Indo-Pacific Region and Philippines

The Philippines and the U.S. share the strategic interest of constraining China’s maritime expan-
sionism. While sharing the interest in the freedom of the seas, navigation, and overflight, the
Philippines’ main concern vis-à-vis China’s maritime expansionism is its territorial integrity, na-
tional sovereignty, and maritime rights. Should Beijing effectively enforce its expansive claim,
Manila will lose about 381,000 sq. kilometers (80% of EEZ), including the Reed Bank and
portions of the Philippines’ Malampaya gas field. In addition, the Philippines could also lose all
of Extended Continental Shelf, estimated to be more than 150,000 sq. kilometers of maritime
space.

Being an ASEAN member, the Philippines, unlike Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and
Myanmar, isn't contiguous with the East Asian region. Such a geographical location makes it an
important part of America's "island chain" strategy and a link in its "Indo-Pacific strategy" that it
eagerly wants to reinforce. The main strategic interest of the US is thus to simultaneously limit
the Chinese influence, constrain its expansion beyond the Malacca Strait, retain its own influence
in the high seas, expand its presence in the littoral states of Indian Ocean and protect its ex-
panded Monroe Doctrine. In this spirit, US Vice President Kamala Harris during her visit to
Palawan in Nov, 2022 spoke of the importance of partnership for economic opportunities, envi-
ronmental protection, peace and stability and international rules and norms in the South China
Sea. The visit set the stage for US Defense Secretary Austin’s visit to the Philippines on 2 Feb
2023, during which four new American military bases in addition to the existing five were an-
nounced indicating Manila’s much bigger role in the US Into-Pacific Policy. President Marcos,
with his visit to the US from 30 April to 4 May, 2023, to meet President Biden, reaffirmed com-
mitment of both sides as Strategic Partners in the Indo-Pacific region specifically for South
China Sea.

It has become increasingly clear that America's "Indo-Pacific strategy" is centered on the Taiwan
question, around which the US made all its military deployments in the Philippines. Most Ameri-
can bases in the Philippines are on Luzon Island which is only a Bashi Channel away from
China's Taiwan province, with its northernmost end being 360 km from the province. Subic Bay
on the west coast of Luzon Island faces the South China Sea and is the spot closest to the waters
of China's Huangyan Island. The Palawan Province right next to China's Nansha Islands is also a
key sitting area for American bases.

The maritime domain is one of the areas in which China is challenging U.S. primacy in the re-
gion. From the U.S. perspective, there is a strategic imperative to ensure that the countries in the
First Island Chain have a close security relationship with Washington in order to ensure Ameri-
can preeminence. There are certain initiatives to strengthen cooperation between and among
members of the U.S.-led hub-and-spokes system of alliances and partnerships. In September
2022, the Philippines, the US and Japan inaugurated the Trilateral Defense Policy Dialogue
(TDPD). The three countries exchanged views on common defense and security challenges in-
cluding the maritime component of such challenges, with an emphasis on the importance of up-
holding freedom of navigation and overflight, and the rules-based order to ensure peace and sta-
bility in the region.
While reinforcing its military deployments in the Philippines, the US is also urging the country
to tighten military ties with Japan. On December 6, 2022, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force
(JASDF) dispatched two F-15 fighters to the Clark Air Base in the Philippines, the first time that
Japanese warplanes appeared in the country after WWII. On February 6, 2023, Philippines’ Pres-
ident Marcos Jr. paid an official visit to Japan, during which Tokyo promised a PHP 150 billion
investment (about US$ 2.7/- billion) to Manila. Defense Ministries of the two countries also
signed a defense cooperation document on humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue and relief,
laying the legal basis for their joint humanitarian aid exercises, a step that is a major strategic re-
grouping.

In addition to the US and Japan, Philippines is also exploring an alliance with Australia, which is
a staunch supporter for the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award in accordance with
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Senator Penny Wong, Minister for For-
eign Affairs of Australia, undertook an official visit to the Philippines on 16-19 May 2023 in
which she announced an increase of Aus $89.9/-million in Official Development Assistance
(ODA) for the year 2023-2024, thereby building on the already deep and wide-ranging maritime
security cooperation between Australia and the Philippines.

Increasing cooperation between Philippines and three of the four members of Quad is particu-
larly irksome for Sinic interests. In a recent meeting in Tokyo (23 May, 2023), the Quad leaders
launched a maritime initiative to combat illegal fishing (implicitly pointing to China’s activities
in South China Sea) and pledged to invest more than $50 billion in developing infrastructure in
the Indo-Pacific as part of their efforts to overcome China’s growing influence in the region.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson accused the US of zero-sum mentality with its furthering
military deployment in the Asia-Pacific. This would escalate tensions and endanger peace and
stability in the region, as China being the largest trade partner in the Philippines will take mea-
sures to protect its own regional interests including but not limited to One China Policy, over-
coming the Malacca Dilemma, financial expansion as well as geo-economic and geopolitical
capital and gains.