WHAT IS REALISM?

(THROUGH
THE THEORETICAL SCOPE OF
ANDRÉ BAZIN)

The middle of the 20th century was an intellectually fertile era, from a philosophical, artistic
and scientific standpoint. In the art of cinema, the technological and theoretical progress
triggered the emergence of many different movements, which shaped the cinematic scene of
the 20th century. André Bazin was a French film critic, who lived and worked in the first half
of the 20th century. He was the general editor of the film criticism journal Cahiers du cinema,
and a considerable part of his work focused on realism. Bazin was greatly influenced by
existentialism, a key philosophy of the 20th century. Existentialism is an empirical
philosophy, rooted in daily existence; amongst other issues, it focuses on the questions of
human existence, and man‟s position in the world. One of the reasons for Bazin‟s interest in
realism, is his existentialist background. Realism is a movement that, at its core, attempts to
understand the world around us. In this essay, I will examine the origins of realism as an art
movement, the relationship between representational arts and film, the distinctive differences
between realism and formalism, as well as, the relationship of realism with film form. I will
conclude with a short comment on the essence of filmmaking in regards to technological
process. I will specifically examine these issues through the theoretical scope of André
Bazin‟s essays “Ontology of the Photographic Image” and “Evolution of the Language of
Cinema”, and further analyze his ideas through the writings of Christian Metz, Siegfried
Kracauer, and Erwin Panofksy.

Bazin, in his search of the origins of the arts, begins with a historical journey. In his essay
“Ontology of the Photographic Image”, he discovers that throughout the depths of
civilization, a recurring theme appears, the so-called “mummy complex”. According to
Bazin, the idea of mummification emerged from the everlasting need of humanity to halt time
against decay. A major tool of humanity in the ongoing battle against death has been the arts:
Preservation of life through representation. Certainly, the idea that immortality can be
achieved through some form of mummification process is no longer the case in modern
society, but “all are agreed that the image helps us to remember the subject and to preserve
him from a second spiritual death”. Throughout the evolutionary process of the plastic arts,
from cave painting to sculpturing, the endeavor to recreate the absolute duplication of reality
has been the ambitious mission of almost every artist, a mission, which, as we will see later
on, will never be accomplished. The obsession of the plastic arts with likeliness was finally
redeemed by Niepce‟s and Lumieres‟ invention, the photographic camera. In the case of
painting, between the image and the object, there will always be the objective mind of the
painter. Frankly, painting, as a tool for creating likeliness by objectivity, is flawed. With
regard to the breakthrough of the camera, Bazin notes “for the first time an image of the
world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man.” When we take a
picture of an object there is a counterfactual dependency between the object and the picture.
The photographic camera captures the image, as it is. Although there will always be the
presence of the photographer, who decides such aspects as framing and exposure, the image
will always be taken by the camera.

Kracauer elaborates on this theory, in his essay „Basic concepts‟ when he talks about the
distinction between photography and cinema on the one hand, and the other representational
arts, such as stage performance or painting, on the other. The difference between the two lies
in the existing “physical reality” or “camera reality”, which can only be captured by the
camera. Physical reality cannot be captured by theatre or painting. Theatre, can only “suggest
a universe of its own”, which is very weak in front of the “physical reality” that the film
captures. Metz will also identify this paradoxical phenomenon. Film spectacle produces a
much stronger impression of reality than theatre does, because theatre is almost too real. The
audience does not have a strong impression of reality, because it understands that theatre is a
convention. The difference between other representational arts and film has been a subject of
discussion for many theorists. Panofsky talks about two specific traits of cinema, the
dynamisation of space, and the spatialization of time. Through editing and special effects, the
spectator of a film, can travel in space and time, a trait which the physically restrictive nature
of theatre cannot compete with.

Bazin sees cinema as “objectivity in time”, Metz builds on Bazin‟s argument; in his essay
„On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema‟, Metz talks about the unique quality that
movement brings to film, and that is the impression of reality. According to Metz, the
impression of reality in film is much more vivid than in photography, by virtue of one critical
reason: movement. “Photography is in a way the trace of a past spectacle… The spectator
always sees movement as being present.” The static photograph will always be something of
the past, whereas film (even though it also takes place in the past) is conceived by the
spectator as present.

Kracauer also elaborates on this matter when he comments on the realistic tendencies. For
Kracauer, there are two main reasons why film creates a greater impression of reality than
photography: movement and staging. He distinguishes between the “objective” movement
within the frame (e.g. actors talking, walking), and the “subjective” movement of the camera
(i.e. camera movement, such as panning, to which the spectator is invited to participate). The
second reason is staging. “The filmmaker is often obliged to stage not only the action, but the
surroundings as well.” Kracauer was a firm supporter of realism, and he considered that the
best way to convey the most faithful impression of reality is to stage it, in a studio or a built
set. For Kracauer, film form is useful in the building of the impression of reality, and it only
becomes an obstacle when we become aware of it. Bazin contradicts this statement; he writes
“undoubtedly studio equipment had continued to improve but only in matter of detail, none of
them opening up new, radical possibilities for direction.” Bazin acknowledges the
technological progress as beneficial to the evolution of the language of cinema, but he
considers that the exploration of creating meaning through film form is a dead end. He looks
elsewhere for content. For Bazin, the art of cinema gains much more potential and depth
through realism, that is, the aesthetic trend that deliberately eliminates the techniques which
construct the image, in order to let reality reveal itself.

Many theorists, such as Kracauer and Panofsky, support the idea that the art of filmmaking
was an incidental result of technological developments. Panofsky writes “it was a technical
invention that gave rise to the discovery and gradual perfection of a new art.” Kracauer, also,
supports the idea that cinema derives from the urge of scientific spirit, and that its basic
property is “to record and reveal physical reality”. Instead, Bazin claims that “the cinema
owes nothing to the scientific spirit.” For Bazin, the art of cinema derives from the obsession
of its pioneers to achieve the ultimate representation of reality, the so-called myth of total
cinema. For Bazin, the driving force of the birth of film was precisely the mythological vision
of those passionate “madmen” who imagined that film could accomplish an integral
recreation of the world in its own image.

In his essay, “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema”, Bazin, on occasion to the
introduction of sound in silent film, explains his theory on montage and the utility of the
“plastics” in film. Bazin attempts to transpose the dividing line in the art of cinema, which
supposedly lies between the silent and the sound cinema, to a much more essential cinematic
distinction: the divide between two types of directors, those who put their faith in reality, and
those who put their faith in the image, which, in fact, correspond to the two main opposing
trends in film making, i.e. realism and formalism (or constructivism). This distinction was
already active from the silent days of cinema, though it became manifest through the rise of
realism in post war cinema.

First, Bazin challenges the generally accepted view that the essence of cinema consists of
what montage and the “plastics” add to a given reality. In this context, Bazin analyzes the
differences in film form between the two movements. The utility of montage and the
„plastics‟ constitute the two definitive factors in formalism.‟ Plastics‟ are, essentially, all
elements of film form, such as framing, lighting, style of the set. Bazin mentions the montage
of „attraction‟, a very popular method amongst Soviet filmmakers in the early 20‟s, as a
typical case where meaning is not derived from the images themselves but only from the very
technique of their juxtapositioning. In the same line of thought, German expressionists used
dramatic lighting to create sharp angles and heavy contrast between shadows and light (i.e.
Rober Wiene‟s The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari, 1920). The French new wave was also a
movement where directors experimented with elements of film form such as editing, and
visual styles. In the center of all these silent film movements are montage and plastics, while
sound was an unnecessary addition, as it “could only play at best a subordinate and
supplementary role: a counterpoint to the visual image.”

Even though Bazin fully acknowledges montage and considers it as the fundamental element
in the birth of a new cinema, he appears to be apprehensive towards these movements. He
believes that any type of manipulation of the image, such as excessive montage and violence
of the‟ plastics‟, restricts film from its true potential; the potential that can be achieved
through realism. Sound, does not prevent, but embellishes film‟s true potential towards
realism. In short, the common ground of all these constructivist movements is their being
suggestive. For example, in Eisenstein‟s film Strike, there is a juxtaposition of two shots; one
of striking workers being attacked, and the other, of a bull getting slaughtered. The derived
meaning from these two shots is that the workers are being treated like animals, even though
this is never shown in either shot. In Bazin‟s words “The meaning is not in the image, it is in
the shadow of the image projected by montage onto the field of consciousness of the
spectator.”
Overall, constructivist cinema suggests an understanding, or guides the spectator to adopt a
definitive meaning that the creator intends. Hence, the spectator assumes a passive mental
attitude, rather than an active engagement with the action in progress. Bazin is opposed to
any device that manipulates the perception of the spectator, and thereby, restricts or
eliminates his potential to develop his own interpretation.

Bazin identifies the main features of realism in directors already of the silent phase of
cinema. The composition of the image in Murnau “adds nothing to the reality, it does not
deform it, it forces it to reveal its structural depth”, while Stroheim rejects the tricks of
montage and, instead, lets reality reveal itself in its bare form. For Bazin, at this point, a new
cinematographic language is born, in which “the image is evaluated not according to what it
adds to reality, but what it reveals of it”. Bazins concept of “directors who put their faith in
reality” does not imply that they do not use the elements of film form at all, but that they use
them in a different way than in constructivism. While in constructivism, meaning is gained
from the analysis of film form, in realism, meaning is gained from the analysis of the scene,
within the form. Hence, the elements of film form neither add anything to reality, nor deform
it.

Montage is an element which Bazin believes “plays no part unless it be the negative one of
inevitable elimination where reality superabounds”. In order to let reality reveal itself, the
usage of montage should be limited to the minimum; as a result, we have the long shot-long
take or “one-shot sequences”. Bazin claims, that in the long shot, through attentive watching,
the spectator can experience the unfolding of the scene in front of his eyes. The special
feature that renders the long shot far more realistic than montage is its fixed relationship with
time. The long shot consists of simply recorded events, as they take place. The spectator
experiences time passing as it does in real life. The long shot stimulates the participation of
the audience and lets the spectators free to choose their own interpretation of events. As
mentioned above, this type of cinema is not suggestive, as montage is, but it reveals latent
structures or relations inherent in the image. This requires an alert and attentive audience. An
indicative example of this type of film is Visconti‟s : la Terra Trema. The film presents the
everyday lives of the fishermen in a small fishing village on the east coast of Sicily. In one
particular long shot, a tracking shot, one witnesses an everyday situation of the beach market
at the village. The camera never focuses on something in particular, as the spectator follows
the natural rhythm of the market, and thereby is introduced to the daily lives of these people.
The eye of the observer is challenged to extract a kind of meaning from the unfolding of the
reality of those people‟s everyday lives. The financial battle between them, the pervasive
poverty and the struggles of life are aspects of the scene, of which we become gradually
aware, through the observation of this long shot.
Bazin‟s concept of realism advocates long shots, and also, depth- of- field shots. Depth- of-
field shots, for Bazin, replace montage. By using depth of focus in Citizen Kane, Orson
Welles covers a whole scene, with one shot. The dramatic effects that would have been
present by montage, are now created by the movement of the actors in a steady framework.
This elimination of editing is very important so that the audience creates its own
understanding of the scene.

The most extreme case of realism, according to Bazin, is Italian neorealism. Characteristics
of Italian neorealism, such as, complete stripping away from all expressionism, total absence
of effects of montage and the performances of non-actors tend to give back to cinema the
sense of the ambiguity of reality. Yet, Bazin is adamant about the distinction between reality
and realism. According to Bazin, reality in itself is meaningless, and the role of art consists,
precisely, of the effort to take something meaningless (reality) and create meaning out of it.
He believes that all directors, from Italian neorealists, to soviet constructivists, aim at the
very same result by means of different methods, and, that is, the creation of meaning.

With the introduction of colour and sound in film, the art of filmmaking started gaining more
and more properties of the real world. Throughout the years, the technological progression in
cinematic art never fails to impress. In our times technical creators of 3D cinema and virtual
reality are striving towards the same aim that their artistic ancestors where striving towards:
The ultimate duplication of reality in film. But no matter how many reality- properties a film
is able to represent, it will always be a representation. The drive towards reproducibility will
always be a failure. There is no equivalent in film to real life and there will never be. There
will always be a gap, between reality and film, and in this gap, is where the creator‟s
expression and the spectator‟s interpretation lie. As a result, film, no matter from which
movement it comes, will inevitably reflect its creator‟s ideas, since the essence of film as an
art form, is not to construct a duplication of reality, but to create meaning.

Bibliography

Bazin, André „The Evolution of the Language of Cinema‟ in Film Theory and Criticism, 4th
Edition eds., Braudy, Leo, and Marshall Cohen, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992)
Bazin, André „The Ontology of the Photographic Image‟ in What is Cinema? Vol.1 trans. By
Hugh Gray, (Berkley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press 2005)
Bazin, André „The Myth of Total Cinema‟ in Film Theory and Criticism, 4th Edition
eds., Braudy, Leo, and Marshall Cohen, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)
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Bazin, André „De Sica: Metteur-en-scené‟ in Film Theory and Criticism, 4th Edition eds.,
Braudy, Leo, and Marshall Cohen, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)
Kracauer, Siegfried „Basic Concepts‟ in Film Theory and Criticism, 4th Edition eds.,
Braudy, Leo, and Marshall Cohen, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)

Metz, Christian, (1991) “On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema” from Metz,
Christian, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema pp.3-15( Chicago: University of
Chicago Press)
Panofsky Erwin „Style and Medium in the Motion Picture‟ Cinema‟ in Film Theory and
Criticism, 4th Edition eds., Braudy, Leo, and Marshall Cohen, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992)
Hallam, Julia and Marshment, Margaret Realism and Popular Cinema, 1st edition,
(Manchester: Manchester Univeristy Press 2000)

Realism in the Film Theory of Sergei

Eisenstein and André Bazin
At first glance the film theories of Sergei Eisenstein and André Bazin seem to be
fundamentally different. Eisenstein puts at the center of his theory a sophisticated concept of
montage while Bazin favors the long deep focus shot of Orson Welles and Italian
Neorealism. In this paper I try to show that despite all these differences the two theories still
share common ground, insofar as they are both interested in the question of realism, i.e. if and
how film can show us the essence of something. It is Bazin who in the most explicit way
point out the importance of essence for film: “I have never been to a bullfight, and it would
be ridiculous of me to claim that the film¹ lets me feel the same emotions, but I do claim that
it gives me its essential quality, its metaphysical kernel: death” (Bazin 2003, 29 – my
emphasis). The argument I develop here is that both theories share this function of film as a
common goal but favor different ways to reach it. I‟ll start by discussing how the concept of
essence can be found in both theories and then point out the differences and similarities.

Essence in Eisenstein’s Theory

At the center of Eisenstein‟s idea of essence stands the idea of dialectic. He draws heavily on
marxist ideas, for example when he begins his text “A Dialectic Approach to Film Form”
with the following quote: “According to Marx and Engels the dialectic system is only the
conscious reproduction of the dialectic course (substance) of the external events of the
world”² (Eisenstein 1977a, 45 – my emphasis). The second part of the sentence seems to be
the crucial one. The concept of dialectic that Eisenstein has in mind is not only a way of
thinking but instead it resembles or even reproduces the way the world really works. In other
words: for Eisenstein the reality is dialectical. A way of thinking that tries to grasp this reality
therefore has itself to be dialectical too. That is the reason why at the center of Eisenstein‟s
theory of montage stands explicitly the dialectical motif of conflict: “So, montage is conflict.
As the basis of every art is conflict (an ‚imagist„ transformation of the dialectical principle)”
(Eisenstein 1977b, 38). The reason for Eisenstein why art has to be dialectical is that its
object is dialectical too: “It is art‟s task to make manifest the contradictions of Being” (ibid.,
46).

It is important to note that Eisenstein with this conception not only breaks with Pudovkin‟s
idea of montage but also with Griffith. For Eisenstein Griffith‟s parallel montage “appears to
be a copy of his dualistic picture of the world” while on the other hand the Russian “concept
of montage had to be born from an entirely different ‚image„ of an understanding of
phenomena, which was opened to us by a worldview both monistic and dialectic” (Eisenstein
1977c, 235). The reasons Eisenstein gives us why the Russian theory of montage for him is
more advanced than the American once again show how closely he links his film theory with
a general materialistic philosophy: “The question of montage imagery is based on a definite
structure and system of thinking; it derives and has been derived only through collective
consciousness, appearing as a reflection of a new (socialist) stage of human society and as a
thinking result of ideal and philosophic education, inseparably connected with the social
structure of that society” (ibid., 245).

The reason why I dealt with Eisenstein‟s conception of dialectic in such great length is that in
it we can find the answer to the question how Eisenstein thinks about realism and essence.
Montage following Eisenstein is realist because it follows the same principles as reality itself.
It should be no surprise than that montage in this view becomes a method that is privileged to
show us the essence of reality. This essence of reality is what in montage is meaning.

Following Eisenstein meaning doesn‟t simply reveal itself, instead we need montage to show
what something means, i.e. what its essence is. When Eisenstein for example
in October (1928) intercuts Kerenski with pictures of a mechanical peacock he tries to point
us to the essence of Kerenski. Similar when in Strike (1925) in the famous montage of
soldiers shooting at a demonstration with pictures from a slaughterhouse where “‟butchering„
is the associative link” (Eisenstein 1977a, 57), it is also this “butchering” that is the essence
of what‟s happening. Or in Bazin‟s words: with the means of montage Eisenstein tries to lay
bare the scene‟s “essential quality, its metaphysical kernel” (Bazin 2003, 29).

Essence in Bazin’s Theory

Bazin labels Eisenstein‟s approach as one that puts its “faith in the image” (Bazin 2005a, 24)
which by the use of montage creates “a sense or meaning not objectively contained in the
images themselves but derived exclusively from their juxtaposition” (ibid., 25). Instead of
this Bazin favors a second approach which he characterizes through its “faith in reality”
(ibid., 24). While writing about Murnau as an example for this approach he defines it as
follows: “It adds nothing to the reality, it does not deform it, it forces it to reveal its structural
depth, to bring out the preexisting relations […]” (ibid., 27). We already see here that this
approach also deals with the essence of reality but in a completely other way then Eisenstein.
Instead Bazin suggests that its possible to show the essence – to which he is here refering as
“structural depth” and “preexisting relations” – by showing reality itself without adding
anything.

It are Italian neorealist directors that for Bazin exemplify this approach in the most complete
form and on which he develops his position of realism. “They never forget that the world is,
quite simply, before it is something to be condemned” (Bazin 2005b, 21 – original emphasis).
A prime example for this kind of film is for Bazin Rossellini‟s Paisà (1946). “The unit of
cinematic narrative in Paisà is not the ‟shot„, an abstract view of reality which is being
analyzed, but the ‚fact‟” (ibid., 37). This facts are not a means to an end but have a value on
their own. That‟s also why there is no need to explicitly connect or interpret them, instead its
a characteristic of films like Paisà that they have “great holes” (ibid., 35). Bazin uses the
following methaphor to elude this point: “The mind has to leap from one event to the other as
one leaps from stone to stone in crossing a river” (ibid., 35). In doing so one might miss a
stone or slip, but that lies in the essence of the stones. “Actually it is not of the essence of a
stone to allow people to cross rivers without wetting their feet […]. Facts are facts, our
imagination makes use of them, but they do not exist inherently for this purpose” (ibid., 35).
Film then has to respect this essence of the facts and present them according to their nature.
That in no way suggests that films like Paisà have no meaning or moral. It just has a different
source there: “For Rossellini, facts take on a meaning, but not like a tool whose functioning
has predetermined its form. The facts follow one another, and the mind is forced to observe
their resemblance; and thus, by recalling one another, they end by meaning something which
was inherent in each and which is, so to speak, the moral of the story – a moral the mind
cannot fail to grasp since it was drawn from reality itself” (ibid., 36). According to Bazin it
then is unnecessary and can only do harm to add something to this factual character. It
wouldn‟t help to bring out the essence of something but instead would obfuscate it. Films
like Paisà or Le Ballon Rouge (1956) – to which the following quote refers to – therefore
don‟t “owe anything to montage” (Bazin 2005c, 45).

Bazin‟s position in this regard can easily be misunderstood. Hence it is important to point out
that he doesn‟t think of “realist” films in the way of an objective documentary that – like a fly
on the wall – is only observing and recording what‟s happening. Instead he reminds us that
it‟s essential for film – as for any form of art – to select what it shows. “Every form of
aesthetic must necessarily choose between what is worth preserving and what should be
discarded, and what should not even be considered” (Bazin 2005b, 26). Yet what is important
for Bazin is that the whole, the entity of what is shown is preserved and not broken apart.
“[N]eorealism by definiton rejects analysis, whether political, moral, psychological, logical,
or social, of the characters and their actions. It looks on reality as a whole, not
incomprehensible, certainly, but inseparably one” (Bazin 2005d, 97). For Bazin only this way
does justice to reality.

Different Approaches – Common Ground?

After introducing the different ideas that Eisenstein and Bazin hold of reality and essence this
part will explore the question if – considering the different approaches that both favor – there
is still common ground that can be found in both theories.

In this search for common ground it is important that one doesn‟t miss the differences of the
two approaches. What seems to separate the two conceptions most fundamentally is a
difference that Bazin described as an a priori vs. and a posteriori approach. “[…] the
neorealist film has a meaning, but it is a posteriori, to the extent that it permits our awareness
to move from one fact to another, from one fragment of reality to the next, whereas in the
classical artistic composition the meaning is established a priori: the house is already there in
the brick” (Bazin 2005d, 99). Examples of Eisenstein‟s montage in this sense are clear
examples where the “house is already in the brick”, i.e. the scenes of a montage only makes
sense in the whole setting. In the scene of Kerenski and the mechanic peacock which was
mentioned above, the image of the peacock can‟t stand for itself, it is meant to be a part of a
montage. In other words, as the essence of the brick is to be part of the house the essence of
this scene is not found in itself but only in the context of the intercutting with Kerenski.

As we‟ve seen, Bazin follows this metaphor further when he contrasts the bricks of the house
with rocks in a river. Their essence doesn‟t lie in the fact that we can use them to cross the
river, unless we use them to build a bridge out of them (ibid., 99). For Eisenstein quite
contrary the scenes of a montage – although he rejects the brick metaphor – are like cells of
an organism. “The shot is a montage cell” (Eisenstein 1977b, 37). In his view the function of
montage is to bring these elements in a dialectical relationship of conflict. “By what, then, is
montage characterized and, consequently, its cell – the shot? By collision. By the conflict of
two pieces in opposition to each other. By conflict. By collison” (ibid., 37). Here Eisenstein
openly admits that the characteristic role of the shot doesn‟t lie in itself, but in the
relationship to another shot.

Following this one could argue that Eisenstein‟s usage of a slaughterhouse scene in his
famous montage in Strike is instrumental, because it used solely to signify something else. It
doesn‟t stand for itself but its main function is to show us the meaning of another scene,
namely the massacring of demonstrating workers. Le Sang des bêtes (1949) on the other hand
could be seen as a film that tries to preserves the essence of a slaughterhouse.

From this point of view the gap between Eisenstein‟s and Bazin‟s position seems to be
irreconcilable. That this is a too simplistic view is indicated by the high opinion that Bazin
holds of Eisenstein and his work. Instead Bazin seems to sense that there is common ground
between his ideas and Eisenstein‟s. “Was it not from the outset their search for realism that
characterized the Russian films of Eisenstein, Pudovin, and Dovjenko as revolutionary both
in arts and politics, in contrast to the expressionist aestheticism of the German films and
Hollywood‟s mawkish star worship? Paisà, Sciuscà, and Roma Città Apperta, like Potemkin,
mark a new stage in the long-standing opposition between realism and aestheticism on the
screen” (Bazin 2005b, 16). Here Bazin puts Italian neorealism in the tradition of
Eisenstein‟s Battleship Potemkin (1925), in fact he suggests that Italian neorealism provides
us with “new solutions” (ibid., 16) for the same problem that Eisenstein dealt with. This
common problem, I would argue, is to find a way how cinema can show us the essence of
things.

We see that it should be undisputed that the approaches Eisenstein and Bazin suggest are
different. For Eisenstein the best way to bring out the essence is montage, because it allows
us to show the meaning of something by contrasting it with other shots. This is grounded – as
was shown above – by a dialectic understanding of the world that makes such an approach
necessary. Bazin on the other hand favors the long deep focus shot used in Orson
Welles„ Citizen Kane (1941) or the fragmentaric character of Rossellinis Paisà. But they
share the common ground that the goal of each approach should be to show us the meaning,
the essence of something.

Bazin seemed to have had more trust that the essence of reality reveals itself if film doesn‟t
give us an interpretation a priori. But for Eisenstein too the purpose of montage isn‟t to force
a special meaning that can‟t be found in reality itself on the spectator. Instead the spectator
plays an active role in Eisenstein‟s conception: “In fact, every spectator, in correspondence
with his individuality, and in his own way and out of his own experience […] creates an
image in accordance with the representational guidance suggested by the author, leading him
to understanding and experience of the author‟s theme. This is the same image that was
planned and created by the author, but this image is at the same time created also by the
spectator himself” (Eisenstein 1977d, 33).

In a way one could therefore say both montage and long deep focus shot leave it to us to
make something out of them. For example in Paisà when we follow a woman looking for her
boyfriend, “leaving us to the task of being alone with her, of understanding her, and of
sharing her suffering” (Bazin 2005b, 37). Of course there are example of montage where the
meaning that Eisenstein wants to show us is obvious and easy to follow, especially in his first
long film Strike³. But in Potemkin or October (1928), by making use of the different
“methods of montage” (Eisenstein 1977e), the examples become more sophisticated and open
for interpretation.

Both also share the notion that in the end film should show something “whole”. For
Eisenstein this can be reached indirectly through montage: “The juxtaposition of these partial
details in a given montage construction calls to life and forces into the light
that general quality in which each detail has participated and which bins together all the
details into a whole, namely, into that generalized image, wherein the creator, followed by the
spectator, experiences the theme” (Eisenstein 1977d, 11 – original emphasis). The function of
montage then is to “evoke in the consciousness and feelings of the spectator, reader, or
auditor, that same initial general image which originally hovered before the creative artist”
(ibid., 31). Bazin shares the goal of showing reality as a whole. But the way he proposes to
reach this goal differs from Eisenstein‟s. As was mentioned before he doesn‟t deny that the
film director must select what he shows in his films, that he “filters reality” (Bazin 2005d, 98
– original emphasis). “[B]ut the selection that does occur is neither logical nor is it
psychological; it is ontological, in the sense that the image of reality it restores to us is still a
whole – just as a black-and-white photograph is […] a true imprint of reality, a kind of
luminous mold in which color simply does not figure. There is ontological identity between
the object and its photographic image” (ibid., 98).

I would argue that Eisenstein – just as Bazin does – also aims at this ontological level with
his montages. But what seems to divide them are different conceptions of ontology.
Eisenstein in this regard can be seen as transcendental realist. The essence of things for him
is hidden and must be discovered and exemplified by a dialectical method of montage. When
he shows us in October a soldier that is shooting with a machinegun at a demonstration and –
in a fine example of metric montage – intercuts the face of the soldier with a close-up of the
firing gun, he uses this technique to point us to the essence of what‟s happening: the coalition
of man and machine, the ambiguity of who‟s controlling whom, the tact in which both
interact together. Bazin on the other hand believes that the essential quality has to be found in
the empirical events themselves. His position therefore can be described as empirical realism.
A good example for this approach can be found in De Sica‟s film Umberto D (1952), where
we see a girl that slowly wakes up in the morning and follow her all the way from bed to the
kitchen where she starts preparing breakfast. The scene is quite long with only a few cuts
showing us this daily routine in its continuity. For Bazin this continuity of time is an
important feature of cinema that was introduced by Welles. “Orson Welles restored to
cinematographic illusion a fundamental quality of reality – its continuity” (Bazin 2005b, 28).
It is also this continuous flow of time that for Bazin is an essential feature of reality.
Combined with long deep focus shots as used in Citizen Kane it is the core of Bazin‟s
concept of a posteriori. “It is no longer the editing that selects what we see, thus giving it an
a priori significance, it is the mind of the spectator which is forced to discern […]” (ibid., 28).

Eisenstein on the other hand doesn‟t seem to be interested too much in this dimension of
time. When for example the sailors await the final attack in Battleship Potemkin the scene is
heavily cut, showing us the single persons only for short periods of time. Instead of depicting
this period of waiting, where time seems to be running slowly, through long and continuous
shots Eisenstein decides to give us an overview what is going on on board. In other words we
see not how the individual reacts but instead the collective, the ship as a whole. From this
collective perspective the time period isn‟t seen as a long and continuous stream but as a
meaningful series of events, condensing the length of the waiting period.
Conclusion

I have tried to show that despite all the differences between Eisenstein and Bazin their
theories have in common a fundamental similiarity: their attempt to answer the question how
film can show the essence of reality. Both agree that this can‟t be accomplished by simply
showing reality as “authentic” as possible, as the usage of non-professional actors both in
Eisenstein‟s movies and in Italian neorealism could for example suggest. Instead they honor
the fact that film is a form of art and therefore must select and decide which facets of reality
to show. Both Eisenstein and Bazin also emphasize the point that the result of the image in
the end should be a whole. While for Eisenstein this whole must be built by using montage
and juxtaposition Bazin claims that the whole can‟t be broken into pieces but that a fact of
reality has to be valued as an end in itself.

It is this difference that seems to be the most serious between the theories of Eisenstein and
Bazin. I have tried to explain it as a difference of the concept of ontology that both hold.
While Eisenstein‟s realism is transcendental and aims to find the essential quality of
something beyond the empirical level Bazin‟s position seems to be more
an empirical realism, looking for the essence in real events and facts.

But after taking into account all the differences both Eisenstein and Bazin have in common
that in their film theory they search for the essence of reality, “its metaphysical kernel”
(Bazin 2003, 29).

Martin Bartenberger, 2012

Notes

1. Bazin here is writing about the film The Bullfight (1951) by Pierre Braunberger.

2. The quote is taken from Razumovsky‟s Theory of Historical Materialism. I want to note
that here I can‟t deal with the question if this quote or Eisenstein gets the theory of Marx and
Engels right. Instead I will here understand and analyze dialectic in the way Eisenstein does.

3. Again the scene with the slaughterhouse is notorious in this regard, but also his depiction
of the “capitalists” or the usage of the lemon squeezer while workers are attacked by soldiers.