Saving in Primitive Economies

Author(s): Carl E. Walsh

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 643-649
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
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 RESEAR CH REPORTS 643

Raven-Hart, R. tion, Department of Anthropology, Uni-

1962 The Beater and Anvil Technique in versity of Michigan.
Pottery Making. Man LXIII:81-83. Stone, D.
Reina, R. E., and R. M. Hill, II 1951 Notes on Present-Day Pottery-Making
1978 The Traditional Pottery of Guate- and Its Economy in the Ancient Chorote-
mala. Austin: University of Texas Press. (v) gan Area. Middle American Research
Rendon, Sylvaia Records 1:269-280.

1951 Modern Pottery of Rio Tenco San Thompson, R. H.

Lorenzo, Cuauhtitlan. Middle American
Research Records 1:251-268.
Rogers, M. J.
1936 Yuman Pottery Makers. San Diego
Museum Papers 2. (w)
Roth, K.
1935 Pottery Making in Fiji. Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute 65:
217-234. (x)
Rye, Owen S.
1976 Keeping Your Temper Under Control:
1958 Modern Yucatecan Pottery Making.
Memoirs of the Society for American Ar-
chaeology 15. (y)
Tufnell, Olga
1961 "These Were the Potters.. ." Note
on the Craft in Southern Arabia. Annual
of the Leeds University Oriental Society II:
26-36. (z)
Voigt, Mary M.
1976 Hajji Firuz Tepe: An Economic Re-
construction of a Sixth Millennium Com-

Materials and the Manufacture of Papuan munity of Western Iran. Ph.D. disserta-
Pottery. Archaeology and Physical Anthro- tion, Department of Anthropology, Uni-
pology of Oceania 11:106-137. versity of Pennsylvania.
1981 Pottery Technology. Taraxacum Waldeman, M.
Manuals in Archaeology, Vol. 4. Wash- 1972 Yoruba Pottery Making Techniques.
ington, D.C.: Taraxacum. Baessler-Archiv.: Beitrage zur Volker-
Smith, Marion F., Jr. kunde 20:313-346.

1980 Archaeological Ceramics as Vessels: Watson, V.

Relating Morphology to Utilitarian Func- 1955 Pottery in the Eastern Highlands of
tion. Paper presented at the annual meet- New Guinea. Southwestern Journal of An-
ing of the Society for American Archaeol- thropology 11:121-128.
ogy, Philadelphia. Young, T. Cuyler, Jr.
1981 Vessel and Sherd Morphology as Indi- 1969 Excavations at Godin Tepe: First
cators of Cultural Use. Paper presented at Progress Report. Royal Ontario Museum
the annual meeting of the Society for Art and Archaeology Occasional Paper 17.
American Archaeology, San Diego. Toronto.

n.d. Toward an Economic Interpretation of Young, T. Cuyler, Jr., and Louis D. Levine
Ceramics: Relating Vessel Size and Shape 1974 Excavations of the Godin Project:
to Use. Manuscript submitted for publica- Second Progress Report. Royal Ontario
tion in Measurement and Explanation of Museum Art and Archaeology Occasional
Ceramic Variation: Some Current Ex- Paper 26. Toronto.
amples. B. A. Nelson, ed. Book in
preparation.
Solheim, W. G.
1965 The Functions of Pottery in Southeast
Asia: From the Present to the Past. In Saving in Primitive Economies
Ceramics and Man. F. R. Matson, ed. pp.
254-273. Chicago: Aldine. CARL E. WALSH
Stanislawski, M. B., and B. B. Stanislawski Department of Economics
1978 Hopi and Hopi-Tewa Ceramic Tradi- Princeton University
tion Networks. In The Spatial Organiza- Princeton, NewJersey
tion of Culture. Ian Hodder, ed. pp.
61-76. London: Duckworth. 1. INTRODUCTION
Steponaitis, Vincas
1980 Ceramics, Chronology, and Commu-
The purpose of this paper is to examine
nity Patterns at Moundville, A Late Pre-
issues relevant to the study of saving behav
historic Site in Alabama. Ph.D. disserta- primitive economies. A framework of anal

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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 644 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [85, 1983]

used which economists have found

preferences helpful
in this model). One in
could assume
studying questions concerning that eachthe allocation
generation of
lives for some arbitrary,
resources both over time and between members possible large, number of periods, but all the
of different generations. Emphasis is placedessential
on elements of the model can be captured
the overlapping nature of all societies' genera-
by assuming that each generation lives for just
tional structure: a given individual will normal-
three periods. Assume that generation t is of size
(1 + n)t where n is the rate of population
ly have contact during his or her lifetime with
some individuals who were born earlier and will growth.
die before the given individual does and with Throughout, this paper will deal with a pure
other individuals who have not yet been born exchange model; that is, no production occurs.
and who will die after the given individual does.
This allows one to focus on the problem of ex-
This overlapping structure was first analyzedchange
in between generations. Each generation
an economic model by Samuelson (1958), who does, however, receive an endowment of the
showed that such a structure creates economic single good in the economy (food).3 Initially it
allocation problems which have important im- will be assumed that output is completely
plications for the economic organization of perishable;
any no technology for storage is avail-
society. The usefulness of Samuelson's frame- able to the economy. It seems reasonable to
work is that it isolates and focuses on one assume that each generation's income (endow-
characteristic, overlapping generations, which
ment) would be small when young, highest
is common to all societies, be they market, when middle-aged, and lower again when old,
non-
market, primitive, or industrial.' reflecting an individual's productive capabilities
The basic model is set out in section 2 of this over a lifetime. For simplicity, assume then that
study while various ways in which a society can the lifetime endowment is the same for all in-
distribute goods between different generations dividuals (both within and across generations),
are compared in section 3. These range from and that it is equal to (0, 1, 0). That is, each in-
markets and money to mats and clubs. Storagedividual receives one unit of food when middle-
and aggregate savings are considered in section aged, nothing when young or old. Aggregate in-
4, and conclusions are summarized in section 5. come for the economy in period t is therefore
equal to (1 + n)t- 1, the number of middle-
2. THE OVERLAPPING aged individuals.
GENERATIONS MODEL2 Only stationary states will be considered. A
stationary state is an allocation which redupli-
The basic economic problem thatcates arises ingeneration after generation. Along a
itself
the overlapping generations model can be sum-
stationary path, each generation receives the
marized as follows. Consider a member of the same lifetime consumption stream. Such con-
generation born at time t, for example, sumption
in- streams are assumed to be ranked by a
preference function which is taken to be the
dividual i. While i is in his or her most produc-
tive years, there will be other individuals, same for all generations. The lifetime consump-
members of older generations, who are now tion
less stream of an individual can be written as c
productive and who would like to use some=of (c1, c2, c3) where ci is consumption in the ith
what i produces in order to maintain their own
period of the individual's life.
consumption levels. Individual i might like toThe economy as a whole faces a budget con-
lend some of what he or she produces, to straint;
be total consumption in period t cannot ex-
paid back when i is older and less productive,
ceed total output for that period. This con-
straint can be written as (1 + n)tc1 + (1 +
but the older generation wishing to borrow will
n)t-lc2 + (1 + n)t -2c3 (1 + n)t or,
not be alive to repay i when i is older. The flow
dividing by (1 + n) -
of time is thus important in studying what, for
the society, is a problem of allocating output
(1 + n)c1 + c2 + c3/(1 + n) < 1. (1)
between generations. The rest of this section is
devoted to setting up an explicit model to study
Equation (1) is the aggregate budget constraint
this allocation problem and defining what will
for the economy. An allocation (cl, c2, c3) is
be called an optimal allocation. defined as feasible if it satisfies (1). It is defined
Suppose that each period a new generationasisefficient if it satisfies (1) with equality. Effi-
born. Individuals born at time t will be referred cient distribution schemes are allocations in
to as generation t, and are assumed to be iden- which all output is consumed.
tical in all relevant respects (endowments and The only economic problem found in thi

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 RESEARCH REPORTS 645

economy is one of 3. DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES

distribution. How
+ n)t - 1 units of output received
by the middle-aged during period t be Primitive economies are largely nonm
distributed among the three living generations? economies, but it will be instructive to fir
Since individuals have preferences over con- sider the possibility of a market arrangem
sumption paths, some allocations will be pre- allocating food between generations.
ferred to others. Can an optimal allocation, one case, output is distributed among gene
preferred by all generations, be defined? One through a market for one period loans.4 T
way to answer this question is to think of a fic- mand for loans (i.e., borrowing) arises f
titious "social planner" (or all members of the young generation. The old are preclude
society brought together in a Rawlsian original borrowing in a market system since the
state) equipped with information on individual be unable to repay their loans; they di
preferences and the economy's budget con- end of the current period. Market equil
straint. Such a social planner would try to find requires that the demand and supply of
the feasible allocation that maximized the utili- equal. The interest rate adjusts to achieve
ty of a representative member of the society in equilibrium
a and aggregate savings (the savings
stationary equilibrium. Such an allocation can of the middle-aged minus the dissaving of the
be found by choosing the most preferred con- young) equals zero.
sumption stream, subject to the feasibility con- Since there is nothing to ensure that the
dition given by equation (1). The solution to equilibrium interest rate, say r', equals n,5 a
this maximization problem, denoted c* = (c?, market system will lead to the optimal consump-
c , cs), will be called the optimal distribution.tion path c* only by chance. If r' > n, an in-
Note that c* defines both a distribution of con- terest rate equal to n results in an excess de-
sumption over each individual's lifetime (cf mand for loans; if r' < n, an interest rate equal
when young, c? when middle-aged, cA when to n leads to an excess supply of loans. The
old) and a distribution of output across genera- market allocation is, therefore, not generally
tions (each member of the middle-aged genera- optimal.
tion gives (1 + n) cf to the young generationIt may be useful to briefly spell out why the
and cg/(1 + n) to the old generation, keepingrate 1 of population growth should be related to
- (1 + n) cf -c*/(1 + n) = c for himself the or rate of interest. Suppose that somehow
herself). members of the current middle-aged generation
It will also be useful to consider the hypothet- are each convinced to give x units of output to
ical case of an individual consumer facing an in- the current old generation.6 In return, the
terest rate r on his or her saving. Such an in- middle-aged generation is told that, when they
dividual faces a lifetime budget constraint are old, they will be given output by the then
which can be written as
middle-aged (the current young) generation.
c1 + c2/(1 + r) + c3/(1 + r)2 < 1/(1 +Since
r)or there will then be more middle-aged in-
dividuals ([1 + n] more), each member of the
(1 + r)c1 + c21 + c3 < 1. (2)
+r I + 1. (2) current middle-aged generation will receive (1
Comparing (1) and (2) reveals +that n)x unitssuch an
of output whenin-
he or she is old. The
dividual will choose c *, the societalrate of return
optimal on thiscon-
transaction is just [(1 +
sumption path, if the interest n)x
rate- x]/x = n; hence
equals n, the
theterm "biological
rate of population growth and
rate ofSamuelson's
interest."
biological rate of interest (Samuelson
If r' < n,1958).
then the market equilibrium in-
Since both the young and oldterest
receive nolow.7
rate is too en-Society is able to transfer
dowment, any allocation will involve
resourcestaking
over timeout-
at a rate of return equal to n
(despiteof
put from those in the second period thetheir
lack oflife
a technology for storing
food),first
and transferring it to those in the but individuals
and last are faced with a rate of
transformation
periods of their lives. In the next section, of only r' < n. At an interest
alter-
native social schemes for carrying out
rate equal to suchis an excess supply of
n, there
redistributions will be examined.loans;
An members of the middle-aged generation
interesting
question is to consider whether or like
would not alterna-
to save more for their old age but the
tive distribution schemes allow the
only wayeconomy
they can do so toin a market economy is
achieve the optimal allocation c*by increasing
by, either their im-
loans to the young and the
plicitly or explicitly, offering young do not wish
individuals a to
rateborrow. The old genera-
of interest equal to n. tion would certainly accept food loans but such

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646 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [85, 1983]

loans, because they cannot be repaid,

generation will
is willing not
to give up a little consump
be made in a market economy. tion whenA nonoptimal
middle-aged in return for a little b
allocation results. more (1 + n more) when old. The old are essen
One way to demonstrate an allocation's non-
tially borrowing from the middle-aged. The
optimality is by showing that there exists a feasi-
never pay this debt off themselves; it is paid of
ble reallocation which makes all generations by future generations. This suggests that soci
better off (i.e., increases everyone's utility).institutions
At which allow the current members of
r', suppose the distribution of consumption
a society to implicitly transact with future
members of the society may allow the optimal
across generations is (cl, c2, c3). Suppose every
period each member of the middle-aged gen- distribution of output across generations to be
eration is asked to give up a small amount, achieved."
x
units, of food in return for (1 + n)x units of ad-
One such social institution might be clubs or
ditional food to be received when they are old.
cult groups in which new membership fees are
The x units each middle-aged individual gives
distributed to existing members. Suppose the
up can be used to give (1 + n)x units of output
old generation forms a club, charging the
to each of the members of the current old
middle-aged a fee, say p, to join. The middle-
generation. This is illustrated in Figure aged
1. Such
are willing to join since they will, when
a transfer is feasible (i.e., it does not lead to a the proceeds from the membership
old, receive
violation of the aggregate budget constraint
fees of[1])
the generation after them. During period
and results in a new lifetime consumption path from new membership fees will be (1
t, receipts
for each individual of (cl, c2 - x, c3 ++ (1n)t +1-p (t -1 since it is the middle-aged
n)x). Since at (c1, c2, c3) the marginal generation
rate of that joins). These new members will,
substitution between c2 and c3 is (1 +inr') the<following
(1 period, divide the revenue from
new membership fees; each will receive (1 +
+ n),8 all individuals prefer the new consump-
tion path to the old one. Therefore, n)tp/(l
the old + n)t - = (1 + n)p. Hence, belong-
allocation was not optimal. Each succeeding
ing to such a club yields its members a rate of

Periods

t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5

t-1 C1 C2 C3+(l+n)x

t C1 C2-x C3+(1+n)x

t+1 C1 C2-x C3+(1+n)x

S t+2 C1 C2-x C3+(1+n)x

t+3 C1 C2-x C3+(l+n)x

t+4 C1 C2-x C3+(1+n)x

t+5 C1 C2-x C3+(l+n)x

Figure 1. Borrowing from t

c2, c3); its posttransfer c
transfers. (Adapted from

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 RESEARCH REPORTS 647

return of n, the biological store output if mrate of

is less than interes
n. A society with
their investment. Such institutions therefore positive population growth and in which stored
allow the optimal distribution of output to be goods depreciate from spoilage (m < 0) should
achieved. As long as each generation expects not store output. Zero storage, then, cannot be
succeeding generations to be willing to join, taken to infer the absence of a storage technol-
clubs implicitly allow trades to be made with ogy.
future generations. Douglas (1963) documents The inefficiency of storage is a reflection of
the existence of such clubs among the Lele.1o the fact that society can already transfer goods
An alternative method of organizing the over time at the rate n. Society essentially
transfer of output from the middle-aged to the throws away output if it uses the less efficient
old is to give the old some item (it need not be storage technology. Suppose that at time t
material) which the old can trade to the middle- generation t - 1 stores some output for use at
aged in return for food. Firth, for example, time t + 1. At t + 1 it consumes the goods it
speaks of the ritual knowledge passed from has stored, but simultaneously generation t is
father to son among the Tikopia (1965:104)." storing goods for its consumption at t + 2. The
Such knowledge is valuable, and the middle- economy carries along a positive amount of
aged generation will be willing to provide out- stored output, but this represents output that is
put to the old in order to maintain the know- never consumed. Consumption could be in-
ledge which has been invested (by previous creased at time t without being reduced at any
generations) in the current old generation. The future time.
return to such knowledge is just n since each This analysis does help to explain why
generation is supported by a larger generation societies do store even when m < n. One can in-
than it earlier had to support. terpret the no storage result as saying that in a
Valuables can also be material. The only re- world of certainty, a growing population in a
quirement is that the item be demanded by the stationary state will not store output if m < n.
middle-aged, either because of its intrinsic This suggests that uncertainty plays a key role in
value or because the middle-aged generation explaining any observed storage of output. For
expects it to be demanded by the generations example, suppose that the endowment received
that follow them. Such items, be they mats, raf- by the middle-aged generation is random. Risk-
fia cloth, or shell necklaces, are often described averse behavior would lead generally to some
as primitive money. storage even if, on average (in expected value),
These brief examples are meant to illustrate storage is not the most efficient means of
the ways in which societies might develop non- transferring output over time.
market institutions or customs which help to Returning to the basic model (no uncertain-
lead the society toward an optimal distribution ty), a few comments can be made on the rela-
of resources both between generations and over tionship between individual and aggregate sav-
the lifetime of each individual. Societies need ings in a closed economy. First, money is not
some mechanism which allows individuals to necessary for individuals to save in the relevant
give to the old and have confidence that they in of having a claim against future resources.
sense
turn will be the recipients of gifts when theyAny
are social institution that leads to the middle-
old. Money, ritual knowledge, clubs, land, kin-
aged supporting the old or lending to the young
ship groups, and a host of others are all social
allows implicitly for individuals to save.
arrangements which help to inspire this con- Second, only the market solution required ag-
fidence and to achieve an optimal allocation of savings to be zero. On the optimal con-
gregate
consumption. sumption path, aggregate wealth, At, can be
either positive or negative. This may seem para-
4. STORAGE AND AGGREGATE SAVINGS doxical. If At is positive, but there are no
durable goods, who holds the negative liabilities
So far it has been assumed that the economy's
that offset this positive wealth? For the examples
output is perishable and there is no storage
of the previous section we have the following
technology that would allow the output of When a new member pays in his or her
answers.
period t to be available during period t + 1.
fee, the club incurs a debt that will be paid off
Suppose instead that there is such a technology
(with interest) the following period. The liabili-
such that if x units of output are stored atty
time
of the club just balances At. Secrets can be
t, (1 + m)x units are available at time t viewed
+ 1.12 as a type of capital whose value is simply
Clearly it will never be optimal for the society
At soto
that a positive net worth is just a reflection

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 648 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [85, 1983]

of the fact that the economyCharlene

owns Gregory
somefor helpful comments. This
capital.
The first old generation toreport
receive
is basedoutput
on a longerforpaper with the same
"money" essentially incurredtitle,
a debtwhich that
is available from me.
is never
paid off. When the middle-aged generation
1 Samuelson's overlapping generations model
makes gifts to the old generation, the old
has bred a large literature in economics. See
generation incurs a liability.Diamond
The old generation
(1965), Cass and Yaari (1966), Lucas
never pays off this debt and it grows
(1972), over
Starrett time
(1972), to (1973),
Gale Barro
just keep balance with At. (1974), Kareken and Wallace (1980). For
general discussions of primitive economics, see
5. CONCLUSIONS
Forde and Douglas (1967) and Nash (1967).
2 For more rigorous developments of the
The present paper is an attempt to present an
overlapping generations model, see Samuelson
explicit model that economists have found
(1958), Cass and Yaari (1966), Gale (1973), and
useful in studying the allocation of resources
Balasho and Shell (1980).
across generations. The model focuses on one
3 Given the time path assumed below for the
particular aspect of society, its overlapping
generations structure, that is commonendowment
to all stream, one could equivalently
assume each individual inelastically supplies one
cultures. The model then provides a framework
for thinking about how differentunit of labor to a constant returns to scale pro-
societies
ductionsocial
allocate output over time and how some process during the individual's "middle
institutions may help lead to optimalage."
distribu-
4 It is food that is being borrowed or lent. No
tions. A few illustrative examples of alternative
social arrangements were discussed, money
and has it yet
wasentered the model.
shown how each affected the intergenerational
5 The demand for loans is given by (1 +
distribution of output. By carrying out
n)tcl(r) the
where cZ(r) is the consumption path
analysis using an explicit model, it chosen
was shown
if the interest rate equals r. The supply
of loans
that money is not necessary for individuals to is
be(1 + n)t 1c3(r)/(1 + r).
able to save (ceremonial rituals, clubs, and kin-
Equilibrium requires that r be such that (1 +
ship groups also allow saving to occur),
n)'cl(r) = ag-
(1 + n)t - lc3(r)/(1 + r). This will
gregate saving in a closed economynot need not
generally hold for r = n. See Cass and Yaari
equal zero, and storage, if technologically
(1966). feasi-
ble, may be an inefficient method of saving.
6 How this might be done will be considered
A very broad definition of savingswhen
has been
nonmarket distribution schemes are
implicitly used in this paper--individuals
discussed. save
by acquiring claims on future resources. Such a
7The case r' > n occurs, when, at r = n,
broad definition is necessary if the great diversi-
members of the young generation would like to
ty of saving mediums that exist in different
increase their current consumption but can find
cultures is to be recognized. A narrow definition
no willing middle-aged lenders. Virtually every-
too easily limits the analysis only to those chan-
one has participated in a nonmarket, social in-
nels of saving utilized in industrial, market
societies. stitution that serves to eliminate this nonopti-
mality-the parent-child relationship. The re-
The model used in this paper is very abstract.
mainder of this paper concentrates on the case
It is hoped that the particular abstraction on
in which r' < n since this case probably has
which the model relies, the overlapping genera-
more relevance to an understanding of the
tions structure, will help in highlighting one of
issues dealt with by economic anthropologists in
the crucial functions of savings in all societies
studying savings.
and aid in the understanding of the economic
8 This follows from the first order conditions
function of alternative social arrangements.
for the maximization of utility.
NOTES 9 That such institutions will arise is explicit in
the methodological view of Lucas: ". . . insti-
Acknowledgments. My thinking ontutions and customs are designed precisely in
this sub-
order
ject was greatly stimulated by sitting in on to aid in matching preferences and oppor-
Alice
Dewey's economic anthropology course tunities satisfactorily." (Lucas 1981:4). For an
at the
University of Hawaii during the fall alternative
of 1981,point of view, see Sahlins (1976).
while I was on leave from Princeton. I thank iO Similar social institutions are reported by

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 RESEARCH REPORTS 649

Einzig (1966) the in New

Kareken, John H.,Hebrides
and Neil Wallace, eds. and
Banks Islands. 1980 Models of Monetary Economics. Min-
11 Among the Lele, "old men kept the secret neapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
of making coloured borders for the most ad- neapolis.
mired dance shirts" (Douglas 1963:54). Lucas, Robert E.
1972 Expectations and the Neutrality of
12 It might be worth remembering that the
length of a period is arbitrary, and that none of Money. Journal of Economic Theory 4:
103-124.
the results depends upon assuming only three
1981 Studies in Business Cycle Theory.
periods. It is thus not necessary to think that
storage requires output to be kept for 20 or 30
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Nash,
years. Since output in the model is received Manning
every period, one might think of the time be-
1967 The Organization of Economic Life.
In Tribal and Peasant Economies: Read-
tween harvests as the minimum calendar time
ings in Economic Anthropology. George
period in dealing with an agricultural society. A
Dalton,
period could be much shorter for a hunting Press. ed. New York: Natural History
society.
1976 Culture and Practical Reason. Chica-

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