moral education throughout Chinese history.
Next, the books defined the ontological framework of the binary cate-
gorical pair of Tao and Utensil: “Tao is the metaphysical truth and Utensil
is the tangible affairs or matters for practical use” (Song, 1990, p. 329).4
This concept suggested a consistency between Tao and Utensil, or
Substance and Utility, that Tao should guide Utensil, and Utensil in turn
should reflect the spirit of Tao; this idea was used by later Confucians to
promote people’s moral development.5 For instance, in the spirit of inte-
grating Tao and Utensil, the ancient Chinese pursued Tao or learned prin-
ciples through moral education, and meanwhile believed that one’s daily
behavior should conform to the spirit of Tao; in other words, people should
consciously use moral principles to direct the conduct of politics, business,
or craftwork, contributing to people’s daily moral self-cultivation.
With regard to the mode of moral education, the books suggested that
a superior man “should harmoniously follow the demands of the preor-
dained morality, moderate according to appropriateness, and exhaustively
inquire into moral principles and human nature so as to understand the
mandate of heaven” (Song, 1990, p. 359). This statement proposed sev-
eral critical assumptions related to moral education. First, the principles of
morality were sacred and ordained by heaven, which justified the necessity
for people to learn and follow them. Second, moral learning helped people
understand the true meaning of the world. Third, exhaustive investigation
was a key approach to understanding moral principles. These concepts
were of great importance as they provided inspiration for philosophical
discussions upon moral education in later ages.
24 Z. YOU ET AL.
Last, but importantly, the books proposed that the superior men assume
the responsibility of cultivating the morality of both themselves and the
masses. They stated that as society had developed unwholesome customs,
the superior men should inspire people’s spirit and nurture good moral
habits and the customs of people. To this end, they should grow like the
trees on the mountain so as to become sages or people of virtue, teach and
set a good example for the masses, and thus improve moral customs in the
whole country (Huang & Zhang, 2004). This, in essence, articulated the
two primary missions of moral education: scholars should practice moral
self-cultivation to develop noble characters, and in so doing, help trans-
form moral customs and manners. While the superior men’s moral self-
cultivation was the precondition of nurturing good customs, the latter was
the ultimate goal of the former, which constituted the main purpose, con-
tent, and approaches of moral education in ancient China.
Jizi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Jizi was a virtuous minister of King Zhou, who was a tyrant and the last
ruler of the Shang Dynasty. It was said that Jizi was punished for remon-
strating with the king, who made him a slave. When the new dynasty of
Zhou was founded, King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty visited Jizi and sought
political advice from him. Jizi was reluctant to be a minister to the new
dynasty but provided King Wu with his thoughts on “tian-dao” (heaven’s
law), explicating ideas on the moral development of a qualified ruler.
These philosophical concepts consisted of his cosmological theory of the
Five Elements, the concept of heaven–human interaction, and the Kingly
Way conforming to heaven’s mandate.
Jizi’s ideas on moral education were recorded in a chapter in The Book of
History named “Hong Fan” or the “Great Laws”. In this chapter, Jizi pro-
posed the concept of the Five Elements—metal, wood, water, fire, and
earth—and suggested that they were the five basic elements or building blocks
of nature; they were used to expound the composition, structure, and the
operating laws of the universe. The concept reflected the primitive idea of the
ancient Chinese people that the natural world was made up of different ele-
ments with corresponding characteristics and properties; this was adopted by
later scholars to analyze the relationships between different moral attributes.
Next, Jizi elaborated on how a king should rule the country with moral-
ity and the cultivation of these virtues. To draw lessons from the collapse
of the Shang, Jizi introduced the framework of “heaven–human interac-
tion”, which had profound moral connotations. To Jizi, the mandate of

heaven was not dependent upon sacrifice but contingent on the moral
behavior of the ruling class, such that only a virtuous monarch could
maintain his rule. Accordingly, kings needed to cultivate their own moral-
ity to meet heaven’s expectations, treading the so-called “Kingly Way”, or
rule by morality. He further contended that there would be ill omen from
heaven if a king did not follow the mandate of heaven, and there would be
auspicious signs if a king did comply. This theory of portents contained
the primitive idea of integrating heaven and man, and justified the need
for the moral cultivation of kings as their morality would determine the
fate of the country.
Coupled with his idea of the mandate of heaven, Jizi proposed the con-
cept of the Three Morals and the Five Matters for sovereigns’ moral self-
cultivation. The Three Morals were integrity, firmness to the noncompliant,
and gentleness to the docile, which were regarded as the goals of ideologi-
cal and political education for rulers. The Five Matters comprised appear-
ance, language, vision, listening, and thinking. Jizi asserted that a qualified
king or king’s son should have a respectable appearance, legitimate speech,
vision, wisdom in accepting advice, and sagacity in thinking. A ruler with
these moral virtues ruled the country in conformity with the Kingly Way,
that is, in the right way and with open-mindedness.
In addition to his proposal for a king’s moral development, Jizi further
suggested that a king, as the leader, should be responsible for shaping
moral customs nationwide. The monarch should not just be the ruler, but
also a parent teaching his people about morality. He thus recommended
that King Wu enact the desired moral principles to be followed by his
people to create the correct atmosphere. In so doing, the king was pleas-
ing “God” and therefore his kingdom could acquire the mandate of
heaven and endure for a long time. This theory helped develop a tradition
that the kings and emperors of subsequent dynasties were regarded as the
moral examples for the state, and were in charge of shaping or nurturing
the good customs of the masses.
The Duke of Zhou’s Philosophy of Moral Education

The Duke of Zhou (c. 1094–c. 1033 BCE),6 the younger brother of King
Wu, is a very important figure in the history of moral education philoso-
phy. He was widely regarded as a critical link between the previous dynas-
ties and later eras as he learned and drew lessons from the preceding times
26 Z. YOU ET AL.
to create a new philosophy and cultural system for moral education, which
had a profound impact on the Chinese people’s belief and moral customs
throughout history. He was also credited as the forerunner of Confucianism
on the grounds that his ideas and practice provided the basic conceptual
framework and inspiration for Confucius’ philosophy. The following sec-
tion will discuss his philosophical concepts regarding moral education as
well as his influence upon Chinese culture.
Moral Self-Cultivation for Moral Governance From his experience of the

downfall of the giant kingdom of Shang and the rise of the small state of
Zhou, the Duke of Zhou realized that the mandate of heaven was not
unalterable. Thus, he put forward a theory of matching heaven with “De”
or “Morality” to legitimize the replacement of the Shang by the Zhou.
Morality, for the Duke of Zhou, was an overarching moral category
including virtues such as filial piety, benevolence, righteousness, love,
respect, modesty, and the employment of good ministers. He held that
only those kings who possessed these virtues could be granted the man-
date of heaven; those who had lost the virtues lost the favor of God and
thus the mandate. The reason behind the shift of the mandate from Shang
to Zhou was that the former had lost morality while the latter retained it.
Hence, he proposed the concept of cultivating morality to match the man-
date. For this purpose, kings needed to implement moral governance, that
is, they needed to respect and promote morals, be prudent in the use of
corporal punishment, and protect their people so as to retain the man-
date—this required a ruler to constantly self-examine his own behavior to
ensure he met the moral demands.
To rule by morality, the Duke of Zhou claimed that the monarchs should
possess good morals themselves so they could set a good example for their
people, which highlighted the importance of moral education for rulers.
This idea was exemplified by how he had nurtured the moral character of
King Cheng, his nephew and the son of King Wu. King Chen was very
young when his father died. Thus, the Duke of Zhou acted as the regent
and took on the responsibility of educating King Chen. He suggested that
King Chen appoint virtuous court officials and stay away from inferior men.
Further, King Chen should cultivate moral development through self-
reflection, self-criticism, and self-control in daily behavior. He also advised
his nephew not to indulge in drinking, games, or beautiful women, but to
be diligent in doing political work and to love people (Anonymous, 1980).
This was a well-known example of the early childhood development pro-

gram combining moral cultivation with political education which was fol-
lowed by the royal families of subsequent dynasties.
Rites and Music as Approaches to Moral Education The contribution of

the Duke of Zhou in moral education philosophy was not limited to his
promotion of the political and moral education of kings. He also estab-
lished approaches and customs relating to moral education, showcased by
his enactment and advocacy of the political/moral education system of
“rites and music” (Anonymous, 1980). The purpose of the cultural system
was designed to reinforce the political infrastructure of the Zhou Dynasty:
the patriarchal clan system.7
Patriarchy was a social system that originated from the patrilineal soci-
ety in which males held primary power. During his regency at the outset
of the Zhou Dynasty, the Duke of Zhou strengthened and perfected the
patriarchal clan system; this stipulated that the eldest son of the principal
wife in the royal family inherited the throne and the other sons of the king
were ennobled as the dukes of vassal states. In turn, the eldest son of the
duke inherited the title of the duke and the other sons were ennobled as
ministers, and so on. This complex system was called the primogeniture
system of inheritance.
The system was intended to meet the need of the Western Zhou king-
dom, once a humble vassal state, to solidify its reign over the vast country.
The royal family members and some meritorious ministers were ennobled
as dukes or marquis and were enfeoffed with land and incorporated as vas-
sals in other parts of ancient China; they in turn enfeoffed their offspring.
But unlike in medieval Europe, where only the first son inherited the title
of nobility and all the property, the Zhou polity allowed the other sons to
inherit a secondary-level title and part of the property, which enabled the
kingdom to expand quickly. The king of Zhou therefore was not only the
patriarch of the royal family, but also the largest patriarch of the whole
country. This tradition gave rise to a political ideology of “grand unifica-
tion” as almost all the vassal states and its subordinates could be traced
back to the patriarch clan of Zhou, strengthening the Chinese mindset of
“the isomorphism between family (clan) and state” or the integration of
family and state; as a result, people tended to view the family as a mini-
state and the state as an enlarged family. This is how the culture of family
and state took form.
28 Z. YOU ET AL.
With that said, it is easy to understand why the Duke of Zhou enacted
and placed moral education in rites and music, instead of law enforcement,
at the center of the political system of Zhou. Unlike the Western system,
which highlighted a contractual relationship between suzerain and vassal,
the enfeoffment system in Zhou highly strongly on consanguinity or the
patriarchal clan relations to ensure the loyalty of subordinates toward supe-
riors (Yang, 2001). Family relationships were the key to the system as social
ranks from high to low were determined by blood ties. Consequently, it was
imperative to establish a moral education system that emphasized moral
principles and cultivated moral sentiments highlighting hierarchical social
order and harmonious family-like relations. The system of rites and music,
accordingly, was critical for the political system as it worked to regulate
human relations, evoke people’s respect for the current social pecking order,
and prevent inferior’s insubordination or even usurpation of the throne.
Generally speaking, a rite served as a cultural symbol denoting social
hierarchy in elegance. A rite was originally a primitive religious ceremony
to eulogize and pray to gods. The Duke of Zhou turned this religious
practice into a social and cultural scheme that could differentiate between
superiors and subordinates, higher status and lower position, old and
young, and closer and remoter relationships. The goal of a rite was to
maintain social order: people of certain social rank should observe the
specific rituals and should not cross the invisible lines they laid out.
Therefore, the essence of rites involved differentiation, which was the
embodiment of social hierarchy, and the practice of rites was in reality a
process of moral education to cultivate people’s respect for others for the
sake of cementing the current political and social system.
Initially used alongside with rites in religious ceremonies, music was a
trinity of dance, song, and instrumental playing in the Duke of Zhou’s moral
education system. Contrary to rites that underscored difference, music
stressed concord, serving as an adhesive to bond the different parts and help-
ing to resolve the conflicts due to differences. Music had a strong function
in moral edification as it symbolized harmony in social relationships, indicat-
ing an orderly coordination in human relations and supporting people’s
affections and temperaments congruent with the current social hierarchy. In
so doing, music helped develop a “morality of music” which embraced the
morals of respect, peace, filial piety, and friendship (Wang, 2011).
In short, music was expected to make people contented with their own
positions so that they would consciously follow the proper social regula-
tions and live peacefully and harmoniously with one another. While the
practice of rites placed the emphasis on the legitimacy of different social

ranks, the playing of music stressed the importance of agreement and
peace among people from different social spectrums. Together, rites and
music served as an important tool of moral education to buttress the patri-
archal clan system in the Western Zhou Dynasty and thereafter. In this
vein, the system of rites and music differs from the Western system of
moral education, which tends to resort to reason and logic for moral
development, in contrast to the Chinese, which is more reliant on the
affective dimension to nurture moral identification.
Influencing the Masses to Develop Moral (Good) Customs Another key pol-
icy proposed by the Duke of Zhou was to cultivate morality nationwide,
that is, to nurture the desired moral conduct of the masses and form good
customs in the country. Aside from promoting the moral development of
the ruling class through rites and music, the government needed to influ-
ence ordinary people with good examples so as to develop the desired
customs and reduce immoral behavior at the grass-roots level, which was
essential to stabilize the kingdom.
The Duke of Zhou contended that rites played an important role in

influencing the masses and fostering good customs. When rites were prac-
ticed by the ruling class, they exerted tremendous impact on society
through setting paragons of virtue for the common people to follow, help-
ing to shape good customs (Shi, 1982) such as respecting elders, loving
relatives, treating other people appropriately, and distinguishing the dif-
ferent gender roles between males and females in the whole country.
Following his path, the rulers of subsequent generations paid considerable
attention to fostering good customs and rewarding moral practices in the
countryside, which fortified a hierarchical society in China.
One of the Duke of Zhou’s contributions to the philosophy of moral
education lay in his promotion of filial piety (xiao) and righteousness (yi)—
the gist of rites—to develop good customs in the society. Even though the
idea of filial piety first appeared in the time of King Wen of Zhou, it was the
Duke of Zhou who explicitly articulated the concept (You, Wang, Jia, &
You, 2014). This concept is very important as it provided a main purpose,
key content, and primary approach to traditional moral education, and has
become one of the chief national characteristics of the Chinese people today.
In order to promote this virtue, the Duke of Zhou publicized the idea of
filial piety and its associated concepts in many of his written admonitions to
his people, declaring that “people who were not filial were very evil persons.
30 Z. YOU ET AL.
If the son did not show filial piety to parents, the parents did not love their
children, the younger brother did not submissively respect the elder brother
as demanded by heaven, the elder brother did not care for the younger
brother, they should be punished due to their unrighteous behaviors”
(Anonymous, 1980, p. 203)
This admonishment had three implications for moral education. First,

it stipulated appropriate human relations such as filial piety and fraternal
love as the fundamental moral principles that should be obeyed by every-
one; second, it declared that these principles were mandated by heaven,
which endowed them with holiness needed for moral cultivation; and
third, these principles were enforced by law (You et al., 2014). The three
layers of meaning constituted the basic paradigm for implementing moral
education in ancient China. In fact, the principle of filial piety had been
stressed by the Duke of Zhou and his followers to such an extent that
China developed a political tradition of rule by filial piety throughout his-
tory, which further enhanced the importance of filial affection in tradi-
tional Chinese moral customs and educational activities.
In the same admonition, the Duke of Zhou advocated the principle of
righteousness in law enforcement and everyday practice as well. Here the
norm of righteousness indicated that the punishment should be commen-
surate with the crime, which was to fix the problem of the misuse and
abuse of punishment in the Shang Dynasty. The moral concept was further
developed by later philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius as appro-
priate for dealing with human relations, and was linked to the sense of
shame.8 With the teaching of the principle of righteousness, any violation
of it could evoke the doer’s sense of shame, which in turn would urge him
or her to correct the mistake and pursue morally righteous behaviors.
Impact of the Duke of Zhou’s Philosophy of Moral Education The Duke of

Zhou is remembered not just a great statesman but also a sage whose phi-
losophy, concerning moral education in particular, lent support to the
development of many important cultural traditions in China. His concept
of matching the mandate of heaven with virtues and the preaching of these
contributed to the development of the ancient Chinese political and edu-
cational tradition that instead of indulging in worshiping ghosts or gods,
rulers should be focused more on human concerns inasmuch as the man-
date of heaven had shifted from previously unpredictable supernatural
power to more tangible factors, namely the people’s support.
Additionally, his creation of a system of rites and music helped solidify

the political system of the primogeniture system of inheritance and build a
hierarchical society valuing concord. By following this practice, the
Chinese people developed the cultural orientations of respecting their
elders, maintaining harmonious human relations, and valuing rites in
social interactions. His beliefs in the government’s responsibility for fos-
tering good customs nationwide also led to the important Chinese tradi-
tion of integrating moral education with politics. As a result, the
government of each dynasty in China invested heavily in establishing
schools to inculcate moral values, encouraging family moral education,
and implementing laws and regulations to promote good customs and
moral habits among the masses.
We should not forget that it is the Duke of Zhou who initially laid the
foundation for Confucianism: Confucius had inherited many ideas such as
moral governance, filial piety, and the system of rites and music from the
Duke of Zhou to develop Confucianism. Aside from being the most
important source of Confucius’ philosophy, the Duke of Zhou, a paragon
of virtue himself, set a moral example for Chinese scholars to follow. For
this reason, he was granted the title of the Original Sage and was extolled
as the mentor of Confucius.
Notes
1. Although controversies exist over the validity of this adage, the 16-word-
maxim was highly regarded by famous philosophers such as Chu Hsi as the
essence of Confucianism.
2. Tao in Chinese philosophy literally means ‘the way’, though it possesses
somewhat different connotations in different philosophical schools. It
denotes the fundamental natural law in Taoism, refers to the ultimate moral
truth in Confucianism, and indicates enlightenment in Buddhism, endow-
ing the concept with rich implications for moral education.
3. The ‘superior man’ (junzi) refers to a person with noble characters. This
appellation is in direct contrast with the ‘inferior man’, which refers to a
mean and vicious person. Both appellations have strong implications for
moral education. Due to historical limitations, junzi or scholars in this phi-
losophy mostly refer to males, so personal pronouns such as ‘he’ are fre-
quently used.
4. Tao and Utensil is a binary categorical pair of philosophical concepts denot-
ing the inextricable relationships between metaphysical truth and tangible
matters, provoking discussions or debates over which side should reign or
32 Z. YOU ET AL.
lead and how they should relate to each other. The mainstream ancient
Chinese ideologies advocate valuing Tao and neglecting Utensil or integrat-
ing Tao and Utensil, indicating the superior position of moral education
throughout Chinese history.
5. Substance and Utility is a binary categorical pair of concepts related to Tao
and Utensil. Substance indicates the fundamentals or the primary quality,
while Utility refers to the applications or the secondary quality. Mainstream
Chinese philosophers such as Chu Hsi held Tao or principles as Substance,
and concrete things and events as Utility. The consistency or integration
between Substance and Utility is one of the central topics of philosophical
debates in China.
6. The dates for the life of the Duke of Zhou is the result of the latest research
result by You Huanmin et al. in their book A complete biography of the origi-
nal sage—the Duke of Zhou.
7. The patriarchal clan system in China featured a highly identical structure
between clan and state based on consanguinity, which is related to or gave
rise to an important Chinese cultural viewpoint: the isomorphism between
family (clan) and state.
8. The sense of shame is an important moral principle in ancient China: people
avoid or redress immoral behavior for fear of being shamed (losing face),
and was widely used for moral education purposes.
References
Anonymous. (1980). Commentaries and explanations to the thirteen classics.
Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Chen, F. (2013). The modern significance of philosophy in the Classic of Changes.
Studies of Zhouyi, 5, 85–93.
Hu, P., & Chen, M. (Eds.). (2012). The book of rites and the classic of Filial Piety.
Huang, S., & Zhang, S. (2004). Translation and annotation of the book of changes.
Shanghai: Shanghai Chinese Classics Publishing House.
Jiang, H., & Qian, Z. (1990). Translation of modern and ancient book of history.
Guiyan: Guizhou People’s Press.
Ke, Y. (1993). Study on Confucius’ moral education. Journal of Huaqiao
University (Philosophy & Social Sciences), 2, 59–67.
Liu, M. (1998). An exploration on notes to Book of Changes (silk book version).
Taipei: Literature History and Philosophy Publishing House.
Mencius, & Yang, B. (1981). Annotations on Mencius. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Nan, H. (2007). Lectures of Nan Huaijin. Shanghai: Shanghai People Publishing
House.
Shi, Q. (1982). Records of the grand historian. Beijing: Chung Hua Book CO.
Song, H. (1985). The forming and development of ancient traditional Chinese
geography. Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 3, 65–70.
Song, Z. (1990). The similarities and differences between the book of changes and its
commentaries. Changsha: Human Normal University Press.
Wang, Q. (2011). Moral education thoughts of Confucianism in the perspective
of the origins of music education. Modern University Education, 3, 89–93.
Yang, Z. (2001). A comparison of the system of enfeoffment between the Western
Zhou and the Medieval Western Europe. Jianghan Forum, 5, 44–47.
You, H. (2001). Study on the book of history. Changsha: Hunan Education
Publishing House.
You, H., Wang, C., Jia, Z., & You, Z. (2014). The full biography of the original
saint the Duke of Zhou. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House.
Yu, K. (1996). Cheng Yi’s study of outer kingliness and serving the state. Confucius
Studies, 2, 38–49.
CHAPTER 3
High Mountains of Admiration:

The Philosophy of Moral Education
of the Confucian Big Three
The Spring and Autumn Period (770–475 BCE) and the Warring States
Period (475–221 BCE) represented a time of continuous national seces-
sion as the Zhou polity lost its dominant power and patriarchal authority,
leaving its vassal states frequently fighting with each other for supremacy.
Interestingly, the weakening of the central government and the need for
competition among different states had resulted in the loosening of ideo-
logical control, which had contributed to a brilliant cultural boom—the
“Contention of A Hundred Schools of Thought”. As such, the period saw
great academic freedom and an explosion of diverse thought when schol-
ars from various philosophical schools, Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism,
and Mohism in particular, established private schools to teach disciples
and traveled to lobby the dukes or kings of vassal states in an attempt to
realize their political ideals. These philosophers argued and debated
intensely with one another on philosophical concepts and political propo-
sitions, a key theme of which was how to promote the moral development
of both the ruling elite and the masses.
Confucianism, for instance, was one of the most renowned doctrines
that appeared in these periods, and was adopted by almost every Chinese
dynasty after the Qin as the state ideology and for moral education
“A high mountain of admiration” was a dictum that Sima Qian, a great ancient
Chinese historian, quoted from The Classic of Poetry to extol Confucius’
greatness.

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_3
36 Z. YOU ET AL.
urposes. The success of Confucianism, however, had more to do with its

p
emphasis on building up appropriate human relations than its philosophi-
cal profundity. In other words, the fact that the philosophy was grounded
in the soil of the culture of family and state instilled in it abundant life and
vitality. As the family was at the center of Chinese social and political life,
it demanded an ideology aiming at the cultivation of the harmonious
human relations that could strengthen the family and link the family with
the country. This is the fundamental reason why Confucianism was later
chosen as the state philosophy over others and why moral education was
given such a lofty place in China. The tendency was fully embodied in the
Confucian efforts toward moral education, such as teaching the five
human relations—namely appropriate relations between father and son,
sovereign and minister, brothers, husband and wife, and friends, and
preaching filial affections and family management—which served as the
basis for political and social service.
On the other hand, Confucianism further reinforced and shaped the
Chinese cultural landscape, which was family and state-oriented and moral
education-centered. With its influence as the orthodox ideology, it con-
tributed to the tradition among Chinese scholars of integrating moral self-
cultivation with political pursuits and gave rise to the political practice of
rule by morality—the government primarily relied on moral education
complemented with legal deterrence to rule the country—which lasted for
approximately two thousand years. In light of its importance, this chapter
centers on analyzing the philosophy of moral education of the “Big Three”
in Pre-Qin Confucianism: Confucius, Mencius, and Hsun Tzu.
Confucius’ Philosophy of Moral Education
An Overview
Confucius (551–479 BCE) was a great philosopher, educator, and states-
man who lived during the late phase of the Spring and Autumn Period,
and who founded the most influential philosophy centering on rule by
morality and moral cultivation: Confucianism. He left such an important
legacy in Chinese civilization that Chu Hsi (1130–1200 CE), a follower of
Confucius and a great philosopher, compared his influence to the sun that
had illuminated ancient darkness, which is a good indicator of Confucius’
philosophical greatness and contribution to the Chinese people’s moral
development.
HIGH MOUNTAINS OF ADMIRATION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL… 37
It is widely acknowledged that Confucius’ philosophy possesses rich

implications for moral education. First, his philosophy per se primarily
concentrates on morality rather than an analysis of logics or metaphysics
(Richey, 2005). For him, virtues were endowed but needed to be devel-
oped (Lai, 1995) and therefore moral education was a central theme in his
philosophical discussion. Additionally, Confucius is considered the great-
est philosopher and the greatest teacher of all time in China. As education
in ancient China was essentially equivalent to moral education, most of
Confucius’ philosophy of education thereby fell into the domain of moral
education. His philosophical remarks on the individual’s moral develop-
ment and the ruler’s moral governance in particular reflected his thought
on moral education. That said, Confucius’ moral philosophy and moral
education theory are in essence integral: his ethics are intended as much as
explication of his moral concepts as for use in moral education.
One of the ultimate goals of Confucius’ philosophy of moral education
was to fix the chaotic situation of the time and restore social order.
Confucius lived in a troubled and disordered era when subordinates fre-
quently usurped the positions of superiors, and fathers and sons killed each
other for the sake of power. He grieved deeply over the breakdown of the
social order and the collapse of rites and music. As an ardent follower of
the Duke of Zhou, he admired the latter’s concept of moral governance
and the approach to moral education through rites and music, and hoped
to restore the ordered system in which the country was ruled by virtue and
people abided strictly by their social positions and behaved accordingly.
It is noteworthy that many of Confucius’ moral education concepts
originated from the Duke of Zhou. Confucius developed his idea of “rule
by morality” from the Duke of Zhou’s proposition that morality should
be cultivated to match the mandate of heaven. Confucius had also inher-
ited the latter’s concepts of filial piety and rites; he often highlighted the
importance of filial piety in maintaining social order, and spoke highly of
Zhou’s rites in promoting people’s moral growth. But Confucius did not
just conserve the traditions, he enhanced those primitive ideas and added
further concepts, eventually transforming the original ideas into a com-
plete philosophical system of moral education, which he taught to his dis-
ciples and promoted to vassal kings and dukes.
The formation of Confucius’ philosophy of moral education could also
be ascribed to his efforts to argue against the propositions of other philo-
sophical schools. In his time, Taoism and the Legalist School all proposed
ideas for educating people and ruling the country, sharply criticizing the
38 Z. YOU ET AL.
old modes of moral governance and moral cultivation. Confucius firmly

defended the traditions of Zhou. He opposed Taoism’s negative attitudes
toward education in benevolence and filial piety, and was strongly critical
of the Legalists’ advocacy of using strict laws and generous rewards to
replace moral education. Meanwhile, although disagreeing with his oppo-
nents’ philosophies as a whole, Confucius did show respect to Lao Tzu,
the founder of Taoism, and absorbed the latter’s ideas of wordless teach-
ing to enrich his own philosophy.
Political Purpose
Rule by morality is both the starting point and the ultimate goal of
Confucius’ philosophy of moral education. His philosophy, judging from
its central themes, was filled with political considerations about rule by
morality, that is, governing the country through promoting the moral
virtues of rulers and forming good customs nationwide, which highlighted
the importance of moral education. To this end, Confucius suggested that
rulers place more emphasis on moral cultivation rather than rely on strict
laws and draconian punishments to maintain social order. He argued that
if rulers only “enforce laws and govern by punishments, people will try to
avoid the punishment but have no sense of shame; if rulers promote moral
education moderated with ritual propriety, people will have the sense of
shame and be sincerely convinced” (Confucius, 1989, p. 3).
The realization of Confucius’ political ideal, to a large extent, depended
on educating the superior men, namely people with high moral standards.
This education was the key to rule by morality because not only should the
state be governed by the superior men, but also the superior men should
set moral role models for the masses and help shape the desired moral
customs to build an ideal world of benevolence. To this end, Confucius
constructed a comprehensive system of philosophy of moral education in
which the doctrine of the mean served as the methodology, “benevolence”
(ren) as the core spirit, the theory of human nature as the philosophical
underpinnings, filial piety, “righteousness” (yi), “faithfulness” (zhong) and
“reciprocity” (shu) as the moral principles and criteria, and “rites and
music” as the approaches to moral education.1
Methodology and the Spiritual Core

Confucius’ doctrine of the mean is the most important methodology in
thinking morally as well as the fundamental principle for implementing
moral education. Like Aristotle’s golden mean, Confucius’ doctrine of the
mean referred to a desirable middle state representing the spirit of har-
mony between the excessive extreme and the deficient extreme. While
Aristotle’s golden mean focused on moral behavior in moderation,
Confucius’ doctrine emphasized the core of benevolence and the impor-
tance of balance. On many occasions, Confucius endeavored to teach his
disciples the meaning of the doctrine of the mean and how to use it for
moral cultivation. When asked if being excessive was better than being
deficient, he replied that “to go beyond is as wrong as to fall short”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 21), indicating that the truth lies in the appropriate
and moderate middle.
In the Analects, Confucius delineated the procedure of employing the
doctrine of the mean as follows: when pondering over a problem, one
should firstly examine the two extremes, then endeavor to find the most
appropriate middle place between the two. He further articulated how to
utilize this principle in educating the superior man, so that “where solid
qualities outweigh refinement, you have rusticity; where refinement out-
weighs solid qualities, you have the clerkly style; refinement and solid
qualities beautifully balanced, then you have the superior man” (Confucius,
1989, p. 18). Specifically, following the doctrine of the mean requires that
a person seeks not just to obtain either refinement or solid qualities but to
achieve both because one without the other results in character flaws—this
became the rule for evaluating a superior man. It is interesting to note that
with the overwhelming influence of Confucianism, this doctrine and mode
of education shaped the Chinese people’s way of thinking to such an
extent that they rarely go to extremes, but tend to keep a balance when
conflicts arise, and often try to think of the common ground and find the
middle way when resolving a dispute.
Confucius’ idea of human nature constructs the logical scaffolding for the
necessity of moral education. In fact, it was Confucius who initiated
Confucians’ discussions on human nature for the next two thousand years.
Unlike his followers, Confucius did not posit human nature as good or evil;
he simply asserted that “men’s natures are originally alike; it is social environ-
ment and education that make the differences in life” (Confucius, 1989,
p. 2). This belief is crucial for Confucius’ philosophy of moral education in
40 Z. YOU ET AL.
two ways. First, the same or similar human nature means that people have the
same needs and mindset, enabling them to place themselves in the place of
others. Second, the decisive role of practice and social influence underscores
the importance of moral education inasmuch as it is education and practice
that make a huge difference in people’s moral character.
Benevolence served as the spiritual core of all of Confucius’ doctrines,
giving his philosophy greatness and loftiness. In essence, one cannot truly
understand Confucius and his philosophy of moral education without
comprehending his idea of benevolence first. The concept of benevolence
is comprehensive and multifaceted in nature, comprising affective, ratio-
nal, and altruistic dimensions. It is the spirit of benevolence that instilled
life into Confucius’ philosophical system, serving as the moral core and
inner motivation for many other moral characters. Guided by benevo-
lence, a superior man could truly fulfill his filial duties in the family, estab-
lish credibility with friends, and maintain righteousness with the king.
Confucius did not invent the word “benevolence” (ren), which first
appeared in The Book of History, but he developed it into a concept rich in
moral connotations. Interpreted as “loving people” (Mencius, 1989, p. 8),
the value of benevolence could be best understood in contrast to the bru-
tality of human sacrifice and the cruel treatment of slaves rampant in previ-
ous times. Thus, benevolence reflected the spirit of valuing life and
respecting human dignity, which started to emerge in the Western Zhou
Dynasty. Confucius’ contribution is that he enriched and transformed the
primitive term into a philosophical domain, endowing it with considerable
ethical weight and surrounding it with many second-tier moral concepts.
Benevolence in Confucianism is all about reciprocal human relations,
which provides it with extensive implications for moral education. The
written graph of this Chinese character comprises two parts—a symbol of
a person on the left side and a word of “two” on the right—denoting how
a person should treat the other in thought, feeling, and action. For
Confucius, benevolence meant being considerate and empathetic in deal-
ing with human relations, so that “people of benevolence is if you want to
establish yourself, help others to be established; wish to be sucessful your-
self, help others to be successful” (Confucius, 1989, p. 30). Here
Confucius suggests that a person should care about other people and
maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with them. The development
of benevolence therefore entailed both rational and emotional dimensions
derived from one’s own needs and feelings, requiring that the superior
man put himself in place of others and show consideration toward them.
Confucius believed that the acquisition of benevolence was up to peo-

ple’s own will, or to put it differently, the nurturing of benevolence
depended on the moral agents’ conscious practice of virtue. He therefore
advocated that “a scholar should demonstrate filial obedience to his par-
ents and show fraternal love to his brothers, behave cautiously in speech
and credibly in actions, care about other people, and stay close to people
of benevolence” (Confucius, 1989, p. 6). On another occasion, he taught
his disciples that a person of benevolence should practice five virtues,
namely “reverence, tolerance, credibility, responsiveness, and generosity”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 6), as they all embodied the spirit of loving people.
As in Kant’s deontology, Confucius underscored people’s duty and perse-
verance in pursuing benevolence: “benevolence is a character that a supe-
rior man should maintain and never give it up even in emergency or in a
miserable situation” (Confucius, 1989, p. 5). The superior man should
adhere to benevolence even at the cost of his life.
The Concept Cluster in Confucius’ Moral Education

To Confucius, the work of cultivating benevolence could be broken down
into tasks of learning and practicing moral principles, particularly the
moral concept cluster made up of faithfulness, credibility, reciprocity, filial
piety, and righteousness because living with these virtues reflected the
spirit of benevolence essential for building up a harmonious and virtuous
society.
Faithfulness was a core concept and embodied the spirit of benevo-
lence, which served a political purpose through moral cultivation. Many
regarded faithfulness as an official’s unswerving loyalty toward the sover-
eign. Confucius’ concept of faithfulness, nonetheless, had a broader scope
than that. For him, faithfulness was more about sincerity in dealing with
social relations than being loyal. With regard to serving the sovereign, “a
minister should be faithful to his sovereign if the latter treated him with
proper rites” (Confucius, 1989, p. 1). His idea of faithfulness or loyalty to
the sovereign included the condition that the sovereign should respect his
minister as well, thus producing a reciprocal relationship. Confucius him-
self set an example for his disciples: when a ruler in the State of Lu did not
treat him with proper rites, he resigned his post immediately. Later
Confucians, however, advocated that people maintain an unconditional
loyalty to the emperor, which apparently distorted Confucius’ original
meaning of faithfulness.
42 Z. YOU ET AL.
On many other occasions, the concept of faithfulness was taught as a

moral principle involving making friends and treating others with a genu-
ine attitude. Confucius held that one should be honest with one’s friends
and should frankly point out their mistakes, but in a kind and faithful way.
Nonetheless, Confucius was not rigid: he also suggested that one should
stop trying to persuade if the other person refuses to accept the advice
(Confucius, 1989).
Confucius often paired the concept of faithfulness with that of credibil-
ity (xin) as the latter was an attitude reflecting the essence of faithfulness.
He underscored the crucial role of credibility in moral development—
“one must honor commitment made to friends” (Confucius, 1989,
p. 7)—and said that a person could not get along well with others if he had
lost his credibility. For Confucius, credibility was of paramount impor-
tance in politics as well. When teaching a disciple about the importance of
credibility for rulers, he suggested that it should be regarded as a policy
priority even before the food supply and military force (Confucius, 1989,
p. 7). Hence, the establishment of a government’s credibility should be a
primary goal of rulers.
Faithfulness and reciprocity (shu) were also put together to elucidate
the core of Confucius’ benevolence. Confucius referred to faithfulness as
the attitude of doing one’s best to treat or help others, and reciprocity as
a person’s willingness to take other people’s feelings or needs into as much
consideration as his own. Reciprocity, therefore, served as the psychologi-
cal and emotional basis by which a person became faithful to others.
Together, the two cohesive concepts represented Confucius’ belief about
how to treat other people. With regard to its implications for moral educa-
tion, Confucius suggested that people follow the reciprocity norm and
“do not do to others what you would not like to be done to you”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 2), insisting that a superior man practice the princi-
ple in his whole life so as to achieve benevolence. By preaching this,
Confucius was asking people to treat others with kindness, care about and
respect them, and do no harm to them.
Filial piety is a key to understanding Confucius’ way of moral educa-
tion. The concept originated from the ancestor worship ceremony and
gradually evolved into filial affection toward parents and fraternal love to
brothers in the Western Zhou Dynasty. Thus, filial piety was tied to prac-
ticing rites and respecting the old. Confucius noted that being filial meant
“treating parents with rites when they are alive, bury them according to
rites when they have passed away, and worship them with proper ritual
propriety afterwards” (Confucius, 1989, p. 5). However, filial piety was

not just about rites; it was more about the heart and respect. Confucius
criticized the interpretation of filial piety as solely providing support for
aged parents. He pointed out that “if (one) supports parents without
respect and sincerity, then how does it differ from raising a dog or a horse?”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 7).
Confucius particularly highlighted the significance of cultivating filial
piety and fraternal love, believing that they were the golden rules in deal-
ing with family relations. But the meaning of nurturing filial affection and
fraternal duty was more than that. Filial piety was directly related to being
faithful to the sovereign, which was mostly valued by rulers. Confucius
argued that “seldom will people who are filial to parents and care about
brothers defy or rebel against superiors” (Confucius, 1989, p. 2).
Congruent with the spirit of benevolence, the practice of filial piety could
arouse affection and obedience toward parents and respect to superiors,
helping to produce loyal ministers and faithful officials. Therefore, teach-
ing the value of filial piety and publicizing this ideology was the best way
to stabilize the country and maintain the social hierarchy.
Like faithfulness and filial piety, righteousness was a virtue derived from
benevolence to describe a supreme moral state. If benevolence presented
the heart and soul of Confucius’ philosophy of moral education, then
righteousness denoted the highest standard of moral conducts fitting the
principle of benevolence. For Confucius, righteousness was the character-
istic and the moral acumen that motivated people to do things morally
right or apply virtues most appropriately; one should do righteous things
at any cost and should not do anything that is not righteous. He even used
the characteristic as a criterion to define the superior men, claiming that
“the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the inferior man is
conversant with personal gain” (Confucius, 1989, p. 16). Nonetheless,
Confucius was not against people seeking personal gain; he only asked
people to make sure “it is righteous before going for it” (Confucius, 1989,
p. 13), so that righteousness should be made the prior consideration and
the decisive factor in moral decision-making.
Contrast Between the Superior Man and the Inferior Man

In the Analects, Confucius frequently contrasted two types of personal-
ity—the superior man and the inferior man. Originally, the superior men,
literally the sovereign’s sons, referred to high-ranking aristocrats and the
44 Z. YOU ET AL.
inferior men referred to ordinary persons. Confucius, nevertheless, tended

to define these two kinds of person more by their morality than their social
status. The superior man was a person with high moral standards and the
inferior man a mean person, which indicated the crucial importance of
moral education inasmuch as a person at the low end of the social spec-
trum could become a superior man through education and moral
self-perfection.
Then how does one become a superior man? Confucius suggested that
a superior man be “humble in his conduct, respectful in serving his supe-
riors, kind in nourishing people, and righteous in ordering people”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 16). Therefore, humbleness, respect, kindness, and
righteousness are four characters that should be developed if one wishes to
become a superior man. Moreover, Confucius used many contrastive sen-
tences to help identify the differences between the superior and the infe-
rior man. He commented: “the superior man is catholic and no partisan.
The inferior man is partisan and not catholic” (Confucius, 1989, p. 14);
“the superior man can endure poverty, but the inferior man when he is in
want will commit evils” (Confucius, 1989, p. 2); “the superior man seeks
harmony but not uniformity, the inferior man seeks uniformity but not
harmony” (Confucius, 1989, p. 23). These sharp contrasts indicated what
a superior man should do in his associations, when facing poverty, and by
principle, providing the benchmark for moral cultivation.
Rites and Music for Moral Education

Practicing rites and playing music properly, according to Confucius, was
one of the most important ways to facilitate people’s moral development
and sustain social order and harmony. It is noteworthy that rites in China
are not religious rituals, as in the Western conception, but a philosophi-
cal concept denoting proprieties with symbolic values, which often
embrace complex social etiquettes, conducts, and ceremony. Rites origi-
nated from worship ceremonies in primitive society. The Duke of Zhou
enacted a system of court rites and music permeated with the norms of
proper social behaviors, aiming at fostering respect or deference toward
authority figures and the old. But as the power of Zhou declined, rites
were commonly arrogated or abolished, ending their function as a social
stabilizer. Confucius, however, enthusiastically advocated restoring the
system of rites and music so as to educate people and solve the social
crises of his time.
In fact, rites were constantly rehearsed as a part of Confucius’ daily moral

instruction. Confucius stressed the role of rites in education on the ground
that rites as an essential part of social norms were used not only to worship
heaven and ancestors, but also to distinguish social classes, discriminate
between gender differences, and identify close and distant social relations. In
view of that, Confucius declared that “one cannot establish himself in society
without knowing rites” (Confucius, 1989, p. 3) because encouraging people
to practice and abide by rites appropriately could reinforce their acceptance
of their positions in family and society, leading them to consciously sustain
the social order in which “the sovereign should behave like the sovereign,
and the minister should behave like a minister; the father should behave like
a father, and the son should behave like a son” (Confucius, 1989, p. 11).
On the other hand, the connotation derived from rites is more than just
maintaining social order; it contains the spirit of benevolence, the doctrine
of the mean, and the purport of harmony inside. Without them, social
order would be meaningless. In reality, rites and benevolence are two sides
of the same coin. While rites are the outer forms to express the meaning
of benevolence, benevolence is the inner morality that gives rites a soul,
each supplementing the other. Confucius accordingly pointed out that
benevolence could be achieved through “constraining one’s improper
desires and restoring rites” (Confucius, 1989, p. 1). Harmony is also a
goal of rites as “the use of rites is to establish harmonious relationships”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 12) and to reach the state of the doctrine of the
mean (Anonymous, 1980). Rites, therefore, served as an agent to harmo-
nize human relations and reduce social conflicts, which required that each
party restrain its desires and take others’ interests into account.
In consideration of its unique connotations and functions, Confucius
advocated using rites for purposes of political governance and moral edu-
cation; this had become a tangible method to realize the ideal of rule by
morality. When rites were used for political purposes, it was called gover-
nance by rites (lizhi); when rites were used for education, it was called
teaching of rites (lijiao), which was also termed the teaching of names or
moral norms (mingjiao) due to Confucius’ emphasis on establishing one’s
social identity or status. These two functions of rites supplemented and
reinforced each other, constituting an integrative system of politics and
education in ancient China.
The purpose of cultivating a harmonious social order, however, could
not be accomplished without incorporating proper “music” into the prac-
tice of rites. The music that accompanied ritual practice was to foster posi-
46 Z. YOU ET AL.
tive feelings toward the social order and a sense of benevolence. In a highly
hierarchical society, people of a certain social status could enjoy only com-
mensurate types or rank of music performance, which reflected the essence
of rites, namely social hierarchy, benevolence, respect, and harmony.
Hence, rites and music are integral and mutually complementary. While
rites attempt to shape people’s moral behaviors from outside, music nour-
ishes people’s temperament and feeling inside, combining perfectly to
promote moral education. This is why Confucius once furiously criticized
a powerful minister in the State of Lu who had illegitimately enjoyed a
musical dance exclusively designated for the kings of Zhou: “if this can be
tolerated, then what can be called intolerable?” (Confucius, 1989, p. 1).
Moral Self-Cultivation
As a great teacher, Confucius realized that moral development was more
cultivated from inside than shaped from outside, and thus he encouraged
his disciples to take charge of their own moral development, claiming that
“the realization of benevolence is contingent on one’s own efforts, not
upon other people” (Confucius, 1989, p. 1). Moral character needed to
be obtained through self-cultivation and through the demands or needs of
the inner heart to become benevolent. Moral self-cultivation accordingly
was a major learning style of a superior man, which included the approaches
of learning, thinking, self-examining and self-reflection, and practice.
Specifically, a moral agent’s continuous learning was essential to
develop the virtues. Confucius claimed that benevolence arose when one
“learns extensively with a firm goal, inquires with sincerity, and thinks
over the current issues” (Confucius, 1989, p. 6). For this reason,
Confucius proposed to learn moral knowledge by perusing ancient clas-
sics such as The Classic of Poetry and The Book of History. He alleged that
if a person loved benevolence but did not want to learn, he would be eas-
ily fooled by others. Conversely, “if a superior man learns extensively
while being moderated with rites, he will not deviate from the right path”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 27).
Thinking is as important as learning in enhancing moral understanding.
Confucius reckoned that learning and thinking supplement each other:
“learning without thinking leads to confusion, thinking without learning
is perilous” (Confucius, 1989, p. 15). As for the methods of thinking,
Confucius recommended that his disciples review prior knowledge to gen-
erate new insights and reflect on their own experience, demeanors, and
attitudes in everyday life to search for meaning and virtue, which high-
lighted Confucius’ ideas on how a person should use thinking as a learning
tool to facilitate his moral development.
In Confucius’ philosophy, thinking borders on self-examination and
self-reflection: “on seeing a man of virtue, try to become his equivalent;
on seeing a man without virtue, self-examine yourself to ensure you don’t
have the same defects” (Confucius, 1989, p. 17). Here self-examination
involved reviewing one’s own conduct, speech, motivations, and feelings,
judging whether or not they fitted the moral standards of benevolence and
rites, and then reflecting on where to improve and how to do it; this was
the Confucian mode of continuous self-perfection in morality. One of
Confucius’ disciples, Zengzi, elaborated on how he had self-examined
himself three times on a daily basis by asking himself: “Have I been
unfaithful when working for others? Have I been untrustworthy to my
friends? Have I not practiced what I have learned?” (Confucius, 1989,
p. 4). The ultimate goal of self-examination is to reach a state of feeling no
guilt upon reflection.
Nonetheless, mere theoretical learning or self-reflection upon moral
issues is not enough; practice is the way to shape one’s character. Confucius
concluded that “practicing in a hard way is akin to benevolence” (Zisi,
1989, p. 4); thus, one should frequently practice what one had learned.
Conversely, to judge one’s character, we should not listen just to one’s
own words, but one also needed to watch what one actually did (Confucius,
1989, p. 10). Confucius’ perspectives on the role of practice in moral edu-
cation might have given rise to the idea of “unity of knowing and acting”
proposed by Wang Yangming of the Ming Dynasty, which will be dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 9.
The Influences of Confucius’ Philosophy of Moral Education

Confucius developed a complete philosophical system devoted to promot-
ing people’s moral development. The spirit of benevolence, for instance,
served as the substance of his philosophy and the ritual practice worked
toward the regulation of daily behavior and an approach to moral educa-
tion, which embodied an integration of Substance and Utility in
Confucianism with respect to moral education. Nonetheless, his philo-
sophical contribution in this regard lay not only in providing the concep-
tual frameworks and content of moral education, but also in its shaping of
traditional Chinese culture as well as the national character.
48 Z. YOU ET AL.
Confucius’ philosophy became the primary content of moral education

for more than two millennia in China. As an admirer of ancient culture, he
had edited the Six Classics of the Western Zhou Dynasty, namely The
Classic of Poetry, The Book of History, The Book of Changes (I Ching), The
Book of Rites, The Classic of Music, and Spring and Autumn Annals, which
were the sources of his own philosophy. These classics, along with The
Analects of Confucius and several other books edited or written by
Confucius’ followers, were used as the textbooks for moral education,
providing moral concepts and thought for school instruction as well as for
older individual’s moral self-cultivation.
Aside from editing textbooks, Confucius had influenced Chinese moral
education with many of his doctrines. In fact, the most important purpose
of traditional Chinese education was to educate the superior man with all
these Confucian virtues; the superior man in turn spread and instilled
these moral values into the general public. By doing so, these virtues had
become the ideal features of the Chinese people and the spiritual core of
Chinese culture: the doctrine of the mean had become the chief method-
ology in moral judgment and the way of thinking in China; benevolence
and righteousness had become the most eulogized virtues of the Chinese
people; faithfulness and reciprocity had been used to moderate relations
between superiors and subordinates or between friends; and rites and filial
piety had become the codes of conduct and the criteria by which to evalu-
ate people’s morality.
It is worth mentioning that Confucius’ moral principles, such as benevo-
lence, filial piety, and reciprocity, which had originated from the culture of
family and state, further reinforced the sense of relatedness in the culture,
revealing itself as people’s preoccupation with interpersonal relationships or
connections in social transactions, communication, and exchange. This
characteristic, nevertheless, complicated the role and function of Confucian
principles in moral education. The core concept of benevolence, for
instance, stemmed from the feelings toward family members and affections
in a so-called human-relations society, which gave rise to the sense of social
responsibility. This fundamental affection, though manifesting an altruistic
spirit, may not completely avoid partiality. This is why Confucians’ moral
ideas had to be conciliated by the doctrine of the mean so as to counterbal-
ance a narrow-minded bias rooted in the ideology to ensure fairness.
That said, this human relations-oriented Chinese culture, undergirded
by Confucian moral teachings, is vastly different from the contract-based
Western culture, which highlights free will, legal consciousness, and inde-
pendence. Within such a relationship-oriented mentality, Chinese people

are mutually interdependent and rely heavily on personal ties and an
exchange of favors in life and work. These social connections are binding
from close to distant—from the family members to the clan, then to the
acquaintance, and eventually to the whole country—to such an extent that
the successful accomplishment of a business is often more determined by
social capital than social contracts.
One of the largest impacts of Confucius’ philosophy of moral education
on Chinese society is that it lent support to the marriage between politics
and education in ancient China, which officially came into being in the
Western Han Dynasty. On the one hand, Confucian moral education
aimed at serving the political purpose of developing faithful officials and
fostering obedient and upright people. On the other, the government also
saw moral cultivation as cost-effective in stabilizing the huge country,
making moral education as a result a higher priority than enforcing laws.
As a product of this union, China developed a culture in which the person
who exceled in academic study and morality would follow a public career.
In addition, Confucius’ attitudes toward divinity had an enormous
impact on the Chinese tradition of separating education and religion.
Confucius kept a respectful distance from the unknown world; he “did not
talk about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorders, and deities”
(Confucius, 1989, p. 21). His teaching essentially focused on this world,
not a hereafter. Consequently, Confucianism as a belief maintained a ratio-
nal and ethical stance, which has to some extent worked like a religion
throughout Chinese history by channeling people’s attention toward
human relations. Some experts even suggest that Confucianism partially
served the function of religion as this philosophy attributed the sources of
morality to the will of heaven (Yang, 2006).
It is particularly worth noting that Confucianism in essence provided
the ancient Chinese people with spiritual sustenance. Compared with
many other places in the world, religious beliefs in ancient China were not
very prevalent. Therefore morality, particularly Confucius’ moral teaching,
played a key role in guiding people’s behavior and shaping the state’s value
system. This is why moral education is so important in the Chinese peo-
ple’s way of life, and why Confucius was extolled by Chu Hsi as the sun
illuminating the ancient Chinese world.
However, many contemporary scholars have suggested that Confucius’
dedication to moral education had negative influence as it might have con-
tributed to Confucians’ neglectful attitude toward science and technology.
50 Z. YOU ET AL.
As moral learning had enjoyed a lofty status while technology was dispar-
aged by Confucianism, science and technology were largely absent or
neglected in both school instructions and examinations. Some even postu-
lated that Confucius’ philosophy was partly accountable for China’s falling
behind in the development of science and technology in early modern
times (Han, 1995; Wang, 1994). Other scholars, however, have opposed
this point, asserting that Confucius’ thought is largely coherent with the
spirit of modern science as it emphasizes the exploration and practice of
truth (Liu, 2007).
The conservative nature of Confucius’ philosophy, showcased by his
attempt to restore the old system of the Zhou Dynasty, became another
subject of dispute. For instance, it was contended that while the emphasis
on filial piety and rites contributed to the close ties in family relations and
the stability of the country, it also helped to create a strict social hierarchy.
In such a hierarchical society, young people were required to respect the
old and follow rules unduly, which might have led to groupthink and a
lack of initiative in challenging authority, thus suffocating innovation
(Yum, 1988). Others, nonetheless, claimed that Confucius’ philosophy
did not restrain people’s initiative as it viewed moral cultivation as one’s
own responsibility (Han, 2009).
The Philosophies of Moral Education of Mencius

and Hsun Tzu
Mencius and Hsun Tzu were two most renowned Confucians in the pre-
Qin era; their work significantly enriched, developed, and transformed
Confucius’ philosophy of moral education. Both philosophers lived in a
time when the debates and competitions among the “Hundred
Philosophical Schools” raged on. Both successfully defended Confucianism
and reconciled it with new developments in their philosophies (Shen,
2010). Mencius stood for the policy of benevolence, criticizing Legalism’s
concept of rule by law. Both Mencius and Hsun Tzu exposed flaws in the
concepts of “universal love” and the “mutually beneficial” of the Mohist
School, and both criticized Taoism’s doctrine of “inaction”.
On the other hand, Mencius and Hsun Tzu differed significantly with
each other in many aspects, representing the idealistic school and the real-
istic school of Confucianism, respectively. While Mencius inherited and
developed Confucius’ concept of benevolence, Hsun Tzu inherited and
transformed Confucius’ concept of rites. While Mencius focused on the

cultivation of the inner moral sense, Hsun Tzu centered on enforcing
external moral regulations. This difference may be partly attributed to the
different social contexts that the two Confucians lived in. Mencius grew
up in the middle of the Warring States Period, when the vibrant academic
environment still favored perennial values. Hsun Tzu, nonetheless, lived
toward the end of the period when the wars of unification among the
states had worsened. Hsun Tzu had to consider more practical ways of
moral education such as integrating rites with law to cater to the short-
term needs of rulers.
Mencius’ Philosophy of Moral Education

Mencius (372–289 BCE) is widely recognized as the heir apparent of
Confucius due to his philosophical congruence with the older philoso-
pher. Mencius himself was a product of moral education. Legend has it
that his mother moved her home three times to choose a wholesome
neighborhood for his son. She also once broke the shuttle of her loom to
teach teenage Mencius the importance of perseverance in learning. As a
great teacher, Mencius placed emphasis on moral education and declared
that “educating the talented students in the world was one of the three
happy things in life” (Mencius, 1989, p. 20).
We should note that Mencius did not just inherit Confucius’ philoso-
phy of moral education, but also instilled it with many of his own concepts
and developed Confucius’ concept of benevolence into a policy of benevo-
lence. Generally speaking, he established his own philosophical system of
moral education with the concept of good human nature as the founda-
tion, the four virtues of benevolence, righteousness, rites, and wisdom as
the content and goals, and “the heart” and qi-centered moral self-cultivation
as the principal approaches.2 In fact, his argument upon human nature and
discourse on self-cultivation is more logically consistent and sophisticated
than Confucius’ relevant doctrines.
uman Nature for Moral Cultivation

H
Mencius was the first Chinese philosopher who explicitly characterized
human nature as innately good, which became the premise and theoretical
underpinning of his philosophy of moral education. He contended that
“human nature is intrinsically good just like water flowing downwards”
52 Z. YOU ET AL.
(Mencius, 1989, p. 2), and then backed up his argument with an example
that “the superior man stays clear of kitchen because he cannot bear to
hear the screaming of the livestock being slaughtered” (Mencius, 1989,
p. 7). This heart of benevolence or compassion toward others’ suffering
proves that people all have a good nature, and in this sense, the heart is a
faculty to allow people to reach their inherent good nature.
Mencius’ philosophy could be perceived as a study of human nature
and the heart; he proposed the good nature hypothesis as well as explicat-
ing the rationales of moral education. From the standpoint of the good
human nature, Mencius asserted that people are born with four good
hearts serving as the starting points of four characteristics: “the heart of
sympathy is the origin of benevolence, the heart of shame is the origin of
righteousness, the heart of modesty is the origin of rites, and the heart of
right or wrong is the origin of wisdom” (Mencius, 1989, p. 6). The four
moral dispositions were not shaped by outside forces but grew from inside
because good conscience allowed people to understand virtue and act
according to it (Mencius, 1989). This meant that even ordinary people by
nature had the quality or potential to become sages or superior men.
Nonetheless, good human nature did not guarantee producing good
people as the nascent good nature could be weakened or even lost in life
due to bad environmental influences. Mencius claimed that people could
“keep it if seek after it, and lose it if give it up” (Mencius, 1989, p. 3);
thus, one should try one’s best to preserve and develop good nature by
nurturing one’s moral character and behaving accordingly, which justified
the significance of moral education and highlighted the autonomy of the
moral agent in his own moral development. It was the different attitude to
life, Mencius stressed, that made the difference between a superior man
and an inferior man as “those who cultivate his own heart will become a
great people; those who pay attention only to the need of his body will
become an inferior man” (Mencius, 1989, p. 15).
Benevolence and Righteousness
Mencius saw benevolence and righteousness as the ultimate goals of moral
education, which should be fostered through observing differentiated
love, stating that “filial affection for parents is benevolence, respect for
elders is righteousness” (Mencius, 1989, p. 15). In contrast to universal
love, Confucian differentiated or extended love held that a person should
first love his family and kin, then extend the love to care about other peo-
ple who were not directly related. Based on this idea, Mencius proposed
that people “honor old people as one’s own aged parents, and care for
other’s children as one’s own” (Mencius, 1989, p. 7). In so doing, Mencius
transformed Confucius’ concept of filial piety from a personal characteris-
tic into a public morality essential to nurturing benevolence.
In fact, promoting differentiated love, practicing filial piety in particular,
constituted a crucial component of Mencius’ benevolence-centered moral
education. Mencius was strongly against the concept of universal love or
impartial caring suggested by Mo Tzu, the founder of the Moist School.
Mencius asserted that it was unrealistic to expect people to observe impar-
tial love inasmuch as it was human to have greater concern toward family
members than to more distantly related people. Differentiated love, there-
fore, served as the emotional and psychological foundations for developing
the character of benevolence, which made it more tenable both as a moral
value and in terms of moral education compared with impartial caring.
Benevolence is central to Mencius’ political theory. By developing
Confucius’ idea of “rule by morality” into a concept of “policy of benevo-
lence”, Mencius suggested that vassal kings care about people’s lives,
reduce taxes and labor, and teach people about the virtues of filial piety
and faithfulness. He argued that possessing benevolence was the key “the
previous three dynasties could reign over the country and abandoning
benevolence is the reason why they lost their reigns” (Mencius, 1989,
p. 3). Adopting the policy of benevolence, he insisted, helped a ruler win
full support from his people and thus achieve supremacy. This is what
Mencius called “the Kingly Way” (wangdao).
Moral education was an indispensable part of the policy of benevolence
as well as the crucial way to realize it. Mencius put good moral education
over good politics because “while good politics leads to fear and tax rev-
enue, good education harvests love and support” (Mencius, 1989, p. 14).
In reality, Mencius’ ideas on moral education centered on cultivating filial
piety and fraternal love, which enabled people to understand proper
human relations, namely “family bonds between father and son, the sense
of righteousness between sovereign and minister, the different roles of
husband and wife, order between seniors and juniors, and trust between
friends” (Mencius, 1989, p. 4). These ideal human relations, derived from
the cultivation of filial affections, became key to deciphering the Chinese
people’s cultural code.
As is the case with benevolence, Mencius emphasized the significance
of teaching the value of righteousness. Righteousness for Mencius was to
do things in the most appropriate way. It was the sense of shame that
54 Z. YOU ET AL.
prompted people to actively align with righteousness; a superior man

would feel ashamed if he did something inappropriate, and this shame
would prompt him to redress it. Mencius deemed there was an intrinsic
relationship between benevolence and righteousness: “benevolence is like
the house in which people live; righteousness is like the road on which
people walk” (Mencius, 1989, p. 10). While benevolence was the funda-
mental virtue inside, righteousness served as the external direction, touch-
stone, and mode of action for dealing with various social relations. If one’s
action was righteous, then one was consistent with benevolence. As a
result, a person needed to constantly engage in self-examination to see if
his actions and motives fitted the principle of righteousness so as to obtain
benevolence.
In Mencius’ philosophical discussion, righteousness was usually con-
trasted with personal gain because following righteousness often conflicted
with seeking personal gain. He firmly put righteousness ahead of personal
gain, believing that placing personal gain over righteousness was the rea-
son why so many sovereigns and ministers became foes, and why fathers
and sons turned against each other. Therefore, pursuing righteousness
instead of seeking gain was the sure way to follow the Kingly Way. Mencius
had put such an emphasis on righteousness that he advocated a dedication
to righteousness even at the expense of one’s own life (Mencius, 1989).
pproaches to Cultivating the Superior Man

A
For Mencius, nurturing the culture of filial piety and fraternal love was
essential to implement the policy of benevolence because it was hard to
imagine people who could be faithful to the sovereign and benevolent to
people without possessing those characteristics. As a result, Mencius advo-
cated teaching people the virtue of filial piety and establishing a social
norm of respecting the old and caring for the young, which he believed
was a key to realizing rule by morality.
The cultivation of filial affection and the proper human relations, how-
ever, should be accomplished not by indoctrination, but through con-
scious self-reflection, which was showcased by Mencius’ idea of reflecting
on oneself and seeking morality inwardly. While the former was aimed at
examining one’s own actions in retrospect, the latter aimed to seek the
right answer from one’s own heart. The heart with a good nature would
inform a person why his behavior did not achieve the expected results and
what he should do to rectify it. Mencius thus elaborated that “one should
always reflect on his own benevolence when he fails to receive love in
turn, reflect on his ways of governance when fails to govern well, reflect
on his own sincerity when fails to gain respect from other people”
(Mencius, 1989, p. 4).
People’s commitment to self-reflection was essential to recover good
conscience and good capacity endowed by nature. Good conscience was a
quality in mind that people are born with, enabling them to distinguish
right from wrong without having to think first, and good capacity was a
quality of the heart that enabled people to do the right thing without
learning first. Nonetheless, it was common that people lost the innate
conscience and capacity due to negative environmental influences in adult
life, which justified the necessity of continuous self-examination to bring
back the lost good conscience and ability (Mencius, 1989). Accordingly,
reflection was not just an approach to finding the right answers but also
included a process of retrieving and strengthening good conscience in
which virtues such as benevolence and righteousness dwelled.
One of the unique contributions of Mencius in moral education was his
idea of practicing mysterious spiritual exercises, such as the nourishment
of “the heart” and the cultivation of qi, which had been widely adopted by
later scholars as the methods of moral learning and even a way of life. The
heart, as indicated previously, had a strong moral function in Mencius’
philosophy. It was not just an organ in charge of thinking, feeling, and
reasoning, but also a faculty that possessed the endowed good virtues and
the capacity for understanding these. It was similar to or equivalent to
“good conscience” or “good nature”. Like the loss of good conscience,
the moral heart might deteriorate due to excessive human desires, losing
its original sense of compassion and righteousness. Thus, a superior man
should nourish his heart by reducing and restraining excessive desires, and
expanding the good moral sense in the heart—both helped maintain or
recover one’s heart of benevolence.
Coupled with the idea of nourishing the heart, Mencius proposed that
people cultivate qi—literally, “air”. Qi, however, is no ordinary air, but a
vital spirit of righteousness and fearlessness, which was “so great and
unbendingly magnanimous that it permeated the universe” (Mencius,
1989, p. 2). This spirit should be nurtured only by integrity and reinforced
by moral principles; without righteousness and morality, the spirit would
languish. Accordingly, the basic characteristic of qi was its moral nature
and the cultivation of qi depended on constantly strengthening one’s
beliefs and conducting moral self-examination. Although the nourishment
of heart was interrelated with the cultivation of qi, the two differed in
56 Z. YOU ET AL.
function. While the former centered on reducing superfluous desires, the

latter aimed at enhancing a sense of moral sublimity in one’s soul.
However, neither the nourishment of the heart nor the cultivation of qi
could be accomplished without strengthening willpower. Mencius believed
it was strong willpower in adhering to moral principles through adversity
that eventually made a superior man. Hence, a person had to endure trials
to succeed: “when heaven is about to place a great responsibility on a gen-
tleman, it always first frustrates his spirit and aspirations, exhausts his mus-
cles […] so as to stimulate his spirit, toughen his willpower, and enhance
his abilities” (Mencius, 1989, p. 15). This proposition reflected Mencius’
perspectives on how a person could grow morally by following his beliefs
through difficult situations. By combining moral character with strong will-
power, a great man “will not be dissipated by the power of wealth and high
rank, will not be swerved from principles due to poverty and lowly status,
and will not be bent by power and force” (Mencius, 1989, p. 2).
Hsun Tzu’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Hsun Tzu (300–230 BCE), also known as Xunzi or Xun Kuang, was a
great early Confucian scholar who transformed, and in many ways,
defended Confucianism. Contrary to Mencius’ advocacy of recovering an
inner good conscience, Hsun Tzu stressed more the role of external regu-
lations in promoting moral development, which was illustrated by his
theme of solemnizing rites and valuing laws.
There is a need to analyze the social contexts in Hsun Tzu’s time so as
to better understand his doctrine. The philosopher lived in an era when
Confucianism and the Legalist School aggressively debated with each
other over “rule by morality” versus “rule by strict laws”. Neither party
won the dispute as Confucianism could not meet immediate needs and
Legalism was too restricted to be accepted by the public. Facing the chal-
lenges, Hsun Tzu absorbed some ideas from other philosophical schools
to innovate within Confucianism, including not only some ideas about law
in Legalism, but also many utilitarian ideas of Mohism, which helped
enrich his proposition of moral education.
Unlike Mencius, who was credited as Confucius’ philosophical heir,
Hsun Tzu was more regarded as a reformer or even a rebel against ortho-
dox Confucianism. His beliefs about heaven, human nature, and relation-
ships between rites and law constituted the logical underpinnings of his
philosophy of moral education; these, however, were in opposition to
those of Mencius. Accordingly, while primarily centering on Hsun Tzu’

philosophy, this section will also compare and contrast the ideas of the two
philosophers concerning moral cultivation.
n Heaven’s Role in Moral Education

O
Hsun Tzu and Mencius held utterly different opinions on what role
heaven played in moral education. Contrary to Mencius’ idea that heaven
had a strong propensity toward morality, Hsun Tzu conceived of heaven
mostly as a heaven of nature with no moral preference, which led to dif-
ferent approaches to moral education being adopted by the two scholars.
To Mencius, heaven was the symbol of virtue itself. Under the theoreti-
cal framework of the unity of heaven and man, he attributed the source of
human nature to heaven, which provided a philosophical basis for his
moral education propositions of the nourishment of the heart and the
cultivation of qi. Hsun Tzu, in contrast, believed in a separation between
heaven and man. He asserted that heaven had no moral will and did not
interact with human beings. Heaven operated in its own way: “it does not
exist for the sake of a good king or dies away due to a tyrant” (Hsun Tzu,
1997, p. 1). Nevertheless, Hsun Tzu did not just rest on this point. He
further proposed that “people control the laws of heaven and make use of
heaven instead of admiring and eulogizing it” (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 13),
and that humans could and should utilize natural resources based on their
knowledge of the world. By taking heaven and earth as a natural existence,
he negated the mysterious power and normative significance of heaven
suggested by many previous thinkers, which highlighted people’s auton-
omy in moral cultivation and advocated taking control of human beings’
own destiny.
Hsun Tzu’s idea about heaven can be partly traced back to the perspec-
tive of Taoism, which treated nature as solely having a natural existence.
Nonetheless, he went further to propose the idea of controlling and mak-
ing use of heaven and nature, which was significant in shaping ancient
Chinese people’s values and way of thinking. It challenged the traditional
ideologies of passively revering heaven or following nature, and encour-
aged people to become the owner of nature. Coupled with the system of
grand unification, the idea of conquering nature helped explain the phe-
nomenon that ancient Chinese tended to concentrate manpower and
resources on building colossal projects such as the Great Wall and the
Grand Canal in the hopes of improving human conditions; this practice
also occurs in contemporary China. Both the belief about changing the
58 Z. YOU ET AL.
world and the idea of following natural laws became two dimensions of
Chinese ideology, which competed and coexisted in Chinese culture and
exerted their influences simultaneously or alternatively along the historical
process.
n Human Nature
O
In contrast to Mencius’ proposition that human nature was good, Hsun
Tzu unequivocally stated that “human nature is intrinsically evil” (Hsun
Tzu, 1997, p. 1). People are born with physical desires as they all wanted
to look at beautiful colors, listen to music, taste good food, and seek per-
sonal gain (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 16). There is no virtue and rationality
within human nature; thus, fights and conflicts are inevitable among peo-
ple if this evil human nature is not curbed. He further indicated that “all
that is good about human nature is man-made” (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 1),
which referred to the changes made through human endeavors such as
education or social influences. This was why the ancient sage kings had
instituted the principles of rites and righteousness to differentiate social
classes (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 1) and moderate human relations.
Like Mencius, Hsun Tzu deemed that it was human relations that made
the differences between wild animal and human beings. But unlike
Mencius’ advocacy of seeking the lost “good conscience”, Hsun Tzu sug-
gested using rites as a moral guide to help transform evil nature into good,
in which rites as external forces functioned to reshape people’s habits and
beliefs, and to improve human relations. Moral education for Hsun Tzu,
therefore, was to ask people to actively learn rites and practice them in life.
However, even though Hsun Tzu and Mencius differed over human
nature, both of them underscored the importance of moral education and
its social functions. Mencius held that moral education helped preserve
and expand good nature so that “everyone can be a sage like Yao or Shun”
(Mencius, 1989, p. 2). Hsun Tzu also asserted that learning and living
with rites and righteousness could transform people from being evil to
being good, so that “even ordinary people on the road can become a sage
like Yu” (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 14). In short, they had reached the same
destination via different beliefs and approaches.
On Rites
Rites in Confucianism represent a range of rules of conduct, attitudes, and
speech performed in a ceremony or on social occasions, aiming at estab-
lishing a hierarchical social order. Hsun Tzu inherited the concept of rites
from Confucius and put it at the core of his own philosophy, in which all
people, old and young, noble and lowly, rich and poor respected social
differences and fulfilled their duties accordingly. For him, rites were not
only the primary content of moral education but also the goal of educa-
tion inasmuch as they defined people’s behaviors and helped sustain social
order. Hsun Tzu highlighted the significance of rites to such an extent
that he even regarded learning rites as the equivalent of moral education:
“there is no more to learn beyond rites” (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 8).
In Hsun Tzu’s philosophical system, the main function of ritual propri-
ety was to “clarify social distinctions so that people can get along with each
other” (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 1). Hsun Tzu held that severe conflicts were
frequent because human nature was innately egocentric. Learning and
practicing rites could help solve the problem. As rites symbolized moral
regulations in a hierarchical society, when one followed a certain ritual,
one had actually accepted the corresponding social position and acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of the social hierarchy as a whole. Accordingly, prac-
ticing rites and living with them could help restrain people’s insatiable
desires and led them to fit into their specific social rank and position,
which fulfilled the mission of regulating human behavior and ensuring
social order.
Furthermore, the role of rites was not limited just to moral education;
they helped govern the country through institutionalization, which epito-
mized the Confucian tradition of integrating politics with education.
Hsun Tzu claimed that rites were symbolic of laws and served as the gen-
eral principles of laws (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 8); the monarch should use
rites to rule and should enact laws based on rites and righteousness. This
stance was termed by Hsun Tzu as solemnizing rites and valuing laws; it
nevertheless incorporated some ideas such as rule by law from the Legalist
School. But in contrast to the Legalists, Hsun Tzu still placed morality at
the center of his philosophy: as rites were the embodiment of Confucian
ethics, rule by rites or rule by law was in fact rule by the core moral values
of Confucianism such as faithfulness and righteousness.
In short, although Hsun Tzu borrowed ideas from Legalism, his phi-
losophy of moral education was different from that of the Legalist School.
Unlike Legalism, which believed in an entirely evil human nature, Hsun
Tzu propounded a more moderate evil nature. Therefore, while the for-
mer led to a policy that relied on strict laws and severe punishment, the
latter resulted in a solution of moral education mostly through practicing
rites.
60 Z. YOU ET AL.
erspectives on Righteousness Versus Personal Gain

P
Hsun Tzu differed with Mencius on the philosophical topic of “righteous-
ness (yi) versus personal gain (li)”, which revealed his pragmatist stance in
moral education. On the one hand, Hsun Tzu noted that righteousness
involved moral principles consistent with rites (Hsun Tzu, 1997); on the
other hand, people were born with personal desires, which accorded with
Hsun Tzu’s belief about human nature. Accordingly, in contrast to
Mencius’ inclination to set righteousness in opposition to personal gain,
Hsun Tzu held a more tolerant attitude toward this relationship, claiming
that “both righteousness and personal gain are people’s necessities” (Hsun
Tzu, 1997, p. 67).
Nevertheless, Hsun Tzu did not compromise righteousness for the sake
of seeking personal gain. Instead, he suggested using righteousness as the
ruling factor in judging the appropriateness of personal gain. He actually
advocated putting righteousness ahead of personal gain when these two
directly conflicted with each other, following the principles of using righ-
teousness to control people’s hearts and utilizing rites to restrain their
desires. But in contrast to Mencius’ tendency to neglect personal needs,
Hsun Tzu took the more realistic standpoint that there was nothing to be
ashamed of in seeking personal gain and that people could have both if
personal gain conformed to the principle of righteousness.
he Ways of Moral Education

T
Based on his evil nature proposition, Hsun Tzu suggested that rulers use
both rites and laws in governing; that is, they should teach people the rites
to promote moral growth and use laws to intimidate the unruly. Like
Mencius, Hsun Tzu placed the emphasis on self-education and self-
examination in moral learning. He particularly stressed the importance of
exercising self-restraint in privacy (shendu), asserting that a superior man
should remain honest and act in accordance with moral principles when he
was alone so as to acquire great virtue (Hsun Tzu, 1997, p. 9). Moreover,
Hsun Tzu viewed moral learning as a process of accumulation, a lengthy
endeavor that demanded perseverance and dedication. He insisted that the
moral character could not be formed in one day, and so the superior man
needed to work hard and long enough and amass his virtue by keeping
doing the right things (Hsun Tzu, 1997).
The Impacts of Mencius and Hsun Tzu’s Philosophies on Later

Generations
Although Mencius and Hsun Tzu were not contemporaries, their indirect
philosophical conversations over the topics of heaven and human nature
had a tremendous influence on the philosophies of later Confucians. Dong
Zhongshu of the Han Dynasty, for instance, integrated the philosophies of
the two scholars, suggesting that human nature contained both good and
evil, and thus proposed moral education approaches accordingly.
Moreover, Mencius’ philosophical propositions on the cultivation of qi
and the nourishment of the heart provided inspiration to the founders of
the School of Principle 3 and the School of Mind of Neo-Confucianism in
the Song and Ming Dynasties. Hsun Tzu’s practical tendency also gave
rise to the Utilitarian School of Confucianism established by scholars such
as Ye Shi and Chen Liang in the Southern Song Dynasty.
It is interesting to note that Hsun Tzu’s philosophy might have, though
vicariously, exerted an unexpected influence on the historical course of
China. Han Fei and Li Si, two disciples of Hsun Tzu, adopted their teach-
ers’ beliefs about laws and evil human nature while rejecting their proposal
for teaching rites. Both disciples later became famous scholars in the
Legalist School, whose theories helped Qin Shi-Huang, the first Chinese
emperor, unite China through rule by strict laws and the launching of
large-scale wars. However, considering that Hsun Tzu had borrowed ideas
from Legalism and his philosophy per se was believed to have a strong
Legalist inclination, the mutation of his students’ philosophy might not be
that unexpected. After all, Confucius’ rites were based on his spirit of
benevolence. When rites lost their spiritual core and were used as a tool,
there was an inevitable slide toward rule by strict laws or the political tac-
tics of Legalism.
Conclusion and Discussion
To recap, Confucius, Mencius, and Hsun Tzu were the three early archi-
tects of Confucianism in the pre-Qin era, whose philosophies, particularly
their philosophies of moral education, laid the foundation for a morality-
centered political culture in ancient China, one which defended social hier-
archy and buttressed social order by spreading sacred moral laws such as
benevolence and faithfulness. Under their influence, Chinese scholars
developed a unique personality and a spiritual pursuit of the “self-cultivation,
62 Z. YOU ET AL.
family harmony, country management, and world peace” continuum, an

organic unity of one’s inner moral cultivation and the application of moral
principles in one’s political life.
We should also note that the three great philosophers played different
roles in the development of the philosophy of moral education. Confucius,
as the founder of Confucianism, conducted groundbreaking work in cre-
ating its philosophical framework and construing all the key concepts.
Mencius and Hsun Tzu, as the developers, enriched and transformed
Confucius’ philosophy of moral education but split in different directions
with Mencius focusing on the cultivation of innate good nature and Hsun
Tzu emphasizing the integration of rites and laws. Still, the three philoso-
phers shared the same purpose in their discussions on moral education:
they all endeavored to restore social order and stabilize society. All of them
stressed the roles of self-cultivation, moral reasoning, and initiative in an
individual’s moral development, which helps to refute a commonly held
stereotype that Confucianism attempted to produce only obedient and
blind followers.
Meanwhile, the implications of the Big Three’s philosophies of moral
education cannot be fully comprehended unless they are evaluated in the
context of their times. In an era of warring states and academic conten-
tion, the philosophy of moral education was an essential part of a scholar’s
package of political proposals to the monarchs about how to rule the state
and achieve superiority over competing states. These Confucian scholars’
philosophies, however, were not enthusiastically embraced by rulers since
benevolence and moral education did not meet their immediate needs of
gaining hegemony in a warring situation; the Legalist School’s proposi-
tion of using strict laws coupled with generous rewards was a better fit.
Although not a short-term winner, the philosophical ideas about moral
cultivation in Confucianism prevailed and prospered in the long run.
Almost all the Chinese emperors in every dynasty after Qin recognized the
critical importance of moral education in strengthening their governance
and building a harmonious society, and thus adopted a revised version of
Confucianism as the official ideology as well as promoting moral educa-
tion accordingly.
Notes
1. Confucius’ concept of faithfulness (zhong) was not unconditional and differs
somewhat from the concept of loyalty that was held by later scholars.
However, as the original concept of faithfulness was distorted to uncondi-
tional loyalty or even blind submission to the monarch to cater to the need
of rulers, this book will use the word “loyalty” instead of “faithfulness” in
those cases.
2. Qi, translated as “air” or “life force”, is a concept in ancient Chinese phi-
losophy and medicine referring to an invisible and dynamic element that
constitutes the universe and provides human body with vital energy. All
things in the world are the results of movements of qi. Some philosophers,
such as Mencius, even endow the concept with implications for moral
education.
3. Neo-Confucianism is a renaissance and further development of classical
Confucianism that highlighted rationality and removed reference to gods. It
primarily flourished during the Song Dynasty (960–1279 CE) and the Ming
Dynasty (1368–1644 CE). It entails two major branches, namely the School
of Principle and the School of Mind, with the former focusing on li (the
moral principle) and the latter centering on heart in faciliating people’s
moral development.
References
Confucius. (1989). The analects of Confucius. In Y. Zhang (ed. & trans.),
Translation of the four books (pp. 60–253). Changsha: Hunan University Press.
Han, Q. (1995). The reasons why Chinese science and technology fell behind in
the early modern time. Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 11, 9–14.
Han, Y. (2009). Initiative moral education model in higher education under the
influence of Confucianism. Journal of Heilongjiang College of Education, 28(7),
148–149.
Hsun Tzu. (1997). Hsun Tzu. Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press.
Lai, K. L. (1995). Confucian moral thinking. Philosophy East and West, 45(2),
249–272.
Liu, J. (2007). Analysis on the scientific spirit in Confucius’ thoughts. Forum of
Social Sciences, 7, 20–22.
Mencius. (1989). Mencius. In Y. Zhang (ed. & trans.), Translation of the four
books (pp. 258–536). Changsha: Hunan University Press.
Richey, J. (2005). Confucius. In Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from
www.iep.utm.edu/confuciu/
64 Z. YOU ET AL.
Shen, H. (2010). An exploration of Mencius’ thought on moral education.

Education Exploration, 1, 10–11.
Wang, Z. (1994). An empirical study on the influence of philosophy on science
and technology: The reason of Chinese science and technology falling behind
in early modern era. Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities & Social
Sciences), 1, 42–47.
Yang, Z. (2006). The mandate of heaven as the source of virtue: Religiosity of
Confucian morality. Social Sciences in China, 3, 39–49.
Yum, J. O. (1988). The impact of Confucianism on interpersonal relationships and
communication patterns in East Asia. Communications Monographs, 55(4),
374–388.
Zisi. (1989). The doctrine of the mean. In Y. Zhang (ed. & trans.), Translation of
the four books (pp. 258–536). Changsha: Hunan University Press.
CHAPTER 4
The Contention of a Hundred Schools

of Thought: The Philosophy of Moral
Education in the Spring and Autumn
and Warring States Periods
The Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods (770–221 BCE) were
noted for the coexistence of social conflict and cultural prosperity, which
made them a special era in Chinese history. It was a time when the rulers
of vassal states enthusiastically sought out ideas that could help them gain
hegemony and unite China, and this gave rise to an ethos of open-
mindedness and academic freedom. In such an atmosphere, different phil-
osophical schools sprouted and flourished; these included not just
Confucianism, but also Taoism, Mohism, the Legalist School, and the
School of Yin and Yang. Among the various topics they dealt with, moral
education was a central theme of these philosophical schools, which con-
siderably enriched the philosophical system of moral education. This chap-
ter therefore explores moral education concepts and thought in Taoism,
Mohism, and Legalism, as well as discussing the exchange of ideas about
moral cultivation among these philosophical schools, and the conflicts
between them.
Philosophy of Moral Education in Taoism

Taoism, also known as Daoism, is an indigenous philosophical system
whose importance in philosophy in China is second only to Confucianism.
In fact, the two philosophical schools, Taoism and Confucianism, coex-
isted for more than two thousand years, conflicting, debating with, learn-
ing from, and supplementing each other; they constitute two major
dimensions of Chinese culture. Unlike the positive and enterprising spirit

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_4
66 Z. YOU ET AL.
embodied in Confucianism, Taoism called for learning from nature and

proposed a relatively quiescent, inactive, and unaggressive attitude to life.
These differences were reflected in the philosophies of moral education in
the two schools as well as in their modes of teaching morality. As a result,
the philosophy of moral education in Taoism could best be comprehended
by comparing it with the beliefs of Confucianism.
It is interesting to note that many ancient Chinese people, scholars and
officials in particular, possessed a mixed moral quality: while they were
mostly influenced by the Confucian idea of serving the country, they also
followed the more aloof attitude of following nature, valuing life, and
seeking inner peacefulness of Taoism when they had retired or were
demoted from their official positions. Thus, it is necessary to survey moral
education concepts in Taoism so as to understand the hermetic tempera-
ment of many Chinese people in terms of their political life and modes of
artistic creation.
To explore this abstruse and naturalistic attitude to life, this section
mainly discusses the philosophical ideas influencing the approaches to
moral education of two representative figures in Taoism: Lao Tzu and
Chuang Tzu. Lao Tzu was the founder of Taoism, while Chuang Tzu was
the most famous Taoist scholar after Lao Tzu, and further developed and
enriched Taoism. The relationship between Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu in
Taoism is much like the relationship between Confucius and Mencius in
Confucianism.
The Philosophical Thought of Lao Tzu on Moral Education

Lao Tzu (c. sixth century–c. fifth century BCE) was a great philosopher of
naturalism in ancient China who served as an official in charge of the
library or archives for the royal court of Zhou, but later chose to retire to
live a reclusive life. Tao, also called as “the Way” or the ultimate truth, is
the fundamental concept in his philosophy; it indicates the primordial
source, pattern, and substance of nature. Tao could be best described as
the chaotic state of the Non-Ultimate, which is limitless, endless, and bor-
derless. It was probably from this feature that Lao Tzu came up with his
conception of the creation of the universe: “Tao gives birth to the One
that leads to Two, and then to Three, which in turn breeds all things in
the world” (Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 37). Hence, Tao could be conceived as the
First Cause of the universe in Chinese philosophy.
THE CONTENTION OF A HUNDRED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT… 67
The concept of Tao was the great contribution of Lao Tzu in both
cosmology and morality. With the idea, he turned heaven and earth from
an objective categories into the embodiment of the ultimate truth.
Following a spirit of minimalism, Lao Tzu removed the unnecessary
details and vicissitudes of the world, fusing all the phenomena into a sim-
ple “one” that allowed people to get to know the essence of the universe
directly. However, to comprehend Tao was not an easy task because it was,
like the Non-Ultimate, without form or shape. The only way to seek Tao
was to follow nature and be inactive, and this became the general principle
and the unique method of his moral cultivation.
In his masterpiece, Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu depicted this method as fol-
lows: “people follow the example of earth, and earth in turn follows
heaven, and heaven in turn follows Tao, which in turn follows nature”
(Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 23). The concept of moral self-cultivation through
following nature was based on his idea that the original state of human
nature possessed the highest morality congruent with the spirit of the nat-
ural world or Tao. This innate moral state, nonetheless, was often blem-
ished by acquired knowledge. Hence the goal of moral education was to
return to the natural state: people should follow the laws of nature or Tao
and oppose those human endeavors that would disrupt the natural laws.
Abiding by the principle of inactivity (wuwei) or action-less activity was
the best way to achieve Tao; instead of disputing over the dichotomy of
good and evil, people should follow nature and do nothing contrived. Lao
Tzu sharply criticized Confucian moral concepts such as benevolence, righ-
teousness, and rites, claiming that the three concepts were the consequences
that arose when people lost their original Way (Tao) and Morals (Te): peo-
ple “would chase morality when they have lost Tao, seek benevolence when
they have lost morality, search for righteousness when they have lost benev-
olence, and look after rites when they have lost righteousness” (Lao Tzu,
2001, p. 34). The observation of rites, accordingly, was not a good method
of moral cultivation, but an indication of the demise of faithfulness and
righteousness. The acquisition of moral knowledge conflicted with the
principle of inactivity or the pursuit of Tao because while learning accumu-
lated knowledge, the seeking of prior Tao demanded reducing the desires
and aspirations evoked by those acquired moral knowledge so as to return
to the primordial state of nature (Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 41).
To further clarify this idea, Lao Tzu proposed the concepts of superior
morality and inferior morality, which could be perceived as great wisdom
and trivial cleverness respectively. Superior morality represented true and
68 Z. YOU ET AL.
spontaneous morality by following the natural laws; inferior morality had

no real morality in that it was confined by acquired moral values such as
benevolence and righteousness (Lao Tzu, 2001). While superior morality
preserved the original truth of the world, inferior morality, mostly man-
made, tended toward hypocrisy. A good example of superior morality was
called “Xuan De”, an original morality that followed the rules of nature
and did nothing. Lao Tzu praised the virtue of Xuan De: “it had nurtured
all the living things in the world without endeavoring to own them or
expecting to get returns” (Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 9).
The key to reclaiming superior morality lay in cultivating the way of life
or moral attitude of acting without competition (action-less activity). In
other words, people should pay less attention to the vicissitudes of for-
tune, social status, reputation, power, and honors; instead, they should
live harmoniously with nature and avoid competition. Nonetheless, this
attitude of non-aggressiveness should not be understood as a surrendering
or giving up. It was a strategy of achieving one’s goal through not com-
peting. By withdrawing from ferocious competition, one could tactfully
survive in a troubled time and eventually get what one wanted, which is
also called retreating in order to advance. This trait of superior morality “is
just like water, which benefits all things but does not compete with them”
(Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 7). Though water was considered soft and non-
threatening, it could be the strongest force in the world by aggregating
small forces and become a rushing torrent. Thus, the concept of being
non-aggressive was not just a moral character to develop but also wisdom
for life and a political strategy.
Learning from nature is the most fundamental method of moral develop-
ment in Taoism, giving rise to Lao Tzu’s idea of wordless teaching. This
method is unique inasmuch as it opposed any contrived attempts to indoc-
trinate the desired moral values or shape people’s moral habits by applying
external rites or norms. Rather, it advocated the natural growth of moral
character, in which leading by example was crucial. Lao Tzu pointed out
that “when political leaders follow the natural rules and do nothing, people
would be enlightened by themselves; when leaders kept a quiet role, people
would do the right thing […] and when leaders eliminated their own desires,
people would become simple and honest” (Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 49). This
approach to moral education was called wordless teaching because when
leaders conducted themselves in a moral way, they set a good example for
their people to follow, which was a much better educational approach than
the traditional way of indoctrination or using punishments and rewards.
Next, Lao Tzu encouraged people to reduce lust and eliminate desires
so as to preserve their original state of morality. He declared that “the big-
gest calamity comes from being not contented and the largest mistake
comes from one’s desires to get more” (Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 40); as a result,
“one would not be insulted by wanting less and knowing when to stop”
(Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 39). Like asceticism in Christianity and Buddhism, the
character in Taoism was not shaped from outside but grew from inside: it
was a process by which people actively sought their true heart by eliminat-
ing insatiable greed. And by keeping such a heart and living an idyllic life,
one could preserve not only one’s virtues but also one’s good health.
Being modest or humble was another crucial moral character congru-
ent with the principle of inactivity. Lao Tzu argued that the reason large
rivers and oceans were able to bring together all the water of myriad creeks
was that they were in the lowest position; therefore, being humble could
allow a leader to garner more power and support from people. “Even
though he did not compete actively with others, no one could really com-
pete with him” (Lao Tzu, 2001, p. 57), which embodied the spirit of
action through inaction. Likewise, Lao Tzu stated that people of high
morality should keep a low profile in social life and be modest, just like an
empty valley. The implication of being empty in morality was that it
allowed people to be opened-minded so that they could accept all kinds of
suggestions and not be conceited.
These approaches to moral education, particularly eliminating desires
and being inactive, were also the ways to realize one’s political ideal. Lao
Tzu believed that if the whole society did not chase after profit, social
status, and reputation, people could live peacefully together without being
corrupted by gain or loss. In so doing, the wars and conflict prevalent at
the time would be greatly reduced or eliminated. Therefore, Lao Tzu’s
proposal of being inactive and doing less was actually his prescription to
solve the social and political crises of his time. In his view, the art of ruling
was just like frying a small fish: rulers should not stir the fish too often, or
put differently, they should not interfere peoples’ lives too much and
should allow things to unfold gradually by themselves. This helped them
to eschew the abuse of power and social disruption due to arbitrary
decisions.
In short, Lao Tzu’s wisdom in moral development was a result of his
reflections upon the ceaseless conflicts among rulers for supremacy in his
time, which triggered his ideas of following nature, preserving modesty,
and being inactive in order to maintain a peaceful mind. Even though his
70 Z. YOU ET AL.
philosophy was seldom adopted as the mainstream ideology by his contem-

porary rulers, his naturalism provided Chinese people with an alternative
way of life; instead of living for earthly honors, as advocated by Confucianism
or Legalism, one could live in a tranquil and pastoral setting searching for
inner peace of mind or could mix these and do both in a balanced or some-
times acrobatic way. His idea of following nature and letting things take their
own course is inspirational in today’s world, where people often agonize
over gain or loss due to excessive desires and intense competition, and where
the relationship between man and nature has deteriorated tremendously.
The Approaches to Moral Education of Chuang Tzu

Chuang Tzu (c. 369—286 BCE) was recognized as the heir apparent and
the developer of Lao Tzu’s philosophy. With great imagination, Chuang
Tzu broadened Lao Tzu’s philosophy and vividly explicated its connota-
tions with anecdotes, allegories, and parables. It was through the essays of
Chuang Tzu that people could better understand the rich philosophical
ideas and the unique spiritual pursuit of moral development in Taoism.
Like Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu sang highly of the morality in the prehis-
toric period. He called for people to return to the pristine moral status of
very ancient times and alleged that this was an era of true morality as
humans lived harmoniously and peacefully with wild animals, birds, grass,
and trees in nature. People during the time were not fettered by the moral
concepts, such as benevolence and righteousness, developed in later eras,
but they were doing the right things based on their original nature; they
did not know the discrepancies between the superior men and the inferior
men, but they still loved each other. Chuang Tzu argued that this ideal
moral status was due to the fact that people at that time were ignorant and
had no desires (Chuang Tzu, 2001). Therefore, giving up “wisdom” and
abandoning the idea of becoming a sage, ironically, was the remedy for the
problem of moral degeneration in Chuang Tzu’s time. In other words, the
best way to cultivate people’s virtues was to go back to the primitive status
of ignorance and lesser desires.
Furthermore, Chuang Tzu reinforced his argument about moral educa-
tion by criticizing the moral philosophies of Confucianism and the Mohist
School. He claimed that the concepts of righteousness and rites, and the
practice of these, as proposed by Confucianism, did not fit the original
nature of people; instead, they led people to seek personal gain and reputa-
tion (Chuang Tzu, 2001). History proved it that people’s morality declined
after the appearance of these moral concepts. This was because when peo-
ple were rewarded to practice benevolence or punished for not doing so,
the moral principle lost their original ethical implications. In his essay enti-
tled “The Thief Zhi”, Chuang Tzu proposed that the thief named “Zhi”
should not be regarded as a thief as he did things according to his own
nature. On the other hand, the moral education of Confucianism made
people hide their nature and needs and put on the mask of virtues such as
benevolence, but they actually sought personal gain in a dishonest way—
they were more like a thief than “the Thief Zhi” (Chuang Tzu, 2001).
The same thing was true of the Mohist School. Chuang Tzu argued
that Mohism’s emphasis on righteousness and admiration of virtuous and
able persons resulted in a corruption of people’s original heart of nature
and peace. The concepts of promoting universal love and utilitarianism in
Mohism posed even bigger problems. Though it sounded noble and altru-
istic at first sight, the idea of sacrificing one’s own interests to help others
was impractical in reality: this kind of moral character could not material-
ize as it did not fit the original nature of people and could not garner sup-
port from society, and therefore the endeavor was pedantic or even
hypocritical. The idea of becoming selfless was in essence selfish because
by doing so people actually wished to gain profit as they hoped others
would give their love back (Chuang Tzu, 2001). Chuang Tzu was espe-
cially against the Mohist School’s advocacy of material gain as this could
disrupt the free spiritual pursuit of Taoism. He argued that “the actions of
seeking material gains made people ignore their own safety and forget
their true nature” (Chuang Tzu, 2001, p. 225).
In contrast to Confucianism, which viewed the sages as paragons of
virtue, Chuang Tzu designated the “True Men” as the role models for
moral development in Taoism. While the sages were persons with noble
moral characters based on human relations, the True Men were people
with natural characters and the spirit of freedom that surpassed ethics. A
True Man did not seek after success or the worldly glory, as Confucian
sages did, but followed the natural laws to retain spiritual serenity, with the
result that he eventually achieved “the Way” or “Tao” and came to under-
stand the secret of the universe. Aside from the indifferent attitude toward
earthly success and reputation, a True Man could even remain tranquil at
a life-or-death moment as he understood that the cycle of life and death
was a part of nature, just like the rise and fall of the sun—thus, life was not
something to be desired and death was not something to be mourned. In
short, a True Man was a paragon of the Taoist’s moral ideals, who had
transcended concern for life and death in spirit.
72 Z. YOU ET AL.
Congruent with his naturalistic worldview, Chuang Tzu suggested that

moral education be implemented according to the learners’ natural incli-
nations. He told a story to explicate this idea. A Marquis of the State of Lu
once caged a sea bird, accommodating it with the best music and food.
Unfortunately, the bird was so depressed at losing its freedom that it
refused to eat and drink, and eventually died (Chuang Tzu, 2001, p. 200).
By telling the fable, Chuang Tzu suggested that leaders and educators
respect the real needs and interests of each individual; otherwise, even
good will could lead to bad consequences. As for the implications of moral
education, Chuang Tzu tended to believe that moral growth came from
an individual’s inward understanding and enlightenment, not as a result of
the inculcation of creeds from outside. It should be, he would say, a grad-
ual clarification of one’s true heart in nature.
As indicated above, the original heart, instead of secular moral princi-
ples, served as the arbiter of right and wrong in Chuang Tzu’s philosophy.
He held that the one was right if it fitted the original natural heart and was
wrong if it was against the natural heart. The heart, accordingly, was used
as both the moral faculty to guide a person and the ultimate goal of moral
cultivation. While Confucians tried to develop their virtues by following
external sacred doctrines and reflecting on their own behavior, Chuang
Tzu called for an inner exploration that aimed at minimizing distractions
so as to obtain the freedom of the heart.
One thing particularly significant about Chuang Tzu’s contribution in
metaphysics, and for moral education, is his idea of integrating heaven and
humans, or maintaining the harmony between man and nature, which
impacted immensely on the cosmology and aesthetics of traditional
Chinese culture. In his discourse about spiritual pursuits, Chuang Tzu
suggested that people sense the coexistence of heaven, earth, and self, and
live peacefully with all things so as to discover the ultimate truth of the
universe. To this end, he proposed an approach of moral self-cultivation
retaining a mental state of void and quietness. Specifically, a person needs
to “sit in oblivion” to become void; that is, he should eliminate all the
worldly chores from his minds and instead focus on his spiritual wander-
ing. A person could come to be oblivious of his body, his knowledge, and
right and wrong in daily life via sitting quietly and enjoying the beauty of
nature, helping him acquire the “ultimate truth” or “Tao” in his mind
(Chuang Tzu, 2001).
The Impacts of Philosophy of Moral Education in Taoism

The philosophy of moral education in Taoism, though not as influential as
Confucianism, played an important part in shaping the Chinese people’s
moral character and enriching their spiritual world. While the ancient Chinese
mostly pursued Confucian moral ideals of self-cultivation and serving the
state, many of them were also influenced by the Taoist attitude of withdraw-
ing from the world of competition so as to enjoy the beauty of mountains
and water. Hence Confucianism and Taoism worked together to shape the
unique characteristics of the Chinese people. While the former drove people
to aggressively seek achievement and build up worldly feats, the latter told
people when to stop striving for secular success, and instead seek spiritual
refuge and freedom through immersing themselves in the beauty of nature.
Moreover, Taoism as a philosophy gave rise to many ideas about moral
education in religious Taoism, such as promoting morality and preserving
health.1 Both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu believed that immoral behavior
would disrupt people’s internal harmony, thereby impairing their physical
and mental health (Lv, 1996). Chuang Tzu, in particular, believed that
observing Taoism’s moral demands of maintaining a peaceful mind and
non-aggressive wisdom was essential to having a good and long life
(Chuang Tzu, 2001). This was absorbed and developed into a central
theme in religious Taoism, namely the intrinsic consistency between valu-
ing life and nurturing morality.
It was also interesting to note that these moral beliefs and the modes of
moral cultivation in Taoism contributed to the formation of the Chinese
tradition of using moral education to replace some functions of religions.
Although Confucianism played a major role in this respect by advocating
ancestor worship and concentrating on human relations, the philosophy
did not provide answers to fundamental questions about life and death,
the laws of the universe, and how to attain peace of mind. With its innate
mysticism, the Taoist philosophy of moral education filled out the missing
parts. For instance, Taoism depicted Tao as the essence of nature, which
at least partly solved the problem of the lack of an ultimate truth and des-
tiny in Confucianism. Moral cultivation in Taoism also contributed to the
practice of integrating the heart with nature, reducing people’s needs for
a single almighty god. In fact, both religious Taoism and Chan Buddhism,
developed at later eras, borrowed theories from Taoism. For instance,
Chan Buddhism’s daily practice of meditating to recover the Buddha
nature was deeply influenced by Chuang Tzu’s practice of moral cultiva-
tion through sitting in oblivion.
74 Z. YOU ET AL.
The Philosophy of Moral Education in the Legalist

School
Legalism is a school of Chinese philosophy which emerged and flourished
during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods; it focused on
the centralized management of people through law enforcement and
political techniques. Although there were several different branches in the
Legalist School, for example, the branch of Qi and the branch of Tri-Jin,
and although Legalist thinkers differed from one another in their ideas,
they all believed in the role of law in ruling the state and educating people.
This section will discuss in detail the philosophy of moral education of two
representative figures of the Legalist School: Guan Zhong and Han Feizi.
The Philosophy of Moral Education of Guan Zhong and His

Followers
Guan Zhong (720–645 BCE) was a noted reformer in the State of Qi dur-
ing the Spring and Autumn Period. As the chancellor of Qi, he had suc-
cessfully helped the Duke of Qi Huan rule the state and develop Qi into
the richest and most powerful among its peers. Guan Zhong was regarded
as the representative of early Legalism in that he stressed both the impor-
tance of moral education and law enforcement; this differed from the later
Legalist thinkers, who essentially dismissed the role of moral education.
On the one hand, Guan established the moral values of rites, righteous-
ness, honesty, and shame as the four ideological pillars to support the state
and placed the emphasis on cultivating the four moral dimensions in peo-
ple. On the other hand, he was the first Chinese who proposed the rule by
law; that is, all people from the Duke down to ordinary people should
follow the law and be equal before the law. Even if Guan did not write a
monograph, some later Legalist scholars in the State of Qi wrote a book in
the name of Guan Zhong, which allowed us to know the moral education
philosophy of Guan Zhong and his followers.
Guan Zhong’s philosophy of moral education was based on his idea of
the selfishness of human nature. He contended that it was the inclination
of human nature to seek advantage and avoid disadvantage that had moti-
vated people to go to dangerous places to gain profit (Guan & Li, 2009).
The craving to be rich was so strong in people’s hearts that even harsh
corporal punishment or killing would not deter them from its pursuit. For
Guan, economic gains determined people’s moral level: “people know
rites when storage is ample and people understand glory and shame when
clothes and food are abundant” (Guan & Li, 2009, p. 2). Thus, moral
education should be based on this aspect of human nature. A thriving
economy was regarded as the foundation for moral cultivation. When
people were well-off or given the opportunities to become wealthy, they
were easy to govern. The precondition for successful moral education
therefore was to enrich people.
Nonetheless, Guan did not downplay the significance of moral educa-
tion. He stated that “while it takes a year to grow crops and ten years to
grow trees, it takes a whole life to educate a person” (Guan & Li, 2009,
p. 30). It was the education and practice of the four moral virtues—rites,
righteousness, honesty, and shame—that determined the fate of a country
(Guan & Li, 2009, p. 4). With the help of the four moral principles, the
sovereign’s orders would be carried out smoothly. The lack of them, on
the contrary, would undermine the social hierarchy, with the result that
the sovereign would not act like a sovereign, the minister would not act
like a minster, the father would not act like a father, and the son would not
act like a son. By this logic, the teaching and cultivation of moral character
were essential to solidify and stabilize the state.
Meanwhile, Guan and his followers highlighted the role of law in secur-
ing the state, believing that moral education and law enforcement should
be integrated as a whole. They insisted the laws be implemented in a way
that would promote people’s moral development; that is, the laws should
reward behavior consistent with the four moral dimensions generously
and punish immoral behaviors harshly. Without corresponding rewards
and punishment, people would easily become shameless due to their
profit-seeking nature. Therefore, a state should, on the one hand, use
people of virtue to promote people’s moral development and, on the
other, should enact laws to curb or deter people’s vices (Guan & Li, 2009).
It is noteworthy that Guan perceived moral education as a process of
cultivation, for which he had put forward six ways: “gradualness, taming,
tempering, edification, adaptation, and habits” (Guan & Li, 2009, p. 58).
First, it should proceed step by step as the moral character grew and devel-
oped gradually. Second, people should be tamed with disciplines and
inspired by good moral examples. Third, people grew morally in difficult
circumstances. Fourth, edification should be used rather than indoctrina-
tion. Moral values should not be inculcated by external forces; rather, they
should be fostered in a benign social environment. Last, learners should
gradually adapt themselves to the moral requirements and form moral
76 Z. YOU ET AL.
habits, which completed the course of their moral education. This process
was called moral cultivation or moral nurturing, and was essential to devel-
oping good customs in the state.
Han Feizi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Han Feizi (280–233 BCE) was an influential political philosopher in the
Warring States Period. Initially, he learned Confucianism from Hsun Tzu,
but later switched to Legalism and became the most famous representative
of the branch of the Legalist School called Tri-Jin. Disagreeing with the
beliefs of the Legalists of Qi, Han Feizi essentially held that it was not
necessary to conduct moral education, and if there was any education
needed, it would be legal education, which taught people about laws and
absolute submission. In short, he advocated replacing moral education
with the teaching of laws and regulations enacted by the state.
There were reasons why Han Feizi upheld rule by strict law. Han lived
in a time when the unification wars among the vassal states had become
increasingly intense and brutal, making Confucianism undesirable to rul-
ers. Additionally, a new feudal economy was prospering and had started to
replace the traditional slavery system. With the emergence and spread of
new technology such as iron farm tools, the new economy was booming
and large land-owners and merchants were seeking profits as well as politi-
cal power. In the face of these harsh realities, the assumption that human
nature was good (as well as traditional moral concepts such as benevolence
and righteousness) was doubted and criticized; traditional moral stances
such as choosing righteousness over personal gain were also seriously
challenged and replaced by the belief that one should strive for one’s own
individual interest.
Han was one of the philosophers who cast doubt on the efficacy of rule
by benevolence and believed that human nature was profit-driven. He
argued that moral cultivation was outdated because “people in the remote
ancient times competed with each other by morality, people in the middle
ancient times competed by wisdom, and nowadays, people compete by
strength” (Han & Wang, 1986, p. 341). Humans, Han declared, were
intrinsically selfish as it was human nature to seek profit and avoid injury.
People’s desires for fortunes, reputation, and social status were the ultimate
inner drives of their behavior. Confucian morality could not be supported
by this egoistic human nature and was unfeasible in today’s society. Thus,
he proposed a more utilitarian kind of philosophy: only right criterion by
which to judge an action was to see if it was for the prosperity of the state.
Put differently, human behavior was deemed moral only when it was useful
for making the state stronger and richer. The policy of promoting agricul-
ture and engaging in warfare was moral in that it helped both people and
the state obtain advantages and survive in a war-torn era.
Accordingly, Han Feizi proposed using legal education and law enforce-
ment to replace moral education, and using officials rather than scholars to
teach the masses. He argued that since it was impossible for people to
voluntarily behave in a moral way due to their egoistic nature, the enforce-
ment of laws and regulations was the only way to make people do the right
thing. This argument differed sharply from the beliefs of Confucianism.
Unlike Confucians’ advocacy of teaching and practicing rites, filial piety,
and benevolence, Han highlighted the importance of using external forces
such as laws and rewards to ensure morality. For him, moral education was
equivalent to the legal education offered by government officials. These
bureaucrats, familiar with laws and government decrees, should not merely
help kings rule the country firmly, but also act as teachers of the law for
ordinary people.
Coupled with legal education, Han proposed that government use
severe corporal punishments to prevent people from doing the wrong
things, claiming it was legal deterrence instead of moral teaching that
made people good. He even suggested restoring a severe law of the Shang
Dynasty under which leaving ashes in the street could result in the offend-
er’s hands being cut off. Though it was mere misdemeanor, Han insisted
that it be punished heavily because in this way people would not dare to
commit minor crimes, let alone felonies. The best way to diminish the use
of corporal punishments, therefore, was to apply corporal punishment as
harshly as possible. In brief, Han attempted to solve all the problems
through legal deterrence.
Nonetheless, Han did not completely eliminate the function of moral
education. In a book chapter entitled “Loyalty and Filial Piety”, he
asserted that the world operated in such a way that ministers served the
sovereign, sons served fathers, and wives served husbands unconditionally
(Han Feizi, 1999). Here, Han used the term “serving” to define and
regulate hierarchical human relations, which aimed at cementing the social
pecking order and strengthening absolute monarchy in favor of kings. It
seems that Han was not against the kind of moral education that could
help reinforce monarchical power, but he perceived moral education to be
only a supplement to the national policy of rule by law, not a panacea for
78 Z. YOU ET AL.
solving every problem, as contended by Confucianism, because only laws,

not ethics or moral education, worked to resolve with the conflicts of
major interests (Chen & Huang, 1999).
We should note that the legal system in Han’s theory was not just about
legal deterrence, but encompassed a reward system as well. This political
system, on the one hand, punished those who disobeyed the laws severely,
and on the other generously rewarded those who abided by the laws.
Working together, people were directed in the way that rulers wished.
Han’s philosophy was conducive to building up a highly centralized
regime and gathering the strength that was needed during a time of large-
scale war. There is no wonder that the king of Qin quickly adopted Han’s
philosophy and turned it into policies of encouraging farming and war-
fare. Motivated by generous rewards and avoidance of punishment, every-
one in the state of Qin worked extremely hard in either plowing or
engaging in warfare, turning the country into a juggernaut of a war
machine, which eventually defeated the other six states and united China.
Unfortunately, Han Feizi’s philosophy did not serve the country well
after the war of unification. The empire of Qin, brief in its duration
(221–207 BCE), was soon toppled by hordes of angry insurgents. The
powerful dynasty lasted for only 14 years due to its abuse of human
resources and harsh punishment, which bred hatred and fomented large-
scale rebellions. The utilitarian philosophy of Han and his ilk, though
worked extremely effectively during the war, did not serve the country
well in peacetime. After the country was united by force, social stability
rather than disruption became the priority of rulers; here Confucianism’s
advocacy of rule by benevolence and moral cultivation served better as it
helped reconcile social conflicts and stabilize the country in the long run.
A closer examination of Han’s philosophical arguments also reveals its
flaws or side effects. While he keenly pointed out the selfish dimension of
people’s nature and accordingly proposed to motivate the masses based on
this assumption, he utterly eliminated the benign dimension in human
nature and essentially annulled the need for moral education, which led to
a policy of extreme utilitarianism. But the mania for material gain might
backfire eventually when greed and resentment permeated society.
Moreover, this legalistic philosophy was not equivalent to the ideas of the
modern legal system. Even though Chinese ancient Legalist theory laid
emphasis on the principle of equality before the law, its ultimate purpose
was to strengthen the monarch’s power. Ordinary people did not have a
say in enacting laws or determining their content, and this inevitably con-
tributed to the autocracy and tyranny of the Qin Dynasty.
Although largely abandoned after the Qin, the philosophy of the
Legalist School did not completely disappear from the Chinese political
realm. Most of the dynasties after Qin adopted Confucianism as the main-
stream ideology and used moral education as an important tool in ruling
the country; however, they also implemented moderated Legalist policies
to manage the country, particularly during the time of reform. Furthermore,
some later Confucians such as Dong Zhongshu had also integrated many
Legalist ideas into their philosophical system to modify Confucianism.
This phenomenon has been summarized as Confucian in appearance but
Legalist in essence by some modern scholars (Yang, 2010; Ying, 1964).2
Even though this controversial point of view might have overstated the
influence of Legalism, we could still find abundant evidence of its influ-
ence throughout Chinese history. It represents a cultural and political
characteristic that should not be neglected in studying Chinese philosophy
and politics.
Mo Tzu’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Mo Tzu (c. 470–c. 391 BCE), who lived at the beginning of the Warring
States Period, was the founder of the Mohist School. When Mo Tzu was
young, he studied Confucianism but found its beliefs, such as rites and
social hierarchy, undesirable and impractical. Thus, he came up with his
own philosophy, which aimed at solving the social and political problems
of his time and eventually established a pragmatist philosophy called
Mohism, which became a major rival to Confucianism in the Warring
States Period. In this doctrine, Mo Tzu advocated cultivating noble
human characters such as “universal love”, “benefiting each other”, and
“frugality”, and these constituted the core concepts of Mohism. Like
Confucius, Mo Tzu was a great teacher who had a lot of disciples and fol-
lowers. He and his disciples traveled to different vassal states to publicize
his ideas, and tried to persuade the monarchs to accept his proposals.
Universal love (jian’ai) or impartial caring was the most important
moral ideal in Mo Tzu’s philosophical system; it suggested that all people
should love each other and should love others just as they love themselves.
The lack of universal love, he claimed, was the cause of all social turmoil and
vices of the time—all the insubordination and defiance from ministers and
sons, unkindness and cruelty from sovereigns and fathers, and continuous
80 Z. YOU ET AL.
warfare among the vassal states could be attributed to the fact that people
did not love each other. Thus, promoting universal love could help to elimi-
nate these social evils and eventually build an ideal world (Mo Tzu, 2009);
this was in sharp contrast to the idea of differentiated love in Confucianism.
Mo Tzu strongly opposed differentiated love, holding that people should
be treated equally regardless of their blood ties or social rank. Through the
practice of universal love, he hoped that vassal states would cease waging
wars, and all people would care for one another and would live peacefully
with like brothers and sisters.
Consistent with his idea of universal love, Mo Tzu presented an
approach that emphasized both righteousness and personal gain. On the
one hand, he held righteousness as the highest moral standard, believing
there was nothing more valuable than righteousness (Mo Tzu, 2009). On
the other hand, he also underlined the importance of personal gain, claim-
ing that both the ruling class and the working class should be awarded
with material gains commensurate with their work. Mo Tzu even sug-
gested that the monarch endow people of virtue and talents with well-paid
high positions. This emphasis on the importance of personal benefit and
material gain ran counter to mainstream Confucianism, which stressed
righteousness while disparaging personal gain.
Mo Tzu was the first Chinese philosopher who rejected the dichotomy
between righteousness and personal gain, contending that “righteousness
was in essence gain”, which was a good indication of his propensity toward
pragmatism. Mo Tzu’s concept of gain referred to the public interest, not
someone’s own interests. Put differently, Mo Tzu was advocating altruistic
action. In his philosophy, action serving another’s interests was righteous
and action harming another’s interests was unrighteous. Based on this
idea, Mo Tzu developed another moral concept of “benefiting each
other”; this suggested that helping each other and sharing benefits was the
way to realize universal love. The two concepts, along with his ideas about
righteousness and gain, formed a compelling chain of logic regarding
mutual benefits. When one loved others, he would be loved by others;
when one helped others, he would be helped by others as well (Mo Tzu,
2009).
Mo Tzu was strongly against using rites and music for moral education,
holding that rites represented an unequal social distinction that was harm-
ful to the country. He denied Confucians’ belief that a luxurious funeral
ceremony was essential to cultivate filial sons and faithful ministers, assert-
ing that such funeral practices did not develop virtues such as filial piety,
but wasted a large amount of social resources. He further pointed out that
a policy of encouraging lavish funerals had resulted in poverty, fewer peo-
ple in the country and disarray in politics (Mo Tzu, 2009). He thus rec-
ommended his followers follow austerity—being frugal in both life and at
one’s own funeral. Aside from holding a simple funeral, he even asked
people to abandon musical performance to reduce the expenditure.
Luxury music performance, for Mo Tzu, wasted a lot of money in terms
of building music instruments such as chimes and supporting orchestras.
Instead, the money could be used to produce more food and clothing for
people.
As a pragmatist, Mo Tzu believed more in learning morality through
action than performing rites. This learning-by-doing, nonetheless, should
start with something small. By completing the small chores and dealing
with one’s relatives well, one could gradually move on to something big-
ger (Mo Tzu, 2009). Mo Tzu especially underscored the value of hands-
on work. He and his disciples were often engaged in producing various
kinds of tools and inventions. This practice, he claimed, could help culti-
vate one’s moral character as well as one’s abilities to pursue a political
agenda. It was recorded that Mo Tzu and his disciples once successfully
prevented an invasion of the small state of Song by the large state of Chu
with their courage, eloquence, and skills in building military tools (Mo
Tzu, 2009)—a good example of how the Mohists practiced what they
believed. Additionally, Mo Tzu encouraged his disciples to reflect on their
own successes or failures in these experiences, and thus to attain true
knowledge of the world.
Like other philosophers, Mo Tzu offered an exemplary figure of
Mohism, namely “Jian Shi”, for his disciples to follow. To become a “Jian
Shi”, however, was no easy task. A person should first develop an altruistic
and noble moral character inasmuch as helping others in need was the mis-
sion of a “Jian Shi”. He should view another’s state as his own state,
another’s family as his own, and another’s needs as his own. He should
take care of his friend when the latter was sick, feed his friend when he was
hungry, and bury his friend when he was dead. Besides possessing these
altruistic virtues, a “Jian Shi” should also be eloquent in debate and per-
suasion, and should be learned in knowledge and technology. These skills
and abilities should be mastered because they were crucial to realizing the
political ideal of the Mohist School—promoting the public good or well-
being of the world.
82 Z. YOU ET AL.
However, Mo Tzu’s propositions of altruism were harshly criticized by

other rival schools. Chuang Tzu, for example, contended that Mo Tzu’s
philosophy was not feasible in that people would neither love others nor
love themselves through practicing the moral values of Mohism (Chuang
Tzu, 2001). Mencius also criticized Mo Tzu’s idea of “universal love” as
discarding fathers and sovereigns, which was the behavior of wild animals
(Mencius, 1989). The problem with Mo Tzu’s philosophy of moral edu-
cation, according to these philosophers, was that he was too idealistic
about human nature and neglected the fact that people were essentially
self-centered. The advocacy of sacrificing oneself and serving others would
make people’s lives miserable, thereby eliminating its attraction for ordi-
nary people. This might have been the reason why the impact of Mohism
faded quickly after the Warring States Period.
Even so, we should not neglect the influence of Mo Tzu’s philosophy
of moral education in enriching and shaping the Chinese people’s spiritual
world. Throughout history, it has been common for people to be willing
to fight bullies and generously help unfamiliar people in need, which
reflects a Mohist’s heroic moral pursuit of upholding righteousness and
helping the unfortunate. For this reason, moral belief in Mohism has been
widely regarded as the origin of the chivalrous spirit of the martial arts, a
legacy that many Chinese people have cherished (Ge, 1999).
Conclusion
It is noteworthy that almost all of the famous schools in this period based
their philosophy of moral education on the conceptual framework of
human nature and actively discussed the relationship between righteous-
ness and personal gain. Thus, it would be informative to link their beliefs
about human nature and their attitudes to righteousness and gain.
Confucianism, for instance, essentially believed that human nature was
good and advocated fostering the moral character of valuing righteousness
while disparaging personal gain. The Legalist School held human nature
to be greedy and evil, thus it stood for promoting individual gain while
neglecting righteousness in order to serve the state’s needs. Taoism pro-
posed that human nature was simple and pure, conforming to the natural
world, hence it advocated abandoning both righteousness and gain.
Mohism tended to believe in a blank-slate kind of human nature; accord-
ingly, it preached the integration of righteousness and gain.
Another pattern we notice in this period is that different schools were

inclined to use different approaches to moral education in realizing their
political ideals. Confucianism focused on “guiding” people’s hearts to
pursue personal moral growth for the sake of building a moral society.
Taoism centered on “following” the original heart of nature, eliminating
unnecessary desires and lusts. The Legalist School attempted to “control”
the desires of people and channel them into serving political needs (Zhang,
1997). Mohism aimed at “arousing” the altruistic heart for the purpose of
facilitating community-based mutual benefit. These approaches to moral
education were derived from and thus congruent with the metaphysical
concepts about morality held in each school.
While holding different opinions and adopting diverse approaches to
moral education, the four major philosophical schools had one thing in
common: they all attempted to solve the serious social crises during a time
of widespread war and political turmoil, which endowed their philosophy
of moral education with strong political hues. Nonetheless, not all of them
were adopted by rulers. The universal love of Mohism, though leaving an
imprint on the Chinese people’s character, was not favored at all by rulers.
Legalism was chosen by the state of Qin, helping the dynasty to unite
China. After the quick collapse of the empire of Qin, however, the
government of the Han Dynasty initially adopted the ideology of inactiv-
ity of Taoism to allow the country to recover after the war, then switched
to Confucianism to build up a strong, stable, hierarchical empire. The
Confucian ideas and approaches of moral education, after various revisions
to cater to the needs of rulers, eventually prevailed and has been the state
orthodoxy ever since.
Notes
1. Religious Taoism is an indigenous Chinese religion that adopted the idea of
Tao from philosophical Taoism and believed that people could obtain eter-
nal life through acquiring Tao.
2. The concept of “Confucian in appearance and Legalist in essence” indicates
that Chinese politics was in reality a system of combining Confucian moral
teaching with the law enforcement and power tactics of Legalism, with the
latter overriding the former. This proposition, however, has not been recog-
nized in mainstream Chinese academia.
84 Z. YOU ET AL.
References
Chen, G., & Huang, Z. (1999). On the thought of moral education of Han Feizi.
Seeker, 1, 84–88.
Chuang Tzu. (2001). Chuang Tzu. In Q. Liu, & F. Cheng (ed. & trans.), Lao Tzu
and Chuang Tzu. Guangzhou: Guangzhou Publishing House.
Ge, J. (1999). Mohismand swordsman: Impacts of Mohism on the Chinese cul-
ture. Journal of Xingyan Normal College, 1, 21–24.
Guan, Z., & Li, S. (2009). Guan Tzu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Han, F. (1999). Han Feizi. Lanzhou: Gansu Nationality Publishing House.
Han, F., & Wang, X. (1986). Collective annotations of Han Feizi. Shanghai:
Shanghai Book Store.
Lao Tzu. (2001). The classic of Tao and Te. In Q. Liu, & F. Cheng (ed. & trans.),
Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. Guangzhou: Guangzhou Publishing House.
Lv, X. (1996). An inquiry on the moral education method of Taoism. Morality
and Civilization, 5, 29–30.
Mo, T. (2009). Translation of Mo Tzu. Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press.
Yang, Y. (2010). Explanation of the ruling thoughts of Chinese feudal society.
Social Sciences in Nanjing, 12, 100–107.
Ying, Y. (1964). Study of the social characteristics of Lu and Jin: Concurrently
discussing the historical contexts of the development of Confucianism and
Legalism. Historical Research, 1, 151–168.
Zhang, S. (1997). An investigation on the moral education thought of the legalist
school. Journal of Zhejiang Normal University, 5(2), 10–14.
PART II
The Era of Conflict, Adaptation, and

Integration
CHAPTER 5
Confucianism’s Ascent to State Orthodoxy:

in the Western Han Dynasty
The Qin Dynasty (221–207 BCE) was the first dynasty of imperial China;
it united the previously fragmented country into a highly centralized
empire by launching large-scale wars of unification. While building the
Great Wall to protect its north border, the ambitious empire also built an
invisible ideological wall to strengthen its control of society and culture. It
unified the Chinese characters, dismissing characters previously used in
other vassal states; it unified different sets of scales into a single set, which
further reinforced the unification of the country; and it endeavored to
unify thoughts through banning all the non-Legalist philosophies and dis-
missing different ideas, as shown in an incident called “the Burning of
Books and Burying of Confucians Alive”.
Starting from 213 BCE, Emperor Qin Shihuang adopted a proposal from
his chancellor Li Si to ban all books not approved by the government, espe-
cially history books and Confucian classics, in an attempt to unify people’s
thoughts. He ordered that people hand over all their books to the govern-
ment to be burned. The only books exempted from this decree was the his-
tory book of the Qin and books of medicine, divination, tree planting, and
agriculture. Anyone violating the decree would be killed along with all their
whole family. Moreover, to suppress heresy and different opinions, the
emperor also ordered the burying of 460 Confucians and necromancers alive.
The incident delivered a devastating blow to ancient Chinese culture
and thought. Many precious ancient books were lost due to the action and
different voices were silenced. Nonetheless, the Qin’s policy of thought

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_5
88 Z. YOU ET AL.
control was comprehensible in that the new empire needed to unify peo-
ple’s ideas to consolidate imperial power. Put differently, the imperative of
the grand unification of China was the inner motivation of the emperor in
putting an end to the era of academic disputes among the Hundred
Philosophical Schools. Hence, it was little wonder that a ruler in the Han
Dynasty did something similar, though much less violently, 80 years later.
Emperor Wu of Han accepted Dong Zhongshu’s proposition of “giving
Confucianism exclusive patronage while dismissing other schools”. But in
contrast to what had happened in the Qin Dynasty, Emperor Wu of Han
utilized Confucian moral cultivation rather than the Legalist policy of
imposing strict laws to rule the country.
The Political Background of the Philosophical

Renaissance
The Western Han Dynasty (202 BCE–8 CE) was established upon the
ruins of the Qin Dynasty, which motivated the new rulers to learn from
the Qin’s mistakes. The Qin empire relied solely on the ideology of
Legalism and lasted less than 15 years. The seemingly invincible empire
collapsed abruptly when angry insurgents could no longer bear the strict
laws and harsh corporal punishment and rebelled. After the overthrow of
Qin, a great insurgent leader called Liu Ban defeated other troops involved
in the rebellion and eventually established the new dynasty.
The rapid demise of the Qin empire provoked people to question the
legitimacy of using Legalism as the ruling ideology, and consequently the
rulers of Han resorted to other philosophical schools, such as Taoism or
Confucianism, to help govern the country. However, the transition from
the policy of the strict laws of the Legalist School to the policy of the
moral cultivation of Confucianism did not come into being at once. It
took the efforts of several generations of Confucians to convince the
emperors of the importance of rule by morality and the significance of
moral education.
It is interesting to note that Liu Ban, previously a peasant in the coun-
tryside and an insurgent troop leader, strongly worshiped force and
despised Confucianism. Liu once claimed that he ascended to the throne
by riding horse and fighting, not by reading Confucian classics. This asser-
tion, however, was rebutted by a Confucian named Lu Jia, who pointed
out that even if the emperor had founded the dynasty by riding a horse, he
CONFUCIANISM’S ASCENT TO STATE ORTHODOXY: THE PHILOSOPHY… 89
could no longer rule the country in the same way. Another incident also
informed Liu Ban about the compelling need for teaching rites in strength-
ening imperial power. When the new dynasty was first founded, there were
no proper ritual requirements for ministers and generals. At a royal ban-
quet, many drunken generals struggled for power, and some even hit the
palace pillars with their swords. Irritated by the scene, Liu Ban realized
that his rule was imperiled by the lack of the safeguard of proper rites and
regulations. Thus, he adopted the advice from a Confucian named Shu
Shuntong to establish a set of court rites to regulate the conduct of his
ministers.
Even though the rulers started to recognize the importance of rites in
stabilizing the country, the philosophy of Huang-Lao Taoism, instead of
Confucianism, was adopted as the guiding body of thought in the early
Western Han Dynasty. The school of Huang-Lao originated in the Jixia
Academy of the state of Qi during the Warring States Period. “Huang”
was a reference to Huang-di—the Yellow Emperor of early legend. “Lao”
was a short form of Lao Tzu, who was the founder of Taoism. The Huang-
Lao school mostly represented a Taoist tradition, but also incorporated
ideas from Legalism and the Military School. This philosophy prospered
during the reigns of Emperor Hui (210–188 BCE), Emperor Wen
(202–157 BCE), and Emperor Jing (188–141 BCE).
There were two reasons why the first few emperors of Han favored the
Huang-Lao Taoism ideology. First, the emperors had learned from the
previous lesson that the policies of strict laws and heavy taxation could
easily result in national uprisings and turmoil. Second, the economy in the
early stages of the Han Dynasty was very weak due to years of large-scale
wars, creating a need for social and economic rehabilitation. The new rul-
ers therefore adopted ideas from Huang-Lao Taoism to alleviate people’s
burden; they allowed them to pay low taxes and required them to provide
only light labor, which actually reflected Lao Tzu’s idea that a small gov-
ernment and inactivity served the country best.
Nonetheless, as economy in the Empire of Han gradually revived and
flourished in later decades, the emperors began to abandon the policy of
inactivity and turn to a more aggressive ideology—Confucianism. This
was because Confucianism’s advocacy of rule by morality and the notion
of promoting moral education better served the ambition of the emperors,
whose primary concern now had shifted from rehabilitation to centraliz-
ing imperial power and expanding the territory. When the great Emperor
Wu (156–87 BCE) took the throne, Confucianism, particularly its concept
90 Z. YOU ET AL.
of moral education, eventually rose to a superior position, marking the

beginning of a great renaissance for the philosophy. To articulate the pro-
cess, this chapter concentrates on the philosophy of moral education of
two important Confucians: Jia Yi and Dong Zhongshu. It depicts the two
scholars’ efforts to promote Confucianism, elaborates on their contribu-
tions to the ascending trajectory of moral cultivation, and discusses the
establishment of the nationwide moral education system in the Han
Dynasty.
Jia Yi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Jia Yi (200–168 BCE) was a renowned Confucian scholar and brilliant
writer who lived in the early Western Han Dynasty. When Jia was young,
he was widely hailed as a prodigy because he was proficient with the clas-
sics of A Hundred Philosophical Schools. In his early twenties, he was
recommended to the imperial court and was appointed as a “Boshi”, an
official position for learned scholars whose job it was to provide advice for
the monarch. Emperor Wen highly appreciated Jia Yi’s talents and fre-
quently sought political advice from him. But imperial favor gradually
faded due to the hostility and opposition from many powerful ministers
and generals with vested interests. Jia was soon demoted from the central
government and was appointed as the Grand Tutor of a vassal king, and
later the Grand Tutor of Prince Liang, Emperor Wen’s favorite son, who
unfortunately died in a horse-riding accident. Feeling guilty about the
mishap and disappointed with his own political career, Jia died at the
young age of 33.
Though ill-fated in his political career, Jia Yi left a legacy of political
ideas and made unique contributions to the development of Confucian
moral education. He is regarded as a critical link between the pre-Qin era
and the great renaissance of Confucianism in the reign of Emperor Wu of
Han: Jia had inherited and developed his philosophy from Confucius,
Mencius, and Hsun Tzu, and in turn influenced the philosophy of Dong
Zhongshu, who successfully launched the campaign of “granting
Confucianism exclusive patronage”. Through his disquisition on the mis-
takes of the Qin Dynasty, Jia proposed a political blueprint of using moral-
ity to rule the country, which helped end the reign of Huang-Lao Taoism
and build a strong central government by highlighting the role of moral
education. In so doing, his philosophy paved the way for Confucianism to
come to the fore again.
Cosmological Frameworks in Jia Yi’s Philosophy of Moral

Education
Like many other of his peers, Jia Yi was not a pure Confucian. It is true
that he had been educated as a Confucian, but his philosophy was not
limited to the orthodox Confucianism of the pre-Qin era. Like Hsun Tzu,
Jia Yi was a reformer. He had made some significant contributions to the
development of Confucian doctrine by absorbing and borrowing ideas
from the Legalist School, Taoism, and the School of Yin-Yang. For
instance, he adopted the key concept of Tao from Taoism, using it as the
cosmological concept in his philosophical system to make up for the lack
of a correlative concept in classical Confucianism. However, Tao in Jia’s
philosophy had a somewhat different meaning from that one it had in
Taoism. While Taoism regarded Tao as the ultimate truth of nature, Jia
tended to highlight the moral connotations of the concept (Su, 1991).
For Jia Yi, Tao was the ultimate source from which everything else in
the world originated. He asserted that Tao was the origin of De, or moral-
ity, which in turn served as the medium for all other things (Jia, 2000).
Yin-Yang, heaven-earth, people, and everything else were all the direct
products of morality. Hence, morality on the one hand represented the
substance of Tao, and on the other hand served as the basic characteristic
of all entities in the world. By connecting the transcendental concept of
Tao with morals and by relating morality to everything else in the world,
Jia endowed the Confucian concept of morality with a divine nature. Even
though it was slightly incongruous to mix the Tao of Taoism with the
morality of Confucianism, he successfully created a metaphysical frame-
work for Confucianism, which provided a divine rationale for his proposal
for rule by morality and the strategy of moral cultivation.
Nevertheless, Jia Yi was still a true Confucian in essence who valued the
function of moral education rather than the Taoist concept of “valuing
one’s own life”. In contrast to the rule by inactivity of Huang-Lao Taoism,
Jia Yi maintained a worldly stance of reassuring people through moral
cultivation, which indicated that his purpose of adopting the concept of
Tao was to consecrate morality and promote benevolence and rites, or, to
put it differently, to endow Tao with moral attributes. He claimed that
there were six virtues of morality, namely Tao, benevolence, righteous-
ness, loyalty, credibility, and prudence. With regard to human nature, Jia
Yi held an opinion similar to Confucius: there was not much difference of
human nature among people and that it was learning and practice that
92 Z. YOU ET AL.
made the difference. He categorized people’s nature into three levels,

namely high, medium, and low, ranging from good to evil; this was fur-
ther developed into the doctrine of “the three grades of human nature” in
Dong Zhongshu’s philosophical system.
Jia Yi proposed a cosmic framework coupled with the concept of Tao:
this integrated the heaven and humans to sanctify the concept of rule by
morality, advocating that the emperor conform to heaven’s will and pro-
mote morality. This concept could be traced back not only to Jizi’s con-
cept of heaven–human interaction, but also to Taoism’s idea of harmony
between man and nature; this required people to follow natural laws and
live harmoniously with heaven and earth. Heaven in Jia Yi’s philosophy,
nonetheless, was not a purely natural existence but a personalized deity
with a moral inclination congruent with Confucian ethical values. He sug-
gested that even if heaven was high above, it could hear clearly and see
everything happening on earth. Therefore, a ruler should be discreet in
solitude and watch his own behavior (Jia, 2000). By providing heaven
with a moral preference, Jia admonished emperors to follow heaven’s
mandate. This semi-theological theory was called the “integration of
heaven and humans” or the “interaction between heaven and man”; it was
actually Confucians’ attempt to sanctify moral principles and restrict impe-
rial power in the name of heaven. This theory was inherited by Dong
Zhongshu, who further enriched and developed Confucian cosmology.
Moral Education as a Method of Governance

By drawing lessons from the catastrophic results of rule by law in the Qin
Dynasty, Jia Yi suggested that Emperor Wen replace strict laws and harsh
corporal punishment with the moral cultivation of rites and righteousness
to strengthen the country. The two different policies, Jia argued, would
lead to different consequences. While the tyrants of Qin had their descen-
dants exterminated, the sage kings of ancient eras such as King Tang of the
Shang Dynasty and King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty established a stable
reign through promoting the moral development of the people (Jia,
2000), proving that moral governance was better than rule by strict laws.
Further, Jia Yi underscored the intrinsic tie between moral education
and good politics, claiming that “education was the foundation of good
politics, and Tao was the source of education” (Jia, 2000, p. 239). Good
politics in combination with moral education could produce hard-working
people, which helped make the country wealthy. Jia further suggested that
rulers’ moral self-cultivation was critical to the success of moral education;

they should act as exemplars if they wanted to promulgate the moral val-
ues of Confucianism to people. Thus, an emperor should consciously
examine his own behavior and correct his mistakes, promote the moral
education of rites and music, and influence moral customs in this way (Jia,
2000).
As for how moral education could work for political purposes, Jia indi-
cated that the proper values and attitudes cultivated by moral cultivation
would be transferred to politics. When Tao or proper moral behavior was
followed by a man in relation to his father, this virtue would be carried
over by him in his service to his emperor; when followed in relation to his
elder brother, it would be carried over in his service to his superiors; when
followed in relation to younger brothers, it would be carried over in his
treatment of his subordinates; and when followed in the family, it would
be carried over to his treatment of the public (Jia, 2000, p. 239). Moral
cultivation, therefore, could help establish an ideal world by building up
harmonious family and social relations, one in which everyone would
behave appropriately according to his family identity and social status,
thereby eliminating conflict and social vices.
As an admirer of Hsun Tzu, Jia Yi praised rites, claiming that they pro-
moted moral education and could be used to teach people proper con-
duct. Confucian rites, in his view, embodied the highest moral values and
ethical standards that could regulate people’s behavior and human rela-
tions. As ritual symbolizes hierarchical relationships, practicing rites helped
foster a benevolent sovereign and faithful ministers, kind fathers and filial
sons, caring elder brothers and respectful younger brothers, peaceful hus-
bands and gentle wives, which were essential to sustaining the social order
and improving political governance.
Jia Yi’s Methods of Moral Education

Like Confucius, Jia Yi highlighted the role of the social environment on
one’s moral development. He asked rhetorically why the Shang Dynasty
and the Zhou Dynasty had some sage kings, but the Qin Dynasty did not.
It was, he pointed out, the social environment that made the difference.
The second emperor of Qin, Huhai, was not evil in nature. It was
Machiavellianism and an extremely utilitarian education in the court of
Qin that had made him a brutal emperor (Jia, 2000). Huhai had received
an education in Legalism, which promoted power tactics and completely
94 Z. YOU ET AL.
denied the use of moral education. Everything was measured by gain and
efficacy with no consideration for the ethical consequences. Therefore, it
was easy to understand why Huhai had become such a heartless ruler,
directly contributing to the quick collapse of the Qin Empire. The conclu-
sion was that a benign environment and moral cultivation were crucial to
the fate of a country, and thus the emperor should purposefully create a
benevolent environment in the royal court to promote the moral develop-
ment of his children.
Self-reflection was another important approach that Jia Yi suggested
emperors and princes use to cultivate their own morality. Simply put, an
emperor should not blame other people if he had experienced frustration;
instead, he should reflect on his own behavior and correct this where it
was at fault. Jia proposed three kinds of moral criteria for rulers to reflect
upon. The first was to respect Tao or the rule by the right path; the second
was to value the moral principles of benevolence and righteousness; the
third was to be credible. A ruler should reflect frequently on whether his
behaviors accorded with these moral demands or not. He should be pre-
ventive and constantly check daily issues so as to detect hidden troubles at
the outset.
Among the three virtues, Jia placed particular emphasis on valuing
benevolence and treasuring righteousness. He referred to benevolence as
being kind to others and suggested emperor be generous and “thick” in
relation to his people—thick stuff such as walls lasted much longer than
thin wares such as silk fabric, dinnerware, and drinking utensils (Jia, 2000).
Using the metaphor of the “thick wall”, Jia contended that a ruler should
be kind and sympathetic to his people if he wanted his reign to last for a
long time. Meanwhile, he should lead by example with righteousness so
that everybody in the country would act and interact with each other in
accordance with their specific social position and status. For instance, an
emperor should treat his ministers with proper rites, while the latter should
show their loyalty to their ruler.
Credibility was another essential moral element that an emperor should
develop so as to inspire his people. Being credible meant that a ruler
should live up to his pledges and never cheat his subjects so that he would
earn the trust and support of his people. If an emperor could not fulfill his
commitment, his people would lose faith in him. This point was well
exhibited by a story. The ancient sage King Wen of Zhou once promised
to a skeleton in his dream that he would bury it with the rites of a king.
When he woke up, he found the skeleton and decided to keep his promise.
When a minister suggested to King Wen it was enough to bury this skel-
eton of a nobody with the rituals proper to a minister, King Wen insisted
on fulfilling his promise. In so doing, King Wen had gained the trust of his
people as they saw that the king had kept his word even to a skeleton (Jia,
2000). By telling the story, Jia tried to convince Emperor Wen of the
importance of being credible as a leader.
Last but not least, learning Confucian classics helped people develop
morally. Jia Yi declared that just like the six directions in the natural world,
there were six behaviors that followed the guidance of Tao: benevolence,
righteousness, rites, wisdom, faithfulness, and music. The six behaviors
were important in that they were the external indicators of endowed
human nature. Although innate in nature, these six virtues were not a
given. They needed to be nurtured and reinforced through learning: one
must study the Six Confucian Classics to learn the six behaviors, with each
behavior corresponding to one of the classics. Jia was the first Confucian
who linked Confucian classics with human nature and proper moral behav-
ior, enriching traditional Confucian moral education in this way.
Jia Yi’s Perspectives on Moral Education for Princes

It is worth mentioning that Jia Yi as the Grand Tutor proposed a system-
atic path for the moral education of princes. He suggested that the begin-
ning of life was critical for a child’s moral growth. Hence the royal family
should be discreet in selecting the empress or the princess. An ideal
empress should grow up in a family valuing and practicing virtues such as
benevolence, righteousness, and filial piety, arguing that mothers with
good family influences were more likely to be women of virtue and would
in turn provide children with good maternal moral education from the
womb. For instance, the mother of King Chen of Zhou was a good exam-
ple of an ideal royal mother. This lady “was cautious at her own behaviors
when she was pregnant: she stood without limping, sat up straight, smiled
instead of laughing, and angered without scolding” (Jia, 2000, p. 391).
Jia pointed out that such fetal moral education had exerted a positive
impact on the characters of the fetus.
Shortly after the baby was born, the emperor should select virtuous
ministers as the baby’s Grand Tutors. When King Chen was born, his
father, King Wu, chose three dukes as his tutors, with Duke Shao in charge
of health, the Duke of Zhou in charge of moral teaching, and Duke Tai in
charge of teaching other lessons. As these three dukes were all paragons of
96 Z. YOU ET AL.
virtue, their moral talks, rites, instructions, and behaviors would help
mold the baby’s personality and influence his character development. In
other words, when a baby grew up in a social environment that accorded
with moral principles, he would very likely grow up to be a sage-ruler.
Consistent with his ideas about human nature, Jia Yi laid considerable
emphasis on the significance of learning in shaping a child’s moral charac-
ter. For him, learning was the key to deciding the good or evil inclination
of a person, and childhood was the pivotal stage in forming such moral
tendencies. As the fate of the country was contingent on the moral char-
acter of the first prince (due to the primogeniture system of inheritance),
it was extremely important to teach him Confucian moral values. This
moral education, Jia added, should be conducted as early as possible
before the child’s mind was polluted by bad external influences (Jia, 2000).
Jia Yi’s ideas that emperors and princes should become moral leaders is
congruent with the Duke of Zhou’s idea of matching heaven with moral-
ity because the monarch’ virtues were crucial to stabilizing the country. As
mentioned earlier, ancient China was made up of various families and
clans, and the monarch was in essence the patriarch of the most powerful
family; he needed to defend the legitimacy of his rule with benevolence
and credibility to other families. Hence, while leaders with morality could
be accepted by all, simply relying on laws or regulations to rule could infu-
riate people and lead to disastrous consequences. This is why emperors
were expected to develop virtues, teach morality to their subordinates, and
act moral leaders so as to coordinate interests among people, reflecting the
demands of the culture of family and state.
Conclusion
Jia Yi was one of the key Confucians who facilitated the shift of state ideol-
ogy from Huang-Lao Taoism to Confucianism in the Western Han
Dynasty. His concept of rule by morality and his philosophy of moral
education helped the regime meet the challenges of his time. After decades
of inactivity and small government, the Western Han Empire gradually
recovered and became wealthier. Meanwhile, the vassal states of Han had
also grown strong, posing a direct threat to the central government. Jia
Yi’s philosophy provided the solution that Huang-Lao Taoism could not:
a more aggressive form of Confucianism allowed the government to play
an active role in ruling the country, meeting the challenges of a much
more complex and wealthier society. For instance, Jia’s ideology of rule by
morality through publicizing filial piety and loyalty justified the grand uni-
fication and reinforced social order, helping to curb the ambitions of vassal
kings.
In reality, Jia Yi’s philosophy did help to weaken the dominance of
Huang-Lao Taoism and significantly enhance the influence of Confucianism
in the royal court of Han. By his efforts, Confucian moral cultivation
through rites and music received more and more support in the political
arena, paving the way for Dong Zhongshu’s campaign. In this sense, Ji Yi
was remembered not just as a prodigy who died at young age, but also for
his insightful ideas and unique contributions to the renaissance of
Confucianism in the Han Dynasty.
Dong Zhongshu’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Dong Zhongshu (c. 179–104 BCE), also known as Tung Chung-shu, is
regarded as the crucial figure who helped promote Confucianism to the
status of official orthodoxy of the Chinese imperial state. Before Dong
Zhongshu, Confucianism was merely one of several philosophical schools
and did not receive special political favor. It was through Dong’s efforts
that Confucianism was fully accepted and promoted as the state ideology
by the Han government. Dong’s philosophical contribution was that he
had absorbed ideas and concepts from Taoism, Yin-Yang cosmology, and
Legalism (Ge, 2001), and with these he built a complete cosmological
framework for Confucianism to cater to the needs of rulers. In this way,
Confucianism was revived and further canonized as the orthodox philoso-
phy in China and many parts of Eastern Asia, starting a political tradition
of rule by morality that lasted for approximately two millennia. During
this process, the ideology of moral education and the practice of this
became the central mission of government even more important than law
enforcement.
Initially, Dong Zhongshu was a “Boshi” in charge of teaching Confucian
classics during the reign of Emperor Jing of Han. When Emperor Wu, son
of Emperor Jing, came to the throne, he asked that every region recom-
mend talented and virtuous scholars to him. Dong was invited to have
policy conversations with the emperor three times; at these, Dong put
forward the famous “three policies of heaven and man”. During the first
and second question-and-answer sessions, Dong expounded his basic
principles and tactics for ruling the country. The third conversation was
about Dong’s concept of interaction between heaven and man; during
98 Z. YOU ET AL.
this, Dong not only explicated the relationships between heaven and
imperial power, but also put forward his famous proposal that government
should canonize Confucianism as the sole state ideology while dismissing
other philosophical schools. He proposed blocking any philosophical
schools that did not follow Confucian doctrines, which Dong argued was
essential to unify thought and concentrate power. Emperor Wu accepted
Dong’s proposal and made Confucianism the state orthodoxy.
After that, Dong Zhongshu was appointed the chancellor of the vassal
state of Jiangdu by Emperor Wu, and then the chancellor for the vassal
state of Jiaoxi. When the king of Jiangdu asked Dong to help him seek
hegemony, just as the wise prime minister Guan Zhong helped the Duke
Huang of Qi become one of the “Five Hegemonies” in the Spring and
Autumn period, Dong admonished the king that a real ruler of benevo-
lence used moral education to positively influence his people, not to seek
power. The Five Hegemonies were not people of virtue inasmuch as they
valued political trickeries over benevolence, and therefore Confucius and
his disciples did not eulogize the Five Hegemonies. Dong retired after
having served as the chancellor of Jiaoxi for four years, and then focused
on academic writing and teaching.
Cosmology in Dong Zhongshu’s Philosophy of Moral Education

One of Dong Zhongshu’s most important philosophical contributions was
laying out a complete cosmological framework for Confucianism. It is well
known that early Confucians did not pay much attention to the idea of gods
or heaven, let alone cosmology. Confucius, for example, did not discuss
supernatural beings. His philosophy centered on cultivating the moral
behavior of people rather than worshiping gods. Hsun Tzu even treated
heaven solely as non-supernatural, highlighting the human ability to con-
trol it. The absence of a role for heaven in the early Confucian philosophical
system had a double consequence. While contributing to a Confucian tradi-
tion that emphasized ethics and moral cultivation to maintain the social
order, it made the philosophy conceptually incomplete and less attractive to
rulers. Thus, the isolation between heaven and man had become an obsta-
cle for Confucianism if it was to become an official ideology.
The reign of Han in its heyday, nonetheless, demanded that
Confucianism be put on the pedestal. Emperor Wu succeeded to the
throne during a time of great prosperity. After decades of rehabilitation,
the economy and military power of the Han Empire had finally reached its
peak. Accordingly, the previous policy of inactivity grounded in Huang-

Lao Taoism no longer met the ambitions of Emperor Wu, who deter-
mined to replace it with more aggressive policies. There were two direct
reasons for such a change. First, Emperor Wu was eager to concentrate
power to defeat the external threat to the Han Empire, namely the
nomadic tribe of Huns. Second, the emperor hoped to suppress the rap-
idly increasing power of big landlords and vassal kings inside the empire,
who posed a significant threat to the central government. Under such
circumstances, an ideology that highlighted social hierarchy and the moral
cultivation of this worked better than an ideology of passive government.
Nonetheless, Dong Zhongshu needed first to theologize Confucianism
to meet the ambitions of Emperor Wu. Early Confucianism, lacking a role
for divine revelation, was insufficient to serve the purpose of strengthen-
ing imperial power. This is why Dong proposed the theory of interaction
between heaven and man. Through integrating heaven’s will with moral
governance, he successfully theologized Confucianism, providing the phi-
losophy with strong religious hues and transcendental implications. Moral
education too was consecrated during the process: it was no longer just a
practice to promulgate and cultivate Confucian moral values but had
become a holy institution consistent with the mandate of heaven (which
could decide the fate of a dynasty). Hence, it is essential to discuss Dong’s
cosmology before we can fully understand his philosophy of moral
education.
Heaven or Tian was the core concept in Dong’s cosmology. Following
Jia Yi, Dong Zhongshu borrowed the concept of Tao from Taoism and
integrated it with the concept of heaven as Tian Tao, or Heaven’s Way. He
asserted that the grandness of Tao originated from heaven. Therefore, as
was believed of the Tao of Taoism, heaven was regarded as the source of
everything in the world such. Moreover, heaven, earth, and man played
complementary roles in the functions of the universe. On the one hand,
man was a copy of heaven. Not only did human minds reflect the spirit of
heaven, human bodies were also derived from or modeled on heaven; this
was called Isomorphic Correlation between Heaven and Humans. This
concept denoted that just as heaven had Yin and Yang attributes, man’s
nature could be categorized into greed and benevolence as well (Dong,
2014).
Further, the conciliation between heaven and earth also relied on the
efforts of men, particularly the work of rulers. Following Jia Yi, Dong held
that heaven was a personalized god that had moral dispositions. Thus,
100 Z. YOU ET AL.
there were strong interactions between heaven and humanity as heaven

would actively interfere with worldly affairs and redress human evil. The
emperor, as the son of heaven, should represent heaven to rule the coun-
try with morality and be responsible for promoting the moral develop-
ment of his people; heaven would monitor the reign of the emperor and
give celestial signs accordingly. If the emperor ruled the country with vir-
tue, heaven would grant earth auspicious signs such as timely rain and
good weather. If the emperor failed to do rule well, heaven would punish
earth with anomalies such as drought, plagues, fires, earthquakes, and
floods to warn the ruler. This divination ideology can be traced back to
Jizi’s theory of omens.
By construing these cosmological concepts, Dong encouraged
Emperor Wu to adopt the Confucian value system and rule the country
by morality. In exchange, the conceptual framework would endow the
emperor’s reign with the mandate of heaven, which allowed the ruler to
concentrate power as Dong’s theory had successfully mystified imperial
power. Nevertheless, Dong also wished to limit imperial power by pro-
posing the idea of celestial signs that could decide the legitimacy of the
reign (Wang, 1990): if heaven was unsatisfied with the ruler’s morality,
there would be portents such as natural catastrophes on earth to warn
him, and in this case, the emperor should confess and redress his wrong
doings, or his throne would be at risk of being overthrown, just as had
happened to the Qin Dynasty.
Aside from his idea of heaven–human interaction, Dong incorporated
Yin-Yang metaphysics and the concept of the five elements into his philo-
sophical system. The idea of Yin-Yang was borrowed from another philo-
sophical school, the Yin-Yang School, which defined Yang and Yin as the
two fundamental attributes of the universe. While Yang represented the
positive category, such as light, mountain, and male, Yin referred to the
negative category, such as darkness, water, and female. Yin-Yang theory
was utilized by Dong to distinguish the superior from the inferior in the
social hierarchy. In his view, heaven was Yang while earth was Yin, the sov-
ereign was Yang while ministers were Yin, father was Yang while son was
Yin, and husband was Yang while wife was Yin. This led to the moral doc-
trine of the “Three Cardinal Guides”: each of the three inferiors should
respect and obey the orders of the three respective superiors (Dong, 2014).
The idea of the five elements was borrowed from Jizi’s philosophy. It
contended that the universe was made up of five elements—wood, fire,
earth, metal, and water—with each element breeding or restraining the
others. The original concept of five elements was a primitive dialectic used
by the ancient Chinese to understand the world. Dong Zhongshu, none-
theless, endowed the five elements or forces with moral attributes. He

noted that wood referred to benevolence, fire referred to rites, earth
embodied loyalty, metal denoted righteousness, water denoted wisdom;
these in turn constituted what Dong called the “Five Virtues”. The con-
cept of five elements was important to Dong’s doctrine of correspondence
between heaven and man inasmuch as it was used to expound the specific
functions and the procedure of the interactions. He argued that the five
elements should be kept in harmony so as to maintain the peace of the
world. If the five elements lost their orders, ill omens would occur (Dong,
2014). Thus, it was the duty of an emperor to reconcile the five elements
or the complex social relations through leading by morality and educating
his people.
Foundation of Dong’s Philosophy: Three Grades of Human Nature

The creed of three-grade human nature is a key to deciphering Dong’s
philosophy of moral education. In his view, human nature could be cate-
gorized into three grades, namely the nature of the sages, the nature of the
common people, and the nature of the inferior persons; this was devel-
oped from Jia Yi’s theory of human nature. The sages, Dong claimed,
were inherently good. They were born to follow moral principles and were
good at moral reasoning, which was not acquired through learning.
However, such an ideal human nature was very rare. Only sages such as
the Duke of Zhou and Confucius had possessed such a sacred nature. The
inferior person’s nature, on the contrary, was born with a tendency toward
evil. By instinct, they sought personal gain without considering moral
principles, which usually brought disasters on themselves and their fami-
lies. It was an abased and animal-like nature that could not only be deterred
and contained by law. As the above two natures were beyond education,
Dong’s philosophy of moral education concentrated on discussing the
common people’s nature and education.
Dong Zhongshu held a unique idea about ordinary people’s nature.
Before him, there were chiefly three kinds of opinions on human nature,
represented by Mencius’ belief in a good human nature, Hsun Tzu’s belief
in an evil nature, and Gaozi’s belief in a blank-slate nature. Dong, in con-
trast, asserted that ordinary people’s nature had both tendencies toward
being good and toward being evil as they had the seeds of both benevo-
lence and greed (Dong, 2014). He further noted that human nature com-
prised a dimension of “nature” that was the primitive and unadorned, and
102 Z. YOU ET AL.
a dimension of “emotion” that was full of greed and lust. While the
dimension of “nature” could produce a good moral character, the dimen-
sion of “emotion” could yield a wicked mentality. Nonetheless, whether a
person would become good or evil was not pre-determined. He or she just
had the potential to be either. The key, therefore, lay in moral education.
Educators should cultivate the good character in the educatee’s “nature”
and at the same time eradicate or curb his “emotion” or evil desires with
moral cultivation. Thus, the special significance of Dong Zhongshu’s the-
ory of human nature was that it highlighted the role of moral education in
developing people’s characters.
The Relationships Between Moral Cultivation and Politics

Moral education was crucial to Dong Zhongshu’s political proposition as
it served to realize the Confucian ideal of rule by morality and meet
Emperor Wu’s political need for grand unification. Hence it is necessary to
analyze Dong’s discussion of the policy of relying on moral cultivation
before resorting to law enforcement, the political proposal of unifying
philosophical thought, and the top-down mode of Confucian moral edu-
cation so as to better understand his philosophy and its influence.
By drawing lessons from the collapse of the Qin Dynasty, Dong sug-
gested that emperors adopt Confucianism to rule the country because rule
by morality helped to ease the tension between the ruling class and the
ruled class; in this way, the behavior of both classes would be guided and
restrained by Confucian moral values. He further pointed out that the suc-
cess of moral governance was essentially contingent on establishing a sys-
tem of moral education, that is, government should use moral principles
such as benevolence, righteousness, rites, and loyalty to educate people,
and thereby build an ideological mechanism, paired with legal deterrence,
to prevent rebellion and usurpation.
But unlike the Legalist School, which solely relied on legal deterrence
or moral indoctrination to control people’s behaviors, Dong’s moral edu-
cation centered on people’s self-awareness—active moral self-cultivation
and self-control—which helped build a peaceful world in which all people
would not do or speak anything discordant with rites (Dong, 2014). Law
enforcement, for Dong, was only secondary to moral cultivation, serving
as a firewall to daunt those who could not be educated. This idea helped
develop a Chinese tradition of using morality and rites as the main under-
pinnings of political rule, and of using law enforcement as a supplement.
While moral education took center stage in political life, laws served a
subsidiary role and that its enforcement had to be congruent with the
spirit of Confucian doctrines.
Next, Confucian moral education and grand unification reinforced
each other. The so-called grand unification was in reality a political unifica-
tion based on the unification of thought, which in turn was both the pre-
requisite and product of moral education. While the central government
guaranteed the lofty status of Confucianism and used its administrative
power to spread Confucian moral values, moral cultivation also helped
enhance imperial authority. As the thoughts of other philosophical schools
were dismissed, those “heresies” would no longer mislead the people and
create instability for the state; when Confucian teachings of filial piety and
loyalty became the sole moral standards, people could understand what
behaviors were correct and consciously follow them, which in turn helped
the regime strengthen its power.
The political support for institutionalizing and promoting Confucian
teachings helped shape one of the basic features of Confucian moral edu-
cation: it functioned in a top-down manner, highlighting the role of rulers
in promoting moral education. Emperors, Dong believed, should person-
ally advocate and teach moral values to their people. The gesture was
mutually beneficial. While Emperor Wu strengthened his power by acting
as a moral leader, Confucian moral education also ascended to a sacred
status nationally. This practice officially established the unique culture of
integrating politics and moral education that Confucian scholars had
preached for centuries.
However, Dong Zhongshu’s efforts at integrating politics with
Confucian moral education did not proceed smoothly. In order to limit
imperial power, Dong developed a concept of heaven’s portents: heaven
would warn the emperor if the latter abused his power. In 135 BCE, when
two imperial palaces caught fire one after the other, Dong believed it was
a good opportunity to propagate this theory. He wrote a report to
Emperor Wu implying that the recent policies of the emperor had irritated
heaven and suggesting he kill his corrupt ministers. Unfortunately, this
infuriated the emperor. Dong was thrown into prison and nearly executed.
As a result, Dong dared no longer mention his theory of portents. The
political support of the emperor was not unconditional. To Emperor Wu,
Dong’s philosophy could be utilized to consolidate imperial power, but
should never be used to restrict it.
104 Z. YOU ET AL.
Content and Teaching Materials of Moral Education

For Dong, people had to learn moral principles to truly understand them
and behave accordingly, and for this purpose, he proposed using moral
creeds such as the “Three Cardinal Guides” and the “Five Constant
Virtues” to educate the people (Dong, 2014). The Three Cardinal Guides
stated that it was the duty of inferiors to obey their superiors; for example,
ministers should follow the orders of the sovereign, a son should follow
the orders of his father, and a wife should follow the orders of her hus-
band. This concept was borrowed from Han Feizi of the Legalist School,
who declared that good governance was contingent on whether minister,
son, or wife could faithfully serve sovereign, father, or husband respec-
tively (Han, 1999), which, Dong held, embodied the spirit of rites.
Dong Zhongshu insisted that the Three Cardinal Guides were sacred
and immutable because they reflected heaven’s mandate and the laws of
nature. He asserted that these moral laws about inferiors following superi-
ors, grounded in his framework of Yin-Yang, “should never alter just as
heaven never changed” (Ban, 1975, p. 2519). However, the three rela-
tionships were not just one directional. Though it was the duty of subor-
dinates to respect their superiors, the latter should also set a good example
for the former. Hence, the essence of the Three Cardinal Guides was to
ask people to abide by their societal ranks and maintain harmonious rela-
tionships with each other according to the preordained social hierarchy
and distinctions. The responsibility was on both sides: everyone, including
superiors, should learn how to perform properly.
Dong Zhongshu’s concept of the “Five Constant Virtues” was a syn-
thesis of the core ideas of previous Confucians. Among his Confucian
precursors, Confucius focused on benevolence, Hsun Tzu placed the
emphasis on rites, and Mencius held the hearts of benevolence, righteous-
ness, rites, and wisdom as the beginnings of the four Confucian virtues.
Dong added credibility (fidelity) to benevolence, righteousness, rites, and
wisdom, and coined the concept of the Five Constant Virtues. These vir-
tues were used to teach people how to manage human relations
appropriately; they were critical to realizing the Confucian ideal of imple-
menting the “Kingly Way” or rule by the virtues.
Benevolence meant loving people. It reflected a characteristic of
heaven—nurturing all living things on earth. To be benevolent, a ruler
should be generous and kind to his people, and the ruled class should
respect and love the monarch and their superiors (Tang, 1995).
Righteousness indicated appropriateness, namely behaving properly

according to one’s specific social rank or position. Rites were all about
human relations. They were an integration of moral content and moral
behavior to differentiate social ranks and relations. For instance, it was
against rites for a minister to arrogate the power or privilege of the sover-
eign. Wisdom referred to the ability to distinguish right from wrong in
human conduct and social relations. It also referred to one’s ability to
think something through thoroughly before acting. Credibility connoted
honesty, genuineness, and faithfulness to friends and superiors. Dong val-
ued fidelity over deception in any situation, holding that a superior man
should not deceive simply in order to win (Dong, 2014).
With the doctrines of the Three Cardinal Guides and the Five Constant
Virtues, Dong Zhongshu developed a complete system of ethical knowl-
edge for moral education. This served one of the central missions of
Confucianism: “Mingjiao”. Mingjiao previously originated from
Confucius’ idea that establishing and observing social identity was the
priority of conducting politics. Here, ming, or “name”, referred to one’s
social identity and status, and jiao meant education. Together, this term
denoted using the ethical codes to educate people so as to reinforce the
hierarchical social and political system. Dong’s contribution was that his
ethical codes of the Three Guides and the Five Virtues had become the
primary content to teach people about Mingjiao, thereby helping unify
the ideas and ideologies of people across all social spectrums.
Like other Confucians, Dong advocated valuing righteousness and dis-
regarding personal gain. As to the conflict between the two, he proposed
a famous thesis of standing for justice and clarifying Tao. Specifically, he
suggested that people “root for justice without seeking personal gain, and
clarifying the Great Way or Tao without claiming the credits” (Ban, 1975,
p. 2524). Like Mencius, Dong held the totally unselfish standpoint of put-
ting righteousness ahead of personal gain. He completely negated the idea
that one could benefit while simultaneously contributing to justice.
Instead, seeking profits and upholding justice conflicted with each other
by nature, with the result that the former would inevitably compromise
the latter. Hence a true superior man should help others or contribute to
the public without considering his own gain or loss. This attitude had
greatly influenced the thinking of Confucians in the Song Dynasty and the
Ming Dynasty, who further developed it into a code of conduct for
scholars.
106 Z. YOU ET AL.
Establishing schools for moral education was an important piece of

Dong’s policy package to Emperor Wu. He suggested the emperor should
found an imperial academy called “Taixue” to study and teach Confucian
doctrine and should order each county to establish local schools to do
likewise. The imperial academy recruited learned scholars as Boshis, who
used the Five Confucian Classics to teach students. Dong maintained that
the academy could be utilized as the origin of moral cultivation—as a
research agency providing workshops to teachers to disseminate Confucian
moral values to all people. He also recommended Emperor Wu establish a
system of selecting erudite Confucians for official appointments, which he
claimed was vital to encourage the rapid spread of Confucianism nation-
wide. Emperor Wu accepted all the advice and issued the decrees accord-
ingly. These policies, in reality, contributed to the flourishing of
Confucianism across the whole country. With these measures, particularly
the integration of Confucian moral education and the selection of officials,
the orthodox status of the philosophy was established. This started a tradi-
tion of nationwide moral education lasting for two thousand years.
Dong Zhongshu’s Approaches to Moral Education

Dong Zhongshu had high hopes that Emperor Wu would lead the cam-
paign of moral education. In order to achieve rule by morality, he sug-
gested the emperor promote moral education in two ways. First, the
emperor should lead by example. Dong noted that the previous sage kings
ruled the country by exhibiting virtues such as filial piety, rites, and benev-
olence. Even though such kings did not resort to harsh corporal punish-
ment, people obeyed the moral principles and laws because of the good
example set. Thus, setting a good example was the primary approach for
rulers to endorse the “correct” moral values for their people. Second, the
emperor should act as a leader in moral education. Dong argued that
people needed educating to become good due to the complexity of human
nature. Thus, rulers should enact policies and laws to encourage moral
behavior nationwide with commensurate rewards and punishments, and
promulgate good moral values through government notices and
announcements.
As for Confucians’ moral self-cultivation, Dong called for people to use
self-discipline and self-reflection to facilitate their own moral develop-
ment. He pointed out that virtues were formed from everyday practices,
and therefore one should actively self-examine one’s own trivial daily acts
from the very beginning. While neglecting one’s self-examination could

easily result in the formation of bad habits, taking preventive measures and
monitoring one’s own behavior helped foster good moral habits. One
principle in conducting this moral self-cultivation was that people should
use benevolence to reassure others and use righteousness to self-discipline
(Dong, 2014). Benevolence signified being generous to other people and
righteousness required continuous and stringent self-examination of one’s
own behaviors. In so doing, people would develop the ethical demeanor
of being strict with oneself and tolerant with others, which was necessary
not only for personal moral growth, but also to the formation of symbiotic
and harmonious social relationships.
Clarifying Tao and valuing lofty aspirations was another important
approach in Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy. First, searching for and eluci-
dating the meaning of Tao was the ultimate goal of moral cultivation for
Confucians (Dong, 2014). To Dong, Tao or the Great Way lay in his
theory of the Three Cardinal Guides and the Five Constant Virtues, thus
clarifying Tao was to study, understand, and observe these Confucian
moral codes. Moreover, clarifying Tao was a strenuous journey that
required scholars to value lofty aspirations and set life goals congruent
with these moral tenets. The efforts made toward clarifying Tao and valu-
ing aspirations reinforced each other. While the need for clarifying Tao
required people embrace noble ideals, valuing aspirations motivated peo-
ple to persistently practice the moral values in life, which in turn bolstered
the mission of clarifying Tao. Through integrating truth-learning and
aspiration-seeking, this approach became the mainstream practice for
scholars’ moral development in subsequent generations, exerting tremen-
dous influence on the belief system and the way of life of the Chinese
people.
Conclusion
Dong Zhongshu’s contribution to facilitating Confucian moral education
cannot be overstated. By enlisting imperial support, Dong had t ransformed
Confucianism into a state ideology, laying the institutional basis for the
Confucian orthodoxy almost singlehandedly. It was from him that
Confucianism became the only mainstream philosophy in China and its
moral cultivation became a widespread practice. By doing so, Dong lent
support to the marriage between politics and moral education. His phi-
losophy of moral education further contributed to the grand unification of
108 Z. YOU ET AL.
ancient China through unifying thought and establishing a nationwide

moral education system, which became an integral part of the political
structure. These efforts exerted such a huge impact on Chinese culture
that the Three Cardinal Guides and the Five Constant Virtues became the
core moral values shared by the royal family and ordinary people.
However, Dong’s philosophy of moral education was not without criti-
cism, particularly from the contemporary time. Although his proposal for
a grand unification of philosophy did help build a centralized social struc-
ture and national mindset grounded in moral education, at the same time
it destroyed the previously rich and diverse cultural heritage that Chinese
people had enjoyed for centuries. As other philosophical schools were dis-
mantled, most of them gradually lost their political voice and their cultural
influence abated. Thus, this unification considerably restricted the devel-
opment of Chinese philosophy and narrowed people’s vision. Nonetheless,
philosophical schools such as Taoism found a way, as shown by people’s
escape from the strict, sometimes harsh moral demands of Confucianism
for spiritual refuge and artistic enjoyment.
Judging from today’s standards, the moral education paradigm of
Dong Zhongshu might have posed many problems to the development of
ancient China. Dong’s moral education propositions were designed to
maintain the rigid social hierarchy and reinforce autocratic monarchy.
Hence, an individual’s ideas and needs were inclined to be suppressed or
ignored. In such a culture, one usually had to sacrifice their own needs or
desires for the sake of conforming to collective requirements and gaining
a societal recognition. Another problem lay in its moral education
approach. The sanctification and canonization of Confucian moral values
inevitably led to a top-down approach, in which educators were regarded
as the absolute authority and students as the receivers of the truth.
Consequently, different ideas were often discouraged, independent think-
ing was discouraged, and heresies were inhibited. This kind of moral edu-
cation might help stabilize the society needed in an agricultural economy,
but was not conducive to breeding a commercial or industrial society.
References
Ban, G. (1975). Book of Han. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Dong, Z. (2014). The luxuriant dew of the Spring and Autumn annals. Beijing:
Zhonghua Book Company.
Ge, Z. (2001). The history of Chinese thought (2nd version). Shanghai: Fudan
University Press.
Jia, Y. (2000). Jia Yi’s new book. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Su, Z. (1991). The thoughts of rites and music for moral cultivation of Lu Jia and
Jia Yi. Social Science Study, 5, 88–92.
Tang, Q. (1995). An initial investigation on the thoughts of moral education of
Dong Zhongshu. Journal of College of Xichang, 1, 79–83.
Wang, D. (1990). Commentary on Dong Zhongshu’s ideas of moral cultivation.
Journal of Zhengzhou University (Philosophy and Social Science Version), 2,
102–107.
CHAPTER 6
Farewell to Migrating Geese: The Philosophy

of Moral Education in a Time of Rebellion
With strong political support from the emperors in the Western Han
Dynasty, Confucian doctrine had been elevated to the pedestal of the state
philosophy, bolstered by a corresponding education system and the
method of selecting officials. Following that, Confucianism was canonized
and dominated the fields from political ideology to daily moral education
in China. However, it exerted negative influences, too. The creeds of
Three Guides and Five Virtues and the teaching of these, for instance, had
grown into a juggernaut of conservative force such that it controlled peo-
ple’s minds and suppressed different ideas and new thought. Dissatisfied
with this ideological tyranny, many scholars turned to the naturalistic ideas
and inactivity of Taoism for spiritual refuge.
This philosophical dissatisfaction and rebellion was first represented by
a scholar named Wang Chong in the Eastern Han Dynasty, who proposed
an atheistic philosophy reflecting a spirit of naturalism. In the ensuing
Wei-Jin Dynasties, the Learning of “Xuan” (metaphysics) or “Neo-
Taoism” emerged and prospered, integrating and refreshing Confucian
doctrine with the framework and concepts of Taoism, challenging the
teaching of rites and introducing novel insights into the philosophy of
“Bidding farewell with eyes to the migrating wild geese” is a famous line
excerpted from Ji Kang’s lyric poetry; it reflects his desire to transcend Confucian
doctrine and pursue spiritual freedom through natural beauty.

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_6
112 Z. YOU ET AL.
moral education. For this reason, this book discusses these dynasties as a
time of rebellion when free spiritual fantasy and unconventional demeanor
by scholars flourished.
Wang Chong’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Wang Chong (27–c. 100 CE) was a prominent Chinese pragmatist
philosopher living in the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220 CE) who was
remembered for his atheistic discourse and materialistic explanation of the
universe. Living in poverty, he was said to frequently stand by booksellers’
stalls and read their wares when he was studying at the imperial academy
in the then capital city of Luoyang. Blessed with a photographic memory,
he became well-versed with all kinds of Chinese classics. After that, Wang
Chong was appointed as a local official and eventually a district secretary,
a post that he soon lost due to his rejection of authority. He retired in his
sixties and returned to his hometown to teach and write.
Wang Chong’s Philosophical Cosmology

Deeply influenced by the philosophy of Hsun Tzu and Taoism, Wang
Chong depicted nature as a material entity and characterized the laws of
heaven as inactivity, a philosophy that he advocated applying in the social
domain as well. He firmly denied that heaven had any directive moral
implications for human society. The formation and changes of the universe
were a consequence of its natural unfolding, for which he proposed the
concept of qi, ethereal substance or life force, as the foundations of all
material. This qi provided everything in the world with its unique charac-
teristics. It was the interaction of qi in heaven and earth that created all
things in the world. All events, causation, and even human personalities
could be traced back to qi and its movements, with different types of qi
being accountable for the creation of different events or characters.
It is important to note that though heaven contained qi, it acted unin-
tentionally. Heaven itself was a part of nature and humans were also a prod-
uct of nature, and there was no intrinsic tie between these two with respect
to social politics and moral preferences. Thus, people could not influence
heaven with ethical or unethical behavior, and heaven too could not deliver
rewards or punishments to people as a result of their conduct (Wang,
1974). Natural phenomena such as thunder, he stated in illustration,
FAREWELL TO MIGRATING GEESE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL… 113
must be caused by fire or heat, and therefore were not signs of heaven
being displeased. In the same vein, people’s fates, such as their lifespans,
was not a result of divine punishment or reward, but was contingent on
their own natural physical quality. In this way, Wang Chong rejected the
portent theory of Dong Zhongshu that natural disasters or people’s desti-
nies were indicators of heaven’s will.
There were strong motivations for Wang Chong to challenge and refute
Dong Zhongshu’s theory of divination as it had brought many negative
effects on society by sanctifying morality in the name of heaven’s mandate.
Under Dong’s influence, omens became popular and superstitions about
deities and ghosts were pervasive in the Han Dynasty. This trend obvi-
ously conflicted with the tradition of classical Confucianism, which rarely
talked about gods or ghosts. Wang Chong strongly opposed to this super-
stition. When a person died, his blood dried out, his qi dispersed, and his
body rotted into dust, so how—he asked—could a ghost or the soul exist?
By negating the existence of ghosts, Wang exposed the fallacy of super-
natural beliefs in Dong Zhongshu’s theory.
However, Wang Chong’s dismissal of heaven’s will did not mean he
denied the significance of ethics and the important role of moral educa-
tion in governing the country. In fact, Wang emphasized using the
“Great Tao”, mainly Confucian virtues, to teach people to love the
country and be faithful to the monarch. He declared that moral values of
rites and righteousness were the reason why a state survived. If people
lost them, the country would perish sooner or later. Hence, it was the
job of Confucians to teach people those moral principles. Yet the Great
Tao was not limited to Confucian moral virtues. Wang noted that the
doctrines in other philosophical schools, the naturalist thought of Taoism
in particular, was instrumental in facilitating people’s moral development
(Wang, 1974).
Further, Wang Chong contended that humans were fully capable of
receiving moral education on the grounds that people, as the most valu-
able beings in the world, possessed wisdom. Nonetheless, he suggested
that this wisdom did not automatically lead to good morals and that peo-
ple need to develop their hearts in daily life to achieve moral development.
Just like bamboo and woods could be carved, whittled, and woven into
utensils, humans could develop noble characters and moral habits through
self-regulation, learning, and practice (Wang, 1974).
114 Z. YOU ET AL.
Human Nature and Its Implications for Moral Education

As for human nature, Wang Chong concurred with Dong Zhongshu that
moral education aimed at promoting the good dimension and suppressing
the evil dimension in ordinary people. But different from Dong Zhongshu,
Wang Chong believed that human nature was not granted by heaven but
was composed of qi. It was the endowed quality of qi—its thickness or
thinness—that determined the extent to which human nature was good or
evil. People’s natures were not fixed, but alterable since qi could be
changed. Wang held that human nature could be changed in different
social environments, just as an originally leaning plant such as fleabane
would grow straight among flax without external supports and white silk
would change to dark in dye vat without being dyed (Wang, 1974). In this
vein, young people could turn from good to evil or from evil to good
under the influence of different external moral influences. Wang’s meta-
phor was similar to Mo Tzu’s comparison of raw silk to human nature but
differed in that while Mo Tzu’s comparison was universal to all people,
Wang Chong’s referred to only ordinary people as he held that sages’
nature and evil people’s nature were innate and not educable.
Compared with other philosophers, Wang tended to have a stronger
confidence in the role of education in altering people’s nature. He asserted
that nurture was more powerful than nature in moral development. Just
as forging could turn iron ore into a sword, moral education could change
a person’s original nature and make him or her a better person. Moreover,
Wang believed in the inner association between nature and emotion,
understanding the link as the rationale for conducting moral education.
He noted that an educator should learn the characteristics of people’s
nature and emotion so as to formulate an education plan accordingly
(Wang, 1974). The best method of moral cultivation was to utilize rites
and music. As people have the nature of modesty and being humble,
practicing rites would help them develop a good moral character; as peo-
ple have emotions such as happiness, anger, sadness, love, and hatred,
music could help them express and soothe such emotions (Yan, 2003). In
brief, moral education aimed to nourish human nature by educating peo-
ple in emotions and helping them avoid evil inclinations by following
proper rites.
Purpose and Methods of Moral Education

The ultimate purpose of moral education, for Wang Chong, was to culti-
vate formidable Confucian scholars (hong-ru). Wang categorized scholars
into four ranks, ranging from the highest to the lowest: formidable schol-
ars, master scholars, learned scholars, and scholars (Wang, 1974). Scholars
were people who had limited knowledge and narrow vision inasmuch as
they were only versed in one of the five Confucian classics. Learned schol-
ars had read extensively and could teach disciples. But they could not cre-
ate new knowledge—they were just like parrots mimicking people’s
speech. The master scholars were people who could use their knowledge
to write and submit political proposals to rulers. The formidable scholars,
the ideal moral example, were independent and innovative scholars who
could write classics to promote people’s moral development.
To become an innovative formidable scholar, a learner should stay criti-
cal in thinking and question the ancient academic authorities. This critical
stance was actually Wang’s reaction toward the conservative academic
atmosphere of his time, in which Confucians worshiped ancient societies
and academic authorities while debasing the present ones. Scholars, under
such a climate, took classical Confucianism as the golden rule and dared
not propose different opinions at all. This academic convention of follow-
ing the tradition was detrimental to learning and developing Confucianism
(Zhang, 2001). Wang objected to this conformism and asserted that,
quite on the contrary, the current state was actually better than the ancient
counterpart when comparing the governance, agriculture, and moral cul-
tivation between the Zhou and the Eastern Han Dynasties.
Likewise, Wang claimed that ancient Confucian sages such as the Duke
of Zhou and Confucius were not born knowing the truth but in reality
came to know it by learning. As a result, learners should not blindly wor-
ship these ancient scholars; instead, they should ask questions if they had
doubts about the ancient classics. This questioning, Wang argued, would
not do harm to Confucian doctrine because it was an effort to clarify Tao
and seek the ultimate truth (Wang, 1974). Scholars should ask hard ques-
tions so as to know what and how. They could, he added, even ask ques-
tions about Confucius’ words in order to understand what the ancient
sage had really meant.
Reading extensively was another approach of Wang Chong’s moral
education. Instead of following the popular practice of merely explicating
Confucian classics in the Han Dynasties, Wang advocated reading
116 Z. YOU ET AL.
c omprehensively; that is, people should peruse not just Confucian classics,
but also books from other philosophical schools such as the Legalist
School, the Mohist School, Taoism, and even books about science. He
noted that just like the ocean accommodating hundreds of rivers, reading
widely could help people enrich their knowledge and broaden their vision.
But Wang did not stop here. He further pointed out that reading widely
was not to accumulate facts, but to achieve a mastery of knowledge
through integrating and applying all kinds of knowledge in real-life
situations.
Wang Chong was one of a few ancient Chinese scholars who laid par-
ticular emphasis on the practical utility of knowledge in human life.
Academia in the Eastern Han Dynasty indulged in the work of annotation
and explanation of the Confucian classics, paying little attention to the
application of knowledge in the real world. Wang, on the other hand,
opposed this trend. The ultimate purpose of learning, for him, was to
teach people to be moral in life and make the world better, not to be a
pedant. He tended to believe that people should create more knowledge
that could be put to use and should not waste time in creating knowledge
that could not be utilized (Wang, 1974). As a pragmatist and consequen-
tialist, Wang held that theory be verified by facts before people could
judge it as right or wrong. Hence it was important for scholars to see,
hear, and determine in real life to check whether such behavior was true or
not. Nonetheless, learning was not confined to first-hand experience as
knowledge would be partial and shallow if people relied simply on direct
experience. Instead, they should think deeply and reason about the experi-
ence with the aim of reaching rational conclusions.
Another unique element of Wang’s ideology of moral education was
that he particularly advocated the integration of morality and wisdom in
learning. Unlike Dong Zhongshu, who tended to put moral learning
before wisdom, Wang Chong believed in the path that learning went from
wisdom to morality, or stated differently, the process of seeking wisdom
was also the way to cultivate morality. While acquiring wisdom enhanced
people’s abilities in moral understanding, a person’s moral growth often
occurred during the process of his pursuit of wisdom. Regarding this rela-
tionship, he noted that a person could not have great aspirations without
morality and could not have broad vision without great talent (Wang,
1985). His concept of wisdom was not limited to the classical Confucian
idea of distinguishing right from wrong, but also entailed other knowl-
edge and skills. In fact, Wang Chong believed that wisdom brought power
to people. He gave the example of Xiao He, the prime minister of Liu Ban,
who collected many files on the Qin Dynasty, with which he helped Liu
Ban defeat his major rival Xiang Yu and found the Han Dynasty (Wang,
1985).
Much like Hsun Tzu in the Era of Warring States, Wang Chong was
widely considered a reformer or even a rebel against orthodox
Confucianism. He was strongly against Dong Zhongshu’s concept of
heaven’s mandate and worship of the sages. His advocacy of critical think-
ing and experiential learning also made him a nonconformist among the
Confucians of his time. However, regardless of his maverick views and
ideas, Wang was still a real Confucian who emphasized moral education’s
role in stabilizing society. He suggested that rulers should make efforts to
promote moral cultivation in the country and at the same time use laws to
guard people from becoming evil.
Wang Chong’s philosophy opened up an era of rebellion, which is
marked by his casting doubts on the legitimacy of theologized Confucianism
and his questioning of the traditional methodology in teaching morality
and regulating people’s behavior. With the weapons from naturalism and
atheism, he instilled new ideas and perspectives into Confucian moral edu-
cation. After Wang Chong, more and more Confucians started challeng-
ing the canonized Confucian learning, and that they eventually formed a
new philosophy named the Study of Xuan in the ensuing Dynasties.
The Study of Xuan in the Wei-Jin Dynasties

The Wei-Jin Dynasties (220–589 CE) was a troubled time. It was an era
when China, divided most of the time, was in constant political turmoil
and ceaseless war. Interestingly, it was also a time when philosophical
ideas, religion, and art flourished; this was regarded as the second era of
prosperity and diversity in thought after the Eras of Spring and Autumn,
and the Warring States (Zhu, 2013). Although division and warfare
brought great pains to people, this period also witnessed a plethora of
free thought and diverse ideas thanks to the slackening of political con-
trol: the ideas of pre-Qin philosophical schools, suppressed by
Confucianism for centuries, were rejuvenated. It was during this time
that the Study of Xuan or Neo-Taoism, a philosophy integrating Taoism
with Confucianism, emerged, which greatly challenged the rigid thought
control by “Mingjiao”.
118 Z. YOU ET AL.
Mingjiao, also called the teaching of rites (li-jiao) or the teaching of

name, is the core of Confucian doctrine centering on promoting rites and
cultivating Confucian norms through moral indoctrination. Mingjiao pro-
posed using rigid moral codes such as the Three Cardinal Guides and the
Five Constant Virtues to teach people. Its main purpose was to establish
people’s family and societal identities, reinforce the hierarchy, and tighten
social control through rigorous moral education. Confucians also defined
the term as the instruction of appropriate relationships between sovereign
and minister, father and son (Yuan, 2002), or more directly, the teaching
of loyalty and filial piety. With the marriage between imperial power and
Mingjiao, such a value system and education system dominated both poli-
tics and academics; it became the reigning ideology and the golden rules
of behaviors during the Han Dynasties. The great peasant uprisings by the
end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, however, did not just destroy the empire
and smash the social hierarchy, but also seriously weakened the ideology of
Mingjiao. With the collapse of the empire and the disillusion surrounding
the teaching of rites, scholars had encountered an unprecedented intel-
lectual crisis in their beliefs, rules of conduct, and purpose of education.
The peasant insurrection, nonetheless, was not the only reason that
Mingjiao was severely challenged.1 Many scholars, such as Wang Chong in
the Eastern Han Dynasty, had already exposed the suffocating power of
Mingjiao in controlling people’s lives and thought. As time went by, an
ideology once designed to cultivate people’s moral disposition had gradu-
ally degenerated into a political tool for strengthening rulers’ own power
and persecuting nonconformists. Those who disobeyed the mainstream
political will would be convicted in the name of Mingjiao, and were even
executed (Liu, 1994). In such a vicious political environment, most
Confucian scholars had to submit to the murky politics. Many scholars,
agonized by the oppression and tired of the clichés of Mingjiao, were
eager to seek spiritual refuge in Taoism; they indulged themselves in the
philosophical debates on metaphysical questions and relished the beauty
of nature, and eventually created the Study of Xuan.
The Study of “Xuan”, literally “mysterious and abstruse learning”,
emerged during the debates about the relationships between Mingjiao and
nature, or Confucianism and Taoism in a broader sense. Taoism, founded
by Lao Tzu in the pre-Qin era, advocated conforming to nature and being
inactive. Nature in Taoism referred to the natural world, in which all
things lived peacefully and harmoniously with each other, providing the
scholars of Wei-Jin Dynasties with a means of spiritual escape. Many
s cholars thus enjoyed studying The Book of Changes and the classics of Lao
Tzu and Chuang Tzu, and transcended troubles in real life through con-
versing about the heart and nature. Among these scholars, two philoso-
phers, He Yan and Wang Bi, in the Kingdom of Wei excelled in their
discussions about metaphysics. They used the frameworks of Taoism to
explain or redefine Confucian doctrines, endeavoring to create a new
moral philosophy that could integrate the two. As a result, the Study of
Xuan, or Neo-Taoism, came into being.
The Study of Xuan in the era of Wei-Jin Dynasties can be divided into
three branches, which represented its three developmental phases. The
first was called the “valuing nonbeing” (wu) branch, represented by He
Yan and Wang Bi who had created a nonbeing-based ontology, stressing
that Mingjiao originated from nature. The second was called the “follow-
ing nature” branch, represented by Ji Kang and Ruan Ji, who held that
Mingjiao and nature essentially conflicted with each other, advocating that
people follow nature and transcend Mingjiao. The third was called the
“evolving independently” branch, represented by Xiang Xiu and Guo
Xiang, who believed in an integration of Mingjiao and nature (Huang,
2011). The following section of the chapter will explore the philosophy of
moral education in the Study of Xuan, as represented by Wang Bi, Ji Kang,
and Guo Xiang respectively, and discuss how their philosophies impacted
on the ideas and practices about moral education as well as the spiritual
world of Chinese people.
Wang Bi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Wang Bi (226–249 CE) was an official-scholar in the Era of the Three
Kingdoms (220–280 CE) who was renowned for his expertise in The
Classic of Tao and De of Lao Tzu and The Book of Changes. Though
Wang Bi died at the very young age of 24, he had successfully adapted a
new philosophical framework of nature to interpret Mingjiao. In his
time, Mingjiao was in deep crisis due to the bankruptcy of Dong
Zhongshu’s theory of divination (interactions between heaven and
man). Therefore, it was an urgent task for Confucians to provide another
conceptual framework for Mingjiao so as to restore its authority and
legitimacy. This was the primary reason why Wang Bi tried to borrow
concepts from Taoism.
120 Z. YOU ET AL.
ang Bi’s New Ontology for Mingjiao

W
As mentioned, though Wang Bi focused his work on Taoism, his ultimate
purpose was to revive Confucianism. He alleged that the reason people
had lost their faith in scholasticism was that Confucians over-emphasized
the trivial details of moral creeds such as benevolence and righteousness
while neglecting the metaphysics of Confucian philosophy. Even worse,
some did corrupt political deals in the name of Mingjiao, leading to the
collapse of the faith system. Thus, if people wanted to rejuvenate Mingjiao,
they should not just debate over moral codes and the cultivation of these,
but need first reestablish and strengthen the foundation of the philosophi-
cal system. In other words, they should put nature and nonbeing as the
cornerstone of the metaphysics of Mingjiao (Wen & Zhang, 2006) because
nature and nonbeing were the ontological basis which the sages had used
to distinguish social identities and ranks, and hence create moral creeds.
Specifically, Wang Bi proposed using a nonbeing-based philosophical
ontology to replace Dong Zhongshu’s theory of divine portents as the
metaphysics in moral education. Nonbeing was a concept of Lao Tzu; he
contended that everything in the world came into existence from being
which, in turn, came into existence from nonbeing (Lao Tzu, 2001), with
Tao acting as the rule (Mu, 1995). Hence nonbeing was the source of
everything. For Wang, Mingjiao should be rooted in nature, which was
characterized as nonbeing or inactivity. Just as nature fostered everything
in the world with its grandness and generosity, human activities, moral
education in particular, should also be conducted in a way fitting the inac-
tivity and invisibility of Tao.
On the basis of his nonbeing-based ontology, Wang Bi suggested that
people realign the value system of Mingjiao with nature. This was, in actu-
ality, a new philosophical system of combining Confucian doctrines with
Taoism in which nature, with its attribute of inactivity, served as the
underlying framework, or Substance, while Mingjiao serving as its con-
tents, or Utility. In Wang’s philosophy, Mingjiao was a set of moral regula-
tions and rules that should be congruent with nature. Put differently,
Mingjiao was not designated arbitrarily by the sages, but was established
on the basis of people’s natural properties. The new framework, though
depriving Mingjiao of its sacred halo, endowed the value system with a
new ontological legitimacy and helped solve the faith crisis at that time
(Wen & Zhang, 2006). Wang further pointed out that nature and Mingjiao
were mutually supporting and complementing. While nature led the way,
it also preserved itself through promoting Mingjiao; while Mingjiao was
subordinate to nature, it adapted itself to the natural laws and safeguarded

nature. By returning to nature, Mingjiao could better serve its purpose of
moral education.
ang Bi on Human Nature and Emotion

W
According to Wang Bi, human nature was neither good nor evil as it
innately conformed to the natural world. This original nature, if preserved,
could lead to a world with no conflicts and thus there was no need to cre-
ate a social hierarchy. Unfortunately, few people except the sages could
preserve this pristine human nature; most people lost it due to their
worldly desires and greediness for material gain, which was the source of
the troubles of the world (Shao, 2006). The sage kings, accordingly, cre-
ated social institutions and the teaching of rites to diminish conflict and
regulate social relations. They set up the positions of officials and educa-
tors, taught people moral values and norms, disciplined them, prevented
them from conducting bad behavior, and helped them restore their origi-
nal nature. In this sense, Mingjiao actually originated from nature (Shao,
2006). By going back to the origin of moral education, Wang justified the
necessity and feasibility of conducting moral education based on the
framework of nature.
How does one teach morality with the approach of nature? Wang sug-
gested that instead of using force, rulers should use a natural way to edu-
cate people—that is, to teach by example. If the leaders did not strive for
personal gain, people would follow suit and be good (Wang, 1980). The
current moral education, led by scholasticism since the time of the Han
Dynasties, had greatly depressed and distorted human nature, leading
people toward chasing personal fame and fortune, which resulted in the
loss of the natural way and people’s disillusionment toward the Confucian
doctrine. The best way to promote moral education, therefore, was not to
indoctrinate people with moral creeds and force them to follow, but to
implement wordless teaching.
Emotion that was congruent with nature had implications for moral
education as well. Many Confucians in the Han Dynasties tended to
regard Confucius as a god rather than a man. He Yan, a philosopher of
Xuan, contended that Confucius was human. But as a sage, Confucius was
different from other people in that he had no emotions such as happiness,
anger, sorrow, and joy. Wang Bi, on the other hand, disagreed with He
Yan, claiming that Confucius had emotions, too. For instance, Confucius
was happy when he first met his favorite disciple Yan Hui, and he was very
122 Z. YOU ET AL.
sad when Yan Hui died at a young age (Wang, 1980). What Wang sug-
gested was that Confucius had human emotions like other people, but his
wisdom was not affected by emotions such that his spiritual world main-
tained its serenity. This point of view was important for moral education
inasmuch as all Confucians took Confucius as a role model in their moral
self-cultivation. Admitting that Confucius was also a human being with
emotions allowed later scholars to take a more humanistic approach to
moral cultivation.
Ji Kang’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Ji Kang (c. 223–c. 263 CE) was a brilliant writer and philosopher of natu-
ralism living in the Era of Three Kingdoms. As an official in the Kingdom
of Wei, he had married a woman from the imperial family of Cao. Ji Kang
was a very famous scholar of the time and was known as the key member
of “The Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove”, a group of scholars who
met regularly in a bamboo forest retreat, drinking, playing music, and
engaging in Taoist-type pure conversations about metaphysics. But what
made Ji Kang’s name immortal is his proposition that Mingjiao conflicted
with nature and his advocacy of transcending the teaching of rites and
pursuing a natural lifestyle.
Nevertheless, his reputation and his criticism of Mingjiao brought mis-
fortune to him. At that time, a powerful family named Shima seized power
and started to massacre imperial family members on a large scale. Due to
the need to consolidate political power, the Shima family forced those who
were discontented, especially famous scholars such as Ji Kang, to take up
high official positions and work for them. Ji Kang was disgusted at the
Shima family’s behaviors of using Mingjiao—such as loyalty and filial
piety—to usurp political power and persecute dissidents, and declined the
offer. Ji Kang’s attitude of nonconformity enraged the Shima family, who
put Ji Kang in jail and sentenced him to death in the name of blaspheming
Mingjiao and defaming the Confucian classics. Before being executed, Ji
Kang calmly played his five-string musical instrument one last time and
viewed the wide geese flying to the south in the evening twilight, leaving
a tragic but undying image of the scholar in Chinese history.
J i Kang’s Philosophical Cosmology and Ideas on Human Nature

Ji Kang was a philosopher of Xuan who firmly believed in a naturalistic
cosmology. He held that the universe was made of qi with Yin or Yang
attributes and that with different configurations and combinations, it

formed heaven and earth as well as the five elements of metal, wood,
water, fire, and earth, which in turn produced humans and myriad things
and events in the world (Cheng & Li, 2003). As human beings were made
of qi, human nature was also a product of nature and human activity could
be traced back to nature. Thus, it was absurd to take the concepts of the
Six Confucian Classics, mostly products of social institutions, as goals for
moral education. They worked, in actuality, to restrict the natural charac-
teristics of mankind. From this perspective, Ji Kang’s cosmological con-
cept of qi provided a proof for his concept of transcending Mingjiao.
For Confucians, human nature was an important philosophical concept
and a premise of moral education. Many Confucians deemed that human
nature was intrinsically good and that people cherished the characters of
benevolence, righteousness, rites, and wisdom. Therefore, learning the Six
Confucian Classics would help people recover these virtues. Ji Kang,
nonetheless, asserted that Confucian moral principles were created by the
sages and thus were not a part of human nature. People’s innate disposi-
tion, determined by nature, was inclined toward a “no work, all play”
attitude, the seeking of safety, and the avoidance of risk (Ji & Dai, 1962,
p. 259). Therefore, the contrived moral cultivation based on the Six
Confucian Classics did not fit humanity’s natural dispositions; instead, it
depressed and misguided people’s needs. While the teaching of rites was
against the will of human nature, following personal needs ensured har-
mony with nature. Consequently, instead of learning rites or other prin-
ciples that were against people’s nature, education should cater to their
innate needs and moral growth should be achieved in a natural way.
To reinforce this argument, Ji Kang further explicated how moral edu-
cation had originated. He claimed that people’s characters in the remote
past were impeccable since they followed nature. They ate and slept hap-
pily, and did not know what benevolence and rites were. It was not until
social morality degenerated in later ages that the sages had to create the
concepts of benevolence and righteousness to rectify people’s wrongs and
discriminate between different groups (Ji & Dai, 1962). In other words,
moral education emerged as people lost their pristine disposition and
their natural way of living was abandoned. Hence the best moral educa-
tion was not to study Confucian doctrines, but to go back to people’s
original state.
124 Z. YOU ET AL.
J i Kang’s Criticism of Mingjiao

Mingjiao, as mentioned before, was a set of Confucian moral principles
aimed at cultivating morality and establishing social identities. Since
Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, Mingjiao had served as the state ideol-
ogy dominating politics and moral education practice. Nonetheless,
Mingjiao in Ji Kang’s time had degenerated into a tool for power struggles
and was utilized to reinforce partisanship and persecute the nonconform-
ists (Liu, 1994). Many scholars, though learned in Confucian classics,
sought personal gain unscrupulously. Their purpose in studying Mingjiao
was not to learn the truth, but to win promotion and get rich.
Agonizing over the gloomy political situation, Ji Kang chose Taoism as
a weapon to criticize Mingjiao. In reply to the assertion that people would
live in darkness forever if they did not learn the Six Confucian Classics, Ji
Kang retorted that the argument was ill-founded in that “the Six Confucian
Classics were not the sun but weeds and wastes, and that benevolence and
righteousness were stinky rotten food” (Ji & Dai, 1962, p. 263). He even
criticized sages such the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, and declared that
he was a follower of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu of Taoism. Ji Kang was the
first scholar who dared criticize Mingjiao after Confucianism had been
canonized as the absolute authority for political guidance and moral edu-
cation (Li, 1995).
Ji Kang strongly opposed using the Six Confucian Classics as the text-
books to promote Mingjiao; rather, he suggested that people transcend
the fetters of Mingjiao and pursue spiritual freedom in nature. The core
values in Mingjiao, such as benevolence and social identity, Ji Kang
asserted, were used to restrain people’s hearts and suppress human nature,
which were the source of all the hypocrisy and deception. This was well
shown by the Shima family members who, as the ministers of the royal
family, had usurped imperial power, but still brazenly propagated the vir-
tues of loyalty and filial piety. For this reason, Ji Kang alleged that Mingjiao
had been used by people in power to seek their own benefit while doing
harm to others. The purpose of moral cultivation through Mingjiao, in
essence, was to force people to obey their orders (Ji & Dai, 1962).
After exposing the real purpose of Mingjiao, Ji Kang declared that he
himself could not be educated by Mingjiao but would willfully pursue the
freedom of living in nature. Ji Kang was one of the earliest philosophers in
Chinese history who had systematically expounded the concept of a natu-
ralistic education, advocating people’s free development. The ideal educa-
tion, for him, should be based on the natural laws. More specifically, it was
a process of pursuing one’s own natural inclination and shattering the

confines of doctrines that ran against nature. For this purpose, people
should rid themselves of worldly vanity, implement simple education, pre-
serve good health, and achieve an ideal personality with a natural
disposition.
J i Kang’s Approaches of Moral Education

Contrary to the complex and tedious forms of Confucian moral cultiva-
tion, Ji Kang advocated a simple education that followed people’s nature;
this originated from the sage kings’ rule by inactivity in the remote past.
He remarked that when a king ruled the country through inactivity, his
people would follow his leadership naturally. Though these sage kings also
taught people about faithfulness and righteousness, this was conducted in
the natural way. In this vein, simple education, unlike the complex and
coercive Mingjiao, was rooted in people’s nature; that is, educators should
not force learners to accept values that did not fit their nature. Rather,
they should base their instructions on people’s natural inclinations, and
educate them accordingly. For instance, Ji Kang expressed his wish that
instead of blatantly seeking fame and fortune during a time of corruption
and hypocrisy, he himself wanted to stay aloof and live in an independent
and unfettered way, preserving his own natural purity.
Following nature demanded people transcend Confucian moral doc-
trines. Ji Kang particularly despised those mean persons who strived to
hide their own desires and act hypocritically. He contended that a superior
man should follow his own natural needs, ignoring the moral judgment of
right or wrong (Ji & Dai, 1962). The real virtue, for him, was to under-
stand Tao without being confined by Mingjiao and to live freely by inte-
grating one’s heart-mind with nature. Transcending moral doctrines such
as Mingjiao was a precondition of achieving a true heart that harmonized
with nature. In contrast to Wang Bi, who tried to combine Mingjiao and
nature, Ji Kang construed Mingjiao as the complete opposite of nature.
Thus, the rites for a true superior man was not something valued, but an
obstacle to overcome or abandon in order to obtain true spiritual freedom
in nature. By doing so, the superior man’s behavior would not deviate
from morality because he had followed nature and his emotion was not
distorted by the worldly desire for fame and wealth (Ji & Dai, 1962).
As a scholar who lived a life of seclusion, Ji Kang explicated in detail
how to live a long and healthy life through moral self-cultivation. Although
he rejected the myth that humans could live forever just like the celestial
126 Z. YOU ET AL.
beings, he claimed that people could achieve longevity through exercise

and self-cultivation. To do so, people needed to maintain a serene and
peaceful mind, reducing desires and lusts. The heart, he added, should
stick to “the One” or Tao and be nourished with harmony and spiritual
freedom, which helped people stay healthy both physically and mentally.
The greedy heart, on the contrary, would do harm to a person’s health. If
a person indulged in seeking fame and profit and was obsessed with good
food and luxury, he would inevitably reap endless troubles and worries,
which at the same time would undermine his physical health.
Music was another method of moral education that Ji Kang advocated.
He believed that music could not only help people cultivate their morality,
but also be used to ameliorate the moral atmosphere of society. Singing
and dancing could contribute to one’s moral growth: while singing helped
people express their yearnings, dancing could arouse their sublime feel-
ings. The function of playing music for moral education, accordingly, was
to nurture and extend the individual’s internal moral sense so as to help
shape good social customs in which people would love and care about
each other (Li, 1995). Ji Kang’s idea of music education for moral cultiva-
tion purposes was a good manifestation of his advocacy of naturalistic edu-
cation, a method to transcend moral doctrines and pursue a free spirit in
nature.
It is worth noting that while criticizing the vices in Mingjiao, Ji Kang
did not completely repudiate its function of moral education. Nor did he
really want to censure ancient sages such as the Duke of Zhou and
Confucius or entirely deny the value of moral principles. In fact, he fre-
quently praised such sages in his book. He also used Confucian principles
such as faithfulness, honesty, respect, and righteousness to teach his family
members. His criticism of Confucianism and the sages in some of his arti-
cles were in reality a strategy to expose the hypocrisy of the Shima family,
who used Mingjiao as a tool to persecute opponents. Although Ji Kang
was strongly against rulers using Confucian doctrines to control ideas and
restrain people’s minds, he still affirmed the efficacy of moral education in
stabilizing society as a whole. In this sense, his philosophy of moral educa-
tion, though it seemed unrealistic to the mainstream world, shed light on
how a moral character could be nurtured in a natural way, bringing us
different perspectives on moral education.
Guo Xiang’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Guo Xiang (252–312 CE) was a Xuan philosopher living in the Western
Jin Dynasty (265–316 CE). In contrast to the philosophers in the previous
two branches, Guo Xiang believed that there was no discrepancy between
Mingjiao and nature—Mingjiao was in essence nature. Guo Xiang’s phi-
losophy was the ultimate attempt by the Study of Xuan to integrate
Confucianism with Taoism, which ended the dispute between Mingjiao
and nature and enriched the understanding of Mingjiao. Gao Xiang’s larg-
est contribution in this regard was his commentary on the book Chuang
Tzu, which significantly boosted the influence of Taoism in the Jin
Dynasties. However, the authorship of this book of commentary was not
without controversy. Many suspected that Guo Xiang’s book was actually
written by Xiang Xiu, one of “The Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove”.
When Xiang Xiu died an untimely death, Guo Xiang presented the book
as his own and removed Xiang Xiu’s name (Liu, 2009).
he Independent Evolution of Human Nature

T
Independent evolution was the primary framework in Guo Xiang’s meta-
physics. In contrast to Wang Bi’s concept that everything in the world
originated from nonbeing, Guo held that all things in the universe were
evolving independently and there was no unifying source or causal rela-
tionship between them. Consequently, there was no common nature for
all and everything in the world possessed its own special characteristics or
unique attributes. As to the relationship between Mingjiao and nature,
Guo declared that the two concepts were intrinsically the same. The social
hierarchy, he argued, was legitimate on the grounds that different people
had different natures and therefore fitted into different social ranks natu-
rally. Therefore, the teaching of rites could serve the state well because it
taught everyone to be satisfied with their own social identities or ranks, as
determined by their own natures.
Guo Xiang’s assertion that Mingjiao was nature actually reflected his
idea of integrating Taoism with Confucianism. In his philosophy, pursuing
Mingjiao equated to following nature and therefore a scholar could do
both at the same time. A sage king, for instance, followed a path of achiev-
ing worldly feats and enjoying the inner spiritual pursuit of nature simul-
taneously. Though he had to live in the royal court and was busy with
political affairs, his heart could wander in the peaceful and quiet forests
and mountains, relishing their natural beauty. Guo named this spiritual
128 Z. YOU ET AL.
realm the Realm of Xuan—a spiritual world enjoyed by the sages. The
independent evolvement of individual characteristics, according to Guo,
should occur in the Realm of Xuan. In this sense, nature and independent
evolution were inseparable. While the latter occurred naturally, nature was
composed of things that developed independently.
In short, Mingjiao and nature reached consensus with each other in the
process of independent evolution. Even though Mingjiao might seem to
conflict with nature and was often used to fetter human nature, the former
was in effect the requirement for and embodiment of the latter (Shao,
2006). In a society full of different people with various kinds of human
nature, Mingjiao could be perceived as the regulations to reconcile rela-
tionships among different natures that were evolving independently. This
is why Guo emphasized that benevolence and righteousness were part of
human nature; while people had a need to eat and sleep, they also needed
to follow righteousness and know how to behave properly.
We should note that Guo Xiang was still a true naturalist in the Study
of Xuan despite his tendency to integrate nature and Mingjiao. He held a
liberal attitude in his approach to moral cultivation; personal natures
should evolve in their own domain without having to be unified, which
differed from the idea of grand unification in canonical Confucianism.
Guo elucidated the idea with an allegory that both a giant bird and a tiny
bird would be satisfied if they lived up to their respective nature and capac-
ities. While the enormous bird should not believe that it had more value
than the small bird, the latter too should not envy the giant bird’s great
journey to the North Sea (Guo, 2011). This metaphor indicated that the
ultimate purpose of humans in the world was to realize their own nature
or potential and to be satisfied with his rank and position, not to seek
things that did not belong to them. This was why humans could simulta-
neously follow nature and meet the requirements of Mingjiao (Shao,
2006), which attempted to teach people to be contented with their spe-
cific social rank. This was, according to Guo, the most appropriate moral
education and the one that harmonized the most with people’s nature.
Guo Xiang’s idea about letting individuals freely realize their potential
or goals commensurate with their capacity was consistent with the educa-
tional ideal of teaching in accordance with students’ aptitudes; this was
embodied in his proposal to allow those who could become a square
become a square, and those who could become a circle become a circle. As
people developed freely to meet their natural endowments, everyone
would be satisfied (Guo, 2011). Further, unlike Confucian scholars such
as Dong Zhongshu and Wang Chong, who believed there were people who
could not be educated, Guo Xiang held that all people could be educated
in accordance with their different and independent natural inclinations.
omments on Guo Xiang’s Idea of Mingjiao and Nature

C
It was not surprising that the branch of “evolving independently” in the
Study of Xuan, represented by Guo Xiang and Xiang Xiu, tried to recon-
cile Mingjiao and nature. When the Study of Xuan developed to this stage,
it needed to return to its original theme of rule by morality. Either follow-
ing nature while rejecting Mingjiao or promoting Mingjiao while disre-
garding nature could not satisfactorily solve the social crisis of the time.
Only a marriage between nature and Mingjiao could meet the need for
reestablishing moral governance (Yu, 1988).
Although Guo Xiang identified Mingjiao with nature, he explicitly criti-
cized the problems of moral indoctrination and political persecution in the
name of Mingjiao during the Wei-Jin Dynasties. Guo alleged that moral
education based on this reality undermined human nature and endan-
gered the harmonious relationships among people. But Guo Xiang was
more realistic than Ji Kang, who essentially opposed using Mingjiao to
educate people. Guo tended to believe that Mingjiao was essential if a
society was to function smoothly. Hence, he criticized only the phenom-
enon of rulers forcefully indoctrinating moral creeds into people while
ignoring the latter’s actual needs and different natures, but did not deny
the educational function of Mingjiao per se. The solution, for Guo Xiang,
rested on a seamless integration of two—fusing the external pursuit of
worldly achievements with inner self-transcendence and teaching moral
creeds based on each person’s natural inclination.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note that the philosophy of moral education in Wei-Jin
Dynasties showed a clear trend toward deviation or even rebellion from
orthodox Confucianism by introducing the conceptual framework of
nature from Taoism. This tendency could be broken down into three
phases, from the initial stage of using nature to reinterpret Mingjiao, to a
radical stage of transcending Mingjiao to enjoy absolute spiritual freedom
in nature, and to a mature stage calling for a unity of the two. During the
process, Mingjiao was enriched and revived with naturalistic ideas, which
endowed moral education with new connotations and implications.
130 Z. YOU ET AL.
The inclination, in a sense, was imperative. Previously, the ultimate goal

of moral education for Confucians was to realize their political ideals, that is,
to help rulers manage the country and to contribute moral virtues to society.
This moral cultivation was demanding considering that it required constant
self-examination and self-reflection on one’s own daily behavior. The prac-
tice, albeit facilitating scholars’ moral development, made life extremely
tough because it neglected individual needs and inclinations. The frustra-
tions and setbacks in political life would make it even harder to bear, some-
times leading to a disillusion in terms of political ideal and moral beliefs.
The integration of nature with Mingjiao, however, provided these offi-
cial scholars with a spiritual refuge, avoiding possible nervous breakdowns
or a degeneration from morality to hypocrisy. With an education saturated
with naturalistic elements, one could maintain a delicate balance between
positively pursuing external achievements and reveling in inner spiritual
freedom, which highlighted personal needs and individual preferences
without compromising moral principles or being overwhelmed by strin-
gent moral demands. In so doing, Confucians could alleviate their desire
for fame and social status through cultivating their own natural disposi-
tions and needs, leading to a pursuit of an unrestrained way of life charac-
terized by spiritual self-satisfaction, poise, and unconventional speech and
deportment.
This tendency toward special lifestyle and cultural ethos was character-
ized as the Wei-Jin Demeanor or Win-Jin Style popular in the Wei-Jin and
Southern and Northern Dynasties, in which famous scholars endeavored
to free themselves from the tethers of rites and social norms, taking delight
in drinking, talking idly about Xuan, playing music, appreciating natural
scenery, and even taking special drugs. This cultural ethos had affected the
lifestyle of ordinary people, as illustrated by a story recorded in a book
entitled New Account of World Tales. Once a servant took a risk to save the
life of a high official. When the official wanted to express his gratitude by
giving a large fortune to the servant, the latter replied that he did not want
a fortune, but if the official could supply him with abundant alcohol to
drink for the rest of his life, he would be satisfied. In such a free and unre-
stricted cultural atmosphere, the whole society altered significantly, mak-
ing the period unique and dynamic in Chinese history. Even though
people at the time paid less attention to moral principles and education in
these, as compared to in the Han Dynasties, they seemed to have enjoyed
spiritual revelry and a bold imagination that helped generate many legend-
ary stories and beautiful artworks.
Note
1. The peasant revolt is also known as Yellow Turban Rebellion (184–205 CE),
which greatly weakened the Eastern Han Empire and eventually led to the
collapse of the dynasty.
References
Cheng, X., & Li, W. (2003). Transcending Mingjiao and following nature:
Exploration of Ji Kang’s ethics. Social Science Front, 2, 225–229.
Guo, X. (2011). Notes and commentaries on Chuang Tzu. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
Huang, Z. (2011). History of thought of Chinese ancient moral education. Beijing:
Chinese Social Science Press.
Ji, K., & Dai, M. (1962). Annotation on the collected work of Ji Kang. Beijing:
People’s Literature Publishing House.
Li, J. (1995). Exploration of Ji Kang’s educational ideas. Zhejiang Social Sciences,
2, 82–87.
Liu, K. (1994). Commentary of Mingjiao and nature in Wei-Jing dynasties.
Confucius Studies, 2, 63–69.
Liu, Y. (2009). New account of world tales. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Publishing United
Group Digital Media, Ltd.
Mu, G. (1995). A short comment on Wang Bi’s valuing nonbeing. Academic
Exploration, 6, 61–62.
Shao, X. (2006). From “Mingjiao originating from nature” to “Mingjiao is nature”
(doctoral dissertation). Shangdong Normal University.
Wang, B. (1980). Proofreading and exposition of the collected work of Wang Bi.
Wang, B. (1985). A concise history of Chinese education. Beijing: Beijing Normal
University Press.
Wang, C. (1974). Lun heng. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press.
Wen, M., & Zhang, L. (2006). The rise and fall of a hundred of philosophical schools.
Beijing: China Environmental Science Publishing House.
Yan, G. (2003). A research on Wang Chong’s thoughts of educational psychology.
Psychological Exploration, 23(2), 5–11.
Yu, D. (1988). Guo Xiang’s time and the theme of study of Xuan. Confucius
Studies, 3, 21–32.
Yuan, H. (2002). Liang Han ji. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
132 Z. YOU ET AL.
Zhang, J. (2001). The maverick of time: The modern implications of Wang
Chong’s educational ideas. Technology and the Management of Medium and
Small Enterprises, 25, 62–62.
Zhu, H. (2013). Analysis on the influence of study of Xuan on the theory of cal-
ligraphy in Wei-Jin dynasties. Beauty and Times, 7, 86–87.
CHAPTER 7
Promoting Morality for Ultimate Liberation:

in Religious Taoism and Buddhism
Historically speaking, there has been a strong tie between religion and the
philosophy of moral education. All the major religions in the world have
devoted a considerable part of their contents and concepts to teaching
people how to act in a moral way. Eliminating evil and promoting good-
ness has always been a central theme of both religion and the philosophy
of moral education. Compared with moral education philosophy, that has
tended to highlight moral agents’ duty to observe moral laws, religions
sometimes work better with the general public insomuch as they provide
people with strong psychological incentives to develop morally by preach-
ing the idea of karmic retribution—that good will be rewarded with good
and evil with evil.
This was particularly true in ancient China as its religions played an
important role in enriching and reinforcing the philosophy of moral edu-
cation. For instance, the primary Chinese indigenous religion, namely reli-
gious Taoism, inherited frameworks from philosophical Taoism to establish
its own instruction regarding proper moral values. Buddhism, introduced
from ancient India, possessed an abundance of philosophical concepts that
stressed the importance of teaching people to be good. As in many other
countries, religious doctrines and the practice of religious preaching in
China were extremely effective in shaping people’s values and behaviors.
Moreover, there was a general trend toward the integration of the three
teachings/religions,1 Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism; they con-
flicted and learned from each other, contributing to the prosperity of

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_7
134 Z. YOU ET AL.
Chinese culture. This feature was salient in the philosophy of moral

education. Both religious Taoism and Buddhism had absorbed moral val-
ues from Confucianism so as to enhance its acceptability in the main-
stream culture. The religions adopted core Confucian moral principles
such as loyalty and filial piety and aligned their religious precepts and the
related education with these moral creeds. Confucianism, facing the chal-
lenges and impact of the two religions, also actively borrowed philosophi-
cal concepts from Taoism and Buddhism to make up for its flaws in
metaphysics and concepts relating to moral education (Pan, 2012). This
integration lasted a long time, starting from the Jin Dynasties (265–420
CE) and the Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–589 CE), and
stretching to the Sui Dynasty (581–618 CE), the Tang Dynasty (618–907
CE), and the Song Dynasties (960–1279 CE) and beyond.
Morality and Immortality: The Philosophy of Moral

Education in Religious Taoism
Religious Taoism as a native Chinese religion originated from the arts of
necromancy, alchemy, and breathing guidance that sought immortality
during the Warring States Period. It eventually developed into an orga-
nized and mature religion in the Han Dynasties by theologizing philo-
sophical Taoism and mixing it with the concepts of Yin and Yang and the
Five Elements. In particular, it inherited the Taoist tradition of integrating
man and nature, valuing life, and promoting morality, and developed into
a mysteries religion seeking the eternal life of mankind. The ultimate goal
of this religion was to help believers ascend to heaven and become physical
immortals or celestial beings. This celestial ascending was achieved by tak-
ing an external elixir produced by alchemy (waidan) or/and by practicing
qigong (the internal elixir or neidan) that stemmed from Huang-Lao
Taoism. It was contended that humans could rise to heaven in their own
flesh body, which differed from the Buddhist belief that only the soul, not
body, became a Buddha.
As had happened to Buddhism in China, religious Taoism also experi-
enced a process of “conflict/integration” with the mainstream ideology of
Confucianism. However, as an indigenous religion rooted in Chinese folk
customs and folk worldview, its collision with Confucianism was much less
drastic compared with the clash between Buddhism and Confucianism. In
reality, the conflict mostly centered on the idea of social hierarchy: the
primitive Taoism was a folk religion believing in the equality of all people
PROMOTING MORALITY FOR ULTIMATE LIBERATION: THE PHILOSOPHY… 135
in the pursuit of immortality. However, when many learned scholars

became Taoists during the era of the Wei-Jin and Southern and Northern
Dynasties, they transformed religious Taoism by incorporating moral con-
cepts of Confucianism into it to cater to the taste of the ruling class.
A close look at the sutras of Taoism at the time reveals a strong presence
of Confucian hierarchical moral values such as loyalty, filial piety, rites, and
benevolence; if a person wanted to become immortal, he first must be filial
to parents, loyal to the sovereign, and docile to Taoist masters. The incor-
poration of Confucian moral concepts, loyalty and filial piety in particular,
was used by Taoists not only to help them align with the mainstream ide-
ology, but also as a strategy to gain advantages over Buddhism as the latter
lacked those concepts. Meanwhile, religious Taoism also actively adopted
concepts such as “karma” and the “eighteen layers of hell” from Buddhism,
asserting that there were corresponding rewards or retribution for one’s
good deeds or evil deeds. These were utilized to teach people to be good
and submissive.
Ge Hong’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Ge Hong (283–363 CE) was one of the most prominent theorists of reli-
gious Taoism during the Wei-Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties.
Born into a privileged and influential family in the Western Jin Dynasty,
Ge dedicated his whole life to seeking physical immortality through taking
alchemically created medicines and practicing inner meditation. As a
scholar who was well versed both in philosophical Taoism and
Confucianism, he helped transform the primitive religious Taoism into a
more sophisticated religion with philosophical connotations by introduc-
ing many concepts of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, such as inactivity, con-
centrating on “the one”, serene inner-observation, and sitting in oblivion,
into his recipe for seeking immortality. More importantly, Ge was also
famous for his efforts to reconcile religious Taoism with Confucianism,
particularly in his introduction of Confucian moral values into Taoism to
enrich and transform the religion. He contended that both ideologies
were necessary because while religious Taoism could help people gain
eternal life, the Confucian doctrine could be used to improve morality and
maintain social order. Nonetheless, for Ge, pursuing Tao was more impor-
tant than Confucian moral cultivation. This idea was well illustrated in his
concept of “Taoism as essential and Confucianism as peripheral” (Ge &
Wang, 1985, p. 184) in which he held Tao as Substance and Confucianism
136 Z. YOU ET AL.
as Utility. While Confucian moral teaching was important for managing

the world, seeking Tao was more fundamental as it attempted to acquire
the ultimate happiness for mankind.
e Hong’s Cosmology
G
Following the philosophical Taoism tradition, Ge Hong believed that
heaven had no will and operated in a natural way. Therefore, people’s
death, longevity, or physical immortality were not determined by heaven.
Celestial divinities in heaven were merely the previous Taoists who had
successfully obtained immortality through practicing Taoism billions of
years ago. Consequently, sacrifices and prayers to heaven would not con-
tribute to people’s longevity and physical immortality, negating heaven’s
preference for morality.
This perspective, however, did not deny the transcendental power.
While depriving heaven of its authority on moral judgment, Ge Hong
highlighted the role of “Tao”, “the One” or “Xuan” as the substance of
the universe that had nurtured all things. He contended that Tao was “the
beginning of nature and the origin of myriads of different things” (Ge &
Wang, 1985, p. 1) and that “with the One, heaven was clear, earth was
peaceful, humans were born, and gods were almighty” (Ge & Wang,
1985, p. 142). It possessed the attributes of profundity, farness, highness,
and wideness unparalleled by any other things, and served as the dictator
or agent for all change in the cosmos. More importantly, it was in charge
of nurturing people’s virtues. The true morality out of Tao was the most
direct reflection or epitome of Tao per se such that it was as pure as raw
silk and unadorned like raw wood (Ge & Wang, 1985) and accordingly
moral education should preserve and follow this ultimate truth. Confucian
doctrine, for Ge, was simply a strategy to cope with the complexity of the
degenerated world, which, however, would inevitably lead to a deviation
from pursuing Tao. This was why Ge regarded Tao as essential and
Confucianism as peripheral.
e Hong’s Concepts Concerning Moral Education

G
While Ge Hong placed emphasis on Tao’s central status in moral cultiva-
tion, he also underscored the importance of Confucian moral principles
such as righteousness, rites, loyalty, and filial piety in his book. His intro-
duction of Confucian ethics into Taoism had a dual motivation: to gain
more political support and to remedy moral degeneration in his time.
Promoting mainstream Confucian moral values helped religious Taoism
obtain endorsement from the ruling class, which was critical for religious
Taoism to compete with Confucianism and Buddhism. Moreover, Ge had
hoped to correct the moral deterioration of his time through combining
Taoism’s pursuit of immortality with Confucian moral cultivation. He
noticed that under the previous influence of the Study of Xuan and the fad
for seeking immortality, many people from the privileged families indulged
in pure conversation and defamed Mingjiao, and this needed to be recti-
fied by promoting Confucian moral education.
For these purposes, Ge Hong highlighted the necessity for observing the
social hierarchy and rites in pursuit of Tao. Contrary to religious Taoism’s
initial standpoint of holding that all celestial beings were equal, Ge asserted
that hierarchy was natural both on earth and in heaven. For instance, the
celestial divinities could be sorted into three ranks. The first-tier celestial
beings ascended to heaven in their physical bodies, the second-tier traveled
in the famous mountains, and the third-tier were transformed into celestial
beings after death (Ge & Wang, 1985). The pecking order of celestial divini-
ties was a vivid reflection of human society with its marked hierarchy of his
time, which justified the legitimacy of social hierarchy in the secular world by
divine revelation. He further declared that the sovereign was just like heaven
and father, and thus the idea that the sovereign could be deposed was just
like the idea that heaven and father could be altered (Ge & Yang, 1991).
Rites, he explained, were designed to resolve the immoral behaviors like
usurping the throne and to ease tensions in society. Thus, all aspects of life,
from living places to utensils for cooking, should be regulated by rites.
Another theme in Ge Hong’s philosophy of moral education is that he
regarded filial piety and loyalty as preconditions for achieving physical
immortality. Traditionally, Taoists pursued the religious goals of personal
ascent and spiritual freedom, which was in direct conflict with the needs of
fulfilling secular obligations, for example being filial toward parents and
being loyal to the king. Ge, nevertheless, incorporated these concepts into
the framework of religious Taoism and made it clear that successfully
becoming a celestial being was contingent not just on practicing Taoist
techniques such as the external elixir or internal elixir, but also on observ-
ing the Confucian virtues of loyalty, filial piety, trustworthiness, and
benevolence. Those who did not follow these moral regulations could not
become immortals no matter how hard they had worked with the esoteric
methods (Ge & Wang, 1985). For Ge, Taoism was not a religion that
challenged the social order of the secular world, but a force that main-
tained the social hierarchy.
138 Z. YOU ET AL.
Accordingly, the goal of seeking Tao was intrinsically congruent with

the need to fulfill the moral duties, or to put it differently, there should be
an integration of becoming immortal and becoming a sage. That said,
religious Taoism’s preserving of the body and gaining of eternal life was
congruent with the spirit of filial piety in Confucianism. In response to
Confucians’ criticism that Taoists’ abandoning of family to pursue Tao was
not filial, Ge retorted that the goal of preserving the body and life forever
in Taoism was filial piety. While Confucianism held that “no posterity” was
the biggest violation of the principle of filial piety, seeking immortality
satisfied the demand of this moral principle on the grounds that it ensured
parents would have an heir who could last forever.
Following the philosophical Taoist tradition, Ge Hong stressed the
importance of eliminating desires in seeking eternal life, which reached a
consensus with Confucian moral cultivation as well. He asserted that
indulgence in pleasure, greed, and desires made people endlessly pursue
gains and fames, bringing myriad troubles and worries to them and doing
great harm to both their morality and their physical health. Thus, absti-
nence from worldly desires was another prerequisite for Taoists’ successful
pursuit of immortality, which indicated a high consistency between moral
development and longevity in Taoism.
Apart from incorporating Confucian principles, Ge Hong also intro-
duced the concept of karma from Buddhism, the idea that people’s for-
tunes were based on their own moral behaviors. While good morality
would bring rewards of health and long life from gods, evil behaviors
would result in celestial punishments such as diseases or suffering after
death in hell. Ge Hong even quantified karmic retribution to encourage
people to pursue moral conduct and deter them from immoral behavior,
claiming that a human’s lifespan and immortality were determined by the
status of his or her morality: the celestial gods kept track of people’s sins
and good deeds, and would decrease the lifespan by three days for a minor
misdemeanor committed, and by three hundred days for a major moral
transgression. Accumulating good deeds, on the contrary, would contrib-
ute to one’s successful pursuit of immortality. A Taoist need accrue 300
good deeds to become an earthbound immortal, and 1200 good deeds to
become a celestial immortal.
But Ge Hong did not just resort to utilitarian incentives. He also had a
strong faith in people’s innate kindness and compassion in facilitating their
own moral development. He called for Taoists to maintain the heart of
compassion and do whatever they could to help people in need, claiming
that “a person who pursues Tao should help people in dire peril and save
them from the troubles. He should help cure people’s illness so that the
latter would not die in vain, which is a super merit and virtue of Taoists”
(Ge & Wang, 1985, p. 53). In reality, he himself studied medicine while
pursuing Tao, which allowed him to cure sick people. He and his wife
once risked their lives and health to save many lives with herb medicines
during a raging pestilence in the region where he was practicing Taoism.
He also wrote books on medicine, which became important works in tra-
ditional Chinese medicine. In fact, one of his herb prescriptions for malaria
provided inspiration for Tu Youyou, who received the Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine in 2015 for discovering artemisinin and
dihydroartemisinin.
Furthermore, Ge Hong’s advocacy of moral cultivation in religious
Taoism was not limited to personal moral development, but embraced
public virtues as well; its aim was to rectify wrongdoings in political affairs
and bring more benefits to the general public (Li, 2000a). For quite a long
time, religious Taoism was criticized as a selfish spiritual doctrine by
Confucianism in that the pursuit of personal immortality ran counter to
the social needs of serving the public good. Ge, however, argued that the
cultivation of Tao could yield not only an individual’s preservation of
health, but also peace to the world as people with the ultimate wisdom
would offer good political advice to rulers. By connecting the goal of
immortality with serving the state, he reconciled the conflict between
individual pursuit and communal morality.
Ge Hong was not the only Taoist philosopher who laid the theoretical
framework for Taoism during this period. Other famous Taoists such as
Tao Hongjing also developed and enriched the philosophical system of
religious Taoism in which moral cultivation was a central theme. In terms
of its metaphysical achievement, nevertheless, religious Taoism was far less
delicate and profound than philosophical Taoism, not to mention
Confucianism. Compared with Buddhism, Taoism’s cosmology and ethics
were also remarkably weaker and less sophisticated. However, as the only
major indigenous religion in China, it proposed a complete value system
compatible with its religious world. With its permeating influence on ordi-
nary Chinese people, this religion in reality worked well in encouraging
moral conduct such as loyalty and filial piety by making them the precon-
ditions of ascending to heaven, and curbing people’s desire to do evil
deeds by introducing the idea of karmic retribution.
140 Z. YOU ET AL.
Morality and Enlightenment: The Philosophy

of Moral Education in Buddhism
Buddhism was founded by Siddhār tha Gautama (c. 563–c. 483 BCE), also
known as the Buddha or “the awakened one”, who had resolved to find
ultimate salvation for humans and eventually obtained enlightenment
while fasting and meditating under a Bo tree. Buddhism was introduced
to China from ancient India via the Silk Road in the Eastern Han Dynasty
and gradually became the most influential religion in China during the
Southern and Northern Dynasties. In contrast to religious Taoism,
Buddhism’s dual process of confrontation with and adaptation to
Confucianism was much more prolonged and tortuous. Since its introduc-
tion to China, Buddhism as an exotic religion had been in a dilemma,
caught between preserving its own core ideology and meeting the moral
demands of Chinese culture. The crux of the sinicization of Buddhism
therefore was if and how it would interact with and adapt to the moral
principles of Chinese culture, Confucian ethics in particular.
Implications of Buddhism’s Cosmology for Moral Education

One of Buddhism’s major contributions to the philosophy of Chinese
moral education lay in its cosmology and ontology, which helped
strengthen the relevant conceptual frameworks of indigenous Chinese
philosophies: it provided a metaphysics that the native Chinese philoso-
phies or religions mostly lacked. Due to their emphasis on human rela-
tions and politics, Chinese philosophies rarely concerned themselves with
the secret of the universe and the meaning of human existence, which
made them philosophically incomplete and less convincing. Confucius, for
instance, refused to talk about the afterlife or gods. Taoism also made no
explicit reference to the next life. Therefore, Buddhism filled in the hiatus
by introducing cosmological or ontological concepts such as a universe
with numerous realms, and the ideas of reincarnation, karma, enlighten-
ment, and nirvana, which enriched the theoretical underpinnings of moral
education philosophy.
Specifically, Buddhism deemed that the cosmos was an infinite process
with cyclic patterns of contraction and expansion; it included myriad
realms of existence—hells, earths, and heavens. Similarly, human existence
was subject to endless impermanence, suffering, and uncertainty because
individuals were reincarnated unceasingly, so had to repeatedly experience
the pains of birth, aging, disease, and death through countless lives.
Coupled with the concept of reincarnation, Buddhism proposed the kar-
mic law of cause and effect to explain human fortune; this was directly tied
to people’s morality. Karma suggested that intent and actions had conse-
quences on the actor, that the conditions of each life was contingent on
past moral behavior. Good deeds in this life would be rewarded in the next
life and misfortunes in this life were a consequence of bad deeds in previ-
ous lives.
This perspective viewed the nature of the world as “dependent arising”:
everything was interrelated to form causality. The causation out of depen-
dent arising resulted in infinite reincarnations, which were the source of
human suffering. One purpose of practicing Buddhism, therefore, was to
understand the emptiness of our world: all things arose in dependence
upon others due to causality and all things disappeared due to the vanish-
ing of causality, which helped people recognize the source of troubles,
dispel delusions, and eliminate the associated suffering. That said, reciting
sutras was a significant part of practicing Buddhism and meditating was an
important approach to achieving enlightenment, which connoted awaken-
ing, or more specifically, deep understanding, wisdom, and insight. With
this wisdom, one could fully understand dependent arising or the empti-
ness of existence so as to escape reincarnation, and eventually reach a state
of nirvana, namely a status of spiritual serenity free of human cravings,
greed, delusions, and attachment, and became a Buddha.
We should note that these metaphysical concepts in Buddhism were
utilized to facilitate people’s moral development. For instance, karmic ret-
ribution was a central theme in Buddha’s religious preaching and moral
teaching. Based on the law of karma, Buddhism demanded that believers
should not commit any evil deeds and should do everything that was
good. On the one hand, people who did evil deeds would be punished
later in this life or the next life due to karmic retribution. On the other
hand, those who accumulated good things would be rewarded in the next
life and eventually obtain eternal bliss. These ideas about karma and rein-
carnation were used as a powerful tool to teach people to be morally good
and curb their evil inclinations, which helped reduce social conflict and
stabilize the country (Huang, 2011).
Nurturing the virtue of compassion was another approach and the goal of
religious/moral cultivation in Buddhism. Compassion was one of the most
important spiritual qualities essential in practicing Buddhism, and covered
the emotional and altruistic dimension of people’s nature. Like Confucian
142 Z. YOU ET AL.
reciprocity, it denoted a human characteristic; when Buddhists saw other

people in misery, they felt their pain as their own, and strived to help lessen
their agony, or felt urged to provide comfort, sympathy, concern, and care
to those unfortunate people. Compassion as a noble spirit was a higher level
of morality than those bred only out of fear of karma. While karmic retribu-
tion deterred people from doing evil things or encouraged them to do good
things with the promise of a good return in the next life, compassion encour-
aged people to help others with little consideration for their own karmic
reward.
Although enriching Chinese culture with new worldviews and concepts
for moral cultivation, the introduction and spread of Buddhism in China
was difficult as some of its religious beliefs and moral values conflicted
with the mainstream value system in China, namely Confucian ethics. For
instance, the monastic practice of abandoning family life and the idea of
transcending secular rites threatened the Confucian core values of filial
piety to parents and loyalty to the sovereign, and aroused considerable
dissatisfaction. Many Confucians contended that Buddhism would under-
mine the traditional values essential to maintain social hierarchy, a serious
accusation that Buddhists had to answer. While following the basic belief
system of Buddhism, many famous Chinese Buddhists took initiatives to
revise the doctrines or even made compromises in exchange for political
support, which accelerated the sinicization of Buddhism as well as facili-
tated the integration of the three teachings/religions.
Hui-yuan’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Hui-yuan (334–416 CE) was a Chinese Buddhist master in the Eastern Jin
Dynasty who was noted for writing a series of treatises, “On Why Monks
Should not Bow Down Before Kings and the Response to Heng Xuan”.
Hui-yuan lived in a time when Buddhism was undergoing rapid growth
and was widespread in China. However, it was also a time when Buddhist
moral beliefs seriously clashed with Confucian creeds, and often with the
government’s interests as well, which inevitably obstructed its further
development. Through his writings and debates on the legitimacy of
Buddhism, Hui-yuan successfully defended Buddhism’s nonobservance of
Confucian rites, and at the same time mitigated the tension between
Buddhist ideology and Confucian moral values.
ui-yuan’s Defense of Why Monks Do Not Bow Down Before Kings

H
When Buddhism was introduced to China, it received a warm welcome
from the Chinese people inasmuch as it offered them a sophisticated spiri-
tual solace; neither Confucianism nor Taoism could do this during an era
of frequent war and political turmoil. With its further development, how-
ever, this foreign religion inevitably collided with Chinese mainstream cul-
ture. First, Buddhism indicated that all beings were equal and that
everyone could become a Buddha, which conflicted with the value system
of Mingjiao, which centered on social hierarchy. Next, as Buddhism gained
more and more popularity in China, the number of monks and nuns
increased hugely. The behavior of abandoning family and becoming a
monk, however, contradicted with the idea of filial piety of Confucianism
as these monks no longer supported and respected their aged parents or
raised children at home. Contrary to Confucianism’s advocacy of actively
participating in the affairs of this world, Buddhism as a religion sought a
departure from this world and pursued happiness in the next. This other-
worldly attitude of abandoning family and the idea of equality clashed
directly with the preaching of Confucianism (Le, 1986).
Economically, the monastery’s ownership of large amount of tax-
exempt land and labor violated the interests of secular landlords as well. In
politics, monks gained tremendous political influences through recruiting
aristocratic believers and even enjoyed the privilege of not bowing
down before emperor and princes, which triggered great dissatisfaction
from the nobles. A powerful minister called Heng Xuan, for instance,
endeavored to suppress the rapid spread of Buddhism. He started a philo-
sophical debate with Hui-yuan by correspondence on whether monks
should acknowledge a royal presence with ritual kneeling. In his letter,
Heng Xuan asserted that monks should bow down before kings on the
grounds that they had been financially and politically rewarded by rulers
and hence it was reasonable to ask monks to show their respect to kings
with proper rituals. How to hold the Buddhist creed of equality of all
living beings and at the same time reconcile the belief system of Buddhism
with Confucian ideology was a dilemma for Hui-yuan.
In response to Heng Xuan’s criticism, Hui-yuan diplomatically
remarked that according to Buddhist sutra, the laity and monks should be
treated differently. Those Buddhists living at home should obey the secu-
lar laws of loyalty and filial piety, treating their superiors with proper rites
and respecting their parents as expected in Confucian classics (Hui, 1991).
In this way, Buddhism and Confucianism did not diverge in terms of moral
144 Z. YOU ET AL.
requirements in the secular world. Nonetheless, these requirements should

not be imposed on those monks and nuns who had already left their fami-
lies permanently. To emperor and princes, monks were only outside visi-
tors in this world, and therefore they should not comply with the worldly
rules. The secular moral laws such as rites in actuality were something that
they needed to abandon in order to become Buddhas. Hence, they should
not change their belief to follow secular rites, even though the monastery
had received donations from the nobility.
Hui-yuan further claimed that monks’ dedication to Buddhism would
benefit the king’s task of ruling the country and stabilizing society. He
argued that both the laity and monks could help facilitate Confucian moral
cultivation. For those laity staying at home, reciting Buddhist sutras could
help them develop morally as those sutras were infiltrated with rhetoric
about serving superiors and respecting parents, namely loyalty and filial
piety. The value of a monk’s work, he added, was to worship the Buddha
and study Buddhist sutras so as to achieve eternal salvation for mankind.
If a monk could accomplish such a feat, his work could help promote
moral values for all people in the world, including his own parents, which
helped kings in harmonizing social relations. Hence, even though monks
did not support their immediate families, they were not against the prin-
ciple of filial piety in a broad sense; even though they did not kneel down
before emperor and princes, they did not show less respect to rulers (Hui,
1991).
It is noteworthy that Hui-yuan endeavored to settle the disputes
between Buddhism and Confucianism through introducing the moral
concepts of loyalty and filial piety into Buddhism. Though he insisted that
monks should not bow down before kings, he made a compromise that
Buddhists at home should observe those moral principles, which reduced
conflict and helped to strengthen royal power. More importantly, Hui-
yuan successfully pointed out that the practice of Buddhism was actually
conducive to enhancing Confucian moral education. Due to the e normous
influence of Buddhism in Chinese society, this religion promoted moral
values desired by the ruling class and therefore benefited political rule as a
whole. As a result of his efforts, the emperor of the Eastern Jin Dynasty
and Heng Xuan exempted Buddhist monks from having to bow down
before emperors and princes on the grounds that monks had left the secu-
lar world.
ui-yuan’s Cosmology and Ontology

H
Hui-yuan held nonbeing (wu) to be the substance of the universe, a con-
cept which he had developed from another famous monk, Dao-an, who in
turn had inherited it from Wang Bi of the Study of Xuan. Nevertheless,
this concept of nonbeing was not just an inheritance of a Taoist tradition,
but also an embodiment of the original Buddhist creed that all of the four
basic elements of the universe—namely, earth, fire, wind, and water—were
void, meaning that all things existed because of dependent arising, and
nothing could exist independently. To be more specific, everything in the
world occurred from nonbeing as a result of the combination and interac-
tion of various factors; everything in the world changed from existence to
nonexistence as a result of the depletion of causations. But a worldview of
nonbeing did not negate Hui-yuan’s belief about the imperishability of
the spirit. On the contrary, he held that Dharma (the Buddha-nature) was
permanent and used a metaphor of wood and fire to expound the perpetu-
ity of the spirit, claiming that the spirit existed with karma despite the
decay of human body, just like fire passed on forever from one piece of
wood to another.2 Hence the essence of nonbeing was not a complete
opposite of being but another name for Dharma (Hui, 1991).
Based on the ontological concept of nonbeing, Hui-yuan indicated that
ignorance was the source of illusion and desires were causes of agony. Due
to ignorance, many people believed that they owned something and were
eager to gain more because of insatiability. Greed for possession often led
to the loss of one’s true nature; once a person had lost his nature, he was
likely to commit evil acts, which triggered karmic retributions due to the
chain reaction of causality (Guo, 2010). Understanding this karmic cau-
sality of agony in life and striving to go back to the state of nonbeing was
therefore the solution to human troubles in Hui-yuan’s religious
philosophy.
In his works, Hui-yuan gave an intricate explanation about karma and
fortune which was conducive to people’s moral development. He held
that the consequences of karma were determined by the morality of peo-
ple’s actions, with good actions engendering rewards and evil actions
resulting in punishment in the current or the next life, or even many lives
later. This theory explained why good people experienced misfortunes in
this life—they were being punished for evil deeds done many lives ago.
Thus, one had to accumulate as many good deeds as possible and never do
bad things so as to be blessed in all lives, and eventually enjoy eternal hap-
piness in the Buddhist’s paradise. Through explicating Buddhist concepts
146 Z. YOU ET AL.
such as causality, retribution, and the immortal soul, Hui-yuan established

a complete philosophical system that aimed at publicizing Buddhist beliefs
and regulating believers’ moral behavior.
Hui-yuan’s philosophy, though mostly religious, contributed to moral
education in ancient China. His concept of karma was different from fatal-
ism inasmuch as people’s fortunes were not predestined by the divine but
were determined by their own choices (Huang, 2011). Under this theory,
one would be more likely to adopt a positive attitude than under deter-
minism. Although one might have to suffer due to faults in previous lives,
moral thoughts or good deeds could make the punishment much less
severe and slower in this life and would lead to rewards in the next lives,
which encouraged people to pursue morally right behavior. Furthermore,
Hui-yuan’s theory was both better in design and easier to understand than
previous explanations about misfortune in religious Taoism. Due to its
simplicity, even uneducated people could understand its logic and be influ-
enced by it. As to its philosophical sophistication, it made up for the flaws
in the previous discourse on karma and explained why a good person
might still suffer misfortune. In short, Hui-yuan’s philosophy integrated
morality and karma, impacting tremendously on people’s value system and
daily conduct in life.
Hui-neng’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Hui-neng (638–713 CE), a great Buddhist master, was dubbed the Sixth
Patriarch of Chan Buddhism (better known as “Zen” in Japanese). Chan
was the Chinese version of Buddhism, which later became an influential
religious and cultural force in East Asia. Unlike other Buddhist schools
highlighting the verbalism of sutra-reading, Chan Buddhism is character-
ized by its emphasis on enlightenment—attaining spiritual knowledge
through intuition and inspiration. It was interesting to note that Hui-
neng was initially an illiterate “barbarian” from the then economically and
culturally backward region of South China, whose job was to do chores at
the Buddhist monastery. But due to his innate intuitive wisdom or Buddha
nature, he surpassed his more learned fellow monk, Shen-xiu, and inher-
ited the official status of patriarch from his master, Hong-ren—the Fifth
Patriarch, who certified Hui-neng’s authority in transmitting the Buddhist
enlightenment of Chan.
Legend has it that after winning a Chan stanza-composing competi-
tion, Hui-neng was secretly chosen by Master Hong-ren as his successor.
With the latter’s guidance, Hui-neng came to his sudden enlightenment

or epiphany while hearing the sermons on The Diamond Sutra from his
master.3 After that, Hui-neng fled to the south for fear of revenge from
Shen-xiu and established the Southern School of Chan, teaching sudden
enlightenment. His fellow monk, Shen-xiu, established the Northern
School of Chan, teaching gradual enlightenment. However, it was Hui-
neng, instead of Shen-xiu, who is remembered by posterity as the greatest
Chinese master of Chan inasmuch as sudden enlightenment was widely
accepted as the official doctrine of Chan Buddhism in later years. As a
great master, Hui-neng’s contribution lay not only in the development of
Buddhism, but also in the promotion of ideologies concerning Buddhist
moral education.
ui-neng’s Concepts About Moral Cultivation

H
Hui-neng’s philosophy of moral education was inextricably bonded with
his preaching of the search for ultimate liberation. To him, the so-called
“three poisons” in Buddhism, namely greed, hatred, and delusion, were
the source of all crimes, concerns, and agonies and led to the suffering of
reincarnation. Hence, the pursuit of Dharma started and ended with elim-
inating and eradicating these three poisons, and the journey of breaking
the cycle of rebirth and becoming a Buddha was highly congruent with
and contingent on moral cultivation in Hui-neng’s philosophy. In light of
this, the following section will discuss themes in Hui-neng’s sutra
concerning the moral education of Buddhists, including the equality of
the Buddha nature, the four great wishes, promoting good and dismissing
evil, and the teaching and learning approach of sudden enlightenment.
One of the central themes in Hui-neng’s teaching of Buddhism was the
equality of Buddha nature for everyone. Buddha nature originally referred
to the nature of Buddha Shakyamuni, which was later developed into a
concept indicating the factor (or seed) in ordinary people that could
enable them to become a Buddha. Hui-neng himself was an illiterate who
came from the then backward region of southern China. When his master
Hong-ren mocked him that even someone from the barbarous south like
him dare hope to become a Buddha, he retorted that “although a place
could be named as north or south, Buddha nature had no such a distinc-
tion” (Hui, 2010, p. 6). For Hui-neng, everyone had the same Buddha
nature regardless of their social rank, economic status, education, and
ethnicity. Moreover, the Buddha nature was intrinsically located inside
one’s heart, such that its discovery did not rely on perusing Buddhist
148 Z. YOU ET AL.
sutras or worshiping Buddhist statues, but was usually triggered by a sepa-

rate heart-to-heart transmission from Buddhist master to disciple, and
reinforced by directly reading one’s own heart. By doing so, a Buddhist
could obtain enlightenment and eventually become a Buddha. In this
sense, the idea of Buddha nature is not unlike the concept of innate good
conscience in Confucianism, both functioning similarly in education.
The recovery of one’s Buddha nature, nonetheless, was not just a cog-
nitive procedure, but also a process of moral development, which was the
foundation and precondition for following the Bodhisattva path.4 For
Hui-neng, the Buddha nature was in one’s own heart and morality was the
essential part of Buddha nature. Put differently, the Buddha nature
embraced innate moral principles such that only those who had cultivated
perfect morality could possibly obtain insights into their Buddha nature.
Consequently, while Hui-neng held mind-reading and sudden-awakening
as the only approach for achieving the Dharma, he also emphasized the
importance of Buddhists’ moral development in purifying their minds,
which integrated moral cultivation with the ultimate goal of achieving
eternal bliss.
Promoting good and eradicating evil was central to Hui-neng’s
Buddhist cultivation in that it was vital for Buddhists to break asunder the
fetters of greed and delusions that obstructed the recovery of the Dharma
Nature. Such a moral pursuit first demanded people follow the Buddhists’
code of conduct, such as the Five Precepts and Ten Good Deeds. The Five
Precepts were the most basic commandments, enjoining abstention from
killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, and drinking. Partially
overlapping with the Five Precepts, the Ten Good Deeds can be sorted
into three categories of bodily action, speech, and mind. Bodily action
entailed no killing, no stealing, and no sexual misconduct; the category of
speech comprised no lying, no idle talk, no slander, and no harsh speech;
the category of mind embraced no greed, no hatred, and no improper
views. Hui-neng particularly highlighted the significance of obeying the
Ten Good Deeds, stating that if a Buddhist practiced these virtues often,
he or she would soon reach paradise (Hui, 2010). This moral cultivation
helped Buddhists clean up the shadow of delusion, which allowed the
peaceful and bright Buddha nature to emerge in their heart.
Goodness or virtuousness (shan) played a critical role in both cultivat-
ing moral growth and achieving true Dharma. Hui-neng declared that
“one evil idea would offset merits accumulated in myriad years; one virtu-
ous idea would wipe out evil karma amassed by committing uncountable
evil deeds” (Hui, 2010, p. 97). The arousal of goodness or evil thought
was triggered by one’s inner moral choice. On the one hand, images such
as a deep ocean, evil dragons, ghosts and gods, hells, and wild animals
were only illusions evoked by one’s own worries, evil desires, and greed;
on the other hand, dispersing these poisonous ideas and following Ten
Good Deeds could lead to a peaceful state of mind, so that people’s heart
would be filled up with positive attitudes of compassion, joyful giving,
purity, and uprightness.
One of the key assertions in Hui-neng’s teaching is that it was people’s
own moral choices that decided whether they was in hell or paradise: a
person was in hell when he indulged in evil ideas and was in paradise when
he was immersed in the thought of virtues. Similarly, one could turn into
wild animals with toxic ideas and became a Bodhisattva with compassion
(Hui, 2010). With these sermons, Hui-neng encouraged people to take
the initiative to develop the character of goodness and serve others with
compassion and wisdom, which worked very effectively for the purposes
of moral education.
Goodness that penetrated the whole process of the moral/religious
cultivation of Buddhists could be categorized into three kinds. The first
was a goodness of convenience, which included good deeds that people
did in life for the sake of achieving their own salvation. The second was the
goodness of liberation, that is, the merit to liberate humans from their
troubles and burdens. The third—the goodness in substance—devoted to
the salvation of all beings, which surpassed the realms of evil and good in
the secular world (Peng, 2010). Hui-neng preached the nurturing of all
the virtues, the third kind in particular. He himself made four great pledges
that he would lead all beings out of the suffering of reincarnation, wipe
out boundless troubles in the world, learn the inexhaustible knowledge of
Buddhism, and realize enlightenment and become a Buddha (Hui, 2010,
p. 93), which vividly illustrated the orientation and goals of moral cultiva-
tion in Chan Buddhism.
ui-neng’s Approaches to Moral Education

H
As a Buddhist master, Hui-neng particularly underscored the role of con-
fession (chan-hui) in facilitating Buddhists’ moral self-cultivation. To con-
fess, he noted, was to perceive one’s own faults, which was needed to
correct mistakes and follow the right path. While the Chinese character
chan denoted a person’s acknowledgment of wrongs done in previous
behaviors, the Chinese character hui referred to the determination that he
150 Z. YOU ET AL.
or she would never do the evil deeds again, which was a first step to rectify-
ing one’s delusions and obtaining serenity of mind. However, confession
to Hui-neng was not just a way of obtaining mental relief, but more
importantly an approach to nurturing moral conscience in guiding one’s
own behavior. Confession should be an integration of action and speech
in one’s whole life. No matter how a person prayed or repented before
Buddhist statues, he would get nowhere if he would not stop doing evil
deeds or thinking about evil ideas.
Heart-to-heart transmission or communication, an esoteric technique
in Chan, was Hui-neng’s most important approach to obtaining sudden-
awakening, which simultaneously worked for moral understanding due to
the inextricable ties between the two. In contrast to the traditional method
of reciting sutras or praying to Buddhist statues, Hui-neng’s approach was
dubbed a separate transmission from mind to mind (Hui, 2010). Such a
transmission could occur only within the close relationship between a
Buddhist master and his disciple. The master usually utilized many ways,
mostly one-on-one conversation, to stimulate his disciples to achieve an
epiphany. Here, nothing was literally transmitted from Chan master to
disciple; rather, enlightenment or Bodhi must be realized by disciples
themselves with inspiration from their masters.5 With the spread of Chan
Buddhism in East Asia, this heart-to-heart communication became a phil-
osophical method and a teaching/learning approach, not only for moral
education and religious teaching but also in the teaching or appreciation
of arts, crafts, and literature in Asian culture.
It is noteworthy that Hui-neng’s approach of heart-to-heart transmis-
sion was overwhelmingly dialogical. While engaging in a conversation,
master and disciple exchanged witty insights on various topics concerning
Chan, and the master usually used a special action—such as a remark or a
lion’s roar or even a knock on the disciple’s head with a stick to wake up
the disciple spiritually—on the special occasion of a paradoxical argument,
which helped the latter suddenly understand all the sources and causes of
human suffering, thereby recovering the seed of Buddhahood in the heart.
One may compare Chan dialogs with the Socratic method of teaching in
the West, which made sense in comparing the master’s role as a midwife.
But unlike the Socratic method, which chiefly relied on logic and evi-
dence, the Chan dialogs placed the emphasis on intuition, inspiration, and
aesthetic perception, with the result that the process was highly situational.
Each witty conversation was unique and could not be repeated.
In fact, the origin of Chan dialog can be partly traced back to the
Chinese tradition of pure conversation of the Study of Xuan in the Wei
and Jin Dynasties. Pure conversation was a fashion in which famous schol-
ars engaged in witty short talks or debates to seek truth or express under-
standing about Tao. With the introduction and spread of Buddhism in
China, pure conversation was adopted as a teaching method to trigger
Buddhists’ spiritual enlightenment—it became a trademark of Chan
Buddhism. The monks of Chan used allegorical dialogs to evoke wisdom,
inspire disciples, and criticize or mock mainstream moral principles and
behaviors. Through various dialogs, monks often negated or challenged
stereotyped moral doctrines, and brought new ideas and thoughts con-
cerning Buddhist beliefs and code of conduct into Chinese culture.
Meditation was another important approach to obtaining Bodhi in
Chan Buddhism. The Chan School, also known as “the meditation
school”, particularly emphasized the role of sitting meditation in recover-
ing the Buddha nature and promoting moral self-cultivation. Besides sit-
ting, monks should also mediate during walking, standing, or when even
lying down, striving to maintain a heart of uprightness and not bend
principles or flatter others. In practicing meditation, one needed to main-
tain constant concentration or dhyana, which was a mental status that had
eliminated external distractions and interruptions to preserve a serene,
clean, and peaceful mind. In the status of dhyana, a Buddhist could use
wisdom to perceive and transcend joy and sorrow, birth and death, gain
and loss, and reflect on the nature of his own existence in the hope of
reaching nirvana.
Hui-neng’s method of moral cultivation was widely welcomed by ordi-
nary people due to its tendency toward minimalism. To most Chinese
people with little or no education, sutra-reading would be a huge barrier
for them to practice Buddhism. Hui-neng, an illiterate himself, provided
those people with an easy, rapid way of seeking enlightenment—a contrast
to the scholasticism and obscurity of other schools. For instance, Hui-
neng’s fellow monk Shen-xiu delivered tedious and cumbersome dis-
course about the three laws of Buddhism, namely “precept”, “meditation”,
and “wisdom”, whereas Hui-neng gave a simpler and shorter recipe con-
centrating on the cultivation of the heart. Hui-neng claimed that “pre-
cept” meant no faults in the heart, “meditation” referred to bravery and
composure in the heart, and “wisdom” denoted the depletion of igno-
rance in the heart. In a word, his method did not rely on abstract ideas or
152 Z. YOU ET AL.
complex concepts but a quick and direct-to-the heart kind of moral culti-
vation, a model that attracted both intellectuals and ordinary people.
For Hui-neng, both deep meditation and witty dialogs served the pur-
pose of achieving sudden enlightenment. This concept of abrupt awaken-
ing was created by a famous monk named Zhu Daosheng, who believed
the path to Bodhisattva was not a slow, accumulated, and orderly cogni-
tive process centered on studying Buddhist sutras, but a giant qualitative
transformation through the sudden realization of one’s true nature. It was
a sudden understanding marked by quickness, directness, profoundness,
and unexpectedness.
While rejecting the traditional incremental method, Hui-neng inher-
ited and perfected the sudden approach of Buddhism, which highlighted
the importance of an immediate change in moral ideas. He explicated that
people originally had a pure and clean nature encompassing the wisdom of
Bodhi. However, the delusions amassed in their secular life had negatively
affected the Buddha nature, which hindered or prevented their enlighten-
ment. If a Buddhist could resolve delusions and reacquire original wis-
dom, he or she would experience sudden-awakening because the enormous
discrepancy between an ordinary person and a Buddha lies only in the
change of a moral idea or concept. This belief about the alteration of a
moral idea in obtaining sudden enlightenment provided the logical under-
pinnings for the old saying in Buddhism that even a butcher or a tyrant
could become a Buddha immediately after laying down his knife and stop-
ping killing (Huang, 2011).
In conclusion, it would be hard to overestimate the extent and depth of
Hui-neng’s impact on the Chinese people’s moral development. With his
advocacy of sutra-less, simple, direct-to-the heart meditation and reflec-
tion, Chan Buddhism attracted a large population of believers, who other-
wise might not have been engaged. Moreover, Hui-neng’s influence went
far beyond Buddhist temples and affected the moral development of lay
Buddhists as he suggested that one did not have to become a monk or nun
to practice Buddhism; in other words, lay Buddhists could follow the
Bodhisattva path at home too. The key was that all Buddhists should obey
the moral principles and code of conduct in Buddhism—for example, filial
piety, compassion, integrity, harmony, forbearance, and self-improvement—
which were essential for both monks and the laity to succeed (Hui, 2010).
If the Buddhists did not follow these moral requirements, they could not
secure final liberation even though they might have chosen to become a
monk or nun. This feature of moral self-cultivation, along with the simpli-
fied religious instruction and direct-to-the heart learning method, helped

Chan Buddhism become a dominant school of Buddhism in China, exert-
ing massive influence on the moral values as well as the way of thinking of
the ancient Chinese people.
Qi-song’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Qi-song (1007–1072 CE), also known as the monk of filial piety, was a
Buddhist living in the Northern Song Dynasty. Qi-song’s chief contribu-
tion to Buddhism was that he held a firm standpoint reconciling Buddhism
and Confucianism, and had incorporated Confucian moral doctrines, filial
piety in particular, into Buddhism. As filial piety was a key element and
one of the central goals of moral education in Chinese culture, Qi-song’s
work facilitated not only the sinicization of Buddhism, but also the forma-
tion of a moral orientation in Chinese Buddhism that valued filial piety
highly. After Qi-song, filial piety had become one of the trademarks of
Chinese Buddhism, differing drastically from its original form in ancient
India.
As mentioned earlier, Buddhism’s role in meeting the spiritual needs of
people was one of the reasons why the religion was able to take root and
spread quickly in China. However, a monk’s action of shaving his head
and abandoning his parents, wife, and children was in direct conflict with
the Confucian core value of filial piety, drawing much criticism from
Confucians for Buddhists’ failure to support old parents and have chil-
dren. As monks were not married and did not have children, this practice
of deserting human relations and evading family responsibility ran counter
to the Confucian creed that having no posterity was the most unfilial
behavior. In actuality, Confucianism was a politically oriented system of
ethics based on family relations, in which the virtue of filial piety was
highly regarded because it was naturally bonded with the character of loy-
alty. Together, filial piety and loyalty were crucial to ensuring a hierarchi-
cal, stable, agricultural society, which in turn was the reason why the ruling
class fully endorsed Confucianism. Hence, if Buddhism wanted to obtain
complete acceptance in China, it had to respond directly to the criticism.
Previously, many Buddhist masters had tried to answer the question by
adopting the idea of filial piety into Buddhism so as to enhance its philo-
sophical compatibility with Confucianism. Hui-yuan, for instance, argued
that monks’ pursuit of Buddhism could benefit their parents in a broad
sense. Nevertheless, even Hui-yuan had to admit that Buddhism and
154 Z. YOU ET AL.
Confucianism differed fundamentally in their view of filial piety. After

Hui-yuan, some Buddhists started to propagandize the idea of filial piety
in their sutras. A monk in the Tang Dynasty even wrote a volume of sutra
dedicated to extoling parents’ great favors to children. This trend showed
that Buddhism in China had gradually shifted from its original form,
which rejected filial obligations, to a Chinese version which publicized the
importance of filial piety. Nonetheless, it was Qi-song who fully integrated
the concept of filial piety into Buddhism and the monks’ pursuit of Bodhi
into Confucian filial duty, essentially settling the dispute between
Buddhism and Confucianism.
In fact, Qi-song’s advocacy of filial piety represented a response from
the Buddhist circle to Confucians’ reproaches about the legitimacy of
Buddhism, which was a common episode in the competition for suprem-
acy between the two philosophies/religions throughout Chinese history.
While Confucian philosophers such as the Cheng Brothers, Chu Hsi, and
Lu Jiuyuan in the Song Dynasties actively absorbed and incorporated
Buddhist concepts about mind and nature and the method of heart-to-
heart transmission into Confucianism, they also frequently censured
Buddhism for discarding important human relations between sovereign
and minister, father and son, and husband and wife. As human relation-
ships were key to the value system of Chinese culture, this criticism put
Buddhism in an awkward position. To redress the situation, Qi-song wrote
a series of articles systematically discussing the inner consensus and com-
patibility between filial piety and the doctrine of Buddhism.
First, Qi-song highly eulogized the virtue of filial piety, claiming that it
was a core value in both Buddhism and Confucianism. He even claimed
that filial piety was the fundamental law of the universe and thus should be
followed by all. When people prayed to heaven and earth, and to gods and
ghosts, they had to be filial in the heart first, otherwise their requests
would be in vain. Those who pretended to be filial but in reality were not
would actually be punished by the divine. Qi-song further indicated that
although both Confucianism and Buddhism highlighted the role of filial
piety in people’s moral development, they focused on different goals.
While Confucianism chiefly used filial piety to help regulate human rela-
tions, Buddhism mainly utilized it to nurture the people’s moral under-
standing (Qi, 1981). The two schools also played different roles as related
to the specific function of filial cultivation: Confucianism defended and
humanized the character of filial piety, whereas Buddhism as a religion
helped spread and sanctify it (Qi, 1981). Consequently, both of the two
religions/philosophies served the purpose of helping the government

rule the country. With the above statement, Qi-song established common
ground on filial piety for the two philosophies/religions, as well as high-
lighting the advantages of Buddhism, with its religious influence, in pro-
moting filial piety.
Further, Qi-song held there was intrinsic consensus between filial piety
and Buddhist moral principles. The Five Precepts in Buddhism, he claimed,
were congruent with the five permanent virtues in Confucianism, that “no
killing was benevolence, no stealing was righteousness, no sexual misconduct
was rites, no drinking was wisdom, and no false speech was credibility” (Qi,
1983, p. 661). Further, observing the Buddhist precepts embodied the core
of fulfilling the duty of filial piety: if a Buddhist followed all the precepts, he
not only brought himself moral development, but also glory to his parents,
which was a manifestation of his filial piety; if a person failed to observe one
of them, he would bring shame to his parents, which indicated a violation of
the principle of filial piety (Qi, 1981). Following Buddhist precepts, Qi-song
added, was filial behavior per se for monks and nuns in that their parents
would not have to worry about their children in the Buddhist monasteries.
In this sense, filial piety also served as the emotional and moral basis by which
a Buddhist would consciously abide by the Five Precepts.
Next, Qi-song reaffirmed and enriched the previous idea about filial
piety in a broad sense, which referred to Buddhists’ contribution to all
human beings, their own parents included, with their efforts to realize
universal salvation. Buddhists’ practice of Buddhism, he contended, would
benefit their parents because even though monks could not support their
aging parents as the laity could, they could pay a debt of gratitude to par-
ents with their own high morality and save their parents from the pain of
reincarnation (Qi, 1981), which could be the highest form of filial piety
for Buddhists.
But unlike the previous monks, Qi-song did not just stop at the con-
cept of filial piety in the broad sense, but further proposed that monks and
nuns show their filial piety directly to their own parents. He argued that if
a Buddhist could not respect and show filial piety to his parents, how
could he bring benefits to other people? Thus, observing filial piety should
be the start of monks’ moral cultivation, a prerequisite for seeking eternal
happiness for human beings (Qi, 1981). Even Siddhār tha Gautama him-
self, Qi-song argued, preached the Dharma to his own mother after he
had become a Buddha. Therefore, Qi-song suggested that monks express
sorrow when their parents had passed way. Even if monks could not
156 Z. YOU ET AL.
observe the Confucian ritual of mourning exclusively for three years for
the deceased parents, they should preserve mourning for their parents in
their hearts for three years, that is, practicing the three-year “heart mourn-
ing”, and preaching the Dharma for their parents.
In closing, Qi-song’s philosophy of moral education tremendously
enhanced the status of filial piety in the doctrine of Buddhism. Unlike his
predecessors, who tended to evade the question, Qi-song admitted that
filial piety should be a core moral feature of monks and nuns. This strategy
was successful in reducing criticism from Confucians: Buddhism entirely
attuned its philosophical system to fit the Chinese tradition of ruling the
country with filial piety. After making considerable compromises,
Buddhism had essentially finished its journey of sinicization and became a
complete Chinese religion. From the philosophical perspective of moral
education, Qi-song’s advocacy of Buddhists’ filial duty further established
filial piety as the cornerstone of Chinese culture, helping strengthen the
filial orientation across the entire Chinese social spectrum.
Conclusion
Generally speaking, religions played an important and unique role in pro-
moting the moral development of the ancient Chinese and could not be
replaced by Confucianism. With strong political support from the ruling
class, Confucian moral education mostly worked in a top-down manner.
Although this doctrine had significantly influenced the value system of
Chinese people as a whole, its impact on the lower classes was not very
effective. This was partly because Confucianism’s philosophical structure,
ethical concepts, and teaching method were too abstract for the common
people, many of whom were illiterate, to understand, and partly because it
did not bring the promise of an afterlife for the lower classes, making it
much less desirable. For the upper classes, the philosophy also failed to
provide them with convincing answers to ontological and cosmological
questions, not to mention the ultimate questions about life. Consequently,
religions such as Buddhism and religious Taoism, with their easy-to-
understand and vivid description of a multiverse system including hell,
paradise, karma, reincarnation, and immortality, filled the ontological,
theological, and motivational voids.
While satisfying people with religious needs of salvation, the two reli-
gions’ discourses about rebirth and karmic retribution were particularly
instrumental in promoting moral growth; they persuaded people to do
good deeds and deterred them from doing evil deeds. Using the simple
logic of karma, most people could easily understand the consequences of
good or evil moral conducts, which was conducive to promoting the
desired moral behaviors and shaping benign social customs. Moreover,
after incorporating the concepts of loyalty and filial piety into their respec-
tive frameworks, these religions helped spread these moral creeds, which
sometimes worked more effectively than Confucianism due to the reli-
gious influence on people in the lower classes. As a result, the so-called
three teachings/religions, namely Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism,
worked together and supplemented each other to teach morality and sta-
bilize society.
This integration of the three teachings, especially Buddhism with
Confucianism, was marked by conflict, competition, and adaptation—this
has usually termed been a process of “conflict-integration” by Chinese
scholars. The success of this integration was based on the fact that all of
the three philosophies/religions shared some common ground. For
instance, all of them had the characteristics of inclusiveness in nature.
While Confucianism and Taoism were noted for the spirit of open-
mindedness and harmony, Buddhism too was marked by the ethos of a
liberal attitude (Guang, 2013), which allowed mutual toleration and
learning. Further common ground was related to the concept of retribu-
tion. All sides had strongly preached pursuing to good and dispelling evil.
While karmic retribution was a core concept in Buddhism, indigenous
Chinese culture possessed the similar idea that families amassing goodness
would receive good fortune, while families accumulating bad deeds would
receive bad fortune (Li, 2000b), which served as the cultural and intel-
lectual foundation for integration.
The conflict-integration process, though sometimes painful, was mutu-
ally beneficial in developing the conceptual frameworks for moral educa-
tion. To Buddhism, the incorporation of pure conversation from
Neo-Taoism and the concepts of loyalty and filial piety from Confucianism
enriched its philosophical system and the teaching/learning approach for
Buddhists’ moral development. Meanwhile, Buddhism, as a foreign reli-
gion, also introduced many new concepts and frameworks into Chinese
religion and philosophy concerning moral values and the cultivation of
these. Religious Taoism, for instance, absorbed the concept of karma and
the eighteen-layer hell from Buddhism, which helped the Chinese native
religion to optimize its cosmology and enhance the function of moral
education. Confucianism too imported many ontological concepts and
158 Z. YOU ET AL.
approaches to moral learning from Buddhism and Taoism to perfect its

own metaphysics and enrich its moral education. This was exemplified by
the efforts of the School of Principle in Neo-Confucianism in the Song
Dynasty, which developed a new metaphysical framework by assimilating
the ideas of Taoism, such as the Non-Ultimate, and adopting Buddhism’s
ontological concepts about the heart and nature. Another example was
that the School of Mind of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming
Dynasties, which adopted Chan Buddhism’s sudden enlightenment as its
key approach for moral learning.
Notes
1. Many scholars, such as Mou Zongsang and Liang Shuming, tend to believe
that though Confucianism is not a real religion, it performs some functions
of a religion in China, meaning that it can be perceived as a religion about
morality and humanity.
2. The Dharma (fa-xing) means the teachings of the Buddha. Dharma nature,
also known as Buddha nature, refers to the ability inherent in all beings to
become a Buddha.
3. Sudden enlightenment or epiphany refers to some Buddhists’ experience of
a sudden and striking realization of the ultimate truth of the universe, which
is contrary to the technique of gradual enlightenment upheld by other
Buddhist masters. This religious approach was borrowed and utilized by
many Chinese philosophers in subsequent periods to teach students to
achieve a great breakthrough in understanding the moral truth.
4. The Bodhisattva path is a process of maturing as a Buddhist; it involves both
leaving behind one’s own concerns and reorienting oneself toward the salva-
tion of other sentient beings. Great compassion, taking vows, wisdom, and
practice are requirements for treading this path.
5. Bodhi refers to Buddha’s understanding of and wisdom about the true
nature of things.
References
Ge, H., & Wang, M. (1985). Collation and connotation on the inner chapters of
Paopuzi. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Ge, H., & Yang, M. (1991). Collation on the outer chapters of Paopuzi. Beijing:
Guang, X. (2013). Buddhist impact on Chinese culture. Asian Philosophy, 23(4),
305–322.
Guo, S. (2010). New interpretation on Hui-yuan’s karmic retribution. Journal of

Anhui Normal University (Liberal & Social Sciences), 38(5), 571–575.
Hui, N. (2010). The platform sutra of the sixth patriarch. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Hui, Y. (1991). On why monks should not bow down before kings. In H. Seng
(Ed.), Collections of hongming (p. 7). Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works
Publishing House.
Le, S. (1986). The transformation of the relationships between Confucianism and
Mingjiao. Journal of Anhui University (Philosophy & Social Sciences), 4, 12–17.
Li, G. (2000a). Ge Hong and his life philosophy. Journal of Literature, History &
Philosophy, 5, 108–114.
Li, X. (2000b). The classic of changes in “commentaries and explanations to the thir-
teen classics”. Beijing Peking: Peking University Press.
Pan, X. (2012). Understanding of Zhou Dunyi’s explanation of the diagram of the
Supreme Ultimate. Daguan Weekly, 35, 28–28.
Qi, S. (1981). Collections of Chanjin. In Y. Ji (Ed.), Imperial collection of four
(Vol. 8). Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works Publishing House.
Qi, S. (1983). Collections of Chanjin. In Da Zheng Zang (Vol. 52). Taipei: New
Wenfeng Publishing House.
PART III
The Era of Full Development and

Transformation
CHAPTER 8
Flying Dragons in the Sky: The Philosophy

of Moral Education in the School of Principle
of Neo-Confucianism
The philosophy of moral education in ancient China reached its peak in

the Northern and Southern Song Dynasties when Confucian scholars
founded the School of Principle by actively renewing traditional
Confucianism and by absorbing ideas from other philosophies and reli-
gions. The new philosophical school was also called “the Study of Tao”
(Daoxue, meaning “the Learning of the Way”) or the Study of Li1; this,
along with the School of Mind, was named Neo-Confucianism by later
scholars. One of the most distinctive contributions of Neo-Confucianism
was that it formulated a comprehensive metaphysical framework for
Confucianism. In fact, the new school emerged when people raised ques-
tions about the efficacy of traditional Confucianism in dealing with the
social crisis of the time, which spurred Confucians to sanctify their moral
principles and elevate them to the heights of cosmology and ontology by
integrating Confucian doctrines with many concepts from Taoism and
Buddhism. In this way, Confucianism was transformed into a semi-
religious philosophy. With the renewed metaphysics, scholars of Neo-
Confucianism deepened and enriched its philosophical system of moral
cultivation, which in turn had a considerable impact on the value system
of the Chinese people.
Flying dragons in the sky is a famous metaphor in The Book of Changes. The
authors use it to extoll the five philosophers for their lofty achievements in the
philosophy of Chinese moral education.

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_8
164 Z. YOU ET AL.
To fully understand the rise of the new school, however, it is imperative

to survey the historical context at the time. The Northern Song Dynasty
(960–1127 CE) was established on the ruins of the era of Five Dynasties
and Ten Kingdoms (907–960 CE), when insubordination and wars were
frequent. It was common for a military general to usurp the throne of the
emperor, only to be replaced by another general a few years later. The
traditional Confucian teachings of faithfulness and filial piety had been
largely discarded in the pursuit of personal power. However, there was a
high price to pay for abandoning the traditional doctrine. People found
they had to endure unceasing warfare and political turmoil when the social
hierarchy was disrupted. Consequently, there was a need to restore the
authority of Confucius’ philosophy as well as its system of moral cultiva-
tion, which was enthusiastically espoused by the emperors of the Song
Dynasties. The new rulers were eager to appoint learned Confucians to
administrative positions to suppress the political ambitions of military gen-
erals. In this sense, the flourishing of the School of Principle in the Song
Dynasties is understandable as it satisfied the emperors’ needs to consoli-
date their rule through reconstructing and reviving classical Confucianism.
But Confucian scholars first needed to construct a new metaphysical
system if they wanted to regain people’s faith in this philosophy. While the
suffering of the endless wars had led people to seek religious comfort in
the delicate sutras and the promises of reward after death of Buddhism and
religious Taoism, Dong Zhongshu’s concept of heaven’s mandate seemed
not to explain why heaven’s will shifted so frequently and aimlessly. With
the collapse of the old cosmology, the teaching of sacred principles of
human relations and social hierarchy also became ineffective. The priority
of Confucians was to renew the cosmological and ontological system of
Confucianism to meet strong competitions from the two religions. This
effort eventually helped the philosophy transcend its canonical tradi-
tion (since the Han Dynasty) of passively interpreting and annotating
Confucian classics.
In this campaign, five distinguished Confucian masters in the Song
Dynasties, namely Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, the Cheng Brothers, and Chu
Hsi, founded and perfected the School of Principle in Neo-Confucianism.
In his theory of creation, Zhou Dunyi designated the Non-Ultimate
(wuji) and the Supreme Ultimate (taiji) as the sources of the universe; this
marked the appearance of Neo-Confucianism.2 Zhang Zai put forward the
concept of qi to explain the myriad phenomena of the universe. The
Cheng Brothers highlighted the role of li, which was also translated as
FLYING DRAGONS IN THE SKY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL EDUCATION… 165
“principle”, “reason”, or “law” in discussions of moral development,

deepening and widening the scope of the School of Principle. Chu Hsi,
deemed one of the greatest Confucian scholars after Confucius, synthe-
sized the concepts of the Supreme Ultimate, qi, nature, and li, and formu-
lated a complete metaphysical system for Neo-Confucianism. In addition
to scholars in the School of Principle, another two Confucian masters, Lu
Jiuyuan of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279 CE) and Wang
Yangming of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 CE), established the School
of Mind of Neo-Confucianism, which centered on the role of mind or the
heart in moral cultivation.
One extraordinary thing about their accomplishments is that these
scholars utilized concepts and themes in Taoism and Buddhism such as the
Non-Ultimate and enlightenment to help build the new metaphysics,
solving the problem that traditional Confucianism lacked an abstract
ontology and logical reasoning. In this new philosophy, the concept of the
heavenly principle (tian-li) or the heart replaced the personalized heaven
as the substance of the world and functioned as the source of all things.
Put differently, it created a cosmic system integrating the universe with
moral principles (li) or the heart, which justified the need for moral educa-
tion and highlighted people’s autonomy in moral learning. The mission of
moral cultivation thus shifted from the mandate of God to people’s own
efforts and choices. The chief work of Confucians, accordingly, also
changed from annotating Confucian classics to developing their own
moral characters and becoming sages.
Aside from metaphysics, Neo-Confucianism learned from the model of
the Buddhist monastery to set up its own private schools—the Academies
or “Shu Yuan”. Like the Buddhist temples, the Academies were built in
famous mountains or by water. These locations, usually in serene, beauti-
ful, and peaceful environments, helped acolytes grow morally and spiritu-
ally. The Neo-Confucian philosophers also introduced the methods of
witty conversation and debate practiced in Chan Buddhism as the teaching
methods in the Academies (Zhu, 2006). These Confucian masters, like
the Buddhist masters, delivered instructions to their disciples and encour-
aged questioning, debates, and discussions in class. But unlike Buddhists
and Taoists, who used their metaphysics and approaches as a way to reach
the unreality of nirvana or immortality, Neo-Confucian scholars utilized
these worldviews and methods to promote the secular aim of regulating
human relations—a totally different goal of moral learning.
166 Z. YOU ET AL.
Zhou Dunyi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073 CE), a Confucian philosopher and cosmologist
in the early Song Dynasty, was credited as one of the most important pre-
cursors and architects of Neo-Confucianism. Zhou was born into a learned
official family and he himself also served in various government positions
throughout his life. Alongside performing his official duties, Zhou wrote
books to explore the ultimate secrets of the universe. He conceptualized a
fresh and complete Neo-Confucian cosmology by drawing heavily on
metaphysical concepts from Taoism and Buddhism. In so doing, he articu-
lated the intrinsic ties between human conducts and the laws of the uni-
verse, and thereby justified the social order as a reflection of the cosmos.
Zhou’s philosophy was inherited and further developed by the Cheng
Brothers and then enriched and optimized by Chu Hsi, who officially
established the School of Principle.
Zhou Dunyi’s Cosmology

Zhou Dunyi’s new metaphysics did not come from a vacuum. A close look
at his philosophical discourse revealed strong religious influences from
Taoism and Buddhism. His masterpiece, Explanation of the Diagram of the
Supreme Ultimate, the cornerstone of cosmology in Neo-Confucianism,
was composed on the basis of Taoist diagrams of the Supreme Ultimate and
the Non-Ultimate, concepts in The Book of Changes, and even a Buddhist
diagram. Hence, it was a philosophical creation that integrated the cosmo-
logical thought of the three teachings/religions to understand the inter-
twining of the universe and ethics. The diagram, with a ccompanying graphic
illustration, conceived of the process of cosmic creation and the operations
of the universe as follows:
In the very beginning, there is the Non-Ultimate (wuji, namely the primor-
dial chaotic state with endless and borderless resource), and then the
“Supreme Ultimate” (taiji) that is the direct origin of actual beings. The
action of the Supreme Ultimate gives rise to Yang (the positive force) which,
when its activity reaches the peak, turns into tranquility. The tranquility gen-
erates Yin (the negative force) which, when tranquility arrived at its maxi-
mum, returns to activity. The alternating and combining of Yin and Yang or
tranquility and activity produce the Five Elements, i.e. water, fire, wood,
metal, and earth, which in turn constitute the basis for the cycles of four sea-
sons and make the myriad things in the world […] this sequence of creation
could be reversed all the way back to the Non-Ultimate. (Zhou, 1936, p. 2)
Although noted for its mystical discourse about the cosmos, Zhou’s
philosophy in fact focused on the practical implications of cosmology: its
ultimate purpose was to guide human conduct. His cosmology about the
creation and evolution of the universe was a prelude to establishing the
background and justifying the rationale for highlighting sacred principles
and promoting people’s moral development. In this complex celestial set-
ting, human beings were regarded as products of the cosmic movement;
they were endowed with the essence and inspiration of the universe, and
therefore should possess the holiness and nobleness of the universe, and its
direction toward moral purposes. The argument was bolstered by the fact
that the sages were called the Human Ultimate or the foremost human
beings because the doctrine of the Mean and the principles of benevolence
and righteousness they had proposed were aligned with the greatness of
heaven and earth (Zhou, 1936); in other words, the moral principles
acquired cosmic sovereignty through reaching a consensus with the laws
of the universe. Hence the significance of Zhou’s philosophy is that it
integrated the path of heaven with the way of human world (these were
previously seen as separate). While the former represented the ontological
significance of moral principles, the latter served the purpose of improving
human existence by teaching morality.
Zhou Dunyi’s cosmology abandoned the transcendental mysticism and
supernatural core of the religions, and instead centered on building a
metaphysical foundation for worldly moral education. As the Supreme
Ultimate was active, it generated the seemingly opposite and yet
complementary properties of Yin and Yang, from which good and evil
were derived. The existence of evil and good meant that humans had
moral issues to consider and that there was a need for people to self-edu-
cate and/or be educated to eliminate evil thinking and bad behavior and
to promote good deeds. This consideration was fully embodied in his con-
cept of the five categories of human nature.
Zhou Dunyi’s Conceptual Framework of Moral Education

Based on the dynamic nature of the cosmos, Zhou Dunyi held human nature
as intertwined and complicated; it could be categorized into five kinds—the
hard and the soft, the good and the evil, and the Mean (Zhou, 1936). More
specifically, it included “hard goodness”, meaning straightforwardness and
decisiveness, “hard evilness”, meaning brutality and violence, “soft good-
ness”, denoting gentleness and compassion, “soft evilness”, indicating
168 Z. YOU ET AL.
cowardice and flattery, and the Mean, connoting harmony and impartiality.
Among the five categories of human nature, the Mean was the only ideal
nature that belonged to the sages; therefore, it was the goal of moral cultiva-
tion for all Confucians.
The discussion of human nature, for Zhou, was intended to stress the
need for moral education, which was accomplished by transforming the
various undesired kinds of nature into the ideal nature of the Mean. He
broke down the goal into three incremental steps: “Scholars should follow
the example of people of virtue, and people of virtue should follow the
example of the sages, and the sages should follow the example of heaven”
(Zhou, 1936, p. 95). Scholars of each level had an appropriate example or
target of moral development. This idea was remarkable as Zhou regarded
sagehood not as inborn but as acquired by learning. Under Zhou’s influ-
ence, the ideal became the ultimate goal of Confucians’ moral self-
cultivation from the time of the Song Dynasties. However, this moral
pursuit was not accomplished in one stroke. It took a long time and
demanded considerable effort and great perseverance. Zhou suggested
that scholars should adopt the attitude of sincerity (cheng), preserve a
mental state of quietness (jing), and cultivate virtues through practicing
rites and music.
Sincerity was the key to achieving the moral perfection of the sages.
Zhou held sincerity to be a noble moral character that served as the source
of the Five Constant Virtues of benevolence, righteousness, rites, wisdom,
and credibility, and the beginnings of a hundred human moral conduct
(Zhou, 1936). The character was so fundamental that sometimes he even
regarded sincerity as the substance of the universe that connected the way
of heaven with the way of humans. Without being sincere, Confucians’
efforts to observe the moral requirements would be meaningless because
sincerity—as a firm will and authentic attitude—was a precondition for any
meaningful learning. No matter how harsh the environment was, a scholar
with sincerity would have strong self-discipline and initiative in sticking to
what was right, which helped the person understand the absolute good-
ness of the universe. This concept, with its promotion of moral self-
cultivation, triggered philosophical discussion among later scholars. For
instance, it was a topic of debate in the Goose Lake Meeting between Chu
Hsi of the School of Principle and Lu Jiuyuan of the School of Mind in the
Southern Song Dynasty, which we will discuss in detail in the next
chapter.
Zhou Dunyi particularly emphasized the role of quietness, coupled

with sincerity, in facilitating Confucian moral cultivation; this was both a
legacy of Chuang Tzu (reflecting while sitting in oblivion) and a tradition
from Buddhism (meditating to seek ultimate liberation). Maintaining a
mental state of quietness in mind, Zhou contended, was a key quality of
the sages as they sought to become the Human Ultimate (Zhou, 1936).
The universe was quiet because the Non-Ultimate was quiet, which in
turn gave its character to human beings, who, however, lost this quality
after being blemished by insatiable lust. Therefore, the way of moral culti-
vation was to return to moral impeccability by reducing desires and main-
taining mental quietness.
Abstinence was a prerequisite of keeping quiet; this originated from
both Mencius’ nourishment of the heart through limiting desires and
Buddhism’s eradication of human craving to recover one’s Buddha nature.
Zhou claimed that a superior man should remove his desires and rectify his
faults so as to achieve a state of tranquility (Zhou, 1936); this state helped
a person distinguish right from wrong, understand ultimate goodness, and
reach a state of justice. This effort, in essence, was to actively restrain and
sacrifice one’s individual needs in exchange for promoting the common
good; stated differently, people gave up their “self” to uphold a collective
and purified moral will (Wang, 2015).
Next, education through rites and music was essential to promoting
people’s understanding of moral principles (li). Zhou argued that rites
were in essence li and music embraced the spirit of harmony. Observing
the proper rites between sovereign and minister, father and son, elder
brother and younger brother, and husband and wife embodied the moral
principle that accorded with the laws of the cosmos. Music as social lubri-
cant worked to regulate human relations: it eased tension among people
and soothed the improper desires that might lead to illicit behaviors such
as defying one’s superiors and usurping the throne. Although admitting
that law enforcement was needed to rule the country, Zhou insisted that
education in rites and music should be made the priority of the country’s
policy, while law enforcement was only a precaution and should not be
abused—showcasing his standpoint of rule by morality.
To conclude, Zhou’s special contribution to the philosophy of moral
education is that he constructed a complete system of Confucian cosmol-
ogy by fusing concepts from Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucian doctrines.
This cosmic framework, including the concepts of the Non-Ultimate, the
Supreme Ultimate, Yin and Yang, nature and the heart, and so forth, were
170 Z. YOU ET AL.
intended to explain the origin of morality and human nature, providing

philosophical rationales for the holy status of morality and education in
morality. With the influence of his groundbreaking work, many other phi-
losophers, such as the Cheng Brothers, Chu Hsi, and Wang Yangming,
further developed and enriched the metaphysical system of Neo-
Confucianism, which enabled the philosophy of moral education and its
related educational activities to grow and prosper, and eventually to reach
new heights in the Song and Ming Dynasties.
Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Zhang Zai (1020–1077 CE) was a preeminent Neo-Confucian philoso-
pher. He was mostly remembered for setting out four missions for
Confucian moral cultivation: “To build the heart for heaven and earth, to
teach morality to the populace, to restore the lost doctrines of the past
sages, and to open up eternal peace for the world” (Zhang, 1978, p. 276).
These inspired later scholars to pursue the goal of serving the country and
the people. In contrast to many other Confucians of his time, Zhang’s
philosophy highlighted practicality; this is why it was also called humanis-
tic pragmatism.
Zhang Zai’s Ontology

Zhang Zai, as a pragmatist, held the primordial matter and force named qi
(air or vital energy), instead of li (moral principles), to be the substance of
the universe, which led to a metaphysical monism based on qi. He further
claimed that qi was the Great Vacuity (taixu), namely the origin of the
universe. Even though the Great Vacuity or the Non-Ultimate had no
shape or form, it was composed of qi. It was qi’s gathering and diffusion,
and the interactions between Yin and Yang, that gave rise to the myriad
solid properties in the world, for example, rivers, trees, animals, and
humans (Zhang, 1978). Tao, or li, was solely derived from or attached to
the matter of qi. This concept of qi, accordingly, provided Zhang’s phi-
losophy with a strong tendency toward materialism and made him a mav-
erick among his peers.
With the idea of concrete qi rather than nonbeing, Zhang’s cosmology
separated Confucianism from Buddhism and religious Taoism. Both
Buddhists and Taoists tended to believe that everything in the world was
in essence unreal and thus sought an escape from this world: the Buddhist’s
worldview denied the existence and meaning of this life and instead pur-
sued fortune in next life and the goal of nirvana; religious Taoism indulged
in the myth of eternal life, renouncing social responsibility. Thus, the cos-
mological ideas of both religions were in actuality the source of the con-
flict and confusion in the social value system. While criticizing the delusions
of the two religions, Zhang held the world to be real on the grounds that
it was composed of qi and hence possessed real implications. As qi changed
constantly, all things in the world changed as well, according meaning to
our lives, which helped explain the ethical issues in the world and supply
moral cultivation with a more solid foundation.
Next, the idea that the universe was made up of monistic qi gave rise to
a question regarding human nature: if everything in the world was made
of qi, then why there was a dichotomy of good and evil that made moral
education a necessity? For Zhang, human nature could be categorized
into two kinds, namely original nature and physical nature; all people have
both of them, creating a dual human nature. Although humans were made
of qi, the composition of their nature was different. Original nature, con-
gruent with the Great Vacuity, was the embodiment of the laws of the
universe and thus was intrinsically good; physical nature was an acquired
nature that was a mixture of good and evil. Each person varied in their
physical nature due to the different quality of qi resulting from his or her
own physical conditions as well as family and environmental influences.
Those with the purest qi were the so-called sages, those with mixed qi
were ordinary people, and those with the most impure qi were evil persons
(Zhang, 1978). Even though everyone had an original nature, this
acquired physical nature could obscure the original nature. Thus, redress-
ing the impure qi in one’s physical nature, so as to recover the goodness
of one’s original nature, was the task of moral education.
Zhang Zai’s Philosophical Discussion of Moral Education

Accordingly, moral education was the key to transforming human nature
and to leading people to follow the laws of the universe, which was a pre-
requisite to realizing the highest goal of a Confucian, namely to become a
person of virtue or even a sage. The way to achieve this goal of moral cul-
tivation, Zhang declared, was a matter of individual effort, not an issue of
ability; therefore, self-consciousness and initiative were crucial in moral
improvement. Though the quality of one’s acquired nature and social sta-
tus was predetermined, the path to becoming a sage was mostly contingent
172 Z. YOU ET AL.
on personal conviction and determination in that everyone could eliminate

his or her evil nature and become a person of virtue through persistent
learning.
The heart played a critical role in overcoming desires in physical nature
and restoring original nature because “the heart incorporated and gov-
erned human nature and sentiments” (Zhang, 1978, p. 374). The heart,
for Zhang, had the innate moral sense and capacity to understand moral
principles, to be motivated, and to make right decisions. However, preju-
dices usually blocked the heart and made people lose this important fac-
ulty. In order to enable the heart to function properly, people needed to
demolish stereotypes and reduce unwholesome desires so as to allow the
heart to make sense of moral principles—or they needed to expand the
heart to overcome the obstructions of evil factors. Consequently, reducing
desire was the first step that made people ready to learn. In so doing, “one
could feel all things in the world […] and that everything was a part of
himself” (Zhang, 1978, p. 24).
But compared with Zhou Dunyi’s advocacy of eradicating human
desires, Zhang Zai tended to have a more tolerant attitude; he used the
phrase “reducing desires” rather than “eradicating” them. He held that
people’s physical nature entailed some legitimate components, such as eat-
ing, drinking, and sex, which were needed by everyone to survive (Zhang,
1978). What Zhang opposed was the excessive desires that would obstruct
the capacity of the heart to recover its original moral nature. To this end,
he encouraged people to restrain themselves from overindulgence and to
endeavor to temper selfish motives with the principle of righteousness.
This effort at self-restraint was essential for achieving substantial moral
development, which could be strengthened by understanding the joy of
morality and through practicing rites.
Zhang Zai particularly emphasized the role of the sentiments in pro-
moting one’s moral growth. For him, the motivator of moral conduct
stemmed from sympathy toward other people’s sufferings and the willing-
ness to help other people. The sages, for instance, usually had a noble wish
to create an ideal world where everyone could enjoy peace and happiness
(Liu, 2011). This moral sentiment and conviction in the heart was the
motivation that enabled them to overcome difficulties and self-interest to
do the right thing. To achieve such a moral consciousness, Confucians
should first nurture the correct sentiments so that they would be happy in
doing good and would loathe evil behavior. More importantly, they should
enjoy moral principles during the process of moral learning. Zhang noted
that when a scholar enjoyed learning principles, he would never stop learn-
ing and would make progress automatically (Zhang, 1978). This kind of
joy was a real understanding of the bliss to be found in moral principles,
with the result that people would voluntarily reject personal desires and
gain, and seek something nobler and more altruistic instead (Gong, 1996).
In addition, Zhang placed much weight on the practice of rites in facili-
tating moral education. For him, ritual was not an externally imposed
constraint or a form of interference in human behavior, but an exhibition
of one’s original nature (Liu, 2011). To put it differently, rites were not
man-made, but a natural existence in the world inasmuch as all things had
an intrinsic sequence from large to small and a distinction between the
noble and the inferior, which reflected a permanent truth. Accordingly,
the rites of Confucianism were designed to follow this natural order; learn-
ing and practicing rites could help people transform the impurity of qi in
their acquired physical nature, cultivate their moral heart, and recover
their original goodness. If a person could consciously follow the rites,
Zhang insisted, he was not far away from the Great Path.3
While rites were an embodiment of the laws of the universe, the moral
values should not be imposed from outside; they depended on one’s own
initiative and understanding if they were to be acquired because people
were autonomous agents in charge of their own moral progress. For this
purpose, Zhang suggested that people read Confucian classics to under-
stand the essence, a process he called the acquisition of rites. A scholar
should read widely, the Six Confucian Classics in particular, to accumulate
a knowledge of morality and comprehend principles and the underlying
rationales. Zhang called this learning approach “from intelligence to sin-
cerity” (zi ming cheng), which was the antithesis of the approach of “from
sincerity to intelligence” (zi cheng ming). While the former highlighted
the necessity for learning moral knowledge by making efforts to reach the
original nature, the latter stressed the imperative of using the original
nature to understand moral principles. Zhang preferred the former as only
the sages could directly go from original nature to moral principles.
Maintaining a void of quietness (xujing) and an attitude of great respect
was necessary for moral self-cultivation. Quietness for Zhang Zai was a
way of drawing near the nature of the universe; on this, he agreed with
Zhou Dunyi. Zhang noted that there was both quietness and activity in
the heart: “Quietness is original nature and activity is where moral senti-
ments are generated” (Zhang, 1978, p. 35). He further preached main-
taining a void of quietness, a concept which was congruent with his
174 Z. YOU ET AL.
cosmological idea of the Great Vacuity, that the universe was void in its
original state. When the heart maintained a void and quiet like the Great
Vacuity, it could eliminate the distractions and focus on the supreme
goodness, which was needed to recover its innate nature.
Great respect was an outer demonstration of the inner void of quiet-
ness. Like the concept of sincerity, this great respect was an attitude of
solemnity and earnestness in practicing rites, learning moral virtues, and
seeking the ultimate truth of the world (Zhang, 1978). The void of quiet-
ness and great respect were mutually supportive in moral development.
No matter how much the heart was vacated and quiet, a Confucian could
not establish himself without great respect; without voiding one’s heart
and reducing one’s desires, one’s determination and ability to pursue the
truth would also be severely limited and hindered.
Conclusion
A real understanding about the purpose of Zhang Zai’s philosophy of
moral education required revisiting the four missions of Confucianism.
The first mission, building the heart for heaven and earth, was to evoke
the sense of sublimity by making human moral cultivation as lofty as the
universe; the second mission, teaching morality to the populace, was to
stress its social functions; the third mission, restoring the lost doctrines,
was to highlight the importance of Neo-Confucianism; and the fourth
mission, opening up eternal peace, was to express its political ideal. Zhang
called the philosophy in the School of Principle the lost teaching because
he believed it was inherited directly from that of the sages such as Confucius
and Mencius; it had been lost due to negative influences from Taoism and
Buddhism’s preaching about the meaninglessness of this world. In this
way, Zhang sanctified his philosophy as the legitimate heir of classical
Confucianism, encouraging scholar-officials to fulfill the Confucian noble
duty of self-cultivation and serving the country.
More importantly, Zhang called for scholars to shoulder the responsi-
bility of preserving the peace and prosperity of the world, which deep-
ened, broadened, and transformed the connotations of the longstanding
Chinese culture of family and state. With the sense of sublimation and the
spirit of devotion, his four assertions instilled the culture with the great
aspiration of serving the country and caring for people. This is remarkable
because in so doing Confucianism had further overcome the narrowness
of the traditional culture: it shifted people’s primary attention from caring
for the family to attending to the country’s well-being, and accordingly it

had now officially developed a strong sense of universal love, differenti-
ated from the love that Confucianism had previously been based on.
It is also worth noting that Zhang Zai’s contribution to the ontology
of moral education, particularly his tendency toward materialism, was
unique among Neo-Confucian scholars. His proposition that the universe
was made up of concrete qi endowed moral education with real meaning
in this world, rebuking delusive religious preaching about seeking happi-
ness in the other world. His ideas on original nature and physical nature
also enriched the traditional theory of human nature, justifying the need
for moral education and legitimizing the corresponding approaches to it.
Besides his contribution to the School of Principle, Zhang’s philosophy
left a valuable legacy to the School of Mind and the Practical Learning as
well due to his philosophical discourse on the role of the heart in moral
understanding and his emphasis on the integration of moral learning and
serving the state.
The Cheng Brothers’ Philosophy of Moral

Education
The Cheng Brothers—Cheng Hao (1032–1085 CE) and Cheng Yi
(1033–1107 CE)—were famous philosophers of Neo-Confucianism whose
most important contribution to moral education was developing a com-
plete philosophical system based on the concept of the heavenly p rinciple
(li or tian-li). This idea of li was of such great significance in Neo-
Confucianism that the School of Principle (the Study of Li) got its name
from it. Born into a family of officials, the two brothers were students of
Zhou Dunyi—the most important architect of Neo-Confucian cosmology.
Both served as government officials and worked as teachers alternatively,
and both were highly regarded as great philosophers and educators rather
than successful officials. Despite some disagreements between their phi-
losophies, the two brothers were often quoted together as the Cheng
Brothers to indicate their joint contribution to the School of Principle.
The Cheng Brothers’ Ontology

In contrast to Zhang Zai’s proposition about qi as the source of the world,
the Cheng Brothers took the heavenly principle as the substance of the
176 Z. YOU ET AL.
universe; everything including qi originated from li (Cheng & Cheng,

1981). While the heavenly principle as metaphysics gave rise to qi, the lat-
ter as more concrete matter directly engendered all things in the world. It
is noteworthy that li as a concept had existed before, but it was the Cheng
Brothers who upgraded the concept to be the heavenly principle, endow-
ing the concept with sacredness in terms of cultivating people’s morality.
Even though the Cheng Brothers regarded qi as secondary to the heav-
enly principle, they believed in an integration of li and qi, meaning that all
things in the world embraced the heavenly principle. In this sense, the
purpose of moral cultivation was to recover Tao or moral principles
through inquiring into all the concrete matters in the world, reflecting
their ontological concept about the integration of Tao and Utensil that
“Utensil is Tao and Tao is Utensil” (Cheng & Cheng, 1981, p. 4). This
idea was a philosophical breakthrough for traditional Confucianism, which
tended to value Tao and neglect Utensil. The seamless fusion of Tao and
Utensil or li and qi provided a rationale for the Cheng Brothers’ famous
method of moral education—investigating the world to learn the heavenly
principle.
Based on this monistic proposition, the Cheng Brothers further claimed
that the heavenly principle was equal to Tao, and Tao was equal to human
nature, indicating that li, Tao, and human nature were in essence one
thing (Huang, 2011). Thus, the original nature could be recovered by
studying li. It was li that gave rise to the Five Constant Virtues of benevo-
lence, righteousness, rites, wisdom, and credibility; these, in turn, were
exhibited in the exemplary five human relations between father and son,
sovereign and minister, husband and wife, senior and junior, and among
friends. As the heavenly mandated nature was identical to li, it should be
intrinsically good. However, if the innate nature was morally good, then
where did evil come from? Like Zhang Zai, the Cheng Brothers postu-
lated that it was the quality of qi in the acquired physical nature that made
the difference. Qi or vital force, secondary to li, formed different kinds of
people due to the diversity in its purity and turbidity. Human beings com-
mitted evil acts because their minds did not follow the heavenly bestowed
nature but were influenced by the turbid qi. Accordingly, people who had
a purer allotment of qi would tend toward the good, while people who
had more impure allotment of qi might show evil inclinations.
On the issue of whether these moral differences were changeable, the
Cheng Brothers gave a positive reply. A person could transform the allot-
ment of his qi from impurity to purity as he changed from being evil to
becoming good through moral education, which was a process of learning

and observing li to regain innate good nature (Cheng & Cheng, 1981).
For the Cheng Brothers, it was the study of li that made the difference
between humans and wild animals—those who understood and observed
the heavenly principle were the sages and men of virtue, while those who
did not know or did not want to follow the sacred moral principles were
not much different from wild animals. Accordingly, the implication of the
Cheng Brothers’ philosophical discussion on nature and qi was that it
affirmed the importance of moral education as well as explained the ratio-
nale of its approaches to learning.
To further elucidate their concept of li, the Cheng Brothers proposed
an assumption that the heavenly principle had diverse manifestations. The
unity of li was that all existence and all the principles in the world could be
attributed to the one ultimate principle, namely the Supreme Ultimate.
The diverse manifestations of li were that each concrete item in the world
represented li in its specific way, reflecting a realistic pluralism of morality.
This concept reflected Neo-Confucianism’s tendency toward both unifica-
tion and flexibility in moral considerations; that is, all the virtues in human
relations should stick to the spirit of li, but at the same time each incident
could have its own variation in content and form due to different condi-
tions. For instance, filial piety was a transcendental principle that should
be followed by everyone in every situation, but each filial story was differ-
ent due to its specific context. This philosophical thought could best be
illustrated by a metaphor in Chan Buddhism: there is only one moon in
the evening sky but it is reflected in every body of water—rivers, lakes, and
ponds (Xuan, 1990).
The Cheng Brothers’ Philosophical Discourse on Moral Education

Like other Confucian philosophers, the Cheng Brothers proposed ideas
about the relationship between righteousness and personal gain. But in
contrast to others, they started by discussing the association between li
and human desires as this relationship was a deeper discussion of the theme
of righteousness and gain. The Cheng Brothers believed that insatiable
human desires would impede the understanding of li. Cheng Yi, for
instance, claimed that everybody possessed the supreme wisdom of moral-
ity, but they tended to forget the heavenly principle as they were distracted
by excessive desire (Cheng & Cheng, 1981). The reason that people
would chase gains was that they had no control over their insatiable greed,
178 Z. YOU ET AL.
and this might eventually lead to the crime of usurping imperial power and
stealing from their parents (Huang, 2011). Thus, the Cheng Brothers
advocated eliminating inordinate desires and avoiding luxury so as to pre-
serve li, the idea of which was inherited and further developed by Chu
Hsi.
As for the relationship between righteousness and personal gain, the
Cheng Brothers saw the two as utterly conflicting with each other. Cheng
Yi stated, “the difference between righteousness and gain was the differ-
ence between public and private” (Cheng & Cheng, 1981, p. 1172), and
that “all the matters in the world could be sorted into these two catego-
ries. When you abandon righteousness, you are into personal gain; when
you abandon personal gain, you are choosing righteousness” (Cheng &
Cheng, 1981, p. 124). In their view, the two concepts were mutually
exclusive: it was righteousness instead of gain that should be the most
appropriate criterion and guidance in reconciling human relations. When
making a decision, a man of virtue should consider if it is righteous or not
first, not calculate the amount of gain. In short, they preached the value of
highlighting righteousness while debasing personal gain in dealing with
human relations.
Nonetheless, the Cheng Brothers, unlike ascetics in Buddhism, did not
advocate the complete abstinence from human desires. They simply pro-
posed reducing or limiting excessive desires and abstaining from a luxuri-
ous life. Then why did almost all the Neo-Confucians propose eliminating
or reducing human desires? To answer the question, we need to discuss
the social and economic context of the time. The Song Dynasties existed
at a time when the country faced a serious threat of invasion from the
nomadic kingdoms on its northern borders, but it was also a time of eco-
nomic prosperity when many people lived a life of luxury and sensual plea-
sures. On the one hand, the dynasty paid annual tribute in the form of a
large sum of money to the northern enemy states in exchange for peace;
on the other, rich people indulged in an extravagant life that led to moral
degeneration. Concerned about the prospects for the country, Neo-
Confucian philosophers proposed the prescription of upholding the heav-
enly principle and limiting desires to address these social vices and rebuild
a society in which people would put righteousness ahead of personal gain.
The foremost righteousness, for the Cheng Brothers, was to follow the
principle of proper human relations between sovereign and minister, and
father and son, as this could secure the stability of Chinese society. For this
purpose, they called for people to curb their own avarice and consciously
observe social norms. However, solely reducing desire was not enough.
This virtue should be undergirded by the principles of benevolence and
filial piety. Cheng Hao reminded students that righteousness was only the
application, while the spirit of benevolence was the fundamental (Cheng
& Cheng, 1981). Hence while stressing the importance of choosing righ-
teousness over gain, the Cheng Brothers suggested that Confucians center
on learning the fundamental moral principles, or li, so as to consciously
promote righteousness.
Reading Confucian classics was an important way to learn the heavenly
principle, especially for novices; the Cheng Brothers compiled a new set of
textbooks called The Four Books from Confucian classics. Specifically, they
selected two chapters from The Book of Rites, entitled “The Great Learning”
and “The Doctrine of the Mean”, and made them into separate books.
These two books, along with the books of The Analects of Confucius and
Mencius, became The Four Books, which constituted a complete set of
books for a beginner’s moral education. The Great Learning was a primer
book for moral cultivation, The Analects delivered the moral guidance and
instructions by Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean provided the method-
ology of inquiry, and Mencius systematically introduced the themes and
approaches of moral self-cultivation for students. Hence, learning should
abide by this above sequence.
Aside from learning from the classics, the Cheng Brothers emphasized
the significance of exhaustive inquiry in seeking the moral truth. They
asked learners to investigate things and events in the world widely and
deeply to get to know the truth and warned that students should not
expect to come to know li through only a single investigation. Even a man
of virtue such as Yan Hui, Confucius’ favorite disciple, could not do so.
Students had to exhaustively investigate one issue each day, accumulate
understanding, integrate knowledge, and eventually achieve a thorough
comprehension of the heavenly principle. This inquiry could be conducted
in a variety of ways, such as reading, assessing historical figures, and engag-
ing with other people on a daily basis. The Cheng Brothers placed particu-
lar emphasis on conducting investigation into one’s own human relations,
“knowing how to be filial as a son, and knowing how to show paternal
affection to children as a father” (Cheng & Cheng, 1981, p. 100). For
them, harmonious human relations were the best exhibition of li.
Like Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng Brothers held sincerity to be a precondi-
tion of moral learning. They asserted that being sincere and authentic was
extremely important in learning, doing business, self-planning, and inter-
180 Z. YOU ET AL.
acting with others (Cheng & Cheng, 1981). If sincerity was an inner focus
of one’s will, respect was an external demonstration of this sincerity. A
person should show great respect and seriousness in daily life; even when
going outdoors, he should behave as if he were to welcome an important
guest.
Like the concentration and deep meditation of Chan Buddhism in
exploring the Buddha nature, the Cheng Brothers advocated using quiet-
ness and meditation to facilitate moral self-cultivation as well. But the goal
of Confucian meditation was different from that of Buddhism. For the
Cheng Brothers, sitting quietly and meditating was to remove desires and
improper thoughts so as to understand the heavenly principle. The cultiva-
tion therefore was not to cease all thinking and recognize the emptiness of
the world, but to actively reflect on one’s own behavior and seek the moral
meaning of life, which was essential to reaching sagehood.
In summary, the Cheng Brothers’ achievement in the philosophy of
moral education was phenomenal. While inheriting and further develop-
ing the cosmologies of Zhou Dunyi and Zhang Zai, the Cheng Brothers
proposed an ontological framework of the heavenly principle and in so
doing they officially founded the philosophical School of Principle. In
addition to metaphysics, they also presented many new thoughts and
ideas, and even prepared the textbooks for students’ moral education.
With their abundant and exceptional philosophical contributions, the
Cheng Brothers not only inspired the philosophy of Chu Hsi, who further
propelled the Study of Principle to its peak, but also the philosophy of Lu
Jiuyuan, who introduced the Study of Mind, to the Southern Song
Dynasty.
Chu Hsi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Chu Hsi (1130–1200 CE), a great Confucian master in the Southern
Song Dynasty, was widely regarded as the most influential figure of the
School of Principle; his importance in Confucianism throughout history is
secondary only to Confucius and Mencius. Chu Hsi’s contributions to the
philosophy of moral education mainly lay in his optimization of Neo-
Confucian metaphysical frameworks, his emphasis on the investigation of
things and events, his annotations of The Four Books, and his synthesis of
Neo-Confucian concepts and approaches regarding moral cultivation.
Chu Hsi’s influence on Chinese moral education was not limited to the
philosophical realm. Although he held official positions for many years, he
was not fully occupied by political affairs, which gave him leisure to read,
write, and teach. Like Confucius, he was a great teacher and devoted most
of his adult life to teaching Neo-Confucianism to hundreds of disciples,
establishing and restoring private Academies, and personally cultivating
moral customs in the region where he served as a local official.
One of Chu Hsi’s feats of Neo-Confucianism was that he proposed the
idea of the Confucian Orthodoxy Lineage. He himself was the fourth-
generation disciple of the Cheng Brothers, who in turn were disciples of
Zhou Dunyi. Chu Hsi thus contended that the lineage of orthodox
Confucianism started from ancient sage kings such as Yao, Shun and Yu,
then to the Duke of Zhou, and was passed down through heart-to-heart
transmission to Confucius and Mencius. However, this lineage was broken
because scholars in the Han Dynasty lost the true meaning of Confucianism.
It was not recovered until Zhou Dunyi understood the core of the phi-
losophy of the ancient Confucian sages. Therefore, the true Confucianism
was transmitted from Yao and Shun to Duke of Zhou, to Confucius and
Mencius, to Zhou Dunyi and then to the Cheng Brothers, and finally was
passed down to Chu Hsi himself. This presupposition of a lineage endowed
Neo-Confucianism with orthodox status, which significantly enhanced the
authority of Chu Hsi’s philosophy and boosted the influence of his moral
education.
Chu Hsi’s Cosmology

Generally speaking, Chu Hsi inherited and synthesized the rich complex-
ity from his Neo-Confucian predecessors, including the Supreme Ultimate
of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai’s idea of qi, and the Cheng Brothers’ concep-
tual framework of li, to construct a comprehensive metaphysics of Neo-
Confucianism. In his philosophical system, the concept of li was located in
the same place as “Tao” or the Supreme Ultimate, which served as the
substance of the universe. To make this point, however, Chu Hsi needed
to first clarify the relationship between the Non-Ultimate and the Supreme
Ultimate, which was proposed by Zhou Dunyi, who asserted the Non-
Ultimate went before the Supreme Ultimate. This proposal might have
evoked some controversies inasmuch as the idea of “being” arising from
“nonbeing” was more of an idea from Taoism than Confucianism. Chu
Hsi thus reinterpreted the relationship between the Non-Ultimate and
the Supreme Ultimate not as a sequential process but as a dual character-
istic—the substance of the universe was intangible (the Non-Ultimate)
182 Z. YOU ET AL.
but embodied moral principles (li or the Supreme Ultimate). This argu-
ment tactically avoided the trouble of putting the Taoist concept ahead of
the Confucian concept, and harmonized the heavenly principle with Tao,
which gave rise to everything in the universe.
Next, qi worked as a medium between li and everything else in the
universe. Chu Hsi asserted that though li and qi coexisted in the universe,
li as the absolute spiritual identity preexisted before the more concrete qi.
It was li that gave rise to qi and qi in turn embraced and reflected the
heavenly principle. Thus, li was the primary and the subject, and qi was
secondary and the object. While li served as the ultimate source of all
things, qi as more physical directly shaped concrete objects (Chu, 2002).
Furthermore, Chu Hsi used the traditional concept of the unity of Tao
and Utensil to explain the relationship between li and qi. He claimed that
li was Tao and qi was Utensil; thus, li should provide guidance for all mat-
ters (qi) in the world and all things in turn embodied li (Chu, 1989). The
relationship between these two, he suggested, was just like the moon in
the sky and the moon’s reflections in millions of bodies of water. First, the
moon appeared in the sky, then the moon’s reflection appeared in the
waters. Without li, qi had no real meaning; without qi, li lost its existence
on earth.
It is interesting to note that the concept of li was deeply influenced by
the concept of Tao in Taoism and the idea of Buddha nature in Buddhism.
For instance, li for Chu Hsi was an eternal existence without beginning
and end, much like the idea of Tao or Buddha nature. That was why the
Study of Li was also called the Study of Tao. However, li was different
from Tao and Buddha nature in its moral connotations. While the Tao of
Lao Tzu denoted the natural law and Buddha nature emphasized ultimate
liberation from this world, Chu Hsi put great emphasis on li’s moral
implications for human society, asserting that li was a generic term for
benevolence, righteousness, rites, and wisdom, and that the four principles
were just the specific demonstration of li in different social relations (Chu,
1989). This idea of social morality was so critical to Chu Hsi’ philosophy
that he actually criticized Buddhism and Taoism for deserting the sacred
moral laws, declaring it was a great crime for them to abolish the Three
Guides and Five Virtues (Chu, 2002).
Chu Hsi’s Conceptual Framework for Moral Education

An important purpose of Chu Hsi’s philosophical discussion of li was to
justify the need for moral education. He noted that li presented itself as
the endowed good nature when connecting to people, which meant peo-
ple had the seed of goodness. However, each person’s difference in the
purity, impurity, darkness, and brightness of qi resulted in different quali-
ties of acquired nature such as good or evil, intelligent or unintelligent.
People’s moral character, thanks to these differences in acquired nature
and the negative influences of inordinate desires, was subject to deteriora-
tion, which made li-based moral education a priority and an instigator of
difference. An ordinary person, he claimed, could become a man of virtue
with moral education, but could also become a mean person without such
education.
To articulate the rationale of teaching li, Chu Hsi quoted the famous
maxim from The Book of History, that “the human heart is perilous, and
the heart of Tao is subtle, to understand the heart of Tao requires concen-
tration and perseverance, and sincerely following the doctrine of the
mean” (Chu, 1983, p. 19). The first line was consistent with Chu Hsi’s
idea about the impurity and instability of acquired human nature, which
justified the necessity of moral cultivation. The second line echoed Chu
Hsi’s idea of equating li with Tao. For Chu Hsi, the heart of Tao and the
human heart referred to original nature and acquired nature respectively—
it was the heart of humans when one thought about one’s desires, and it
was the heart of Tao when one thought about righteousness and rites
(Chu, 2002). Accordingly, the mission of moral cultivation was to trans-
form the perilous human heart and restore the heart of Tao by following
the doctrine of the Mean and obtaining li. Based on this logic, Chu Hsi
proposed his famous adage that moral education was to preserve li and
annihilate human desires (Chu, 2002).
For Chu Hsi, eliminating excessive desires was both the starting point
and an important goal of his moral education. He held that desires and li
were intrinsically in conflict with each other: “when li exists, desires would
disappear; when desires prevail, li would perish” (Chu, 2002, XIV, p. 388).
Since li was the sources of all moral values and proper human relations and
desires were the source of all evils, people should endeavor to eliminate
excessive desires so as to restore the heavenly principle. All the Confucian
classics written by the sages, he added, taught people to eradicate desires
and preserve li.
184 Z. YOU ET AL.
However, like the Cheng Brothers, Chu Hsi was not an ascetic person
who denied necessary human needs. He clarified the difference between
human needs and human desires: “food and drinks are li, but a table of
delicacies is desire” (Chu, 2002, XIV, p. 389). Desires here referred to
insatiable greed. Inordinate desires or greediness of gain were the biggest
obstacle for people to maintain a heart of benevolence; hence, they should
be refrained from or even eradicated. Then how should human desires be
eliminated? Chu Hsi suggested that a gentleman should strictly follow
Confucian principles: he should not see what did not conform to rites,
should not listen to what was unfit for rites, and should not speak what
was irrelevant to rites (Chu, 2002). If he did these, he would be able to
retrieve the heart that he had lost, which was the original moral heart
enabling him to understand the heavenly principle.
Chu Hsi believed that the heart played an important role in one’s own
moral development. He applauded Zhang Zai’s proposition about the
heart governing human nature and sentiments, and further explained that
“human nature is the Substance, and sentiment is its Utility. The heart can
be in charge of both because human nature and sentiments are all coming
out of the heart” (Chu, 2002, XVII, p. 3304). The heart that could con-
trol one’s nature and sentiments was the moral heart or the heart of Tao,
not the human heart chasing fortune and profit. In reality, Chu Hsi’s
argument on the role of the heart was to highlight one’s free choice and
initiative in moral cultivation, with the result that all human thought, sen-
timents, desires, and actions were controlled by free will.
Moral education should be conducted through human nature and sen-
timents arising out of the moral heart. When the heart was not in motion,
it was manifested as nature; when the heart was in action, it was mani-
fested as sentiments. While nature incorporated the moral values of benev-
olence, righteousness, rites, and wisdom, sentiments entailed not just
ordinary happiness, anger, sadness, and joy, but also the four beginnings
of four values: sympathy, shame, modesty, the sense of right and wrong.
With these beginnings, one could perceive one’s own nature with the
moral heart (Chu, 1989). In this vein, nature and sentiments were an
integrated entity, serving the purpose of moral development. Moral culti-
vation, in turn, could be perceived as a process by which people used their
heart to embrace good nature and nurture moral sentiments so that they
could restrain themselves from evil inclinations as well as retrieve and iden-
tify with the heavenly principle.
Chu Hsi’s Approaches of Moral Education

As for the approach to learning, Chu Hsi particularly stressed the impor-
tance of sustaining great respect (jujing), conducting exhaustive inquiry
into li (qiongli), and practicing it sincerely (duxing) in moral self-
cultivation. Sustaining respect referred to having an attitude and behavior
of reverent composure. Scholars should be serious and united in their
spirit and action; they should dress correctly and tidily, look steadily for-
ward, settle their minds, and look solemn. This was a combination of inner
attitude and external outlook in reverence to others and everything else in
the world with a sober state of self-awareness and self-control. Only
through this attitude could one clarify the ultimate truth of the world,
namely the heavenly principle.
Alongside the attitude of sustaining respect, a scholar should also make
an exhaustive inquiry into li: he should investigate concrete objects and
events to attain the moral truth. From an epistemological perspective, both
reading and investigation were the primary methods for moral learning.
Chu Hsi held that reading was an important way for Confucians to obtain
the heavenly principle. But a learner could not become a sage just by perus-
ing the classics; he needed to inquire into the moral issues in person (geiwu)
to truly understand the meaning of those moral principles (zhizhi). Here, ge
meant “to exhaust the meaning”, and wu meant “things” or “events”. Thus,
a scholar should investigate things as deeply as he could because all things,
when exhausted by inquiry, would turn out to be a result of right or wrong,
which was the best way to achieve deep moral understanding (Chu, 1989).
Further, Chu Hsi pointed out that investigation should be conducted
into everything in the world, which was best illustrated by his metaphor of
the moon’s reflections in myriad bodies of water. Because the truth was
scattered across many things, it was imperative to investigate as many
events as possible. Accordingly, he suggested people investigate one thing
a day, accumulate understanding, and eventually synthesize all the experi-
ence to comprehend the transcendental li. The objects of the inquiry, Chu
Hsi emphasized, should encompass all types of things. This could be as
great as the concept of the Supreme Ultimate or as tiny as grass or insects.
When a person missed one thing, he might miss the relevant knowledge
that it could give him (Chu, 2002).
This idea of investigating exhaustively to find the truth, like the Western
scientific inquiry, was a breakthrough in the Chinese traditional way of think-
ing. It is widely understood that the ancient Chinese tended to perceive the
186 Z. YOU ET AL.
world from whole to parts; that is, they viewed the world as a whole first and
then came to analyze the individual parts and the connections among them.
This also explained the sociocultural phenomenon that they tended to put
collective interests ahead of individual interests. That is why the concept of
Tao was so important in Chinese culture and why the ideas of grand unifica-
tion and collectivism were so popular in Chinese society. Chu Hsi’s investi-
gation went the other way—that is, from learning the individual parts to
know the whole world—and in this way he challenged and enriched the
traditional mode of philosophical thinking in China.
But unlike modern inquiry, the purpose of Chu Hsi’s method directed
more toward moral education than toward scientific discovery. In contrast
to Western science, which explores objective laws, Chu Hsi’s investigation
concentrated on studying the subjective and predetermined moral princi-
ples, which were decided by his ultimate purpose of understanding the
transcendental li. Therefore, human relations were the most ideal target of
this exhaustive inquiry: the relations between sovereign and minister,
father and son, and husband and wife were the best themes of the investi-
gation (Chu, 1989). When a person endeavored to be a filial son to his
parents, or to be a good brother, he was exhausting the meaning of the
moral principles concerning filial piety and fraternal duty.
For Chu Hsi, knowing alone was not enough. To truly comprehend li,
students must sincerely practice what they had learned in real life—
knowing and practice were inseparable. On the issue of which one was
prior, Chu Hsi deemed that knowing or knowledge-learning should go
before practice in that moral practice needed the guidance of moral prin-
ciples. The illumination of the profound moral principles, he added, would
enable people to act better. Meanwhile, Chu Hsi asserted that practice was
more important than knowing because moral principles without practice
did not represent true knowledge. He compared knowing and practice as
two feet walking together: when you knew better, you could practice more
sincerely; when you practiced more sincerely, you could know even better.
Neither should be neglected (Chu, 2002). However, this knowing-then-
action sequence was not fixed; sometimes practice could go first. For
instance, elementary education should start from doing; that is, children
should practice moral behavior first before they started reading more pro-
found Confucian classics. This was because children were too young to
understand those moral doctrines, whereas their practice of daily rites
could help them form good moral habits, which in turn would allow them
to better understand moral principles later.
Chu Hsi’s Ideas on School Moral Education

As a great educator, Chu Hsi had systematic ideas about moral education
in schools. He suggested that moral education should be made the priority
of school education, and he criticized school education that mostly aimed
at preparing students for the imperial examination but neglected the
responsibility for moral cultivation.4 This kind of school practice, he argued,
encouraged students to pursue reputation and gain while disregarding
righteousness, which had contributed to the deterioration of moral stan-
dards. Therefore, the greatest concern in school education was not about
the establishment of regulations, but about whether students truly fol-
lowed and enjoyed moral principles or not. For Chu Hsi, the purpose of
school education was to cultivate harmonious human relations and fortify
social order with the Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues.
This was well embodied in the regulations of the White Deer Grotto
Academy, which were compiled by Chu Hsi himself. This regulation syn-
thesized basic educational ideas and learning approaches from Confucian
classics. It primarily included:
1. The Outlines of Five Education: Kinship between father and son,

righteousness between sovereign and minister, different roles
between husband and wife, order between seniors and juniors, and
trust among friends.
2. The Sequence of Learning: Learn extensively, inquire carefully,

think deeply, differentiate clearly, and practice earnestly.
3. The Gist of Self-Cultivation: Speak with faithfulness and credibility,
practice with sincerity and respect, constrain wrath and eradicate
desires, correct mistakes and become morally good.
4. The Crux of Conducting Oneself: Root for justice without seeking
personal gain, and clarify Tao without claiming the credits.
5. The Kernel of Getting along with People: Do not do to others what
you would not like to be done to you; reflect on your own fault if
things do not turn out in your way (Chu, 2002, XXIV, p. 3586).
In addition, Chu Hsi advocated implementing different forms of educa-

tion according to students’ ages. He divided the schooling into two types:
elementary learning and great learning. Elementary learning was for chil-
dren, centering on learning by doing. He suggested that children under
15 come to understand moral principles through action. These children
188 Z. YOU ET AL.
needed to learn by cleaning rooms, practicing rites such as how to greet

and respond to guests, as well as developing moral habits such as loving
their parents, respecting seniors and teachers, and getting along with their
relatives. When children grew up, they should start learning the moral
principles. Young people in The Great Learning should follow the Three
Guiding Principles and fulfill the Eight Clauses indicated in The Great
Learning. The guiding principles included illuminating morality, refresh-
ing oneself, and reaching a state of moral perfection. The eight clauses
entailed investigating the world to acquire knowledge, striving to achieve
sincerity, keeping a righteous heart, cultivating morality, keeping the fam-
ily in order, governing the state well, and bringing peace to the world.
Rich in implications for moral education, these sequences, contents,
approaches, and goals for moral learning had become the guidelines for
later Confucians in their pursuit of sagehood.
As a Confucian scholar, Chu Hsi particularly emphasized the role of
reading in illuminating morality. In his view, investigating to know should
be accompanied by reading broadly and thinking deeply. Without these,
moral inquiry would yield few or no results. Chu Hsi once composed a
poem entitled “Thoughts While Reading”, which read: “a small square
pool shines like a mirror, in which daylight and shadows of clouds drift
back and forth. When asking how it stays so clean, it says water keeps flow-
ing in from the springhead” (Chu, 2002, XX, p. 286). In this poem, he
compared the heart to a pond and inspiration to spring water. It was the
understanding and continuous inspirations evoked by reading books that
kept the heart clean and clear. Thus, the philosophical poem expressed not
just ideas about perusing books, but also introduced an important
approach to cultivating a heart that could perceive the truth of the world.
Finally, Chu Hsi’s contribution to school moral education also lay in his
editing and annotating of The Four Books. Though it was the Cheng
Brothers who first proposed using The Four Books for moral education,
Chu Hsi officially made them textbooks and wrote a very influential book
of commentary entitled Collected Annotations on the Four Books. While
Chu Hsi’s philosophy was promoted as orthodox Confucianism and the
official learning, this book was also officially appointed as required reading
for the imperial examination in the ensuing Yuan, Ming, and Qing
Dynasties. Following that, millions of Confucians, intellectuals in some
other East Asian countries included, read Chu Hsi’s books and pursued a
life of moral self-cultivation and service to the state. In this sense, Chu
Hsi’s influence was not just limited to ancient China, but also to many
other East Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, where his
works were regarded as the official learning, and accordingly influenced
education and culture.
As the mainstream philosophy and the official learning in the Southern
Song Dynasty and beyond, the School of Principle in Neo-Confucianism,
along with its derived moral education activities, considerably impacted on
and shaped the worldview, value system, social norms, political life, family
education, and even artistic creation of the ancient Chinese people. The
philosophical concepts such as the Supreme Ultimate, li, qi, investigation,
sincerity, respect, the heart, eradicating desires, and the original nature
became the most important terms in daily philosophical discussions and
the modes of moral education for many centuries.
More importantly, through incorporating concepts from Taoism and
Buddhism, the School of Principle successfully came up with comprehen-
sive cosmological and ontological frameworks and ultimately made up for
the shortcoming of traditional Confucianism in metaphysics. But unlike
religions, the philosophy did not rely on karma or the promise of immor-
tality to facilitate people’s moral development; instead, it placed the task
of moral cultivation on the shoulders of everyone, highlighting people’s
autonomy, self-determination, and self-restraint. These influences were
greatly reinforced when the governments of the successive dynasties des-
ignated Chu Hsi’s works as textbooks for school education and for prepar-
ing the imperial examination, which made its influence, both positive and
negative, much more profound for many years to come.
Even from today’s standards, the impact of moral education in the School
of Principle on Chinese culture, belief, and people’s behavior was far-reach-
ing and positive. With its inspiration, many Confucians aspired to realize the
ideals of building the heart for the universe, teaching about the Great Path,
restoring Confucian traditions, and opening up eternal peace. The call to
abstain from excessive desires and preserve the heavenly principle also helped
redress the social vices of extravagance and moral degeneration, and enhance
the moral level of society at the time. With the relevant educational activi-
ties, virtues such as faithfulness, filial piety, benevolence, and righteousness
became part of the national spirit, contributing to the emergence of many
national heroes who were willing to sacrifice their own interests or even lives
for the needs of the country when China was in crisis.
190 Z. YOU ET AL.
Nonetheless, the negative influences of this philosophy were tremen-

dous as well. The School of Principle emphasized the moral values of filial
piety, rites, and loyalty to such an extent that it lost much of the generosity
and flexibility of classical Confucianism. The maxim of eradicating desires
to seek li was overstressed and distorted in subsequent generations, with
the result that it was used by rulers as a tool to cement the hierarchical
system, suppress people’s natural dispositions, and limit their freedom.
The propaganda that women should preserve their chastity even at the
cost of starving to death, as suggested by the Cheng Brothers, also added
to the suffering of Chinese women, leading to numerous misfortunes. A
scholar named Dai Zheng in the Qing Dynasty, accordingly, censured this
inhumanity as killing people with li (Dai, 1980). More importantly, the
practice of sanctifying Confucian creeds gradually rigidified people’s way
of thinking, prevented the introduction of new ideas and perspectives
from Western countries; this may account for China lagging behind at the
dawn of the modern era.
Notes
1. The word “li” refers to the underlying reason for the cosmos, moral prin-
ciples or the heavenly principle in Neo-Confucianism. Although rite (li) and
the Neo-Confucian heavenly principle (li) have similar connotations and are
pronounced the same in the Chinese phonetic alphabet, they are in fact
represented by two different Chinese characters. While rite denotes more
the proper external regulations of people’s conduct, the heavenly principle
leans towards people’s internal moral virtue and reason.
2. The concept of the Non-Ultimate first appeared in Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching,
where it indicated the primordial void before the universe comes into being.
The concept of the Supreme Ultimate first appeared in the commentaries on
The Book of Changes, denoting the state of undifferentiated absolute and
infinite potential of the universe before the emergence of the duality of Yin
and Yang. There are two different explanations of their relationships. One is
that the Non-Ultimate (nonbeing) goes before the Supreme Ultimate
(being). The other is that both concepts are actually two names for one
thing, namely the substance of the universe. The authors of this book believe
the Supreme Ultimate is the turning point from nonbeing to being.
3. The Great Path (Tao) denotes the ultimate truth or the moral principle (li)
in Neo-Confucianism.
4. The imperial examination (keju) was a civil service system starting in the Sui
Dynasty to select candidates for the state bureaucracy. As the content of the
exam was based on knowledge of Confucian classics, it greatly enhanced the

influences of Confucianism in ancient China, and was a clear manifestation
of the integration of politics and moral education.
References
Cheng, H., & Cheng, Y. (1981). Collections of the Cheng Brothers. Beijing:
Chu, H. (1983). Collected annotations on the four books. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Chu, H. (1989). Collections of works by the duke of culture, Chu Hsi. Shanghai:
Shanghai Ancient Works Publishing House.
Chu, H. (2002). Collective books of Chu Hsi. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works
Publishing House.
Dai, Z. (1980). The collections of Dai Zhen. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works
Publishing House.
Gong, K. (1996). On Zhang Zai’s moral education thought. Hebei Academic
Journal, 4, 46–50.
Liu, J. (2011). Philosophy of moral psychology of Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzi.
Social Science, 5, 126–133.
Wang, Q. (2015). Zhou Dunyi’s penetration of the three religions. Book, 7, 57–60.
Xuan, J. (1990). Song of Tao of Yongjia. In J. Ren (Ed.), Sutra of Chinese dazang.
Zhang, Z. (1978). Collections of Zhang Zai. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Zhou, D. (1936). The collections of Zhou Lianxi. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient
Works Publishing House.
Zhu, P. (2006). The construction of Chu Hsi’s philosophical ontology and its
implications of Li. Journal of Jiaying University, 5, 24–27.
CHAPTER 9
My Heart Is the Universe: The Philosophy

of Moral Education in the School of Mind
of Neo-Confucianism
The emergence of the School of Mind in Neo-Confucianism could be

viewed as a philosophical divergence and rebellion from the mainstream
School of Principle. The School of Principle, represented by the Cheng-
Chu Learning,1 had drawn criticism due to its overemphasis on external
principles and rigidity in moral education. For instance, many scholars did
not concur with the idea that the moral principle was the substance of the
universe because it neglected people’s subjectivity and initiative. They fur-
ther criticized it on the grounds that the sanctification of moral principles
was conducive to a blind worship of these holy virtues without true under-
standing and that the tedious and fragmented process of moral learning in
this philosophical school seriously hindered people’s moral development.
Hence there was a need to create a new philosophy that could touch peo-
ple’s hearts, meet the needs of daily life, and promote individual moral
understanding with a simple and easy methodology and a holistic
perspective.
As the representatives of these scholars, Lu Jiuyuan in the Southern
Song Dynasty and Wang Yangming of the Ming Dynasty stood out and
established a new branch of Neo-Confucianism, namely the School of
Mind, through exploring the role of the heart in embracing the moral
truth of the universe. More specifically, the two philosophers inherited
thinking about heart-based moral development from Mencius and the
Cheng Brothers, reconstructed Confucian cosmology and ontology by
incorporating concepts and learning approaches from Buddhism and

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_9
194 Z. YOU ET AL.
Taoism (Huang, 2011), and eventually developed a philosophical school

that came to rival the dominant Cheng-Chu Learning. After that,
Confucians’ moral self-cultivation could mostly be categorized into two
kinds—one focused on investigating external events to acquire the ulti-
mate truth and one centered on recovering the original heart to facilitate
moral understanding.
The Six Classics Are My Footnotes: Lu Jiuyuan’s

Philosophy of Moral Education
Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1193 CE) was a brilliant scholar in the Southern Song
Dynasty who, along with his brother Lu Jiuling, created the Study of
Mind. Criticizing the doctrine of Chu Hsi about seeking morality from
outside, he proposed a conceptual framework based on “the heart as li”,
which underscored the importance of a person’s own autonomy and ini-
tiative in moral learning. As an official-scholar, he had several famous phil-
osophical discussions with Chu Hsi, exemplified by the debate in the
Goose Lake Meeting upon the sequence and approaches to moral educa-
tion. As an educator, he taught thousands of disciples, publicizing the idea
of moral self-cultivation through the heart. All of these efforts paved the
way for Wang Yangming, who officially established and substantially devel-
oped the School of Mind in the Ming Dynasty.
Cosmology and Ontology in Lu Jiuyuan’s Philosophy

The heart is the key word in Lu Jiuyuan’s philosophy of moral education.
In ancient Chinese culture, the heart was equal to mind, which had mul-
tiple functions with respect to physiology, cognition, emotions, will, and
morality. For Lu, the heart was the source of morality, and morality was
the central function of the heart. The heart contained not only the moral
principles, but also the moral capacity to tell right from wrong; this was,
in fact, a transcendental mind that knew all things about morality before-
hand. Therefore, the cultivation of the inner heart, instead of the learning
of extrinsic moral principles, was both the starting point and the ultimate
goal of moral education in Lu’s philosophy.
Lu Jiuyuan attributed his idea of the heart as the source of morality to
Mencius’ philosophical discourse about the heart and human nature. He sug-
gested that Mencius’ propositions such as human nature being essentially
MY HEART IS THE UNIVERSE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL EDUCATION… 195
good, the function of the heart was to think, and recovering the lost heart
constitute the foundation of the Study of Mind, indicating that the heart pos-
sessed the fundamental truth and the functions of moral reasoning and reflec-
tion. Based on this belief, Lu posited that moral principles lay inside one’s
heart and therefore should be elicited from it. Accordingly, moral develop-
ment was not a result of external investigation, but the product of self-exam-
ination and introspection or the purification of the original moral heart.
However, Lu Jiuyuan did not just inherit Mencius’ ideas, he further
elevated the concept of the heart to the height of cosmology. For him, the
heart was not solely a human organ with a moral faculty, but the substance
of the universe with myriads things existing within it, which embraced the
ultimate truth of the cosmos. The idea was well demonstrated by his
famous adage that “the universe is my heart, and my heart is the universe”
(Lu, 1980, p. 314). Moral principles, he argued, were an intrinsic exis-
tence that was extended from the heart and eventually filled up the uni-
verse. This assertion about the heart as the universe possessed not only
novel cosmological values, but also implications for moral education. By
equating people’s hearts with the universe, Lu had lifted up the human
spiritual world so that people could break away from individual narrow-
ness and selfishness and reach a realm as great as the universe, granting
people a sense of nobleness and sublimity for moral cultivation.
The proposition about the role of the heart in moral learning could be
found in the philosophical discourse of great masters in the School of
Principle as well. Cheng Hao, for instance, believed that li was inside the
heart, which generated myriads events (Cheng & Cheng, 1981). Chu Hsi
also categorized the heart into the human heart and the heart of Tao; he
advocated to his followers that they should eliminate the human heart and
seek the heart of Tao. But these Neo-Confucian philosophers regarded the
heavenly principle as the primary and the heart as secondary. Lu, on the
contrary, made the heart primary, remarking that “all human had hearts,
and all hearts had li, thus the heart is li” (Lu, 1980, p. 149). Since the heart
included the moral principles, these principles were discoverable if the heart
was purified. Unlike the Cheng Brothers, who regarded li as the highest
category, Lu made li the nature of the heart or something subordinate to
the heart. With this proposition, he successfully converted the study of li
into a study of the heart or mind through transferring the substance of the
universe from li to the heart (Huang, 2011). The essence of this transition
was to integrate the subjectivity of mind with the objectivity of moral prin-
ciples, situating the heart at the center of moral development.
196 Z. YOU ET AL.
Based on the assumption of the heart as li, Lu Jiuyuan proposed that

people make the recovery of their original heart the priority in moral cultiva-
tion. For him, the original heart was a heart of conscience and was abso-
lutely good in that it was born with the essence of the universe. He further
quoted the theory of four hearts by Mencius to elucidate the innate virtues:
“the heart of sympathy is the origin of benevolence; the heart of shame is
the origin of righteousness; the heart of modesty is the origin of rites; the
heart of the right or wrong is the origin of wisdom. This is what I called the
original heart” (Lu, 1980, p. 487). This original heart was possessed by all
people, sages and ordinary people alike. The problem was that people’s
original heart was usually tainted or obscured by desires resulting from their
pursuit of personal gain, and that all immoral actions arose after people had
lost the original heart. The sages and persons of virtue were people of high
morality; they had realized the existence of the original heart and took the
initiative to remove the blemishes from it. By this logic, all moral learning
should center on regaining and cultivating this heavenly endowed heart.
Lu Jiuyuan held people’s autonomy and initiative to be crucial in their
moral development, which he described as “lifting up one’s own spirit and
being in charge of oneself” (Lu, 1980, p. 455). Everybody, he added,
could become a sage through his own efforts to recover the original heart.
A moral agent should actively study something more fundamental than
trivial investigations, that is, he should start with his own heart. Lu criti-
cized Chu Hsi’s way as tedious and uninformed. For him, the heart for
people was just like the roots for a tree—it was needed for prosperity.
When one’s heart was established, all the factors would automatically
come together; one would know when to be sympathetic, when to be
ashamed, when to be modest, and how to distinguish right from wrong.
This was why Lu opposed annotating the Confucian classics, something
Chu Hsi did; instead, the Six Classics should be the footnotes to his phi-
losophy (Lu, 1980, p. 522). Since his heart had already understood all the
moral principles or the true meaning of the Six Classics, there was no need
to annotate the Confucian classics. Chu Hsi’s approach, Lu said, was like
attending to trifles and neglecting the essential.
Sudden Enlightenment and Moral Education

A close examination of Lu’s philosophy revealed the strong influence of
Chan Buddhism, as indicated by his use of sudden enlightenment or
epiphany for moral education. This similarity was evident in that both
Chan masters and Lu emphasized the importance of the heart and inspira-
tion in moral understanding. Both believed that everyone had the original
heart containing the ultimate truth or Buddha nature, only for this to be
tainted by inordinate desires or distracting emotions and ideas. Accordingly,
removing these mental obscurations was the chief task of moral education
or becoming a Buddha. While Chan masters aimed at helping disciples
retrieve their Buddha nature, Lu’s philosophy asked people to recover the
lost original heart of morality. Both negated the traditional ways of pro-
longed learning and worshiping authority and instead accentuated the
functions of inspiration, intuition, instant enlightenment, and critical
thinking in challenging traditional doctrines.
As a master in the School of Mind, Lu was skilled at using the method
of sudden enlightenment to promote a disciple’s moral understanding.
Legend has it that when an official named Yang Jian asked him what the
original heart was, Lu replied that the original heart was the four hearts of
sympathy, shame, modesty, and right and wrong. Yang could not under-
stand what this meant. Later, when Yang Jian had finished determining a
lawsuit, he asked Lu Jiuyuan the same question again. Lu replied that
since he had just determined the outcome of a lawsuit, he knew right from
wrong, and that this was the original heart. Yang asked: “Is that all?” Lu
unexpectedly gave a loud shout: “Isn’t that enough?” Hearing the roar,
Yang immediately came to a sudden enlightenment.
This story is a good example of how Lu Jiuyuan helped his students
achieve sudden awakening. Like the masters of Chan Buddhism, Lu was
good at using situated cases, puns, gestures, witty words, and comparisons
during conversations to point out the crux of a matter or create a vivid image
of the moral issues; these could abruptly intrigue the inspiration of disciples
who, accordingly, would make a giant leap in understanding. This kind of
moral instruction reflected not just a Chan influence, but also a development
in the Confucian traditional learning method emphasizing heuristic teaching
and questioning; it recalled the naturalistic tradition of Lao Tzu and Chuang
Tzu that valued intuition and holistic thinking. Therefore, the method was
understood as an integration of Confucianism, Taoism, and Chan Buddhism,
reaching into the realm of aesthetic appreciation. This aesthetic tendency
was perceptible in Lu’s teaching as he advocated spontaneous learning in the
natural environment. For instance, he often led students to climb mountains
and approach water falls, enjoying the beauty of the natural landscape and
playing musical instruments, which he believed could help people become
inspired and achieve enlightenment.
198 Z. YOU ET AL.
Because of the sudden enlightenment teaching method , Lu Jiuyuan’s

philosophy was satirized by Chu Hsi as a study of Chan. This comment
seemed reasonable on the grounds that there was a great deal in common
between Lu’s study of the heart and Chan Buddhism. However, a detailed
analysis of Lu’s philosophy revealed an intrinsic difference from Chan
Buddhism. Like other Confucian schools, Lu’s philosophy centered on
people’s moral development in this world, and the ultimate purpose of
learning was to serve the world by being virtuous. This standpoint was in
sharp contrast to Buddhism, which relinquished worldly responsibilities
and pursued liberation from this world. Lu himself also pointed out that
his philosophy differed from Chan Buddhism in righteousness and selfless-
ness. While Buddhism as a religion centered on the selfish purpose of
escaping from this world, the aim of moral education in Lu’s philosophy
was to encourage people to realize the righteousness of this world (Lu,
1980).
Lu Jiuyuan’s Approaches to Moral Education

In contrast to complicated and dreary approaches of the School of
Principle, Lu Jiuyuan proposed that people use a simple, easy method of
moral education. This idea of a simple, easy method could be traced to
Mencius, who claimed that people “seek something far away despite the
great path is near, and seek to accomplish something difficult even though
it is easy” (Mencius, 1989, p. 173). For Lu, moral development was easy
and simple because people did not have to read intensively or investigate
strenuously; rather, they should obtain moral truth directly through recov-
ering the original heart. When the heart was purified and ready, one could
master all the moral principles easily. Lu’s advocacy of the direct-to-the
heart learning approach had special implications for moral education. Due
to its simplicity, it could be easily accepted, understood, and followed, and
could draw a large number of people to learn who otherwise had been
scared away by the complexity and difficulty of the School of Principle.
How should this method be conducted? Or, to put it differently, how
should the original heart be recovered? Lu first proposed that disciples use
a way called removing the shadows or taints from the heart-mind. If one’s
heart was blocked, one should peel back these shadows to let the heart be
illuminated. When the shadows came back and blocked the original heart
again, one should peel back the shadows again. This process “should be
repeated many times until all the blemishes and shadows are gone and the
original heart emerges and shines” (Lu, 1980, p. 458). Another way that
Lu suggested, similar to that of sitting in oblivion, was to cultivate one’s
heart through sitting quietly with eyes closed; this would allow scholars to
concentrate on and reflect upon moral issues in quietness and peaceful-
ness, getting rid of desires and distractions in mind. This was also a
moment when a scholar could reach sudden enlightenment and com-
pletely recover his original heart.
Although Lu Jiuyuan criticized Chu Hsi’s learning approaches of inves-
tigation and perusing classics as pointless and tedious, he did not completely
believe that reading had no importance in moral development. Lu remarked
that all the sages and the superior men needed to learn to be one. Even
Confucius made progress by reading books and learning from teachers and
friends. A scholar thus needed to read just as fish needed water. Nevertheless,
Lu opposed Chu Hsi’s advocacy of reading systematically and attentively;
instead, he stood for reading with ease and leisure. He asserted that reading
too much and too hard would distract people from the real purpose of
moral cultivation. Students did not have to peruse every book, emphasize
the difficulty of books, or push themselves too hard while reading; rather,
they should read in an unhurried manner and digest a few books with deep
reflection. The crux is that one should connect reading with daily life and
attain a better comprehension of its true meaning. This idea of reading with
leisure was somewhat similar to the ideas of reading and thinking in
Aristotle’s liberal education, a good example of great minds’ thinking alike.
Aside from reading with ease, Lu Jiuyuan underscored the significance
of promoting independent thinking and critical thinking in reading. He
encouraged his disciples to question the classics on the grounds that inquir-
ing was essential for learning. People could make small progress if they
questioned slightly and would make giant progress if they questioned
greatly (Lu, 1980). Lu even told his disciples not to have a blind faith in
classics, claiming that “if the book is reasonable, we should learn it even if
it is not written by the sages” (Lu, 1980, p. 380). He further proposed that
people should not believe in a book that was not reasonable even though it
was written by the sages. This attitude differed vastly from that of Chu Hsi.
Although Chu Hsi too asked his students to question during reading, his
questioning was not to doubt the legitimacy of books of the sages, but to
question if people of subsequent ages, teachers included, had correctly
understood the true meaning of the sages (Gao, 2006). Given that there
was a culture of sage-worship in ancient China, Lu’s advocacy of question-
ing the sages’ words was truly an audacious challenge to authority.
200 Z. YOU ET AL.
Lu Jiuyuan’s attitude to reading was consistent with his central idea of

learning morality through cultivating the heart. As the ultimate truth existed
in one’s heart, the purpose of reading was to help illuminate the heart. In
other words, even though the books contained moral principles, scholars
should not deviate from the central mission of recovering and cultivating
the moral heart. Only with leisure could one think freely and could such
readings enrich one’s mind, which allowed readers to be free from possible
bias and stereotypes embedded in books. Thus, Lu believed that the creeds
in those classics should not be accepted unconditionally; rather, they were
subject to evaluation and judgment by the heart, which was a good embodi-
ment of his idea of putting the heart at the center of moral learning, and was
the reason why he declared that the Six Classics should be his footnotes.
Conclusion
In short, Lu Jiuyuan’s philosophy was a kind of transcendentalism, which
had both positive and negative influence on the moral education of his
time. On the one hand, the transcendental and almighty heart encom-
passed moral principles, which highlighted people’s initiative and auton-
omy in moral development and counteracted the rigidity of learning in the
School of Principle. On the other hand, as the learning of moral knowl-
edge was regarded as simply an enrichment and verification of transcen-
dental nature, disciples might easily neglect the importance of learning
knowledge (Huang, 2011). This might lead people nowhere, particularly
when they were not talented enough and were not properly guided.
Lu Jiuyuan was a highly gifted philosopher who was able to reach his
enlightenment alone; he introduced the Study of Mind almost all by him-
self, but his method of learning was not suitable for everyone. Although
he claimed that his approach was simple and easy, it was actually rather
difficult to master due to the high demands it made on learners’ natural
gifts such as inspiration and intuition: it was easy to understand initially,
but it was difficult to make progress and persist in moral learning on the
basis of this philosophy. Without teachers’ proper guidance, disciples
could either slide toward Chan Buddhism or return to Chu Hsi’s verbatim
manner of moral learning. In fact, Lu’s influence quickly faded after his
death. His disciples either fell into the wrong path of Buddhism or Taoism,
or switched back to the School of Principle. It was not until the emergence
of Wang Yangming, the greatest philosopher in the Ming Dynasty, who
republished and wrote commentaries on Lu Jiuyuan’s works, that Lu’s
philosophy was revived, deepened, and systematically developed.
The Goose Lake Meeting: Philosophical Debates

Between Chu Hsi and Lu Jiuyuan
The Goose Lake Meeting was a significant event in the history of the phi-
losophy of moral education. It highlighted the philosophical controversy
between Chu Hsi, the representative of the rationalistic wing of Neo-
Confucianism, and Lu Jiuyuan and his brother Lu Jiuling, the spokesmen
of the idealistic wing of Neo-Confucianism. The philosophers debated
over “honoring moral nature” versus “following the path of inquiry and
study”, which were the two eternal theses of discussion on moral educa-
tion. Both phrases were adopted from the famous axiom of the Doctrine
of the Mean and referenced Confucius’ saying that “a man of virtue should
honor moral nature and follow the path of inquiry and study” (Zisi, 1987,
p. 52), which had defined two important approaches of moral learning.
The two approaches were actually also a major difference between the
School of Principle and the School of Mind, with the former highlighting
the importance of inquiry and study and the latter stressing the signifi-
cance of recovering the moral heart. In this sense, it was not just a scho-
lastic debate on the philosophies of these great scholars, but also a duel
between the two philosophical schools on how to conduct moral
education.
The philosophical meeting, starting on 5 June 1175 CE at the Goose
Lake Temple of Jiangxi Province, lasted for three days with more than a
hundred in the audience, including local officials and scholars, and friends
and disciples of each party. The debate was moderated by another famous
Confucian scholar, Lu Zuqian, who had initiated the meeting in the hope
of overcoming the philosophical differences and integrating the two
schools. The debate was intense and challenging but not without elegance.
Philosophers of both sides even composed philosophical poems to clarify
their own points. When Lu Jiuyuan recited his verse that “while the easy
and simple path eventually will grow and last, the tedious business will
ultimately prove ephemeral” (Lu, 1980, p. 301), Chu Hsi was displeased
due to what he perceived as irony but he maintained his good manners.
After that, both sides preached on their own way of moral education,
exchanged thoughts, and picked holes in the other’s philosophical argu-
ments. Eventually, the two parties ended the meeting and separated with-
out announcing the result of the debate.
202 Z. YOU ET AL.
Analysis of the Philosophical Debate

History did not record the details of the philosophical debate except some
fragmented notes from Lu Jiuyuan’s disciples. However, this process could
be restored and replayed through comparing the major differences
between Chu Hsi and Lu Jiuyuan in their metaphysics and approaches
to moral development, particularly their exchanges and criticism of each
other in their respective works; these revealed important and interesting
information regarding moral education in the two major Confucian
schools.
Generally speaking, even though the objective of both parties was to
achieve sagehood, they disagreed with each other on the approach
required—the result of their differing ideas to metaphysical questions.
Chu Hsi laid the emphasis on following the path of inquiry and study,
believing that the best way to achieve moral development was to investi-
gate all things in the world thoroughly. Investigating the world’s affairs
and perusing Confucian classics systematically allowed people to come to
understand the ultimate truth. He asserted that the Lu Brothers had made
things too simple, and that this went against students’ moral understand-
ing. The Lu Brothers, on the contrary, highlighted the importance of
honoring moral nature. They contended that the heart already knew all
the moral principles. Thus, moral learning should be a search conducted
inwardly, not outwardly. If a person understood this, the Six Classics
would only be his footnotes.
It is worth reiterating that these differences in the approaches to moral
education could be traced to their disparities in metaphysics. Lu Jiuyuan,
for instance, held that the heart, as the substance of the universe,
incorporated the heavenly principle. Therefore, people should cultivate the
original heart and master the highest moral law. Once the moral heart had
been recovered, the rest unfolded naturally. In this vein, moral principles
were not an external existence but the intrinsic quality of the heart: “there
is only one heart and there is one li. These two are actually one. They are
not separate” (Lu, 1980, pp. 4–5). Chu Hsi, nonetheless, held that li was
the substance of the universe, and was embodied in many objects and
events of the world. The heart was mostly an organ capable of recognizing
these moral principles. Therefore, moral learning could be accomplished
only by accumulating knowledge through investigating Confucian classics
and social events so as to eventually achieve a complete mastery of li. He
accordingly pointed out that “the philosophy of Lu Jiuyuan has myriad of
ills. The problem is he does not realize that qi acquired from life was
impure; instead, he erroneously regarded the impure and vulgar qi as the
heavenly principle in the heart” (Chu & Li, 1986, p. 2977).
From an epistemological perspective, the difference between the two
parties could be seen as the “nature versus nurture” bifurcation, which
was best illustrated by the classical antithesis that “going from sincerity to
intelligence is called nature and going from intelligence to sincerity is
called education” (Zisi, 1987, p. 46). “Sincerity” here referred to a sage’s
quality that understood morality without thinking and did the right thing
without effort. Intelligence referred to systematic inquiry and examina-
tion. While the former was congruent with “honoring moral nature”,
which emphasized the important role of original nature or the heart in
understanding moral issues, the latter was accordant with “following the
path of inquiry and study”, which highlighted the role of teaching and
learning in achieving the state of sincerity.
For Chu Hsi, moral learning was a process mostly proceeding from
external to internal. He argued that the heart could be categorized as the
human heart and the heart of Tao. The human heart occurred when one
centered on one’s desires, and the heart of Tao emerged when one focused
on righteousness (Chu Hsi & Li, 1986). Hence scholars should learn
moral knowledge or gain li accumulatively through reading, asking,
inquiry, practice, and self-restraint so as to eliminate the human heart and
preserve the heart of Tao. Lu Jiuyuan, on the other hand, suggested that
the learning proceeded from inside to outside. He opposed the division of
the human heart and the heart of Tao, and argued that there was only one
heart; he asked, “how could people have two hearts?” (Lu, 1980, p. 396).
As long as people recovered the original heart, they could get all things
right and understand everything immediately.
It is worth noting that Chu Hsi did not oppose honoring moral nature.
On the contrary, he contended that both investigation and honoring
moral heart were needed. While the heart of Tao was the goal of investiga-
tion and reading, honoring one’s moral nature helped guide systematic
inquiry. But the learning should still proceed from the elementary to the
advanced. The comprehensive inquiry was essential because only when
everything in the world was investigated thoroughly would people come
to understand li. Among all these efforts, reading the Confucian classics
was a priority. Chu Hsi called for people to peruse the sacred classics word
by word and sentence by sentence to accumulate knowledge. This was also
204 Z. YOU ET AL.
why he spent a lot of time annotating Confucian classics, trying to under-

stand what the ancient sages had really meant.
The Lu Brothers, however, were strongly against this complex, slow
learning process. As Lu Jiuyuan asked Chu Hsi at the Goose Lake Meeting,
if people needed to read books to attain sagehood, then how had legend-
ary ancient sages such as Yao or Shun become wise since they lived before
the writing of the Six Classics? In this way, Lu Jiuyuan criticized Chu Hsi’s
tendency of blindly worshiping authority and stressed the importance of
individual initiative and independent thinking in moral cultivation.
Furthermore, because Chu Hsi’s approach was petty and incoherent, it
actually hindered people’s understanding of the moral truth from a holis-
tic perspective. Lu further noted that it was only through focusing on the
original heart that people could understand the core of morality. Reading
systematically and investigating extensively, as a result of what could be
seen as its fragmentation and lack of cohesion, would not necessarily cul-
tivate the original heart or produce moral behavior.
In his book, Chu Hsi commented on his differences with Lu Jiuyuan in
the approaches to moral learning: “since Zisi, honoring moral nature and
following the path of inquiry and study have been the most valued
approaches of teaching and learning. Now what Lu Jiuyuan has discussed
is only the former and I have elaborated more about the latter” (Chu,
1985, p. 962).2 A disciple of Lu Jiuyuan named Chu Xiangdao also noted as
follows:
When discussing the way of teaching, Chu Hsi wanted people to read exten-
sively, following a path from complex to simple. The Lu Brothers wanted
people to recover their hearts, then read extensively. While Chu remarked
Lu’s way as too simple, Lu criticized Chu’s way as a fragmented learning.
Both sides varied tremendously. (Lu, 1980, p. 491)
After the Goose Lake Meeting

Although there was no victory by one side in the philosophical debate, all
the philosophers were apparently deeply affected by this academic
exchange. After the meeting, Chu Hsi wrote a letter to the debate’s mod-
erator, Lu Zuqian, noting that he had been agonized by it and had to
dwell in seclusion on a big mountain to practice sitting quietly for several
months to heal the discomfort. He also wrote an article a year later, con-
tending that the Lu Brothers’ approach to learning neglected the hard
work of daily investigation and hence would lead nowhere (Chu, 1985).
The influence though was not wholly negative as Chu Hsi noted in the
letter that he had benefited philosophically from discussions with the Lu
Brothers at the Goose Lake Meeting (Chu, 1985). Lu Jiuyuan, too, was
affected by Chu Hsi’s argumentation, and had adjusted his stance on the
reading of the Confucian classics.
Six years later, Lu Jiuyuan visited Chu Hsi at the White Dear Grotto
Academy. The purpose of Lu Jiuyuan’s visit was to ask Chu Hsi to write
an epitaph for his brother Lu Jiuling, who had passed away the previous
year. Chu Hsi agreed and then asked Lu Jiuyuan to give a lecture to his
students. Lu Jiuyuan lectured on a chapter in The Analects of Confucius
entitled “The mind of a superior man is conversant with righteousness; the
mind of a small man is conversant with gain,” in which Lu stated that the
choice of righteousness or gain was the criterion to judge who was a supe-
rior man who was a mean person. Listening to Lu Jiuyuan’s lecture, many
students were moved to tears. Chu Hsi also commended the lecture,
claiming that he and his students would not forget Lu Jiuyuan’s teaching
(Lu, 1980). Later, Chu Hsi even asked people to inscribe Lu Jiuyuan’s
outlines of the lecture on a stone tablet and cherish it in the academy. This
story showed that even though the two great philosophers differed vastly
in their opinions, they respected each other academically and shared the
same views about the principle of righteousness.
It was interesting to note that the philosophical differences between these
two Confucians could in part have been ascribed to their different disposi-
tions, as could be perceived by reading their works and the records left in
their disciples’ memoirs. Chu Hsi was generally a solemn and rigorous scholar
but not without tolerance. Lu Jiuyuan, on the other hand, had a casual,
spontaneous, and uninhabited personality with a love of liberty. These differ-
ences might have led them to develop different philosophies regarding moral
education. While Chu Hsi’s method was to put all the pieces together to
restore the whole picture, Lu Jiuyuan proposed that disciples form the whole
picture in mind first, then get to know each part in turn. Lu Jiuyuan tended
highlight inspiration and individuality, while Chu Hsi stuck to a strenuous
and down-to-earth mode of education through systematic and rigorous
learning, investigation, and knowledge accumulation.
Regardless of their differences, the two scholars did share some com-
mon grounds in the philosophy of moral education. Both philosophers
valued the heavenly principle, and both concurred that people needed to
develop Confucian virtues. Huang Zongxi, a philosopher in the late Ming
206 Z. YOU ET AL.
and early Qing Dynasties, commented that Chu Hsi and Lu Jiuyuan
worked collaboratively to serve the purpose of supporting Confucian
moral law and reinforcing Mingjiao.
The fact that the two philosophers could differ freely in their opinions
(Huang & Quan, 1986) was a good example of the academic freedom
that existed in the Song Dynasties. This tradition of freedom was inherited
from the Contention of a Hundred of Philosophical Schools in the Spring
and Autumn and Warring States Periods. These philosophers of different
schools exchanged their opinions freely and treated each other equally.
Taking the Goose Lake Meeting, for example, compared with Chu Hsi,
who was already a very famous scholar and a high-ranking official, Lu
Jiuyuan was much less famous in academics and junior in both age and
official rank at the time. However, this did not prevent Lu Jiuyuan from
harshly challenging Chu Hsi’s philosophy. On the other hand, even
though Chu Hsi felt uncomfortable about the challenge, he was still open
to learning and willing to recognize Lu Jiuyuan’s philosophical achieve-
ment. The Goose Lake Meeting was thus remembered not just as a leg-
endary exchange of different schools in the philosophy of moral education,
but also a paragon reflecting the open-minded spirit and graceful bearing
of ancient Confucian scholars.
The Extension of Innate Knowledge: Wang

Yangming’s Philosophy of Moral Education
Wang Yangming (1472–1529 CE), also known as Wang Shouren, was the
most important figure in the School of Mind. By inheriting the study of the
heart and nature from Mencius and Lu Jiuyuan, and learning from the
philosophies of Zhou Dunyi and the Cheng Brothers, he fully established
the School of Mind and made it the most popular form of Neo-Confucianism
in the mid-to-late Ming Dynasty. As the greatest Confucian after Chu Hsi,
Wang Yangming bequeathed many well-known concepts and propositions,
such as the extension of innate knowledge and the unity of knowing and
acting, which had not only become a part of the Chinese people’s daily
conversation concerning moral education and philosophical discussion, but
also had influenced the cultures of many East Asian countries.
During Wang Yangmin’s time, Cheng-Chu Learning had already domi-
nated academia for several hundred years. Chu Hsi’s philosophy had become
the mainstream ideology of the Ming Dynasty, and his book—Collected
Annotations on the Four Books—was officially designated the textbook for

the imperial examination. Almost all Confucians read the books written or
edited by Chu Hsi and followed his method of conducting investigation to
acquire li. However, there was growing dissatisfaction toward the philo-
sophical school. Many criticized the tendency of “vulgarization” in the
School of Principle. This tendency placed the emphasis on memorization
and recitation (ji-song), and textual criticism (xun-gu) in teaching and learn-
ing, and there was a refusal to question the words of authority figures such
as Chu Hsi. They also critiqued the fact that many people tended to study
the Cheng-Chu Learning for the sake of becoming officials rather than for
moral self-cultivation. As a result, many official-scholars lived corrupt and
luxurious lives, forgetting about the mission of serving the state. Some
scholars even shamelessly flattered powerful ministers or eunuchs, abandon-
ing righteousness and integrity. All of these indicated that the Cheng-Chu
philosophy had gradually lost its efficacy in facilitating people’s moral
growth and restraining inordinate desires.
As a young person, Wang Yangming was an ardent admirer of Chu Hsi.
He once tried to investigate bamboo branches continuously for seven days
and nights in hopes of understanding li and becoming a sage, but failed.
Disappointed with Chu Hsi’s philosophy, he then indulged himself in reli-
gious Taoism and Buddhism for a long time. Then he came to read the
books of Lu Jiuyuan, which inspired him. But it was not until in his exile
that he eventually achieved his sudden enlightenment. In 1507 CE, Wang
was exiled to an extremely remote mountainous area called Longchang
due to his bold action of impeaching a powerful eunuch. Wang stayed
there for three years alone and had no books to read. But when he tried to
recollect his knowledge and his previous experiences in life, he suddenly
realized that moral truth was not somewhere outside but in his heart. This
awakening made him immediately a master in the School of Mind. When
the exile was over, he was promoted to high official positions because of
his success in cracking down on the rebellions.3 He then started teaching
disciples and spread his philosophy for the rest of his life.
The Heart as the Origin of the Heavenly Principle

Compared with Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming proposed a more thorough
thesis that saw the heart as the substance of the universe. Even though Lu
Jiuyuan also held that the heart was li, he tended to believed that li existed
in both the universe and the heart, which made his philosophy somewhat
208 Z. YOU ET AL.
self-contradictory (Zhao, 1989). Wang, nonetheless, took the heart and li

as completely identical. He further contended that the heart was not just
the origin of morality, but also the world per se (Feng, 2004), or, to put it
differently, the heart was the premise that all things could exist and that
the heavenly principle was only the virtue originating from the heart.
Through negating the existence of the external li, he affirmed the heart’s
exclusive role in moral cultivation: “there is nothing outside the heart,
there is no event outside the heart, there is no li outside the heart, and
there is no righteousness and kindness outside the heart” (Wang, 2011,
p. 156). By saying so, he completely replaced li with the heart as the high-
est philosophical category and the ultimate existence of the universe. In
short, Wang had overcome the limitation of Lu Jiuyuan, and made the
heart-based ontology more methodological, rigorous, and systematic, tak-
ing the traditional concept of interaction between heaven and man to a
new level and establishing the philosophical School of Mind as a fully
formed rival of the School of Principle.
This concept of the heart as the world was well illustrated by an anec-
dote. When Wang Yangming was traveling with a friend in the moun-
tains of his hometown, the friend pointed at a flower tree in the rocks and
asked that “the flower tree is in the big mountain, blooms and then with-
ers. If there is nothing outside the heart, then how is the tree related to my
heart?” Wang replied: “when you do not watch the flower, both the flower
and your heart are in void; when you start to watch the flower, you get to
know the colors of the flower, which means the flower is not outside your
heart” (Wang, 2011, pp. 107–108). This perspective of the heart as the
source of reality was not unlike René Descartes’ famous philosophical
statement “I think; therefore, I am.”
Wang Yangming’s philosophy could be viewed as an absolute idealism,
which deemed that all things in the world, moral principles in particular,
were derived from, and thus should be governed by, the heart. As for the
content of li, Wang did not vary much from Chu Hsi. Both scholars
referred to it as Confucian principles about human relations such as benev-
olence and righteousness. The differences lay in the role of li in their
respective philosophy as well as the approach to its acquisition. While Chu
Hsi treated li as the source of the universe, Wang regarded li as the
embodiment of the heart; while Chu Hsi asked students to seek li out-
wardly, Wang suggested that li was the organization of morality in the
heart and hence should search inwardly. Wang explained: “li is when the
heart is not obscured […] it is filial piety when used to serve father, it is
loyalty when used to serve the sovereign, and it is credibility and benevo-
lence when used to make friends” (Wang, 2011, p. 2).
The Doctrine of Innate Knowledge

Based on his concept of the heart, Wang Yangming proposed his doctrine of
innate knowledge (liangzhi) and the moral education concept of the exten-
sion of innate knowledge. Innate knowledge was an idea developed from
Mencius’ concept of “good conscience”. In his book, Wang quoted
Mencius’ famous adages that “good conscience” in the heart enabled peo-
ple to know right from wrong without considering first, and “good capac-
ity” was a quality of the heart that enabled people to do the right thing
without learning first. For Wang, innate knowledge, as its name indicated,
was an inborn knowledge that enabled people to understand the difference
between good and evil. It was not just a moral function of the heart, as sug-
gested by Mencius, but also “the substance of the original heart” (Wang,
2011, p. 61). Wang had lifted innate knowledge to such a height that “it
was the spirit of creation. It created heaven and earth, determined ghost and
emperor” (Wang, 2011, p. 104). It was, he concluded, the existence of the
heavenly principle in the original heart. This proposition about innate
knowledge helped avoid the emptiness in Lu Jiuyuan’s d octrine of the heart
and made the heart-based moral education more concrete and tangible.
Epistemologically speaking, the significance of innate knowledge was
that it enabled the heart to know the right moral choices by instinct: “it
knows filial piety when sees father, knows caring when sees brother, and
knows sympathy when sees a small child dropping into the deep well”
(Wang, 2011, p. 6). While revealing people’s inborn moral inclinations,
this standpoint in essence highlighted autonomy in one’s own moral cog-
nition. Because the heart contained all things in the world, innate moral
knowledge in the heart allowed people to be fully in charge of their own
moral understanding and ethical decisions, which justified a highly auton-
omous and self-determining process of moral education. This argument
was reinforced by Wang’s assumption that even though people might have
differences in intelligence, all of them possessed innate moral knowledge
deep in the heart, which allowed them to make the right decisions and
become a sage or a person of virtue.
However, simply possessing a good conscience was not enough. To
promote moral development, innate knowledge needed to be extended
from the heart and applied to all the concrete events in the world. In fact,
210 Z. YOU ET AL.
the extension and application of innate knowledge was the core of Wang’s
philosophy of moral education and the primary approach to cultivating
sages and people of virtue. This idea was best described by his famous
instruction that “the substance of the heart is neither good or evil, but
good or evil occurs when ideas arise, innate knowledge is knowing good
and evil, and investigation is to do good things and remove evils” (Wang,
2011, p. 1576). The first two statements describe the original and pure
state of the heart and denote how ideas engendered moral issues. Although
this neutral state of the heart seemed to conflict with the concept of the
heart encompassing li, it was actually to emphasize the impartial role of
the heart in moral judgment. The last two statements refer to the function
of innate knowledge in perceiving and solving moral issues in the real
world through investigation and application, highlighting the importance
of extending innate knowledge to promote moral growth.
Wang Yangming’s idea about the extension of innate knowledge
marked a leap forward from Lu Jiuyuan’s sudden enlightenment as a way
of moral education. Though Wang too underscored enlightenment and he
himself was a good example of sudden awakening, he provided his disci-
ples with the other, more viable approaches. After all, very few people
could experience a qualitative change in moral understanding directly
through sudden enlightenment. The extension and application of innate
knowledge provided people with a more palpable approach to grow mor-
ally before they could achieve the ultimate enlightenment. Yet this exten-
sion of innate knowledge should not be confused with Chu Hsi’s
investigation to know. They were, in essence, utterly opposite. While Chu
Hsi advocated that people investigate things in the world to help the heart
comprehend moral knowledge or acquire li, Wang’s approach was to
recover moral knowledge in the heart and then extend it to apply in real
life situations.
We should note that the extension of innate knowledge was not a sepa-
rate process from inside knowing to outside acting, but a simultaneous
process. The former incorporated righting the mindset, being sincere,
conducting self-reflection to remove obscurity and recover knowledge in
the heart, whereas the latter involved extending and applying the moral
principles in real life, which in turn further nourished and strengthened
innate knowledge, each reinforcing the other. This was, Wang would say,
a good illustration of the Confucian moral education ideal of inner sage-
hood and outer kingliness.
The effort of restoring li in the heart and extending innate knowledge,

nonetheless, could not be accomplished without endeavoring to eliminate
excessive desires. Like other Neo-Confucians, Wang advocated restraining
the greediness of gain as this would disrupt the effort of moral self-
cultivation. To this end, he suggested that people guard their mind and
spare no effort to eliminate desires. But this effort was not easy. Wang
once commented that it was easy to capture the bandits in the mountains,
but hard to wipe out the thieves in one’s own heart (Wang, 2011).
Compared with Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming held a more conciliatory
attitude toward the issue of honoring moral nature or following the path
of inquiry and study. Although Wang, like Lu Jiuyuan, emphasized the
importance of honoring moral nature, he also laid emphasis on following
the path of inquiry and study. Sometimes he even tried to integrate the
two. When asked about the debate, Wang claimed that the path of inves-
tigation was in fact honoring moral nature. He made the point by asking
rhetorical questions: “without inquiry, is it possible to honor anything? Is
it possible that investigation has nothing to do with moral nature?” (Wang,
2011, p. 138). On the one hand, the process of honoring nature should
include inquiry, ran counter to Lu Jiuyuan’s sole emphasis on the cultiva-
tion of the heart. On the other hand, investigation should also be under
the guidance of the original heart and should serve the purpose of clarifying
the heart, which showed his disagreement with Chu Hsi’s aimless investi-
gation. By proposing the ideas of extending innate knowledge and the
unity of knowing and acting, Wang integrated the two approaches.
Unity of Knowing and Acting

For Wang Yangming, the extension of innate knowledge was actually a
procedure to unite knowing with acting, that is, to gain moral knowledge
and at the same time do what the knowledge commanded. This concept
was a great contribution by Wang to the philosophy of moral education
inasmuch as it solved the problems evoked by the separation of knowing
and acting in traditional moral education: it avoided the division of knowl-
edge and action in Cheng-Chu Learning and overcame the shortcoming
in the previous School of Mind, which centered on the heart but essen-
tially neglected practice.
In fact, though both knowing and acting were believed by Confucians
be crucial for moral education, few had truly integrated the two. For
instance, moral education in Cheng-Chu Learning was perceived as a pro-
212 Z. YOU ET AL.
cess from knowing to acting. Cheng Yi once stated that without knowing,
action was impossible (Cheng & Cheng, 1981). Chu Hsi also explicitly
noted that knowing should be pursued before acting, even though acting
was more important than knowing. He further claimed that the education
of the sages began with inquiring into knowledge and ended with practice
(Chu, 1985). Wang’s unity of knowing and acting, in this sense, was a
reaction to and remedy for this knowledge first, action second dualism.
He asserted that separating knowing and acting had led to the problem
that people knew moral principles well but did not follow them in daily
life.
Wang Yangming sharply criticized many scholars in his time on the
ground that they only centered on learning moral knowledge but rarely
practiced those principles, which was the reason why moral education was
not effective. Thus, the unity of knowledge and action was a timely pre-
scription for the problem. He further contended that knowing and acting
were inseparable in that knowing entailed action, whereas action also
included a dimension of knowing. It was not a true form of knowing if one
knew something but did not act in response accordingly. Any moral
instruction would be in vain if people did not have the motivation for
action. In terms of their integrative relationship, Wang explicitly stated
that “knowing was the idea of acting and acting was knowing’s effort, and
[…] knowing was the beginning of acting and acting was the finish of
knowing” (Wang, 2011, p. 4). In this sense, one could acquire knowledge
only through simultaneous cognition and action; knowing and acting
were unified from beginning to end.
This proposition, nonetheless, was subject to debate. A student once
asked Wang how he could explain why there were many people with abun-
dant moral knowledge but did not practice it at all. For instance, a person
knew that he should be filial to his father and care for his brothers, but in
fact was not filial or caring. In this vein, knowing and acting were two dif-
ferent things. Wang replied that this person’s knowledge had been under-
mined and obstructed by his improper desires, and therefore he was not
knowing and acting in the real sense (Wang, 2011); in other words, he did
not truly know what filial piety truly was. The moral virtues were just
words or concepts for him, not real knowledge coming from his heart as
his heart was blocked by his greed. If a person did know filial piety, he
would treat his parents with respect and genuine feeling, which was called
true knowing. After all, empty talk about filial piety did not produce real
knowledge about the moral principle.
Wang Yangming’s Moral Education Methods and Practice

Wang Yangming developed concrete moral education approaches in accor-
dance with his concepts of the extension of innate knowledge and the
unity of knowing and acting. As for children, he suggested that their edu-
cation should focus on cultivating filial piety, care, righteousness, integrity,
and the sense of shame with the teaching/learning methods of lecturing,
reciting poems, and practicing rituals. Like Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming
suggested that teachers should not teach too many books to children;
instead, their lectures should focus on a few books so that children could
have deep comprehension of moral values. As a philosopher with a liberal
orientation, he particularly opposed traditional education methods that
relied on reprimands and corporal punishment, which made students hate
teachers as enemies and see schools as prisons. The right schooling, he
suggested, should be able to attract children and made them happy and
willing to learn.
As for adults, Wang encouraged them to actively illuminate and recover
their lost heart through sitting quietly, making efforts, and working out
moral principles in life. Sitting quietly was a traditional method of
Confucians to nurture moral character by reflecting on one’s own b ehavior
and meditating on moral issues. Wang advocated that people sit quietly to
examine and eliminate all their excessive desires or concerns for reputa-
tion, gain, social status, lust for beauty, and so forth, just like they would
search for and eliminate thieves hidden in the mountains. In so doing,
people could retrieve and purify their original hearts.
Besides sitting quietly, making efforts was crucial for moral learning:
people should actively explore and endeavor to solve difficult moral
dilemmas. Reflecting deeply and trying hard could empower students to
be active learners, which was conducive to enabling their final enlighten-
ment. To this end, they should strenuously work out and apply all the
moral principles in reality so as to truly understand their meaning (Zhu,
1995). Wang insisted that if one just kept quiet and meditated but did
not put moral knowledge into practice, one would be overwhelmed
when he encountered difficult events in real life (Wang, 2011). Thus,
working out one’s moral principles or assumptions in reality was essen-
tial on the grounds that it could bring people not only a profound
understanding of morality, but also the capacity for correctly dealing
with moral problems.
214 Z. YOU ET AL.
It is interesting to note that Wang’s contribution to moral education

was not limited to his philosophical achievement and his teaching of dis-
ciples, but also to social education. As a local official, he utilized all kinds
of resources to cultivate a moral society. During his tenure, he founded
many community schools to teach ordinary people how to read and to
instill Confucian moral values in them. He himself compiled and issued
the “Local Agreement in the South Jiangxi Province” to promote good
customs through encouraging people to restrain and monitor their own
behavior. The guidance in this agreement asked the local people to actively
show filial piety to parents, respect the elderly, teach children, maintain
harmonious relations, help each other when in troubles, encourage good
behavior, and admonish evil deeds (Wang, 2011).
Like Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming’s philosophy showed a strong influ-
ence from both Taoism and Buddhism as he adopted many Buddhist and
Taoist concepts for the purposes of moral education. For instance, his
advocacy of preserving a serene and transcendental spiritual status, sitting
quietly to meditate, and reducing distractions were all similar to Taoist
beliefs and practices. His idea about the heart as the source of the universe
was not unlike the Buddhist concept that all bearings originated from the
heart. Nonetheless, Wang fundamentally rejected the core ideology in
both religious Taoism and Buddhism and explicitly reprimanded the two
religions for their selfish renunciation of human relations and social
responsibility.
Wang Yangming’s Philosophical Contribution and Influence

To conclude, Wang Yangming’s largest contribution to the philosophy of
moral education was that he successfully challenged the reigning status of
Cheng-Chu Learning, and completely established the School of Mind as
the other wing of Neo-Confucianism. In so doing, he took the heavenly
principle out of hands of the sages, and put it back in the heart of each
individual. This transition was remarkable because people were no longer
passive moral apprentices, but active learners in charge of their own moral
development. Unlike Chu Hsi’s tendency to emphasize external authority,
Wang’s philosophy fully endorsed subjectivity and free will in people’s
moral understanding and choice-making; this instilled a tendency toward
liberal thought and a spirit of questioning in later scholars.
However, Wang’s philosophy of moral education was not without criti-
cism. Even though his philosophy helped overcome the vulgarization of
the “Cheng-Chu” Learning, it was also held partially accountable for the
frivolous atmosphere among scholars in the late Ming Dynasty. As the
School of Mind became very popular at that time, many scholars enjoyed
discussing the heart and sudden enlightenment but neglected reading and
learning. This tendency was somewhat inevitable as not everyone could
meet the high demands of self-discipline, penetrating intuition, and bril-
liant inspiration required by Wang’s philosophy. However, Wang’s liberal
ideology and pragmatic spirit had a far-reaching effect on the subsequent
eras. Under his influence, many scholars of enlightenment in the late Ming
and early Qing Dynasties criticized the autocratic monarchy and publi-
cized early republican ideas during a time of crisis of Confucianism.
Finally, the influence of Wang Yangming’s philosophy was not limited in
China but spread to some other East Asian countries such as Korea and
Japan as well. When his philosophy was introduced to Japan in the mid-to-
late Ming Dynasty, it was quickly adopted as the Japanese study of Yangming,
forming a rival school of the study of Chu Hsi in Japan. More importantly,
Wang Yangming’s philosophy attracted many followers during the period of
the Meiji Restoration. His concepts such as the heavenly principle in the
heart and the unity of knowing and acting became the creeds of many cru-
cial reformers such as Ito Hirobumi and Saigo Takamori, encouraging them
to act according to their beliefs. In this sense, Wang Yangming’s philosophy
also contributed to the historical progress of Japan (Yu, 2009).
Notes
1. Due to the common ground and shared lineage of inheritance in philosophy
between the Cheng Brothers and Chu Hsi, their philosophies were called
the Cheng-Chu Learning as a whole.
2. Zisi, also known as Kong Ji, was a Chinese philosopher and the grandson of
Confucius. It was said that Mencius learned Confucianism from Zisi’s
disciple.
3. In 1519 CE, Wang Yangming created a military miracle by quickly defeating
the rebellion of the Prince of Ning with only local troops. Before that, he
was famous for combating bandits in the mountainous areas of Southern
Jiangxi province.
References
Chu, H. (1985). Collection of literary works by Master Chu. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
216 Z. YOU ET AL.
Chu, H., & Li, D. (1986). Categorized conversations of Chu Hsi. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
Feng, Y. (2004). A concise history of Chinese philosophy. Beijing: New World Press.
Gao, G. (2006). Reexamination of educational theory of Lu Jiuyuan’s sudden
enlightenment. Southeast Culture, 1, 62–66.
Huang, Z., & Quan, Z. (1986). Scholarly annals of Song and Yuan period. Beijing:
Lu, J. (1980). The collection of Lu Jiuyuan. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Wang, Y. (2011). Collected works of Wang Yangming. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient
Yu, H. (2009). Five hundred years of Wang Yangming. Guiyang: Guizhou
Education Press.
Zhao, S. (1989). From Lu Jiuyuanto Wang Yangming: On the establishment of
the School of Mind. Confucius Study, 4, 84–92.
Zhu, H. (1995). On Wang Yangming’s moral education thought. Journal of
Hunan University, 2, 52–61.
Zisi. (1987). The golden mean. In X. Chu (Ed.), Annotations of the four books
(pp. 21–58). Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House.
PART IV
The Era of Crises, Learning, and

Regeneration
CHAPTER 10
From Practical Learning to Chinese

Substance and Western Utility:
The Philosophy of Moral Education in an Era
of Crises
After reaching its apex in the Song and Ming Dynasties, the philosophy of
moral education in China eventually and inevitably arrived at its era of
crises in the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912 CE). During this epoch, the phil-
osophical transformations in the early and the late Qing Dynasty are par-
ticularly noteworthy as these were the two transition periods when people’s
ideas were subject to unprecedented challenge. The former era was turbu-
lent because the Manchu, an ethnic minority, established the Qing
Dynasty, the last dynasty in China, after conquering the once powerful
Ming Empire, which had spurred Confucians to reflect and to develop the
practical learning. The latter period saw even greater challenges due to the
invasions of Western forces and the introduction of Western philosophy,
religion, social system, science and technology, which shook the ideologi-
cal supremacy of Confucianism in China. In response to the severe crisis,
scholars debated the role of traditional philosophy, proposing different
versions of Chinese Substance and Western Utility to save the nation.1
The Philosophy of Moral Education in the Era

of Practical Learning
The primary feature of the philosophy of moral education in the early

Qing Dynasty is its emphasis on practical learning to serve the country
(jingshi zhiyong). The new philosophical trend was represented by three

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_10
220 Z. YOU ET AL.
great philosophers, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu, whose

common experiences and ardent patriotism helped lead to a flourishing of
practical learning. All three philosophers lived during the late Ming to
early Qing Dynasties, all fought for the Ming Dynasty when Qing troops
invaded, and all refused to cooperate with the new regime when their
efforts at saving the country failed. Finally, all proposed the idea of practi-
cal learning after experiencing the agony of losing their country and
reflecting on the incapacity of Neo-Confucianism to educate people of
integrity in the practical skills to defend the country.
Both the School of Principle and the School of Mind, the philosophers
argued, failed in moral cultivation as they could not prevent the corrup-
tions, shamelessness, and ineptitude of Confucian scholar-officials in the
late Ming Dynasty. Many officials surrendered to the Qing, completely
abandoning the creeds of loyalty and the sense of shame. Others, although
good at discussing the transcendental principle or the moral heart and
human nature, could not do anything useful to save the country but com-
mitted suicide when enemy troops broke in. The problem, the three phi-
losophers argued, lay in the distortion of the true meaning of Confucius’
teachings by Neo-Confucian philosophers in the Song and Ming Dynasties.
As Neo-Confucianism had incorporated concepts such as the Non-
Ultimate and meditation from Taoism and Buddhism, leading to scholars
indulging in metaphysical debates about li or the heart while neglecting
the real concerns of society. Consequently, they were incapable of fulfilling
the traditional Confucian mission of rule by morality.
As a result, the three philosophers proposed a return to the moral
teaching of pre-Qin Confucianism, which was a combination of moral
cultivation (inner sagehood) and serving the state (outer kingliness).The
issue of Neo-Confucianism was that it had centered on moral self-
cultivation but neglected serving the country. Although Neo-Confucianism
also called for the cultivation of good customs, it did not directly serve the
compelling need for the state with practical utility (Deng & Yin, 2015),
which highlighted the importance of promoting practical learning.
The philosophers suggested that Confucians reject empty discussion
and abstract cosmological concepts in Neo-Confucian studies and go back
to the norm of integrating moral development and social service in classical
Confucianism. In a materialistic perspective based on qi, they claimed that
scholars should focus on the practical utility of their learning so as to help
the country in times of difficulty. This insight, along with their republican
ideas about putting country and people before emperor, and the concept
FROM PRACTICAL LEARNING TO CHINESE SUBSTANCE AND WESTERN… 221
of balancing righteousness and personal gain, brought philosophical

enlightenment to people during their time as well as to the reformers of
the late Qing Dynasty.
Wang Fuzhi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692 CE), also known as Wang Chuanshan, was a
Confucian who participated in the resistance force against the Manchu
invaders in his early years. When these efforts failed, he chose to live as a
recluse in the mountains, where he wrote many books on philosophy and
politics with a strong anti-Manchu stance. When officials in the Qing pol-
ity invited him to serve the new dynasty, he wrote a couplet to make his
attitude clear: “the Six Classics ask me to make a ground-breaking under-
taking, my seven-feet body determines to follow the old dynasty or be
buried alive” (Wang, 1996, p. 717). Wang’s moral integrity and his prag-
matist philosophy deeply influenced the thinking of many reformers and
revolutionaries such as Tan Sitong and Mao Zedong in modern times.
etaphysics and Moral Cultivation

M
Wang Fuzhi explicitly attributed the downfall of the Ming Dynasty to the
negative influence of Chen-Chu Learning, particularly its idealistic stance
of regarding li as the substance of the universe. By absorbing Zhang Zai’s
materialistic concept of qi, Wang Fuzhi proposed a more practical and
realistic philosophy, suggesting that the substance of the universe was not
abstract ideas but omnipresent, concrete qi. It was the ceaseless interac-
tions and conflicts of qi with traits of Yin and Yang that produced all things
in the world. This ontology that held qi to be the building block of the
universe endowed his philosophy with the characteristic of materialism,
which differed from Chu Hsi’s idea about transcendental principles or
Wang Yangming’s belief in the heart as the substance of the world.
Based on the monism of qi, Wang Fuzhi criticized Chu Hsi’s idea regard-
ing qi as only the use of li. For Wang, principle was secondary to qi and
derived from qi. It was qi that determined the nature of moral principles,
with the result that “moral principles were inside qi and there would be no
principle without qi” (Wang, 1996, p. 15). Hence there was no transcenden-
tal li and all the abstract concepts and laws could arise only from concrete
things and events. This materialist perspective helped obliterate the transcen-
dental concepts of Buddhism and Taoism from Confucianism, allowing
moral principles and moral education to become more firmly rooted.
222 Z. YOU ET AL.
This ideology of practicality allowed Wang Fuzhi to better construe the

relationship between Substance and Utility or Tao and Utensil. Following
tradition, Wang noted that the two were integrative: where there was
Substance, it had Utility; and while Substance must evoke Utility, Utility
must be consistent with Substance (Wang, 1976). In his materialistic
worldview, nonetheless, qi or concrete events were mostly regarded as
Substance and principles were regarded as Utility, which was in contrast to
traditional mainstream ideas regarding nonbeing or moral principles, or
the heart as Substance and concrete objects or events as Utility. Therefore,
moral principles (Utility) should be derived from and based on concrete
stuff and social events formed by qi (Substance). Yet Wang posited that the
relationship could be reversed as sometimes li could serve as the substance
of qi as well, which reflected his monism about Substance and Utility.
Similar relationships existed between Tao and Utensil. In traditional
Chinese culture, Tao, as the fundamental law of the universe, was usually
placed before and above Utensil, namely concrete objects or events. For
Wang, however, Utensil existed before Tao. Where there was no Utensil,
there was no Tao. He illustrated this idea with the metaphors that it was
impossible to shoot without a bow and arrow, and there was no driveway
without a horse and carriage (Wang, 1996). Tao, accordingly, was not the
highest law of the world, as previously held, but just the use or function of
Utensil. He declared that Tao had a practical utility in moral education:
the use of moral principles was to reconcile human relations and cultivate
moral growth. Thus “all the discourses about Tao are to teach people (to
be moral)” (Wang, 1996, p. 458).
The world was in constant flux due to the ceaseless alterations and con-
flicts of qi, which indicated that principles were not fixed but should be in
a state of constant change as well. The change, for Wang, was not a cycle
of repetition but a process of renewal; people or social organization
removed the old elements from its own body and brought in fresh ones on
a daily basis (Chen, 1998). Although the idea of change was part of tradi-
tional Chinese culture—for example, The Book of Changes described
change as the cyclic motions of the universe—for most previous Confucians,
moral principles or li were not subject to change, even though the world
changed. Thus, Wang’s idea about the alteration of moral principles based
on a changing reality was bold and refreshing. Nonetheless, he did not
blindly stand for change but realized that there was a coexistence of con-
stant and change and that people should maintain what should be main-
tained and change what should be changed (Wang, 1996).
Likewise, Wang posited that human nature was also a result of move-
ments of qi. It was the evolution of qi that had produced and shaped
human beings and human nature. He further proposed that “human
nature was originally physiological, and it grows and evolves on a daily
basis” (Wang, 1996, p. 299), suggesting that human nature was a combi-
nation of physiological traits and social attributes (Tang, 1988). Unlike
the previous idea about intrinsic nature, Wang held nature to be neither
purely innate nor fixed and that its attribute of good or evil was an out-
come of environmental influences and social practice. It could be shaped
when it had not been shaped and could be altered after it had been shaped.
Education and learning played a crucial role in changing people’s nature.
The existence of foolish and ignorant people was due to the fact they had
not received a good education and were not properly guided, which
underscored the importance of moral cultivation in both childhood and
adult life.
oral Education, Righteousness, and Gain

M
As a pragmatist, Wang Fuzhi held a balanced perspective on the relation-
ship between righteousness and personal gain. He noted that righteous-
ness could make people upright and personal gain referred to fortune and
reputation in life. People needed both that “without righteousness,
uprightness disappeared; and without gain, people could not live well”
(Wang, 1976, p. 277). This stance was different from the previous idea of
valuing righteousness and disregarding gain, for example, Dong
Zhongshu’s view of seeking justice without seeking personal gain or Chu
Hsi’s advocacy of eradicating desires to preserve li. Wang tended to oppose
the stereotype of “either/or” and affirmed the necessity of both li/righ-
teousness and desire/gain. For Wang, human desires were not inherently
evil as they were part of our nature, which sought material gain; people
needed to wear warm clothes when cold and eat when hungry, and thus
pursuing benefits was an indispensable part of life, and one that should not
be condemned. But, on the other hand, Wang Fuzhi criticized the behav-
ior of indulging in excessive desires and sensual pleasures, which he
believed would make people abandon moral virtues. As a Confucian,
Wang did advocate using righteousness to contain the urge for gain and
opposed the behavior of seeking personal gain at the cost of righteousness.
For this purpose, he maintained that moral education was imperative for
people to curb their inordinate desires.
224 Z. YOU ET AL.
Although acknowledging the importance of satisfying people’s needs,

Wang Fuzhi objected to Guan Zhong’s idea about making economic ben-
efit a precondition of moral development. Wang deemed that education
about rites, music, integrity, and the sense of shame should be conducted
regardless of the economic situation, on the grounds that greed could be
insatiable if it was not under control. Often people would not be satisfied
even despite immense wealth, and in this logic moral virtues such as rites
and righteousness would never occur. Thus, moral education on righ-
teousness and integrity was urgently needed to curb people’s excessive
desires. Moreover, morality was sometimes independent of economic con-
ditions. Many people would not cease the pursuit of moral virtues even if
they were poor (Wang, 1996). Therefore, moral education should and
could be implemented before people had enough food or money.
pistemology and Moral Education

E
Wang Fuzhi rejected Wang Yangming’s transcendental idealism that there
were innate moral principles inside one’s heart that could be attained
through intuition or sudden enlightenment. Instead, he contended that
people’s acquisition of knowledge should be mostly based on inquiring
into objective matters and concrete affairs through a slow and gradual
process. There would be no true understanding without real world experi-
ence as people could not have knowledge arise in their heart for those they
had not seen or heard (Wang, 1996). This idea was congruent with his
belief that the world was in a state of ceaseless change. As the world was
changing, so were the principles. Accordingly, getting in touch with the
specific situations of the events with the sense organs and mind was essen-
tial to understanding and refreshing the moral principles.
Practice therefore played a significant role in obtaining moral knowl-
edge. Wang Fuzhi proposed that scholars put practice before knowledge,
which contrasted with Chu Hsi’s proposal of putting knowledge before
action and with Wang Yangming’s integration of acting and knowing. The
reason was that while practice usually entailed knowledge, knowledge did
not necessarily incorporate practice. He further argued that action and
knowledge could supplement each other because each had its own efficacy
and merits. This practice-oriented epistemology was actually a reaction
against the Neo-Confucian scholars’ practice of engaging in empty talk or
sitting quietly but rarely getting involved in social life. For Wang, action
was better than meditating and people’s progress in moral development
was achieved more through down-to-earth action in social life than by
individual deliberation.
iscourse on Moral Education

D
Wang Fuzhi placed considerable emphasis on the need for moral educa-
tion, holding that it determined a country’s fate of prosperity or doom.
The governance of a country, he contended, lay in politics and education.
While politics went before education, education was more important than
politics in stabilizing and securing the country. The primary reason for the
demise of the Ming Dynasty was that its moral cultivation was on a con-
tinuous decline, which had led to the moral degeneration of many scholar-
officials and resulted in a lack of talented individuals who could defend the
country when the Manchu invaded (Wang, 1996).
Wang surpassed previous Confucians in the philosophy of moral educa-
tion in that he advocated changing the themes of traditional education.
For instance, he opposed previous moral education that stressed the
importance of absolute loyalty to emperor; instead, he suggested that the
survival of the country was more important than being loyal to the mon-
arch as the former determined people’s life and death. Hence, he pro-
posed that people follow a principle of a higher category, namely the
country’s fate, instead of being unconditionally submissive to the mon-
arch if the emperor was unable to defend the country. This alteration of
moral principles was an embodiment of his metaphysical idea that princi-
ples were not fixed but subject to change over time. More importantly, his
criticism of blind loyalty and the idea of putting the country ahead of the
monarch provided the idea of enlightenment to the revolutionaries of the
late Qing Dynasty.
Two important approaches that Wang Fuzhi proposed for moral edu-
cation were to teach students in accordance with their aptitudes and to
encourage students to have lofty aspirations. He argued that all people
could be educated if he was taught according to his gifts. Teachers should
educate those students to achieve great things if the latter had great
talents. Even when students had only small talents, teachers should edu-
cate them to find their own niche. In addition, the appropriate sequence
of teaching based on students’ ages and cognitive ability was also impor-
tant. Teaching should start from small, simple items and then move to big,
complex affairs, and then to big, simple ideas as well as small, concrete
ideas. The ultimate purpose was to enable students to understand all kinds
of ideas (Wang, 1996). Furthermore, Wang held noble aspirations to be
critical to people’s moral growth as the differences between people of
virtue and ordinary people was that the former had developed great moral
aspirations while the latter had not. But solely establishing goals was not
226 Z. YOU ET AL.
enough. One needed to frequently correct and reexamine these aspira-

tions, ensuring that they would not slide into two extremes—being too
lofty to ignore small lapses or being dispirited and thus lacking passion
and motivation (Wang, 1996).
Huang Zongxi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Huang Zongxi (1610–1695 CE) was a renowned Chinese philosopher
and an encyclopedic scholar proficient in Confucian classics, history, geog-
raphy, astronomy, and agriculture. He was the son of a high official in the
Ming Dynasty who was persecuted to death in prison after impeaching a
powerful eunuch. When the eunuch group was deposed by the new
emperor, Huang Zongxi revenged his father by stabbing a eunuch in the
court with an awl hidden in his sleeve. Later, he joined the insurgents in
resisting the invasion of Manchu troops and refused to cooperate with the
new regime all his life. As a pragmatist, Huang Zongxi placed much
emphasis on uniting the development of moral virtues with practical util-
ity; this was fully exhibited in his philosophy of practical learning.
uang Zongxi’s Ontology

H
Like Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi believed that the universe was made up
of the concrete matter of qi. The transcendental moral principle, he
argued, was not the substance of the universe, but the regulation or the
law of the appropriate movements of ups and downs of the qi, ascending
and descending. Thus, qi and li were two names for one thing, not two
separate things. There would be no principles if there was no qi (Huang,
1992). As qi spread all over heaven and earth, li—the principles of qi—
could be found everywhere in the world as well, which showed his ten-
dency toward materialism. Nonetheless, Huang put forward his second
proposition that just like qi, the perception of the heart permeated the
universe as well, which pushed his philosophy toward idealism.
Compared with Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi was a much less complete
materialist philosopher. As a follower of Wang Yangming, he tried to inte-
grate the idea of the heart with qi: “it was called the heart when qi was in
people, it was called nature when li was in people; the heart and nature
were congruent with qi and li” (Huang, 1992, p. 408). Huang highlighted
the role of the heart in moral cultivation because li in the heart was actu-
ally the principle of all things in the world: “the exhaustive investigation of
li was to investigate myriads of different ideas in the heart, not to research
on myriads of differences in myriads of items or events” (Huang, 1992,

p. 60). In short, although both Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi believed
in a concrete world made up of qi, they differed in their approach to cogni-
tion. While Wang Fuzhi proposed to investigate the concrete world to
obtain moral truth, Huang Zongxi, under the influence from the School
of Mind, stressed the role of the heart in understanding these moral
principles.
ractical Learning for the State

P
Despite his agreement with the School of Mind in epistemology, Huang
Zongxi put forward another important proposition—that hard work or
effort was the substance of the heart. This attempted to fix the problem of
idle talk about the heart in the School of Mind. To explain the concept, he
boiled down all the traditional methods of learning, thinking, and practic-
ing into one thing—effort—claiming that all the teachings of the sages
were simply asking people to act with effort. The philosophical stance in
essence indicated a switch in his focus from inner moral cultivation to the
application of knowledge in an attempt to serve the country. For this pur-
pose, the content of knowledge should not be limited to the traditional
human relations-oriented moral principles but be expanded to social and
natural sciences and technology as well.
Huang’s proposition of practical learning for the state showed a strong
influence from the Yongkang Utilitarian School represented by Chen
Liang and the Yongjia Utilitarian School represented by Ye Shi. Unlike the
School of Principle, which centered on investigating the heavenly princi-
ple, the Practical School emphasized particularly that learning should aim
at serving the country in practical terms, which evoked a reproach from
the School of Principle. Chu Hsi, for instance, criticized the utilitarian
orientation of this philosophical school as neglecting justice and l egitimacy.
In response to the criticism, Chen Liang argued that there was morality
when business succeeded and there was li when things worked out (Chen,
1999, p. 460).2
Huang reached consensus with the Utilitarian School on the practical
use of moral learning. He asserted that such learning was not the real
Confucianism if it could not help the country in a time of crisis (Huang,
1992). Like Chen Liang, who aimed at resisting the invasion of the
minority regime of Jin (the ancestors of Manchu minority), and recover-
ing the lost land, Huang Zongxi too found it necessary to highlight the
practical utility of learning so as to fight against the Qing government.
228 Z. YOU ET AL.
This practical purpose of resisting invasion, he contended, was the great-

est form of righteousness and rites of Confucianism on the grounds that
it could help enrich the country and enhance its military power to resist
invasion.
To this end, Huang strongly advocated integrating moral self-cultivation
with the mission of serving the country. Whereas serving the state should
be based on developing the qualities of benevolence and righteousness,
the acquisition of these virtues too should be demonstrated by the action
of serving the state (Huang, 1992). When practical use was not based on
promoting benevolence and righteousness, it could degenerate into rule
by force or the pursuit of personal gain only; when the learning of moral
principles did not serve practical purposes, it would end futilely, with the
result that scholars could do nothing useful for the country when needed.
This stance of integrating the two necessities was proposed not only to
solve the problem of empty debate in Neo-Confucianism, but also to
eschew the inclination toward neglecting moral considerations in Chen
Liang’s philosophy.
In the spirit of pragmatism, Huang strongly opposed the tendency that
scholars learned only for the purpose of passing the imperial examination
as this ran counter to his proposition of serving the country with useful
knowledge. The infatuation with the imperial exam, he argued, would
result in the decline of real learning. When scholars were attracted by the
prospect of becoming an official, they usually learned for the sake of pass-
ing the exam without thinking what really mattered for society and coun-
try, let alone learning about agriculture, military affairs, rites, and music,
which were important subjects in Huang’s practical learning.
uang Zongxi’s Discourse on Moral Education

H
As mentioned above, Huang held practical utility and moral cultivation as
inextricably tied, and this was fully reflected in his approaches to moral
education. Huang took the learning of Confucian classics as the primary
approach to education in that those classics could help students under-
stand moral principles and serve society; he stressed the study of history
because it helped students understand the lessons of the rise and fall of
previous dynasties; he highlighted the use of poetry and writing as they
could help nurture good moral sense and taste; he also advocated the
learning of natural science and technology as this would help meet societal
needs and enrich the country (Zhou, 2005). Like Wang Fuzhi, Huang
suggested updating the themes of moral education for the sake of serving
the country. For instance, he opposed the teaching of moral principles

such as unconditional loyalty to the monarchy and instead proposed a
primitive republican concept of making the country the priority over the
emperor, which led to the idea of limiting the monarchical power.
Moreover, Huang Zongxi stressed the role of practice in promoting
moral growth. He indicated that the sages were not much different from
ordinary people in regard to innate talent. Sages attained their sagehood
as they studied very hard and practiced what they had learned. Without
practice, knowledge would be a matter of empty show. He referred to the
word “extension” in Wang Yangming’s extension of innate knowledge as
practicing knowledge in real-life situations, which was the key for students
to become the talented individuals needed by society. Nevertheless, prac-
tice had a broader connotation than just applying knowledge in real life.
Huang once told his students that “the approaches of learning broadly,
asking in details, thinking cautiously, distinguishing wisely suggested by
the sages are in fact just one word—practice” (Huang, 1985, p. 1).
When it came to a specific learning methodology, Huang advocated
striving to attain new ideas; students needed to learn eagerly, discuss freely,
and question boldly. They should study comprehensively in different phil-
osophical schools and come to understand the core tenets of these schools,
which Huang held was a precondition for coming up with one’s own
insights. Discussing freely in class was another way to produce fresh per-
spectives. Huang was strongly against the behavior of blindly following
teachers’ instructions or what was written in books, but encouraged stu-
dents to put forward their own ideas, ask hard questions, and debate
ardently; they should endeavor to discover something unknown to previ-
ous scholars and to question traditional doctrines in terms of their legiti-
macy in the new era.
Besides these learning methods, Huang particularly emphasized the
importance of nurturing benign emotions in facilitating moral
development. He believed that people should maintain good moral emo-
tions according to the demands of the doctrine of the mean (Wang, 2007),
with the result that the expression of emotions should be appropriate,
timely, and to the point. A scholar should express happiness when he
should be happy, anger when should be angry, sadness when should be
sad, and joy when should be cheerful. Since these emotions were indica-
tors of benevolence, righteousness, and rites, such emotional expressions
helped people grow morally (Huang, 1985), which served as the moral
and mental foundations for practical learning.
230 Z. YOU ET AL.
Gu Yanwu’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Gu Yanwu (1613–1682 CE) was widely recognized as one of the three big
Confucian thinkers of the enlightenment in the late Ming and early Qing
Dynasties (the other two are Wang Fuzhi and Huang Zongxi). For the
modern Chinese, he is remembered for his famous epigram that the rise
and fall of the nation is the responsibility of every ordinary person (Gu,
1994, pp. 41–42), which inspired numerous Chinese people of later eras
to defend the country when it was in crisis.3 Gu Yanwu gave up the hope
of an official career after failing the imperial examination, and turned
toward practical learning that could help serve the country. Like the other
two philosophers, he actively engaged in anti-Qing insurgent activities and
persisted in this for many years. Throughout his life, Gu refused to serve
the new regime and devoted himself to studying the reasons for the col-
lapse of Ming in the hope of restoring the old regime, demonstrating the
virtue of integrity.
ntology and Human Nature

O
Although Gu Yanwu was less impressive in philosophical achievement
compared with the other two philosophers, his ideas about practical learn-
ing for the service of the country and his wide-ranging thought on the
moral cultivation of this exerted tremendous influence on the moral ideas
of Chinese. Like the other two, Gu asserted that the universe was full of qi
and that it was qi that had produced the principles. Without qi, moral
principles had no place to dwell. Tao therefore existed in the four seasons,
in the growth of myriad lives, and in scholars’ field experience, reading,
practice, and reflection (Xu, 2004).
For Gu Yanwu, spirit came into being only when qi was strong enough,
which was a manifestation of the qi of heaven and earth in people’s hearts
(Gu, 1994). Thus, the heart played a vital role in people’s moral cognition
and sense-making and the process of moral learning went from inner heart
to the external world and from metaphysics to practical utility (Ouyang,
2013). It is noteworthy that the heart here was not the transcendental
heart that knew all beforehand, as suggested by the School of Mind;
instead, it was the heart based on concrete qi—the knowing in the heart
was actually the reflection of principles of all things in the external world
and in turn should be applied to serve the world.
Like previous Confucians, Gu held human nature to be intrinsically
good; the filial piety of sons, the faithfulness of ministers, the credibility of
husbands, and the chastity of wives were all determined by heaven’s will,
which was embodied as nature in people (Gu, 1994). But unlike the oth-
ers, his ideas about human nature were firmly grounded in his materialistic
pursuits. He argued that human nature, like the knowledge in the heart,
could be traced back to qi. Thus, it was rooted in the ceaseless interactions
of the concrete matters and events of the universe, which could boil down
to daily life experience. Additionally, Gu noted that human nature also
possessed an egotistic dimension as everyone had their own selfish needs,
such as caring for their relatives and loving their own children (Gu, 1994).
This perspective, though it seemed to conflict with his assumption that
human nature was essentially good, was congruent with his practical learn-
ing stance, which justified the need for moral education.
ractical Learning for Serving the State

P
Based on the Confucian tradition of inner sagehood and outer kingliness,
Gu Yanwu proposed that the mission of moral education was to clarify
moral principles and rescue the state, which gave meaning and structure to
practical learning (Gu, 1983). Gu put forward his idea about rescuing the
state by drawing lessons from the downfall of the Ming Dynasty and
accordingly suggested learners investigate two aspects of life: the reasons
leading to the country’s rise and fall, and matters concerning people’s
livelihoods. Gu criticized Neo-Confucianism on the grounds that it had
done great harm to the country with its useless talk about li and the heart
(Huang, 2011).
The biggest problem, Gu Yanwu argued, was that those philosophical
schools did nothing useful for the country when needed. To reverse the
trend, scholars should directly study the Six Classics, which helped people
to understand the great path of the ancient sages. For instance, the study
of The Spring and Autumn Annals, compiled by Confucius, allowed stu-
dents to comprehend the implications of righteousness: “to respect the
sovereign, resist the invasion of minorities, and wipe off the usurpers and
traitors, which were the true meaning of nature and Tao” (Gu, 1994,
p. 400). Apart from the clarification of morality, Gu advocated that stu-
dents learn a variety of fields of practical knowledge, including military
affairs, handicraft production, geography, agriculture, which could enable
them to satisfy societal needs, promote the economy, and resist external
invasion.
232 Z. YOU ET AL.
n Moral Cultivation
O
With respect to specific measures, Gu Yanwu proposed to rectify people’s
hearts and ameliorate moral customs through moral cultivation, with the
former centering on the education of scholar-officials and the latter on the
education of the general public. Nurturing the character of integrity
through highlighting the sense of shame of scholars was the central theme
in his approach to moral cultivation, which served as a precondition for
improving moral customs nationwide. He added that when scholar-
officials possessed integrity and a sense of shame, the moral customs would
naturally become benign under the influence of the elite (Gu, 1994).
For Gu and the other philosophers, the demise of the Ming Dynasty
could be attributed more to the corruptions of scholar-officials than the
peasant uprisings or the invasion of Manchu. Many scholar-officials in the
late Ming Dynasty were so greedy that they did anything they could to
accumulate fortunes, and this was the primary reason that the country was
thrown into chaos. The sense of shame should be emphasized in moral
education in that scholar-officials’ infringements of rites, righteousness,
and integrity all stemmed from their lack of a sense of shame. Accordingly,
he suggested highlighting the principle so that scholars would feel shame
for their improper behavior and thus promote self-restraint. If officials
could remain upright and honest, the social climate would become sound
and moral.
In order to promote the virtue of integrity and the principle of shame,
Gu Yanwu further proposed the strategies of establishing a system of polit-
ical criticism, rewarding honesty and uprightness, and encouraging the
pursuit of a good reputation. The first strategy was to form a benign politi-
cal environment that encouraged scholars to appraise the behaviors and
characters of other scholar-officials, particularly those in high positions, so
as to create public opinions to supervise these officials’ behaviors. The
second strategy was to reward those scholar-officials who had high moral-
ity, encouraging others to follow. The third was actually an invention of
Gu Yanwu, which was to encourage scholar-officials to pursue a good
reputation in terms of integrity, credibility, faithfulness, and righteousness.
In doing so, Gu hoped to eliminate officials’ greed by channeling their
attention from the pursuit of personal gain to seeking a good moral
reputation.
Reconstructing moral customs was an important strategy to enhance
the moral development of the entire country. Moral customs were a col-
lection of long-established practices, social norms, and attitudes among
the general public, which influenced people’s values and way of life. Gu
held moral customs to be the foundation of a country, claiming that
implementing moral cultivation, rectifying people’s heart-mind, and pro-
moting good folk customs were crucial to the country’s survival and pros-
perity. Hence, if a ruler wanted to stabilize his reign, he need to make
efforts to build up desirable moral customs (Gu, 1994) as good customs
and bad customs could switch under certain conditions.
Like previous philosophers, Gu believed that rulers should serve as moral
examples for the people. It was the moral behaviors and moral preaches of
emperor and scholar-officials that determined the moral customs of a coun-
try. Good customs were formed when the ruling class preached good moral
characters and set good examples for people. Conversely, moral customs
could deteriorate when rulers did not perform in a moral way, even if they
preached the moral virtues. Meanwhile, economic development was an
important factor in building up good customs. Gu pointed out that accu-
mulating wealth was the priority in forming a culture of filial piety and fra-
ternal love in the rural areas because moral development needed to be based
on ample personal property (Gu, 1994), which was one of rationale behind
his proposition of promoting practical learning.
As a philosopher with preliminary republican ideas, Gu Yanwu had
questioned and challenged the legitimacy of the traditional moral princi-
ple of loyalty to the monarch. He proposed that there was difference
between the concept of country (tianxi) and the concept of kingdom.
While the kingdom belonged to rulers, the country belonged to everyone.
If the fall of a kingdom was the end of the dynasty, the perishing of the
country put the whole nation’s existence in jeopardy (Ma, 2014).
Therefore, everyone, rich or poor, noble or humble, should bear the
responsibility for the rise and fall of the country. This idea is significant as
it indicates that the moral cultivation based on a family–state continuum
was no longer a privilege of scholars but also the mission of the common
people, helping to generate a new culture of family and country with the
appearance of a preliminary republic. Under his influence, this axiom had
become an important theme in Chinese moral education, providing
enlightenment to numerous ordinary people and encouraging them to
engage in social events and care about the fate of the country. In this
sense, Gu’s biggest contribution is not in his philosophical achievement,
but his republican ideas, which challenged the previous moral principles
and motivated people to overthrow the autocratic monarchy in early mod-
ern China.
234 Z. YOU ET AL.
The Era of Chinese Substance and Western Utility

If the dynasty transition from the Ming to the Qing presented a great chal-
lenge to the beliefs of Confucians, the Western invasions in the late Qing
Dynasty posed an even bigger threat to traditional Chinese philosophy.
Starting from the first Opium Wars (1839–1842 CE), the Chinese people
faced a profound crisis and great social transformation, which was, as a
scholar-general Li Hongzhang described, unprecedented in the previous
three thousand years (Li, 1962). It was a time of fundamental and full-
scale crisis, not just because of the Qing Empire’s political concessions to
foreign powers after a series of military defeats and its inferiority in science
and technology compared with the Western countries, but also because of
people’s great concerns or even serious doubts over the efficacy of the
Chinese traditional value system and the way of education represented by
Confucian doctrine. To cope with the crises, some scholars proposed the
concept of “Chinese Substance and Western Utility” or, more specifically,
using Confucianism as Substance (zhongti) and Western science and tech-
nology as Utility (xiyong).
This strategy of learning Western science and technology while preserv-
ing Confucianism as the ideology and the content of moral education was
the guiding thought of the Self-Strengthening Movement (also known as
the Westernization Movement).4 This movement was initiated by a group
of open-minded scholar-generals who hoped to cope with the crisis with-
out having to alter the traditional value system in China. The reformists in
the Hundred Days’ Reform, however, questioned the logic and legitimacy
of isolating Substance from Utility.5 They endeavored to integrate
Confucianism and Western ideas so as to supply Western Utility with bet-
ter philosophical and educational support. These efforts and debates
defined the basic ideological landscape of China in the late Qing Dynasty,
shedding light on the philosophy of moral education during this era of
radical social, political, and philosophical change.
The Idea of Chinese Substance and Western Utility
ontext of Chinese Substance and Western Utility

C
The idea of Chinese Substance and Western Utility could be viewed as a
further development and variation of the practical learning that prospered
at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty. The so-called practical learning was
in turn rooted in the classical Confucian ideal of cultivating moral charac-

ter and serving the country. Backed by philosophers in the early Qing
Dynasty, practical learning had become a popular trend in Confucian
study and a guiding principle for moral education (Zhang, 2004). The
special significance of practical learning was that it accentuated the spirit of
serving the state with practical utility, which varied drastically from Neo-
Confucianism’s emphasis on moral self-cultivation.
It is noteworthy that this utility in practical learning was based on the
moral principles of Confucianism, or, to put it differently, the traditional
Confucian value system served as the foundation and guidance for con-
ducting practical activities. The leaders of the Self-Strengthening
Movement, such as Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zhang Zhidong,
were all educated with the idea of Confucian practical learning, and they
on the one hand strongly identified with the value system of Confucianism,
and on the other acknowledged the importance of practical utility in
enriching and defending the country.
However, the impact of the West, particularly its military weapons and
technology, was so formidable that these scholar-generals started to recog-
nize the overwhelming advantages of Western utility over traditional
Chinese utility. The urgent need to defend the country against foreign
invasions and to put down internal uprisings pushed them to establish a
modern military industry, set up new types of schools, and even send stu-
dents to study abroad. But meanwhile, these officials’ strong belief in
Confucianism made them reject Western ideas and its derived social sys-
tem by instinct, fearing that the introduction of ideological dimensions of
Western learning would lead to national subjugation and cultural geno-
cide. For them, the Confucian doctrine and its education system were the
fundamental moral basis of China and should never be altered; this gave
rise to a marriage of convenience that used Chinese culture as the ideo-
logical foundation but at the same time made use of Western science and
technology, marking a separation of Substance and Utility, or Tao and
Utensil in a philosophical sense.
Wei Yuan was the first Chinese scholar who suggested that government
learn from Western military technology to resist foreign invasions during
the first Opium War (Wei, 1998). In 1861, another scholar, Feng Guifen,
expanded the concept of Western Utility from military affairs to include
mathematics, science, and technology, claiming that “we should keep
Chinese moral principles and Mingjiao as our Substance, and supplement
them with the Western techniques for wealth and power” (Feng, 2002,
236 Z. YOU ET AL.
pp. 68–69). He further specified that schools should cultivate moral values

through teaching Confucian classics, and by teaching Western mathemat-
ics to promote utility.
This philosophical stance was interesting as it preserved Chinese tradi-
tional moral principles such as filial piety and loyalty, which were the
embodiment of a highly hierarchical social structure and autocracy, but at
the same time attempted to achieve the effectiveness of modern Western
science and technology. If traditional practical learning still maintained a
congruence between its Substance and Utility, the idea of Chinese
Substance and Western Utility inevitably severed its instrumental rational-
ity from its value rationality (Zhang, 2004).
hang Zhidong on Chinese Substance and Western Utility

Z
Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909 CE) was a high-ranking scholar-official and
a leader in the Self-Strengthening Movement who was famous for his phil-
osophical discourse on the rationales of Chinese Substance and Western
Utility. As a famous scholar, he laid particular emphasis on the importance
of education, stating that “the prosperity or decline of a dynasty and the
wax or wane of talented people was decided by politics in surface, but in
essence by education” (Zhang, 2002b, p. 1).
In fact, Zhang was one of the Confucians who endeavored to reconcile
Chinese learning with Western application. Chinese learning for him
included Confucian philosophy and the corresponding political system
and moral education. With regard to Western learning, he categorized it
into Western arts, politics, and history. While Western arts referred to
mathematics, science, and technology, Western politics embraced econ-
omy, law, military affairs, and education. Compared with the previous
Western learning, which encompassed only science and technology, his
new category expanded to embrace the dimension of social sciences and
even some social systems. Regarding the roles of the two types of learning,
he specified that Chinese learning was the internal study in charge of moral
cultivation and Western learning was the external study dealing with social
affairs (Zhang & Zhao, 2008), with the former working as Substance and
the latter as Utility.
There were, generally speaking, three major philosophical stances with
respect to the binary categorical pair of Substance and Utility on how to
cope with the crisis. The first one was Chinese Substance and Chinese
Utility, supported by the old guard highlighting traditional Chinese value
system and utilities; this, however, was outdated in the face of serious
external threats. The second was using Western ideologies and Western
utilities to replace Confucian learning and Chinese utilities; this, however,
ran counter to the will of most Chinese people. The third one was Chinese
Substance and Western Utility: following the Chinese traditional moral
cultivation but at the same time utilizing Western science and technology,
which was a compromise that could be accepted by the ruling class (Lu,
2014). Zhang adopted the third path. He tended to keep a balance, criti-
cizing the old school for neglecting the practical use of Western science
and technology and repudiating the radical reformists for abandoning the
fundamentals of the country—Confucian doctrine.
Even though Zhang Zhidong viewed both types of learning as essen-
tial, he insisted that the two were separate and should not be mixed. For
him, Confucian learning was fundamental for China and should never be
changed; Western learning was used to supplement the deficiency in
Chinese culture. Hence while studying Western science and technology
were necessary, much more weight should be put on Confucian learning
than the trivial Western learning. He added that if China “abolished the
Confucian learning of classics and history, then we lost our traditional
moral values that were critical to cultivate talented people and revive
China” (Chen, 2008, p. 525).
In the same vein, Zhang pointed out there were things that could be
changed but there were things that should never be changed: “human
relations should not be changed while law and system can; Confucianism
should not while utensils can; the heart and nature should not while tech-
niques can” (Zhang & Zhao, 2008, p. 368). The Three Cardinal Guides,
for instance, designated the proper relations between sovereign and min-
ister, father and son, husband and wife; these aimed at teaching people to
love family, respect superiors and seniors, and distinguish gender roles.
The principles were essential to regulate people’s behavior and promote
social stability, which was why China had maintained its identity as China
for thousands of years (Zhang, 2002b). While introducing Western utili-
ties aimed at the defense of the country, teaching Chinese philosophies
was to preserve the core values of traditional culture and the seeds of
Chinese civilization. In terms of the discussion on the changeable versus
the unchangeable, Zhang made a strong philosophical statement on the
legitimacy of combining Chinese Substance and Western Utility but iso-
lating the two. This idea, however, was flawed philosophically. A thinker
named Yan Fu, for instance, pointed out the absurdity that it was trying to
have the body of a cow with the use of a horse (Yan, 1986).
238 Z. YOU ET AL.
oral Education Based on Chinese Substance and Western Utility

M
Along with his peers in the Self-Strengthening Movement, Zhang Zhidong
advocated renovating the traditional curriculum and teaching methods so
as to promote Western utilities. The scholars educated in the academies,
though proficient with Confucian classics, could not meet the demands of
the new era. Thus, Zhang and his colleagues established many new schools
for military purposes and industrial needs and sent students to study sci-
ence and technology in Western countries. However, Zhang still empha-
sized the importance of traditional moral education as it provided spiritual
and ideological guidance for students. He asserted that if a Chinese person
did not know Confucianism, he was like “a people who did not know his
name, a horse without harness, a boat without rudder. The more he
learned, the more he disliked China” (Zhang, 2002b, p. 146). What then
the use of him for the country? As a result, although Western technology
was very much needed, there was no way it could override Chinese moral
education.
This attitude was best exemplified by the incident of sending children to
study abroad, which started in 1872. At the suggestion of a businessman
called Yung Wing, the Qing government decided to send a total of 120
Chinese boys, ranging from 12 to 14 years old, to study in the United
States in four sub-batches. Li Hongzhang, an important leader in the Self-
Strengthening Movement, stipulated that these children should be taught
Confucian classics in the United States, and should be indoctrinated with
ideas such as righteousness and respecting seniors and superiors (Li, 1962).
Another official, Xue Fucheng, also warned that the Western advantage
was its science and the Chinese advantage was in moral principles such as
rites and righteousness. Thus, children should, on the one hand, learn
traditional virtues, and, on the other, learn Western science and technol-
ogy to make up for the shortage of China in utility (Xue, 1971).
Nonetheless, when the boys started receiving American education, they
were inevitably influenced by American religion, culture, and the concepts
of equality, democracy and freedom. Some boys were even converted to
Christianity, believing in God instead of Confucius; most boys hated to be
laughed at by their American peers because of their traditional costumes
and their special hairstyle and hence altered this and wore suits (Liu,
2006). All these changes seriously concerned the conservative officials in
the Qing regime, who stated that these students had betrayed their own
ancestors by changing their costumes and converting to foreign religions.
The concerns and opposition were so strong that the Qing government
eventually ordered the withdrawal of the students in 1882, even though

most of them had not finished their planned study. This story showed that
Chinese learning was actually more important than Western Utility in the
eyes of the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Movement. This, unfortu-
nately, also exposed the incompatibility between Chinese Substance and
Western Utility.
Interpenetration of Chinese Substance and Western Utility
he Perspective of the Early Reformists

T
In contrast to Zhang Zhidong and his peers, the reformists had cast doubts
on the separation of Chinese learning and Western learning in the Self-
Strengthening Movement. Zheng Guanying (1842–1922 CE), for exam-
ple, stated that there was Substance and Utility in Western learning as well:
education in school, politics in Congress, and the unity of the monarch
and people represented the Substance of the West; steamships, railways,
cannon, and telegraphs represented the Utility. As Substance and Utility
were inseparable, learning from the West should include its political and
social systems as well. The paradox in the opinions of the leaders of the
Self-Strengthening Movement was that they had abandoned the Substance
in the West and solely used its utilities (Zheng, 1982), which inevitably
caused problems.
To fix these, Zheng Guanying proposed to “integrate Chinese Learning
with Western Learning and let the principles of the two interpenetrate”
(Zheng, 1982, p. 285). As a reformist, Zheng still upheld the slogan of
Chinese Substance and Western Utility in an attempt to reduce the resis-
tance from the conservatives, which nonetheless made his philosophy
often self-contradictory. On the one hand, he indicated that Confucianism
was fundamental and Western Utility was only supplemental; on the other,
he suggested that people should not overlook the importance of Western
Substance. To reconcile the two, he called for incorporating Western ideas
into Chinese moral philosophy, and drew the conclusion that China
needed to reform its political system and educational system accordingly.
Zheng Guanying used the philosophical discussion of Tao and Utensil
to further clarify his points. Traditionally, Tao was regarded as superior to
Utensil. The Book of Changes indicated that Tao was metaphysics and
Utensil was physics (Huang & Zhang, 2004). Chu Hsi also ascribed the
attributes of Yin and Yang, and the moral concepts of benevolence and
240 Z. YOU ET AL.
righteousness as Tao and the concrete utilities or stuff as Utensil, with the
former transcending the latter (Chu & Shu, 1989). Zheng had a different
perspective from the past, holding that Tao and Utensil were closely inter-
related. All the world affairs started with Tao at the beginning and ended
with its Utensil or the practical usage. While Tao could not exist without
Utensil, all Utensil should embrace Tao as well (Zheng, 1982). Accordingly,
Chinese learning and Western learning should interpenetrate: people
should incorporate some Western ideologies and social theories into
Chinese philosophy so as to facilitate the development of Western utility
in China.
In reality, Zheng Guanying was not the only one who had stressed the
importance of establishing a congruence between Substance and Utility. A
high-ranking official named Zhang Shusheng remarked that the reason
China could not catch up with the West was that it had discarded its
Substance and only sought Utility (Zheng, 1982). But how to integrate
Chinese learning and Western learning was a dilemma as the traditional
Chinese value system was mostly incompatible with Western concepts of
equality, freedom, and democracy. Neither Zheng Guanying nor Zhang
Shusheng could provide a feasible solution. Thus, some reformists sug-
gested bypassing the problem. A scholar named Wang Tao, for example,
posited that people did not have to start by solving the dilemma. If Tao or
Substance in the East and the West could not interpenetrate, “the two
sides could interpenetrate via utensils. Train and steamboats could move
Tao forward” (Wang, 2002, p. 2).
he Idea of the Late Reformists

T
It is noteworthy that the representatives of the late reformists, Kang
Youwei (1858–1927 CE), Liang Qichao (1873–1929 CE), and Tan
Sitong (1865–1898 CE) launched the Hundred Day Reform of 1898 to
establish a Westernized political system of constitutional monarchy in
China. Though the campaign was quickly cracked down on by the conser-
vatives, these scholars left their marks on Chinese politics, philosophy,
education, and other social domains based on their ideas about Chinese
Substance and Western Utility.
Like the early reformists, Kang Youwei underscored the importance of
the interpenetration of Chinese learning and Western learning (Qi, 1995),
that is, integrating some Western ideologies and social systems into
Confucianism. In order to gain an endorsement from the royal court,
Kang postulated that those Western ideas had already existed in Chinese
learning thousands of years previously as ancient sage kings such as Yao,

Shun, and Yu had already adopted parliamentary democracy in their time.
Hence, this Western learning was actually a part of Confucianism. He then
suggested the emperor of Qing follow the examples of those sage kings.
Additionally, Kang Youwei strived to mix the concept of human nature
in Chinese learning with Western concepts like evolution and utilitarian-
ism to legitimize his proposition. He claimed that “human nature is intrin-
sically good inasmuch as everyone has the heart of sympathy, which is also
called benevolence or electricity or ether” (Kang, 1987, p. 2); thus, teach-
ing virtues such as benevolence should be a priority in schools. Meanwhile,
he asserted that the world was evolving, and that this was motivated by the
natural human behavior of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. This moti-
vation drove people to reform things which had brought more pain than
pleasure, such as some of the old political systems, and to seek those which
could bring people more pleasure than pain, such as a legal system and
moral education, justifying his advocacy for political and social reform.
Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei’s favorite disciple, laid the emphasis on the
mastery of both Chinese and Western learning. In his Guideline for
Imperial University of Peking (the predecessor of Beijing University), he
stated that students should be proficient in the Six Classics to get to know
the principles and reasons, and should incorporate the principles into the
learning of Western politics. The best scholars were those who could have
a good command of both and integrate them (Liang, 1989).
Tan Sitong, another leading reformist, remarked that Tao and Utensil
were interrelated such that if utensils had altered, so should Tao be
changed (Tan, 1981). He called for breaking away from the confinement
of old Confucian doctrines and promoting social evolution in a spirit of
benevolence and interpenetration. Tan’s benevolence was somewhat dif-
ferent from the original concept in connotation as he had incorporated
Western ideas of equality and universal love into it. Moreover, his concept
of interpenetration referred to building up a bond between East and West,
inside and outside, and male and female (Tan, 1981). While benevolence,
as a spirit of loving humans equally, encouraged people to overcome
obstacles, interpenetration allowed people to initiate social reforms by
learning from the West. Unfortunately, Tan Sitong encountered strong
resistance from the old guard. He was the only one among the three major
leaders of the reform who refused to escape and was executed by the Qing
regime when the campaign was repressed.
242 Z. YOU ET AL.
Conclusion
The era of crises can be broken into two phases: the phase of the early
Qing Dynasty, when Confucians drew lessons from the downfall of the
Ming Dynasty and proposed to revive the mission of serving the country
with practical utilities; and the phase of the late Qing Dynasty, when schol-
ars and officials proposed the concept of Chinese Substance and Western
Utility to cope with the unprecedented challenges from the West. While
the former helped form the trend of practical learning in the philosophy of
Chinese moral education, the latter contributed to the modernization of
industry, politics, military affairs, and school education, preparing Chinese
society for the thorough political, social, and cultural transformations of
the twentieth century.
The results of the proposals of Chinese Substance and Western Utility
by the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Movement and the reformists in
the Hundred Days’ Reform are particularly worth revisiting. Although the
Self-Strengthening Movement had introduced modern industries along
with some science and technology to China, it eventually failed when the
main fleet of the Qing Empire was totally annihilated by the Japanese
Navy in the Battle of the Yellow Sea in 1894; this indicated that solely rely-
ing on the utility of modern military weapons could not really defend the
country. The hierarchical and conservative old social system based on tra-
ditional Chinese ideology was not compatible with modern industry and
military affairs. People following the old ideology were incapable of inter-
national success even if they were operating modern machines.
The idea of interpenetrating the Substance of China and the West held
by the reformists was in essence a radical variant of Chinese Substance and
Western Utility as it tried to integrate the old Confucian doctrine with
Western politics. This proposal too did not work well in that the Hundred
Days’ Reform was quickly put down by the old guard in the Qing govern-
ment. After all, Confucian ideology did not mix well with Western politi-
cal thinking. The interpenetration of the two types of learning, no matter
how attractive it sounded, could not come into being without fundamen-
tally renovating traditional Confucian creeds first. However, the two
movements based on the idea of Chinese Substance and Western Utility
did bring people the enlightenment of modern knowledge and revolu-
tionary ideas, opening the door to a new era which brought much more
fundamental changes.
Notes
1. Chinese Substance and Western Utility refers to the proposition of the Self-
Strengthening Movement in the late Qing Dynasty that China should fol-
low Confucian moral doctrines as the core of Chinese culture but at the
same time learn Western science and technology for the purpose of utility.
2. Chen Liang’s argument was concluded by Chen Fuliang in Chen Fuliang’s
book.
3. Gu Yanwu had expressed the meaning of it in his book, but the exact epi-
gram that “the rise and fall of the nation is the responsibility of every ordi-
nary people” was concluded and paraphrased by Liang Qichao in his book
entitled Collections from the Ice-Drinker’s Studio.
4. The Self-Strengthening Movement was an institutional reform initiated by
some high-ranking scholar-generals during the late Qing dynasty to
strengthen China by learning military affairs, industry, and modern science
and technology from the West.
5. The Hundred Days’ Reform was a cultural, political, and educational reform
movement in 1898 initiated by a few reformists and supported by the young
Emperor Guangxu. The reform lasted for only 103 days and was cracked
down on by powerful conservatives.
References
Chen, B. (1998). Review on Wang Fuzhi’s philosophical thought. Journal of
Fuzhou University (Social Science), 3, 62–64.
Chen, F. (1999). Collected works of Chen Fuliang. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University
Press.
Chen, S. (2008). Zhang Zidong’s writing about education. Beijing: People’s
Education Press.
Chu, H., & Shu, Y. (1989). The book of changes—Xi Ci I. Shanghai: Shanghai
Ancient Books Publishing House.
Feng, G. (2002). Jiaobinlu kangyi. Shanghai: Shanghai Book Store.
Gu, Y. (1983). Collected works of Tinglin. Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company.
Gu, Y. (1994). Commentaries on records of knowledge daily acquired. Changsha:
Yuelu Publishing House.
Huang, Z. (1985). Learning cases of Confucians in the Ming dynasty. Beijing:
Huang, Z. (1992). Complete works of Huang Zongxi. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient
244 Z. YOU ET AL.

Kang, Y. (1987). Annotations on Mencius, the golden mean, and Liyun. Beijing:
Li, H. (1962). Complete books of Li Wenzhong Gong. Taipei: Wen Hai Press.
Liang, Q. (1989). Collections from the Ice-Drinker’s Studio. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
Liu, L. (2006). Americanization of the Chinese teenagers and the abortion of the
study in the U.S.: Explorations of the reasons. Jiangshu Social Sciences, 5,
200–205.
Lu, L. (2014). Zhang Zhidong’s educational thought of “Chinese substance and
western utility” and its implications. Journal of Institute of Training Young
Managerial Personnel of Hebei, 26(2), 43–46.
Ma, J. (2014). Exploration on Gu Yanwu’s thought of moral education. Lantai
World, 9, 140–141.
Ouyang, W. (2013). The ontological framework and its influence on Gu Yangwu’s
philosophy. Social Sciences in Yunnan, 5, 39–43.
Qi, Q. (1995). From Chinese substance and western triviality to Chinese sub-
stance and western utility. Social Sciences in China, 1, 186–198.
Tan, S. (1981). Complete works of Tan Sitong. Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company.
Tang, K. (1988). A concise review on Wang Fuzhi’s moral education and moral
cultivation. Journal of Zhengzhou University (Philosophy and Social Science), 2,
62–66.
Wang, F. (1976). Extended meaning of the book of history. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
House.
Wang, T. (2002). Anthology of Tao Garden (Outer chapters). Shanghai: Century
Publishing.
Wang, X. (2007). Research on Huang Zongxi’s thought on educational psychology
(unpublished master’s thesis). Shanghai: Shanghai Normal University.
Wei, Y. (1998). The illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms. Changsha: Yuelu
Publishing House.
Xu, S. (2004). Awareness of issues and proper arrangement of ideas in Gu Yanwu’s
philosophy. Philosophical Researches, 11, 39–43.
Xue, F. (1971). Complete works of Yongan. Taipei: Zhonghua Book Company.
Yan, F. (1986). Collected works of Yan Fu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Zhang, Z. (2002b). On encourage learning. Wuhan: Hubei People’s Press.
Zhang, Z. (2004). From practical learning to Chinese substance and Western util-
ity: Zhang Zidong’s adaptation and confinement of the traditional
Confucianism. Confucius Studies, 4, 98–111.
Zhang, Z., & Zhao, D. (2008). Complete works of Zhang Zhidong. Wuhan: Wuhan
Publishing House.
Zheng, G. (1982). Collections of Zheng Guanying. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s
Press.
Zhou, Q. (2005). Review of Huang Zongxi’s perspective on cultivating talented
individuals. China Youth Study, 4, 41–43.
CHAPTER 11
When East Met West: The Philosophy

of Moral Education at a Historical
Turning Point
Introduction
The New Culture Movement was a major socio-cultural campaign in
China; it lasted from the mid-1910s to the 1920s, and occurred at a his-
torical turning point when China was transformed radically from the old
feudal empire into an early modern state. This cultural movement sprang
from people’s discontent and anger about the government’s incapacity
and the failure of traditional ideologies in addressing the country’s major
problems in national sovereignty, military affairs, diplomacy, and social
and economic areas. While remembered as the prelude to the May Fourth
Movement,1 the New Culture Movement was marked by its attempt to
abolish traditional Chinese philosophy, as represented by Confucian teach-
ings, and to introduce Western philosophies to restructure Chinese learn-
ing. Under the influences of Western culture, scholars such as Chen Duxiu,
Cai Yuanpei, Lu Xun, and Hu Shih made scathing criticisms of
Confucianism, holding it accountable for all the misery and grief in mod-
ern China; there were heated philosophical debates between liberals and
conservatives over Confucian doctrine and about the legitimacy of
introducing Western ideologies into China to replace or renew traditional
Chinese ideologies.
In 1915, Chen Duxiu published an article entitled “A Call to Youth” in
a monthly periodical entitled Youth Magazine; this officially started the
New Culture Movement. In this article and others in the following issues
of the periodical, he publicly denounced the teaching of Confucian rites,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_11
248 Z. YOU ET AL.
criticizing the Confucian dogmas of loyalty, filial piety, chastity, and righ-
teousness as moral principles for slaves. He further pointed out that the
Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues were designed to
strengthen the patriarchal clan system, the rigid social hierarchy, and total-
itarianism, and that these had greatly hindered the progress of China. To
break away from the fate of slaves, the Chinese needed to initiate a new
ideology that could teach people to be autonomous and independent,
replacing Confucian teachings with Western ideas of democracy and sci-
ence (Chen, 1916).
The call for learning from the West was welcomed so warmly by the
public in the initial stages of Republican China that even some supporters
of Confucianism endorsed the introduction of Western ideas and the
renewal of the teachings of Confucianism. For instance, Liang Shuming
(1893–1988 CE), a famous conservative philosopher and educator, for
instance, criticized Kang Youwei’s conservative idea that Confucianism
should be used as the national religion of China.2 Instead, Liang proposed
to go back to classical Confucianism to seek answers and meanwhile intro-
duce the Western concepts of democracy and science, and then eventually
integrate the two. Though generally considered an opponent of the New
Culture Movement, Liang and his philosophy actually represented a dif-
ferent path for traditional Confucianism in China, namely New
Confucianism.3
During this period, Western philosophical influences grew stronger as
Western philosophers visited China, Western philosophical works were
introduced, and students studying philosophy and education overseas
returned. In 1919, John Dewey came to visit China, where he spent two
years spreading his theory of pragmatism. Other famous Western philoso-
phers, such as Bertrand Russell and Paul Monroe, visited China in the
1920s and brought new ideas about moral philosophy and education. The
1920s and 1930s also witnessed the introduction of Western philosophical
works on education. For instance, Johann Friedrich Herbart’s General
Pedagogics was translated and introduced to China in 1936. The overseas
returnees included famous scholars such as Chai Yuanpei, Tao Xingzhi,
and Hu Shi, who introduced and adapted Western philosophical concepts
to fit the Chinese social environment and cultural contexts, and accord-
ingly created new philosophies integrating East and West.
WHEN EAST MET WEST: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL EDUCATION… 249
Chen Duxiu’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Chen Duxiu (1879–1942 CE) was a representative philosopher and stan-
dard bearer of the New Culture Movement who unambiguously advo-
cated completely overthrowing the teachings of Confucianism and
replacing them with Western ideologies of freedom, democracy, equality,
and universal love. Due to his anti-Qing activities, he was forced to flee
China in 1901 and spent his years in exile studying in Japan, where he
studied many Western ideas. In 1915, he founded the monthly periodical
Youth Magazine in Shanghai, calling for establishing a new philosophy and
way of life for China. At the invitation of the then president of Peking
University, Cai Yuanpei, he served as a faculty member at this famous
higher institution in 1919, where he became one of the leaders of the May
Fourth Movement.
Although the New Culture Movement involved itself in a diversity of
topics, including philosophy, science, religion, education, fine arts, and
literature, the philosophy of moral education was its central theme. Chen
Duxiu, for instance, attributed the failures and frustrations of Chinese
reforms and revolutions to the negative effect of the deeply rooted tradi-
tional teaching of Confucian rites on Chinese society (Xue & Liu, 2007).
With the overwhelming influence from Confucian value system and the
teaching of this, it was impossible to overhaul the old political, social, and
economic systems in China. Both the disappointment of the Self-
Strengthening Movement and the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform in
1898 were mainly due to the fact that the power of the old guard was too
strong and that the reformers themselves still upheld the teachings of
Confucian doctrine, which made the reforms incomplete and feeble.
Therefore, the renovation of the Chinese value system became a top prior-
ity and a prerequisite before any fundamental changes could occur.
Criticism of Teaching About Rites in Confucianism

Chen Duxiu made the teaching of rites, or Mingjiao, the core of
Confucianism, the target of his criticism. He claimed that as the purpose
of the teaching of rites was to promulgate the moral values of feudalism, it
was not suitable for modern society and should be entirely abandoned. To
make this point, he used the theory of evolution as a weapon to expose the
fallacy of the old guard. In response to the conservatives’ argument that
moral principles should never change, just as heaven never changed, Chen
250 Z. YOU ET AL.
retorted that as all things in the world were shifting ceaselessly, so was
morality. He added that “morality should change along with the transfor-
mation of society, should alter as time has changed, and should evolve and
should not be fixed” (Chen, 1984, p. 190). If China wanted to survive
and prosper in this world, the Chinese people should discard the old doc-
trines and renew their moral education system.
The teaching of Confucian rites, Chen remarked, “is an education for
slaves, not education for owners” (Chen, 1987, p. 41). The principles
inculcated by rites and moral cultivation, for example, loyalty, filial piety,
and chastity, were designed to strengthen social control and defend the
interests of the monarchy and nobles through suppressing independent
thinking and restricting the freedom of ordinary people. For instance, the
Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues were rules for the class
system and autocracy; these were intended to justify the legitimacy of the
pecking order and maintain the rigid social hierarchy (Chen, 1987). This
is why traditional moral education emphasized submission to authority
figures: wife followed husband, family members followed the orders of the
patriarch, and all people followed the orders of the emperor, who was
essentially the patriarch of the whole country. There were four negative
consequences of this system: it deprived individuals of their independent
personalities; it suffocated thought of freedom; it denied the right of
equality; and it smothered vitality through forming habits of dependency
(Hu, 2009).
To avoid the fate of being enslaved, Chen advocated using Western ideas
to replace the old moral education system; he placed considerable emphasis
on the principles of independence, equality, and freedom, arguing that
people should nurture their individuality to combat a uthoritarianism. The
belief behind this ideological replacement was that these modern principles
and Confucian doctrines were mutually exclusive (Chen, 1987). The mod-
ern spirit of equality was in stark contrast to Confucian teaching of social
hierarchy; freedom of speech and thought was essential to developing
a modern republican state, which conflicted with the practice of using
Confucianism as the sole ideology of the nation. In short, as the alliance
between politics and Confucian teachings had formed such a formidable
force in hindering the development of modern China, the successful trans-
formation of Chinese society demanded that Confucianism be first knocked
off its pedestal.
Reconstruction of the Chinese People’s National Character

For Chen, reconstructing the people’s national character was both the
purpose and the method of moral education in the new era. He argued
that under the negative influence of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism,
the Chinese people had developed the low and despicable national charac-
teristics of slavishness, ignorance, conservativeness, and laziness. While
Confucian teachings stifled the autonomy and independence of Chinese
people, Buddhism and Taoism led to a nihilism that contributed to the
conservative attitudes (Liu, 2002). Consequently, it was essential to launch
a campaign of enlightenment to reconstruct the Chinese national
character.
Moral education based on Western concepts could play a critical role in
reconstructing the national character and solving social problems in China;
to this end, Chen suggested using Western ideologies such as human
rights, freedom, science, equality, and democracy to replace the teaching
of rites in Confucianism. He sang particularly highly of the concepts of
democracy and science and made them the core of Western culture, claim-
ing that the Chinese should promote these two Western ideas through the
education system and the media, and should nurture a new individualism
to replace family-oriented collectivism as the ideology of China, com-
pletely eradicating conservativeness and servility. By saying so, he actually
advocated using Western culture to supplant Confucianism so as to estab-
lish a congruence between Substance and Utility, namely Western
Substance and Western Utility in China. This differed from the previous
idea of Chinese Substance and Western Utility held by the leaders of the
Self-Strengthening Movement and the Reformists.
Chen Duxiu’s Goals and Approaches to Moral Education

Chen Duxiu proposed two major goals of moral education, namely inde-
pendence and a personality of barbarity—the latter an attitude of aggres-
siveness, personal initiative and ambition to compete and fight—for the
purpose of reconstructing the Chinese national character. First, he called
for teaching young people the values of independence and freedom, which
represented a revolt against the Confucian emphasis on interdependence
in human relations and submissiveness to superiors and elders. Chen con-
tended that people’s orientation toward independence and freedom were
the prerequisites for implementing the Western political, social, and
252 Z. YOU ET AL.
e conomic systems in China and were the most important qualities needed
if the Confucian rites and value system were to be defeated. This goal of
moral education aimed at rectifying negative attitudes, such as Confucian
values of modesty and Taoism’s advocacy of inactivity, as well as at devel-
oping healthy bodies and a strong will to participate in domestic and inter-
national competition, which would help overcome the shortcomings of
docility and negativity entrenched in the traditional Chinese disposition.
Coupled with these moral education goals, Chen proposed the idea of
two transitions in education (Chen, 2016). The first was to shift from
stressing moral cultivation to emphasizing a broad knowledge-based
learning. Traditional Chinese education centered on moral instruction
and individual moral development, with the result that it had narrowed
people’s horizons and led to their incapacity in meeting social needs.
Including the learning of social and natural sciences, therefore, would not
only educate talented individuals needed for modern society, but also
enable people to break away from the confines of Confucian dogma. The
other transition was from elite education to education for the general pub-
lic. Traditional education aimed at educating only a few scholars in
Confucian moral virtues to help rule the country, leaving the majority of
people in ignorance. Modern education, according to Chen, should be a
universal education that would endow the masses with knowledge and
wisdom to become full citizens (Chen, 1984). While the purpose of the
former system was to cultivate sages and people of virtue who could serve
as moral examples for the masses, this nonetheless represented more of a
brainwashing than real education for the general public. Universal educa-
tion, in contrast, was an education of enlightenment and empowerment
that could facilitate the full development of ordinary people.
Even though Chen also discussed people’s innate natures, most of his
philosophical discourse about moral education focused on social practice.
He particularly opposed traditional moral education, which stressed perus-
ing classics or cultivating the moral heart, which he believed would mostly
end in idle talk or daydreaming. He asserted that “the progress of people’s
morality is made through education with actions, not by empty talks or
loud voice. The higher the volume of moral preaching is in a society, the
more backward and degenerating the society is” (Chen, 1984, p. 641).
Thus, a new form of moral education should be conducted by encourag-
ing young people to engage in social activities and allowing them to
develop responsibility toward society and the fate of the country.
In short, Chen Duxiu represented a new school of radical philosophers
and thinkers in the early twentieth century who proposed to replace the
old Confucian doctrine with Western ideologies. They argued that the
traditional teaching of rites and moral cultivation worked against the needs
of society and should be held accountable for China’s stagnation in the
modern era; it therefore should be totally rejected. Under the influence of
Chen and his peers, Confucianism, the most important ideological, politi-
cal, and educational tool for more than two thousand years in China, was
removed from its pedestal and gradually lost its role as a juggernaut of
influence on politics and moral education.
From a historical perspective, Chen and his peers significantly trans-
formed Chinese society and culture in both positive and negative ways.
On the one hand, the overthrow of the ideological hegemony of Confucian
doctrine was essential to refresh Chinese culture and for the successful
transition of China from a backward, ignorant agricultural society into a
modern country. With their efforts, the ideas of democracy and science
became current among the Chinese people, and the hierarchical social
system and autocratic political system were also considerably challenged
and weakened. On the other hand, the radical movement of completely
annulling Confucianism and its moral teachings also had some side effects.
Many scholars asserted that completely repudiating Confucian teachings
should be at least partially responsible for the loss of traditional moral
virtues and the moral decline in modern China (Chen, 2011; Sun, 2015).
After waves of enlightenment and revolution, quite a few people today
have started to rediscover and reaffirm the values of Confucianism in pro-
moting Chinese culture and morality.
A close examination of the literature reveals that even Chen did not
completely deny a role for Confucianism in moral education. His criticism
of Confucianism mainly lay in those principles that had restricted people’s
freedom and independence, not in its discourse of human nature and edu-
cational approaches. Moreover, Confucian virtues such as benevolence,
the sense of shame, integrity, credibility, respect, frugalness, and sincerity
were regarded by Chen as valuable; they could be included among univer-
sal moral principles (Chen, 1916). Therefore, Chen’s severe reprimand of
the traditional philosophy of moral education should be understood
within the specific social and political contexts of the early twentieth cen-
tury, when shaking off traditional ideological shackles was an imperative in
254 Z. YOU ET AL.
China. Any reevaluation of traditional philosophy of moral education

today should take this factor into consideration.
Liang Shuming’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Liang Shuming was widely known as an opponent of Chen Duxiu in the
New Culture Movement. Nevertheless, he was not just a defender of tra-
ditional Chinese culture, but also a reformer of Confucianism. Liang
actively utilized concepts from Buddhism and Henri Bergson’s philosophy
of life to renew traditional Confucianism. As such, he was widely recog-
nized as the founder of New Confucianism in modern China and has been
called the last Confucian by Western academia (Alitto, 1986). Liang’s phi-
losophy was rich in connotations for moral education, which he put into
practice in the Rural Reconstruction Movement in the early Republican
era of Chinese history.
Consensus and Discordance with Chen Duxiu

It is interesting to note that Liang Shuming and Chen Duxiu were col-
leagues at Peking University and that Liang was actually recruited by
Chen, who was then the director of liberal arts. Though widely viewed as
rivals in their attitudes toward Confucianism, the two scholars in reality
had much in common. Both agreed that the renovation of Chinese moral-
political philosophy was the ultimate solution for political and social crises
in China, both held the core of Confucian doctrine, such as the Three
Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues, accountable for the
misfortunes in China, and both supported introducing Western concepts
of democracy and science as a remedy for problems in Chinese society
(Gao, 2016).
Nonetheless, unlike Chen Duxiu’s advocacy of a total Westernization
of ideology, Liang Shuming believed that Confucianism, as the core of
Chinese moral culture, should not be abandoned. He declared that the
learning of benevolence, instead of the teaching of rites, was the essence
of Confucianism (Liang, 1950). The former was the real Confucianism
because it was directly taught by Confucius and Mencius, and embodied
the spirit of loving people. In contrast to later Confucianism, which accen-
tuated subordinates’ unilateral loyalty to superiors and juniors’ submission
to seniors, the learning of benevolence defined the human relations as
reciprocal: a son should be filial to his father, and a father should be
a ffectionate to his son as well. In the same vein, Liang called Confucianism
after the Qin Dynasty bogus Confucianism on the grounds that original
Confucianism had been skewed by later Confucians such as Dong
Zhongshu and Chu Hsi, who, he claimed, had deprived classical
Confucianism of humanistic factors and distorted it into inhuman ethical
codes and moral indoctrination that victimized many vulnerable people.
The study of benevolence, with its emphasis on cultivating the heart of
benevolence via rites and music, was intrinsically different from Chen-Chu
Learning, which laid the emphasis on rigid moral codes. While the Three
Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues heightened social depression
and hampered the nation’s progress, the learning of benevolence would
contribute to the renewal of Chinese culture and education. Liang stressed
the role of the learning of benevolence in renewing the value system of
Chinese people and reconciling it with Western ideas. In contrast to Chen
Duxiu, Liang contended that the Western concepts of democracy and sci-
ence, though absolutely necessary for modern China, should be accepted
only on the basis of life attitudes in traditional Chinese culture.
Philosophical Foundations of Liang Shuming’s Moral Education

Liang Shuming’s philosophy of moral education was grounded in his the-
ory of three cultures. In his magnum opus, Eastern and Western Cultures
and Their Philosophies, Liang proposed that there were primarily three
kinds of culture in the world: the culture of the West, the culture of China,
and the culture of India. The culture of the West mainly dealt with the
relationships between humans and nature by looking forward to the
future; it aimed at conquering the natural world to achieve individual
survival and national prosperity. The culture of India mostly dealt with
the relationships between body and mind, spirit and body, and life and
death by looking backward to the past. Through ascetic practices, it
sought liberation from the illusions arising from inner self and the exter-
nal world. The culture of China concentrated on the current human rela-
tions by following the doctrine of the mean (Liang, 1950). He further
noted that Confucianism was the representative of Chinese culture. It was
human relations-oriented and conciliatory, and therefore was better than
Western culture and could be an ideal destination for human society—the
future culture of the world could be a renaissance for Chinese culture
(Liang, 1987).
256 Z. YOU ET AL.
It is important to recognize that Liang was not a pure conservative. In

order to refresh and renovate Confucianism, he had absorbed ideas from
the West, particularly the life philosophy of Henri Bergson. Bergson was
noted for his philosophical argument that human intuition and immediate
experience were more significant than abstract rationalism and science in
understanding reality. The world, in essence, was a process of continuous
and dynamic life. While rationality could allow people to understand static
and fixed matters, intuition enabled them to make sense the changing
world and the impulse of life (Bergson, 1911). Liang highly admired
Bergson’s philosophy as it was congruent with the philosophies of the
School of Mind of Neo-Confucianism and Chan Buddhism that high-
lighted the roles of the heart and intuition. He thus incorporated Bergson’s
ideas of life, continuity, and creation through the impulse of life into his
own philosophy as evolving nature, which helped him renew and update
classical Confucianism, creating New Confucianism. Through a marriage
between Bergson’ thought and Confucianism, Liang instilled fresh mean-
ing and value into Confucianism, with the aim of reaching a consensus
with Western culture.
Although endorsing Western democracy and science, Liang was still a
real Confucian who firmly believed that Confucianism was the truth of the
world. He alleged that the idea of total Westernization suggested by Chen
Duxiu could destroy the “harmonious relationships between humans and
nature and among people, thereby resulting in people’s loss of innate
nature due to abandoning the meaning of life and the value of morality”
(Zhang, 2002a, pp. 26–27). Only by adopting the evolving nature and a
holistic worldview could humans reverse this perilous tendency: people
should learn and practice Confucian moral virtues so that they could
progress in a continuous journey of life as “morality came into being when
people could practice this evolving nature” (Liang, 1984, p. 216).
Liang Shuming’s Philosophical Discourse on Moral Education

Liang defined education in the East as education in moral virtues and feel-
ings and education in the West as an education in knowledge. He con-
tended that while education in knowledge was essential, education in
moral virtues and feelings was more fundamental for the survival and pros-
perity of human beings in the long term. Consequently, the teaching of
the real Confucianism provided a solution for China and the rest of the
world to realizing the goal of developing a harmonious yet evolving world.
For Liang Shuming, real Confucianism was neither about codes of con-
duct nor science but was a way of life that people learned by themselves,
so that “people understood themselves and knew how to solve the prob-
lems of their own” (Liang, 1950, p. 45). This way of life actually embod-
ied the traditional Confucian attitude that people reflected on themselves
to seek meaning inwardly and consciously observed moral principles in
life. Following the tradition of moral autonomy and initiative, moral edu-
cation accordingly should be conducted not by intimidation or indoctri-
nation or preaching but through the methods of self-cultivation and
practice.
The effort of moral self-cultivation, however, should be coupled with
the traditional endeavor of reducing excessive desires to promote morality.
Liang suggested that inordinate desire was the source of anxiety, confu-
sion, and concerns in life, and would disrupt the moral cultivation. With
insatiable desire in mind, people tended to agonize over gain or loss.
Reducing the level of desire enabled people to maintain a heart of peace
and benevolence, thereby according with the doctrine of the mean and
preserving vitality (Liang, 1950), which was good therapy for curing the
unhappiness prevalent in modern society.
The best way to cultivate such an attitude of life was to enjoy rites and
music in life as they were the essence of classical Confucianism. It was the
abandonment of these practices after the Han Dynasty that had made
Confucianism lose its true meaning (Liang, 1984). Liang’s concept of
rites was different from the teaching of rites advocated by Dong Zhongshu.
While the latter taught them to reinforce the social hierarchy, the former
centered on a life of sincerity and harmony. He categorized rites into two
kinds, ceremonies such as weddings and funerals and worshiping a ncestors,
and the daily rites such as greeting friends and guests. Liang particularly
appreciated the functions of daily rites, which he believed turned life into
an art of rites without ceremony and music without voice. The essence of
practicing rites and enjoying music was that it utilized external conduct to
appease the inner mind, which could shift people’s attention from seeking
personal gain to focusing on one’s own spiritual pursuit and thus enhanc-
ing their morality.
In fact, Liang Shuming had such a high opinion of Confucianism in
people’s moral development that he even proposed using this philosophy
as an ethical religion to replace religion. Although Confucianism was not
a religion and rarely discussed a supernatural deity, Liang claimed that it
had served a role similar to that of the major religions of the world. It had
258 Z. YOU ET AL.
maintained the stability of Chinese society for thousands of years with its
advocacy of filial piety and fraternal duty, and the implementation of the
system of rites and music. While the former allowed people to concentrate
on proper human relations and social interactions, the latter soothed peo-
ple’s emotions and brought them great spiritual comfort. While stabilizing
society and drawing people’s relations close, this function of moral educa-
tion in Confucianism at least partially met the Chinese people’s spiritual
needs.
Even though Liang seemed to among the old guard of Chinese tradi-
tional moral education, he was actually endeavoring to reconcile Eastern
culture with Western learning through using Chinese traditional wisdom
to guide the absorption of Western knowledge. On the one hand, he
acknowledged that democracy and science were needed for renewing
Chinese society; on the other, he opposed the stances of Westernization
and scientism held by scholars such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi. Liang
insisted that the Chinese should not completely copy Western culture;
instead, they need follow traditional Chinese attitudes to life while learn-
ing Western sciences. In the same vein, he criticized the tendency toward
scientism, the replacement of philosophy with science. While science
investigated natural phenomenon using reasoning, philosophy explored
human values and ideals using intuition, and one could not replace the
other (Liang, 1984). Confucianism, with its unique role in moral cultiva-
tion and spiritual guidance, should work as the fundamental attitude to
life of the Chinese people as it could help people avoid the confusion and
alienation of life due to excessive belief in the power of science.
We should note that Liang Shuming was not just a philosopher, he was
also an educator and practitioner of his own philosophy as well, as shown
by his long-term experiment in rural education. Liang chose rural villages
as the subject of his social and educational experiment for two reasons:
first, the root of Chinese culture was in the countryside as it still possessed
the emotions and ethics of Confucianism; second, traditional social struc-
ture and moral orders in Chinese rural areas, facing various external chal-
lenges, were disintegrating, and these demanded assistance and education.
Therefore Liang, along with his colleagues, planned to create a new cul-
ture in the countryside so as to restore morality in rural villages. To this
end, he established many peasant schools in a Chinese county called
Zouping in the hope of reconstructing the organization of rural villages
and turning rural villages into schools implementing enlightenment edu-
cation and moral education under the guidance of New Confucianism
(Zhou, 2007). Though he was forced to abort his experiment due to the
invasion by the Japanese, it considerably impacted on Chinese people’s
ideas and educational practice during this time.
Conclusion
From historical and cultural angles, Liang Shuming’s philosophy of moral
education could be conceived of as a new version of Chinese Substance
and Western Utility. On the one hand, he advocated that people adhere to
Confucianism for to maintain an evolving and vigorous attitude to life and
for their spiritual guidance. On the other hand, he called for the learning
of Western democracy and science to meet the challenges in modern
China; these, however, should be guided and supervised by New
Confucianism. This conservative stance inevitably drew much criticism.
But from the perspective of culture and civilization, Liang’s philosophy
did provide people with provocative ideas about the renewal of the Chinese
philosophy of moral education in the modern era and the unique values of
Confucianism in maintaining a humanistic orientation in the face of the
juggernaut of scientism.
Cai Yuanpei’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940 CE) was a legendary Chinese philosopher, edu-
cator, and statesman in the early twentieth century. At the age of 24, he
passed the highest imperial examination in the Qing Dynasty and was
appointed as a member of the Imperial Academy, but later he chose to join
the revolutionary party and was obliged to flee to Europe, where he
studied philosophy in France and Germany. In 1911, he became the sec-
retary of education in the government of Republican China (1912–1949
CE). Cai also served as the president of Peking University from 1916 to
1926, where he advocated academic freedom and inclusiveness, which
helped develop the university into the best higher education institution in
China. In terms of the philosophy of moral education, Cai attempted to
integrate East with West in the hope of generating formulas applicable to
Chinese education.
260 Z. YOU ET AL.
The Sources and Ideas of Cai’s Philosophy

Cai Yuanpei’s philosophy of moral education had two origins: Western
philosophy, as represented by Immanuel Kant, and traditional Chinese
philosophy, exemplified by Confucianism. Unlike Chen Duxiu’s radical
attitude toward Westernization or Liang Shuming’s conservatism, Cai
tended to innovate in his philosophy by synthesizing and fusing the phi-
losophies of two sides, which made his philosophy both modernized and
applicable. Inspired by Kant’s philosophy, which categorized reality into
the noumenal world and the phenomenal world, Cai proposed the Unity
of Five Types of Education to help people develop what he termed healthy
personalities. But he did not just copy the Western ideas into his philoso-
phy, he actually tried to create a new philosophical system by absorbing
Western concepts to update Chinese ones, claiming that instead of
being assimilated by the West, “we should absorb and digest Western ideas
so that they would become a part of mine […] absorb their merits to
strengthen our own characteristics” (Cai, 1984, p. 28).
The other source of Cai’s philosophy came from Confucianism. While
maintaining that many Confucian creeds, such as being loyal to the sover-
eign and worshiping Confucius, were outdated and should be discarded,
he also claimed there were many dimensions in traditional Chinese phi-
losophy that were congruent with Western philosophy; for example, righ-
teousness was in fact freedom, forgiveness was equality, and benevolence
was universal love (Cai, 1984). This was an endeavor on the part of Cai to
preserve the useful parts of Confucianism and use them as a foundation to
incorporate Western concepts and transform traditional Chinese
philosophy.
Cai’s Philosophical Discussion of the Two Worlds

A close examination of Cai’s works reveals the strong influence of Kant’s
dualism, which categorized existence into the phenomenal world and the
noumenal world. The former belongs to the category of experience lim-
ited by time and space; the latter—the world as it is in itself—was not
bounded by time and space and its understanding was dependent on intu-
ition and reason. The two worlds were not exclusive or conflicting but
comprised the dual nature of reality (Cai, 1984). Cai regarded the sub-
stance of the noumenal world as morality or transcendental laws, stating
that “the ultimate goal of the phenomenal world is to return toward the
noumenal world” (Cai, 1984, vol. 3, p. 283). He further noted that the
noumenal world could be comprehended through the Chinese concepts
of a priori Tao, the Supreme Ultimate or God (Cai, 1984), which was the
highest notion or will serving as spiritual guidance for people.
Then the question becomes how to achieve a successful return from the
phenomenal world to the noumenal world. Cai deemed that there existed
differences and inequalities among people in the phenomenal world.
These variances contributed to the idea of comparison and the desire for
gain; this, however, hindered people’s understanding of the noumenal
world or Tao. Therefore, people should eliminate those improper desires
so as to perceive the noumen and feel happiness. Here Cai Yuanpei suc-
cessfully integrated Western ideology with Chinese concepts such as Tao
and the elimination of desires to create his own philosophy, one which
aimed at serving the needs of the Chinese people.
However, unlike Buddhists and Taoists, Cai did not ask people to give
up happiness in the phenomenal world for the sake of reaching the nou-
menal world; instead, people should transcend the limit of the former and
attain both. He declared that the goal of politics was to seek happiness in
the phenomenal world; the goal of religion was to sacrifice happiness in
the phenomenal world for the sake of reaching the noumenal world, while
education took root in the phenomenal world but sought freedom in the
noumenal world. While the noumenal world provided the ideas and target
for education, the pursuit of these transcendental ideas contributed to the
happiness that arose from education (Cai, 1984). Hence the mission of
educators was to remove the shackles upon happiness in the phenomenal
world and use moral education and aesthetic education to cultivate peo-
ple’s virtues and provide spiritual comfort for them (Ban, 2009), allowing
people to reach the ultimate goal of life.
Cai’s Discourse on Moral Education

As mentioned above, Cai placed great emphasis on the role of moral educa-
tion in achieving the goal of standing in the phenomenal world and seeking
freedom in the noumenal world. For him, people needed to do two things to
reach the transcendental realm: first, eliminate prejudice toward each other to
attain the idea of universal brotherhood; second, transcend the obstacle of
competing for gain to attain spiritual freedom. Accordingly, education should
pay more attention to the ultimate ideal of mankind and less on its utility;
262 Z. YOU ET AL.
education is to “provide students with the capacity to develop and help

him or her consummate his or her moral character to be a responsible
person, not to shape them into a special utensil or to be applicable” (Cai,
1984, IV, p. 177).
To achieve the realm of universal brotherhood, students should develop
both a passive moral character and positive morality. Cai referred to the
passive moral character as the virtues of goodness, honesty, and integrity,
which should be followed by everybody. However, moral education should
not be limited to preserving individual moral integrity but should also
include encouraging people to engage in social activities and serve the
world, which Cai saw as positive morality. He further suggested that peo-
ple’s moral development started by nurturing passive morality and should
be reinforced by positive morality: “the two morals [are] just like the two
wheels of a cart or the two wings of a bird, therefore, neither should be
ignored” (Cai, 2008, p. 160). This idea of moral development was in fact
Cai’s inheritance from the traditional Confucian ideal of cultivating moral-
ity and serving the state.
Cai’s ideas on moral education were best embodied in his proposition
about the Unity of Five Types of Education, namely civil-military educa-
tion, utilitarian education, civic and moral education, worldview educa-
tion, and aesthetic education; moral education in the broad sense was the
soul, core, and purpose of the five types of education. Civil-military educa-
tion comprised physical education and military training. This education
was necessary to cope with the threat of foreign invasions and endless
warfare among warlords in China. Utilitarian education referred to gen-
eral education that could bring about the social, economic, and industrial
development of the country. These two types of education were regarded
as urgently requirements to meet the demands of modern China. However,
the remaining three types of education, accordingly to Cai, were more
fundamental to the Chinese people.
Civic and moral education was central to the system of five types of
education. Cai held that traditional individual moral cultivation was not
enough to educate citizens for modern society; thus, he introduced the
Western ideas of freedom, equality, and universal love as the goal and con-
tent of moral education. He pointed out that civic and moral education
was the core of all education in that “worldview education and aesthetic
education are in essence moral education in a broad sense; military educa-
tion and utilitarian education should be based on moral education” (Cai,
1984, II, p. 263). He further argued that if a person were both physically
strong and highly intelligent but low in morality, he would misuse those
qualities and scientific knowledge, leading to disastrous consequences for
society and himself. Civic and moral education, therefore, had more fun-
damental and far-reaching impacts on people than the others did.
Having said that, Cai Yuanpei sorted the first three types of educa-
tion—military, utilitarian, and civic and moral education—into the politi-
cal domain of the phenomenal world, and the remaining two—worldview
education and aesthetic education—into the domain of the noumenal
world, which highlighted the transcendental nature of the latter two.
Worldview education referred to the education in philosophy with the
purpose of knowing the world. It was contended that one should learn to
develop beliefs and purposes, particularly the ultimate value of life, which
could function partly as religion for guiding people. Aesthetic education
was closely related to civic and moral education and worldview education
was the bridge that connected the phenomenal world with the noumenal
world. Aesthetic education had a strong impact on people’s moral charac-
ter in that it could cultivate noble affections and values (Cai, 1984).
Sometimes Cai even proposed using aesthetic education to replace reli-
gion because aesthetic feelings possessed the transcendental power that
could enable people to reach the noumenal world from the phenomenal
world. It helped eliminate people’s selfish ideas and prejudices in the vicis-
situdes of the phenomenal world and gave rise to feelings of holiness and
grandeur that could supply people with spiritual comfort similar to that of
religion. This proposition could be traced back not just to Kant’s idea
about aesthetics but also to the Confucian tradition of using rites and
music to supplant the need for worshiping God.
Conclusion
Despite of his emphasis on the noumenal world, Cai Yuanpei’s philosophy
of moral education was intended to reform the real world. As a Chinese
educator and a statesman, he hoped to facilitate social changes through
moral education and develop citizens with healthy personalities for a dem-
ocratic society (Ban, 2009). This was why he adopted Kant’s philosophical
concept of the two worlds. However, Cai was not a copycat of a Western
philosophy but an innovator. He actively reinterpreted both Western
frameworks and Chinese traditional concepts to meet the needs of China.
In contrast to Chen Duxiu’s radical Westernization, Cai acknowledged
there were valuable dimensions in Confucianism that could reach
264 Z. YOU ET AL.
c onsensus with Western philosophy regarding moral education; compared

with Liang Shuming’s conservatism, his philosophy incorporated many
more Western factors needed to update and reform the old philosophical
system of China. In short, Cai’s philosophy of moral education and the
practice of it indicated a third path that attempted to integrate East with
West.
Tao Xingzhi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Tao Xingzhi (1891–1946 CE) was one of the foremost Chinese educators
and reformers in the era of Republican China. Born into a poor family,
Tao Xingzhi was lucky enough to receive his higher education in a mis-
sionary school called the University of Nankin. From 1914 to 1917, he
studied at Teachers College at Columbia University, where he learned
from John Dewey, Paul Monroe, and William H. Kilpatrick. Though
deeply influenced by John Dewey’s pragmatism, Tao’s theory of educa-
tion was not a replica of John Dewey’s but in fact a creative transformation
of Dewey’s philosophy of education adapted to the Chinese social and
cultural context.
Like Dewey, Tao Xingzhi was both a philosopher and a doer. He was
one of the leaders of the Mass Education Movement in the early 1920s,
promoting rural education in China. In 1927, he founded the famous
Xiaozhuang Normal School in Nanjing city to educate teachers for rural
villages, where he put into practice his educational theories such as life
as education, society as school, the integration of teaching, and learning
and doing. Although the school was forced to close in 1930, it was
exalted as the greatest experiment of school reform in Chinese history.
Compared with the three philosophers already discussed in this chapter,
Tao Xingzhi is better remembered as great educator than a philosopher
because of his focus on the practical utility of education. Nonetheless,
his theory of life education was rich in philosophical concepts concern-
ing people’s moral development; more importantly, his effort to adapt
and innovate John Dewey’s philosophy to meet Chinese realities indi-
cated a new path of development for the philosophy of Chinese moral
education.
The Sources of Tao’s Philosophy and Its Transformation

In fact, Tao Xingzhi’s philosophy had multiple sources, including not only
John Dewey’s ideas but also ideas from some Chinese ancient philoso-
phers. Initially, Tao Xingzhi was deeply influenced by Wang Yangming’s
philosophy, which could be inferred from the fact that he changed his
name from Tao Wenjun to Tao Zhixing. “Zhixing” in Chinese means
knowing and acting. The young man changed his name while he studied
Wang Yangming’s Study of Mind and believed in the latter’s concept of
unity of knowing and acting in moral cultivation (Tao, 1984). Nonetheless,
he changed his name again in 1934 from Zhixing to Xingzhi, which
reversed the sequence of “knowing–acting” to “acting–knowing”, inas-
much as he came to realize the importance of action in facilitating know-
ing. He further said: “while Wang Yangming believes in knowing is the
beginning of acting and acting is the completion of knowing, I believe
that acting is the beginning of knowing and knowing is the completion of
acting” (Tao, 1984, p. 245).
This reversal was significant for Tao Xingzhi as it had indicated the
transformation of his epistemology from “knowing–acting–knowing” to
“acting–knowing–acting”. After years of educational practice, he had real-
ized that acting was more important than knowing due to the chaotic situ-
ation in Chinese society at the time. With no action, there would be no
knowledge acquired, no matter how lofty the philosophy was. Moreover,
although ancient Confucian philosophers such as Chu Hsi and Wang
Yangming all stressed the importance of acting, they limited knowing and
acting solely to individual moral cultivation. Tao Xingzhi, however,
extended the fields of application of acting–knowing to social life and pro-
ductive activities, which enriched the connotations of moral education.
This indicated that Tao Xingzhi was not just a learner of the previous
philosophies, but a transformer as well. In fact, he was eager to transform
others’ philosophies to fit the needs of his time, as showcased by his
transformation of John Dewey’s philosophy to cater to the specific

demands of China.
Mohism was another key source of Tao Xingzhi’s philosophy. Tao par-
ticularly appreciated Mo Tzu’s concepts of knowing in person and univer-
sal love. Referring to Mo Tzu’s teachings, Tao Xingzhi claimed there were
three kinds of knowledge source: knowing in person, knowing by hearing,
and knowing by saying. Knowing in person was to know via practice, by
hearing was to be taught by teachers or books, and by saying was to infer
266 Z. YOU ET AL.
knowledge through logical reasoning. Tao Xingzhi held that knowing in

person was the foundation of all knowledge and that knowing by hearing
or saying could work only when they were rooted in knowing in person
(Tao, 1984), which helped explain the crucial role of acting in his own
epistemology. In addition, Tao Xingzhi’s idea of loving people, the moti-
vation of his efforts to promote mass education, could be traced back
partly to the universal brotherhood preached by the religious school he
had attended, and partly to Mo Tzu’s idea of universal love. Universal love
in Mohism denoted the spirit of loving all people in the world equally. Tao
Xingzhi taught and practiced this idea throughout his life, which moti-
vated him and his students to devote all their passion, time, and energy to
the work of mass education, particularly to the enlightenment of poor
people in rural areas, for the sake of saving China.
Finally, the most important source of Tao Xingzhi’s philosophy of
moral education was John Dewey’s pragmatism and educational philoso-
phy. For Dewey, the validity of any proposition was subject to testing by
its consequences (Dewey, 2013). This pragmatist stance had given rise to
Dewey’s ideas in philosophy of education. For instance, student practice
or experience rather than teacher indoctrination was crucial to any mean-
ingful learning; people’s moral character was formed through interactions
in the social environment, and therefore school itself should be a social
institution (Dewey, 2013). Chinese scholars accordingly summarized the
core concepts in Dewey’s progressivism as “education as life (experience)”,
“school as society”, and “learning by doing” (Hu, 1997).
As Dewey’s student, Tao Xingzhi had hoped to use Dewey’s philoso-
phy to renew Chinese education and society, but unfortunately this did
not work well in reality. After drawing lessons from previous social experi-
ments, Tao decided to transform Dewey’s philosophy to fit the national
conditions of China. He reversed the order of the above two propositions
as “life as education”, “society as school”, and expanded the idea of “learn-
ing by doing” to “integration of teaching, learning, and doing”, which
constituted the backbone of his theory of life education. While Dewey
believed that education and life were closely related, Tao took life as edu-
cation, stating that education should be as broad as life: life determined
the content of education and education in turn should serve the purpose
of reconstructing social life (Tao, 1991).
In the same vein, Tao Xingzhi argued that schools should be located in
society and should serve communal needs: “while school as society is like
to put a bird in a cage, society as school is to set the captive bird free from
the cage” (Tao, 1991, p. 390). The unity of teaching, learning, and doing
was an adapted version of Dewey’s learning by doing. Tao noted that “the
way of teaching should be contingent on the way of learning, the latter of
which in turn should be decided by the needs of action or doing in the
world” (Tao, 1991, p. 225). In other words, it was the need of action to
solve social problems that determined the way of learning and the way of
teaching. This philosophical transformation was designed to meet the
requirements of the mass education movement in China, which demanded
that educators be directly involved in teaching ordinary people and in
reforming the old social system. By relocating education in real life and
encouraging people to become agents of social change, students could
develop the ideal of loving people and the spirit of serving the country.
Moral Education Implications of Life Education Theory

In brief, the purpose of Tao Xingzhi’s moral education was to educate
“True Men” or “True Women”, who were eager to seek truth instead of
personal gain. In contrast to Chuang Tzu’s concept of the True Man, who
embodied a Taoist ideal of following nature, Tao Xingzhi’s True Man was
a paragon of virtue with sincerity and authenticity. He should endeavor to
become a person of the people, not a person above other people. Internally,
a True Man should become a whole person pursuing the real, the good,
and the beautiful. Externally, he should exhibit the characteristics of wis-
dom, benevolence, and courage extolled by Confucius: “wisdom is about
loving to learn, benevolence is about practicing the truth, and courage is
about knowing the sense of shame” (Zisi, 1987, p. 43). This ideal of the
True Man accordingly reflected the strong influence of traditional
Confucianism on Tao Xingzhi’s philosophy of moral education.
However, it is worth reiterating that Tao Xingzhi was not a member of
the old guard but rather an audacious reformer of traditional philosophy.
He strongly opposed the conservatives’ proposal of learning new
knowledge but preserving the old morality, retorting that new knowledge
should be commensurate with the new morality encompassing democracy
and scientific attitudes (Tao, 1984). In so saying, he considerably expanded
the connotation of moral education by incorporating Western concepts.
Like Dewey, Tao instilled new meaning into democracy. For him, democ-
racy was not just a social system of rule by the majority, but rather a pro-
cess of creativity; that is, people’s creativity could be greatly promoted
with the equal opportunities ensured by democracy. As for the scientific
268 Z. YOU ET AL.
attitude, Tao defined it as a willingness to accept science, create new sci-

ence, and establish scientific views in morality (Zhang, 2008), which was
a new virtue in modern times.
Even though Tao Xingzhi proposed his theory as life education rather
than moral education, his goal of moral education, namely educating True
Men, was central to his theory of education (Chen, 2002). Life as educa-
tion, for instance, was full of implications for moral education. Rooted in
the broad social life, this kind of education served the end of cultivating
people with the moral character needed for modern China. First, a rich
social life determined the content and ways of education, with the result
that it enabled people to better understand the essence of morality. Next,
people’s effort to reconstruct social life helped develop the character of
devotion and altruism that other educational activities could not.
Additionally, the unity of teaching, learning, and doing also had rich
implications for moral education. As doing was central to teaching and
learning, it allowed the moral character to be nurtured and developed dur-
ing the process of social practice and transformation, which avoided the
empty debates of traditional school education. Just as Tao Xingzhi claimed
“we should pursue the true knowledge in action” (Tao, 1984, p. 44), this
true knowledge inevitably included the knowledge of morality and creativ-
ity in real-life situations.
In the spirit of learning by doing, Tao Xingzhi suggested that students
be autonomous in their own school lives. For him, an important goal of
moral education was to educate students “to be the owners of themselves,
the owners of the country, and even the owners of the world” (Tao, 1984,
p. 429). Therefore, allowing students to self-govern their lives was neces-
sary on the grounds that students could learn to become the owners of
themselves through exercising autonomy, which in turn was essential for
them to understand the true meaning of democracy. This attitude is a
good indicator of Tao Xingzhi’s strong preference for a democratic society
and his opposition to the authoritative and didactic nature of traditional
school education.
The early twentieth century was a turbulent yet exciting era in China, a
period when the Eastern philosophy of moral education directly encoun-
tered Western philosophies, which warranted further discussion and reflec-
tion. In the face of deep crises throughout the country, many Chinese
scholars finally recognized the imperative of reforming or even discarding

the traditional reigning philosophy of Confucianism and the need for
introducing the Western philosophy and social system. It was also an age
of enlightenment, one when different scholars proposed different philo-
sophical prescriptions for moral education in China and actively publicized
these ideas and put them into practice in school education.
This chapter, accordingly, sheds light on the philosophy of moral edu-
cation of the four most influential Chinese scholars and educators in the
time period. Among the four scholars, Chen Duxiu and Liang Shuming
are directly opposed philosophically. Chen Duxiu called for the downfall
of Confucianism and proposed a complete Westernization in ideology,
whereas Liang Shuming advocated updating and preserving classic
Confucianism as an attitude of life that could be compatible with democ-
racy and science, and also avoid the side effects of scientism. Though it
seemed radical, Chen Duxiu’s proposition did play a crucial role in break-
ing the ideological shackles of Confucian doctrine, providing the much-
needed enlightenment for Chinese people at that historical turning point.
Though conservative, Liang Shuming did offer a fundamental solution
from the perspective of world cultures, reminding us of the special values
of Confucianism in moral education in the contemporary world.
The philosophies of Cai Yuanpei and Tao Xingzhi represented the third
path of integrating Western philosophies with Chinese philosophies to
meet the urgent demands of Chinese society. Cai Yuanpei strongly advo-
cated promoting the Western ideas of freedom, equality, and universal love
in China, but at the same time preserving the beneficial core of Chinese
culture, endeavoring to fuse ideas from East and West to fit the specific
national conditions of China. His ideas on the Unity of Five Types of
Education, particularly using worldview education and aesthetic educa-
tion to replace religions, fully reflected this philosophical stance. Tao
Xingzhi was another representative figure who actively adapted and
transformed Western philosophy to fit Chinese social, economic, and

political realities, as shown in his way of tactically revising John Dewey’s
philosophy for use in China. The path of the two scholars provided inspi-
ration for how the philosophy of Chinese moral education would be
renewed in the contemporary era.
270 Z. YOU ET AL.
Notes
1. The May Fourth Movement was a Chinese sociopolitical and cultural reform
movement sparked by student protests against the government’s feeble
response to the Treaty of Versailles on 4 May 1919. It has been widely
regarded as a part of the New Culture Movement of 1915–1921, which
criticized traditional Confucian doctrine and upheld Western concepts such
as democracy and science.
2. Kang Youwei, once the leader in the Hundry Days’ Reform of 1898, had
become much more conservative in ideology in the early Republican Era.
3. New Confucianism is one of three philosophical trends (the other two are
Marxism and the Liberal Westernization) of modern China developed in the
early twentieth century; this was a reaction of some modern Confucian schol-
ars against the philosophical trend of Westernization. These scholars firmly
believed that Chinese traditional moral culture still possessed timeless values
for people in China and the rest of the world. This modern philosophical
trend has been translated as New Confucianism in English so as to differenti-
ate it from the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties.
References
Alitto, G. (1986). The last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese dilemma of
modernity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ban, J. (2009). Adaptation and transcendence: Two dimensions in Cai Yuanpei’s
moral education thought. Modern University Education, 6, 82–86.
Bergson, H. (1911). Creative evolution. London: Macmillan & Co.
Cai, Y. (1984). Collections of Cai Yuanpei (Vols. 1–7). Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Cai, Y. (2008). Chinese people’s cultivation. Beijing: China Workers Publishing
House.
Chen, D. (1916). Constitution and Confucianism. New Youth, 2(3), 1–11.
Chen, D. (1984). Selections of Chen Duxiu’s articles. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing
Company.
Chen, D. (1987). Chen Duxiu’s collections. Hefei: Anhui People’s Press.
Chen, S. (2002). Tao Xingzhi’s theory of moral education is in essence a life moral
education. Morality and Civilization, 4, 63–65.
Chen, S. (2016). Initial exploration of Chen Duxiu’s new education. Education
Chen, X. (2011). On Confucius and the teaching of rites: A review on new culture
movement and the cultural revolution. Journal of Hunan University, 25(6),
104–108.
Dewey, J. (2013). Logic—The theory of inquiry. Worcestershire: Read Books Ltd.
Gao, L. (2016). Opposing Confucianism vs. respecting study of benevolence:

Perspectives of Confucianism by Chen Duxiu and Liang Shuming. Academic
Monthly, 48(4), 178–185.
Hu, J. (2009). Chen Duxiu’s perspectives of Confucianism. Journal of Huazhong
University of Science and Technology (Social Sciences), 23(3), 37–44.
Hu, S. (1997). Record of speech of Hu Shi. Shijiazhuang: Hebei People’s Press.
Liang, S. (1950). Philosophy and culture east and west. Hong Kong: Pacific Book
Company Limited.
Liang, S. (1984). Human heart and human nature. Shanghai: Academia Press.
Liang, S. (1987). The essence of Chinese culture. Hong Kong: SDX Joint Publishing
Company.
Liu, C. (2002). Chen Duxiu’s reconstructing of national characteristics during the
New Culture Movement (unpublished doctoral dissertation). Hefei: Anhui
University.
Sun, X. (2015). Individualism and familism: Rethinking on the 100-year anniver-
sary of new culture movement. Fudan Journal, 4, 62–69.
Tao, X. (1984). Collections of Tao Xingzhi. Changsha: Hunan Education Press.
Tao, X. (1991). Selections of Tao Xingzhi’s works on education. Beijing: People’s
Education Press.
Xue, Y., & Liu, Z. (2007). Chen Duxiu’s perspectives on moral education and
evolutionism. Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences),
37(1), 130–137.
Zhang, Q. (2008). The value sources of Tao Xingzhi’s educational thought.
Jiangsu Social Sciences, 3, 233–236.
Zhang, S. (2002a). On Liang Shuming’s philosophy of education. Journal of
Henan University (Educational Sciences), 18(3), 24–28.
Zhou, X. (2007). Cultural and social implications of Liang Shuming’s educational
spirit. Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University (Social Sciences), 20(6),
10–13.
CHAPTER 12
The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education

for the Twenty-First Century: Challenges,
Regeneration, and Significance
After surveying the historical landscapes of the philosophy of Chinese

moral education in the previous chapters, we now recap the development
process and the main characteristics of this philosophy, as well as analyze
the cultural implications of its concepts and propositions. This recapitula-
tion is necessary as it can contribute to a better understanding of the
essence of this philosophy and its impact on Chinese culture and society,
laying the foundations for further discussion upon its conceptual renewal
and theoretical reconstruction in contemporary China. We argue this
renewed philosophy contains ideas and ways of thinking that are valuable
in helping solve conflicts between humanity and nature, and humanity and
science, and between the different social groups, ethnicities, and cultures
in our world today.
Recapitulating the Characteristics
of the Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education
We should note that the philosophy of Chinese moral education, which

grew up approximately three millennia ago, was developed throughout
history. This special philosophical phenomenon stemmed from ancient
Chinese scholars’ philosophical thought about the dynamic relation-
ship between the universe and humans, as well as rulers’ reflection upon
the need for rule by morality in stabilizing their rule. These consider-
ations have lent support to the formation of this unique philosophical

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4_12
274 Z. YOU ET AL.
and political system, a powerful trend toward moral education that had
considerably enhanced cultural cohesion and societal harmony in
China. It represents an important reason why this civilization has been
able to survive and prosper uninterruptedly for thousands of years.
First, it is the existence and prosperity of Confucianism throughout his-
tory that have mostly legitimized this philosophy. Confucian doctrine is
unparalleled in terms of its impact upon people’s moral development, per-
haps only comparable to major world religions with respect to its influence
on people’s beliefs and way of life. The other Chinese philosophical schools
and belief systems, such as Taoism, Mohism, Legalism, and Buddhism,
also engaged in philosophical discussion on moral education, supplement-
ing Confucian doctrine’s role in facilitating people’s moral development.
For instance, Buddhism’s teaching of karmic retribution was particularly
instrumental in encouraging people to go good and refrain from evil in a
way that Confucian moral teaching was not. Taoism as a philosophy too
worked in a different way from Confucianism. Unlike the latter’s emphasis
on people’s initiative and aggressiveness, Taoism advocates a quiescent
and non-aggressive moral attitude through following nature and main-
taining a low profile. It provides Chinese people with a spiritual escape
from the rigorous moral demands of Confucianism and Buddhism, pro-
viding tranquility and aesthetic experience.
Although incorporating different schools, the philosophy is not a mix-
ture of various philosophies related to moral education, but more of a
process of interaction and integration among these different sections.
These philosophies/religions collided with, learned from, or adapted to
each other, leading to renewal of each in metaphysics, epistemology, eth-
ics, and approaches to moral education. Hence, the historical develop-
ment of the philosophy of Chinese moral education can be perceived as a
dynamic process of conflict, adaptation, fusion, and transformation of
philosophical thought among different schools of philosophies/religions,
between or among different philosophical branches of the schools inside
Confucianism, and even between philosophies of East and West.
Another important feature of the philosophy is that it tends to use
grand narrative and intuitive thinking about the universe and humans to
justify the rationale for moral education: the concepts of Tao, the heavenly
principle, and the heart are utilized to denote the ultimate truth or the
source of truth for purposes of moral education. Frameworks such as
innate human nature, Yin/Yang duality, the Five Elements, and interac-
tion between heaven and man are used to explain the logic of moral
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHINESE MORAL EDUCATION… 275
e ducation. The idea of unity or separation between Substance and Utility

is utilized to legitimize certain moral education endeavors; for example,
the idea of Chinese Substance and Western Utility triggered discussions
upon the legitimacy of following a traditional moral education philosophy
in early modern China.
Moreover, the philosophy contains rich and diverse approaches to
moral education derived from or compatible with its metaphysical frame-
works and ultimate purpose. These include the approach of rites and
music, which serves the needs of maintaining social hierarchy and harmo-
nizing human relations. Also included are investigating to know, preserv-
ing moral principles and eliminating excessive desires as related to pursuing
the heavenly principle. Sudden enlightenment and sitting quietly are
Buddhist methods and Confucian traditions that center on the inner moral
cultivation of the heart, whereas practical learning marked a philosophical
shift of emphasis from self-cultivation to social practice. Finally, wordless
teaching is a unique way of moral cultivation based on the Taoist idea of
following nature; it has been used to counter the stagnation of Confucian
creeds as well as to offset an over-aggressive attitude in Confucian moral
education.
In summary, these conceptual frameworks and educational methods
serve the primary purpose of the philosophy: to nurture “proper” human
relations. The metaphysics highlights the holiness of teaching human rela-
tions, the moral education principles aim at defining ideal human rela-
tions, and the moral education approaches center on the way of cultivating
the desired human relations. All of these indicate an ingrained cultural and
psychological feature of the Chinese people—that it is human relations
oriented. As such, any future transformation of the philosophy must take
this intrinsic inclination into account.
The Impact of the Philosophy on Chinese Culture

It is worth noting that the philosophy of Chinese moral education, due to
its enormous influence on educational activities and social life, has contrib-
uted to the formation of steady and entrenched national identity, values,
and modes of behavior in China, including filial piety, faithfulness, confor-
mity, reconciliation, modesty, and maintaining a low profile, highlighting
rituals and hierarchy, valuing social connections, and identifying the family
with the state. This mindset, though weakened by criticism and ideologi-
cal shifts in modern times, is still held to represent the core values of
276 Z. YOU ET AL.
Chinese people, warranting a review of underlying rationales and f unctions

of the philosophy, as well as a discussion about how they have impacted on
the Chinese personality.
Specifically speaking, the prosperity of this philosophy in Chinese his-
tory can largely be ascribed to its political functions of regulating human
relations and maintaining social hierarchy through moral cultivation,
which is based on the extension of differentiated love and the filial piety–
faithfulness continuum. In contrast to the universal love of the West, the
character of loving people or benevolence in this philosophy springs from
family blood ties, such that one extends love for relatives to people of
remoter or no relationship. In a similar vein, the cultivation of loyal min-
isters is based on the teaching of filial piety; that is, the moral virtue of
being filial to parents can be extended to the social responsibility of being
faithful to the monarch. Accordingly, people’s moral development should
follow the sequence of individual cultivation, family responsibility, country
service, and world peace. While the affection originates from family blood
ties, it can be carried over to larger social domains; while the love high-
lights harmony, it serves to differentiate people and maintain the social
order in which political function and moral education merge.
The above beliefs and their related educational system helped to shape a
rigid social hierarchy in ancient China. Daily moral education activities
such as practicing rites have nurtured a system of hierarchical human rela-
tions in which everyone lives appropriately according to his or her social
status and rank, which has further led to the customs of respecting the old
and conforming to authority. The relationships, nonetheless, are recipro-
cal. In return for respect and filial piety from juniors and subordinates,
seniors and superiors should love and care about the former, forming a
stable and harmonious relations. This reciprocity dismisses the stereotype
that moral education philosophies in China only teach unidirectional sub-
missiveness. However, the emphasis on social hierarchy cannot meet the
current demand for a more diverse and democratic society stressing auton-
omy and innovation, which calls for a flatter and less rigid social hierarchy.
This philosophical perspective has given rise to the ideal of the “inner
sage and outer king” and reinforced the cultural mentality of “the isomor-
phism between family and state”, which further exerts an influence on
Chinese social conventions. While the former refers to a combination of
moral self-cultivation and serving the state, the latter is a cultural mindset
that emphasizes the integration of filial piety and faithfulness. The family
and the state therefore are perfectly united in individual moral d
evelopment
and political pursuit, which explains why the Chinese tend to possess a
strong sense of national identity and why the idea of a grand unification
that prevents the division of the country—alongside the existence of inter-
woven exchange of interests between family (clan) and the state—took
root. It also leads to the phenomenon that human relations-based moral
cultivation have become highly regarded and an essential part of poli-
tics because the country, to a certain extent, was ruled more like a family
than a contractual society.
The mindset of the integration of family and state, a byproduct of the
philosophy, has both positive and negative impacts on Chinese societies,
which seems to be confusing and paradoxical. On the one hand, it lends
support to people’s patriotism and social responsibility, such that individu-
als and families are willing to give their time, energy, property, or even lives
to the country when needed, creating national cohesion and consolida-
tion; on the other hand, it might also result in obscuring the distinction
between private interests and public goods, meaning that putting the fam-
ily’s or a small group’s interests ahead of the public interest is subcon-
sciously considered acceptable by many people when there are conflicts of
interest. If not properly supervised, this cultural mentality and convention
may easily breed nepotism, cronyism, and favoritism in public affairs, often
in the form of an exchange of private interests but in the name of the pub-
lic good. This is why mainstream Chinese philosophers advocate putting
righteousness ahead of personal gain in the hope of overcoming the
problem.
Next, this philosophy might have contributed to forming many of the
unique Chinese social norms and customs. With its emphasis on harmo-
nizing social relations, Chinese society leans toward moral self-discipline,
public scrutiny, reconciliation, and negotiation in solving social issues; in
this, it differs from Western society, which prefers legal settlement.
Moreover, the philosophy is closely related to other cultural and psycho-
logical orientations, such as a holistic perspective on the world, confor-
mity, concord, reciprocity, interdependence, and the sense of balance since
the teaching of ideal human relations lends support to the spread and
development of these values and modes of thinking. However, its concen-
tration on human relations may also reinforce, though indirectly, the tra-
ditional cultural propensity of people to rely heavily on a special social
capital created out of interpersonal networking or guanxi to exchange
benefits or favors for personal and business purposes, which is considered
critical to people’s career success in Chinese society.
278 Z. YOU ET AL.
The philosophical influences could be better comprehended by com-

paring traditional Chinese culture to mainstream Western culture. While
the idea about God granting life to people highlights the concept of indi-
vidual freedom, the idea of receiving life from parents or ancestors empha-
sizes family responsibility. Traditional Chinese culture tends to stress
collectivism, which differs from mainstream Western culture’s emphasis
on individualism; Chinese culture is inclined to seek conformity and
emphasize interdependence, which varies from Western culture, which
tends to underscore difference and independence. On the one hand,
Chinese people are noted for diligence, modesty, a sense of responsibility,
and their holistic view; on the other hand, they seem to lack individuality,
passionate expression, and the spirit of adventure—all could be seen as a
result of, at least partly, the influence of the traditional philosophy and its
related educational activities.1
Nonetheless, the orientations of the philosophy as well as its impact on
Chinese people should not be viewed as uniform or unidirectional. In fact,
the richness and diversity in the traditional philosophy have often led to
differing or even conflicting national characteristics. For instance, while
Confucian doctrine teaches the need to preserve the present social order,
Legalistic ideas advocate changing the current system for utilitarian pur-
poses. Whereas the Chinese tend to enjoy following the laws of nature and
being inactive, following the teaching of Taoism, they also try to build
grand projects and alter the natural and societal landscapes to ensure the
country’s safety or improve human life, which could be traced back to
Hsun Tzu’s idea that people can control nature with collective force. As
for life attitude, both the Confucian enterprising spirit about this world
and the Buddhist worldview of dependent arising or impermanence can be
found in many people’s belief systems. These conflicting characteristics,
coexisting with each other throughout history, form the basic outlook of
Chinese culture.
It is imperative to note that this philosophy of moral education was
formulated in an agricultural society, one which developed its basic nature
by emphasizing human relations and social hierarchy. The need for sowing
and harvesting in an agrarian society required stability and collaboration,
which called for well-ordered and harmonious human relations and grand
unification. Senior people in the family were respected for their experience
and wisdom in agriculture, while the ancestors were worshiped in the
hope that they would bless the harvest. These social patterns in ancient
China are in sharp contrast with those in Ancient Greece, which was
essentially a commercial society highlighting independence, equality, and

the rule of law, because, unlike in Chinese society, the Greek personal
blood ties and clans were destroyed when the city states were formed
(Engels, 2010). The origin of basic features of Eastern philosophy and
Western philosophy, in this sense, may be attributed to the characteristics
of agricultural civilization and commercial civilization respectively.
Many concepts in the philosophy, nevertheless, are obsolete in the modern
era, given that democracy, science, and individuality are highly valued. For
instance, the Principle of Three Cardinal Guides was designed to regulate
relations in a traditional society. These moral guides should be abandoned
due to their overemphasis on submissiveness and hierarchical social structure,
which cements inequality and suppresses people’s critical thinking and cre-
ativity (Cui, 1999). The constantly changing world today makes this old
value system even more outmoded. The rapid development of technology,
the disintegration of traditional society, and growing globalization and mul-
ticulturalism all demand alterations in the traditional modes of social interac-
tion, which have further deepened the crisis in the philosophy. Consequently,
the traditional philosophy of moral education was challenged, questioned,
and even largely discarded in some phases of early modern China.
The Contemporary Moral Crisis and the Prospect

of Regeneration
However, completely repudiating the traditional philosophy of moral edu-

cation in contemporary China has evoked large-scale moral depravity and
caused serious social conflict. This problem is compounded at a time when
the market economy predominates, when the immoral or even illegal pur-
suit of wealth and power has become frequent. With the hedonism and
money worship prevalent in society, the traditions of honesty and integrity
are weakened, human relations are often distorted and soured, and social
order is undermined (Fang, 2013; Yuan & Zhang, 2013). Another con-
comitant problem of the moral decline is the rise of radical ideas or emo-
tions among some Chinese people; these pose a potential threat to the
mainstream Chinese culture of inclusiveness and generosity, as well as the
country’s long-term development.
In effect, the obsession with profit and sensual pleasures brings people
great pain, confusion, and disillusion. Without the anchor of morality, the
game of seizing personal gain and feeding individual greed often results in
280 Z. YOU ET AL.
violent conflict or even self-destruction, which prompts people of vision to

reconsider the role of the traditional philosophy of moral education. Many
scholars contend that the absence of a traditional moral education has
aggravated the current moral decline, mental crisis about the meaning of
life, and the weakening of the value system, and thus call for the reinstat-
ing of traditional virtues (Mou, 2012; Zhang, 1998). Others propose a
regeneration and reinterpretation of traditional moral philosophy to con-
struct a new moral foundation and promote moral education for Chinese
people (Yang, 1999; Yi, 2005). The current Chinese government too rec-
ognizes the importance of renewing and reviving traditional Chinese cul-
ture for the sake of promoting people’s moral development, hoping that
this could reinforce or at least work as a supplement to the present main-
stream moral education based on Communist ideas.
The Imperative and Feasibility of Philosophical Regeneration

We argue that in a country with a civilization going back thousands of
years such as China, cutting off its cultural roots, particularly its traditional
moral values and education, is unwise and problematic. The traditional
philosophy of moral education, though outdated in some respects, still
possesses valuable implications for moral education today and contains
emotional and psychological frameworks that can accommodate the
Chinese people’s needs and national condition. Hence the introduction
and naturalization of modern concepts in China has to be based on these
innate mental structures and cultural characteristics. Any endeavor to wipe
away the past would mean that the efforts toward modernization would
be ineffective. The reactivation of the traditional philosophy of moral edu-
cation with a new spirit, therefore, is crucial if people want modern con-
cepts to take root in China.
Nonetheless, the revival of the philosophy is not just a simple restora-
tion of the old system as some scholars have wished, but rather a renewal
and regeneration. After all, it is impossible for traditional philosophy to fit
into the current society when interest groups and value orientation are
now much more diversified. There are reasons why the old philosophy was
criticized and discarded in the early modern era. When China turned from
an agrarian society into an industrial society and market economy, the
traditional extended families, emphasizing blood ties and intricate social
networks, started disintegrating. More and more people have chosen to
move to new places, and nuclear families have gradually replaced extended
households.
In fact, the disintegration of the old extended family structure has

changed the foundation of the society in terms of human relations, mak-
ing philosophical upgrading and transformation both a possibility and a
necessity. The reliance on human relations arose when there was low social
mobility and limited resources in a highly populated agrarian society,
which demanded the teaching of the moral principles of benevolence,
righteousness, and faithfulness to regulate interests amid complex net-
works of human relations. However, with increased social mobility and
international coordination, these moral principles, while retaining some
universal implications, need to be renewed so that they can be compatible
with a modern legal system, universal values, and a global consensus.
The transformation of an economic and social system demands teach-
ing new outlooks on life as well. Instead of preserving absolute collectiv-
ism and compliance, the new industry and market economy in China calls
for educating people more about individuality and equality, stressing qual-
ities such as independence, self-actualization, and challenging convention,
and so forth, which make some traditional concepts such as the hierarchi-
cal society and loyalty obsolete. The contemporary social patterns demand
people develop respect for the rules and strengthen their sense of fairness,
reducing the abuse of power or the corruption of nepotism and cronyism.
Political realities also require that the renewed philosophy of moral educa-
tion accommodate modern ideologies of democracy, science, equality,
freedom, and the rule of law. In short, the philosophy should be rebuilt
upon both Chinese cultural traditions and modern concepts, taking the
needs of Chinese society in the post-modern era into account.
While highlighting the necessity for philosophical regeneration, we
should note that many concepts and frameworks in the philosophy of
Chinese moral education have universal values transcending time and
place (Xue & Liu, 2007) and could be incorporated into the revived phi-
losophy and moral education system (Gao, 1999). These values can con-
tribute to the human well-being of our world as they encompass elements
helpful in overcoming the side effects caused by modern industry and
market economy, making its regeneration particularly significant. For
instance, virtues such as benevolence, credibility, reciprocity, and harmony
are valuable in terms of curing current social ills such as apathy, callous-
ness, extremism, and dishonesty. Other principles such as faithfulness, filial
piety, wisdom, rites, integrity, with their revived meanings, may also help
solve the problem of moral decline today. Nevertheless, these virtues need
to be upgraded, reinterpreted, and transformed before they can be used to
282 Z. YOU ET AL.
reconstruct the philosophy of moral education. This need is best illus-

trated by Singapore’s example; its former leader, Lee Kuan Yew, adopted
many Confucian virtues for the purpose of moral education in schools
after giving them modern connotations and catering to Singapore’s social
realities and cultural characteristics (Gong, 2006). We should pursue simi-
lar strategies to renew the philosophy of Chinese moral education.
It is also of note that the philosophy per se possesses the spirit of renewal
and adaptability within it that could facilitate this transformation.
Throughout history, the philosophy was in a dynamic and continuous
process of evolution and transformation, incorporating fresh elements and
adjusting to new demands, which endowed it with rich vitality and resil-
iency in coping with crises at each stage of development. Religious Taoism
and Buddhism, for instance, were active in incorporating Confucian ideas
of filial piety and faithfulness into their own teachings; Neo-Confucianism
also endeavored to absorb metaphysical concepts from Buddhism and
Taoism to replenish its own philosophy. This spirit is reflected in Chu
Hsi’s belief that the aim of the Great Learning was to clarify morality and
renew oneself, and that “the word ‘renewal’ meant to replace the old with
the new” (Chu, 1983, p. 3). This quality of adaptation and transformation
is significant inasmuch as it proves that the philosophy has the ability to
evolve and regenerate in the post-modern era and during a time of global
conflict, collaboration, and mutual learning.
The Conceptual Renewal

Before projecting conceptual renewal onto the philosophy of Chinese
moral education, there is a need to revisit the soil from which it sprouted,
namely the culture of family and state, because any ideological regenera-
tion needs to take its cultural characteristics into consideration. To the
Chinese people, family ties and the attachment to the state are their social,
psychological, and affective roots; the intertwined relations in family and
human networks generate social capital essential for the development of
individuals, who in turn are expected to contribute to the networks as
well. However, to avoid the narrowness of a family/small group-centered
mentality, the philosophy during its historical process called for the devel-
opment of altruistic love for unrelated people and for caring for the coun-
try and even the world, which helped it transcend the limitations of the
culture. This conception of a family–state–world continuum should be
utilized to renew the philosophical concepts. While preserving harmoni-
ous human relations and holistic consideration, people also need to expand
their concern from their family or private clique to the realms of the coun-
try and the world. This is the basic logic for rejuvenating the philosophy
of Chinese moral education.
In what follows, we will discuss the renewal of moral concepts for cur-
rent moral education purposes as well as their potential for helping to
solve social problems in modern times. However, while eliminating nega-
tive connotations and updating the meanings of the concepts, we need to
preserve its core and spirit—its universal values. Thus, it should be con-
ducted according to the principle of sublation (aufheben), such that the
interplay between the abolishing of the outdated and the preservation and
enhancement of the valuable elements eventually helps the concepts tran-
scend their old forms and implications. By doing so, we will be able to
enrich and transform the concepts in light of modern needs so that they
can work not just for Chinese people but for all humanity as well.
Benevolence (ren) is a key concept with universal values in the tradi-
tional philosophy of Chinese moral education. This concept connotes the
virtue of loving people, which is used not only for an individual’s moral
cultivation, but also as guidance on how to deal with other people or other
countries. The core of this virtue is to respect, understand, and care about
other people; when coupled with reciprocity, it develops a genuine will-
ingness to think for others. Teaching benevolence in the current world of
diversity and globalization is of particular significance: benevolence could
be an important principle for dealing with the conflicts prevalent today
between people or among different ethnicities, religions, and countries.
With its spirit of reciprocity, generosity, and kindness, the principle can
help reduce social contradictions and contribute to a harmonious global
community.
However, the original meaning of Confucius’ benevolence is innately
tied to other Confucian virtues such as filial piety and faithfulness, indicat-
ing that benevolence, though encompassing the factor of universal affec-
tion, is mostly a differentiated love with connotations of a hierarchical
society. This characteristic has dual implications for today’s moral
education. On the one hand, Confucian benevolence is a love extended
from one’s affection toward parents or children to other more remote
relations, and eventually to other unrelated people. Therefore, nurturing
the love for mankind can start from cultivating filial affection and fraternal
love, which provides the virtue with solid emotional and psychological
foundations. On the other hand, we need to eliminate the implications of
a rigid social hierarchy and partiality hidden in this concept, and transform
284 Z. YOU ET AL.
it with the modern ideas of equity, fairness, and freedom. The spirit of
compassion and equality in Buddhism and the impartial care of Mohism
could also be used to supplement the idea of Confucian benevolence,
broadening the scope of this concept.
The same is true about teaching the virtue of filial piety, which is one of
the central goals and a core value in Chinese traditional moral education.
This character, widely regarded as the root of Chinese culture, has given
rise to many other characteristics, such as respecting seniors and being
faithful to the sovereign. However, the traditional principle of filial piety
has come under severe criticism in modern times for its tendency toward
blind and absolute obedience to parents or conformity to authority fig-
ures. Though the censure of blind filial piety helped shake the old hierar-
chy at the beginning of the twentieth century, totally denying its value
could lead to confusion in morality and the problem of being callous in
human relations. In fact, filial piety in traditional Chinese philosophy has
three levels of meaning: supporting parents, respecting parents, and sub-
missiveness. While blind submissiveness should be abandoned, supporting
and respecting parents should continue to be taught as the core value of
Chinese culture. In the spirit of sublation, while preserving respect for the
old and one’s superiors, people should also be encouraged to challenge
authority and achieve the self-actualization needed for innovation and
creativity.
Along with filial piety, faithfulness was regarded as an old-fashioned
principle in the New Culture Movement. Nonetheless, just like filial piety,
faithfulness has positive elements for moral education as well. Besides loy-
alty to the monarch, this virtue maintains a true and sincere attitude
toward friends and other people, and the sense of responsibility and dedi-
cation to the business that one is conducting. Accordingly, while discard-
ing the idea of blind loyalty to superiors, people should promote the value
of faithfulness in life, helping them get along well with each other and
conduct business with an earnest attitude and credibility, reducing
cheating or the manufacturing of poor-quality goods for the sake of

becoming rich quickly.
Rites are another virtue that should be preserved and renewed.
Traditionally, Chinese people regarded rites and music as an important
approach for nurturing proper behavior, beliefs, and affections. The pur-
pose of teaching rituals was to ask people to act appropriately according to
their social rank or family status; this is criticized widely today, perhaps
justly, because it reinforces a rigid social hierarchy. But completely negating
the importance of rites in modern times also causes a vulgarization of soci-

ety, or even social disorder in that rites or etiquette are an important yard-
stick for the spirit of concord between people. Hence, while de-emphasizing
its implications of a strict social hierarchy and social distinction, people
need to preserve the spirit of respect, modesty, tolerance, and agreement
embodied in the education of rites and music; they need to incorporate the
modern values of equality and respect for the rules into rite, as well as
highlighting its function of harmonizing human relations.
Besides reducing the implications of strict social hierarchy, the renewal
of the above principles demands that people address the conflict between
collectivism and individualism. In essence, the old system of benevolence,
filial piety, faithfulness, rites, and the doctrine of the mean was designed to
highlight collectivism—traditional Chinese culture tends to make collec-
tive interests a priority, with the result that sometimes individual interests
or rights may be overlooked or even overridden for the purpose of recon-
ciling competing interests in the group, which reflects the characteristics
of an agrarian society. However, the rise of individuality in the modern era
with its market economy and high technology requires an updating of the
relationship, which is the source of people’s dissatisfaction with the tradi-
tional philosophy. That said, the establishment of the new relationships
demands both renewing and preserving traditional ideologies. On the one
hand, people need to instill the principles with the modern spirit of democ-
racy, freedom, and equality so as to give greater weight to individual needs
and personal rights; on the other hand, they also need to reserve the tra-
ditional collective consciousness in harmonizing human relations, which is
imperative to reducing social conflicts and eschewing callousness and
indifference in modern society.
While the concepts need renewing to be compatible with modern prin-
ciples and practices such as democracy and the rule of law, the naturalization
of these modern ideas too needs to take the special Chinese cultural environ-
ment and national conditions into considerations so as to take root in China.
The mentality of regarding family as one’s roots, for instance, tends to gen-
erate an intricate human network of guanxi and the exchange of interests,
which can sometimes frustrate or even disrupt efforts to develop modern
systems and establish rules. The problem is that this culture highlights
resources in social networks and personal relationships other than indepen-
dence and fair play, which complicates many situations. To remedy the prob-
lem, China needs to promote institutional innovations in implementing
286 Z. YOU ET AL.
democracy and the rule of law so that these systems can grow and prosper,
fitting with and transforming the human relations-oriented culture. This
attitude, along with the regeneration of the philosophy of moral education,
could lend support to the modernization of ideology and social institutions
in China today.
Implications for Current Chinese Moral Education

We should point out that the philosophy of moral education, with its uni-
versal moral connotations and renewed implications, can contribute to
solving social crises and mental problems in contemporary China. For
instance, philosophical discussion about righteousness and gain is particu-
larly useful in helping curb the prevalent problem of pursuing one’s own
self-interest unscrupulously, which has become a bigger and more compli-
cated issue today than in the past. While insatiable greed may produce
immoral behavior or corruption, personal gain is considered a major moti-
vator essential for the current market economy, which leads to confusion.
Teaching the idea of integrating righteousness and gain held by the phi-
losophers of practical learning helps address the issue. This proposition,
on the one hand, admits the legitimacy of personal gain; on the other, it
asks people to use righteousness to guide and supervise their activities in
seeking benefits, which lends support to the long-term healthy develop-
ment of the market economy in China.
In addition, the traditional mode of moral self-cultivation and the
nationwide effort to nurture good customs advocated by the philosophy
can be used to promote moral education. Although the themes and pur-
poses of this traditional moral education are mostly outdated, we believe
that they can be adapted to fit today’s needs. These approaches in moral
education, highlighting autonomy and self-determination in one’s own
moral development and the state’s effort to form a good moral atmo-
sphere in society, can contribute to the present-day moral education
through publicizing the updated and modernized moral virtues, making
up for the deficiency of moral education in today’s schools.
We argue that current moral education in Chinese schools has mostly
relied on didactic teaching and indoctrination, which is not very effective.
The weakness of such moral education derives partly from its emphasis on
students’ test scores rather than their full development, partly from its
isolation from social life. As a result, many schools have to resort to the
methods of precept, preaching, or discipline to make students submissive.
There is a compelling need to restore the philosophical idea of taking full

responsibility for one’s own moral growth in that real moral development
should be achieved through free will, initiative, and self-actualization.
Aside from the emphasis on autonomous moral self-cultivation, the tradi-
tional advocacy of pursuing lofty moral ideals is also significant today: the
ideas about pursuing Tao or the heavenly principle and the cultivation of
the moral heart can provide students with inner motivation, sublimity, and
inspiration to become active moral learners.
Meanwhile, establishing a good community-based moral environment
is crucial to promoting moral education in schools today. In the spirit of
cultivating good customs, contemporary China should encourage various
community members to participate in moral education activities for chil-
dren and accordingly reconnect school moral education with broad social
life and practice, instilling true meaning into abstract moral creeds. In this
sense, it is no longer a traditional top-down moral cultivation, but a new
grass-roots moral education effort situated in the family, neighborhood,
and society as it attempts to create a moral atmosphere that encourages
young people to follow good examples and behave according to the moral
consensus.
Next, metaphysical frameworks such as Tao and Utensil in the philoso-
phy are also of special significance for the moral development of Chinese
people today. The present moral decline in China is, to some extent, a
result of overcorrection of the traditional tendency toward valuing Tao
while neglecting Utensil, with the result that nowadays people go to the
other extreme of valuing Utensil and abandoning Tao. Put differently,
people pay too much attention to technology and material gain, namely
Utensil, but pay much less attention to moral development or pursuing
Tao. While the practical utilities have contributed to the rapid economic
development and social change in China, they have also brought many
side effects, such as environmental pollution, the prevalence of immoral
behavior, hedonistic tendencies, and a spiritual vacuum due to the absence
of proper guidance in morality. To fix the problems, the country needs to
revisit the traditional notion of using Tao to guide utensil, and rebalance
and coordinate the relationship between Tao and Utensil, which high-
lights the importance of renewing the philosophy and promoting moral
education accordingly.
288 Z. YOU ET AL.
Philosophical Significance for Today’s World

The revitalization of this philosophy of moral education, with its renewed
spirit and holistic perspective, is significant not just for promoting Chinese
moral education, but also for building a better world. The idea of integrat-
ing Tao with Utensil, for instance, gives insight into reconciling the con-
flicts between science and humanity in industrial and post-industrial
societies, which is much needed as the improvement of technology does
not necessarily guarantee a corresponding improvement in morality.
We argued that modern science and technology is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, it has greatly empowered people and improved
living conditions, but on the other, it has created massively destructive
weapons and cutting-edge technologies that could be used to jeopardize
human life and cause social and environmental problems if not properly
directed. Therefore, scientific discoveries and techniques (Utensil), with
their overwhelming power, should be guided by or be compatible with or
at least be reconciled with philosophy and other humanities (Tao), and be
moderated by moral values and education in these. This idea of integra-
tion is imperative because in so doing, the former could better serve
human purposes with direction, self-control, and responsibility, which
helps prevent the distortion and alienation of human nature due to the
excessive belief in scientism or consumerism.
In addition, the philosophy has abundant implications for easing the
tension between different peoples, and between man and nature in the
post-modern era. Through teaching the spirit of inclusion and rapport,
this philosophy can help decrease conflicts and facilitate coexistence among
different races, ethnicities, and religions. Teaching the Confucian doctrine
of the mean helps to nurture a much-needed way of thinking that high-
lights moderation, balance, and reasoning to dampen the radical views and
extremist ideologies that have been rampant in many parts of the current
world. Besides Confucian teachings, the philosophy of moral education in
Buddhism and Taoism can contribute to a more harmonious world as
well. The preaching of living peacefully with nature and the wisdom of
action-less activity in Taoism can alleviate people’s excessive urges to con-
quer nature, lending support to a harmonious and symbiotic relationship
between human beings and the world, body and mind. Teaching in
Buddhism also helps to reduce anxiety and concern arising from consum-
erism with its advocacy of eliminating excessive desires and the idea of
impermanence, which supplies people with the sobriety much needed
today to curb inordinate desires as war and conflict often originate from
insatiable greed and avarice.
Furthermore, the principles in the philosophy such as harmony, inter-
dependence, and benevolence provide important reference points for
dealing with international relationships, which could help ease the ten-
sions and promote collaboration among different countries. The unrest
and clashes in today’s world, we argue, often stem from conflicts of inter-
est, differing beliefs, and bigotry among different countries or groups of
people. The problem could be partly ascribed to the ways in which we deal
with it, inasmuch as solely relying on solutions such as contracts or tech-
nology may not be able to bind the wounds of division among peoples,
not to mention the worship of force, which could intensify the contradic-
tions. The emphasis on building up family-like close human relations
between different peoples, on the other hand, might be a better option or
at least a supplement. The ideas of harmony, good will, and reciprocity,
with their emphasis on affections rooted in human relations of reconcilia-
tion and mutual benefits, can help solve issues arising from insensitivity
and arrogance in a pure rule-based world through developing trust and
forming long-term collaborations among different countries.
The universal values of these moral education concepts can be better
understood by revisiting the connotations of the Chinese culture of family
and state, in which people have developed strong sentiments to both fam-
ily and state—psychologically, they tend to view the country as an enlarged
family and treat other people as family-like relations. The development
and transformation of this culture has implications for today’s world as
well, which was best showcased by the moral ideals proposed by Zhang
Zai, particularly his advocacy of pursuing the mission of opening up eter-
nal peace for the world. In view of this, the philosophy possesses special
value in our times as it can extend and transform people’s sentiment
toward family and the state into concern for the world, that is, into regard-
ing the world as an enlarged family as well, which enables the philosophy
to develop its core values such as benevolence, harmony, and inclusiveness
into universal values for promoting the peace and prosperity of today’s
world.
When discussing the implication of the philosophy of Chinese moral
education in the world, it is tempting to characterize its cultural tenden-
cies as collectivism and relatedness, which are in contrast with the main-
stream Western inclinations toward individualism and independence.
This dichotomy, however, may have oversimplified or stereotyped the
290 Z. YOU ET AL.
characteristics, meaning that it misses the full picture of both philoso-

phies. While Western thought also highlights the sense of interdepen-
dence, Chinese philosophy does include the idea of independence and
individuality. For instance, Taoist perspectives deviate from the main-
stream idea of collectivism through stressing independent evolution and
individual spiritual freedom, which is a manifestation of the diversity and
richness of this philosophy.
It is important to note that the revived philosophy should inherit and
further develop the tendency toward aesthetics in traditional Chinese phi-
losophy. Confucianism, for instance, emphasizes practicing rites and music
for moral education, which integrates moral education with artistic activi-
ties. Taoism and Buddhism also allow people to cultivate their morality
through immersing themselves in the realm of serenity and the peaceful-
ness of nature or by underscoring the inspiration and enlightenment of the
heart, which transforms moral cultivation into an aesthetic experience.
This unique philosophical characteristic could enrich the global culture of
moral education because in this way people can enhance and consummate
their morality through artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation.
The prospect of the regeneration of the philosophy of moral education
and its implications for the current world urges us to discuss something
more fundamental from a broad perspective: this philosophy, in effect, is a
set of peaceful philosophical frameworks and ideas with the aim of educat-
ing people and helping them to self-educate about the appropriate life
attitudes and ideal relations among people, which has become an integral
part of the perennial wisdom of human civilization. The essence and ulti-
mate purpose of the philosophy, with its devotion to the teaching of vir-
tues, is to pursue a state of balance and rapport between man and nature,
body and mind, human relations, and family and state by accommodating
competing interests, needs, and values.
Though not without limitations, the spirit of benevolence, inclusion,
and harmony in this philosophy is of particular significance in today’s
world. It is actually the product of the ancient Chinese people’s reflections
upon the sufferings occasioned by violent conflicts and turmoil through-
out history, which prompted them to eschew extreme opinions and radical
thought, and move toward a peaceful, balanced life of coexistence through
moderating human relations and promoting moral education. Realizing
this cultural characteristic helps us understand why avoiding the Thucydides
trap or reducing the clash of civilizations in the current world is possible
and imperative. In this sense, the philosophy in its renewed spirit, could
contribute to the ideal of sustainable development in the era of globaliza-

tion with its orientation toward interdependence and common
prosperity.
Note
1. Though general differences may exist between the two cultures, we should
be cautious not to stereotype either them or individual people.
References
Company.
Engels, F. (2010). The origin of the family, private property and the state. London:
Penguin UK.
Fang, C. (2013). The reconstruction of human relations: An essential route to the
renaissance of Chinese culture. Journal of Literature, History & Philosophy, 3,
83–93.
Gao, L. (1999). Probe into modernity. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.
Gong, Q. (2006). The moral and value orientation of Singapore. Journal of
Shanghai Normal University (Philosophy & Social Science), 3, 18–20.
Mou, Z. (2012). The need of absorbing Confucian elements in today’s educa-
tional reform. Confucius Studies, 6, 4–8.
37(1), 130–137.
Yang, Q. (1999). Traditional Chinese moral spirit and school moral education in
the 21st century. Educational Research, 12, 23–26.
Yi, L. (2005). Interpreting life meaning in traditional morality: Construction of
the moral system of “life and practice”. Journal of Educational Studies, 1(5),
63–67.
Yuan, H., & Zhang, Y. (2013). The May 4th Movement and the modernization
of Chinese traditional culture. Journal of Ninxia Party Institute, 15(6), 53–56.
Zhang, J. (1998). From negating the traditional culture to the booming of
Chinese studies (part I). Journal of Gansu Social Science, 1, 71–74.
References
Alitto, G. (1986). The last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese dilemma of
modernity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ban, G. (1975). Book of Han. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Ban, J. (2009). Adaptation and transcendence: Two dimensions in Cai Yuanpei’s
moral education thought. Modern University Education, 6, 82–86.
Bergson, H. (1911). Creative evolution. London: Macmillan & Co.
Cai, Y. (1984). Collections of Cai Yuanpei (Vols. 1–7). Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Cai, Y. (2008). Chinese people’s cultivation. Beijing: China Workers Publishing
House.
Chen, B. (1998). Review on Wang Fuzhi’s philosophical thought. Journal of
Fuzhou University (Social Science), 3, 62–64.
Chen, D. (1916). Constitution and Confucianism. New Youth, 2(3), 1–11.
Chen, D. (1984). Selections of Chen Duxiu’s articles. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing
Company.
Chen, D. (1987). Chen Duxiu’s collections. Hefei: Anhui People’s Press.
Chen, F. (1999). Collected works of Chen Fuliang. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University
Press.
Chen, F. (2013). The modern significance of philosophy in the Classic of Changes.
Studies of Zhouyi, 5, 85–93.
Chen, G., & Huang, Z. (1999). On the thought of moral education of Han Feizi.
Seeker, 1, 84–88.
Chen, S. (2002). Tao Xingzhi’s theory of moral education is in essence a life moral
education. Morality and Civilization, 4, 63–65.

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4
294 REFERENCES
Chen, S. (2008). Zhang Zidong’s writing about education. Beijing: People’s

Education Press.
Chen, S. (2016). Initial exploration of Chen Duxiu’s new education. Education
Chen, X. (2011). On Confucius and the teaching of rites: A review on new culture
movement and the cultural revolution. Journal of Hunan University, 25(6),
104–108.
Cheng, X., & Li, W. (2003). Transcending Mingjiao and following nature:
Exploration of Ji Kang’s ethics. Social Science Front, 2, 225–229.
Company.
Chu, H. (1985). Collection of literary works by Master Chu. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
Chu, H. (1989). Collections of works by the duke of culture, Chu Hsi. Shanghai:
Shanghai Ancient Works Publishing House.
Chu, H. (2002). Collective books of Chu Hsi. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works
Publishing House.
Chu, H., & Li, D. (1986). Categorized conversations of Chu Hsi. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
Chu, H., & Shu, Y. (1989). The book of changes—Xi Ci I. Shanghai: Shanghai
Ancient Books Publishing House.
Chuang Tzu. (2001). Chuang Tzu. In Q. Liu, & F. Cheng (ed. & trans.), Lao Tzu
and Chuang Tzu. Guangzhou: Guangzhou Publishing House.
Confucius. (1989). The analects of Confucius. In Y. Zhang (ed. & trans.),
Translation of the four books (pp. 60–253). Changsha: Hunan University Press.
Dai, M. (2004). The integrity of moral education and philosophy of moral educa-
tion. Journal of Jiangxi Normal University, 2, 111–117.
Dai, Z. (1980). The collections of Dai Zhen. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works
Publishing House.
De Mente, B. L. (2009). Bridging Cultural Barriers in China, Japan, Korea &
Mexico. Cultural-Insight Books.
de Ruyter, D. J., & Miedema, S. (2012). Introduction: A commitment to clarity
in philosophy of moral education. In D. J. de Ruyter & S. Miedema (Eds.),
Moral education and development (pp. 1–10). Dordrecht: Springer Science &
Business Media.
Dewey, J. (2013). Logic—The theory of inquiry. Worcestershire: Read Books Ltd.
REFERENCES
295
Dong, Z. (2014). The luxuriant dew of the Spring and Autumn annals. Beijing:
Engels, F. (2010). The origin of the family, private property and the state. London:
Penguin UK.
Fang, C. (2013). The reconstruction of human relations: An essential route to the
renaissance of Chinese culture. Journal of Literature, History & Philosophy, 3,
83–93.
Feng, G. (2002). Jiaobinlu kangyi. Shanghai: Shanghai Book Store.
Feng, Y. (2004). A concise history of Chinese philosophy. Beijing: New World Press.
Frankena, W. K. (1958). Toward a philosophy of moral education. Harvard
Educational Review, 28(4), 303–313.
Gamer, R. E. (2017). Preface. In Eds. R. E. Gamer and S.W. Toops. Understanding
contemporary China (5th ed.) (p. xi). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Gao, G. (2006). Reexamination of educational theory of Lu Jiuyuan’s sudden
enlightenment. Southeast Culture, 1, 62–66.
Gao, L. (1999). Probe into modernity. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.
Gao, L. (2016). Opposing Confucianism vs. respecting study of benevolence:
Perspectives of Confucianism by Chen Duxiu and Liang Shuming. Academic
Monthly, 48(4), 178–185.
Ge, G. (2011). Impacts of Taoism on Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy. Qunwen
Tiandi, 11, 213–213.
Ge, H., & Wang, M. (1985). Collation and connotation on the inner chapters of
Paopuzi. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Ge, H., & Yang, M. (1991). Collation on the outer chapters of Paopuzi. Beijing:
Ge, J. (1999). Mohismand swordsman: Impacts of Mohism on the Chinese cul-
ture. Journal of Xingyan Normal College, 1, 21–24.
Ge, Z. (2001). The history of Chinese thought (2nd version). Shanghai: Fudan
University Press.
Gong, K. (1996). On Zhang Zai’s moral education thought. Hebei Academic
Journal, 4, 46–50.
Gong, Q. (2006). The moral and value orientation of Singapore. Journal of
Shanghai Normal University (Philosophy & Social Science), 3, 18–20.
Gu, Y. (1983). Collected works of Tinglin. Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company.
Gu, Y. (1994). Commentaries on records of knowledge daily acquired. Changsha:
Yuelu Publishing House.
Guan, Z., & Li, S. (2009). Guan Tzu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Guang, X. (2013). Buddhist impact on Chinese culture. Asian Philosophy, 23(4),
305–322.
Guo, S. (2010). New interpretation on Hui-yuan’s karmic retribution. Journal of
Anhui Normal University (Liberal & Social Sciences), 38(5), 571–575.
Guo, X. (2011). Notes and commentaries on Chuang Tzu. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
296 REFERENCES

Han, F., & Wang, X. (1986). Collective annotations of Han Feizi. Shanghai:
Shanghai Book Store.
Han, Q. (1995). The reasons why Chinese science and technology fell behind in
the early modern time. Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 11, 9–14.
Han, Y. (2009). Initiative moral education model in higher education under the
influence of Confucianism. Journal of Heilongjiang College of Education, 28(7),
148–149.
Hsun Tzu. (1997). Hsun Tzu. Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press.
Hu, J. (2009). Chen Duxiu’s perspectives of Confucianism. Journal of Huazhong
University of Science and Technology (Social Sciences), 23(3), 37–44.
Hu, P., & Chen, M. (Eds.). (2012). The book of rites and the classic of Filial Piety.
Hu, S. (1997). Record of speech of Hu Shi. Shijiazhuang: Hebei People’s Press.
Huang, Z. (1985). Learning cases of Confucians in the Ming dynasty. Beijing:
Huang, Z. (1992). Complete works of Huang Zongxi. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient
Huang, Z., & Quan, Z. (1986). Scholarly annals of Song and Yuan period. Beijing:
Hui, N. (2010). The platform sutra of the sixth patriarch. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Hui, Y. (1991). On why monks should not bow down before kings. In H. Seng
(Ed.), Collections of hongming (p. 7). Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works
Publishing House.
Ji, K., & Dai, M. (1962). Annotation on the collected work of Ji Kang. Beijing:
People’s Literature Publishing House.
Jia, Y. (2000). Jia Yi’s new book. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Jiang, H., & Qian, Z. (1990). Translation of modern and ancient book of history.
Guiyan: Guizhou People’s Press.
Kang, Y. (1987). Annotations on Mencius, the golden mean, and Liyun. Beijing:
Ke, Y. (1993). Study on Confucius’ moral education. Journal of Huaqiao
University (Philosophy & Social Sciences), 2, 59–67.
Kohlberg, L. (1971). The philosophy of moral education. New York, NY: Harper &
Row.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages and the idea
of justice. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.
REFERENCES
297
Lai, K. L. (1995). Confucian moral thinking. Philosophy East and West, 45(2),
249–272.
Le, S. (1986). The transformation of the relationships between Confucianism and
Mingjiao. Journal of Anhui University (Philosophy & Social Sciences), 4, 12–17.
Li, G. (2000a). Ge Hong and his life philosophy. Journal of Literature, History &
Philosophy, 5, 108–114.
Li, H. (1962). Complete books of Li Wenzhong Gong. Taipei: Wen Hai Press.
Li, J. (1995). Exploration of Ji Kang’s educational ideas. Zhejiang Social Sciences,
2, 82–87.
Li, X. (2000b). The classic of changes in “commentaries and explanations to the thir-
teen classics”. Beijing Peking: Peking University Press.
Liang, Q. (1989). Collections from the Ice-Drinker’s Studio. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company.
Liang, S. (1950). Philosophy and culture east and west. Hong Kong: Pacific Book
Company Limited.
Liang, S. (1984). Human heart and human nature. Shanghai: Academia Press.
Liang, S. (1987). The essence of Chinese culture. Hong Kong: SDX Joint Publishing
Company.
Liu, C. (2002). Chen Duxiu’s reconstructing of national characteristics during the
New Culture Movement (unpublished doctoral dissertation). Hefei: Anhui
University.
Liu, J. (2007). Analysis on the scientific spirit in Confucius’ thoughts. Forum of
Social Sciences, 7, 20–22.
Liu, J. (2011). Philosophy of moral psychology of Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzi.
Social Science, 5, 126–133.
Liu, K. (1994). Commentary of Mingjiao and nature in Wei-Jing dynasties.
Confucius Studies, 2, 63–69.
Liu, L. (2006). Americanization of the Chinese teenagers and the abortion of the
study in the U.S.: Explorations of the reasons. Jiangshu Social Sciences, 5,
200–205.
Liu, M. (1998). An exploration on notes to Book of Changes (silk book version).
Taipei: Literature History and Philosophy Publishing House.
Liu, Y. (2009). New account of world tales. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Publishing United
Group Digital Media, Ltd.
Lu, J. (1980). The collection of Lu Jiuyuan. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Lu, L. (2014). Zhang Zhidong’s educational thought of “Chinese substance and
western utility” and its implications. Journal of Institute of Training Young
Managerial Personnel of Hebei, 26(2), 43–46.
Lv, X. (1996). An inquiry on the moral education method of Taoism. Morality
and Civilization, 5, 29–30.
298 REFERENCES
Ma, J. (2014). Exploration on Gu Yanwu’s thought of moral education. Lantai

World, 9, 140–141.
McClellan, B. E. (1999). Moral education in America: Schools and the shaping of
character from colonial times to the present. New York: Teachers College Press.
Mencius, & Yang, B. (1981). Annotations on Mencius. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
Mo, T. (2009). Translation of Mo Tzu. Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press.
Mou, Z. (2012). The need of absorbing Confucian elements in today’s educa-
tional reform. Confucius Studies, 6, 4–8.
Mu, G. (1995). A short comment on Wang Bi’s valuing nonbeing. Academic
Nan, H. (2007). Lectures of Nan Huaijin. Shanghai: Shanghai People Publishing
House.
Ouyang, W. (2013). The ontological framework and its influence on Gu Yangwu’s
philosophy. Social Sciences in Yunnan, 5, 39–43.
Pan, X. (2012). Understanding of Zhou Dunyi’s explanation of the diagram of the
Supreme Ultimate. Daguan Weekly, 35, 28–28.
Qi, Q. (1995). From Chinese substance and western triviality to Chinese sub-
stance and western utility. Social Sciences in China, 1, 186–198.
Qi, S. (1981). Collections of Chanjin. In Y. Ji (Ed.), Imperial collection of four
(Vol. 8). Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Works Publishing House.
Qi, S. (1983). Collections of Chanjin. In Da Zheng Zang (Vol. 52). Taipei: New
Wenfeng Publishing House.
Richey, J. (2005). Confucius. In Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from
www.iep.utm.edu/confuciu/
Rošker, J. (2014). Epistemology in Chinese philosophy. In The Stanford encyclope-
dia of philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-
epistemology/
Shao, X. (2006). From “Mingjiao originating from nature” to “Mingjiao is nature”
(doctoral dissertation). Shangdong Normal University.
Shen, H. (2010). An exploration of Mencius’ thought on moral education.
Education Exploration, 1, 10–11.
Shi, Q. (1982). Records of the grand historian. Beijing: Chung Hua Book CO.
Song, H. (1985). The forming and development of ancient traditional Chinese
geography. Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 3, 65–70.
Song, Z. (1990). The similarities and differences between the book of changes and its
commentaries. Changsha: Human Normal University Press.
REFERENCES
299
Su, Z. (1991). The thoughts of rites and music for moral cultivation of Lu Jia and
Jia Yi. Social Science Study, 5, 88–92.
Sun, X. (2015). Individualism and familism: Rethinking on the 100-year anniver-
sary of new culture movement. Fudan Journal, 4, 62–69.
Tan, S. (1981). Complete works of Tan Sitong. Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company.
Tang, K. (1988). A concise review on Wang Fuzhi’s moral education and moral
cultivation. Journal of Zhengzhou University (Philosophy and Social Science), 2,
62–66.
Tang, Q. (1995). An initial investigation on the thoughts of moral education of
Dong Zhongshu. Journal of College of Xichang, 1, 79–83.
Tao, X. (1984). Collections of Tao Xingzhi. Changsha: Hunan Education Press.
Tao, X. (1991). Selections of Tao Xingzhi’s works on education. Beijing: People’s
Education Press.
Wang, B. (1980). Proofreading and exposition of the collected work of Wang Bi.
Wang, B. (1985). A concise history of Chinese education. Beijing: Beijing Normal
University Press.
Wang, C. (1974). Lun heng. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press.
Wang, D. (1990). Commentary on Dong Zhongshu’s ideas of moral cultivation.
Journal of Zhengzhou University (Philosophy and Social Science Version), 2,
102–107.
Wang, F. (1976). Extended meaning of the book of history. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company.
House.
Wang, Q. (2011a). Moral education thoughts of Confucianism in the perspective
of the origins of music education. Modern University Education, 3, 89–93.
Wang, Q. (2015). Zhou Dunyi’s penetration of the three religions. Book, 7, 57–60.
Wang, T. (2002). Anthology of Tao Garden (Outer chapters). Shanghai: Century
Publishing.
Wang, X. (2007). Research on Huang Zongxi’s thought on educational psychology
(unpublished master’s thesis). Shanghai: Shanghai Normal University.
Wang, Y. (2011b). Collected works of Wang Yangming. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient
Wang, Z. (1994). An empirical study on the influence of philosophy on science
and technology: The reason of Chinese science and technology falling behind
in early modern era. Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities & Social
Sciences), 1, 42–47.
Wei, Y. (1998). The illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms. Changsha: Yuelu
Publishing House.
Wen, M., & Zhang, L. (2006). The rise and fall of a hundred of philosophical schools.
Beijing: China Environmental Science Publishing House.
300 REFERENCES
Wu, Z. (1999). Discussion on the traditional implications of moral self-cultivation

on nurturing modern personalities. Jiangsu Social Sciences, 1, 156–162.
Xu, S. (2004). Awareness of issues and proper arrangement of ideas in Gu Yanwu’s
philosophy. Philosophical Researches, 11, 39–43.
Xuan, J. (1990). Song of Tao of Yongjia. In J. Ren (Ed.), Sutra of Chinese dazang.
Xue, F. (1971). Complete works of Yongan. Taipei: Zhonghua Book Company.
37(1), 130–137.
Yan, F. (1986). Collected works of Yan Fu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Yan, G. (2003). A research on Wang Chong’s thoughts of educational psychology.
Psychological Exploration, 23(2), 5–11.
Yang, Q. (1999). Traditional Chinese moral spirit and school moral education in
the 21st century. Educational Research, 12, 23–26.
Yang, Y. (2010). Explanation of the ruling thoughts of Chinese feudal society.
Social Sciences in Nanjing, 12, 100–107.
Yang, Z. (2001). A comparison of the system of enfeoffment between the Western
Zhou and the Medieval Western Europe. Jianghan Forum, 5, 44–47.
Yang, Z. (2006). The mandate of heaven as the source of virtue: Religiosity of
Confucian morality. Social Sciences in China, 3, 39–49.
Ying, Y. (1964). Study of the social characteristics of Lu and Jin: Concurrently
discussing the historical contexts of the development of Confucianism and
Legalism. Historical Research, 1, 151–168.
Yi, L. (2005). Interpreting life meaning in traditional morality: Construction of
the moral system of “life and practice”. Journal of Educational Studies, 1(5),
63–67.
You, H. (2001). Study on the book of history. Changsha: Hunan Education
Publishing House.
You, H., Wang, C., Jia, Z., & You, Z. (2014). The full biography of the original
saint the Duke of Zhou. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House.
Yu, D. (1988). Guo Xiang’s time and the theme of study of Xuan. Confucius
Studies, 3, 21–32.
Yu, H. (2009). Five hundred years of Wang Yangming. Guiyang: Guizhou
Education Press.
Yu, K. (1996). Cheng Yi’s study of outer kingliness and serving the state. Confucius
Studies, 2, 38–49.
Yuan, H. (2002). Liang Han ji. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Yuan, H., & Zhang, Y. (2013). The May 4th Movement and the modernization
of Chinese traditional culture. Journal of Ninxia Party Institute, 15(6), 53–56.
Yum, J. O. (1988). The impact of Confucianism on interpersonal relationships and
communication patterns in East Asia. Communications Monographs, 55(4),
374–388.
REFERENCES
301
Zhang, J. (1998). From negating the traditional culture to the booming of
Chinese studies (part I). Journal of Gansu Social Science, 1, 71–74.
Zhang, J. (2001). The maverick of time: The modern implications of Wang
Chong’s educational ideas. Technology and the Management of Medium and
Small Enterprises, 25, 62–62.
Zhang, J. (2012). Translation and annotation of Hsun Tzu. Shanghai: Shanghai
Classics Publishing House.
Zhang, Q. (2008). The value sources of Tao Xingzhi’s educational thought.
Jiangsu Social Sciences, 3, 233–236.
Zhang, S. (1997). An investigation on the moral education thought of the legalist
school. Journal of Zhejiang Normal University, 5(2), 10–14.
Zhang, S. (2002a). On Liang Shuming’s philosophy of education. Journal of
Henan University (Educational Sciences), 18(3), 24–28.
Zhang, X. (1999, April 2). A brief discussion on the holism in traditional Chinese
culture. Guangming Daily, p. 7.
Zhang, Z. (1978). Collections of Zhang Zai. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
Zhang, Z. (2002b). On encourage learning. Wuhan: Hubei People’s Press.
Zhang, Z. (2004). From practical learning to Chinese substance and Western util-
ity: Zhang Zidong’s adaptation and confinement of the traditional
Confucianism. Confucius Studies, 4, 98–111.
Zhang, Z., & Zhao, D. (2008). Complete works of Zhang Zhidong. Wuhan: Wuhan
Publishing House.
Zhao, S. (1989). From Lu Jiuyuanto Wang Yangming: On the establishment of
the School of Mind. Confucius Study, 4, 84–92.
Zheng, G. (1982). Collections of Zheng Guanying. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s
Press.
Zhou, D. (1936). The collections of Zhou Lianxi. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient
Works Publishing House.
Zhou, Q. (2005). Review of Huang Zongxi’s perspective on cultivating talented
individuals. China Youth Study, 4, 41–43.
Zhou, X. (2007). Cultural and social implications of Liang Shuming’s educational
spirit. Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University (Social Sciences), 20(6),
10–13.
Zhu, H. (1995). On Wang Yangming’s moral education thought. Journal of
Hunan University, 2, 52–61.
Zhu, H. (2013). Analysis on the influence of study of Xuan on the theory of cal-
ligraphy in Wei-Jin dynasties. Beauty and Times, 7, 86–87.
Zhu, P. (2006). The construction of Chu Hsi’s philosophical ontology and its
implications of Li. Journal of Jiaying University, 5, 24–27.
Zisi. (1989). The doctrine of the mean. In Y. Zhang (ed. & trans.), Translation of
the four books (pp. 258–536). Changsha: Hunan University Press.
Index1
A Buddha nature, 73, 146, 180,

Abstinence, 169 182, 197
Actionless activity, 67, 68 Buddhism, 140–156
Aesthetics, 72, 263, 290 Buddhist sutras, 144, 147–148, 152
Agricultural civilization, 17, 279
Analects of Confucius, the, 48, 179, 205
Ascending, 90, 134, 139, 226 C
Cai Yuanpei, 247, 249, 259–264, 269
Caring relatives, 19
B Chan Buddhism, 73, 146, 147,
Balance, 39, 48, 70, 290 149–151
Benefiting each other, 79, 80 Chen Duxiu, 247, 249–255
Benevolence, 38–41, 289, 290 Cheng Brothers, the, 154, 164, 166,
Bergson, Henri, 254, 256 170, 175–177
Bertrand Russell, 248 Chen Liang, 61, 227, 228
Blood-ties, 18 Cheng Hao, 175, 179, 195
Bodhisattva, 148, 149, 152, 158n4 Cheng Yi, 175, 177, 178, 212
Book of Changes, the, 15, 21–24, 48, Chinese learning, 236, 239–241, 247
119, 166, 190n2, 222 Chinese national characters, 251
Book of History, the, 15, 24, 40, 46, Chinese Substance and Western
48, 183 Utility, 219, 234–241
Book of Rites, the, 15, 48, 179 Chuang Tzu, 66, 70–73
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56434-4
304 INDEX
Chu Hsi, 36, 154, 164, 166, 168, Descartes, René, 208
170, 180–189 Dewey, John, xi, 248, 264–266, 269
Clarifying Tao, 107 Dharma nature, 145, 158n2
Clash of civilizations, the, 2, 290 Differentiated love, 7, 52, 53, 80, 175,
Collaboration, 2, 278, 282, 289 276, 283
Collected Annotations on the Four Divinatory symbols, 22
Books, 188, 206–207 Doctrine of innate knowledge, the,
Collectivism, 17, 186, 251, 278, 209–211
281, 289 Doctrine of the Mean, The, 179, 201
Compassion, 138, 141, 149, 152 Dong Zhongshu, 22, 61, 79, 88, 90,
Complete Westernization, 256, 269 97, 101, 104, 105
Concept cluster, 41 Downfall of Confucianism, the, 269
Confession, vii, 149 Duke of Zhou, the, 15, 16, 21, 25–31
Conflicting beliefs, 288
Conflict-integration process, the, 157
Conflicts of interest, 277, 289 E
Confucian classics, 95, 106, 123, Eastern Han Dynasty, the, 112
124, 173 Eliminating desires, 7, 69, 138, 261
Confucianism, 3, 21, 26, 31, 31n1, Emperor Qin Shihuang, 87
31n2, 35, 36, 39, 40, 274, 290 Emperor Wen, 89, 90, 92, 95
Confucianism in appearance while Emperor Wu of Han, 88, 90
Legalism in nature, 79, 83n2 Epistemology, xvii, 3–5, 7, 224, 227,
Confucius, 4, 16, 21, 31, 36, 39, 40 265, 266, 274
Contention of a Hundred Schools of Equality, 78, 134, 143, 147, 284, 285
Thought, the, 9 Eradicate desires and preserve li, 183
Cross-cultural understanding, xii, 2 Era of globalization, 2
Cultivation of “qi”, the, 55 Eternal life, 83n1, 134, 135, 138
Cultivating morality to match the Ethics, xi, 2, 4, 37
mandate of heaven, 26, 37 Evolving nature, the, 256
Culture of family and state, x, 17, 18, Excessive desires, 55, 70, 172, 177,
27, 36, 48, 174, 282, 289 178, 183, 189, 275, 288
Exchange of interests, 277, 285
Extended family, 17, 281
D Extension of innate knowledge, the,
Dai, M., 3 206, 209–211, 213
Dai Zheng, 190 External elixir, 134, 137
Dao-an, 145 Extreme opinions, 290
Delusion, 141, 147, 148, 150 Extremes, 16, 39, 226
Democracy and science, 248, 251,
253–255
Deontology, 41 F
Dependent arising, 141, 145 Faithfulness, 7, 38, 40–42, 284
de Ruyter, D.J., 3 Family-roots sentiment, the, 17, 19
INDEX
305
Family-state continuum, 17, 18, 233 H

Feng Guifen, 235 Han Feizi, 74, 76–79, 104
Filial piety, 26, 28–31, 37, 38, 48, 50, Harmony, 39, 44, 45, 62, 289, 290
53, 153, 154, 284 Heart as li, the, 194, 196
Filial piety-faithfulness integration, 18 Heart of Tao, the, 16, 183, 195, 203
Five Constant Virtues, 105, 107, 108, Heart-to-heart transmission, 7, 16,
118, 176, 187, 248, 250 148, 150, 154, 181
Five Elements, the, 24, 100, 134, Heavenly principle, the, 4, 165,
166, 274 175, 176
Five Hegemonies, the, 98 Heng Xuan, 142–144
Five Precepts, the, 148, 155 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 248
Following nature, 57, 67, 69, 123, He Yan, 119, 121
125, 267, 274, 275 Hong-ren, 146, 147
Following the path of inquiry and Honoring moral nature, 201–204, 211
study, 201–204, 211 Honoring the person of virtue and
Form good customs, 29 vision, 19
Formidable Confucian scholars, 115 Hsun Tzu, 36, 50–61
Four Books, the, 179, 180, 188 Huang-Lao Taoism, 89
Frankena, W.K., 3 Huang Zongxi, 205, 220, 226–229
Fraternal duty, 43, 186, 258 Hui-neng, 146–153
From intelligence to sincerity, 173, 203 Hui-yuan, 142–146, 153
From sincerity to intelligence, 173, 203 Human heart, the, 16, 183, 203
Frugality, 79 Human nature, 16, 23, 38, 51, 56, 58
Human relations, 7, 8, 17, 18, 285,
286, 289, 290
G Humble, 22, 27, 44, 69, 114, 233
Gautama, Siddhār tha, 140, 155 Hundred Days’ Reform, the, 234,
Ge Hong, 135–139 242, 249
Getting rid of evils and promoting
goodness, 133
Giving up “wisdom”, 70 I
Goodness, 148, 149 Idealistic school, the, 50
Goose Lake Meeting, the, 201, 206 Immortality, 134–139, 156, 165, 189
Governance by rites, 45 Inactivity, 67, 69, 83, 89, 288
Grand Tutor, the, 90 Inclusion, xix, 288, 290
Grand unification, 7, 18, 27, 57, 88 Independence, 3, 48–49, 250, 251,
Great Learning, the, 179, 188 253, 278, 279, 281, 285, 289
Great Vacuity, the, 170, 171, 174 Independent evolvement, the, 128
Guanxi, 7, 18, 285 Individuality, 205, 250, 278, 279,
Guan Zhong, 74–76, 126, 224 281, 290
Guo Xiang, 119, 127–129 Inferior man, the, 31n3, 43, 44
Gu Yanwu, 220, 230–233 Initiative and autonomy, 200
306 INDEX
Inner sageliness, 210, 220, 276 L

Insatiable greed, 69, 177, 184, 279, Lao Tzu, 38, 66, 67
286, 289 Legalism, 6, 35, 50, 56, 59
Integration of teaching, learning, and Liang Qichao, 240, 241, 243n3
doing, 266 Liang Shuming, 158n1, 248, 254–259
Integration of the three teachings, Life as education, 264, 266
142, 157 Life education theory, 267–268
Interaction between heaven and man, Li Hongzhang, 234, 235, 238
7, 92, 97, 99, 119, 208, 274 Liu Ban, 88, 117
Interdependence, 7, 17, 251, 277, Lofty aspirations, 225
278, 289–291 Loyalty, 77
Internal elixir, 134, 137 Lu Jia, 88
Interpenetration, 241, 242 Lu Jiuling, 194, 201, 205
Investigating the world to learn the Lu Jiuyuan, 154, 165, 168, 180,
heavenly principle, 176 193–200
Isomorphic correlation between Lu Xun, 247
heaven and humans, 99 Lu Zuqian, 201
Isomorphism between family and state,
the, 17, 276
Ito Hirobumi, 215 M
Mandate of heaven, the, 20, 23, 25,
26, 30, 99
J Mao Zedong, 221
Jian Shi, 81 Marriage of politics and
Jia Yi, 90–97, 99, 101 education, the, 7
Ji Kang, 119, 122–126 Mass Education Movement, the, 264
Jizi, 15, 21, 22, 24–25, 92, 100 Meditation, xi, 7, 135, 151, 152,
180, 220
Meiji Restoration, 215
K Mencius, 4, 16, 19, 30, 36, 40, 50–61
Kang Youwei, 240, 241, 248 Metaphysics, 2–5, 9, 37, 72
Kant, Immanuel, 260 Miedema, S., 3
Karma, 135, 138, 140–142, 145, 146, Mingjiao, 128–130, 137, 143, 206
148, 156, 157, 189 Moderation, 39, 288
Karmic law of cause and effect, the, 141 Mohism, 6, 35, 56, 65, 71, 79
Karmic retribution, 7, 133, 139, 141, Monism, 170, 221, 222
142, 145, 156, 157, 274 Monroe, Paul, 248, 264
Kilpatrick, William H., 264 Moral cultivation, xi, 1–6, 15
Kingly Way, the, 24, 25 Moral customs, 24, 26, 30, 38, 93,
King Tang of the Shang Dynasty, 92 181, 232, 287
King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty, 92 Moral decline, 280, 287
King Yu, 16 Moral principle, 23, 25, 28
Kohlberg, L., 3 Moral self-cultivation, 46–47
INDEX
307
Moral sentiment, 28, 172, 173, 184 Q

Mo Tzu, 53, 79–82, 114, 265 Qi (chi), 7
My heart is the universe, 195 Qin Dynasty, the, 87
Qing Dynasty, the, 10, 190, 219,
234, 259
N Qi-song, 153–156
Nature versus nurture, 203 Quietness, 168, 169, 173, 174,
Neo-Confucianism, 9, 61, 158, 164, 180, 199
165, 193
New Confucianism, 254, 256, 258,
259, 270n3 R
New Culture Movement, the, 247 Radical ideas, 290
Nirvana, 140, 141, 151, 165, 171 Radical views, the, 288
Nonbeing, 119, 120, 127, 145, 170 Realistic school, the, 50
Non-Ultimate, the, 66, 67, 158, Realm of Xuan, the, 128
164–166, 169, 170, Reciprocity, 7, 38, 41, 42, 48, 142,
181, 190n2 276, 281, 283, 289
Noumenal world, the, 260, 261, 263 Regulations of the White Dear Grotto
Nourishment of “the heart”, the, 55 Academy, the, 187
Reincarnation, 140, 141, 147, 149,
155, 156
O Relatedness, 48, 289
Ontological legitimacy, 120 Religious Taoism, 73, 133–139
Ontology, 4, 119, 120, 140 Righteousness, 18, 21, 26, 29, 30, 38,
Original heart, the, 72, 83, 194, 40, 41
196–198, 202 Righteousness vs. gain, 7
Original Sage, the, 31 Rites, 7, 18, 21, 28, 29, 37, 51, 59,
Outer kingliness, 210, 220, 231, 276 228
Rites and music, 18, 27–29, 31, 37,
38, 44, 46, 284, 290
P Rule by inactivity, 91, 125
Paragon of virtue, 31, 71, 267 Rule by law, 59, 74, 76, 77, 92, 279,
Patriarchal clan society, the, 17, 19 281, 285
Patriotism, 220, 277 Rule by morality, 4, 7, 25, 26, 31, 36
Phenomenal world, the, 260, Rural education, 258, 264
261, 263
Policy of benevolence, 51, 53
Practical learning, 175, 220, 226 S
Practical learning for serving the Sages, the, 71, 101, 117, 120, 121, 123
country, 219, 230 Saigo Takamori, 215
Pragmatist, xi, 60, 79, 81, 112 Scholar-officials, 174, 220, 225,
Principle of sublation, the, 283 232, 233
308 INDEX
School of Mind, the, 9, 61, 158, 163, Superior men, the, 21, 22, 24, 38, 43,
165, 168 70, 199
School of Principle, the, 9, 61, Supreme Ultimate, the, 7, 21, 22,
158, 164 164, 166, 167, 169, 177, 181,
Self-discipline, 106, 168, 215, 278 185, 189, 190n2, 261
Self-reflection, 18, 26, 46, 47, 54, 55, Sudden-awakening, 148
106, 130, 210 Sudden enlightenment, 147, 152,
Self-restraint in privacy, 60 158, 196–199, 207, 210, 215,
Self-Strengthening Movement, 224
235, 236, 238, 239, 242, Superior morality, 67, 68
243n1, 243n4
Sense of shame, the, 30, 38, 213, 220,
224, 253, 267 T
Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove, Tan Sitong, 221, 240, 241
The, 122 Tao, 16, 23, 66, 72
Shang Dynasty, the, 15, 19, 21, Tao and Utensil, 7, 23, 31n4, 32n5,
30, 77, 93 176, 222, 235, 239, 241, 287
Shen-xiu, 146, 147, 151 Taoism, 65–73, 82, 83, 83n1
Sinicization, 140, 142, 153, 156 Tao Te Ching, 67, 190n2
Sit in oblivion, 72 Tao Xingzhi, 248, 264–269
Six Classics, the, 196, 200, 202, 204, Teaching of rites, the, 45, 118,
221, 231, 241 121–123, 127, 249, 251, 254,
Social hierarchy, 28, 43, 46, 50, 59, 61 257
Social order, xvi, xvii, 1, 3, 18, 28 Ten Good Deeds, 148, 149
Social responsibility, 48, 171, 276, 277 Thief Zhi, The, 71
Society as school, 264, 266 Theory of divination, 113, 119
Socratic Method, the, 150 Theory of life education, 264, 266
Solemnizing rites and valuing laws, Three Cardinal Guides, 100, 104,
56, 59 105, 107, 108, 118, 187, 237,
Song Dynasties, the, 154, 164, 168, 248, 250, 254, 255, 279
170, 206 Three grades of human nature,
Sovereign, the, 41, 43, 45 101–102
Spring and Autumn Period, the, 35 Three teachings, 157, 166
State ideology, 35, 96–98, 107, 124 Thucydides trap, the, 290
Strengthening imperial power, 89, 99 True Men, 71, 267, 268
Study of benevolence, the, 255
Study of Xuan, the, 117–129
Substance and Utility, 7, 23, 32n5, U
47, 222, 235, 236, 239, 240, Ultimate liberation, the, 169
251, 275 Unity of action and knowing, 7
Substance of the universe, the, Unity of Five Types of Education, the,
145, 168, 175–176 260, 262, 269
INDEX
309
Unity of Knowing and Acting, Win-Jin Style, 130

211–212 Wordless teaching, 38, 68, 121
Universal love, 3, 50, 52, 53, 71, 79, World peace, the, 276
80, 82, 175
Utilitarianism, 71, 78
X
Xiang Xiu, 119, 127, 129
V Xiaozhuang Normal School, 264
Valuing aspiration, 107
Void quietness, 173, 174
Y
Yan Hui, 121, 179
W Yellow Emperor, 89
Wang Bi, 119–122, 125, 127, 145 Ye Shi, 61
Wang Chong, 111–118, 129 Yin-Yang, 91, 97, 100, 104
Wang Fuzhi, 3, 220–226 Yongjia Utilitarian School, the, 227
Wang Tao, 240
Wang Yangming, 4, 47, 165, 170,
193, 194, 206–215 Z
Warring States Period, the, 35, 51, 65, Zeng Guofan, 235
74, 79 Zengzi, 47
Wei-Jin Dynasties, the, 117 Zhang Shusheng, 240
Wei Yuan, 235 Zhang Zai, v, 164, 170–175
Western Han Dynasty, the, 49, 96, 111 Zhang Zhidong, 235–239
Western ideologies, 237, 240, 247, Zheng Guanying, 239, 240
249, 251 Zhou Dunyi, 22, 164, 166–170,
Western learning, 235, 236, 239–241, 172, 173
253, 258 Zhou Dynasty, the, 19, 27, 93
Western Substance, 239, 251 Zisi, 47, 201, 203, 204, 215n2, 267

Zhuran You - A G Rud - Yingzi Hu - The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education - A History-Palgrave MacMillan (2018)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Zhuran You - A G Rud - Yingzi Hu - The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education - A History-Palgrave MacMillan (2018)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Philosophy

Zhuran You, A.G. Rud, and Yingzi Hu

ISBN 978-1-137-56433-7 ISBN 978-1-137-56434-4 (eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover image © IMAGEMORE Co, Ltd./ gettyimages

Printed on acid-free paper

My purpose in this foreword is to provide a broad context for English-

A useful set of essays for university undergraduates begins with this

China is about superlatives. It has the largest population, the fastest-grow-

The several issues in this significant sub-theme require discussion. First, in

As a transition to the text, the book’s introduction offers an initial synthe-

political moment in Chinese history and a corresponding philosophy of

The book was sponsored by the Professor’s Starting Grant of Shaoxing

1 Introduction of the Philosophy and the Book 1

Part I The Conceptual Origin and the First Flowering 13

2 The Heart of Tao Is Subtle: The Emergence

3 High Mountains of Admiration: The Philosophy of Moral

4 The Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought:

Part II The Era of Conflict, Adaptation, and Integration 85

5 Confucianism’s Ascent to State Orthodoxy:

6 Farewell to Migrating Geese: The Philosophy of Moral

Guo Xiang’s Philosophy of Moral Education 127

7 Promoting Morality for Ultimate Liberation:

Part III The Era of Full Development and Transformation 161

8 Flying Dragons in the Sky: The Philosophy of Moral

Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Moral Education 170

9 My Heart Is the Universe: The Philosophy of Moral

Part IV The Era of Crises, Learning, and Regeneration 217

10 From Practical Learning to Chinese Substance

11 When East Met West: The Philosophy of Moral Education

Liang Shuming’s Philosophy of Moral Education 254

12 The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education

Introduction of the Philosophy and the Book

© The Author(s) 2018 1

Why the Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education?

literature. Frankena (1958) and Kohlberg (1971, 1981) wrote articles or

cosmological frameworks and ontological concepts about the substance

philosophy was not confined to academic discussions about ethical issues

What Is Included? And Why Is It Important?

Specifically, the book examines cosmological and ontological concepts

What Are the Ground Rules and Structure

To sum up, the book is designed to incorporate and integrate knowledge

In order to distinguish this philosophy from others, ground rules are

6. Guanxi refers to connections in the personalized social networks of influ-

The Conceptual Origin and the First

The Heart of Tao Is Subtle: The Emergence

To many, the first emergence of the philosophy of moral education in

© The Author(s) 2018 15

heart-to-heart transmission of the essence of Chinese culture. It states:

The Background of Chinese Moral Education

psychological patterns. For this purpose, we propose the concept of the

Based on these ideas, we propose that there is a culture of family and

From a deeper perspective, the essence of the philosophy was to recon-

Political Background: The Dynasty Transition

Philosophy of Moral Education at the Beginning

As noted above, the early philosophy of moral education was mostly a

Philosophy of Moral Education in The Book of Changes

Another important concept rich in implications for moral education in

of subsequent generations to strive for moral self-cultivation through

Jizi’s Philosophy of Moral Education

tion”, which had profound moral connotations. To Jizi, the mandate of

The Duke of Zhou’s Philosophy of Moral Education

Moral Self-Cultivation for Moral Governance From his experience of the

1 Introduction of the Philosophy and the Book 1

Part I The Conceptual Origin and the First Flowering 13

2 The Heart of Tao Is Subtle: The Emergence

3 High Mountains of Admiration: The Philosophy of Moral

4 The Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought:

Part II The Era of Conflict, Adaptation, and Integration 85

5 Confucianism’s Ascent to State Orthodoxy:

6 Farewell to Migrating Geese: The Philosophy of Moral

Guo Xiang’s Philosophy of Moral Education 127

7 Promoting Morality for Ultimate Liberation:

Part III The Era of Full Development and Transformation 161

8 Flying Dragons in the Sky: The Philosophy of Moral

Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Moral Education 170

9 My Heart Is the Universe: The Philosophy of Moral

Part IV The Era of Crises, Learning, and Regeneration 217

10 From Practical Learning to Chinese Substance

11 When East Met West: The Philosophy of Moral Education

Liang Shuming’s Philosophy of Moral Education 254

12 The Philosophy of Chinese Moral Education

urposes. The success of Confucianism, however, had more to do with its

uman Nature for Moral Cultivation

pproaches to Cultivating the Superior Man

n Heaven’s Role in Moral Education

erspectives on Righteousness Versus Personal Gain

he Ways of Moral Education