First International Meeting

of Directors of Peace Research

and Training Institutions

What Agenda
for Human Security
in the
Twenty-first Century?
PROCEEDINGS

27-28 November 2000

UNESCO, Paris
 First International Meeting
of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions

What Agenda for Human Security

in the Twenty-first Century?

UNESCO, Paris
27–28 November 2000
Editors:
UNESCO
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
Social and Human Sciences Sector

The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the participants in the
First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions
and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNESCO.

The designations employed throughout the publication do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area,
or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Any communication concerning this publication may be addressed to:

Ms Moufida Goucha / Ms Claudia Maresia

Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
Social and Human Sciences Sector
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15, France
Tel: +33 (0)1 45 68 45 52 / 54
Fax: +33 (0)1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org

Published by the United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization
7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France

Composed and printed

in the workshops of UNESCO

© UNESCO 2001
Printed in France

SHS-2001/WS/12
 3

CONTENTS

FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................................................... 7

OPENING CEREMONY

Inaugural speech ..................................................................................................................................................... 11

by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura,
Director-General of UNESCO
read by Mr Ali Kazancigil, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences a.i.

Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations ................................. 13
by Mr Hassen Fodha,
Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France

Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security .............................................. 15

by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel,
Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO

Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace .................................................................. 19

by Mr Enzo Fazzino,
Programme Specialist, International Year for the Culture of Peace, UNESCO

FIRST ROUND TABLE

The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Africa .............................. 21

Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director,

Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France.............................................................................................................. 23

Lecturers:
Peace and human security in Africa ......................................................................................................................... 25
by Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP),
Yaoundé, Cameroon

Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS ............................................................................ 31

by Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa
4

SECOND ROUND TABLE

The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe ............................ 37

Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO .......... 39

Lecturer:
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans ........................ 41
by Mr Bjørn Møller, Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA),
Copenhagen, Denmark

THIRD ROUND TABLE

The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Latin America
and the Caribbean .................................................................................................................................................. 63

Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO ........... 63

Lecturers:
Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America .................................................................. 65
by Mr Alejandro Bendaña, President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua

Human security: An academic perspective from Latin America ............................................................................. 69

by Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO),
Santiago, Chile

The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean .................. 77
by General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN),
Montevideo, Uruguay

FOURTH ROUND TABLE

The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States .............. 83

Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr René Zapata, Director, Division of Programme Planning,
Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO ........................................................................................................................ 85

Lecturer:
Challenges to human security in the Middle East ................................................................................................... 87
by Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, Researcher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt

FIFTH ROUND TABLE

The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Asia and the Pacific ........ 93

Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-General, ‘Priority Africa’ Department, UNESCO .... 93

Lecturers:
What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa .............. 95
by Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada;
Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark

Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia ......................................................................... 101
by Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International
and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh
 5

CLOSING SESSION

Reports on the debates of the five round tables: ............................................................................................. 109

First round table, Rapporteur: Mr Mambaelele Mankoto, Programme Specialist,

Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO ................................................................................................................ 109
Second round table, Rapporteur: Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme Specialist,
Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO ................................................................................................... 109
Third round table, Rapporteur: Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme Specialist,
Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO ............................................................................................................ 110
Fourth round table, Rapporteur: Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme Specialist,
Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO .................................................................................................................... 110
Fifth round table, Rapporteur: Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme Specialist,
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO .............................................................. 111

Final Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 113

presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General
Director, Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO

Agenda for Action of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion
of Human Security and Peace ............................................................................................................................... 115

APPENDICES

Organizing Committee ............................................................................................................................................... 119

Programme .................................................................................................................................................................. 121
Working document – The promotion of human security: The state of play.......................................................... 125
List of participants ...................................................................................................................................................... 127
Bio-sketches of the lecturers ..................................................................................................................................... 139
The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum ................................................................................................................................. 143
UN Resolution A/RES/53/243 of 13 September 1999 – Declaration and Programme of Action
on a Culture of Peace ............................................................................................................................................... 145
UN Resolution A/RES/53/25 of 10 November 1998 – International Decade for a Culture of Peace
and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001–2010) ............................................................................... 151
Other UNESCO publications of interest ................................................................................................................... 153

FOREWORD
by Ms Moufida Goucha
on behalf of the Organizing Committee
Human security is a paradigm in the making, as
stressed in the Final Recommendations of the First
International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions, which had as its theme:
‘What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first
Century?’
As the Director-General of UNESCO stated in his
inaugural speech, ‘The theme that has brought you
together today links in with UNESCO’s own proposals
for the orientation of its future activities, since its Draft
Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007 is entitled
“UNESCO – Contributing to peace and human develop-
ment in an era of globalization”. In every one of its
fields of competence – education, the sciences, culture
and communication – the Organization will devote all
its energies to helping states to grapple resolutely with
the risks and threats hanging over humanity.
Eradication of poverty, preservation of ecosystems
(especially freshwater resources), respect for human
rights and cultural diversity, and promotion of an ethics
of science and technology are among the priorities
which UNESCO has laid down in order to fight this
battle. For human security is a global and inclusive
concept. Some of its aspects – extreme poverty,
terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation,
illegal immigration and AIDS – go far beyond national
boundaries. That is why international cooperation is
essential in order to achieve tangible results. We must
take action together without further delay.’
The meeting, whose objectives were the following:
(1) to bring together directors of institutions
concerned with peace research and training
who are representative of several countries and
regions, in order that they may present the prior-
ities of their action-oriented research programmes;
(2) to prompt reflection among them resulting in
joint programmes aimed at promoting peace and
human security;
(3) to lay the foundations of steadier cooperation
among such institutions in the form of networks;
(4) to make plans for practical projects, particu-
larly in the field of education and training for
peace and human security, paying special atten-
tion to educational content and to UNESCO Chairs;
7
had the benefit of the contributions of a number of
eminent specialists from the world’s regions, who
gave the key lectures for each of the round tables.
As may be seen, these lectures, starting out from
widely different viewpoints, deal with the new chal-
lenges to be met and suggest new avenues of action
for promoting human security. Our warmest gratitude
is hereby expressed to these specialists for sharing
their knowledge and experience with all the partici-
pants, and for allowing the meeting to draw up its
Final Recommendations and to adopt an Agenda for
Action on the basis of an in-depth analysis of major
issues to be dealt with in the near future.
I should also like to take this opportunity to thank
all the other participants who contributed to the
success of the meeting: those from all over the world
who made valuable intellectual contributions to the
debates with enthusiasm and conviction, the moder-
ators, in particular Mr Bertrand Badie who made a
major contribution to the preparation of the launching
of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum, and last but not
least, the Rapporteurs, representing all UNESCO’s
fields of competence.
As this volume comes off the press, the follow-
up to the Recommendations of the First International
Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training
Institutions is well under way, in particular with a
view to defining human security agendas at the
regional and in particular at the subregional level.
Thus, in the framework of the International
SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security
and Peace launched by the participants in November
2000, four regional follow-up expert meetings have
been organized for the second half of 2001 on the
theme ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention’:
first, on Africa, in cooperation with the Institute
for Security Studies, in Pretoria (South Africa), July
2001;
second, on South Asia, in cooperation with the
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA),
in Karachi (Pakistan), October 2001;
third, on Central Asia, in cooperation with the
National Commission for UNESCO, in Almaty,
(Kazakhstan), November 2001;
8
Foreword What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
fourth, on Latin America and the Caribbean,
in cooperation with the Latin American Faculty
of Social Sciences (FLACSO), in Santiago (Chile),
November 2001.
The proceedings of these expert meetings will also
be jointly published by UNESCO and its partners and
will serve to set the agendas of the regional inter-
national conferences planned for 2002–2003, as well
as the Second International Meeting of Directors of
Peace Research and Training Institutions, to be held
in 2003 at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris.
Last but not least, many of the issues already iden-
tified have also been duly reflected in UNESCO’s Draft
Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007, in which human
security is given a prominent place under Strategic
Objective 5, entitled Improving human security
by better management of the environment and
social change. In this framework, UNESCO will, inter
alia, ‘further address the need to prevent conflicts at
their source and the needs of the most vulnerable
populations at regional and subregional levels,
through its global network of peace research and
training institutions, thereby reinforcing human
security and contributing to the implementation of
the Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence
for the Children of the World’ (para. 108 of the Draft
Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007). One of the
expected outcomes under Strategic Objective 5 is ‘the
elaboration of integrated approaches to human
security at the regional, subregional and national
levels, targeting the most vulnerable populations,
including the preparation of methodologies for the
prevention and resolution of conflicts, in particular
over natural resources’.
OPENING CEREMONY

INAUGURAL SPEECH
by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura,
Director-General
of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)
Directors,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Allow me to welcome you to UNESCO on the occa-
sion of the First International Meeting of Directors of
Peace Research and Training Institutions.
This meeting, held as part of the International
Year for the Culture of Peace, deals with an extremely
topical theme: ‘What Agenda for Human Security in
the Twenty-first Century?’. For although the Cold War
belongs to the past, the same cannot be said of the
many territorial, ethnic and religious conflicts which
survive here and there on the fertile ground of intol-
erance, discrimination, environmental degradation and
extreme poverty.
When the United Nations system was set up in
the mid-twentieth century, it gave UNESCO a special
mandate, at the crossroads of human knowledge
and human aspirations, to encourage all approaches
that might strengthen individual human dignity, self-
awareness and personal fulfilment.
This meeting will be instrumental in strongly
reasserting a number of values – peace, democracy,
justice, tolerance and freedom of expression – which
the Organization has defended since it was estab-
lished, and in fulfilling the injunctions of its
Constitution ‘to contribute to peace and security by
promoting collaboration among the nations through
education, science and culture in order to further
universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and
for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which
are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without
distinction of race, sex, language or religion’.
Many of you are already closely involved in our
Organization’s work for peace in the fields of research,
education and training. The proceedings of this
meeting will no doubt help to strengthen it.
The theme that has brought you together today
links in with UNESCO’s own proposals for the orien-
tation of its future activities, since its Draft Medium-
Term Strategy for 2002–2007 is entitled ‘UNESCO –
Contributing to peace and human development in an
era of globalization’.
Opening ceremony 11
Inaugural speech
In every one of its fields of competence – educa-
tion, the sciences, culture and communication – the
Organization will devote all its energies to helping
states to grapple resolutely with the risks and threats
hanging over humanity. Eradication of poverty, preser-
vation of ecosystems (especially freshwater resources),
respect for human rights and cultural diversity, and
promotion of an ethics of science and technology are
among the priorities which UNESCO has laid down
in order to fight this battle.
For human security is a global and inclusive
concept. Some of its aspects – extreme poverty,
terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation,
illegal immigration and AIDS – go far beyond national
boundaries. That is why international cooperation is
essential in order to achieve tangible results. We must
take action together without further delay.
It is ten years since the international community
became aware of the extent of the problem. In 1992,
the United Nations Security Council expressly recog-
nized that non-military threats to peace required
urgent action just as much as conflicts between states
and within states.
Two years later, the United Nations Development
Programme’s Human Development Report 1994 on
human security initiated a broad debate which
substantially helped to enrich the concept of human
security and provide the impetus for wide-ranging
action to curb the impact of threats to it. I am thinking
in particular of Canada’s initiative to make the concept
of human security more operational in order to estab-
lish a specific policy agenda, and of the priority given
to promoting democratic security in the Council of
Europe. I am also thinking of Japan, whose initiative
facilitated the setting up of the human security fund
in the United Nations in March 1999 with a contri-
bution of $90 million, and which is preparing to fund
an information, education and communication
campaign on HIV/AIDS prevention in China that will
shortly be launched by the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and UNESCO.
The 1995 World Summit for Social Development
in Copenhagen also underlined the urgent need to
tackle poverty, especially extreme poverty, as well as
12
Inaugural speech What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
social exclusion, both of which are being covered by
the work of a broad coalition of international, inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations.
The same holds true for the fields of food safety,
environmental safety and a number of other areas
which are now termed ‘new dimensions of security’.
For UNESCO and the whole of the international
community, one of the main keys to human security
and all forms of development – individual, social,
economic and sustainable – is education. The World
Education Forum held in Dakar (Senegal) in April
2000 provided striking confirmation of this fact.
There will be no lasting peace without sustain-
able endogenous development, which attacks the
root causes of division and of entrenched poverty
and exclusion. Education fulfils its true purpose by
allowing individuals to make their own decisions and
take control of their own lives.
What a distance we have travelled from that time,
not so very long ago, when we thought of security
in terms of defence and when resources for security
were allocated solely for the purchase of arms!
But there is still a long way to go before human
security becomes a central concern of every society.
Your discussions, I have no doubt, will help us
towards that goal.
I therefore wish you every success in your work.
You may count on UNESCO’s firm support.
Thank you for your attention.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
ON THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY
WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS
by Mr Hassen Fodha,
Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France
It is with great pleasure that I take the floor today
with the contribution of the United Nations system
to the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace
Research and Training Institutions, held on the initia-
tive of UNESCO.
Needless to say, this meeting is most timely since
it comes in the wake of the Millennium Summit and
its Declaration, marking the commitment of all
Member States to refine and apply concerted, coord-
inated action for a better world of peace, tolerance
and human security.
The Millennium Declaration, signed by, among
others, the 150 heads of state and government present,
states: ‘We recognize that, in addition to our sepa-
rate responsibilities to our individual societies, we
have a collective responsibility to uphold the princi-
ples of human dignity, equality and equity at the
global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to
all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable
and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom
the future belongs … We consider certain fundamental
values [freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect
for nature and shared responsibility] to be essential
to international relations in the twenty-first century.’
The Millennium Declaration calls for strong part-
nerships with civil society and particularly non-
governmental organizations, including the private
sector, in order to end poverty and destitution and
to help advance development plans in the world.
It must be recalled that with the year 2001 we
are also entering the International Decade for a
Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children
of the World (2001–2010) and will be celebrating the
United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.
Peace research and training institutions respond
to all these universal measures and priority objec-
tives; and the United Nations is grateful to them for
their willingness and their aptitude for playing a key
role in peace-building, in that their research can throw
light not only on the causes of conflicts but also on
how to establish and then consolidate a just and
lasting peace afterwards; moreover, their training activ-
ities produce a multiplier effect in terms of civilian
actors for peace, tolerance and solidarity.
Opening ceremony 13
Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations
They can do much to create conditions for a
dynamic promotion of human security, inseparable
from human development, as the annual Human
Development Reports of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) have clearly
shown, particularly since 1994.
The theme you have chosen to look at in detail,
‘What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first
Century?’, is a central concern of many societies with
the general realization of growing international action
for security and the protection of individuals. Efforts
to ensure the security of individuals and communi-
ties must today be conducted in unison by all players
in society, with heed for the fact that the globalization
under way requires new forms of interdependence
concerning all spheres of life in society, without
exception.
I will not dwell upon the far-reaching changes to
the concept of security that have come about in recent
years, since a consensus is emerging on the multi-
dimensional nature of security and the basic foun-
dation needed for its construction, that is, respect for
all the rights proclaimed in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Like human rights,
human security is indivisible; like human rights,
human security must also be universal. Hence action
for human rights has become a central prerequisite
to all the programmes and activities of the United
Nations system, since human security demands respect
for and implementation of all human rights, including
the various fundamental freedoms, the right to dignity
and the right to development.
I should like, for my part, to return to some
aspects I see as essential and that deserve emphasis
and, above all, incorporation in the work you are
embarking on today at UNESCO.
First, there is no getting away from the harsh
fact that intra-state or internal conflicts persist
despite the huge efforts in recent years by the inter-
national community, whether under United Nations
auspices or through the regional intergovernmental
organizations to which the Charter of the United
Nations gives a major role in maintaining peace and
security.
14
Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
The United Nations peace-keeping forces are
present in sixteen countries in the world and step in
to maintain an often purely notional peace, as they
cannot end conflicts or try to alleviate the suffering
and the consequences that peoples, particularly
women and children, suffer in these regions of the
world.
Non-state forces and paramilitary groups, which
are often predatory and closely linked to the most
diverse trafficking, in particular of drugs and arma-
ments, go unpunished in many countries, with the
constant risk of perpetuating conflicts and spreading
them regionally.
The figures say it all: the internal conflicts of the
past ten years have left more than 5 million dead
and produced 25 million refugees worldwide.
The international community has come to realize
in the past decade that intra-state conflicts call for
new approaches in preserving and maintaining peace.
The Millennium Declaration calls for prompt
action on all fronts: first, that of prevention, by
promoting steady, balanced economic growth, while
protecting human rights and minority rights and
adopting political agreements that ensure the equit-
able representation of all groups. At the same time,
protection of the most vulnerable, strengthening of
peace-keeping operations, better targeting of sanc-
tions and arms reduction remain priorities for the
whole international community.
The General Assembly is exploring the possibility
of establishing a flexible and efficient follow-up mech-
anism able to react rapidly where necessary.
Clearly, though, the objective of living in a world
without fear cannot be dissociated from that of living
in one protected from need.
The known figures on the quarter of the world’s
population living in extreme poverty means that the
United Nations system must face up to the impera-
tive of responding. The Millennium Summit and the
various reports of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,
on the subject commit themselves to it: halving by
2015 the proportion of people living in extreme
poverty. Member States are invited to submit by 2005
national plans and strategies for achieving this. The
objective of halving poverty in the world by 2015
requires much effort from the entire international
community, including civil society. It is a credible
commitment to the prospects of human globalization.
Extreme poverty is compounded by the devas-
tating effects of pandemics, primarily the AIDS
pandemic which is threatening to wipe out achieve-
ments in human development, in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa, where its ravages will by 2010 produce
40 million orphans. However, AIDS is spreading well
beyond Africa, with increases of more than 70 per
cent in the numbers of infected persons in Asia
between 1996 and 1998, while starting to loom very
large indeed in countries such as the Russian
Federation.
The AIDS pandemic was recently described in the
United Nations as a genuine threat to peace and
security, and it was stated that prevention strategies
and strategies to treat people suffering from the afflic-
tion must be strengthened urgently.
All these crucial problems, together with others
such as environmental degradation and the depletion
of natural resources, have combined effects on popu-
lation groups and particularly on the most vulnerable
of them.
Your work today and the follow-up to it provide
an illustration of civil society in action; practical action
with regard to peace training, the culture of peace
and the attitude that all individuals must have in their
daily lives. It is not enough for states to legislate or
for international organizations to run conventions;
education must also prepare people and information
must build awareness.
Your workshops concern all the regions of the
international community: Africa, the Arab States, Asia,
the Caribbean, Europe and Latin America. They are
intended to build a universal network able to meet
the challenge of human security and introduce a
mechanism to implement urgent and priority deci-
sions.
Thanks to your voluntary action, the concept of
human security is also turning into a veritable agenda
for action drawing on all available knowledge and
resources.
Volunteers can play their part in transforming soci-
eties. In his report to the Millennium Summit, Kofi
Annan proposed the creation of a corps of volun-
teers to travel throughout the developing countries
and help to train communities in order to ensure that
the new information technology actually serves human
development. Forty development volunteers are
already in the field. Several others are being assigned
to the unit concerned with ‘harnessing information
technology for development’ and will soon be
swelling the ranks of these volunteers.
Our meetings at UNESCO contribute their own
brick to the edifice and so consolidate action to
promote a culture of peace.
I will end by expressing the hope that your work
here at UNESCO Headquarters will be thoroughly
successful and productive. I am sure that the efforts
we all make together within the United Nations and
its Specialized Agencies, in common with what you
accomplish at this meeting and later, will over the
years have beneficial consequences of a magnitude
beyond anything we can predict or conceive of today.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
ON THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE
TO STRENGTHEN HUMAN SECURITY
Towards human security:
a people-centred approach
to foreign policy
by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel,
Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO
1. New global realities
Canada’s foreign policy of human security begins with
this simple understanding: that nobody, in the present
age, is safe from the violence that threatens the security
of people. It is plain, for example, that war itself now
occurs increasingly within states, and kills mostly
civilians. But it is just as plain that the causes of conflict,
and the consequences, extend far beyond national
borders. And violence against human security also takes
other forms. We see it in systematic abuses of rights
and freedoms. In the cruellest exploitations of children
and women. In the extortions of warlords and the drug
trade, and in the disorders of corruption. No people
anywhere are invulnerable to these threats, or unaf-
fected by the violence. It is the defining nature of our
age that whether or not we share the great benefits of
globalization, we are all subject to its dangers.
Canada’s approach to human security responds
to these global realities. And it addresses directly the
imperative of human security – to protect people from
pervasive, violent threats to their rights, their safety,
or their lives. Indeed, human security is now more
widely and better understood as an imperative of
governance – an obligation of states, and of others
in the global community. The provision of human
security is a matter of good governance, within states
and among them.
As a policy imperative, human security serves to
focus attention and action not just on the security of
the state, but on the security of the person. Kofi
Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General, has
given voice to this new emphasis. ‘The state,’ he has
said, ‘is now widely understood to be the servant of
the people, and not vice versa.’ By looking more to
the security of people in the conduct of international
relations, we redefine the very meaning of security
– and transform the conduct of world affairs.
2. Human security, national security
This is not to disparage the place of the state, or its
importance in protecting people. On the contrary,
Opening ceremony 15
Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security
human security and national security are comple-
mentary. People are made safer by an open, tolerant
and responsive state, capable of ensuring the protec-
tion of all its citizens. At the same time, improving
human security reinforces the state by strengthening
its legitimacy and its stability.
It is important to add, however, that while the
security of the state is a necessary condition of human
security, it is not a sufficient condition. When states
are externally aggressive, internally repressive, or too
weak to govern effectively, human security suffers.
Sometimes, the state itself – strong or weak – is the
most brutal enemy of human security. In such cases,
the international community will hear calls for inter-
vention and humanitarian necessity may ultimately
outweigh arguments of sovereignty.
3. Human security, human development
So human security and state security are closely
related. Similarly, human security is brother and sister
to human development. Human security provides the
sheltering environment for human development, the
social peace and freedom from fear that make
development practical. Just as surely, good human-
development strategies can relieve the privations and
inequalities – and remedy the ills of bad governance
– that jeopardize human security. Human security
and human development serve and strengthen each
other.
4. Canada’s human security agenda
Human security is simply defined: it means freedom
from pervasive threats to the rights, the safety, or the
lives of people. It is the threat of violence that distin-
guishes the human security objectives of Canadian
foreign policy.
Of course, violence is not the only threat to human
well-being. Poverty, the ruin of the environment,
the pressures of urbanization, and epidemics of infec-
tion all constitute challenges to human security.
16
Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Specifically, Canada has identified five foreign policy
priorities for advancing human security:
First, protection of civilians. More than 80 per
cent of all the casualties in present-day conflicts are
civilians. That is why strengthening protection for
people, especially those at risk from violence, is a
defining priority on Canada’s human security agenda.
The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines
is a successful example, but more challenges remain:
to protect war-affected children and internally
displaced persons; to strengthen human rights protec-
tion; to find better ways, and better rules, for inter-
national humanitarian intervention.
Our second priority concerns peace support oper-
ations. These are no longer just about peace-keeping.
Now, more than ever, peace support operations
require complex combinations of military and civilian
expertise. Enhancing international capacity to succeed
at these complex operations is an urgent international
objective.
A third priority is conflict prevention. Just as the
causes of violent conflict are fearfully diverse, so the
means of prevention must be many and varied. The
priority here is to improve international capacity, and
develop local institutions, to prevent conflict and build
peace. With sanctions that are more effective, and
less harmful. With controls on the pernicious trade
in small arms. With post-conflict peace-building that
is lasting and just.
Fourth is the promotion of good governance.
Failures of governance carry grave consequences:
political and social exclusion, inequities, discontent
and civil strife. That is why the development of
accountable, democratic governance is critical to
building a society’s capacity to manage conflict
without violence.
The fifth priority, one of critical importance, is
public safety. Transnational, criminal violence
threatens the safety of people everywhere. These are
the destructive and complicated threats of organized
crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. Against these
menacing forces, human security requires better inter-
national coordination of knowledge and action.
5. Effective coalitions for human security
Violent threats to human security, in all their diversity,
share this common characteristic: they always interact,
in dangerous contagions of cause and effect. Think
of the connections between, say, the sufferings of
war-affected children, failed discipline among security
forces, a weak justice system, and corporate
connivance in diamond smuggling or the drug trade.
The linkages are insidious, and they reach across
national borders. Against these interacting threats, not
even powerful governments can prevail alone.
Protecting human security requires cooperative
coalitions among states – acting with others in the
global community.
These coalitions are being organized in a new,
more open and more creative kind of diplomacy.
They take many forms, with many different member-
ships, as needs and opportunities arise. At the United
Nations, for example, we now see the Security
Council, with several of the UN Specialized Agencies,
turning more powerful attention – and action – to
the protection of human security.
One of the significant features of globalization is
the proliferation, activism and special expertise of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in advancing
human security. It is often NGOs that give the first
warning of crisis, inform the international media, and
galvanize government action. Just as often, NGOs
provide critical knowledge of local conditions, coor-
dinate relief and development operations, and share
the work of long-term peace-building programmes.
In truth, NGOs and their worldwide networks have
become indispensable partners and political allies in
the protection and promotion of human security.
Examples abound, from the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, to the work of Human Rights
Watch for the International Criminal Court, to the
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. The
Canadian Government acknowledges and values these
NGO partnerships. This is how successful governance
in today’s world, specifically on the human security
agenda, will be achieved – by ever more vigorous
collaborations among government institutions, NGOs,
business, and labour.
6. Conclusion
The human security imperative responds to the
violence of the present age – it compels collabora-
tive action. No government can succeed alone. It
recognizes that our own security is indivisible from
the security of others. Ultimately, it unites us all in
the shared opportunity to redeem the meaning of our
common humanity, to build a more just and peaceful
global community.
The human security network
The Human Security Network, which includes parti-
cipation by over a dozen countries from all regions
of the world, originally grew out of a bilateral arrange-
ment between Canada and Norway – the ‘Lysøen’
partnership, named after the Norwegian island where
the idea was conceived. Building on the success
achieved through international cooperation on the
landmines campaign, Canada and Norway sought to
apply the same energy and advocacy to a range of
other threats to people’s safety.

Since its establishment two years ago, the
Network has promoted international support for UN
efforts to protect civilians, including two ministerial
meetings, in Bergen, Norway (May 1999), and in
Lucerne, Switzerland (May 2000), attended by NGO
experts from around the world. Jordan is to host the
next ministerial meeting of the Network in Petra in
May 2001.
An informal, flexible mechanism, the Network
identifies concrete areas for collective action, for
example, coordinated preparation for the United
Opening ceremony 17
Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security
Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2001. It also
plays a catalytic role by bringing to international atten-
tion new and emerging issues, for example the chal-
lenge of engaging non-state actors, such as armed
groups, in complying with international humanitarian
and human rights law.
Members of the Human Security Network include
Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali,
the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland,
Thailand and, as an observer, South Africa.

PRESENTATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR
FOR THE CULTURE OF PEACE
by Mr Enzo Fazzino,
Programme Specialist, UNESCO
On 20 November 1997 the General Assembly of the
United Nations proclaimed the year 2000 as the
International Year for the Culture of Peace in order
to ‘mobilize public opinion at the national and inter-
national levels for the purpose of establishing and
promoting a culture of peace’.1 The Declaration and
Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace adopted
by the General Assembly in September 19992 supple-
mented the proclamation by indicating the key players
and the major areas in which the culture of peace
should be applied.
The Programme of Action calls upon civil society
in general and non-governmental organizations in
particular, with governments and the United Nations
system, to work in partnership to form a ‘global move-
ment for a culture of peace’.
The 72 million people3 – more than a hundredth
of the world’s population – who have signed
Manifesto 2000, pledging to apply in their daily lives
the principles on which the culture of peace is based,
give an idea of the extent to which public opinion
has been mobilized in more than 160 countries of
the world, thanks to the work of thousands of organ-
izations in civil society.
Of the 1,700 local, national and international
organizations (associations, cities, schools, media,
universities, companies, governmental and United
Nations organizations), 183 are research and training
institutions.4 Several of the institutions that you are
representing at this meeting today have played an
active part in the International Year.
This global movement, which began with the
International Year for the Culture of Peace, can be
strengthened and broadened in the coming
International Decade, 2001–2010. As a follow-up to
the year 2000, the Decade is devoted to promoting
‘a culture of peace and non-violence for the children
of the world’.5
In his most recent document about the Decade,6
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,
presents two parallel approaches to be followed in
its implementation: partnerships for a global move-
ment and education to be extended to all the chil-
dren of the world.
Opening ceremony 19
Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace
First, the global movement ‘needs to be continued
and strengthened in order to involve everyone, at all
levels of society, in the transition from a culture of
war and violence to a culture of peace and non-
violence’.7 In order to do this, the global movement
will be able to use the network of National
Committees and offices put in place by UNESCO
during the International Year. Networks of inter-
national organizations are another channel for
mobilizing civil society.
Second, children should be at the centre of the
Decade and, among the specific measures to be taken,
‘priority should be given to education, including the
teaching of the practice of peace and non-violence
to children. All other areas of action for a culture of
peace should take children into special consideration’.
‘Education should be engaged in the broad sense
of the term – not only formal education in schools
but also out-of-school institutions, including the family
and the media. It should involve the full participa-
tion of governments, intergovernmental organizations
and the civil society … an approach that is compre-
hensive and holistic, involving all educational partners
and various agents of socialization, including non-
governmental organizations and community organi-
zations in a process of democratic participation.’8
One of the objectives of this meeting, ‘to make
plans for practical projects, particularly in the field of
education and training for peace and human security’,
corresponds well with this way of implementing the
Decade. The International Year for the Culture of
Peace led millions of people to become sensitive to,
aware of and committed: the Decade should transform
this commitment into action in longer-term projects
such as those you are going to plan and implement.
The United Nations Programme of Action on a
Culture of Peace set out the major fields of activity
for such practical projects:
(a) education for a culture of peace and non-violence;
(b) sustainable economic and social development;
(c) respect for all human rights;
(d) equality between women and men;
(e) democratic participation;
(f) understanding, tolerance and solidarity;
20
Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
(g) participatory communication and the free flow of
information and knowledge;
(h) international peace and security.
What is new about the concept of the culture of
peace – structured around eight major areas – is that
it provides a single framework within which to maxi-
mize the complementary nature of, and synergy
between, all the players: governments, the United
Nations system and civil society.
NOTES
1. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution
E/1997/47, 22 July 1997.
2. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution
A/RES/53/243, 13 September 1999.
3. This figure is as of end November 2000.
4. This information can be found on the International Year
website: www.unesco.org/iycp.
I invite you to join the global movement for the
culture of peace or, for those of you who took part
in the International Year, to continue and redouble
your efforts during the Decade, particularly through
the network of peace research and training institu-
tions that you are going to form. I wish you a
successful meeting.
Thank you.
5. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution
A/RES/53/25, 10 November 1998.
6. Document A/55/377, 12 September 2000.
7. Idem.
8. Idem.
 FIRST ROUND TABLE

The main challenges

facing the promotion of human security
and peace in Africa

Moderator:
Mr Bertrand Badie,
Graduate Programme Director, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France

Lecturers:
Mr Gabriel Siakeu,
President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP),
Yaoundé, Cameroon
Mr Jakkie Cilliers,
Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Pretoria, South Africa

Opening remarks
by the moderator, Mr Bertrand Badie,
Graduate Programme Director, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France
Allow me – after all I must do something to deserve
my chairmanship – to open these proceedings with
a few reflections, which you may rest assured will
be brief. Human security – which we have already
heard something about, and the speakers at the
opening session emphasized the point – is a new
concept, one that for me evokes four key words, and
perhaps with these words we may begin to reflect.
They are human purpose, globality, interdependence
and rationality.
Human purpose. For me it is a major event that
security has now finally been reconciled with its true
purpose: people, human beings. Security is becoming
once again what it should always have been, an
instrument for the advancement of human progress
and the construction of humanism. The notion of
military security tended to make security not so much
an instrument as an end in itself, and tended, where
security remained an instrument, to make it no more
than an instrument of power. The idea of military
security was associated more with the idea of an
instrument of power than an instrument of human
development. Reverting to the idea of human security
means reshaping security into what it ought to be – an
instrument in the service of humanity. And that,
I think, is one of the first gains.
Globality, meaning that human security desector-
alizes the principal constituents of social progress and
human progress. We can no longer view food security,
as we used to, in particular during the Cold War, as
distinct from economic security, itself distinct from
military security, which is in turn distinct from the
defence and promotion of human rights. These are
not compartments of human endeavours; they repre-
sent human endeavour as a whole. And then to be
aware, to demonstrate, and to act, to ensure that the
promotion of human rights, food security and
economic security are efforts that converge towards
a single goal, is a second very important element
which is inherent in the idea of human security.
The third idea is perhaps that of interdependence,
which seems very important to me. It has become
banal to say that we live in an interdependent world,
but, when it comes to security, this is no longer so
banal, since the security of my neighbour, near or
far, is vital to my own security. I cannot live securely,
First round table 23
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States
safely, or feel protected if my neighbour has no
security. My neighbour’s insecurity today is my own
insecurity tomorrow. And, therefore, linking the
various social contracts on which the various nation-
states are founded, is a correspondence which we
must learn to promote and build on as an element
of collective security. This is perhaps the second death
of Thomas Hobbes; in any event I believe that it is
the resurrection of this idea of humanity that has
perhaps been – and I speak here in the name of my
own academic freedom – somewhat hastily sacrificed,
abandoned, to the notion of peoples.
And lastly, the fourth element, rationality. Human
security must not become a concept which is uniquely,
or even chiefly, ethical or moral. Human security is
a collective asset, a common good that is necessary
for the advancement of men and women wherever
they may find themselves and whatever they may be.
It is not merely to satisfy a moral need that we
promote, indeed must promote, human security; it is
also because this is the only chance for humanity to
survive in the face of the challenges confronting it.
Promoting human rights and promoting food security
are certainly positive accomplishments, but, beyond
that, they entail the construction of a universe of
security, assurance, tranquillity, which is an essential
prerequisite to progress and the accomplishment of
the collective goals of everyone on the planet. This
is not only an ethical discourse – I fear, moreover,
that politicians are not very attentive to ethical
discourse – it is also a utilitarian discourse. Human
security has real utility, and I think this is an aspect
which will have to be highlighted in our work to
show that we are fighting not only for what is good
but also for what is clearly in our interest.
For this reason I should like, very tentatively and
very provisionally, to propose the idea that human
security is first of all an attitude. Rather than a
programme, it is an attitude, a way of being, a way
of viewing the world, of viewing international rela-
tions, of viewing the interaction between economics
and politics, between politics and culture, between
culture and society, and so forth. It is a stance. Military
security was not a stance; it was a budget, and it
was a policy. Human security is a way of being and
a way of fitting into the international system.

PEACE AND HUMAN SECURITY
IN AFRICA
by Mr Gabriel Siakeu,
President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP),
Yaoundé, Cameroon
1. Preliminary note
Human security and peace can only be properly
appreciated by those who, at some time or another,
have experienced acts or scenes of insecurity, violence
and war. For the rest of humanity, security and peace
are very secondary considerations, and this forum is
just one more of its kind, an opportunity for speeches,
statements and debates; one more meeting, as ever
here at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris; another inter-
national gathering to be consigned to oblivion once
the curtain falls tomorrow.
My agreeing to take the floor at this First
International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions – and it goes without saying
that the honour is mine – signifies my belief that this
meeting will come up with practical resolutions and
recommendations that will be put into effect, whose
influence will gradually spread so that the promotion
of human security may be effective, so that a lasting
peace may be established not just in Africa, in whose
name I am speaking today, but also throughout the
world. For human security and peace cannot be
genuine unless shared by all the nations and all the
citizens of the world, without exception.
He who has the signal honour of addressing you
today, while not claiming to have immediately
suffered insecurity and war, was born in a country
which, at the time, was engaged in a struggle for
independence. That struggle coincided with a power
contest between two rivals opposed by seemingly
different ideologies that were exacerbated by the then
colonial power. It was a dark period in the history
of my country, marked by arbitrary detentions,
summary executions, abductions, disappearances,
new and ambiguous expressions such as curfew, state
of emergency, the limited movement allowed to
citizens provided that they could produce a laissez-
passer, and with no freedom of expression or of
assembly, as a corollary of the single-party system
established between 1966 and 1990.
I have also had occasion to take on the role of
consultant in a very beautiful African country where
security and peace today are no more than hollow,
First round table 25
Peace and human security in Africa
meaningless words. For when children can be killed
by crushing in a mortar or dissection, just as a butcher
chops a piece of beef, cutting open the belly of a
pregnant woman with a machete to pull out the
foetus, then let us admit that we have reached the
peak of horror and that this kind of act is very diffi-
cult to credit to human beings. And yet the evidence
is there.
This is a country where the only crime is to be
born into one or other of the only two tribes; a
country where killings have become so natural and
frequent that one may be pleasantly surprised to learn
at the end of the day that no one has been killed.
This is a country where visibly starving and sick old
people, orphans of war and AIDS, are crammed into
veritable concentration camps set up near the capital
for reasons that are clear though unspoken.
I have also travelled up and down the coast of
a country in West Africa and been struck by the prac-
tically unbreathable air, polluted from the open-air
sale of petroleum; and I have visited, not far from
there, the major market of a town built near an
immense tip where rubbish and detritus of all kinds
are deposited and where thousands of people
converge.
After such a summary account of my own unfor-
tunate experiences of insecurity in the course of my
brief existence, a question occurs to me: why is there
this climate of insecurity and violence in the world?
The causes of human insecurity are to be found
in the mind and nature of people.
The answer is bitter and sad: it is indeed the
human mind. And this mind is marked by cruelty,
selfishness, greed, egocentrism, hatred, distrust,
contempt, and an obsession with power and money.
As these personality traits cannot be modified by
scientific and technical research nor by political
speeches and programmes, we can understand the
profound meaning of the Constitution of UNESCO
which proclaims that ‘since wars begin in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences
of peace must be constructed’.
This way of thinking coincides with that of the
World Association for the School as an Instrument of
26
Peace and human security in Africa What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Peace (EIP). The slogan of this Geneva-based inter-
national non-governmental organization (NGO), of
which I run a national section, is ‘Disarm the mind
to disarm the hand’.
We may now understand the concern of the
world’s nations after the Second World War, expressed
in the Charter of the United Nations in these terms:
‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
… to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom, … to practice tolerance and
live together in peace with one another as good
neighbours…’.
The proclamation by the United Nations is a call
for more security and non-violence. Otherwise, how
can we imagine a family enjoying security when the
parents, as victims of an economic crisis, have been
made redundant or when the children finish their
studies and are still looking for their first job?
How can we imagine human security in a village
whose crops have been destroyed by a swarm of
locusts, or which is permanently under threat from
the neighbouring village, or in which there are no
health and education facilities?
How can we imagine people enjoying security in
a town where factories pollute the air, where road
traffic is dense, where slums and ghettos exist cheek
by jowl with rich neighbourhoods?
How can we imagine people enjoying security in
a country where there is no political changeover, a
country where corruption has been institutionalized,
a country where the right to education and health is
a right for some but not for all?
How can we imagine human security in a world
one-quarter of whose population lives below sub-
sistence level; a world where three-quarters of the
wealth belongs to one-quarter of its inhabitants and
where a mere ten countries direct the conduct of all
the other states?
As the problems differ from one continent to
another, however, I have been asked to look at the
main challenges facing the promotion of human
security in Africa. If these challenges are taken up in
all continents, we can hope that they will in the aggre-
gate allow human security to be ensured worldwide.
Africa is the continent of all ills.
From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, Africa
experienced the slave trade. This shameful commerce
played its part in depopulating and weakening the
continent.
From the end of the nineteenth century to the
independence period, around 1960 for most coun-
tries, Africa was colonized. That colonization resulted
in the Balkanization of the continent. Africa was
divided into colonial possessions regardless of
geographical realities. Some conflicts sapping the
African continent today derive from this arbitrary
apportionment.
• We have seen the upheaval of the social structures
of the colonies – with customs swept aside, changed
habits, the emergence of social contrasts – in short
the acculturation of Africans.
• We have seen the weakening of communities
through forced labour such as portering and
corvées, a further form of slavery.
• We have seen the looting of mineral resources for
European industries. In the colonies, such work as
road-building and the establishment of administra-
tive structures was only carried out with an eye to
the needs of the colonizing countries.
• We have seen the dismantling of the African
economy, or what passed for it at the time.
The word independence initially aroused many hopes.
Since 1960, however, Africans have become dis-
illusioned. Colonization was succeeded by neo-
colonialism, the continuation of the colonial system
in another form, resulting in the omnipresence of the
former colonizing power. We can count on the fingers
of one hand the countries in Africa which have not
experienced coups d’état and armed conflict. Even
those that had become reputed havens of peace and
political stability are now going through (and we
hope only going through) a very alarming period of
disorder, violence and insecurity.
As if that were not enough, all these woes are
compounded by:
• diseases such as ebola, cholera, malaria and, of
course, the AIDS pandemic. Some experts think that
by 2010, the twenty-three countries hardest hit by
AIDS will have lost 66 million individuals.
• pollution. African countries are industrializing or still
under-industrialized. However, the activity of indus-
trialized countries is damaging the environment on
a global scale and causing extensive pollution and
disruption of ecosystems. If the current trend
persists, the natural environment will be increas-
ingly threatened, particularly since the effects of
bush fires and deforestation must be taken into
account in Africa.
• poverty. Almost 1.3 billion people live on less than
a dollar a day, and nearly 1 billion cannot meet
their minimum nutritional needs. The vast majority
of them live in Africa, which moreover accounts
for upwards of thirty-five of the fifty least-
developed countries in the world – the poorest of
the poor. The situation is worsening because of
armed conflicts and violence that could reach
unprecedented levels. This violence, generated by
tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, will be the most
common form of conflict in the coming century
and will claim hundreds of thousands of victims
each year in Africa.
This whole catalogue of woes, and many others,
are unmistakable signs of insecurity and war in
Africa. The current situation is serious and it is time
to find urgent solutions so that Africa, already badly

affected, does not become definitively mired in
violence.
As already noted, it is not enough to list the evils
afflicting the world and endangering world peace.
This is no time simply to be surprised at the ever-
growing number of refugees, street children, AIDS
orphans and destitute, at the tragic scale of the effects
of environmental damage, and so on.
It is time to take action and to act positively in
a way that will make people safer, and as a result
to establish lasting world peace. The challenge here
is on a world scale and, in my opinion, it cannot be
confined to a single continent since security and peace
are either a matter for all continents or they are non-
existent.
Furthermore, the development train is one that
travels fast, very fast indeed. Africa must catch it,
hold on to it, keep up the same speed and avoid
just submitting to it.
The challenge of development is a major one, a
challenge that cannot be met without security and
without peace. There can be no sustainable devel-
opment without peace. There can be no peace without
security. Peace and security are two inseparable and
imperative notions for the development of Africa. It
is therefore urgent to promote them, but to promote
them in terms of the strategies and major challenges
set out below.
2. The Internet and computer technology:
to make up time
2.1. Internet: multiple services
On 17 October 1996, at the meeting on Africa
and the new information technologies held in
Geneva, President Alpha Omar Konaré of Mali
stated: ‘If we say yes to the challenges of the
new information technologies, it is without being
naive, since we are well aware of the consid-
erable implications…’.
The importance of information and commu-
nication is indeed no longer disputed. The
opportunities offered by the Internet to Africa
are countless.
Internet users, wherever they are, whatever their
education, can learn, meet one another, share
hobbies, look for associations and information of
all kinds and make friends with people on the
other side of the world through electronic mail.
What is more, scientific and technical infor-
mation circulates with disconcerting ease and
speed. African Internet users, who are increas-
ingly numerous I am glad to say, may consult
freely accessible databases of universities and
research centres.
Thanks to the Internet tool, African teachers
can obtain documentation to use in their classes.
First round table 27
Peace and human security in Africa
Students can find documentation for their
research, dictionaries, encyclopaedias and maps.
Farmers can connect to find out more about
new cultivation methods. Commercial businesses
have an ideal medium for vaunting their goods
and services to millions of potential customers.
The Internet is a gateway to leisure activities,
sport and job opportunities. All over the world
people can keep abreast of the latest national
and international developments by consulting
any of the countless news services available on
the Internet.
2.2. Internet: still too expensive
Unfortunately, as the cost of telecommunications
is high and markets still limited, Internet service
providers generally charge more in Africa than
elsewhere for opening Internet accounts.
According to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 20 hours of
Internet access cost $29 in the United States,
including telephone bills and tax charged by the
provider, as against $74 in Germany, $52 in
France, $65 in the United Kingdom and $53 in
Italy. Seeing that per capita income in these
countries is ten times the African average, one
may well have misgivings about the spread of
the Internet in Africa. And while that may be a
financial problem, there is another more sensi-
tive social issue involved: how can a commu-
nity whose form of communication is based on
the oral tradition prepare for the concept of
universal communication?
3. Education: a primary way of promoting
the culture of peace
3.1. Education: at least
able to read and write
Imagine what someone who cannot read or write
is missing. Surely, such people are completely
cut off from any understanding of how their
environment is changing and can take no effec-
tive part in running public affairs. They there-
fore constitute what amounts to a brake on social
development. Of course, using a computer does
not require a given intellectual level, but it does
presume a universal language beyond the reach
of illiterates. One has to be able, at least, to
read and write.
In addition to school-type teaching, this means
a vast African literacy campaign to familiarize
everyone with computers and use of the Internet.
3.2. Education: a matter of all and for all
The great hope for Africa lies in the education
of all its children. Education in the broadest
28
Peace and human security in Africa What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
sense, including formal, non-formal and informal
education and demanding the participation of
all partners – ministries of education, families,
the media, religious leaders, parents’ associations
and, above all, NGOs.
The EIP has understood that education is a
prerequisite for peace and development, serves
humanity and opens up the path to under-
standing for all the world’s children. It is there-
fore at pains to encourage education worldwide
and secure respect for Article 26 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, stipulating inter
alia that education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages, and that
elementary education shall be compulsory.
It is therefore all-important to invest in educa-
tion. Respecting the right to education means
building peace, the progress of nations and
sustainable development.
Investment in sustainable human development,
as Federico Mayor, former Director-General of
UNESCO, said, means opting for an essential
change of direction in a world where the gap
that separates us from one another in terms of
material prosperity and knowledge continues to
grow rather than to shrink.
4. Human rights
and fundamental freedoms:
learn to live together
Peace-loving states and individuals must do every-
thing they can to ensure that the content of existing
international and national instruments concerning
human rights and fundamental freedoms is well
known, popularized, put into practice, experienced
and shared.
Investing in education is good, while investing in
the promotion of human rights is even better and
complementary. Human rights education gives people
the opportunity to get to know one another better,
to practise mutual tolerance and to accept in some
people feelings and ways of thinking and acting that
differ from those of others. Through human rights
education, we learn respect for life and human beings,
we learn mutual understanding and we combat all
attitudes that encourage war, violence and intoler-
ance, the source of human insecurity.
EIP-Cameroon is convinced that human rights
education must start as early as possible, with the
inclusion of human rights and peace education in
state education systems, in particular from the primary
level or even sooner.
How, though, can education be promoted in an
African population when the vast majority live below
subsistence level? There is after all a saying that words
are wasted on the starving.
5. Combating poverty: a prerequisite
for security and peace in the world
5.1. Combating poverty: for shared happiness
Can one have it all and be happy alongside
those who have nothing? Can one be happy
alone? Can one live in security and peace in a
world a quarter of whose population goes
hungry, is ill and has no hope of improvement?
The rich countries have understood this and
a first step was taken on 18 June 1999 in Cologne,
where almost $48 billion (i.e. less than 0.5 per
cent of global gross domestic product) of debts
owed by forty-one poor countries, out of a total
debt of nearly $230 billion, was cancelled by
the G7 countries.
5.2. Rich countries: could do better
We may already appreciate the generosity of the
Western countries but hope that they will, as
soon as possible, adopt the position of Germany
in favour of total and immediate debt cancella-
tion. This would ease the burden of the poorest
countries, which ought to be devoting their
resources to development and in particular to
social sectors such as education and health.
When we take a close look at the forty-one
countries that could be eligible for debt-
servicing relief, we realize that most of them
have been or are involved in armed conflict. We
are forced to the conclusion that poverty is a
cause (if not the main cause) of insecurity and
violence. Combating poverty, providing edu-
cation in general and education on human rights
and fundamental freedoms in particular, and
popularizing computers and the Internet are the
major challenges that Africa must take up to
make security a reality. What can actually be
done to move on from the dream to reality? The
actions I put forward here, while neither entirely
new nor unknown, are proposed to encourage
reflection on the contribution that must be made
in order that human security may cease to be
just a matter of slogans in Africa.
5.2.1. Strengthen the capacity for action
of civil society, in particular NGOs
NGOs are support bodies seeking through their
activities to complement government action.
Their action in all fields deserves to be encour-
aged and consolidated, particularly through:
• training NGO officials in fund-raising tech-
niques, project development and manage-
ment of their structure;
• training NGO members in human rights and
peace education;
• providing structures with computer equip-
ment;

• training members to use the Internet so that
communities and associations able to join
together in accordance with shared interests
or affinities can be enhanced and energized;
• establishing and supporting NGO coalitions
working to promote human rights and peace,
which should meet regularly to take stock of
their activities and refocus their work on the
ground.
5.2.2. Introduce new development-oriented
military policies
The key purpose of the armed forces is of
course to ensure national stability and the
security of citizens. To that end, they use
weapons spelling violence, death and desola-
tion. Hence the military are trained and
prepared for war. It is time to shape in them
a new attitude, that of peace, by directing them
towards development activities.
The military, who in most states make up a
substantial proportion of the working popula-
tion, can be trained for social work.
They can also take part in agriculture
(bringing land under cultivation), health
(increasing the number of health centres, espe-
cially in rural areas), building road infrastruc-
ture, public works, and so on.
This new direction for the armed forces
would ‘disarm the minds of the military to
disarm the hands’ and transform armed forces,
defence and war ministries into ministries for
peace. And, as revealed by a famous inscrip-
tion that so aptly adorns a wall of the United
Nations esplanade in New York, ‘they shall beat
their swords into ploughshares, and their spears
into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up
sword against nation, neither shall they learn
war any more’.
Imagine for just a moment how many viola-
tions of human rights the world would be
spared if all its inhabitants were to adopt this
position today and learn war no more!
Insecurity would give way to security and
war (which is the antithesis of human rights)
would disappear in favour of lasting peace.
5.2.3. World lobbying campaign to promote
human security
Such a campaign would mean encouraging
the participation of all those involved in
First round table 29
Peace and human security in Africa
development, without exception, in a vast
world movement for peace. Let us recall the
groups of men and women who, through their
action and pressure, have secured the adop-
tion of positions making for better human
conditions in the world:
• The Jubilee 2000 Coalition, an association
made up of NGOs, religious groups, media
bodies and individuals, carried out an active
campaign to persuade governments to adopt
a stance on debt relief for insolvent countries.
• The International Campaign to Ban Land-
mines (ICBL), founded by human rights
defenders, which has brought together over
1,000 organizations in sixty countries. Their
significant achievement was the adoption of
an international treaty banning landmines.
The network being created here in Paris of
directors of peace research and training insti-
tutions could follow this example and build
awareness in the world for the sake of greater
human security, in particular:
• by encouraging governments (which always
feel politically vulnerable) to regard human
rights as a humanitarian and not a political
issue and to apply human rights treaties;
• by approaching the competent authorities
with a view to including human rights and
peace teaching in their education systems and
ensuring that they abide by their obligations;
• by encouraging arrangements for monitoring,
surveying and reporting on the application
and violation of international standards
regarding the right to education;
• by launching an appeal for support for popu-
larization of the Internet to all those involved
in development, such as NGOs, schools,
research centres, government services, and
so on;
• by backing all women’s initiatives for peace
and equal access for girls and women to
quality education;
• by conducting a publicity campaign for
parents so that they never buy or give their
children toys associated with war and
violence, such as toy rifles, tanks, swords,
grenades, and so on.
If all these initiatives were taken into account
they, among others, would be bound to
contribute to building a world in which human
security and peace become realities.
30
Peace and human security in Africa What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Culture of Peace and UNESCO; basic document
summary report. See www.unesco.org/cpp.
UNESCO transdisciplinary project ‘Towards a
Culture of Peace’. See www.unesco.org/cpp.
The following periodicals: Jeune Afrique,
No. 2007, June–July 1999;
Amina, No. 367, November 2000;
Réveillez-vous, 22 November 1998; 22 July 1997;
The Watchtower, 15 September 2000.
The latter cites:
• Global Environment Outlook 2000, Nairobi, United
Nations Environment Programme, 2000;
• The Global Burden of Disease and Injury, Harvard
University Press, 1996;
• Confronting AIDS, the situation in the developing
countries, joint report by the European Commission
and the World Bank;
• Human Development Report 1999: Globalization
with a Human Face, New York, United Nations
Development Programme, 1999;
• At the Dawn of a New World: the Security of the
United States in the Twenty-first Century, United
States commission on national security in the
twenty-first century.
The Human Right to Peace: declaration by the
Director-General of UNESCO, January 1997, 15 pp.
(UNESCO doc. SHS.97/WS/6.)

SECURITY IN AFRICA:
STATE FORMATION
AND THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS
by Mr Jakkie Cilliers,
Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Pretoria, South Africa
1. Introduction
For many the end of the Cold War promised an end
to conflict and held out the prospects for peace and
prosperity. This has proved inaccurate for Africa, as
for much of the rest of the world. In fact, conflict in
Africa has increased in recent years. To these chal-
lenges, and their impact on the continent, a new
scourge is now added in the potential impact of
HIV/AIDS on the already precarious African security
situation.
This paper deals with the issue of state forma-
tion in Africa followed by an analysis of the impact
of HIV/AIDS. The purpose is to explore and outline
these two challenges as a basis for discussion rather
than to suggest remedial action.
2. State formation in Africa
Effective colonial rule of much of Africa lasted for a
relatively brief historical space of some eighty years
– as opposed to settlements along the coast which
go back several centuries. During this period the
colonial countries sought to administer African
countries along their own models, generally a foreign
administration largely run by foreigners in a very
different continent. The result, at the time of inde-
pendence during the 1950s and 1960s, was a series
of African states with the trappings of Europe, but
inherently untouched by Western influence, politics
and systems – much like South Africa after apartheid.
As a result, the modern state structure in Africa
imposed on the continent during this period often
forms little more than a thin carapace over the largely
hidden realms of the informal economy and its
companion polity.
At root the colonial and apartheid state was based
on domination and on its ability to impose its hege-
mony upon the subject peoples and to extract from
them the taxes necessary for the maintenance of the
colonial state apparatus.
Colonial administrations were bound together by
a common code of ethics and surety of racial
First round table 31
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS
solidarity – an intrusion ruled by a foreign elite
banded together under the governor by a code of
behaviour, ‘a set of guardians whose strength lay in
the pack’.1
While the colonial state was essentially bureau-
cratic, the post-independence regimes have been
ultrapolitical.2 Many African states came to inde-
pendence through low-intensity conflicts waged by
liberation movements against colonial powers. Having
taken power in this way, the new state incumbents
were left highly exposed and vulnerable to challengers
from within – sometimes from competitors bent on
using these very same methods against them once
the unifying solidity of a common enemy had disap-
peared. Rulers also now had to rely on their fellow
nationals to maintain law and order, some with
political ideas and ambitions of their own. It soon
became evident, as in all functionally undifferentiated
societies, that the closer one was to the centre of the
political apparatus, the greater the chances of material
reward. As a result, the state in Africa has often been
the primary arena for competition, for power, and
for influence over the distribution of scarce resources.
Writing in the early 1980s, Jackson and Rosberg noted:
‘What the Church was for ambitious men in medieval
Europe or the business corporation in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century America, the state is today for
ambitious Africans with skill and fortune.’3 In the
absence of other opportunities the state in Africa
largely serves as a ‘private’ resource instead of a
‘public’ good.
The driving force behind Africa’s second experi-
ment with democracy during the 1980s and early
1990s came both from ideological conviction and the
growing impatience of an ever-bolder public
consciousness, and from the related matter of the
continent’s prevailing economic crisis. For the first
time since independence, domestic support became
more important than foreign patrons, and African
leaders had to confront the inherent weaknesses of
their regimes and to consider sharing power with
others. These were uncomfortable times, for all this
happened at a time of deep and structural economic
crisis.
32
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
At the very moment when democratization stim-
ulated the popular demand for better social and
welfare services, structural adjustment required that
this be denied. In broad terms this played a signif-
icant part in further undermining the state’s claims
to legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens. As the
World Bank itself recognized in its 1997 World
Development Report, ‘An institutional vacuum of
significant proportions has emerged in many parts
of sub-Saharan Africa, leading to increased crime and
an absence of security, affecting investment and
growth’.
By the 1990s the ‘military balance’ between the
state and society in Africa had changed profoundly.
At independence, one could still argue that most of
the post-colonial regimes retained the balance of force
through control over the security apparatus and the
level of armaments at their unique disposal. At the
turn of the century an increased number of African
states have atrophied and weapons have spilled over
from armed conflicts throughout the region, circulating
virtually uncontrolled. This has allowed groups in a
number of societies to arm and challenge the incum-
bent elite, while in many instances the security
agencies themselves have decayed and lost their
coherence. As a result, a military victory by any of
the various armed forces in a number of countries
at war, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo
or the Sudan, is unlikely to reduce levels of social
violence or the trend towards social fragmentation
without additional and substantial negotiations and
peace-building measures. At the same time state
control, to the extent that it exists in the form of
organized administration and the provision of services,
has contracted inward, in many instances reflecting
an exclusively urban bias and neglect of the rural
populations.
Today the surfeit of arms and lack of control
over national territories has resulted in much of sub-
Saharan Africa being characterized not by the state’s
monopoly over the instruments of coercion, but by
a balance of force between the state and the commu-
nity. The result, in a highly armed and violent
continent, ironically, is the creation of a security
vacuum. Within Nairobi, Johannesburg or Luanda
security is available to those who can afford it. In
Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, war continues in
those countries that have exploitable resources worth
fighting for and that can sustain conflict. In all
instances those vast sections of the population in
the rural areas, dependent upon subsistence agri-
culture, are left to fend for themselves and forced
to arm and organize to prevent their exploitation by
local warlords, ethnically based politicians or crim-
inals.
Although the end of superpower competition had
resulted in a reduction in state-sponsored arms
transfers to Africa, the fact that local disputes were
less globalized meant that outside powers had less
will to impact upon on the conduct, termination and
outcome of these conflicts. Local rivalries and
antagonisms were given freer rein, being more remote
from world centres of power and insignificant in terms
of the global system. Africans could no longer rely
on outside assistance to end local wars that were no
threat to vital foreign interests and are now forced
to accept responsibility for peace and security them-
selves – though at a time when the African state is
at its weakest.
The loss of the coherence of the state has also
encouraged the emergence of new forms of power
relations, notably between the central government
and local actors, and of new institutions, such as
vigilante groups and private militias. The creation of
new economic and financial opportunities has seen
the emergence of national and transnational actors
who are directly implicated in criminal economic
activities such as drug trafficking, trade in stolen cars,
general smuggling, and more. In short, the outsourcing
and commercialization of state functions in uncon-
solidated states have not proved a panacea for the
lack of capacity that has characterized the post-
colonial state.
For a time external non-state actors, including
private military companies, stepped into the void left
by the international community, sometimes as proxies,
sometimes as independent agents, able to influence
local events to their own advantage or that of their
paymaster. More recently it would appear as if a
number of African leaders are using their armed forces
in part pursuit of commercial opportunities in neigh-
bouring countries.
With the collapse of bipolar competition, Africa’s
importance has reverted to a lower level, reflecting
its lack of strategic relevance and marginal economic
role. As the state weakened, governance contracted
inward, often reflecting little more than the limits of
the urban sprawl and an absence of administration
in the countryside, making governance more myth
than reality.
The effect of the end of the Cold War has also
forced sub-state actors to develop alternative resources
from those prevalent during the bipolar era. Over
time, organized violence itself has become an
economic means of accumulation in certain areas.
Previously organizations such as the MPLA and UNITA
could obtain resources by presenting themselves as
instruments in a much wider scheme, that of super-
power competition. In the post-bipolar era, Cold War
patronage has been replaced by the exploitation
of easily accessible natural resources. Less dependent
upon external support, the exploitation of diamonds,
cobalt, hardwood and the like have reduced the
ability of external actors to pressurize the pro-
tagonists. Increased internationalization and the
apparent universal salience of economic liberalization,

sometimes referred to as globalization, has opened
up new avenues for linkages by local actors that can
now bypass state control through networks that are
neither geographically located nor internationally
regulated. The information age has not only bene-
fited traders on Wall Street, but also rebel leaders,
allowing them to hold and transfer off-shore accounts,
to hide liquid assets and to purchase arms through
brokers in distant countries where control is weak.
The business of war profiteering has become priva-
tized and often relocated to less-developed countries
where lack of controls and oversight ease operations.
In this sense the rise in so-called ‘resource wars’
reflects the changed domestic and regional economic
and social patterns under conditions of greater inter-
national interaction and access to the global economy
for developing countries. In a country such as Angola,
Cold War patronage has been replaced by resource
war instrumentalization.
Direct conflict between African states, such as
that between Ethiopia and Eritrea, has in fact been
a relatively isolated phenomenon. Not so war by
proxy. Today any numbers of African countries are
involved in indirect confrontations with one another.
Often these conflicts are conducted through support
to armed opposition parties in neighbouring states,
sometimes with a religious or ethnic character, often
taking place in a third country, drawing others into
the war and expanding the conflict. There are many
examples of these activities in the Horn and in Central
Africa. In other cases neighbouring countries have
involved themselves directly in the internal affairs of
others or allowed their territory to be used as a
springboard for such involvement. Possibly the most
obvious examples today relate to what is happening
in central and eastern parts of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Yet in other instances coun-
tries have been drawn into conflicts by their diffi-
culty in controlling their often inhospitable and
rugged borders, particularly when international
boundaries cut through rather than follow broad
ethnic and tribal divides.
But the most significant characteristic of these
conflicts is the degree to which they are now African
wars.
Unsupported by foreign patrons, Africa is coming
to terms with itself and the African state seeking a
solid root. In this manner, free from colonialism and
the Cold War, the turbulence in Africa reflects a
delayed process of state formation. As state forma-
tion in Europe not that long ago was often a bloody
and messy affair, so state formation in Africa is also
serving to be violent and accompanied by intense
human suffering. But, very different to Europe, Africa
has already been carved into political entities – the
state has preceded the nation.
At the strategic level the degree to which Africans
are wrestling with their own security identity is a
First round table 33
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS
source of hope for the future, despite the extent to
which the global economic rules are biased against
developing countries. The largest unknown factor is
the potential role of HIV/AIDS.
3. HIV/AIDS and Africa4
It is hardly possible to overstate the potential impact
of an epidemic that has the capacity to reverse
decades of national development, to widen the gulf
between rich and poor nations, and to cause unpre-
cedented social disruption. In Africa the epidemic
is now more devastating than war: in 1998,
200,000 Africans died from conflict, but 2.2 million
died from AIDS.5 The rapid loss of human capital,
from every walk of society, reflects the decimation
of a major conflict, with similar consequences.
The year 2000 began with 24 million Africans
infected with the HIV virus. In the absence of a
medical miracle, nearly all will die before 2010. Each
day 6,000 Africans die from HIV/AIDS. Each day, an
additional 11,000 are infected. The epidemic has
proceeded much faster in some countries than in
others. Altogether, at the end of 1999, there were
sixteen countries (all in sub-Saharan Africa) in which
more than one-tenth of the adult population aged 15
to 49 was infected with HIV. In seven countries (all
in southern Africa), at least one adult in five was
living with the virus. In Botswana, 36 per cent of the
adult population is HIV-positive. In Swaziland and
Zimbabwe, the infection rate is 25 per cent. Lesotho
is at 24 per cent. In Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
the figure is 20 per cent. In none of these countries
has the spread of the virus been checked.6
In contrast to most infectious diseases, which take
their heaviest toll among the elderly and the very
young, HIV/AIDS takes its greatest toll among young
adults. By 2010, Africa is expected to have 40 million
orphans – roaming the countryside and city streets
without schooling or work, prime candidates for the
criminal gangs, marauding militias and child armies
that have slaughtered and mutilated tens of thousands
of civilians in countries such as Sierra Leone and
Liberia in the last decade.
HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming one of the key
human security issues in sub-Saharan Africa. The
effects of the epidemic are felt in a number of inter-
related ways. Recently more attention has been paid
to the economic consequences. A number of
researchers have commented and tried to calculate
the macro-economic consequences of HIV/AIDS on
the gradual, but cumulative erosion of growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) in heavily affected countries.
In a country such as Zimbabwe, for example, AIDS
deaths had already severely impacted upon subsis-
tence agriculture long before the recent politically
induced economic crisis.
34
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
It is evident that HIV/AIDS will exacerbate popu-
lation pressures and trends, particularly migration and
urbanization, to create more volatile social and
political situations. This combination can produce
heightened competition for limited resources and
foster more intense rivalries among groups in
countries marked by ethnic, religious, or other
diversity.
War serves to spread HIV/AIDS in ways that
compound the impact and extent of the pandemic.
The armed forces (both formal and guerrilla forces),
which constitute a major population bloc in many
African societies, are highly mobile and often active
across borders. For example, a movement such as
UNITA is active in Angola, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Zambia
and Namibia. Seeking to contain the rebels, the
Angolan armed forces have long been deployed in
the DR Congo and Congo-Brazzaville, while Namibia,
Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and others have
deployed troops in the DR Congo, within which
Uganda is also involved in a proxy war with the
Sudan. As the infection pattern in African combat
forces, largely composed of single males at the peak
of their sexually active life, is generally higher than
in the civilian population, conflict serves to spread
the pandemic. The impact of HIV on civilian popu-
lations lies in the high rates of sexual interaction
between military and civilian populations, whether
through commercial sex, or in rape as a weapon of
war; and in the extreme vulnerability of displaced
and refugee populations to HIV infection. Women in
a refugee camp are six times more likely to contract
HIV than the general outside population.7
Apart from spreading the disease, HIV infection
poses an additional and serious threat to the order
function of the African state. Unlike the situation in
many other areas, African armed forces are actively
employed internally either in support of or parallel
to the police in providing internal security. High AIDS
attrition rates within the armed forces therefore does
not only compromise the armed forces’ readiness, but
also limits their ability to impose social order and to
protect countries from external intervention. This
compounds the security vacuum evident in many
African countries and therefore contributes to the
weakness of state institutions and the recourse to
alternative sources of security.
The spread of the disease can further intensify
pressures on governmental structures. Disease can
decimate the ranks of skilled administrators, diminish
the reach or responsiveness of governmental institu-
tions, or reduce their resilience. This will detrimen-
tally affect the operational effectiveness of such insti-
tutions as the police, prosecution service and judiciary.
Weaknesses in the criminal justice system will be
exacerbated by increased poverty and social tensions,
and a burgeoning orphan population. The result will
inevitably be an increase in crime from its already
high levels.
If a government is perceived to be incapable of
adequately addressing health problems created by the
spread of HIV/AIDS, this can produce a heightened
sense of marginalization among affected populations
and a stronger sense of deprivation and resentment.
Alienation can be particularly adverse when combined
with chronic poverty. These attitudes can contribute
to the eruption of violence, not just spontaneously,
but in some cases as the result of exploitation by
ethnic, religious, or national elites to serve their
narrow interests.8
But tragically it is not only war and conflict that
spread the disease, but also the effects of peace. We
already know that the aftermath of complex human-
itarian crises presents particular opportunities that
could accentuate the HIV/AIDS risk climate:9
• social disruption resulting in sudden, widespread
and profound poverty exacerbated by reductions in
agricultural output;
• lack of income leading to sale of sex by women
– but also by children;
• increased child labour, and many children living on
the streets;
• active migration to find work, further disrupting
family integrity;
• lives characterized by a desperation that fosters
increases in sexual and domestic violence and
abuse, rape and gender inequality;
• decimated health infrastructure, and deterioration of
most state services such as education, security and
welfare.
No wonder therefore that a January 2000 report by
the United States Government’s National Intelligence
Council concluded that there is a definite link between
infectious disease epidemics (in particular HIV/AIDS)
and security10 and that the United Nations Security
Council debate on AIDS in Africa some months later
redefined the epidemic as a threat to human security.
The US Government report found that:
• The impact of HIV/AIDS is likely to aggravate and
even provoke social fragmentation and political
polarization in the hardest-hit countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.
• The relationship between disease and political
instability is indirect but real. Infant mortality
(likely to more than double in a number of
southern African states because of HIV/AIDS by
2010) correlates strongly with political instability,
particularly in countries that have achieved a
measure of democratization.
• The severe social and economic impact of
HIV/AIDS, and the infiltration of the epidemic into
the ruling political and military elites and middle
classes of developing countries, are likely to inten-
sify the struggle for political power to control scarce
state resources. This will hamper the development

of a civil society and other underpinnings of -
democracy, and will increase pressure on demo-
cratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa.
• An estimated 22 million orphans in sub-Saharan
Africa by 2010 are expected to comprise a ‘lost
orphaned generation’ with little hope of educational
or employment opportunities. Such societies will be
at risk of increased crime and political instability
as these young people become radicalized or are
exploited by various political groups for their own
ends – the child-soldier phenomenon may be one
example. The increase in crime and political
instability, moreover, will be accompanied by a
probable increased availability in illicit small arms
and increased operations of organized criminals in
sub-Saharan Africa.
The more widespread the disease, the weaker the
state’s capacity to respond. The weaker the state’s
capacity to respond, the greater the increase in the
prevalence of the disease.11 This negative spiral is
most intense in southern African countries whose state
capacity is severely limited since they have fewer
human, financial, and other resources from which to
draw to break the cycle.
4. Conclusion
I began by arguing that the end of colonialism left
most African states poorly prepared for self-
governance, let alone independence. The subsequent
Cold War served to buttress weak African states but
at the same time stunted any further institutionaliza-
tion of the state as somehow separate and distinct
from private interests.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the
situation is much changed. At independence, one
could still argue that most of the post-colonial regimes
retained sufficient monopoly of force through control
over the security apparatus and the level of
armaments at their disposal. Subsequently an
increased number of African states have atrophied
and weapons have spilled over their borders from
armed conflicts throughout the region, circulating
virtually uncontrolled. This has allowed groups in
any number of countries to arm and challenge the
incumbent elite while the security agencies them-
selves, in many instances, have decayed and lost
their coherence.
It has long been evident that a number of African
states are either weak or exist as what some have
First round table 35
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS
referred to as ‘quasi-states’ – they exist mainly because
they are recognized internationally as existing, not
because they perform the functions of a state or share
its attributes.
What will happen in this situation when one then
considers the AIDS epidemic raging across sub-
Saharan Africa – a tragedy of epic proportions and
one that is altering the region’s demographic future
– reducing life expectancy, raising mortality, lowering
fertility, creating an excess of men over women, and
leaving millions of orphans in its wake?
Undoubtedly the impact of the epidemic will be
magnified by the fragility and complexity of the
continent’s geopolitical systems. Eleven of the world’s
twenty-seven conflicts are in Africa; fifteen sub-
Saharan countries face food emergencies; drought in
East Africa threatens to exacerbate food scarcity. These
emergencies pose real threats to social and political
stability in Africa. United Nations Secretary-General,
Kofi Annan, told the Security Council at the begin-
ning of 2000: ‘By overwhelming the continent’s health
and social services, by creating millions of orphans,
and by decimating health workers and teachers, AIDS
is causing social and economic crises which in turn
threaten political stability.’12
There are many unknowns in the effects of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. How will the loss of
so many adults in rural communities affect food
security? What will be the social effects of the missing
generation of young adults unable to rear their
children? How will intra-African peace-keeping
operations be affected by the epidemic that dis-
proportionately affects military personnel? What
impact will the virus have on the functioning of state
departments in already poorly performing criminal
justice systems in sub-Saharan Africa? How will 30 per
cent to 40 per cent of the adult population, who are
HIV-positive and dying, react when their government
decides to spend limited state resources on policing,
education or housing instead of building more
hospitals and care centres for those infected by the
virus?
I believe that the threat of HIV/AIDS underlines
the requirement for state-building and for the simul-
taneous engagement of civil society. Strong, efficient
and capable states will remain the prerequisite for
both stability and democracy in Africa – the precon-
dition for peace-building. But the experience in
Uganda demonstrates the degree to which only civil
society has the ability to engage in combating the
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
36
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
NOTES
1. D. Austin, ‘Things Fall Apart’, Orbis, Winter 1982,
pp. 928–9.
2. Ibid., p. 929.
3. R. H. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black
Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, p. 14,
Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1982.
4. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance
provided by Martin Schönteich of the ISS with the section
on HIV/AIDS.
5. Council of Foreign Relations, Panel to discuss HIV/AIDS,
A New Priority for International Security, Briefing Pack,
Washington, D.C., 5 June 2000.
6. HIV Epidemic Restructuring Africa’s Population,
Worldwatch Issue Alert 1A10, 31 October 2000. Available
at http://www.worldwatch.org/chairman/issue/001031.html
7. Council of Foreign Relations, op. cit.
8. Contagion and Conflict. Health as a Global Security
Challenge, Report of the Chemical and Biological Arms
Control Institute and the CSIS International Security
Program, p. 14, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, D.C., January 2000.
9. Council of Foreign Relations, op. cit.
10. The Global Infectious Threat and its Implications for the
United States, NIE 99-17D, Washington, D.C., US Govern-
ment National Intelligence Council, 2000.
11. Contagion and Conflict…, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
12. AIDS Becoming Africa’s Top Human Security Issue, UN
Warns, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) press release, 10 January 2000. Available
at http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/press/eng/
pressarc00/ny10100.html
 SECOND ROUND TABLE

The main challenges facing

the promotion of human security
and peace in Europe

Moderator:
Mr Philippe Ratte,
Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO

Lecturer:
Mr Bjørn Møller,
Former Secretary-General,
International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark

Opening remarks
by the moderator, Mr Philippe Ratte,
Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO
A few words of introduction, if you will, before we
hear Mr Møller’s report, which he will present this
afternoon. Remember that the Second World War had
not yet ended when General de Gaulle decided to
found the future and security of France, and more
generally of Europe, on the concept of civil security.
The purpose of the notion of civil security adopted
immediately after the war was to create within society
a force and a momentum that would ensure long-
term peace. Let us recall also that that war, the Second
World War, was the result of a bitter failure, the failure
of collective security and the pacifist principles that
had inspired it for a good many years before it
collapsed with the failure of the League of Nations.
And then, need I call your attention – I rather
hesitate to do so after a meal which probably held
an element of risk – to the fact that what is in the
news today is food security, or rather food insecurity,
and that if matters were taken to their logical extreme,
the only reasonable position would be perpetual
fasting. So, to extricate ourselves from this predica-
ment, I would also like to call your attention as
etymologists to the fact that the concept of security
is a vague and curious one. The word comes from
the Latin securus, ‘free from care’, from se (without)
and cura (care, concern); and it is therefore a strange
concept because it is based not on a reality but on
the concern we have about it, the preoccupation that
we have in relation to that reality. It is, in a sense,
halfway between two concepts which flank it, the
concept of defence on the one side – where, clearly,
we react to aggression, to attack – and at the other
extreme the concept of safety, safety being an
ontological position in which we do not even have
to worry about security.
At this rather vague halfway point where we
locate the concept of security, I would like, perhaps
being provocative, to suggest that you think in
contrary terms, in terms of ‘curity’. The word does
not exist, the concept does not exist, but it has to
do with taking care of something. Security is all well
and good, but it is tragic when it means neglecting
the changeable and vague situations that exist around
us; the concept of security is only valuable insofar
Second round table 39
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe
as it inspires in us an attitude of ‘curity’, of care, of
concern about things.
We have many reasons to do this – and I would
like to mention just five areas in which this concept
of security has its rightful place. The first is our rela-
tion to others in the classical tradition of the Peace
of Westphalia – moreover, it is state security that is
going to be discussed here, I believe. In this case,
we protect ourselves against the risks that others
might make us run, ‘others’ being an extremely large
category, and which, within Europe itself, which is
perhaps geopolitically the most stable part of the
world today, is not without some worrying aspects,
whether in the East, or recently in the Balkans, or
perhaps in the South. But there are two other dimen-
sions that considerably expand this relationship to
others: the relationship, on the one hand, to the
world, and on the other hand, to oneself. First, the
dimension of the world, which is greater than the
sum of its parts, and which is a global, holistic
phenomenon. We have just witnessed the failure of
the conference which was supposed to re-examine
our concerns about the greenhouse effect, and which
showed that states are unable, for the time being, to
properly manage a global situation as worrying as
this. Opposite is the dimension of the self, within
societies, within nations, within communities, where
the most serious threats to security may exist – drugs,
sects, social breakdown, loss of points of reference,
and so forth.
I would like to add two additional dimensions:
after others, the world, the self, we have things: such
as this amazing prion which has no name in any
language, these viruses or retroviruses which act
inside things, this piercing anxiety we have about the
progress of science. This is the feeling that within
things themselves, within the physical reality of what
we eat, of where we go, of what we breathe, there
may be very serious causes of insecurity.
The final dimension is that of the future. Situations
that are very safe today, which give us a feeling of
extreme security, can change with time. I would there-
fore like to suggest a very simple framework to struc-
ture our debates a little. In the classic framework, we
40
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
are in the middle and worried about our security in
relation to others or the security between others. The
four other dimensions, that which is known, i.e. the
world and the self, the two extremes, that which is
greater than the state, that which is smaller than the
state (society, content, the individual, moral reference
points), and then, in the same duality, things and the
future, make up the five dimensions which may
prompt us to reflect on the question of security. A
difficult reflection, which is why it is fortunate that
you are all here to debate the matter with your compe-
tence and knowledge. I would like to illustrate this
difficulty with a second framework, before giving the
floor to those for whom it is intended.
Here is an example of another classic and
extremely simple framework for security. In the
middle is the territory. Everyone knows what a terri-
tory is, it has borders, it is limited, it is known. Around
the territory is the nation. A nation is larger than a
territory – it has interests, it has commercial dimen-
sions, it has a reputation, and so forth. And then,
still larger than the nation, is the defence system,
which is projected outwards from the territory and
the nation to protect them as far as possible. Next
we have the ‘three Ss’: within the territory, the concept
of internal security; beyond the limits of defence, the
concept of collective security; and linking the two,
that which is the most all-encompassing and the most
internal, the problem of security, which is much more
complex, inasmuch as it involves values and philo-
sophical reference points, extremely subtle systems
of international relations and legal values. This is a
very comfortable situation because we know where
the concepts are, where the problems are, and where
the means of handling them are.
The trouble is that this situation no longer exists,
and the current situation, it seems to me, is much
closer to a test for colour-blindness, in which people
who cannot distinguish certain colours see only a
mass of dots, a cloud of elements, which is extremely
confusing and chaotic. The sharpest eyes will distin-
guish something resembling an S, but it may be a
serpent, or a dollar sign, or perhaps security, we don’t
know.

NATIONAL, SOCIETAL AND HUMAN SECURITY:
GENERAL DISCUSSION
WITH A CASE STUDY FROM THE BALKANS
by Mr Bjørn Møller,
Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA),
Copenhagen, Denmark
1. Preface
‘Human security’ has become something of a catch-
phrase, used both by United Nations agencies,
national development aid agencies and international
as well as national non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) has been in the forefront of this debate, as
illustrated by the following quotations:
‘The concept of security must change from an
exclusive stress on national security to a much greater
stress on people’s security, from security through
armaments to security through human development,
from territorial security to food, employment and en-
vironmental security’ (Human Development Report
1993).1
‘For too long, the concept of security has been
shaped by the potential for conflict between states.
For too long, security has been equated with the
threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations
have sought arms to protect their security. For most
people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from
worries about daily life than from the dread of a cata-
clysmic world event. Job security, income security,
health security, environmental security, security from
crime, these are the emerging concerns of human
security all over the world. … Human security is rele-
vant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in
poor. The threats to their security may differ – hunger
and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in
rich nations – but these threats are real and growing.
… Most people instinctively understand what security
means. It means safety from the constant threats of
hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means
protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the
pattern of our daily lives – whether in our homes, in
our jobs, in our communities or in our environment’
(Human Development Report 1994).2
The Commission on Global Governance in its
1995 report on Our Global Neighbourhood likewise
lent its support to a reorientation towards human
security:
‘Although it is necessary to continue to uphold
the right of states to security, so that they may be
Second round table 41
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
protected against external threats, the international
community needs to make the protection of people
and their security an aim of global security policy.’3
However, the academic community has been more
reluctant to embrace the concept of human security,
perhaps out of fear that doing so might blunt the
edge of an otherwise sharp analytical tool.
There is certainly some justification for this reluc-
tance. ‘Security’ is such a positively value-laden term
(in analogy with ‘peace’) that it is virtually impos-
sible to argue against security. With the exception of
Hecate, who in Shakespeare’s Macbeth (Act 3,
Scene 5) described security as ‘mortals’ chiefest
enemy’, everybody has to be in favour of ‘security’,
however defined. Hence the temptation to subsume
whatever is desirable (‘motherhood and apple pie’)
under it, which would surely do little to enhance its
analytical utility.
The following account analyses the development
of the theoretical use of the concept, from a rather
narrow, state-centric and militarized one (‘national
security’), via one focusing on national and other
identities (‘societal security’), to a much wider concept,
including concerns for human rights, development,
gender issues, etc., labelled ‘human security’. In
conclusion is an illustration of how the different forms
of security are interlinked, with a look at national,
societal and human security problems in the Balkan
conflicts.
2. From positivism to constructivism
2.1. International relations
and peace research perspectives
As an academic term, ‘security’ was until fairly
recently almost monopolized by the discipline
of international relations (IR). IR theorists
employed the term in a rather narrow sense, i.e.
as almost synonymous with military power.
According to this simplistic logic the more mili-
tary power, or the more favourable the military
balance, the more security. Surprisingly little was,
however, written about the concept of security
42
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
(as opposed to presumed strategies for achieving
it) by the IR theoreticians. In his seminal work
on Realism, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly both-
ered to define ‘security’.4 Arnold Wolfers was
thus almost alone in venturing a definition, which
has become ‘standard’:
‘Security, in an objective sense, measures the
absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjec-
tive sense, the absence of fear that such values
will be attacked.’5
Even this definition leaves open a number of
questions: Whose values might be threatened?
Which are these values? Who might attack them?
By what means? Whose fears should count? How
might one distinguish between sincere (albeit
perhaps unfounded) fears and faked ones? And
should the ‘absence’ of threats and/or fear be
understood in absolute or (as indicated by the
term ‘measure’) relative terms? I shall return to
most of these questions in due course.
In contrast to IR, peace researchers have for
decades endeavoured to develop meaningful
conceptions of peace, security and violence6 –
a preoccupation that also reflects their long-
standing interest in development issues7 and
desire to break those bonds of ethnocentrism
that have always characterized IR.8
Both Johan Galtung’s term ‘positive peace’ and
the late Kenneth Boulding’s ‘stable peace’ could
thus, in retrospect, be seen as precursors of the
emerging, expanded security concept.9 For
‘security’ to be genuine and durable, it would
have to be based on a positive or stable peace
structure. This would entail considerably more
than a mere ‘negative peace’, in its turn equated
with an absence of war, representing merely one
particular form of ‘direct violence’. Genuine
peace and security would thus presuppose an
elimination (or at least a reduction) of what
Galtung called ‘structural violence’, i.e. the rela-
tive deprivation of large parts of the world popu-
lation. Thus conceived, a ‘positive peace’ was
more or less synonymous with what is today
referred to as ‘human security’ (vide infra).
Belatedly, members of the IR community have
come to accept the challenge of developing
broader conceptions of security.10 Barry Buzan
and his collaborators (but not including the
present author) at the Copenhagen Peace
Research Institute (COPRI) have belonged to the
theoretical vanguard in this endeavour by virtue
of their analyses of national as well as ‘societal’
security (vide infra).11 However, while acknow-
ledging the need for shifting the focus from the
(now defunct) East-West conflict and military
matters,12 most members of the ‘strategic studies’
(now often relabelled ‘security studies’) commu-
nity have continued their rearguard battle against
what they regard as an inappropriate expansion
of the concept of ‘security’.
Even though a consensus thus seems to be
emerging on the need for a certain widening,
disagreement persists about where to draw the
line. To expand the notion of security too far –
say, to include the absence of all types of
problem – would not be practical, as it would
merely create the need for an additional term
for ‘traditional security’, now relegated to being
merely one species of the genus ‘security’. Not
to widen the concept at all, on the other hand,
might relegate ‘security studies’ to a very margin-
alized position, if (as seems likely) traditional
security problems will be perceived as having a
sharply diminishing salience – at the very least
as far as the West (or North) is concerned.
2.2. Social constructivism
The quest for a ‘correct’ definition of an ‘essen-
tially contested concept’13 such as ‘security’ is
probably futile. Rather, this is a matter of defi-
nitions, which may be more or less useful or
relevant, and which may both reflect and impact
on power relations, but which can be neither
right nor wrong. One may thus have to agree
with Lewis Carroll’s fictitious Humpty Dumpty
in his linguistic philosophy:
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in
rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what
I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can
make words mean so many things.’ ‘The ques-
tion is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be
master – that’s all’ (Through the Looking Glass).14
The ‘Humpty Dumpties’ of political science
and IR, usually labelled ‘constructivists’, are
probably right in rejecting as futile the quest
for concepts that are ‘correct’ in the sense of
corresponding to reality, if only because this
‘reality’ is itself socially constructed, inter alia,
by means of concepts such as ‘peace’ and
‘security’. Mindful of being part of the game
oneself, what the analyst can do is merely to
analyse how concepts are used, and how the
security discourse is thus evolving.15 As argued
by Ole Wæver and others, the challenge is to
analyse the security discourse as a complex
‘speech act’ (or Wittgensteinean ‘language
game’), i.e. to explore the evolving ‘securitiza-
tion’ and ‘desecuritization’ of issues.16 Among
other advantages, this approach induces caution
with regard to elevating too many problems to
the status of ‘security problems’, which
inevitably has political implications, some of
which may be undesirable.
• First, in the political discourse to label some-
thing a ‘security problem’ may be (ab)used by

the powers that be for a ‘tabooization’ of issues
and marginalization of ideological opponents.
A matter with alleged national security impli-
cations is arguably ‘off limits’, i.e. not a totally
legitimate subject for political or academic
debate, but one where everybody has to show
loyalty to ‘the common cause’. In order to
prevent such a closure of important debates,
a relevant political goal might be a ‘desecur-
itization’ of pertinent issues, which may allow
for a more open and fruitful debate.
• Second, certain strata in society may benefit
from securitization, e.g. because they are tradi-
tionally viewed as responsible for ‘security’,
however defined. To securitize various prob-
lems may thus provide the armed forces with
a justification for their claim on national
resources, which may not be desirable. ‘Critical
security studies’ devote themselves, inter alia,
to uncovering the interests and power games
underlying the security discourse.17
On the other hand, to proclaim something to
be a security problem may certainly be justifi-
able, as it attaches a label of urgency to an
issue. Hence the attraction of, for example, secur-
itizing environmental problems, which is tanta-
mount to elevating a problem to one of ‘exis-
tential’ importance. Unless solved without delay
such a problem may destroy all other values,
which warrants giving it absolute first priority.18
Whether to expand the concept of security or
not, and if so in which direction and to what
extent, is thus a matter of both political choice
and analytical convenience. In the following
Table 1: Expanded concepts of ‘security’
Security of whom?
Degree of expansion Label
Focus
No expansion National security The state
Incremental Societal security Nations
Societal groups
Radical Human security Individuals
Humanity
Ultra-radical Environmental security Ecosystem
Second round table 43
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
I analyse how it might be expanded while paying
a certain attention to both the positive and nega-
tive political implications thereof.
3. Axes of expansion
In principle, expansion can take place along different
‘axes’, i.e. as answers to various questions, which
may be subdivided according to how radically they
depart from the prevailing orthodoxy.
• Security of whom? This is the question of focus,
i.e. of the appropriate ‘referent object’ (in the termi-
nology of Buzan et al., whereas Bill McSweeney
prefers the term ‘subject’).19 Three types of entity
immediately spring to mind which might be either
secure or insecure: the state, other human collec-
tives, or the individual, more about which shortly.
• Security of what? Depending on whose security is
at stake, security will be a matter of an absence of
threats to different values, i.e. it may have
completely different connotations.
• Security from whom or what? This is the question
of the source of threat. Different values may
obviously be placed in jeopardy by different actors,
in addition to which there may be numerous ‘struc-
tural’ threats (global warming, for example) without
any agents. These might, in principle, also be
securitized, but they rarely are.
My main emphasis is on these three questions (see
Table 1), and especially on that of focus, as this is
where ‘human security’ represents the most radical
departure from security studies orthodoxy. However,
I also briefly discuss three additional sets of questions:
Mode of expansion
Security from whom
Security of what?
or what?
Value at risk
Source(s) of threat
Sovereignty Other states
Territorial integrity (Sub-state actors)
National unity (States)
Identity Nations
Migrants
Alien culture
Survival The state
Quality of life Globalization
Nature
Sustainability Humanity
44
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
• Security from what? Depending on which values
are supposed to be threatened by whom (or what),
these threats may appear in different dimensions
(or ‘sectors’), such as the military domain, the en-
vironment, or the economy.
• Security by whom? This is a question of agency,
as there will be different answers to the question
of who is supposed to ‘do security’, depending on
all of the above. Moreover, this question of agency
has both a macro (international) and a micro (sub-
state) dimension. The former refers to the level at
which security is sought, e.g. by individual states,
dyads or larger groups of states, or the interna-
tional system as such. The latter refers to the above-
mentioned division of labour within society between
the ‘security services’ and the rest.
• Security by which means? This is a question of both
strategies (or, rather, ‘grand strategies’) and of
concrete plans determining, for example, the rela-
tive importance of military and other means to the
end of security.
4. State-centric (‘national’) security
Most of the security discourse continues to revolve
around the state, but even here it makes sense to
distinguish between orthodox security studies and
‘alternative security studies’.
4.1. The orthodox version
What characterized the traditional IR approach
to ‘security’, especially during the era of almost
unchallenged dominance of Realism and neo-
realism,20 was a focus on the state as the referent
object of security, i.e. that entity which was
allegedly insecure, but should be made secure.
Even though the preferred term was ‘national’
security, this was a misnomer, because nations
are not the same as states, except in a score or
so of genuine nation-states (Japan, for example)
where nation and state happen to be (almost)
coterminous.21
Even in those instances, however, the state, is
an entity sui generis, often portrayed as endowed
with almost metaphysical features or personi-
fied, i.e. treated as if it were an individual ‘writ
large’. Neither the interests nor the will of the
state are thus reducible to the sum of those of
its citizens, but they are likewise sui generis.22
State security is, in the final analysis, only defin-
able in terms of sovereignty and territorial
integrity.23 What Realists have really referred to
has thus been the security of the territorial (rather
than nation-) state, which was indeed the prin-
cipal actor in their ‘Westphalian’ universe. It was
presumed (if only ‘for the sake of the argument’)
to be both universal and perennial. In fact it
was neither, but a historical product of fairly
recent vintage and, until the latter half of the
twentieth century, a distinctly ‘northern’ phenom-
enon.24
The international system, in its turn, was
supposed to be anarchic, i.e. lacking in supra-
national authority and consisting of sovereign
states, each pursuing its ‘national’ interest
‘defined in terms of power’ or, somewhat more
modestly, in terms of security in the sense of
state survival. Furthermore, this universe was
characterized by perpetual strife, as national
interests inevitably collided, hence the perva-
siveness of competition, conflict and war.25
As states were thus inherently insecure, they
were well advised to make sure that their power
would suffice to parry threats from other states
to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. As
far as the system as such was concerned, the
best safeguard of peace would presumably be
a ‘balance of power’.26 As pointed out by critics,
such balance is inherently difficult to define, and
well-nigh impossible to achieve or preserve.
Hence, such an anarchical system had an
inherent propensity for arms races and war.27
While most ‘Realists’ have placed the main
emphasis on military threats, hence also on mili-
tary strength as the most reliable safeguard of
‘national security’, a few authors have held a
somewhat broader view of state security, for
example by including the economic dimension
of security.28 Such ‘economic security’, however,
may mean (at least) two rather different things.29
Either it may be understood narrowly as refer-
ring to the economic foundations of military
power, or it may be seen as an aspect (or dimen-
sion) of security in its own right.
• Economic power is eminently ‘fungible’ in the
sense that it may be transformed into almost
anything, including military strength. Money
can thus buy a state weapons from abroad,
and economic strength may increase produc-
tivity, thus allowing for a transfer of labour
from the civilian sphere into that of arms
production or armed service. In the final
analysis, wealth is thus tantamount to military
mobilization potential, if not in the short term
then at least in the medium to long term.30
• Economic strength may also be seen as a viable
functional substitute for military power, both
for offensive and defensive purposes.
Economic warfare may thus be employed to
cripple the economy of an adversarial state,
thereby indirectly also its military potential, as
in the case of blockades or economic sanc-
tions.31 Conversely, economic strength may be
a powerful contribution to national security,
as it may render the state invulnerable to such

warfare. Certain peace researchers (Galtung
and others) have therefore advocated
economic self-sufficiency as a means of
‘defence’, i.e. of national security.32
4.2. Moderate alternatives
Proposals for a modification of this security
strategy without any radical rejection of its prem-
ises, and certainly without shifting the focus from
state security, have been voiced (at least) since
the early 1980s, inter alia under the label
‘Common Security’. The term was promulgated
in the Palme Commission’s 1982 report Common
Security. A Blueprint for Survival. Its main
message was that security under conditions of
anarchy and high levels of armaments required
‘mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the
realities of the nuclear age’, in the absence of
which ‘the pursuit of security can cause inten-
sified competition and more tense political rela-
tions and, at the end of the day, a reduction in
security for all concerned’. Furthermore, ‘the
security – even the existence – of the world
[was acknowledged as] interdependent’, hence
the admonition that ‘security can be attained
only by common action’.33 Common Security
was thus envisaged as a way of resolving (or
perhaps better: circumventing or transcending)
the well-known ‘security dilemma’, about which
so much has been written by IR scholars, not
least by Realists.34
The growing number of references to Common
Security (alternatively labelled ‘security partner-
ship’, ‘mutual security’, ‘reciprocal security’ or
‘cooperative security’) in political statements as
well as in the academic literature was, unfortu-
nately, not matched by any rigorous theoretical
analysis of the implications of the concept.35
Some (including the present author) advocated
a rather austere, minimalistic and parsimonious
concept of Common Security, tantamount to little
more than an admonition to mutual restraint.
This presupposes neither any abandonment of
competition in favour of cooperation nor any
far-reaching institutionalization – much less a
rejection of the ‘Realist’ premises.
Thus conceived, Common Security would be
little more than an special instance of ‘cooper-
ation among adversaries’, i.e. a form of ‘regime’
entirely compatible with the teachings of both
‘soft Realism’, ‘liberal institutionalism’,36 and the
so-called ‘English School’ notions of ‘interna-
tional society’.37 Moreover, it did not automati-
cally entail any broader notion of security, but
signified little more than the same type of
security, only to be achieved by other, less
confrontational means. The state remained the
referent object of security and the focus remained
Second round table 45
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
on threats from other states, including (or
perhaps even primarily) military threats, against
which a military defence was still deemed indis-
pensable. For which purpose Common Security
proponents tended to advocate ‘non-offensive
defence’ (NOD, also known as ‘defensive
defence’ or ‘non-provocative defence’).38
Other Common Security proponents went
further, seeking to subsume a very broad
panoply of security strategies under Common
Security, and typically also emphasizing the need
for broader concepts of security, including devel-
opment, ecological security, etc. Laudable
though such endeavours certainly were, very
little was achieved in terms of rigorous theor-
etical analysis.39
Another extension of the state-centric concept
of security was that of ‘Collective Security’, which
is both more and less radical than (some versions
of) Common Security. Less radical in the sense
of being conceived of as a counter to the tradi-
tional state-versus-state military threats, yet more
radical by envisaging a transfer of powers from
the state to supranational authorities, i.e. a partial
relinquishment of sovereignty. Whereas collec-
tive security was until recently dismissed as
irrelevant by most of the IR community (because
of its poor achievement in the inter-war years),40
it was being taken increasingly seriously in the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War.41 So far,
however, the 1991 war against Iraq for the liber-
ation of Kuwait remains the only real-life
example of a collective security operation, and
the victorious West’s systematic undermining of
UN authority does not bode well for its future.42
Even if it should miraculously be given another
chance, however, even collective security would
do little to address other security problems. It
does not fundamentally address the motives for
aggression, but merely seeks to dissuade attack
by deterrence and/or defence; and it does
nothing to change, but rather tends to perpet-
uate, the ‘Westphalian’ state system with all its
detrimental implications for other forms of
security (vide infra).
4.3. State security: the indirect approach
The latter critique does not really apply to the
more radical alternative strategy for state security
that might be called ‘the indirect approach to
state security’, borrowing from the terminology
of Basil Liddell Hart.43
The furthering of interdependence, even to the
point of integration, is such an indirect approach
to state security, addressing primarily the moti-
vation for aggression and doing so almost entirely
by non-military means, thus representing a ‘soft
security’ strategy. This has, for example, been
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National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
the predominant approach to security taken by
the European Union ever since its infancy.44 The
underlying understanding has been that a web
of mutual interdependencies may serve as a
powerful inhibition against war, in perfect
conformity with the tenets of ‘classical’ liberalism,
as well as with the writings of Norman Angell,
and modern analysts of ‘complex interdepend-
ence’ (Keohane and Nye, among others).45
From its modest start with the European Coal
and Steel Community, via the Rome Treaty and
the European Economic Community (EEC) to
the present EU, the ‘European project’ has thus
all along been motivated by the quest for peace,
as was made explicit in the 1952 Schuman
Declaration:
‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without
the making of creative efforts proportionate to
the dangers which threaten it. … Europe will
not be made all at once, or according to a single
plan. It will be built through concrete achieve-
ments which first create a de facto solidarity.
The coming together of the nations of Europe
requires the elimination of the age-old opposi-
tion of France and Germany. … The pooling of
coal and steel production should immediately
provide for the setting up of common founda-
tions for economic development as a first step
in the federation of Europe. … The solidarity in
production thus established will make it plain
that any war between France and Germany
becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially
impossible.’46
These considerations remain as valid today as
they were then. The EU has already proceeded
way beyond the ‘Westphalian model’, and is
today more than a ‘pluralistic security commu-
nity’ in the traditional sense. Whether its progres-
sive amalgamation will eventually produce a new
‘superstate’, or a polity sui generis remains to
be seen, but it is surely a solid security commu-
nity where traditional security concerns among
the members have receded into near oblivion,47
i.e. a zone of stable peace.48
4.4. The limitations of state-centric security
The Realist worldview upon which all of the
above strategies were premised was not merely
bleak and probably incorrect. With the excep-
tion of the aforementioned ‘indirect approach’,
it also invited the development of strategies that
were counterproductive in the sense of sacri-
ficing other human values for those of the sover-
eignty and territorial inviolability of the state.
So-called ‘national security’ was thus achieved
at the expense of ‘human security’.
National (i.e. state) security was, moreover, all
too often equated with the security of the regime
in power. Contrary to the Hobbesian view of
the state, if controlled by an unscrupulous regime
the state often ceases to be a protector of its
citizens and becomes a security threat to them,
as in the case of various African ‘vampire states’49
or totalitarian regimes.50 However, the rules of
the game of ‘Westphalia’ privilege existing states,
regardless of their nature, and proscribe inter-
ference into ‘domestic affairs’, i.e. everything
taking place within the territorially defined exclu-
sive domain of the sovereign states comprising
the system. Within this protected domain
numerous unspeakable atrocities have been
committed, and human security thus violated
with impunity.
More recently, there has been some move-
ment on this issue. To the extent that UN forces
[or those of other international organizations,
such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)] have not ‘merely’
been employed for restoring peace between
states, but also within states, or for safeguarding
human rights there, they might be seen as harbin-
gers of a modified international system with an
amended set of rules. In his 1992 Agenda for
Peace, the UN Secretary-General thus included
the following cautious formulation:
‘The foundation-stone of this work is and must
remain the state. Respect for its fundamental
sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any
common international progress. The time of
absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has
passed; its theory was never matched by
reality.’51
A ‘new world order’ would, however, no
longer be based on sovereign states with imper-
meable borders, but would be a truly global one
in which ‘international politics’ is replaced by
‘domestic politics on a global scale’
(Weltinnenpolitik) where human security (vide
infra) might receive its due priority.52 However,
it remains to be seen whether those isolated
instances of ‘humanitarian interventions’ that the
world has seen so far are in fact harbingers of
such a new order, or merely aberrations from
‘business as usual’ attributable to the confusion
of the present transitional period – or old-
fashioned power politics dressed up as humani-
tarianism.53
5. From ‘national’ to societal security
Whereas most Realists and neorealists deny the impor-
tance of individual security, charging this approach
with ‘reductionism’,54 some of them nevertheless
acknowledge the inadequacy of the state-centric
approach.

5.1. Threats to identity
The so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ thus advo-
cates accepting human collectivities as possible
‘referent objects’ of security. The particular form
of security applicable to such collective, yet non-
state, referent objects is labelled ‘societal secu-
rity’, which in the seminal work on the topic
was defined as
‘… the ability of a society to persist in its
essential character under changing conditions
and possible or actual threats. More specifically,
it is about the sustainability, within acceptable
conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns
of language, culture, association, and religious
and national identity and custom.’55
‘Societal security’ is thus a matter of ‘identity’,
which has indeed become quite a fashionable
topic in IR theory.56 It resonates quite well with
the rediscovery of the cultural aspects of inter-
national relations (viz. the ‘clash of civilizations’
debate),57 just as it corresponds to the actual
‘securitization’ of such phenomena as migration
or ‘cultural imperialism’ (viz. the debate about
‘franglais’ as a threat to French culture).58
Unfortunately, it also holds the potential of
appealing to xenophobic political groupings on
the extreme right with whom the authors surely
do not want to join ranks.
Combined with the aforementioned method-
ology of discourse analysis and the postmodern
rejection of ‘objectivist ethics’,59 one might fear
that the theory (however inadvertently) may
simply lead to ‘rubber-stamping’ all assertions of
threats to national (or ethnic) security as equally
valid. If there are no objective yardsticks against
which to measure such allegations, the analyst
is confined to merely recording what is being
securitized, perhaps by opportunistic leaders
seeking power by playing the ‘nationalist card’
in a manipulatory fashion, as did such figures
as Slobodan Milosevich or Franko Tudjman.60 If
‘anything goes’ then the analyst must be
prepared for this:
‘If total moral relativism, which is undeniably
one of the options of postmodernity, gains the
upper hand, even the assessment of mass depor-
tation and genocide becomes a matter of taste.’61
This moral nihilism is part of the critique raised
by Bill McSweeney against the Copenhagen
School. Another part of his critique is the contin-
uing focus of the state, not as the sole referent
object, but as the mechanism through which all
securitization attempts have to pass. Finally, the
‘school’ (if so it is) is criticized for privileging
some possible identities over others, namely
national and ethnic ones. Rather than assuming
a priori that these are always the most salient
identities, the analyst should adopt a scientific
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National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
approach, requiring actual sociological investi-
gations into how people rank-order their various
identities.62
With these caveats in mind, the theory of soci-
etal security seems to have some merits, as it
allows for a better understanding of certain
recent phenomena than traditional security
analysis. Much of the recent discourse about
‘risks’ as opposed to ‘threats’ may, for example,
really reflect societal security concerns for
national unity, as do the (alleged) new types of
threats such as that from Islam (vide infra). Of
course, the various societal developments
referred to in this discourse also impinge on the
state level in various ways, yet to make this their
‘admission ticket’ into the field of ‘security prob-
lems’ is often rather far-fetched.
Run-away population growth has, for example,
been singled out by some authors as perhaps
the most serious security problem for the
decades ahead,63 if only because of the
‘Malthusian’ implications of a growing discrep-
ancy between the available resources for
consumption and the much-faster-growing
number of would-be consumers. This may
certainly constitute a (human) security problem
in its own right, particularly of course for the
losers in the competition for scarce global
resources, but also with implications for the
winners.
It might, for example, become a societal
security problem for the North if resource deple-
tion in the South should lead to a tidal wave
of migration to the North.64 Whereas it strains
the imagination to envision, say, countries such
as Denmark being more than marginally affected
by this, countries in the borderland between
North and South (such as the entire
Mediterranean region) might well be more seri-
ously affected. Migration may also flow in the
East-West direction, not so much as a reflection
of a population surplus, as because of a deficit
of resources, say if the economic transformation
embarked upon since 1989 should fail
completely. One might, for example, envisage
migration from the former Soviet Union to
Poland, and/or from the latter or the Czech
Republic to Germany. If sufficiently massive,
such migration flows might conceivably place
national identity in the receiving countries at
risk.65
Another societal security problem is represented
by the forces of nationalism that were unleashed
by the democratic revolutions of 1989 and 1991
in the east and south-east of Europe.66 To the
extent that this leads to violent strife between
ethnic and/or religious or cultural groups (a
phenomenon of which there have already been
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National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
dozens of examples), it certainly constitutes a
serious societal security problem, where one
group’s security spells insecurity for the others.
This is a genuine ‘societal security dilemma’,
which may even have such abhorrent manifesta-
tions as ethnic cleansing or even genocide.67 It
also threatens to become a political security
problem affecting the already weak states in the
countries in question, if nationalism is manifested
in a struggle for secession. This is often exacer-
bated by the so-called ‘matrozka effect’, which
promises fragmentation down to very small, and
often not survivable, political units.68
Problems such as the above may also have
repercussions for the relations between states,
i.e. develop into ‘traditional’ (state-centric)
security problems. Communal strife thus has an
inherent propensity for internationalization,
especially in those (numerous) cases where a
suppressed, exploited or otherwise disadvan-
taged ethnic group can draw on the support of
its ‘paternal’ state.69 Also, nationalism entails the
risk that the numerous unresolved territorial
disputes may be reinvigorated. Were this to
happen, especially during a period of political
weakness, ‘old-fashioned’ war for territorial
conquest may, once again, become conceivable.
This does not mean that societal security is a
mere derivative of national security but simply
serves to illustrate how all levels in the security
game are interlinked (vide infra).
5.2. Religion and gender
Even though ‘societal security’ as a concept
supposedly applies to any human collective, it
has almost exclusively focused on national and
ethnic collectives (viz. McSweeney’s above-
mentioned critique). Important though these
certainly are, one might also envision cleavages
among other societal groupings that might even-
tually come to be securitized. A first step in this
direction would surely be political organization.
Because of the absence of this, it still strains the
imagination to envision a securitization of, for
example, the virulent smokers versus non-
smokers dispute, but in principle it could not
be ruled out. More likely is a possible (societal)
securitization of religion or gender.
Religion has already been extensively politi-
cized, if only because of its close links to some
forms of nationalism.70 A few nations (Jews and
Bosnian Muslims, for example) are thus defined
in religious terms, which is also the case of
states such as Pakistan and Iran (both with the
prefix ‘Islamic Republic of’). In such cases, ‘alien’
religions risk being viewed as threats to national
cohesion, hence securitized. To the extent that
nations or states are not defined in religious
terms, but as secular, the politization of any reli-
gion (even the ‘national’ one) may likewise come
to be seen as a threat, as in modern-day Turkey
or India, or in certain Arab states where radical
Islamic fundamentalism threatens already Islamic
states.71 Even in the case of stable and cohe-
sive states such as those of the West we see
this phenomenon, as in the growing securitiza-
tion of Islam by the West, not merely in the
shape of allegations to the effect that Islamic
states constitute a threat to peace, but also with
a societal security twist, arguing that Islam
(personified by migrants) is a threat to Western
civilization.72
Gender might in principle also be securitized,
as indicated by various strains of ‘feminist IR
studies’, the gist of which seems to be that the
traditional focus on the state reflects male domi-
nation, and that the concurrent emphasis on
military means corresponds to innate male
aggression, hence that an empowerment of
women would produce more genuine and lasting
security.73
Both these topics also have obvious human
security aspects, if only because they are regu-
lated in several human rights conventions.
Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights thus makes clear that
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and free-
doms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.’
Article 18 of the same convention would also
seem to proscribe any securitization of religion
with the following unequivocal stipulation:
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship
and observance.’
Regardless of whether, say, the influx of
Muslims might arguably constitute a threat to
some nations’ identity, i.e. a societal security
threat (a very big if) it would thus constitute a
violation of human rights to prevent these people
from practising their religion, hence a threat to
human security, to which I shall now, at long
last, turn.
6. Human security
Just as societal security may thus endanger individual
security, the state-centred approach to security has

been charged with neglecting the people, i.e. of
jeopardizing human security. This is basically a matter
of human well-being and, in the last analysis, survival
of people, regardless of their national or other
affiliations.74
6.1. Human security versus state
and societal security
Thus conceived, human security may indeed be
placed in jeopardy by an unrestrained quest for
state security, say if the latter should involve
war. Hence, for example, the uncomfortable
‘Red or dead’ dilemma which haunted NATO
(and especially Germany) for decades: should
one place the survival of the population at risk
for the sake of such intangible values as
sovereignty?75 Or should a developing state
invest heavily in the implements of state security
(i.e. armed forces) at the inevitable expense of
economic development?76
According to a ‘cosmopolitan’ ethics,77 what
really matters is the survival and well-being of
the individuals, or as the utilitarians formulated
it, ‘the greatest happiness principle’.78 Such
happiness is, of course, compatible with, but
only rarely presupposes, the sovereignty of one’s
state, or for that matter the cohesion of one’s
societal group. Moreover, for principled propo-
nents of this view, state security can merely be
a relevant goal to the extent that the state derives
its powers from la volonté générale. If and when
the state ceases to represent the interests of its
citizens, say when state security places individual
security in jeopardy, the latter must take
precedence.79
Even though the state was presumably ‘created’
for the sake of its citizens’ security, it can also
constitute a threat to their security, as mentioned
above. The life of man (and woman) in Hitler’s
Germany or Pol Pot’s Kampuchea, for example,
was surely at least as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish
and short’ as it was in the proverbial ‘state of
nature’, i.e. before the establishment of the state
as an institution.80 Too strong and oppressive
‘Leviathans’ may thus constitute security threats
in their own right, as acknowledged by at least
some IR writers, even by some of the Realist or
neorealist persuasion.81
The main security problem in today’s devel-
oping world may, however, not be an excess
but rather a deficit of state power. Most devel-
oping states are thus ‘weak states’ in which there
is a ‘dissonance between the loci of authority
and power’ (Mohammed Ayoob), where society
and state boundaries are far from coterminous,
inter alia as a reflection of the colonial legacy,
and where the state’s administrative capacity is
quite inadequate, making it little more than a
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National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
hollow shell, i.e. a ‘quasi-state’. Hence the lack
of state as well as regime legitimacy and a
perpetual struggle for control of the state appa-
ratus and for autonomy or cessation – a struggle
which all too often assumes violent forms, and
which sometimes leads to complete state
collapse.82 The resultant armed conflicts may
already be the most prevalent form of war (say,
measured in terms of numbers of violent deaths)
and will most likely become so in the coming
years, where ‘Hobbesian Warre’ (bellum omnium
contra omnes) may almost supersede the
‘Clausewitzian war’ among states as the most
widespread form of violent conflict.83
Not only may ‘war’ thus be getting smaller,
but more widespread, but other forms of violent
conflict also seem to proliferate. In weak states,
ordinary crime and intercommunal strife may
become so prevalent that security simply
becomes ‘privatized’. When and where the state
cannot ensure law and order, people tend to
take matters into their own hands. In order to
protect themselves, their families and their prop-
erty, they will resort to self-help, such as by
arming themselves, or by enlisting the services
of private security companies – as we have seen
in a country such as South Africa.84 This grad-
ually leads to an erosion of the state’s Weberian
‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’,
producing a vicious circle where violence spurs
a proliferation of small arms, in its turn producing
more violence, etc.85
6.2. Structural violence and human security
Direct violence (in the terminology of Johan
Galtung) is not, however, the only threat to
human security, as various forms of ‘structural
violence’ (vide supra) may produce even larger
numbers of casualties and even greater human
suffering. In order to make any analytical sense
of this rather ‘fuzzy’ and vague term, however,
we have to break it down into sub-categories.
• First, there are those non-violent, but never-
theless ‘intentional’ threats to human security,
for which the state is to blame, i.e. the broad
category of human rights violations, docu-
mented inter alia in the annual Human
Development Reports of the UNDP, or in the
reports of NGOs such as Human Rights Watch
or Amnesty International.
• Second, we have structural violence perpe-
trated by one societal group against another,
as by the White minority against the Black
and Coloured majority in South Africa under
apartheid, or by Israelis against Palestinians in
the occupied territories until the present day.86
The general oppression of women by men
would fall into the same category, even though
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National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
it is, alas, all too often also combined with
direct physical violence, including rape.87
• Third comes the kind of structural violence
which the global order, according to some
analyses, represents, either in the general
shape of ‘imperialism’, ‘centre-periphery rela-
tions’ or globalization, producing a relative
deprivation of the peoples of the developing
world.88
• Fourth, we have threats from ‘nature’, some
of which may surely be exacerbated, but which
are not caused by, societal and/or political
factors, as is the case of HIV/AIDS (viz. South
African President Mbeki’s unfortunate and
highly controversial formulations).89
Whether any of these forms of structural violence
should be securitized, i.e. treated as human
security issues, is, as argued above, a matter of
political choice. It probably does little to enhance
the analytical rigour of security studies to include
the fourth type, which is basically a matter of
humanity’s struggle with nature.
7. Environmental security
The man/nature relationship is also at the heart of
the debate about ‘environmental security’.
That the environment is degrading was discov-
ered several years ago. However, the awareness of
ecological challenges was especially boosted by the
publication in 1987 of the report of the Brundtland
Commission on Our Common Future, which inspired
a flood of books on ‘environmental’ or ‘ecological
security’.90 However, to recognize environmental
decay as a problem was, of course, one thing, to
elevate it to the status of a security problem was
something else which remains disputed. There are,
at least, three different senses in which the environ-
ment might become subsumed under an expanded
notion of security:
• First, environmental problems could be caused by
war, or preparations for war, of such severity as to
count among the most serious indirect war effects.91
A precursor of the current environmental aware-
ness in ‘peace circles’ was, for example, the debate
in the early 1980s on the ‘nuclear winter’ hypoth-
esis, according to which even a ‘small-scale’ nuclear
war could have caused a climatic and ecological
disaster, the casualties of which would not ‘only’
be the warring states, but the entire globe.92
• Second, wars might accrue from environmental prob-
lems, such as in the form of resource wars. An
obvious example might be wars over scarce water
supplies, say between states sharing the same river.93
• Third, environmental problems might, according to
some analysts, constitute a security threat directly,
i.e. whether or not weapons and physical force ever
enter into the picture. In extreme cases, the phys-
ical basis of a state could be placed in jeopardy
by nature. For example, countries such as
Bangladesh or the Netherlands would almost disap-
pear in the case of severe global flooding.
While state security might thus, in principle, be endan-
gered by the environment, in most cases human
beings would be the victims. Hence, ‘environmental
security’ as usually conceived is really a species of
the genus human security.
An even more radical position is, however,
possible. All the above might be criticized as hope-
lessly ‘anthropocentric’, whereas the appropriate
referent object might be the environment itself, i.e. the
global ecosystem, as argued by Robyn Eckersley.94
One implication of this view might be that true envi-
ronmental security might require an extermination of
the main threat to the environment, namely the species
homo sapiens. This would obviously be utterly incom-
patible with human security. Belonging to the species
in question myself, however, I shall disregard this
ultra-radical approach to security, its immaculate logic
notwithstanding.
8. Conclusion and illustration
8.1. The need for a comprehensive approach
We have thus seen that there are different forms
of security, with ‘national’ (i.e. state) security,
societal and human security constituting the main
categories, defined by the different referent
objects (state, societal group, individual). As
threats to the different values of the various
referent objects (sovereignty, identity and
survival) may appear in many different shapes,
all three categories have different ‘dimensions’
or ‘sectors’ such as the military, economic, and
environmental ones.
While this may make for a neat analytical
framework, the real world is less orderly, if only
because the different forms of security impinge
upon each other, and strategies to achieve one
may damage the others – as shown in the case
study of the Balkans below. Hence the need for
a comprehensive approach to security, as
acknowledged by several states.95 Only by being
mindful of the implications for other forms of
security can strategies intended to solve security
problems stay clear of the well-known ‘fallacies
of the last step’ and even of doing more harm
than good.
While this surely calls for a concept of security
that goes well beyond the traditional one, one
should also guard against excessive ‘securitiza-
tion’, as this may entail risks such as
• A danger of militarization, as the security ser-
vices (mainly the army and the police) tend

to assume that ‘security is their business’. In
times of impending cutbacks in military expen-
ditures, the military tend to be quite eager to
embrace expanded notions of security in the
hope that this will protect them against further
reductions.
• A danger that a subsequent desecuritization of
issues may lead to a neglect of them. If security
concerns, for example, are accepted as the
primary rationale for development assistance,
development aid may decline once it is realized
that countries of the South constitute no real
danger to the North.
8.2. Illustration: the Balkan conflicts
The Balkan conflict(s) of the 1990s and (so far)
the first year of the new millennium provide
ample illustration of the complexities of the quest
for security as well as of the linkages between
state, societal and human security. The following,
however, is merely a very tentative and prelim-
inary analysis, intended mainly as illustration.
The initial break-up of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY) was the result of societal
security problems, in casu of the quest for nation-
and statehood on the part of the constituent
parts.96 However, it is difficult to judge to what
extent the nations of Tito’s Yugoslavia were
primordial (i.e. ‘natural’, hence enduring) or
socially constructed,97 maybe even instrumen-
talized by unscrupulous leaders such as Milosevic
and Tujman for their private ends.98 While there
had certainly been ethnic and nationalistic strife
before,99 there is no doubt that the nationalist
leaders benefited from the economic hardships
(i.e. a human security problem) afflicting the
FRY from the mid-1980s100 as they were able
to place the blame for the problems on the
‘ethnic other’.
The attempted, and eventually successful,
secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia from the FRY101 could initially be
seen as a problem of national security for the
latter, and societal security for the former. Upon
secession, however – or rather, upon the inter-
national recognition of the new states102 – what
began as an intra-state conflict became trans-
formed, literally by the stroke of a pen, into an
international conflict between rump-Yugoslavia
(comprising Serbia and Montenegro) and the
others, i.e. a problem of national security. In
legal terms, however, the struggle in Bosnia
between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims (later
renamed ‘Bosniacs’) was an internal conflict (i.e. a
societal security problem for all three), albeit
heavily internationalized through the support by
Serbia and Croatia for their ethnic kin.103
Second round table 51
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
It was further internationalized by the involve-
ment of the United Nations, subsequently also
NATO, the former in the form of peace-keeping
forces and ‘safe havens’, the latter in the form of
air strikes and subsequent leadership of the
Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) established to implement the 1995
Dayton Agreement.104 All this amounted to a
serious national security problem, especially for
Serbia. Not only did the air strikes, the more or
less conventional war between the three sides,
and the genocidal atrocities committed by the
Serbs and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Croats
and Muslims constitute a human security problem
for the civilian population. So did the sanctions
regime imposed on Serbia, which turned it into
the poorest country in Europe.
It all culminated when the conflict reached
Kosovo where a liberation movement, long
suppressed by Serbia, rebelled. The societal
security problem of the Albanian Kosovars
constituted an obvious national security problem
for Serbia.105 Whereas the initial Kosovar rebel-
lion had been largely non-violent, under the
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova,106 by 1998 it had
come to bear all the imprints of a guerilla war.
Even though some of the allegations against the
Serbs should probably be taken cum grano
salis,107 there is little doubt that the Serb regime
acted with extreme brutality in its attempted
counter-insurgency, thereby exacerbating the
societal security problems of the Kosovars.108 At
the same time, repression in Serbia became more
severe, thereby aggravating the human security
problems for the civilian population of Serbia
itself.109 Something had to be done.
As both developments in Serbia proper and
in Kosovo (internationally recognized as being
a province of Serbia) took place within the
protected sovereign domain, however, there was
no legal way of intervening militarily without a
UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the
use of force. Hence, NATO acted unilaterally, in
blatant violation of international law, albeit prob-
ably out of (mainly) humanitarian motives,
i.e. for the sake of the human security of the
Kosovar civilians.110 However, it is also possible
to argue that NATO was partly motivated by
societal security concerns of its own, i.e. by the
(rather far-fetched, but nevertheless perhaps
earnest) fear that a flood of refugees might upset
the ethnic balance in European states. At the
very least, all NATO countries went out of their
way to ensure that the refugees remained in the
Balkans, most of them in Macedonia, where they
did in fact cause societal security problems.111
The resultant 78-day war went disastrously
wrong.112 Far from stopping the killings or the
52
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
ethnic cleansing, Serbia accelerated both once
NATO started its war, as shown by the figures
from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in Table 2. At least
temporarily, the human security problems were
thus exacerbated.
Table 2: Refugees from Kosovo, 1999
Country of refuge 23 March 4 April 23 April
Albania 18 500 170 000 362 000 431 500
Macedonia 16 000 115 000 133 000 233 300
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 000 0 32 600
Montenegro 25 000 32 000 66 500
Other 0 0 17 929
Total 69 500 317 000 612 029 792 125
Source: UNHCR, cited by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at
http://www.um.dk/kosovo/pjece/
After the war, the returning Kosovars created an
acute societal security problem for the Serb minority
in Kosovo, most of whom chose to flee, seeking
refuge in Serbia proper. This, of course, ‘solved’ the
societal security problem of the Albanian population,
but in a rather brutal manner, which also led to the
expulsion of the (completely innocent) Roma segment
of the population.113
As the above account has, I hope, shown, the
three forms of security are closely linked, illustrating
the need for a comprehensive approach to security.
To its credit, the EU took the lead in this respect.
On its initiative a summit meeting was called in
Sarajevo, where a ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe’ was launched.114 Somewhat ironically, the
very same countries that had launched the attack
against the FRY on 24 March 1999, by adopting the
Pact on 10 June 1999 reaffirmed their ‘shared respon-
sibility to build a Europe that is at long last undivided,
democratic and at peace’ (Sarajevo Summit
Declaration, art. 2, cited from www.summit-sarajevo-
99.ba/documents.htm).
• ‘1. …We affirm our collective and individual readi-
ness to give concrete meaning to the Pact by
promoting political and economic reforms, devel-
opment and enhanced security in the region. …
• ‘2. … we affirm our determination to work together
towards the full achievement of the objectives of
democracy, respect for human rights, economic and
14 May social development and enhanced security to which
we have subscribed by adopting the Stability Pact.
We reaffirm our shared responsibility to build a
Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic
18 500 and at peace. We will work together to promote
the integration of South Eastern Europe into a conti-
64 300
nent where borders remain inviolable but no longer
44 525
denote division and offer the opportunity of contact
and cooperation. …
• ‘7. We will work together to accelerate the transi-
tion in the region to stable democracies, prosperous
market economies and open and pluralistic societies
in which human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the rights of persons belonging to national
minorities, are respected, as an important step in
their integration into euro-atlantic and global insti-
tutions. … Our shared objective is the development
of peaceful and good neighbourly relations. …
• ‘8. The Stability Pact process will concentrate on
the areas of democracy and human rights, economic
development and cooperation as well as security.
• ‘9. … Established ethnic, cultural and linguistic iden-
tities and rights should be consistently protected in
accordance with relevant international mechanisms
and conventions. We welcome the initiative by
countries of the region to develop a dialogue and
consultations on human rights issues.
• ‘11. … We pledge to work towards ending tensions
and creating peaceful and good neighbourly rela-
tions in order to strengthen a climate of security
throughout the region.’
This was as clear a commitment to ‘comprehensive
security’ as one could reasonably expect, including
both national, societal and human security concerns.

NOTES
1. Human Development Report 1993: People’s
Participation, New York, United Nations Development
Programme, 1993. Overview available at
http://www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm
2. Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions of
Human Security, New York, United Nations
Development Programme, 1994. Overview available at
http://www.undp.org/hdro/e94over.htm
3. Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the
Commission on Global Governance, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1995, p. 82.
4. The closest he came to a definition was: ‘National
security must be defined as integrity of the national
territory and its institutions’, in Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and
Peace, p. 562, 3rd edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1960. In another connection, he added ‘culture’ to
the list, emphasizing that the ‘survival of a political
unit in its identity’ (i.e. ‘security’) constitutes ‘the irre-
ducible minimum, the necessary element of its inter-
ests vis-à-vis other units’. See ‘The Problem of the
National Interest’ (1952), in idem, Politics in the
Twentieth Century, pp. 204–37 (quote from p. 219),
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971.
5. Arnold Wolfers, ‘National Security as an Ambiguous
Symbol’, in idem, Discord and Collaboration. Essays
on International Politics, pp. 147–65 (quote from
p. 150), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1962.
6. See also Gert Krell, ‘The Development of the Concept
of Security’, in Egbert Jahn and Yoshikazu Sakamoto
(eds.), Elements of World Instability: Armaments,
Communication, Food, International Division of
Labour, Proceedings of the International Peace
Research Association Eighth General Conference,
pp. 238–54, Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1981; Egbert
Jahn, ‘From International Peace Research to National
Security Research’, in Nobel Jaap (ed.), The Coming
of Age of Peace Research. Studies in the Development
of a Discipline, pp. 57–75, Groningen, Styx, 1991;
Daniel Frei, ‘Was ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu
verstehen?’, in Wolfgang Heisenberg and Dieter S. Lutz
(eds.), Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers. Frieden und
Sicherheit. Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in
Osteuropa, Vol. 1, pp. 41–9, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, 1990; Carolyn Stephenson, ‘New
Conceptions of Security and their Implicatons for
Means and Methods’, in Katharine and Majid Tehranian
(eds.), Restructuring for World Peace. On the Threshold
of the Twenty-First Century, pp. 47–61, Creskil, N.J.,
Hampton Press, 1992; Dietrich Fischer, Nonmilitary
Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach, Aldershot,
Dartmouth/United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, 1993. See also Bjørn Møller, ‘Security
Concepts: New Challenges and Risks’, Working Papers,
No. 18, Copenhagen, Centre for Peace and Conflict
Research, 1993.
7. See, for example, Johan Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory
of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6,
No. 2, 1971, pp. 81–118; idem, ‘A Structural Theory
of Imperialism – Ten Years Later’, Millennium, Vol. 9,
No. 3, 1980, pp. 183–96; idem, The True Worlds.
A Transnational Perspective, New York, Free Press,
Second round table 53
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
1980; Peter Lawler, A Question of Values. Johan
Galtung’s Peace Research, pp. 70–9, Boulder, Colo.,
Lynne Rienner, 1995; Arghiri Emmanuel, L’Échange
Inégal, Paris, Maspero, 1969; Samir Amin, Le
développement inégal, Paris, Editions du Minuit, 1973;
idem, L’accumulation à l’échelle mondiale, Vols. 1–2,
Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1976; Andre Gunter Frank,
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969; idem and
Barry K. Gills (eds.), The World System. Five Hundred
Years or Five Thousand?, London, Routledge, 1996;
Proceedings of the International Peace Research
Association Second Conference, Vol. I: ‘Studies in
Conflicts’, Vol. II: ‘Poverty, Development and Peace’,
IPRA Studies in Peace Research, Assen, Von Gorcum
& Co., 1968.
8. Stephanie Neuman (ed.), International Relations
Theory and the Third World, New York, St Martin’s
Press, 1998. On the US dominance of the discipline
see also Ole Wæver, ‘The Development of a Not So
International Discipline: American and European
Developments in International Relations’, in Peter J.
Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D.
Krasner (eds.), Exploration and Contestation in the
Study of World Politics, pp. 687–727, Cambridge, Mass.,
MIT Press, 1999.
9. Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’,
in idem, Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays
in Peace Research. Volume I, pp. 109–34, Copenhagen,
Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975; idem, ‘Peace Research’,
ibid., pp. 150–66; idem, ‘What is Meant by Peace and
Security? Some Options for the 1990s’, in idem, Trans-
armament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace
Research, Volume VI, pp. 61–71, Copenhagen,
Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988. On ‘stable peace’, see
Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace, Austin, University of
Texas Press, 1978; or idem, ‘Moving from Unstable
to Stable Peace’, in Anatoly Gromyko and Martin
Hellman (eds.), Breakthrough. Emerging New
Thinking, pp. 157–67, New York, Walker & Co., 1988.
10. A good illustration of the development is the two
consecutive versions of a textbook on security studies,
Richard Shultz, Ray Godson and Ted Greenwood
(eds.), Security Studies for the 1990s, Washington, D.C.,
Brassey’s, 1993; and Richard H. Shultz Jr, Roy Godson
and George H. Quester (eds.), Security Studies for the
21st Century, Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 1997. A
precursor of the present debate was Richard Ullman,
‘Redefining Security’, International Security, Vol. 8,
No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 162–77. Good overviews are
Joseph E. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones: ‘International
Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the
State of the Field’, International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4,
Spring 1988, pp. 5–27; Sean Lynn-Jones, ‘The Future
of International Security Studies’, in Desmond Ball and
David Horner (eds.), Strategic Studies in a Changing
World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives,
Series ‘Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence’,
Vol. 89, pp. 71–107, Canberra, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, the
Australian National University, 1992. See also Peter
Mangold, National Security and International
Relations, London, Routledge, 1990; Ken Booth,
54 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
‘Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
Practice’, International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991,
pp. 527–45; idem (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy
and International Security, London, Harper Collins,
1991; Michael Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.),
World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century’s
End, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1991; Michael Clarke
(ed.), New Perspectives on Security, London, Brassey’s
Defence Publishers/Centre for Defence Studies, 1993;
G. Wyn Rees (ed.), International Politics in Europe.
The New Agenda, London, Routledge, 1993; Terry
Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan,
Security Studies Today, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.
11. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War
Era, 2nd edition, London/Boulder, Colo., Harvester
Wheatsheaf/Lynne Rienner, 1991; idem, Morten
Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole Wæver et al., The
European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-
Cold War Era, London, Pinter, 1990; Ole Wæver, Barry
Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity,
Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe,
London, Pinter, 1993; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and
Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for
Analysis, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998.
12. Good examples of ‘expanded strategic studies’ are
Neville Brown, The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for
the Twenty-First Century, London, Brassey’s Defence
Publishers, 1992; Lennart Souchon, Neue deutsche
Sicherheitspolitik, Herford, Mittler Verlag, 1990.
13. W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, in Max
Black (ed.), The Importance of Language, pp. 121–46,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Praeger, 1962.
14. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and
Through the Looking Glass, p. 274, Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books, 1962.
15. A basic work on social constructivism is Peter L.
Berger and Thomas Luckman (1967), The Social
Construction of Reality, London, Allen Lane. On this
and various ‘postmodern’ approaches to IR theory see
Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical
(Re)Introduction to International Relations, Boulder,
Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994; John A. Vasquez, ‘The
Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific
Enquiry and International Relations Theory After
Enlightenment’s Fall’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith
(eds.), International Relations Theory Today,
pp. 217–40, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995; John
Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together?
Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist
Challenge’, in Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner
(eds.), op. cit. (note 8), pp. 215–46. For a critique
see Øyvind Østerrud, ‘Antinomies of Postmodernism
in International Studies’, Journal of Peace Research,
Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1996, pp. 385–90.
16. Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in
Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, pp. 46–86,
New York, Columbia University Press, 1995; Buzan et
al., 1998, op. cit. (note 11). The notion of language
games comes from Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philisophische Untersuchungen, Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1953. Recent works of a related construc-
tivist or post-structuralist orientation include David
Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign
Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998; Simon
Dalby, ‘Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Policy and
Theory’, International Studies, Burnaby, B.C., Dept.
of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 1991;
K. M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies.
Critical Investigations in Security, Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 1998; Jef Huysmans,
‘Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick
Signifier’, European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 226–55; Lene Hansen,
‘A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist
Conceptualization of Security’, Cooperation and
Conflict, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1997, pp. 369–97;
Costas M. Constantinou, ‘Poetics of Security’,
Alternatives, Vol. 25, No. 3, July–September 2000,
pp. 287–306. For a critique of the ‘Copenhagen School’
(Buzan, Wæver and others) for not being consistently
constructivist see Bill McSweeney, ‘Security and
Identity: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, Review
of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1996,
pp. 81–93; idem, Security, Identity and Interests.
A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
17. See, for example, Keith Krause and Michael C.
Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies. Concepts and
Cases, London, UCL Press, 1997; Richard Wyn Jones,
Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, Boulder, Colo.,
Lynne Rienner, 1999; K. M. Fierke, Changing Games,
Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998.
18. A good example of this is the recent writings of Gwyn
Prins, who argues in favour of a reorientation of secu-
rity studies to the environment. See, for example,
idem, ‘Politics and the Environment’, International
Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1990, pp. 711–30; idem, ‘A
New Focus for Security Studies’, in Ball and Horner
(eds.), op. cit. (note 10), pp. 178–222; idem, ‘Global
Security and Military Intervention’, Security Dialogue,
Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 7–16; idem, ‘Security
challenges for the 21st century’, NATO Review, Vol.
45, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 27–30; idem, ‘The Four-
Stroke Cycle in Security Studies’, International Affairs,
Vol. 74, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 781–808.
19. Ole Wæver, ‘Self-referential Concepts of Security as
an Instrument for Reconstruction of an Open-ended
Realism in IR’, in idem, Concepts of Security,
pp. 347–73, Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science,
University of Copenhagen, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998,
op. cit. (note 11), pp. 35–42; McSweeney, op. cit.
(note 16), p. 87.
20. For a historical account of ‘Realism’ see, for example,
Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to
Kissinger, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
Press, 1986. The best example of classical Realism is
Morgenthau, op. cit. (note 4). Good examples of
neorealism are Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics, Reading, Mass., Addison-
Wesley, 1979; Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in
World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1981; Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its
Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986;
and Buzan, op. cit. (note 11). See also Frankel
Benjamin, (ed.), Roots of Realism, London, Frank Cass,
1996; idem (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal,
London, Frank Cass, 1996; Stefano Guzzini, Realism
in International Relations and International Political
Economy. The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold,
London, Routledge, 1998. For a critique see John
Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics. From Classical

Realism to Neotraditionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
21. Buzan, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 69–82. On the concept
of ‘nation’ see, for example, two excellent readers:
John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.),
Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; idem
and idem (eds.), Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996. See also Ernst Gellner, Nations
and Nationalism, London, Basil Blackwell, 1983;
Sukumar Periwal (ed.), Notions of Nationalism,
Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995;
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism,
London, Verso, 1991; Paul Brass, Nations and
Nationalism. Theory and Comparison, London, Sage,
1991; James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and
Ethnicity, Houndsmills, Macmillan, 1991; Charles
Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the
New Europe, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press,
1995; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory
and Comparison, London, Sage, 1991.
22. On the notion of raison d’état see, for example,
Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism. The Doctrine of
Raison d’Etat and its Place in Modern History, Boulder,
Colo., Westview Press, 1984. Besides Machiavelli, other
ancestors of modern Realism come close to a personi-
fication of the state, e.g. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968, who describes
the Commonwealth as ‘the multitude so united in one
person’ (p. 227). On the concept of ‘national interest’
see Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin
Frankel (eds.), Origins of National Interests, London,
Frank Cass, 1999.
23. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations
as Political Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1993; Rodney Bruce Hall, ‘Territorial and
National Sovereigns: Sovereign Identity and
Consequences for Security Policy’, Security Studies,
Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter 1998/Spring 1999, pp. 145–97.
24. On European state-building see Charles Tilly,
Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990,
Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990; Anthony Giddens,
The Nation-State and Violence, Oxford, Polity Press,
1995; Bruce Porter, War and the Rise of the State, New
York, Free Press, 1994; Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign
State and its Competitors, Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press, 1994. See also Michael Ross Fowler
and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign
State. The Evolution and Application of the Concept
of Sovereignty, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995; Stephen D. Krasner,
Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press, 1999. On the ‘export’ of
the European state model to the developing world
see Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security
Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the
International System, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner,
1995; Christopher Clapham, Africa and the
International System. The Politics of State Survival,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Kalevi
J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
25. The best example is Waltz, op. cit. (note 20). For a
critique see Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’,
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring
1992, pp. 391–425.
Second round table 55
26. Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
Power, 1955, reprint, New York, W. W. Norton & Co.,
1967, passim; Arnold Wolfers, ‘The Balance of Power
in Theory and Practice’, in idem, op. cit. (note 5),
pp. 117–31; Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and
Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, pp. 161–94,
New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1997; Michael
Sheehan, The Balance of Power. History and Theory,
London, Routledge, 1996. For a critique see Vasquez,
op. cit. (note 20), pp. 249–86.
27. K. J. Holsti, ‘The Concept of Power in the Study of
International Relations’ (1964), in Robert L. Pfalztgraff
Jr (ed.), Politics and the International System,
2nd edition, pp. 181–95, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott,
1972; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Balance of Power: Prescription,
Concept or Propaganda?’, pp. 452–80, 1953, ibid.;
Robert Neild, An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the
Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting, pp. 106–10,
London, Macmillan, 1990; Bjørn Møller, ‘From Arms
to Disarmament Races: Disarmament Dynamics after
the Cold War’, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), The New
Agenda for Peace Research, pp. 83–104, Aldershot,
Ashgate, 1999.
28. An example of this is Robert G. Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1981; idem, ‘The Economic
Dimension of International Security’, in Henry Bienen
(ed.), Power, Economics, and Security. The United
States and Japan in Focus, pp. 51–68, Boulder, Colo.,
Westview, 1992; Kenneth Waltz also included
economic factors in his ‘aggregate capabilities’, for
example in op. cit. (note 20), pp. 129–31. For a recent
attempt at measuring such aggregate strength see
Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and
Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in
the Postindustrial Age, Santa Monica, Calif., RAND,
2000.
29. See, for example, Bienen (ed.), op. cit. (note 28),
cf. Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11), pp. 230–69.
30. See, for example, Klaus Knorr, ‘The Determinants of
Military Power’, in Bienen (ed.), op. cit. (note 28),
pp. 69–133; which is an update on idem, The War
Potential of Nations, Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press, 1956. The archetypal example of such
a potential military giant with modest standing armed
forces or military expenditures, hence with an unex-
ploited mobilization potential is, of course, Japan. See,
for example, Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan’s
Defense. Technology, Economics and Strategy, McLean,
Virginia, Brassey’s, 1992; Craig C. Garby and Mary
Brown Bullock (eds.), Japan. A New Kind of
Superpower, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1994; Michael J. Green, Arming Japan. Defense
Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search
for Autonomy, New York, Columbia University Press,
1995; Glenn D. Hook, Militarisation and
Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, London,
Routledge, 1996; Thomas M. Huber, Strategic Economy
in Japan, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1994; Ron
Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama (eds.), Japan’s
Military Renaissance?, New York, St Martin’s Press,
1993; Neil Renwick, Japan’s Alliance Politics and
Defence Production, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1995;
Richard J. Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’.
National Security and the Technological
Transformation of Japan, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell
University Press, 1994.
56 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
31. On sanctions see, for example, Donald G. Boudreau,
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
‘Economic Sanctions and Military Force in the Twenty-
First Century’, European Security, Vol. 6, No. 2,
Summer 1997, pp. 28–46; Elizabeth S. Rogers, ‘Using
Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts’,
Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, Summer 1996,
pp. 43–72; Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘The Sanctions Glass:
Half Full or Completely Empty’, International Security,
Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 50–65; Robert A.
Pape, ‘Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work’,
ibid., pp. 66–77; Franklin L. Lavin, ‘Asphyxiation or
Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma’, Foreign Policy,
Vol. 104, Fall 1996, pp. 139–53; David Cortright and
George A. Lopez (eds.), Economic Sanctions. Panacea
or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, Boulder,
Colo., Westview Press, 1995; Ernest H. Preeg, Feeling
Good or Doing Good with Sanctions. Unilateral
Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest,
Washington, D.C., CSIS Press, 1999; Geoff Simons,
Imposing Economic Sanctions. Legal Remedy or
Genocidal Tool?, London, Pluto Press, 1999.
32. Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to
Peace and Security, p. 13, Nottingham, Spokesman,
1984; Dietrich Fischer, Preventing War in the Nuclear
Age, pp. 142–53, Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld,
1984; idem, Wilhelm Nolte and Jan Øberg, Frieden
gewinnen. Mit autonomen Initiativen den Teufelskreis
durchbrechen, pp. 195–99, Freiburg, Dreisam Verlag,
1987.
33. Independent Commission on Disarmament and
Security Issues, Common Security. A Blueprint for
Survival, pp. 138, 5, 7, 9, New York, Simon & Schuster,
1982.
34. John M. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism.
A Study in Theories and Realities, Chicago, Chicago
University Press, 1951, passim; idem, ‘Idealist
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World
Politics, No. 2, 1950, pp. 157–80; Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics,
pp. 58–93, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press,
1976; cf. idem, ‘Cooperation Under the Security
Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978,
pp. 167–214; Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11),
pp. 294–327; Charles L. Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma
Revisited’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997,
pp. 171–201; Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-
Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, in Frankel (ed.),
Realism, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 90–121. The most elab-
orate study of the security dilemma is Alan Collins,
The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War,
Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997.
35. Among the theoretical analyses, the following deserve
mention: Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), Policies for Common
Security, London, Taylor & Francis, 1985; Egon Bahr
and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee
und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen,
Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer
Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
1986; Richard Smoke, ‘A Theory of Mutual Security’,
in idem and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), Mutual Security.
A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations,
pp. 59–111, London, Macmillan, 1991; Kurt Gottfried
et al., Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in
Europe, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Peace Studies
Program, 1989; Kurt Gottfried and Paul Bracken (eds.),
Reforging European Security. From Confrontation to
Cooperation, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1990;
Janne Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement. Cooperation
and Security in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution Press, 1994.
36. On cooperation among adversaries see Helen Milner,
‘Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation
Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses’, World
Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 466–96. Good
examples of this tradition include Robert Jervis,
‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, Vol. 36,
No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 357–78; Robert Axelrod, The
Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books,
1984; Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate.
Circumstance and Choice in International Relations,
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1990; Charles L.
Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’,
in Frankel (ed.), Realism, op. cit., (note 20), pp. 122–63.
On regimes see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.),
International Regimes, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University
Press, 1982; Harald Müller, Die Chance der
Kooperation. Regime in den inter nationalen
B e z i e h u n g e n , Dar mstadt, Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1993; Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime
Theory and International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon
Paperbacks, 1995; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer
and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International
Regimes, Cambridge Studies in International Relations,
Vol. 55, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
On liberal institutionalism see Robert O. Keohane,
‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World
Politics’, in idem (ed.), International Institutions and
State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory,
pp. 1–20, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989; idem,
Lisa L. Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’,
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995,
pp. 39–51; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World
Polity. Essays on International Institutionalism,
London, Routledge, 1998.
37. Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester, Leicester
University Press, 1977; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical
Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, London,
Macmillan, 1977; Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell
(eds.), Hedley Bull on International Society, London,
Macmillan, 2000; Adam Watson, The Evolution of
International Society, London, Routledge, 1992; Tim
Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of
the English School, London, Macmillan, 1998.
38. Bjørn Møller, Common Security and Non-Offensive
Defense. A Neorealist Perspective, Boulder, Colo.,
Lynne Rienner, 1992; idem, Resolving the Security
Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-
Offensive Defence, London, Brassey’s Defence
Publishers, 1991; idem, The Dictionary of Alternative
Defense, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; or Egon
Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit.
Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen
Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im
Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988.
39. Egon Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame
Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd. 2: Zu
rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und
militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit,
Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987; Dieter
S. Lutz and Elmar Schmähling (eds.), Gemeinsame
Sicherheit. Internationale Diskussion. Bd. 5: Beiträge
und Dokumente aus Ost und West, Baden-Baden,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990.

40. Cf. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis
1919–1939. An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations, 2nd edition 1946, New York,
Harper Torchbooks, 1964; Inis L. Claude, Swords into
Plowshar es. The Pr oblems and Pr ogr ess of
International Organization, 4th edition, pp. 21–40,
New York, Random House, 1984; George W. Downs,
‘Beyond the Debate on Collective Security’, in idem
(ed.), Collective Security Beyond the Cold War,
pp. 1–13, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan
Press, 1994; Charles Lipson, ‘Is the Future of Collective
Security Like the Past?’, ibid., pp. 105–31.
41. Dieter S. Lutz (ed.), Kollektive Sicherheit in und für
Europa: Eine Alternative? Beiträge zur Utopie und
Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und Sicherheits-
programmatik. Pro und Contra, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985; idem, Sicherheit 2000.
Gemeinsame Sicherheit im Übergang vom Absch-
reckungsregime zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit
in und für Europa, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlags-
gesellschaft, 1991; Dieter Senghaas, Europa 2000. Ein
Friedensplan, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag,
1990; Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Beyond the Alliance System’,
World Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1990,
pp. 215–50; Robert C. Johansen, ‘Lessons for Collective
Security’, ibid., Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 561–74;
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ‘Concerts,
Collective Security, and the Future of Europe’,
International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991,
pp. 114–61; idem and idem, ‘The Promise of Collective
Security’, ibid., Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 52–61;
Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Collective Security in a
Changing World, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1993;
Andrew Butfoy, ‘Themes Within the Collective Security
Idea’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4,
December 1993, pp. 490–510; Thomas R. Cusack and
Richard J. Stoll, ‘Collective Security and State Survival
in the Interstate System’, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 33–59; Bjørn
Møller, ‘Multinationality, Defensivity and Collective
Security’, in Jörg Calließ (ed.), Rüstung – Wieviel? Wozu?
Wohin?, Loccumer Protokolle, No. 63/93, pp. 251–90,
Rehburg-Loccum, Evangelische Akademie Loccum,
1994; idem, ‘UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive
Defence. Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention
and Peace Operations’, Peace and Conflict Studies,
Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1996, pp. 1–20. For a more
sceptical view, see Richard K. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace
or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control,
and the New Europe’, International Security, Vol. 17,
No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 5–43; Mark T. Clark, ‘The
Trouble with Collective Security’, Orbis, Vol. 39, No. 2,
Spring 1995, pp. 237–58; Josef Joffe, ‘Collective Security
and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead
Ends’, Survival, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 36–50.
42. For an elaboration see Bjørn Møller, ‘The Slippery
Slope of Authority Eroded: A Rejoinder’, Security
Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 87–90; idem,
‘The United States and “the New World Order”’, Indian
Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 11, Nos. 1–2, June and
December 1998, pp. 77–118.
43. Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy. The Indirect Approach,
2nd revised edition, 1967 reprint, New York, Signet
Books, 1974.
44. Ernst Haas, International Political Communities,
pp. 93–110, New York, Anchor Books, 1966; Roger
Hansen, ‘Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade
Second round table 57
of Theoretical Efforts’, in Michael Hodges (ed.),
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
European Integration, pp. 184–99, Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books, 1972; Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen,
‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?
A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of
the EC’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 20, No. 1, 1991, pp. 1–22.
45. On the ‘classics’ see Crauford D. Goodwin, ‘National
Security in Classical Political Economy’, in idem (ed.),
Economics and National Security. A History of Their
Interaction, pp. 23–35, Durham, Duke University Press,
1991; Doyle, op. cit. (note 26), pp. 230–50. On the
modern ‘liberal peace’ theorem see, for example,
Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade and War, Princeton,
N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994. On complex
interdependence, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph
S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in
Transition, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown, 1977; and for
a historical survey, Jaap de Wilde, Saved From Oblivion:
Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th
Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and
Complex Interdependence, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1991.
See also Hylke, Tromp, ‘Interdependence and Security:
the Dilemma of the Peace Research Agenda’, Bulletin
of Peace Proposals, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, pp. 151–8;
Ernst B. Haas, ‘War, Interdependence and
Functionalism’, in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), The Quest for
Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War
Among Societies, Cultures and States, pp. 108–27,
London, Sage, 1987; Katherine Barbieri, ‘Economic
Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of
Interstate Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33,
No. 1, February 1996, pp. 29–49; John R. Oneal, Frances
H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, ‘The Liberal
Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International
Conflict, 1950–85’, ibid., pp. 11–28; John R. Oneal and
Bruce Russett, ‘The Classical Liberals Were Right:
Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2, June
1997, pp. 267–94.
46. Robert Schuman, ‘The Schuman Declaration’, in Brent
F. Nelsen and Alexander C.-G. Stubb (eds.), The
European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice
of European Integration, pp. 11–12, Boulder, Colo.,
Lynne Rienner, 1994. See also David Mitrany,
‘A Working Peace System’, ibid., pp. 77–97.
47. The classic work on security communities is Karl W.
Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light
of Historical Experience, pp. 3–90, Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press, 1957. On the EU project
see Ole Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in
the West European Non-War Community’, in
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security
Communities, pp. 69–118, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1998; idem, ‘Integration as Security:
Constructing a Europe at Peace’, in Charles Kupchan
(ed.), Atlantic Security: Contending Visions, pp. 45–63,
New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998.
48. On zones of peace see Max Singer and Aaron
Wildawsky, The Real World Order. Zones of
Peace/Zones of Turmoil, Chatham, N.J., Chatham
House Publishers, 1993.
49. The term stems from George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in
Chaos, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1998. See also
William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States,
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998.
58 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
50. A contemporary example is Iraq. See Kanan Makiya,
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
Republic of Fear. The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley,
Calif., University of California Press, 1998. On the
equation of Saddam’s cause with that of the nation,
‘Arabism’ and even Islam see Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s
Word. The Political Discourse in Iraq, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1998.
51. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace.
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the
Security Council on 31 January 1992’, in Adam Roberts
and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations,
Divided World. The UN’s Role in International
Relations, new expanded edition, pp. 468–98, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1993.
52. Recent works about the possible modification, or even
abandonment of the ‘Westphalian order’ of sovereign
states include J. A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End
of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and
Fragmenting World, London, Edward Elgar, 1992;
Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons,
Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty
as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa,
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1996;
Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law,
Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, University
Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995;
Luis E. Lugo (ed.), Sovereignty at the Crossroads.
Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold
War Era, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1996;
Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.),
Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and
International Intervention, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995; Mortimer Sellers (ed.), The New
World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-
Determination of Peoples, Oxford, Berg, 1996.
53. On humanitarian intervention see, for example, Nigel
Rodley (ed.), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness.
International Intervention in Defence of Human
Rights, London, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1992;
Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the
1990s. A New Logic of War, London, Routledge, 1992;
Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman
(eds.), Foreign Military Intervention. The Dynamics of
Protracted Conflict, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1992; Michael J. Mazarr, ‘The Military Dilemmas
of Humanitarian Intervention’, Security Dialogue,
Vol. 24, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 151–62; Adam Roberts,
‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human
Rights’, International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993,
pp. 429–50; Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices.
Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention,
Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998; John
Williams, ‘The Ethical Basis of Humanitarian
Intervention, the Security Council and Yugoslavia’,
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer
1999, pp. 1–23. On Kosovo see the concluding
chapter.
54. See, for example, Waltz, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 60–7;
idem, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis,
New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.
55. Ole Wæver, ‘Societal Security: the Concept’, in idem
et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 17–40 (quote from p. 23).
See also Barry Buzan, ‘Societal Security, State Security
and Internationalization’, ibid., pp. 41–58.
56. Ole Wæver, ‘Identities’, in Judit Balázs and Håkan
Wiberg (eds.), Peace Research for the 1990s,
pp. 135–50, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993; Yosef
Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwill, ‘Revisiting the
“National”, Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism’,
in idem and idem (eds.), The Return of Culture and
Identity in IR Theory, pp. 105–26, Boulder, Colo., Lynne
Rienner, 1995; Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Formation of
National Identity’, in Henry Harris (ed.), Identity. Essays
Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the
University of Oxford, pp. 129–53, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1995; Helena Lindholm, ‘Introduction:
A Conceptual Discussion’, in idem (ed.), Ethnicity and
Nationalism. Formation of Identity and Dynamics of
Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 1–39, Göteborg, Nordnes,
1993; David Keithly, ‘Security and Ersatz Identity’,
European Security, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1998,
pp. 80–96; Paul A. Kowert, ‘National Identity: Inside
and Out’, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter
1998/Spring 1999, pp. 1–34; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Identity
and the Outbreak of War’, International Journal of
Peace Studies, Vol. 3. No. 1, January 1998, pp. 7–22;
Michael E. Williams, ‘Identity and the Politics of
Security’, European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 204–25.
57. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon &
Schuster, 1996. For a critique see Stephen Chan, ‘Too
Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington
and Civilizations’, Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1997,
pp. 137–40; David A. Welch, ‘The “Clash of
Civilizations” Thesis as an Argument and as a
Phenomenon’, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, Summer
1997, pp. 197–216; Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal
and Michaelene Cox, ‘Clash of Civilizations, or Realism
and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence’, Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000,
pp. 583–608.
58. René Étiemble, Parlez-vous Franglais?, Paris,
Gallimard, 1973. See also Maxim Silverman,
Deconstructing the Nation. Immigration, Racism and
Citizenship in Modern France, London, Routledge,
1992; Ulla Holm, ‘Det franske nationsbegrebs betyd-
ning for franske indvandrerdiskurser’, forthcoming in
Peter Seeberg (ed.), No Title, Odense, Odense
Universitetsforlag, 2001.
59. See, for example, Mike Featherston, ‘In Pursuit of the
Postmodern: An Introduction’, Theory, Culture and
Society, Vol. 5, Nos. 2–3, June 1988, pp. 195–215;
Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér, The Postmodern
Political Condition, Oxford, Polity Press, 1988. On
(the lack of) postmodern ethics see Paul Saurette,
‘“I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them”:
Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order
in International Relations Theory’, Millennium, Vol. 25,
No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 1–28. For an attempted rebuttal
of the charges against postmodernism see Jim George,
‘Realist “Ethics”: International Relations and Post-
modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy
Thematic’, ibid., Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1995,
pp. 195–223.
60. John A. Hall, ‘Nationalisms, Classified and Explained’,
in Sukumar Periwal (ed.), Notions of Nationalism,
pp. 8–33, Budapest, Central European University Press,
1995; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Nationalism: An Instrumental
Social Construction’, Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1993,
pp. 505–45; Maurice Pearton, ‘Notions in Nationalism’,

Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1–15.
On the Balkans see the concluding chapter.
61. Heller and Fehér, op. cit. (note 59), p. 9.
62. McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 68–78.
63. See, for example, Pierre Lellouche, Le nouveau monde.
De l’ordre de Yalta au désordre des nations,
pp. 257–305, Paris, Grasset, 1992.
64. See, for example, Myron Weiner, ‘Security, Stability
and International Migration’, International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 91–126.
65. Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, ‘Migration
and the Links Between Social and Societal Security’,
in Wæver et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 148–66.
66. See, for example, Jack Snyder, ‘Averting Anarchy in
the New Europe’, International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4,
Spring 1990, pp. 5–41; Stephen Iwan Griffiths,
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European
Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993; Charles
A. Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the
New Europe, A Council of Foreign Relations Book,
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1995.
67. On the societal security dilemma see Barry R. Posen,
‘The Security Dilemma of Ethnic Conflict’, Survival,
Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27–47; Barbara F. Walter
and Jack Snyder (eds.), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and
Intervention, New York, Columbia University Press,
1999; Paul Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic
Conflict as Tragedy’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36,
No. 2, March 1999, pp. 183–202.
68. The image refers to the famous Russian wooden dolls:
when you open the biggest one, a smaller appears,
inside which is an even smaller, etc. On secession
see Mortimer Sellers (ed.), The New World Order.
Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-Determination
of Peoples, Oxford, Berg, 1996; Antonio Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Michael
Freeman, ‘The Right to Self-Determination in
International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a
Policy’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3,
1999, pp. 355–70; Hudson Meadwell, ‘Secession, States
and International Society’, ibid., pp. 371–87; Viva Ona
Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
69. Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of
Communal Strife, London, Routledge, 1992; Michael
E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of
Internal Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996;
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear,
Diffusion and Escalation, Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press, 1998.
70. Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion,
London, Routledge, 1992; Luc Reychler, ‘Religion and
Conflict’, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 2,
No. 1, January 1997, pp. 19–38; Peter Janke (ed.),
Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. Europe and Asia,
Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994.
71. On Turkey see Metin Heper, Ayshe Öncü and Heinz
Kramer (eds.), Turkey and the West. Changing
Political and Cultural Identities, London, I. B. Tauris,
1993; Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey. The
Challenge to Europe and the United States, Washington,
D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000; Vojzech
Mastiny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey Between
East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional
Power, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1996. On India
Second round table 59
see Partha Chatterjee, ‘History and the Nationalization
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
of Hinduism’, in Vashuda Dalmia and Heinrich von
Stietencron (eds.), Representing Hinduism. The
Construction of Religious Traditions and National
Identity, pp. 103–28, New Delhi, Sage, 1995. On the
Islamist threat to the Arab States see Laura Guazzone
(ed.), The Islamist Dilemma. The Political Role of
Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World,
Reading/New York, Ithaca Press, 1995.
72. Paul Rich, ‘European Identity and the Myth of Islam’,
Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, July
1999, pp. 435–52. See also Graham E. Fuller and Ian
O. Lessler, A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam
and the West, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1995; Fred
Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation,
London, I. B. Tauris, 1996; Mohammed A. Muqtedar
Khan, ‘US Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests,
Ideas, and Ideology’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 4,
December 1998, pp. 449–62; Haifaa A. Jawad, ‘Islam
and the Threat: How Fundamental Is the Threat?’, The
RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 4, August 1995, pp. 34–8;
Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West.
Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence,
Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998; Mark Huband,
Warriors of the Prophet. The Struggle for Islam,
Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1999; Fereydoun
Hoveyda, The Broken Crescent. The ‘Threat’ of Militant
Islamic Fundamentalism, Westport, Conn., Praeger
Press, 1998; Scott W. Hibbard and David Little, Islamic
Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.,
United States Institute of Peace, 1997.
73. Lene Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security
Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the
Copenhagen School’, Millennium, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000,
pp. 285–306. In feminist circles the notion of male
aggression seems to be fairly widespread. See, for
example, Benina Berger Gould, ‘Gender Psychology
and Issues of War and Peace’, in Knud S. Larsen (ed.),
The Social Psychology of Conflict, pp. 241–9, London,
Sage, 1992; Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence:
Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1996; Johan Galtung, Peace by
Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and
Civilization, pp. 40–8, London, Sage, 1997. On gender-
ized security studies in general see also Terriff et al.,
op. cit. (note 10), pp. 82–98; Jean Bethke Elshtain,
‘Feminist Inquiry and International Relations’, in Michael
W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), New Thinking
in International Relations Theory, pp. 77–91, Boulder,
Colo., Westview Press, 1997; J. Ann Tickner, ‘Feminist
Perspectives on Security in a Global Environment’, in
Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.), Globalization,
Insecurity, and the African Experience, pp. 41–58,
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1999. For a male
perspective on the woman’s particular view of the
world see Ken Booth, ‘Security and Self: Reflections
of a Fallen Realist’, in Krause and Williams, op. cit.
(note 17), pp. 83–120, especially pp. 99–101.
74. On human security as a concept see Astri Suhrke,
‘Human Security and the Interests of States’, Security
Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 265–76;
George MacLean, ‘The Changing Perception of Human
Security: Coordinating National and Multilateral
Responses. The United Nations and the New Security
Agenda’, at www.unac.org/canada/security/
maclean.html; William T. Tow and Russell Trood,
‘Linkages between Traditional Security and Human
60 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Security’, in William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
Taek Hyun (eds.), Asia’s Emerging Regional Order.
Reconciling Traditional and Human Security,
pp. 13–32, Tokyo, United Nations University Press,
2000; Woosang Kim and In-Taek Hyum, ‘Toward a
New Concept of Security: Human Security in World
Politics’, ibid., pp. 33–46; Peter Wilkin, ‘Human
Security and Class in a Global Economy’, in Thomas
and idem (eds.), op. cit. (note 73), pp. 23–40; Caroline
Thomas, ‘Furthering the Debate on Human Security’,
ibid., pp. 179–83; Agostinho Zacarias, Security and
the State in Southern Africa, pp. 139–60, London, I. B.
Tauris, 1999; McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16),
pp. 152–72; Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival.
Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New
Age of Insecurity, pp. 135–53 et passim, London,
Earthscan, 1997; Ken Booth, ‘Security and
Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, Vol.
17, No. 4, 1991, pp. 313–26; idem, ‘Human Wrongs
and International Relations’, International Affairs, Vol.
71, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 103–26.
75. See, for example, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (ed.),
Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung, 2nd edition,
Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971; Horst Afheldt,
Atomkrieg. Das Verhängnis einer Politik mit
militärischen Mitteln, 2nd edition, Munich, dtv, 1987;
Karl D. Bredthauer and Klaus Mannhardt (eds.), Es
geht ums Überleben. Warum wir die Atomraketen
ablehnen, Cologne, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981; Henry
Kendall, ‘The Effects of a Nuclear War’, in Hylke
Tromp (ed.), War in Europe. Nuclear and Conven-
tional Perspectives, pp. 35–44, Aldershot, Gower
Publishing Group, 1989; Robin Clarke (rapporteur),
London Under Attack. The Report of the Greater
London Area War Risk Study Commission, London,
Basil Blackwell, 1986.
76. Marcus Cheatham, ‘War, Military Spending, and Food
Security in Africa’, in Norman A. Graham (ed.), Seeking
Security and Development. The Impact of Military
Spending and Arms Transfers, pp. 229–53, Boulder,
Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994; Kwabena Gyimah-
Brempong, ‘Do African Governments Favor Defense
in Budgeting?’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29,
No. 2, May 1992, pp. 191–206; J. Paul Dunne and
Nadir A. L. Mohammed, ‘Military Spending in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Some Evidence for 1967–85’, ibid.,
Vol. 32, No. 3, August 1995, pp. 331–43; K. Muepu,
‘Defence Expenditures Reduction and the Re-
Allocation of Resources in Southern Africa with
Specific Reference to South Africa’, Strategic Review
for Southern Africa, Vol. 20, No. 1, May 1998,
pp. 58–90. On the general relationship between mili-
tary spending and development see Nicole Ball,
Security and Economy in the Third World, Princeton,
N.J., Princeton University Press, 1988.
77. For an analysis of the communitarian/cosmopolitan
dichotomy, see Chris Brown, International Relations
Theory. New Nor mative Appr oaches, Hemel
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
78. John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, in Max Lerner (ed.),
Essential Works of John Stuart Mill, pp. 189–248, New
York, Bantam Books, 1963. See also Anthony Ellis,
‘Utilitarianism and International Ethics’, in Terry Nardin
and David R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions in International
Ethics, pp. 158–79, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1993. (Cambridge Studies in International
Relations Series.)
79. Cf. Jean-Jacques Rosseau, Du contrat social, Paris,
Garnier-Flammarion, 1966.
80. Quotation from Hobbes, op. cit. (note 22), p. 186.
81. For example, Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11),
pp. 35–56.
82. Ayoob, op. cit. (note 24); idem, ‘The Security Predica-
ment of the Third World State: Reflections on State
Making in a Comparative Perspective’, in Brian L. Job
(ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of
Third World States, pp. 63–80 (quotation from p. 66),
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Brian L. Job,
‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State
Securities in the Third World’, ibid., pp. 11–35; Robert
H. Jackson, Quasi-States. Sovereignty, International
Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1990; Thomas G. Weiss
and Maryl A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in
the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner,
1991; Holsti, op. cit. (note 24); Clapham, op. cit.
(note 24); William I. Zartmann (ed.), Collapsed States.
The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate
Authority, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Ali
A. Mazrui, ‘The Failed State and Political Collapse in
Africa’, in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle
(eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New
Century, pp. 233–44, Lanham, Md., Rowman &
Littlefield, 1998,.
83. Taylor B. Seybolt, ‘Major Armed Conflicts’, SIPRI
Yearbook 2000, pp. 15–58; Peter Wallensteen and
Margareta Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989–99’,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September
2000, pp. 635–50. See also Kalevi J. Holsti,
‘International Theory and War in the Third World’, in
Job (ed.), op. cit. (note 82), pp. 37–60; Martin Van
Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York, Free
Press, 1991; Donald M. Snow, UnCivil Wars:
International Security and the New Pattern of Internal
War, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1996; Reno, op.
cit. (note 49); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
Organized Violence in a Global Era, Oxford, Polity
Press, 1999; Bjørn Møller, ‘The Faces of War’, in
Christian P. Scherrer and Håkan Wiberg (eds.),
Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and
Peace Strategies, pp. 15–34, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999.
84. Jacklyn Cock, ‘The Cultural and Social Challenge of
Demilitarization’, in Gavin Cawthra and Bjørn Møller
(eds.), Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in
Southern Africa, pp. 117–44, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997;
Robert Chetty (ed.), Firearm Use and Distribution in
South Africa, Pretoria, National Crime Prevention
Centre, 2000; Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.),
Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security
in War-Torn African Societies, Halfway House,
Institute for Security Studies, 1999; Greg Mills and
John Stremlau (eds.), The Privatisation of Security in
Africa, Braamfontein, South African Institute of
International Affairs, 1999.
85. Max Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’ (1918), in H. H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology, pp. 77–128 (quote from p. 78), New
York, Galaxy Books, 1958.
86. On the ‘apartheid system’ in Gaza see Sara Roy, The
Gaza Strip. The Political Economy of De-Development,
Washington, D.C./London, Institute for Palestine
Studies/I. B. Tauris, 1995.
87. Charlotte Bunch and Roxanne Carrillo, ‘Global
Violence against Women: The Challenge to Human

Rights and Development’, in Michael T. Klare and
Yogesh Chandrani (eds.), World Security. Challenges
for a New Century, 3rd edition, pp. 229–48, New York,
St Martin’s Press, 1998. On rape as a means of war
see Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Justice for All: Wartime Rape
and Women’s Rights’, Global Governance, Vol. 3,
No. 2, May–August 1997, pp. 197–212. See also the
figures for rape in the Human Development Report
2000, New York, United Nations Development
Programme, pp. 247–51.
88. On centre-periphery relations see the works cited in
note 7. On globalization see Michael Renner, ‘The
Global Divide: Socioeconomic Disparities and
International Security’, in Klare and Chandrani (eds.),
op. cit. (note 87), pp. 273–93; Paul Hirst and Grahame
Thompson, Globalization in Question. The
International Economy and the Possibilities of
Governance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997; Malcolm
Waters, Globalization, London, Routledge, 1995; Jaan
Art Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction,
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999; Roland Robertson,
Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture,
London, Sage, 1992; Ian Clark, Globalization and
Fragmentation. International Relations in the
Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1997; Nelson W. Keith, Reframing International
Development. Globalism, Postmoder nity, and
Difference, London, Sage, 1997; James H. Mittelman
(ed.), Globalization. Critical Reflections, Boulder,
Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1996; Anthony G. McGrew, Paul
G. Lewis et al., Global Politics. Globalization and the
Nation State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992; Eleonore
Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds.), Globalization.
Theory and Practice, London, Pinter, 1996; Richard
Falk, Predatory Globalization. A Critique, Oxford,
Polity Press, 1999.
89. What he said, in an interview with Time was, among
other things: ‘If the scientists … say that the virus is
part of the variety of things from which people
acquire immune deficiency, I have no problem with
that. But to say that this is the sole cause and there-
fore the only response to it is anti-retroviral drugs,
[then] we’ll never be able to solve the AIDS problem.
… If you accept that there can be a variety of reasons,
including poverty and the many diseases that afflict
Africans, then you can have a more comprehensive
treatment response.’ Quoted from the statement
issued by the President’s office, 10 September 2000,
available at www.gov.za/president/index.html.
90. World Commission on Environment and Development,
Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1987; Gro Harlem Brundtland, ‘The Environment,
Security and Development’, SIPRI Yearbook 1993,
pp. 15–26; Richard H. Moss, ‘Resource Scarcity and
Environmental Security’, ibid., pp. 27–36. See also the
articles by Gwyn Prins cited in note 18; Michael G.
Renner, ‘National Security: The Economic and
Environmental Dimensions’, Worldwatch Paper, No. 89,
Washington, D.C., Worldwatch Institute, 1989; Caroline
Thomas, The Environment in International Relations,
pp. 115–51 et passim, London, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1992; Ernst U. von Weizsäcker,
Erdpolitik. Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum
Jahrhundert der Umwelt, 3rd, updated, edition,
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992;
Elise Boulding, ‘States, Boundaries and Environmental
Security’, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der
Second round table 61
Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice.
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
Integration and Application, pp. 194–208, Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 1993; Simon Dalby,
‘Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-
Cold War Security Discourse’, Alternatives, Vol. 17,
No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 95–134; Lothar Brock, ‘Security
Through Defending the Environment: An Illusion?’, in
Elise Boulding (ed.), New Agendas for Peace Research.
Conflict and Security Reexamined, pp. 79–102,
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Patricia Mische,
‘Security Through Defending the Environment: Citizens
Say Yes!’, ibid., pp. 103–20; Ursula Oswald,
‘Ecodevelopment: What Security for the Third World’,
pp. 121–6. A good overview is Nina Græger, ‘Review
Essay: Environmental Security’, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 109–16.
91. A good overview is Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Armed
Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the
Literature’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3,
May 1998, pp. 381–400.
92. See, for example, Carl Sagan, ‘Nuclear War and
Climatic Catastrophe’, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983–84,
in William P. Bundy (ed.), The Nuclear Controversy.
A Foreign Affairs Reader, pp. 117–52, New York, New
American Library, 1985; Paul Ehrlich, Carl Sagan,
Donald Kennedy and Walter Orr Roberts, The Cold
and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War, London,
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.
93. Peter H. Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict: Fresh Water
Resources and International Security’, International
Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 79–112;
Miriam R. Lowi, ‘Bridging the Divide: Transboundary
Resource Disputes and the Case of Westbank Water’,
ibid., pp. 113–38; Natasha Beschomer, ‘Water and
Instability in the Middle East’, Adelphi Papers, No. 273,
London, International Institute of Strategic Studies,
1992; Mary E. Morris, ‘Water Scarcity and Security
Concerns in the Middle East’, The Emirates Occasional
Papers, No. 14, 1998; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon,
Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press, 1999; Wenche Hauge and
Tanja Ellingsen, ‘Beyond Environmental Scarcity:
Causal Pathways to Conflict’, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May 1998, pp. 299–317; Arun
P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict
and Cooperation in International River Basins,
Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1999; Mohamed Suliman (ed.), Ecology, Politics
and Violent Conflict, London, Zed Books, 1998.
94. Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political
Theory, London, UCL Press, 1992.
95. See, for example, Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War.
Japan’s Concept of Comprehensive National Security,
Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 1984; Kurt R. Spillmann,
1989, ‘Beyond Soldiers and Arms: the Swiss Model of
Comprehensive Security Policy’, in Joseph Kruzel and
Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Between the Blocs. Problems
and Prospects for Europe’s Neutrals and Non-Aligned
States, pp. 161–74, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1989. See also Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian
Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences,
Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1998.
96. Håkan Wiberg, ‘Societal Security and the Explosion
of Yugoslavia’, in Wæver et al., op. cit. (note 11),
pp. 93–109; Paul Mojzes, Yugoslav Infer no.
Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans, passim, New
York, Continuum Press, 1994.
62 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
97. For the distinction see John Hutchinson and Anthony
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity, pp. 32–56, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
98. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War,
pp. 21–59, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview,
1996.
99. On the historical background see, for example, The
Other Balkan Wars. A 1913 Carnegie Endowment
Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and
Reflections by George F. Kennan, Washington, D.C.,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993.
On the more recent background see Sabrina P. Ramet,
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia,
1962–1991, 2nd edition, pp. 176–213, Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1992.
100. See, for example, Ramet, op. cit., 1992 (note 99),
pp. 136–75; Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of its
Demise, pp. 10–23, London, Routledge, 1999; Vojin
Dimitijevic, ‘Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic
Dimension of Yugoslavia’s Demise’, in Payam Akhavan
and Robert Howse (eds.), Yugoslavia, the Former and
Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region,
pp. 75–111, Washington, D.C./Geneva, Brookings
Institution Press/United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, 1995.
101. A good overview is Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds.
Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in
Transition, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press,
1995; and Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos
and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution Press, 1995.
102. The EU played a special role in this connection, spear-
headed by Germany. See Mario Zucconi, ‘The
European Union in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.),
Preventing Conflicts in the Post-Communist World,
pp. 237–78, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution
Press, 1996; Stephanie Anderson, ‘EU, NATO and CSCE
Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe’s
New Security Architecture’, European Security, Vol. 4,
No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 328–53; Woodward, op. cit.
(note 101), pp. 183–9.
103. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention, passim, Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe,
1999.
104. Wolfgang Bierman and Martin Vadset (eds.), UN
Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the
Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998; Phillip
Corvin, Dubious Mandate. A Memoir of the UN in
Bosnia, Summer 1995, Durham, Duke University
Press, 1999; Elinor C. Sloan, Bosnia and the New
Collective Security, Westport, Conn., Praeger Press,
1998. On Dayton and the aftermath see Pauline
Neville-Jones, ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations
in Bosnia’, Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996–97,
pp. 45–65; David Chandler, Bosnia. Faking
Democracy After Dayton, 2nd edition, London, Pluto
Press, 2000; Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, ‘Bosnia’, in
Donald C. F. Daniel, Brad Hayes and Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the
Containment of International Crises, pp. 41–78,
Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1999; Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force.
US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World,
pp. 127–67, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2000; Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, ‘Former
Yugoslavia’, in James Mayall (ed.), The New
Interventionism 1991–1994. United Nations
Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and
Somalia, pp. 59–93, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1996; Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia and
Herzegovina: How Not to End a Civil War’, in Walter
and Snyder (eds.), op. cit. (note 67), pp. 73–145.
105. On the background see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short
History, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998; Greg Campbell,
The Road to Kosovo. A Balkan Diary, Boulder, Colo.,
Westview Press, 1999. Contrasting Serb and Albanian
views are presented in Thanos Veremis and Evangeloss
Kofos (eds.), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War,
Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign
Policy, 1998.
106. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, London,
Pluto Press, 2000.
107. Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started
a War, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999.
On the role of the media see Philip Hammond and
Edward S. Herman (eds.), Degraded Capability. The
Media and the Kosovo Crisis, London, Pluto Press,
2000.
108. Hannes Tretter, Stephan Müller and Violeta Demaj,
‘Die Verfolgung der albanischen Volksgruppe im
Kosovo’, in Joseph Marko (ed.), Gordischer Knoten
Kosovo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren?, pp. 127–55,
Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999.
109. Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. Politics in the
1990s, London, Hurst, 1999; Eric D. Gordy, The
Culture of Power in Serbia. Nationalism and the
Destruction of Alternatives, University Park, Pa.,
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; Sonja
Biserko, ‘Serbia: Dictatorship, Implosion or Recovery’,
Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999,
pp. 289–90.
110. For an unconvincing contrary opinion see Noam
Chomsky, The New Military Humanism. Lessons from
Kosovo, London, Pluto Press, 1999.
111. Elmar F. Pichl, ‘Die “albanische Frage” in Mazedonien’,
in Marko, op. cit. (note 108), pp. 57–73.
112. Michael Mandelbaum, ‘A Perfect Failure. NATO’s War
Against Yugoslavia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5,
September–October 1999, pp. 2–8; Bjørn Møller, ‘The
UN, the USA and NATO. Humanitarian Intervention in
the Light of Kosovo’, Working Papers, No. 23/1999,
Copenhagen, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute,
1999. For a more positive assessment see Ivo H. Daalder
and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly. NATO’s War
to Save Kosovo, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution
Press, 2000; Ansgar Rieks and Dieter Weigold, ‘Der
Kosovo-Konflikt – eine militärpolitische Auswertung’,
in Joachim Krause (ed.), Kosovo. Humanitäre
Intervention und Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, pp.
13–54, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2000; Bernhard Pfoh,
‘Eine Bilanz des Luftkrieges der NATO gegen
Jugoslawien’, ibid., pp. 55–88; Daniel A. Byman and
Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power
Debate’, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring
2000, pp. 5–38.
113. Eric A. Witte, ‘Der Wideraufbau des Kosovo: die
ethnische Dimension’, in Krause (ed.), op. cit.
(note 112), pp. 169–84.
114. Johannes Varwick, ‘Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg:
Ein überforderter Stabilitätsanker?’, in Krause (ed.),
op. cit. (note 112), pp. 185–200.
 THIRD ROUND TABLE

The main challenges

facing the promotion of human security and peace
in Latin America and the Caribbean

Moderator:
Ms Kaisa Savolainen,
Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO

Lecturers:
Mr Alejandro Bendaña,
President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI),
Managua, Nicaragua
Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena,
Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)
Santiago, Chile
General Juan Alberto Lezama,
Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN),
Montevideo, Uruguay

PEACE, HUMAN SECURITY
AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
IN CENTRAL AMERICA
by Mr Alejandro Bendaña,
President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI),
Managua, Nicaragua
1. Introduction
Human security, in the post-war Central American
context, must above all take the form of the consol-
idation of peace if the ending of war is to give way
to the beginning of justice. The human security chal-
lenge in this respect has come to be known as post-
conflict peace-building. According to the United
Nations Agenda for Peace, post-conflict peace-building
consists of ‘action to identify and support structures
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in
order to avoid a relapse into conflict’.1
In Central America, as in other parts of the world,
concepts such as human security and peace-building
were employed to draw attention to the specific char-
acter of post-Cold-War conflicts, post-war settings, and
international responses appropriate to them. However,
it was not always clear whether such terms were
intended to be more descriptive than analytical. In
the absence of such analysis, definitions and method-
ologies, their utility in dealing with the complexities
of post-war Central America was questionable.
Nearly eight years after the El Salvador peace
agreements and four after the settlement in Guatemala,
the question is whether these countries are able to
make the profound kind of transformations put
forward in ambitious peace-accord packages. There
are differences between the two countries, as there
are differences with Nicaragua where the peace settle-
ment took the form of the February 1990 election
and a quietly negotiated transition thereafter. In
Guatemala and El Salvador, the principal accom-
plishment was the apparent consensus on an under-
standing of peace not only as the cessation of hostil-
ities, but also as addressing the principal problems
that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. In
Nicaragua, a similar consensus came about as regards
maintaining many of the basic changes undertaken
as the result of the Sandinista Revolution, while
reversing some of its undemocratic features.
In this respect, one could argue that many
elements of the human security agenda were already
contained in the political settlements of the three
countries:
Third round table 65
Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America
• democratization and human rights;
• strengthening civilian authority and defining the role
of the army in a democratic setting;
• reforming the constitution and electoral system;
• addressing socio-economic problems, including land
reform;
• resettlement and reintegration of the demobilized
and displaced;
• incorporation of armed dissidents into political life.
Much has been accomplished as regards civil and
political rights. The restoration of civilian rule has
greatly diminished the systemic state-sponsored
abuses of the past. Questions remain, however, about
the subordination of the armed forces in Guatemala
and El Salvador, as well as Honduras, and to a lesser
degree in Nicaragua. The military’s realm of political
action was greatly circumscribed, but it has retained
much of its autonomy intact. Progress as regards the
judiciary system remains limited. Police reform in
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador is in its infancy,
and impartiality is severely questioned.
2. The ‘new violence’
2.1. Direct violence
Violence and crime are surfacing as seemingly
insurmountable problems. El Salvador has the
highest murder rate in the world: an average of
120 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Deaths
through violent crime for 1996 are estimated to
be 8,200, while 15,000 people were wounded by
criminal violence. This represents a ratio which,
if it continues over the next nine years, will mean
that crime will have claimed more than the 100,000
victims – 25 per cent more – known to have been
killed during the twelve years of the war. In
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, polls reveal
that common crime is the top public concern.
The impact of this crime wave on human rights
and human security is undeniable. Anti-crime legis-
lation and policies designed to deal with crime
do not always meet international standards for
judicial processes or police accountability.
66
Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Peace has thus not been achieved at the level
of everyday life for most citizens. Violence has
taken on a more social and multifaceted expres-
sion than the polarized political violence of the
1980s. Cultures and structures of violence are
not vanquished in peace settlements; they must
be uprooted over time, and across public and
private life. For example, women’s organizations
have noted a rise in domestic violence
throughout Central America, which they link to
the impact of peace and unemployment on
young men who have spent most of their youth
fighting. A 1997 study from the Inter-American
Development Bank showed that some 52 per
cent of women in Managua had experienced
some type of abuse in their homes: psycho-
logical, physical or sexual.
2.2. Economic violence
The statistics tell a grim story. Between one-
third and one-half of urban dwellers and about
two-thirds of rural dwellers in Central America
live in poverty.
According to United Nations figures, in
Nicaragua 47.9 per cent of the population lives
in poverty, including 17.3 per cent in extreme
poverty. In the rural areas the figures are 68.5 per
cent and 28.3 per cent, respectively. Fifty per
cent of children living under conditions of
poverty do not go to school. Half of all chil-
dren who abandon school do so for economic
reasons. There is no access to potable water for
35 per cent of the population. Over 30 per cent
of poor children and almost 40 per cent of
extremely poor children are malnourished,
compared with 12 per cent of non-poor chil-
dren. Poor children under 5 years of age are
particularly affected by chronic malnutrition, up
to 36 per cent among the extremely poor.
Although on an overall basis the surveys indi-
cate that chronic malnutrition has declined since
1993, it has increased by 45 per cent among the
urban poor and 30 per cent among the extremely
poor. The worst levels of chronic malnutrition
are reported in the north and central parts of
Nicaragua, where nearly half of the extremely
poor children suffer from this condition.
A similar story can be told for Guatemala,
where 75 per cent of the population lives below
the poverty line, or for Honduras (50 per cent)
and El Salvador (48 per cent).
2.3. Globalized violence
A human security programme must also take
account of economic policies that perpetuate
poverty. The priority given by the donor commu-
nity to structural adjustment programmes after
peace accords is interpreted by elites and the
public as signals that economic liberalization and
privatization are more important than peace-
building and human security concerns.
National governments are not blameless, yet
each claims that its hands are tied by the nature
of the region’s insertion into the global economy.
The G7 and their multilateral economic organi-
zations appear unwilling to make substantive
concessions in the form of real debt cancella-
tion or preferential trading arrangements for poor
countries, including those recovering from war.
This means, for example, that in Nicaragua only
11 per cent of the government budget is allo-
cated to education, while 25 per cent goes
towards debt payments.
3. Peace education as global education
Human security is a precondition – not an outcome
– of development. Economic policies that favour
growth over equity and human development are not
only analytically questionable, they are undemocratic.
The human security agenda should require the devel-
opment advocacy networks to push for modification
in external assistance policies, particularly for war and
post-war economies, to accelerate the reduction in
foreign debt, and to support small-scale producers,
particularly in the countryside.
The value of a human security agenda lies partly
in exposing the hypocrisy of governments extolling
peace and democracy while at the same time imposing
economic policies that increase the suffering and
exclusion of millions of people. Human security
entails worrying less about ‘formal democracy’ and
more about ‘real democracy’, understood as equal
access to basic economic, social and cultural rights
for the majority of the population, along with the
recognition of, and if need be reparation for, histor-
ical injustice.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
• Ten years after the end of the war in Nicaragua,
eight in El Salvador and four in Guatemala, a nega-
tive peace prevails in the region. Despite consid-
erable external cooperation and international atten-
tion, the human security picture is not positive.
Poverty and violence are everyday features of life
for most Central Americans. To be sure, there are
new political openings and peaceful electoral tran-
sitions. State reform and modernization is on the
agenda, while non-governmental organizations are
energetically working to ensure a voice for women
and indigenous communities. The sum of local
efforts to build socio-economic justice is however
outweighed by the effects of an unfavourable global

economic and political context. A key challenge
takes the form of what has been termed ‘civil society
strengthening’ to compensate for state and institu-
tional weakness, yet to do so in a way that is not
disproportionately dependent on externally funded
projects.
• The human security agenda must forcefully engage
what others prefer to evade. We refer here to the
perceived post-war need for national reconciliation,
on the one hand, and the human rights imperative
to counteract impunity and ensure justice to victims,
on the other. Lately the United Nations, driven by
Security Council orientations, seems to be acting as
if there is an unavoidable tension between human
rights and peace. The result in these cases is con-
tinuing impunity. If the human security agenda
means anything, it is that the principles of human
rights and international humanitarian law are non-
negotiable. The El Salvador and Guatemala
experiences point to the danger of UN operations
being perceived as prepared to sacrifice human rights
for a short-term political deal falsely labelled ‘peace’.
• Many international actors and national political
figures would prefer to pretend that the basic
conflicts have been ‘resolved’, and that develop-
ment as usual is back. Such reasoning is not accept-
able. The human security agenda in Central America
is first and foremost about social, economic and
cultural rights. The educational and organizational
challenge is how to better link the struggle for these
NOTES
1. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 17 June
1992. (UN doc. A/47/277–S/24111.) Available at
http://www.un.org.Docs/SG/agpeace.html
Third round table 67
Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America
rights with civil and political rights, and to do so
in a way that is not exclusively state-centred.
• Education is one answer. But let us not be naive
as to the nature of the playing field. Awareness is
one thing and implementation quite another, espe-
cially in poor countries still characterized by extreme
(and growing) inequality and weak democratic tradi-
tions. International financial institutions and like-
minded bureaucrats will argue that social and
economic rights – the human security and peace-
building agenda – have to be postponed: that they
must be temporarily sacrificed in order to allow the
correct application of pro-growth neoliberal
economic policies. In this scheme of affairs, foreign
investors should not be intimidated by overly
zealous communities defending land rights, working
women demanding better conditions in sweatshop
factories, or labour unions resisting the privatiza-
tion of public-sector enterprises and social-security
schemes.
• Human security cannot be negotiated away in the
name of ‘peace’, ‘peace process’, or ‘economic
reform and macro-economic stability’. The macro-
economic and macro-political cannot be exclusive
of the macro-social and macro-ethical. Therefore, a
human security matrix will recognize and act upon
the potential conflict between macro-economic
requirements upheld by international financial insti-
tutions and donors (including UN donors) and
economic rights and opportunities for people.

HUMAN SECURITY:
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE
FROM LATIN AMERICA
by Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena,
Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)
Santiago, Chile
1. Introduction
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the people
have begun to take centre stage in the international
system. This is a strategic change in perception. Today
we recognize the origins of this change, in the imple-
mentation of which states and organizations of civil
society must contribute simultaneously.
Countries with similar perspectives seek to place
human security as a pivot of international peace,
governability and international cooperation in this
new century. This innovative international approach
will develop a new security agenda and a new
perspective for global and regional actions.
The idea that human rights are a value that should
be preserved, and that they should take precedence
over other rights, has been present since the birth of
international public law. The Spanish theologian
Francisco de Vitoria (1480–1546), in a work published
in 1532, demonstrated that from the point of view of
international law, action must be taken against those
countries denying their citizens fundamental rights.
Humanitarianism has been an essential source of
international law in the past five hundred years,
existing even before the Peace of Westphalia and
inter-state order in 1648.1
With the end of the Cold War and the process of
globalization, opportunities have increased for co-
operation in the international system and in diverse
subregions. The communication revolution, the new
wave of democracies worldwide, and the phenomenon
of globalization have contributed to universalizing the
values and principles established in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The promotion and
respect of this charter require closer association and
cooperation.
An approach to global politics from the human
interest perspective, as developed by Mel Gurtov,
allows the differentiation of values from various
theoretical perspectives.2 Realist theory looks at inter-
national phenomena, emphasizing conflicts and com-
petitiveness, which means that cooperation among
the different actors is not measured appropriately.
The corporate-globalist transnational perspective
Third round table 69
Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America
emphasizes the economic aspects and the hegemony
of a production model and division of labour of a
capitalist nature. However, if these are the rules of
the game ensuring general preservation, they are seen
as a zero-sum game in comparison with other values.
In the absence of shared values, both the realist and
the corporate-globalist perspectives emphasize
competitiveness as the basis of conflict and permanent
rivalry.
Looking at the world from a new perspective,
with a global-humanist projection, emphasizes
different values. The need for a more holistic perspec-
tive means asking the central question: who speaks
for the planet? Approaching international relations
from another angle means thinking about them as
matters for the people.
With this focus it is possible to relate diverse
problems to new priorities. The main priority is
necessarily peace, which is directly associated with
social and economic justice, political justice, human
governance and the common responsibility for an
ecological balance.
All these priorities are expressed through multiple
alternative emphases in terms of the values they seek
to promote. Table 1 compares the main values
promoted by those who support each theory.
Conditions currently exist to establish an inter-
national coalition of states and organizations of civil
society that could support and advance initiatives
aimed at increasing human security and placing
people at the centre of international security. This
would be primarily achieved through the perfecting
of a new international law to ensure peace and
governability and the advancement of positive incen-
tives. In this respect, we take the perspective outlined
at the Lysøen meeting of the Human Security Network,
according to which an ‘innovative international
approach will be needed to address the sources of
insecurity, remedy the symptoms and prevent the
recurrence of threats which affect the daily lives of
millions of people’.3
The academic role is fundamental to this
endeavour. The experience of FLACSO-Chile, espe-
cially through its ‘Peace and Security in the Americas
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Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Table 1: Alternative values to major theories
Realist
Institutional Bargaining
Influence
Mission
Control
Norms Alliance system
Hegemony
National mission
Protectionism
Intervention
Structure System-maintaining
Power blocs
Source: Mel Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 25–6.
Program’, demonstrates the importance of dialogue
between academics, civil and military functionaries
and other key actors in the analysis of this new inter-
national context and the formulation of recommen-
dations to advance stability and develop peace. Their
participation contributes to transparency of action and
defines the terms of cooperation. In addition, it could
help to identify specific problems related to the appli-
cation of confidence-building measures. On the other
hand, the academic role in ‘Track Two’ diplomacy is
crucial for positive development (as shown by recent
experience of border problems between Ecuador and
Peru).
The building of common perspectives in the multi-
lateral sphere, the support of states with similar polit-
ical and social perspectives, plus a solid theoretical
foundation, create the potential for new global public
goods required for international security and the
sustainable development of the planet. In other words,
a fresh opportunity to construct linked international
regimes, organized from a new perspective of inter-
national relations in which civil society and human
beings increasingly occupy a relevant place. We do
not need new laws, we need to institutionalize the
existing ones.
We need to develop a more comprehensive and
global outlook on international security – a holistic
perspective capable of illustrating the direct inter-
relation between security, development and peace.
This becomes clearer when we consider democratic
political systems.
Evidence exists that democratic regimes tend to
maintain peaceful and demilitarized relations. War is
therefore an unusual phenomenon among democratic
political regimes. Yet there are exceptions.
Nevertheless, if we also take into consideration the
international regimes linking the capitalist democra-
cies of the West, war has disappeared from the
Corporate-Globalist Global-Humanist
Access Accountability
Hierarchy Management
Influence Equal opportunity
Consumption Decentralization
Capitalism Basic need
Global culture Interdependence
Equal interdependence International regimes
Laissez-faire ‘One world’
Integration International law
System-maintaining System-transforming
Liberal order World order
region’s future perspective. To this region should be
added a group of countries which is growing in
significance – the Latin American countries. The
combination of democratic political systems, coopera-
tive multilateralism and common international regimes
allow them to achieve and maintain peace in an effi-
cient manner.
Ensuring stability and peace makes it possible to
adequately satisfy the growing demand for human
security. Without inter-state security, citizens run the
highest risks, producing a change in the conceptual-
ization of international security.
2. Security: a concept in transition
An important tendency is revealed when moving from
a zero-sum paradigm to a paradigm which, while
taking into account the importance of power, attempts
to find possible solutions through cooperation.4 In
this respect, the theory of international regimes is
continually growing in significance and weight.
The new paradigm is essentially founded in
persuasion and in inducing achievements in a multi-
lateral framework. From an operational point of view,
prevention systems (preventive diplomacy), crisis
prevention and early-warning systems are crucial. As
interdependence plays a crucial role, cooperation and
integration are also substantial elements. The plan of
action reaffirms the multilateral search for solutions.
Regimes will thus have a proactive character, given
that their key elements are prevention, early warning,
and the joint search for solutions.
Security is a controversial concept, the concep-
tual definition and delimitation of which are the result
of political processes. Security for some may mean
insecurity for others. The same reality is perceived
and communicated from different ‘positions’. Security

is also an elusive concept, embedded in a broad cat-
egory that transcends military issues and has non-
military aspects. Security must be understood in its
social, historical, cultural and geographical context.
During the Cold War, security concepts were
broached from the perspective of the state or from
considerations linked to state security and the mili-
tarization of international relations. Post-Cold-War, a
new dimension of human security has made a forceful
appearance as a key concept of a world in transi-
tion.5 Both perspectives have been seen as contro-
versial, although both should have the welfare of
human beings as their goal. The intellectual chal-
lenge, which is also an institutional and operational
challenge, lies in the linking and associating of
concepts from a human security standpoint and
projecting these concepts into international security,
including state security.
Every area of security theory involves a chain of
concepts that must be linked. In this way, interna-
tional security is linked to multilateralism, state security
to national sovereignty, and human security to govern-
ability and development. These three spheres must be
articulated and related more efficiently.
The complexity of the new reality and the new
agenda cannot be comprehended by traditional
concepts of international security. The response of
some actors is to expand the concept of international
security, situating the context of security issues at
various levels (military, economic, social), hindering
practical operability and the development of specific
actions. The main threat in this respect is that social,
economic and other policies will become ‘militarized’.
The concept of international security must be
centred primarily on issues related to war and peace.
International security clings to the question of force:
how to contain it, stop it, restrict it and occasionally
threaten to use it or actually use it. This takes into
account the conditions that reinforce or weaken
organized violence in international affairs and the
conduct of all types of military activity. In the post-
Cold-War era, international security has to be repo-
sitioned at the core of the nature of conflict, as well
as the use of force.6
The different regions and countries of the world
have priorities that are important for sustaining life
or avoiding threats to it, but they are not all security
issues. Moreover, security is not necessarily at the top
of all agendas. Everything tends to be ‘securitized’,
therefore responses of a military nature, or those of
bureaucracies dealing with organized violence, take
priority.
The emphasis changes when considering the
trilogy of human security, state security and inter-
national security, depending on the scenario. In the
majority of cases, the weight will fall upon state
security, because the state continues to be the main
international actor and the one that has the greatest
Third round table 71
Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America
resource strength. Also, because the demands of civil
society for the mandatory requirements of human
security are voiced and implemented by the state, the
latter has to meet the demands. In turn, international
stability is threatened by multilateral alternatives in
which the state is the actor issuing recommendations
and solutions. For several geographical regions,
mainly in Africa, the centre of gravity may be inter-
national security and its main actors, i.e. the reaction
of the international system to a governance crisis in
fragile or semi-defunct nations.
Sovereignty is a closely related concept. In a
globalized world, in addition to referring to the
capacity of unilateral definition in a determined terri-
tory, sovereignty corresponds to the responsibility that
the politicians and citizens of a territory should
demonstrate towards themselves and towards
humanity as a whole. Sovereignty in the globalized
world represents national, as well as international,
responsibility.
It can thus be argued that if inter-state relations
are demilitarized, and if basic intrinsic distrust that is
perceived as a threat can be resolved, it should be
possible to coordinate policies and foster international
collaboration on security matters. The greater the
global stability, the better that inter-state relations will
focus on and attach priority to the resolution of the
demands of human security. These demands are
structurally connected to the solution of development
problems.
The effort of concentrating on a specific agenda
avoids overstating the concept of security and the
consequent militarization of all issues affecting human
life.
The human security agenda includes a wide
variety of issues, such as natural disasters, racism,
peace education, refugees, cooperation for develop-
ment, natural resources, sustainable development,
equity, small arms, child soldiers and war-affected
children, landmines, International Criminal Court,
ecological sustainability, etc. The breadth of these
issues makes it difficult to generate policies that would
have a significant impact on the international environ-
ment, hence the need to discover a means of expres-
sion that will give consistency and coherence to the
concept of security. In my opinion, this continues to
be the use of force. Many life or death problems
affecting a large part of the population are linked to
the use of force, whether because the state does not
have a monopoly over violence or because of its
inability to construct a demilitarized order.
Establishing goals and objectives, in terms of
international/global and regional public goods, facili-
tates the effective articulation and promotion of
comprehensive agendas such as that outlined above.
Intra-state problems are a central characteristic of
the new international conflicts, highlighting the need
to articulate more accurately the three different levels
72
Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
of the concept of security. Also, the growing presence
of transnational phenomena (international mafias,
terrorists and so on) that use force but do not have
the capacity to pose strategic threats to the state,
needs to be addressed in order to design coordina-
tion mechanisms and policies incorporating traditional
non-military dimensions in the use of force. This
implies new means of prevention.
The current historical period facilitates the
construction of new forms of association and inter-
national cooperation. Coalitions established on the
basis of cooperative multilateralism help to reach the
renewed goals of peace and international security.
The Americas constitute a zone of peace. In the
last decade substantive advances have occurred
through inter-state links, as evidenced by the devel-
opments of diplomacy in the framework of the
Summits of the Americas.7 In fact, one of the sections
of the Second Summit (1998) action plan is dedicated
to encouraging trust and security between states. In
this section the participating governments are
instructed to develop and bring to completion a series
of specific measures in order to consolidate peace
and stability in the region. To this end they entrusted
a series of tasks to the Organization of American
States (OAS), such as the setting up of a special
conference on international security.8 The consensus
on a common conceptual framework and the imple-
mentation of policies in areas of mutual trust, trans-
parency, and cooperation will require the creation of
specific follow-up mechanisms. In this respect, foun-
dations have been outlined for the construction of a
System of International Functional Regimes in Matters
of International Security. Similarly, systems must be
created in the other areas of concordance indicated
by the heads of state and governments in the
Americas.
Some important deficiencies should be recog-
nized, however, as manifested by civil wars, trans-
national crime, lack of governability, and the diffi-
culty of confronting these non-military challenges in
the international and domestic spheres.
The academic community could make a great
contribution here through its capacity to
• observe and contribute to early-warning measures;
• bring together actors from different sectors to parti-
cipate and generate confidence;
• design alternatives and options.
The main problem for the academic community is
the lack of resources to facilitate the development of
sustained perspectives, the experience of which could
be transferred to other parts of the world.
3. The human security agenda
The human security agenda is associated with the
ability to prevent, act and react to humanitarian
emergencies. Rather than humanitarian intervention,
I prefer humanitarian action. That is to say, the preven-
tive capacity to protect people’s lives and their
security. The most important goal is to create the
conditions where events and crises affecting security
can be foreseen.
The Human Security Network represents positive
action in the international multilateral environment.
In the Declaration of the Second Ministerial Meeting
of this Network the goal ‘to promote respect for
human rights and international humanitarian law, and
to strengthen the rule of law and good governance’
was highlighted. Participants recognized the need to
foster a culture of peace, including the peaceful reso-
lution of conflicts, to control the instruments of
violence and to end impunity in case of violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law.
Ministers and representatives recognized that threats
to human security differ from one region of the world
to another, as do the resources available to meet
these threats. Network governments would work to
build, over time, a wider consensus on human security
at the global level, and, at the same time, would
promote regional approaches and flexible frameworks
for cooperation. They emphasized the importance of
an inclusive and transparent approach.9
Coming back to the use of force as a conductive
thread in human security, two issues are particularly
relevant: the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons, and the role of non-state actors in armed
conflicts.
3.1. Light weapons
Latin America has taken substantial and signifi-
cant steps towards the banning and control of
small arms and light weapons. In the last few
years, the countries of this region, on the basis
of regional political cooperation in the Rio
Group,10 decided upon a series of initiatives. A
commission was set up on the auto-limitation of
armaments and control of illicit arms trafficking.
Substantive advances were made at a meeting in
Cancun, Mexico, in March 1997. The accords
were formulated into a proposition of the conven-
tion at the Rio Group Summit of Asunción,
Paraguay, in August 1997. The negotiations that
followed were brought to a successful conclu-
sion and approved by the OAS, culminating in
the ‘Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related
Materials’, 13 November 1997.11
The region has also made significant progress
concerning transparency in the matter of conven-
tional armaments. Of particular significance is
the ‘Inter-American Convention of Transparency
in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions’, which
was approved on 7 June 1999.12

Important accords have also been reached on
the issues of international security, terrorism, and
mutual confidence-building measures at both the
Summit of Miami (Florida, USA) in 1994 and that
of Santiago (Chile) in 1998. It is of special signifi-
cance that the heads of state suggested calling
extraordinary conferences to analyse the concept
of security. These will provide an opportunity
to present and apply the new conceptualizations
of security emerging from the Lysøen Network.
It is also important to note that the Central
American countries have signed The Central
American Democratic Security Treaty,13 and that
the members of the Southern Cone Common
Market (Mercosur), along with Chile and Bolivia,
have declared a zone of peace.
Despite these important advances, some defi-
ciencies remain. In terms of state security, several
border delineation issues have yet to be resolved.
These conflicts threaten international security, as
shown by the crisis between Ecuador and Peru
throughout the 1990s. Nicaragua and Honduras
are other examples of states with territorial issues
pending.
Similarly, in the domestic sphere, civil wars
threaten security and state viability, endangering
international security as well as that of the state
in question. Both of these spheres affect human
security.
The internal conflict in Colombia has had
serious consequences, including changes in
Colombia’s relationship with neighbouring coun-
tries, an increase in militarization in the region,
and damage to civil society. The conflict has
spilled over into other countries in the region.
The central issue concerning human security
and the possible use of force in Latin America
is linked from a political point of view to a lack
of democracy, from an economic point of view
to inequality, and from a social point of view
to discrimination. The lack of democratic culture
and of pacific resolution of conflict increases the
potential for the use of force in the region. The
illegal trafficking of arms also has a negative
effect on the chances of resolution.
In the twenty-first century, domestic conflicts
are also international conflicts, even more so
when we place humanity at the centre of inter-
national action. The international system needs
to generate multiple types of action before,
during, and after conflicts. Focusing on each
situation allows more appropriate action to be
taken to positively influence the mitigation of
conflict.
The role of academia is very important at each
of these stages. Academic institutions have the
capacity to generate early-warning measures in
the pre-conflict stages. During a conflict they
Third round table 73
Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America
can suggest negotiated solutions and alternative
methods of resolving conflict. At the post-conflict
stage, they can help to design mechanisms to
ensure governability.
The following suggestions could be addressed
at this multilateral forum in the perspective of
integrating the question of light weapons within
a broader policy:
• Exchange foreign debt for light weapons.
• Set up an international financial endowment
to buy arms in pre- and post-conflict situa-
tions.
• Support the improvement of capacities to
control the entry and distribution of light
weapons. Explore technological developments,
especially satellite technology, which allow
greater levels of cooperation worldwide. New
questions should be raised on how to develop
accountability in a free market context.
• Cooperate in the exchange of laws and effec-
tive experience.
• Develop a culture of peace that gives a key
role to negotiation and pacific resolution of
conflict.
• Draw up an international code of conduct for
states and companies related to the weapons
trade. Without such a code, it is impossible
to effect monitoring, sanctions or embargoes.
3.2. Non-state actors in armed conflicts
Post-Seattle, The Economist referred to the pres-
ence of a ‘non-governmental order’.14 We live
in a world that is becoming increasingly complex
through the variety of actors and the different
relationships that they establish. The most
diverse powers are to be found among the non-
state actors. Some are very positive, such as the
Red Cross, and are key factors in the protection
of human security. But terrorist organizations are
also acting internationally to cause grave damage
to human and international security.
This complex subject requires effective meas-
ures to avoid the escalation of a conflict because
of non-state actors’ relation to it. All conflicts
are simultaneously international and national
today.
Our fundamental guiding principles here
should aim to promote a monopoly on the use
of force by the main actor at both international
and state levels. The dispersion of capacities and
mechanisms of force increases opportunities for
non-state actors to use force, and thus increases
opportunities for human rights violations.
Governance is the key. Governance means
greater transparency, greater participation and
greater accountability.
We need to know more about the national
and subregional contexts of conflict. With the
74
Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
end of the Cold War we need a more complete
interpretation.
We need to know why force is used. Poverty
is not a sufficient explanation. In this respect
there is a certain vision of the future in which
cultural tradition is important. If this vision is
incorporated appropriately, it could be an impor-
tant element in the protection of human rights.
Cultural traditions related to human rights and
the use of force are important to understand the
actions of different actors. The cultural aspect is
closely related to the dominance of law and the
establishment of effective national norms in
accordance with international law.
The cultivation of a culture of pacific conflict
resolution completes our guiding principles.
Each region has its own cultural perspective. We
need to include these in a global perspective.
One of the leading risks to the international
system is to become involved with non-state
actors that use belligerent force in the explicit
or implicit sense.
To avoid this risk, the space for dialogue
generated by the academic arena and non-
governmental organizations is fundamental. It is
through ‘Track Two’ diplomacy that greater
participation and transparency of the actors in-
volved in this process will occur, a process that
has as its principal objective respect for human-
itarian law, human rights, and the search for
alternatives to military conflict.
The academic world can assist this process by
providing more information, new interpretations,
and a space for the dialogue of politics and
diplomacy.
International humanitarian action is always
urgent in character, but it must be balanced with
a perspective of support and cooperation for
long-term development. Otherwise, stabilization
will not be possible and crises will recur.
The joint work of civil society (non-
governmental and academic organizations) with
multilateral and intergovernmental organizations
facilitates the creation of a space for generating
efficient alternatives to protect the security of all
humanity.
4. Cooperative multilateralism
Effective cooperative policies are developed in the
multilateral arena. This is where it is possible to give
policies a fresh opportunity when violence appears.
Multilateralism allows the creation of spaces for nego-
tiation and opportunities for diplomacy. Building these
multilateral spaces is essential. The trust they offer
allows the timely development of jointly attainable
goals. Even in extreme situations, it is possible to
present human rights as a significant factor in the
(state or non-state) actors’ relationships. Without multi-
lateralism, opportunities for cooperation are reduced
and the costs of human security are increased; and
multilateralism is compromised as a basic principle
that orders and regulates rights.
As a fundamental objective, multilateralism has
had to resolve the basic anarchy in the relations
among central actors. In the framework of multilat-
eralism, agreement has been reached on the basic
rules and norms allowing cohabitation, thus reducing
conflict and promoting cooperation. International law
effectively exemplifies this.
We are moving from a strategic-state multi-
lateralism towards one of another kind, a societal-
state multilateralism, and although still disarticulated
and disinstitutionalized, it will take precedence in the
future. We are faced with an international society in
the midst of an emergency. In this new multilateralism,
the reduction of sovereignty and the permeability of
the nation-state are expressed in all environments,
the most obvious being matters of finance and human
rights. National sovereignty ceases to exist, in the
state sense, as we advance towards a world where
access to various means of communication and trade
is becoming easier. Values, in particular those of
Western origin, have a decisive influence.
We are experiencing the rise of a transnational
civil society with distinct forms, strengths and inter-
ests. A segmented and asymmetric global framework,
which combines multilateralism in some dimensions
with strong monopolization in others, such as the
armed forces.
The traditional multilateral system is in crisis; a
crisis expressed in the United Nations, in the OAS,
and in the Organization of African Unity. The parlia-
mentary-based international system is in crisis and
seeks to be replaced by an ad hoc diplomacy. This
is often exhausted by photo opportunities without
adopting actual, concrete decisions. We should there-
fore advance towards an effective cooperative multi-
lateralism.
Multilateralism can change the reality of the inter-
national system and domestic politics. It is the only
instrument capable of generating decisions that go
beyond the states that compose the organization. How
can one build such an association? It is a human
creation and therefore depends on the political will
of the individuals or organizations that develop it.
Without shared values a political consensus is impos-
sible, and without a consensus there will be no co-
ordinated action; an institutional reality will not exist.
The recognition and promotion of shared values
allow for the design and creation of an international
public well-being and a global public well-being. This
is the main task of the twenty-first century.15 This
will allow the objectives of the United Nations to be
fulfilled.

Global problems, especially those referred to in
the new agenda (matters of finance, the environment,
drugs, migration, natural resources and quality of life)
cannot be tackled by unilateral politics. No state can
resist their impact alone, action on a world scale is
required.16 The development of a cooperative multi-
NOTES
1. Alfred Verdross, Derecho internacional público, Madrid,
Editorial Aguilar, 1955.
2. Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest,
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
3. Chairman’s Summary, ‘A Perspective on Human
Security’, Lysøen (Norway), 20 May 1999. The Human
Security Network comprises the governments of Austria,
Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and
Thailand.
4. Danny Ertel, Negociación 2000, Colombia, McGraw Hill,
1996.
5. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of
Human Security, New York, United Nations
Development Programme, 1994.
6. Lawrence Freedman, ‘International Security: Changing
Targets’, Foreign Policy, No. 110, Spring 1998.
7. Francisco Rojas-Aravena (ed.), Cooperación y seguridad
internacional en las Américas, Caracas, Editorial Nueva
Sociedad, 1999; idem, Globalización, América Latina
y la diplomacia de cumbres, Santiago, FLACSO-
Chile/Latin American and the Caribbean Centre (LACC),
1998.
8. Action Plan, Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago
(Chile), April 1998.
9. Chairman’s Summary, Human Security Network Second
Ministerial Meeting, Lucerne (Switzerland), 11–12 May
2000.
10. The Rio Group is a mechanism to reach common posi-
tions on significant subjects for Latin America at the
Third round table 75
Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America
lateralism and the corresponding political determina-
tion will allow a new architecture and new interna-
tional institutions to be built. The special task of the
global system and regional groups is to envision inter-
national well-being and an institutional system capable
of putting it into practice.
regional or global levels. Founder members in 1986
were Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Mexico (the
former Contadora Group), as well as Argentina, Brazil
and Peru. The Group expanded to include Bolivia,
Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and one represen-
tative each from the Central American and Caribbean
countries. At the 54th General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1999, the Group resolved to incorporate as
members in full standing Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua.
11. Available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/
bureau_pm/csbm/inter_amer_firearms.html
12. Available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/
bureau_pm/csbm/fs_000622_transparency.html
13. Available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/
bureau_pm/csbm/cadst.html
14. The World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in
Seattle, USA, November/December 1999, witnessed
unprecedented public demonstrations against the poli-
cies, practices and organizational set-up of the global
trading body.
15. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, Global
Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st
Century, New York, United Nations Development
Programme/Oxford University Press, 1999.
16. Informe Desarrollo Humano 1999, New York, United
Nations Development Programme/Mundi Prensa Libros,
1999. (Human Development Report 1999: Globalization
with a Human Face.)

THE PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES
TO THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
by General Juan Alberto Lezama,
Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN),
Montevideo, Uruguay
1. Introduction
Bearing in mind the time and framework allocated
to this meeting, I would like to express some reflec-
tions and proposals that I hope will be constructive
for the participants and contribute to cooperation on
specific projects.
First, I will briefly attempt to describe the insti-
tution that I am honoured to head; explain why we
have integrated with UNESCO’s Management of Social
Transformations (MOST) Programme and mention
some of the activities developed therein; discuss the
theme for which we are here today; and conclude
with some proposals.
The Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN)
of Uruguay, is a postgraduate studies institute run by
the Ministry of Defence. It was established in 1976
to allow both civilian and military professionals to
study assessment, planning and management within
the national strategy arena.
The CALEN provides a calm environment for study
where absolute academic freedom prevails, together
with the teacher’s right to instruct and investigate
without government intervention or compromise while
respecting the law of the state. My presentation today
is my personal opinion and does not represent the
position of my country nor that of the institute.
Turning to my second point, I must offer special
thanks to UNESCO for the opportunity to found a
National Committee of the MOST Programme, thus
widening our horizons in joining with UNESCO in
the intellectual task of contributing to peace through
the application of the social sciences, promoting
security through education, science, technology, social
communications, computer technology and culture.
We are taking part in this initial experiment in order
to commemorate fifty years of UNESCO in Uruguay.
We began with a meeting on 7 December 1999 at
the CALEN on the theme ‘Human Security and
Development at the Beginning of the 21st Century’,
attended by well-known figures from Argentina,
Brazil, UNESCO and our own country.
This year, all the activities of the institute were
focused on the theme ‘Civil Security for a Culture of
Third round table 77
The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean
Peace and its Importance in Human Development’,
analysing thirty-one research projects and a DELPHI
poll. This work will be presented at a seminar
scheduled for December 2000, and the results of the
poll, some of which I have with me today, will be
published shortly.
UNESCO’s 2000–2001 budget refers to innovations
in education for a culture of peace. The year 2000
was one of innovation for the CALEN, the results of
which will be presented at the meeting in Montevideo
to which you are all invited.
Our country, Uruguay, has contributed to world
peace through missions in different continents over
the years: Chaco Boreal, 1935; Sinai, 1981; Iran-Iraq,
1988; Honduras-Nicaragua, 1988; Cambodia, 1992;
Mozambique, 1993; Liberia, 1993; Rwanda, 1994;
Georgia, 1994; Angola, 1995. It is one of the coun-
tries that, relative to the size of its population, has
made the greatest efforts towards world peace.
The theme of human security has been studied
and developed in depth by the MOST Programme
since its creation in 1993, and for this reason we are
honoured to participate.
Returning to the theme of this meeting, I think
that some concepts need to be clarified because the
same words, thoughts or concepts may mean different
things to different people.
2. Basic concepts
There is no doubt that the concepts of security and
defence are intimately connected. However, this inter-
relation does not imply a single entity. If a national
defence policy corresponds to that of the political
representatives of society, with the advice of the
professionals who are mainly responsible for it, the
armed forces, a national security policy is something
else altogether. The concept of security covers the
widest areas of society, including the economy, educa-
tion, health and welfare, social security, employment,
the smooth running of the political system, develop-
ment and modernization in harmony with the envi-
ronment, internal public order and much more, such
78
The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
as sector policies. Clearly, responsibility for the design
of a national security policy and its implementation
at the level of a national security strategy transcends
the institutions of the armed forces and the state as
a political association, despite the state’s strategic role
of advocate, coordinator, harmonizer and principal
executor, through which it immerses itself in civil
society.
This raises questions about what is to be main-
tained in a condition of security, protected from risk
or aggression: obviously the country, its inhabitants
and the concept of ‘nationality’ – all of which require
clarification.
The central nucleus of every culture is based on
its ideology or national myth. This concept involves
at least two basic elements: on the one hand, a system
of beliefs about the position of a group, community
or society in the world and about its destiny. On the
other hand, equally important, is the adherence to a
system of values, symbolically expressed and re-
affirmed through ritual ceremonies.
This concept of national ideology is understood
as a cultural dimension with an explicit unbiased
logic, with strong characteristics that drive a society
to historical action and form the most solid basis of
its global identity, all of which constitute what we
call ‘nationality’.
Several points should be added to the case we
have established so far:
• The theme under discussion implies the constitu-
tion and development of nation-states. The concepts
of nationality and national identity are linked to the
process of development of the nation-state.
• This relates to the kind of definition that a group
attributes to itself – concerning its strengths and
weaknesses, hopes and fears, history, current
prospects and future expectations, everything that
is found to be intimately related to its traditions
and values.
• The national identity resides in the collective
memory.
• This memory is based on, and legitimized through,
its relation to the differences separating groups
from one another and produced by actor-narrators
who interpret and manufacture situations, beliefs
and values. In the background is always to be
found the sphere of power with its struggles and
conflicts, the driving force of national historical
development. Also, a profusion of viewpoints indi-
cates the presence of a profusion of actors and
political movements.
• Nationality or national identity is not a simple thing.
It consists of partial contributions that sometimes
converge and sometimes diverge.
• The maintenance of a national identity is not a
static process. Neither does it imply change. On
the contrary, it requires an attempt to understand
new indigenous and exogenous elements, which
could naturally bring about a synthesis with the
national project, within a context of integration.
• A different, although complementary, approach
considers that the concepts of strategy, policy, objec-
tives, security and defence are intimately connected,
to the point of constituting a true conceptual system.
The policy of national objectives answers the ques-
tion ‘what to do?’, while the national strategy relates
to the preparation and application of power in the
struggle for and/or maintenance of the objectives
set out by the policy. It assumes the ‘where, how
and when’.
Speaking of strategy raises questions about how to
follow the objectives, with what means and in what
coordinates of time and space. Strategy, a political
tool, must achieve the objectives that have been
proposed in spite of internal and external threats to
them. According to United Nations Document
A 553/38, security is a ‘situation in which states
perceive that they are free from military aggression,
economic coercion and political pressure, to freely
continue with a development search’. National
defence is seen, in terms of action, as a strategy,
because a strategy is ‘how’ things are done.
Human security is the sum of all the rights that
a person may enjoy, and a fuller concept of security
would be a ‘situation of safety’, transcending physical
security and encompassing social tensions, dissidence
within the state, political instability, economic and
commercial problems, production, technological
competition, etc., all factors that affect the survival
and progress of humanity and the environment,
intrinsic to the idea of security and incorporated in
the collective feeling of the social body. If we think
of the opposite situation, insecurity in any of its mani-
festations, it is clear that such a negative feeling is
one of the major factors working against the balance
required to sustain political and social stability in any
country or region of the world.
The introduction to the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS) states:
‘Convinced that the historic mission of America is to
offer to man a land of liberty and a favorable environ-
ment for the development of his personality and the
realization of his just aspirations’, and goes on to set
out the nature and purposes of the organization. Two
of these purposes stand out: ‘to strengthen the peace
and security of the continent’ (Article 2a); and ‘to
promote, by cooperative action, [the Member States’]
economic, social, and cultural development’
(Article 2f). The principles set out in Chapter II
include ‘social justice and social security as bases of
lasting peace’ (Article 3j); ‘the fundamental rights of
the individual without distinction as to race, nation-
ality, creed, or sex’ (Article 3l); ‘respect for cultural
values’ (Article 3m); and finally that ‘the education
of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom
and peace’ (Article 3n).

All this is affirmed by a commitment to the funda-
mental rights and duties of states, with reference to
‘collective security’, ‘integral development’, and the
creation of the Inter-American Juridical Committee
and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,
to take on board these themes.
It was thus that the Charter of the principal inter-
national organization of the Americas expressed the
will and collective concern for the continental and
human security of the Member States and their popu-
lations. From this to our theme today, I believe, is
no great distance. At the time of the gestation of
these mechanisms of security for the hemisphere, the
wise drafters of the OAS Charter anticipated the theme
that brings us here today.
It may be considered that new threats exist, such
as those mentioned today, nevertheless, interpreting
other parts of the text we see that some of them
were foreseen: ‘To seek the solution of political,
juridical, and economic problems …’ (Article 2e);
‘Social justice and social security are bases of lasting
peace’ (Article 3j); ‘Economic cooperation is essential
to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples
of the continent’ (Article 3k), already appear in the
Charter of the OAS.
The extent and accuracy of some of the so-called
new threats, such as poverty, drug trafficking, inter-
national terrorism, international mafias, degradation
of the environment, unemployment and social
marginalization, cognitive exclusion, and selective
emigration, are very difficult to determine.
In recent years much has been written and
debated about these threats, as if the penuries that
our continent is suffering from today were ‘new’,
although we should point out that national authori-
ties and regional bodies have been actively involved.
In meetings of the OAS, of heads of state and
ministers, the more frequent topics of debate are
related to human security and future projections. The
security of the continent, the security of states and
the security of humanity are convergent themes on
the permanent agenda of our governments.
I believe this would be a good opportunity to
comment on certain regional data that bear out our
case.
For example, the population of China is six times
that of the Mercosur region, with an economic growth
rate of 9.6 per cent a year from 1983 to 1998, every
seven years doubling its gross domestic product (GDP),
which is rather smaller than the GDP of California but
more than that of the whole of South America.
Latin America has a growth rate of 1 per cent
or negative, depending on the country. It has a trade
deficit with the United States of $17 billion.
On the European front, some interesting data from
the World Trade Organization (WTO) show European
Union subsidies of the order of $143 billion, to ensure
what is referred to as the ‘nutritional security’ of
Third round table 79
The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean
285 million Europeans. This sum is greater than the
GNP of all the countries of South America, with the
exception of Brazil and Argentina. If we think of the
Japanese, North American and European subsidies,
$360 billion, we arrive at $1 billion per day – almost
the figure for Argentina.
With reference to science and technology, the
United States invests approximately $220 billion per
year between private and state enterprises, almost a
third of the entire Brazilian GDP.
Global trade figures, beginning with the five
largest, according to WTO 1999 estimates were:
1. United States: $710 billion, the equivalent of the
GDP of Brazil exported per year;
2. Germany: $545 billion, the GDP of Argentina plus
the rest of South America;
3. Japan: $388 billion, the GDP of Argentina;
4. France: $305 billion;
5. United Kingdom: $273 billion;
6. China: only $200 billion, but if Hong Kong and
Taiwan were included the country would be the
second-largest exporter in the world (and these
figures were several months old);
7. Mexico: $120 billion, seventeenth on the WTO
scale;
8. Brazil: locomotive of the Mercosur, exports
$49 billion and cannot expand much more as this
figure represents 0.8 per cent of the global market.
These are simply some examples to guide us.
This new international order, the gestation of
which is so arduous and difficult that only its general
outlines are recognizable at the moment, has attracted
the attention of a number of academics. They have
meticulously listed the problems faced by humanity,
in transition from a bipolar world with the emphasis
on state and military security, to a multipolar world
where the concept of security is increasing in
complexity and widening to include the concept of
personal security as well as the theoretical construc-
tion of regional security.
The strategic threats that have been detected are
many and complex, in their causes as well as in their
development and consequences. Of particular note
are the demographic explosion, essentially affecting
the poorest countries, which have fewer resources
and smaller scientific-technological capacity; and the
deterioration of the atmosphere partly caused by the
struggle of the most needy societies to survive, and
partly by the consumer culture that prevails in highly
developed countries. It appears that the consumption
of one North American child causes as much envi-
ronmental damage as that of two Swedish children,
three Italians, thirteen Brazilians or 280 Haitians. This
discrepancy is without a doubt a cause of friction
and conflict.
The revolution in agriculture and biotechnology
seriously threatens the productive and exporting
capacity of the developing countries, in that the
80
The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
incessant development of computing and robotics
increases industrial production and improves the
quality of products while at the same time causing
the loss of countless jobs.
The revolution in international finance and
communications, the ceaseless expansion of trans-
national companies, while transforming the world into
a global village, limit the decision-making capacity of
the smallest and least-developed states, threatening
to widen the breach between those at the centre and
those at the periphery.
The nation-state is not free from challenges, pres-
surized by multiple local and independent demands
and by the general tendency to transfer matters that
were formerly of domestic interest to supranational
entities and organs. The panorama becomes even
more complex when the list of strategic challenges
includes ethnic, cultural, religious and ideological
conflicts, the latter vestiges of the bipolar strategy of
the Cold War and the rigid mindset of certain groups.
The demographic explosion, environmental
pillaging, and exterior poverty encourages a current
of ‘illegal’ immigrants, many of whom are seeking
the benefits of modernity in more opulent societies,
often provoking ethnocentric and xenophobic
reactions. This situation constitutes an unprecedented
cultural soup among which mafia groups and terrorists
interact in cycles that oscillate from mutual ignorance
to reciprocal support.
Finally, post-modern culture with its attitudes of
hyper-consumerism, seen through the fleeting images
of tele-reality, the basic principle of which seems to
be the cultivation of an extreme hedonism, certainly
does not help to promote solidarity and cooperation
among individuals, groups and states.
Consideration of new threats does not imply,
affirm or admit that the traditional threats have defini-
tively disappeared. The armed forces, as well as
learning to deal with the new situations, thus have
to maintain the capacity to respond to classic
hypotheses, some of which could even derive from
the escalation or evolution of new or current threats,
as they are known today.
As a corollary of this approach, priority does not
need to be given to international instruments regu-
lating cooperation in the hemisphere in the traditional
way.
The peculiar nature of the new threats raises deli-
cate problems. Although it is desirable that states
should cooperate to confront a threat, international
agreement should not facilitate interference in the
internal matters of a state.
The boundaries between these situations can
sometimes become blurred because of the nature of
the threat. To attenuate the danger means recog-
nizing the central role of the government in whose
territory the situation that calls for international
action is developing. Such action should aim at
cooperating with that government and obtaining its
agreement.
The link between new threats does not mean that
they should all be confronted by the armed forces
or by military means. The shape that they can assume,
however, may have a substantial effect on security
and require eventual military deployment, if the
government so decides. The heads of South American
states, meeting in Brasilia at the Second Summit of
the Americas, pointed out the potential gravity of the
new phenomena.
The possible creation of international instruments
to respond to the new threats also raises some
complex questions. It is clearly convenient for
different situations to be regulated by multilateral
mechanisms, themselves responsive to a multilateral
consensus of opinion. Thus state sovereignty could
have been a topic for serious consideration if safe-
guards had not been foreseen in the successive treaties
that link us.
Today, certain facts are clearly recognized as
new threats. We wish to draw attention to the fact
that these ‘new’ threats are the result of the appli-
cation of technologies that are not only used for
war but have been incorrectly, imprudently or
perversely used. It is on these points that we should
concentrate our efforts, generating knowledge,
following up technological advances, above all in
areas that affect security. Otherwise we give out
signals of indifference or omission to the judicial
system as well as those of security and defence.
Likewise we must expect warnings from third parties
in the event of their feeling threatened by our action
or non-action.
Finally, I wish to mention the concepts of
Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, for whom one of the
most delicate objectives for the twenty-first century
is to avoid exclusion:
• cognitive exclusion will mean ‘missing the train of
history’;
• incorporation in commercial and production plat-
forms of global reach is imperative;
• understanding of the gravitational field of other
cultures is required;
• subjection to inhabitual strategic policies is neces-
sary, and this applies to certain politicians.
Following this line of thought, we are facing two
basic factors concerning the future of humanity. The
first is the colonization of space. Not only military
devices are launched into space, there are coloniza-
tion projects, space technology, space laboratories,
and so on. This is not Jules Verne’s dream, it is reality;
facing the challenge of a chimerical encounter with
other forms of life.
The second factor is that, for the first time in the
recorded history of humanity, we are beginning to
modify the physical and mental aspects of living
beings, with human as well as animal cloning.

These are two of the horizons towards which
humanity is heading in the next hundred years.
Must Latin America and the Caribbean be
excluded? Should we gather the collective force to
succeed? Would it be worth the effort? I believe that,
although our leaders will decide our future, it is our
duty to alert them to the risks and opportunities, and
to the growing importance of the time factor. The
decisions are for today, tomorrow could be too late,
and we will be left on the platform.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
‘Human Security and Development at the beginning
of the 21st Century’ Seminar, CALEN-UNESCO
Montevideo, December 1999. Participants:
Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, Colonel Carlos
Rodríguez Lagreca, Dr Jorge Lanzaro, Ambassador
Dr Hernán Patiño Mayer, Mr Manuel Bernales,
Professor Oscar Amorín, Mr Roberto Domínguez,
Mr Francisco Lacayo.
Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS),
signed in Bogotá in 1948 and amended by the
Protocols of Buenos Aires in 1967, Cartagena de
Indias in 1985, Washington in 1992 and Managua
Third round table 81
The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean
In conclusion, I believe that the fundamental axes
of the proposed Human Security Network should be
the dissemination of projects and discoveries, the
reform of academic links for the benefit of our soci-
eties, in both state and particular sectors, so that
advances in science and technology may become the
‘patrimony of humanity’.
The defence of equal opportunities in commer-
cial trade could also condemn our economies
to eternal poverty, no matter how strong our efforts.
in 1993. Available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/charter.html
Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, Time of Perplexities,
1996.
Our Creative Diversity, report of the World
Commission on Culture and Development, United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization/United Nations, 1993.
United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action
on a Culture of Peace. Available at http://www.
unesco.org.cpp/uk/declarations
 FOURTH ROUND TABLE

The main challenges

facing the promotion of human security
and peace in the Arab States

Moderator:
Mr René Zapata,
Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO

Lecturers:
Ms Ghada Ali Moussa,
Researcher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES),
Cairo, Egypt

Opening remarks
by the moderator, Mr René Zapata,
Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO
We are now going to begin our fourth regional discus-
sion, concerning the promotion of human security in
the Arab States. Before giving the floor to Professor
Moussa, I would like to make two general remarks.
The first concerns a problem that I think is crucial
to human security – the articulation between the
recognition that there are new and multiple dimen-
sions of human security, as clearly expressed in our
discussions up to now, and what I would call the
compounded impact of all the new threats to popu-
lations. This is one problem that has not been analysed
in its totality, not only at our meeting but in general.
We do recognize that environmental problems, food
problems, ethnic problems, cultural problems, have
a direct impact on human security. But we still lack
a view of their impact at the local level. Local can
mean national, but we need to understand more
specifically, within a nation, how all these threats
affect populations, as a whole, at a given time and
place.
The second general remark concerns the Arab
States. We are dealing here with a vast region, which
has gone through very complex and different
processes of state-building since decolonization, some
states in relation to the Ottoman Empire, others to
imperial powers such as France or the United
Kingdom. It is a region that is striving for unity, as
are many other regions in different organizational
schemes, whether through the League of Arab States
or at the subregional level through the Union of the
Arab Maghreb, which is trying to build, in coopera-
tion with the European Union, some structural articula-
tions with other regions. A notable example is the
Euro-Mediterranean dialogue framework which, as
you know, has advanced only slowly and another,
Fourth round table 85
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States
which of course weighs very heavily on the Arab
States as a whole, is the question of the Palestinian
people. This is a critical question and as Mary
Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, said on visiting the region, the situa-
tion of the Palestinian people is recognized by many
in the international community to be intolerable.
In conclusion, yesterday we talked about the
diversity, the differences between regions of Latin
America, the distinction between Mexico, Central
America, the Caribbean, and in South America, the
differences in development, in the problems of
different regions. I think that today also we have to
take cognizance of the great diversity of the Arab
States and of their great creativity. The Arab States,
from the cultural point of view, are called upon to
enhance the exposition of this creativity. We may
not know much about the region for linguistic or
other reasons, but I think that it is one of the most
creative in terms of political thought, in terms of the
arts, in terms of music. This is a factor to be taken
into consideration when talking about human
security. The cultural dimension within a region is
a very, very important factor and sometimes a threat
to cultural diversity or cultural expression can also
constitute a threat to human security. I will not deal
here with the Huntington thesis, except to say that
I feel that even within UNESCO, the concept of frac-
tures or clashes of civilizations was not taken
seriously enough at the time. It was taken seriously
by a certain number of organizations, especially
defence organizations, but I do not think we
responded adequately to what was a schematic
reorganization of power politics which of course
closely concerns the question of Islam.

CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SECURITY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
by Ms Ghada Ali Moussa,
Researcher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES),
Cairo, Egypt
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the multilateral organ-
izations have come up with new concepts and terms
ranging from ‘sustainable development’ to ‘partner-
ship’ and, last but not least, ‘human security’. Yet
these concepts are interrelated and share many
common principles, consistent with the commitment
of protecting and promoting human lives. One of
the most fundamental challenges that we face is the
realization of a humane, safe and equal world. This
is not only a moral imperative, it is a pragmatic
goal, because the facts in the world around us speak
for themselves. These facts drive us, as representa-
tives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
government officials and intellectuals, to search for
new approaches and new tools. We need a new
form of people-to-people diplomacy, based on the
collective efforts of a variety of actors, inside and
outside government bodies. It will depend on the
ability of NGOs and governments to raise people’s
awareness of fundamental human security needs and
will require a broad-based consensus between the
state and other actors within the state to address
basic human rights, needs and fears affecting daily
life.
This diplomatic effort reaches beyond traditional
and official relations between states to engage in-
dividuals and organizations from a variety of sectors
within civil society. We have seen the beginning of
this new drive towards a much more humane world
in the successful fight against terrorism, pollution and
drug trafficking in today’s world, where a single state
can accomplish little on its own. More than ever, we
need not only to use but to empower the multilat-
eral institutions that are available and to try to work
with like-minded and opposing countries inside and
outside these institutions to benefit from all ideas
and resources. Among the first priorities is to increase
efforts to strengthen international humanitarian law
in order to improve the security of individuals, espe-
cially in disadvantaged regions such as Africa and
the Middle East.
Fourth round table 87
Challenges to human security in the Middle East
2. Challenges to human security
In my opinion, human security means acknowledging
nations’ and peoples’ rights to an equal share of
economic, social and political world development and
protecting them from threats emanating from within
their own or other countries. And because the concept
we are dealing with here is very broad, a wide range
of old and new threats may be considered to be chal-
lenges to human security, ranging from epidemic
diseases to economic crises and the use of weapons
of mass destruction. These threats are not of the same
level and severity in each country. Every country,
although sharing similar threats with other countries,
has its own strategic threats and prioritizes them.
If human security is focusing on the security of
people, we cannot neglect the fact that their security
largely depends on state stability and a cooperative
internal community. When dealing with human
security issues we are not denying the major and
necessary shift in internal relations and world affairs,
which have long placed the predominant emphasis
on the security of the state. However, protection of
citizens, preventing violent conflicts, supporting peace
operations, governance and accountability, combating
terrorism, all these aspects engage ‘the state’ as first
priority, especially in developing countries where the
NGOs and Track Three diplomacy (universities,
research centres, public opinion) still play a minor
role compared with that of the state and govern-
ments, and where people and states still fear tradi-
tional forms of intervention when state efforts fail.
In today’s world there are worrying trends that
are disruptive in themselves and that threaten not
only the existence of the state, as the best-known
legal framework, but of the international order estab-
lished in the last few decades. One clear trend is
‘globalization’ which – although it may have led to
an emerging sense of community – has brought new
challenges to human security, principally the under-
mining of the importance of cultural diversities; and
superpowers that exercise leadership in addressing
problems of special interest to their countries, while
88
Challenges to human security in the Middle East What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
undermining problems that constitute a real challenge
to human security in developing countries and the
Middle East, such as social and economic progress
and democracy.
As we make the transition into the new century,
we must acknowledge the concerns associated with
globalization and admit that it is a mere process, not
a concept, and that we need to maximize the bene-
fits of globalization for all countries and human
beings. We also need to make every effort to secure
full respect for different approaches to globalization.
I believe that the concept of human security is of
the greatest value and serves as a complement to
existing international agendas focusing on promoting
national security and human development.
3. Challenges to human security
in Arab countries
As mentioned above, we may distinguish between
common challenges to human security, the solution
of which is considered vital to all world citizens, and
challenges specific to developing and Middle East and
Arab countries. I intend to focus on challenges
emanating from within the Middle East states, taking
Egypt as an example, and challenges to human
security imposed by the international order.
In order to respond strategically to some of these
diverse threats to human security in the Middle East
and Arab countries, I have identified nine major priority
areas, which include challenges affecting Egypt as a
developing country and a key Middle East country.
Egypt has survived changes of regime, ideology,
patterns of leadership, and, in modern times, trans-
formations in modes of production and social struc-
ture. Historically, most changes in Egyptian life have
been generated from the top down. Egyptian bureau-
cracy has performed some useful functions. It has
kept a steady statecraft functioning and allowed Egypt
to adjust to sudden changes that could have upset
the equilibrium of the state.
Few factors are more critical to the future of Egypt
and other Middle East countries than their progress
on the economic front. While the Arab countries have
made measurable progress in a number of areas, a
critical distance has still to be traversed before they
are out of the economic danger zone. These coun-
tries also have a great distance to traverse in order
to overcome the political and social costs of rapid
structural adjustment and its effect on internal stability.
3.1. Challenges to human security emanating
from within the state
3.1.1. Population growth
The most serious challenge to the domestic
stability of Egypt and Arab countries, which
feeds on underlying economic and political
discontent, is population growth. This consti-
tutes the worst threat to human security. The
rate of growth in Egypt has increased from
1.9 per cent in the 1970s to an estimated 2.9 per
cent in 1996. Despite this relatively modest
rise, the population is growing by 1.8 million
a year. This increase has, for a number of
years, exceeded the job-creation capacities of
the Egyptian economy and increased the
number of poor and marginalized people from
2.96 million (5.9 per cent of the total popula-
tion) in 1990 to 3.44 million (6.5 per cent of
the population) in 1994. The figures have not
changed dramatically in 1999. The private and
public sector together must create sufficient
employment opportunities to absorb a work-
force that is increasing by some 400 to 500 thou-
sand new entrants each year.
3.1.2. Economic growth
Economic growth is related to population
growth, although it is also a reflection of world
economic progress. In Egypt, as in most other
countries that undertake economic reform, real
growth in gross domestic product slowed after
the Economic Refor m and Structural
Adjustment Program from an average of 2.5 per
cent annually (in Fiscal Year (FY) 89–91) to
0.41 per cent annually (in FY 92–93). Yet Egypt
has managed to absorb a population increase
of about 14 to 15 million between 1981 and
1993, equal to the combined population of
Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian National
Authority. However, it has been estimated that
Egypt would require a consistent growth rate
of no less than 5 per cent annually to absorb
the expected increase in population at the
present level of per capita income of approx-
imately $710 in 1997. Although Egypt achieved
a 5 per cent growth rate by 1997, it is not
clear that this level can be sustained. Without
a substantial decline in population growth or
an increase in employment, Egypt will face
gradual erosion of the significant gains in
standard of living achieved over the previous
decade. Mobilization of new resources and
skills at the national, regional and international
levels is urgently required to ensure growth,
employment and stability.
One of the most pressing and immediate
economic dimensions of human security is the
employment problem. Egypt needs to create a
minimum of 6 million jobs in the coming years.
If current levels of unemployment are to be
reduced significantly, another 1.5 to 2 million
jobs must be found for the next three years.
To reduce unemployment, the number of jobs

must rise by about 50 per cent. Standards of
professionalism must also be reinforced and an
approach developed that stresses quality over
quantity. All Arab countries need to launch
more programmes of social and political adjust-
ment to augment and enhance the programme
of economic adjustment.
To ensure continuity and confidence, all
changes should be institutionalized within a
clear, legal framework. The systems in many
Arab countries, including Egypt, require the
institution of much more serious measures of
accountability from top to bottom and from
bottom to top. The above findings and calcu-
lations affect the security of women, in parti-
cular, in a negative way, assuming that the
current very low participation of women in the
Egyptian workforce (about 12 per cent) will
persist. Increasing women’s market activities
typically raises the opportunity costs of chil-
dren and contributes to reduced fertility rates.
These important long-term benefits will be fore-
gone unless more jobs can be created at the
same real wage. To reduce poverty – in this
sense – real wages need to rise, which means
a more rapid opening up of the demand for
labour.
3.1.3. Water supply and food security
Egypt’s total water supply is essentially fixed
at 55 to 56 billion cubic metres annually.
Whatever developments may occur, despite
improved storage and sharing of water among
Nile riparian states, they are unlikely to have
much positive effect in the short term, if
Ethiopia increases its utilization of the Blue
Nile water resources and if the Sudan expands
its irrigation projects. More sophisticated
demand management will therefore be essen-
tial. This is overwhelmingly the responsibility
of the agricultural sector, because about
85 per cent of all Egyptian water is used in
farming. Water constraint could mean that
Egypt’s only road to food security lies in
exporting farm and factory products,
depending on new land reclamation projects.
The same problem exists in other Arab coun-
tries such as Syria and Iraq, which faced a
water crisis when Turkey launched its GAP
(Great Anatolia Project for electricity and
irrigation in south-east Turkey). Therefore, in
order to prevent conflict over water in the
future, and because almost all rivers running
through Arab countries have their source in
non-Arab countries, intensive coordination
between both groups should exist. We do not
want to be caught by the saying that water
wars are inevitable.
Fourth round table 89
Challenges to human security in the Middle East
3.1.4. Improving human resources
Any viable strategy of export-led growth, or
any other growth strategy, must include invest-
ment in upgrading the quality of the most
important resource in Egypt – human beings.
In this sense, the following points are of note:
• The failure to provide all Egyptians with basic
literacy has been a serious deficiency in
public policy. Not until the late 1980s were
almost all Egyptian boys enrolled in primary
schools, while almost a quarter of Egyptian
girls are still not enrolled. Without acceler-
ated progress in this area, poverty reduction
will not be achieved and gender and social
inequalities will widen.
• Improving human capital means the ability
to respond to shifting technological and
market conditions. If Egypt and Arab coun-
tries must export in order to employ and
feed their citizens, they must be able to
compete in the international market with a
literate, skilled workforce. An illiterate work-
force is poor material from which to craft an
export-led growth strategy.
• It is not enough to be aware of new tech-
nologies; Arab countries need to possess the
know-how to utilize them effectively.
3.1.5. Environmental crises
Population growth, with an expansion in
consumption and excessive production, has led
to environmental crises, climate change and air
pollution. In this endeavour, we still face the
lack of cooperation between the stakeholders
in this area to identify the barriers and come
up with innovative solutions or to form a task
force. Egyptian NGOs have played a major role
in trying to bring conflicting parties together
and in introducing new methods to resolve
recurring conflicts. They have also participated
in awareness campaigns, which still need to
be expanded and strengthened. We are strongly
committed to close cooperation among
ourselves and with developing countries and
international organizations to help to resolve
major outstanding issues, such as air pollution,
which have greatly affected human health and
damaged production capacity.
3.2. Challenges to human security emanating
from the international system
3.2.1. World economy and trade
There is another form of ‘patriarchy’ that has
negative effects on developing countries. The
twentieth century has achieved unprecedented
economic progress, yet not all international
parties have benefited from the boom. The
90
Challenges to human security in the Middle East What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
world economy grew stronger, but the number
of poor and marginalized people and countries
grew more quickly, so that social safety nets
failed to catch up and to ensure strong, sustain-
able growth and greater prosperity for all. It
is true that the multilateral trading system
embodied by the World Trade Organization has
provided its members with enormous trade
opportunities, but it has not – until now –
addressed the legitimate concerns of developing-
country members, or the ineffectiveness of their
participation because they were denied access
to world markets. In this sense a comprehen-
sive partnership cannot be developed because
the partners are not on an equal footing
and because the world trade challenges to
developing countries do not address the
improvement of the situation of the least-
developed countries.
3.2.2. Weapons of mass destruction
The acquisition of weapons of mass destruc-
tion places a great burden on the financial and
economic capabilities of all countries alike,
depriving citizens of the opportunity of fulfilling
their basic needs and shifting resources. Egypt
has made great efforts to raise the awareness
of the danger of proliferation in the Middle
East, calling upon states in the region, including
Israel, to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and remains committed to
promoting universal adherence to and com-
pliance with the NPT, especially after the
outnumbering of citizens in Sinai and Jordan
living near the Israeli nuclear reactor at Negev,
where there is fear of environmental damage.
International concern is also growing about the
threat of terrorist groups and individuals
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and
concerted efforts must be made to prevent such
a crisis.
3.2.3. Neglecting cultural diversity
With the launching of the ‘clash of civilizations’
thesis by Samuel Huntington in 1993,1 an
attempt was made to transform into a threat
the very core of the values that deeply inspire
the lives of the great majority of the popula-
tion of the Arab world in general, and of the
Middle East in particular – the values of Islam.
Huntington went so far as to speak of ‘Islam’s
bloody borders and of a Muslim propensity
towards violent conflict’, and explained Muslim
violence in the last two decades by the absence
of one or more core states, or by the demo-
graphic explosion of Muslim societies and the
number of unemployed men between the
ages of 15 and 30. Needless to say, these
explanations and others referred to by
Huntington are part of a clear-cut attempt to
isolate what he calls the West from the rest of
the world, with a view to legitimizing the exer-
cise of armed power politics in the twenty-
first century. Even though many scholars have
been highly critical of Huntington’s ideas, one
should be careful not to underestimate the
influence that they exert on strategic and
defence communities in Europe and the United
States.
Although cultural diversities are a source of
social and economic dynamism and enrich
human life, new social trends neglect the fact
that cultures not of Western origin could inspire
creativity and stimulate innovation. Not
acknowledging and respecting other cultures
leads to racism and discrimination by the
people and their states (recalling what has
happened to foreigners and immigrants in
Germany and France). Therefore, and from this
honourable gathering, I support the work of
the United Nations in its preparations for a
Conference against Racism, to be held in South
Africa in 2001.2 I also encourage education
ministers from all countries to meet to promote
education to foster the understanding of
different cultures.
3.2.4. Lack of implementation
of international humanitarian law
In the course of the twentieth century the inter-
national community has witnessed many
regional and civil wars, in which all kinds of
weapons – produced by human intelligence –
have been used against civilians and have
threatened the security of nations worldwide.
Until now the international community has
failed to protect civilians from the effects of
war, though advances have been made in
setting humanitarian rules and norms, espe-
cially through the extensive efforts of the inter-
national Red Cross and Red Crescent.
This is one of the major threats to human
security in our region, and is particularly
evident in Iraq and the Sudan where civilians
are paying the price of international sanctions,
or in the Palestinian National Authority where
civilians, mostly children, are deprived of
normal living conditions because of the Israeli
occupation and aggression and Israel’s refusal
to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949
and its additional Protocol of 1977 concerning
the protection of civilians in time of war.
Last but not least, we in the Arab countries
and the Middle East region clearly recognize
that the process of globalization and the fast
pace at which information and technology are

advancing have engendered various concerns.
It is not enough for conferences and meetings
to address such concerns so that the parti-
cipants can enjoy peace of mind. We need to
see the results of such conferences and meet-
NOTES
1. S. P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22–49.
Fourth round table 91
Challenges to human security in the Middle East
ings implemented, at least in one or two areas,
to help in securing the future of humanity. We
do have a common concern, but perhaps our
legitimate tools differ, logically following the
diversity of cultures.
2. World Conference against Racism and Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,
August/September 2001, Durban, South Africa.
 FIFTH ROUND TABLE

The main challenges

facing the promotion of human security
and peace in Asia and the Pacific

Moderator:
Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos,
Assistant Director-General, ‘Priority Africa’ Department, UNESCO

Lecturers:
Mr Timothy M. Shaw,
Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada;
Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan,
Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS),
Dhaka, Bangladesh

WHAT PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY
IN ASIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
SOME PARALLELS WITH AFRICA
by Mr Timothy M. Shaw,
Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada;
Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
1. Introduction
‘… the building of cooperative peace within the frame-
work of ASEAN is of paramount importance for other
regions and their respective intergovernmental
regional organizations. Indeed, much can be learned
from the methods of the ongoing cooperative peace
process within ASEAN …’ (Goucha and Zapata, 1999,
p. 19).
‘The first few years of the twenty-first century
may represent something of a hiatus for Asian region-
alism, and other forms of economic and security insti-
tutional diplomacy may come to the fore . . .’ (Higgott,
2000, p. 262).
‘While the concept of human security has attracted
much attention in the West, including Canada, it
remains poorly understood and contested in Asia’
(Acharya and Acharya, 2000, p. 1).
The ‘Asian crisis’ (crises, in fact?) of the late 1990s
(Mastanduno, 2000; Soros, 2000, pp. 208–34) trans-
formed the character of ‘security’ issues and discourses
throughout Asia as well as prospects for and opti-
mism about regional cooperation/integration (Higgott,
2000). In the preceding heady days of the ‘Asian
miracle’, in which prevailing assumptions about the
‘developmental state’ went unchallenged (Chan et al.,
1998), it was largely conceived as ‘national security’.
At the start of the new millennium – still the Pacific
century? – not only the continent’s economic growth
and development along with its myriad ambitious
regional projects (Bergsten, 2000) but also its social
and political stability are in question (Bello, 1990;
The Economist, 2000b, p. 93; Jomo, 1998).
One positive result of the unanticipated after-
shocks of the late 1990s throughout Asia, which
followed on the global earthquakes of the end of the
Cold War half a decade earlier, has been a transfor-
mation in definitions of and debates about security
around the region towards a more comprehensive
notion of ‘human security’ (Acharya and Acharya,
2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001). This parallels the
overall evolution of this notion with its relevance to
other continents such as Africa (Lee, 2000; UNDP,
1994). It also raises profound issues about the distinc-
Fifth round table 95
What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa
tiveness and resilience of ‘Asian’ forms of capitalism,
now increasingly incorporated into more global forms
via fireside sales of assets to established Western multi-
nationals (Soros, 2000, pp. 201–34). The exception-
alism of Asia was always problematic, notions of
‘Asian values’ notwithstanding (Mead, 2000). Now its
comparability is non-controversial, reinforced by
assertions such as the ‘African renaissance’ (Shaw and
Nyang’oro, 2000) in contrast to the ‘Asian demise’!
This overview seeks to estimate prospects for
human development in Asia by juxtaposing concepts
of ‘human security’ at the start of the new century.
It privileges notions of ‘governance’ in which a trio
of actor types are involved: not just states but also
companies and civil societies. This enables it to review
the history and potency of three parallel tracks of
diplomatic-cum-strategic governance – Tracks One,
Two and Three – which reflect and reinforce the
contributions of non-state actors (Kraft, 2000). In turn,
I review the changing balance among conventional,
nuclear and human security in the region. Section 5
speculates on a range of possible scenarios for Asia
in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and
the final part considers implications arising from such
a human security perspective for established modes
of analysis and practice, both established disciplinary
and interdisciplinary perspectives alike, with lessons
for/from Africa (Shaw, 2000) as well as Asia (Acharya
and Acharya, 2000; Goucha and Zapata, 1999).
In part, this presentation constitutes something of
a personal confession or critique as I remained some-
what sceptical about the relevance and acceptability
of human security for this region towards the end of
the twentieth century (Quadir and Shaw, 1998) given
the degree of resistance in much of the region (parti-
cularly emanating from the regime advocating the
‘Singapore School’!) towards even the notion of
‘human rights’. But the spillover from the series of
interrelated crises, ecological as well as economic,
has served to advance such analysis and practice –
from human rights to human security – even if not
all incumbent regimes so appreciate let alone
welcome it (Acharya and Acharya, 2000). And I have
been pleased to develop the notion of ‘island
96
What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
governance’ – how each island community (i.e. its
regime, economy and society), no matter what its
formal status, positions itself in the regional and global
political economies – in association with colleagues
from the archipelagic states of South-East Asia (Shaw,
1998).
2. Governance for human security
The Asian crisis of the late 1990s shook confidence
in Asian values and revealed the tenuousness of links
between the region’s economies, polities and societies
(Soros, 2000, pp. 201–34). Continuing tensions among
states, corporations and civil societies point to the
imperative of re-examining the erstwhile ‘develop-
mental state’ and learning new lessons from/for Asia
(Stein, 1995). Certainly, the intensity of the
crisis/decline and resilience of response/revival have
diverged dramatically throughout the region, with
Hong Kong and Singapore least negatively affected
and Indonesia and the Philippines the most (The
Economist, 2000a, 2000b); i.e. the area’s Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs) are today further away
from their aspirations than ever: the geese may be
flying backwards! Moreover, the continuing stagna-
tion of the Japanese economy in contrast to the
sustained expansion of that in China affects the
balance between these regional powers at the turn
of the century. Furthermore, just as island governance
draws attention to highly divergent patterns of
development among neighbouring island political
economies (e.g. Java versus Irian Jaya or Luzon versus
Mindanao), so forms of ‘globalizations’ have generated
opportunities for high-tech ‘islands’ such as the
Special/Export Processing Zones of coastal China or
Bangalore in India, which are becoming more inte-
grated globally than nationally with profound impli-
cations for the cohesion of these two major Asian
powers (Tiejun, 2000).
Pressures for first political and then economic
liberalization throughout the region have served to
change the balance between state and non-state actors
leading towards new patterns of governance between
them. The sequences and consequences of these
conditionalities are crucial factors determining
whether human development and human security are
achievable and sustainable in today’s Asia (Acharya
and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001).
Governance in Asia, as elsewhere in the new
century, means the ongoing roles of companies and
civil societies as well as states in policy- and decision-
making on all issues, including security (Wolfish and
Smith, 2000). These are advanced through the analysis
of not-for-profit think-tanks (Stone, 2000) and the
related advocacy of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), increasingly orchestrated and advanced
through regional and global coalitions and networks
(McGann and Weaver, 2000). In turn, such ‘triangular’
relations serve to reinforce notions of human rather
than state security as other interests and threats are
recognized; in the classic United Nations Development
Programme conceptualization, protection from ‘the
threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social
conflict, political repression and environmental
hazards’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 22).
In short, human security (cf. www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity; www.unesco.org/
securipax) is less concerned with national, state or
regime security than with basic needs, community,
economic, environmental, gender, personal and polit-
ical securities. These are internal and transnational
rather than inter-state, and they can be advanced by
a variety of interests and institutions rather than just
the military. Thus, at least some analysts and activists
in Asia have gone beyond common, comprehensive
and cooperative security towards more inclusive
conceptualizations of human development/security
(Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez,
2001).
3. Tracks One, Two and/or Three
in the new millennium
Conventional notions of national security imply a
monopoly of ‘Track One’ official, inter-state diplo-
macy: the classical ‘realist’ world. Such exclusive inter-
regime negotiations and confrontations still exist even
if they are increasingly subject to non-state attention,
especially from the local to global NGOs (e.g. Amnesty
International, Greenpeace) and media. However,
reflective of presumed ‘Asian values’, to advance the
Asian miracle in the 1980s, a second tier was devel-
oped: a distinctive ‘Track Two’ of diplomats, academics
and others in their ‘personal capacities’ typically
focusing on ‘functional’ or ‘technical’ matters, such as
communications, disasters, energy, oceans, river
valleys, etc. Such informal patterns of diplomatic gover-
nance, centred around the twenty-plus national/asso-
ciate/regional members of the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (www.cscap.org),
advanced furthest in the Institute of Strategic and
International Studies network in South-East Asia in the
early 1990s (www.jaring.my/isis), reinforcing the Asian
Regional Forum (ARF) of ASEAN (www.aseansec.org).
But as Richard Higgott indicates, such optimism and
attention was not to last:
‘Thus the events of 1997–98 – the most traumatic
experienced in Asia since decolonization and the Cold
War confrontations of the 1950s and 1960s – also
have spawned lessons for Asian regionalism. The
crises have sidetracked policy elites from the regional
dialogue activities – trade liberalization and security
– popular throughout the first half of the 1990s. In
this context, ASEAN, as the activist leader of wider

Asian regional dialogues, has lost its way since 1997’
(Higgott, 2000, pp. 263–4).
In short, reverberations from the regional crises of
recent years have meant that the salience of Track
Two peaked well before the end of the century, to
be superceded by a return to more exclusive and
antagonistic Track One inter-state relations along with
the evolution of a Track Three of non-state actors
(Kraft, 2000). The latter is also ‘exclusive’ but not inten-
tionally so: local and national, regional and global
NGOs along with more progressive think-tanks, media.
etc. (see www.twnside.org.sg). While the former
concentrates on orthodox short-term military threats,
the latter puts longer-term non-traditional issues on the
agenda: cultural, economic, ecological, personal, social,
technological threats to human development/security
such as droughts and floods, drugs and gangs, land-
mines and small arms, etc. (Mbabazi et al., 2001;
MacLean and Shaw, 2001). Unfortunately, currently
Tracks One and Three exist in somewhat splendid
isolation from each other, reflective of the lingering
tensions between state and civil society, although Kraft
(2000) hopes that mutual suspicion can be overcome
by ‘inter-track’ ‘confidence-building measures’. As
Behera et al. indicate, Track Three reflects voices from
the margins of international relations which seek to
‘build constituencies for peace which can question
conventional practices and beliefs and present alter-
natives to official government positions’ (1997, p. 19).
In the first decade of the new millennium, Track
Two is clearly needed now more than ever to bridge
the gap and facilitate a dialogue between the three
corners of the governance triangle both intra- and
inter-regionally. Such intentions lay behind some
late-twentieth-century national ‘architectures’ for
Asian security and development such as CANCAPS
(www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps), the Canadian adjunct of
CSCAP [see also the new Swedish South Asian
Studies Network (SASNET) supported by the
Swedish International Development Agency, Sida
(http://sasnet.soc.lu.se/) and related Asia-Pacific
(national through human) security networks]. At the
national level, it too seeks to bridge the state-
corporate-civil society/academic divide in an ongoing
series of workshops, discussions, publications, etc.,
which are largely compatible with current official and
non-state ‘foreign policy’ reflecting a human security
orientation, so reinforcing the work of the Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada (www.asiapacific.ca). Sympto-
matic of the interdependence of the Three Tracks, as
well as their potential outside as well as inside ASEAN,
was the award of the Nobel Prize for Peace in
December 2000 to the President of the Republic of
Korea, Kim Dae Jung, for negotiating an unprece-
dented summit with the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea in the north and facilitating ‘family reunions’,
which are leading to other state and non-state attempts
to engage the Kim Jong II regime.
Fifth round table 97
What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa
4. Conventional, nuclear and human security
in contemporary Asia
Just as the trio of diplomatic ‘Tracks’ have evolved
within the last decade, so has the balance among
conventional, nuclear and human security concerns
(ISIS, 2000). If the first predominated in the era of
the Asian miracle, the last two have become central
at the turn of the century, reflective of an intensifi-
cation of intra- and inter-state inequalities and in-
securities. The escalation of nuclear-related stand-offs
between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, and
the two Koreas, has come to supercede the several
decades of Cold War bipolarity between the two
superpowers across the Arctic. Such contemporary
Asian flashpoints are even more ominous because of
the spread of ballistic-missile technologies. To date,
a mixture of great-power cajoling and Track Two
mediation has prevented either a nuclear accident or
a protracted hot war, but recent Gulf Wars should
provide history lessons of the potential costs entailed.
In contrast to the revival of inter-state confronta-
tions, intra-state inequalities are intensifying as the
stages of the crisis unfold and the associated gains
and costs are spread unevenly. These have already
led to an escalation of internal conflicts around the
peripheries of countries such as Indonesia and the
Philippines which may yet lead to de jure as well as
de facto separatist states such as Aceh and Irian Jaya.
Like Africa, Asia has had to accommodate ‘new states’
in the new century even if we had all assumed that
the ‘nationalist’ era of formal independence ended in
the 1960s. The painful birth of East Timor (Kraft,
2000; Traub, 2000), like that of Eritrea, may not deter
other aspirants as in the southern Philippines and
reinforce the attractions of relatively flexible and
informal inter-island ‘triangles’ rather than more rigid
archipelagic states.
Moreover, the cumulative consequences of en-
vironmental decay are only beginning to be recog-
nized, let alone calculated, as clean air and water
become ever more scarce (Quadir and Shaw, 1998).
Certainly the ‘haze’ crises of the late 1990s constituted
something of a wake-up call even if illegal logging
practices have community as well as environmental
aspects. Likewise, the intrusion and spread of viruses
such as HIV/AIDS have served to concentrate minds
on prevention, with the epidemic spreading from
Africa to Asia, especially among poorer, migrant
communities.
Non-traditional security threats in Asia always bore
more resemblance to other continents like Africa than
was admitted during the boom years (MacLean et al.,
2001). Even then syndromes around drugs/gangs/guns,
migration/refugees, piracy, etc., were reminiscent of
some African issues, including the privatization of
security. So the centrality of Afghanistan in the world
of hard drugs, as well as fundamentalism, may be
98
What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
contrasted to some African trans-shipment centres. In
part because of geography as well as relative afflu-
ence, there has always been a much higher preva-
lence of piracy on Asia’s high seas than around Africa’s
long coastline, although one correlate of on-land
conflicts and peace-keeping is off-shore crime, both
to humans and resources such as fish and coral
(e.g. around Somalia). Indeed, the continuing in-
stability around the South China Sea is in part an
instance of the role of impoverished navies out of
uniform! Hence the imperative of effective ocean and
island governance, reinforcing novel patterns of
Asian/archi-pelagic ‘triangles’ (Shaw, 1998).
Moreover, Asia has considerable experience of
soldiers in power, so that ‘civil-military relations’ have
been as fraught there as elsewhere. New forms of
democratic governance may lead towards a more trans-
parent relationship in which NGOs join elected offi-
cials in monitoring statutory forces to ensure com-
pliance with human rights and codes of warfare. As
security is privatized, so such supervision is needed
for private military companies as well. Soldiers continue
to be engaged in private as well as illegal sectors, in
part to finance their operations, particularly arms races,
which seem to be heating up again at the turn of the
century. Ubiquitous ‘off-budget’ activities and incomes
– from small- to large-scale – mean that official figures
underestimate the real costs of military forces in Asia
as elsewhere (Berger, 2000; ISIS, 2000).
5. Scenarios for Asian futures
in the new century
Given the above cautions about the elusiveness of
human development/security, along with increasingly
revisionist reflections around the Asian crisis (Bello,
1990; Jomo, 1998), including the balance between
more exclusive forms of ‘Asian bilateralism’ versus
more inclusive forms of Asia Pacific regionalism (Asian
Regionalism …, 2000; Mastanduno, 2000), at least five
plausible scenarios can be abstracted for the region
over the first one or two decades of the new millen-
nium, with profound implications for all other conti-
nents. These take into account alternative definitions
of national to human security along with the parallel
roles and relative salience of the three tracks (Acharya
and Acharya, 2000; Behera et al., 1997; Kraft, 2000).
First, notwithstanding the continuing reverbera-
tions of the Asian crisis, the official, Track One opti-
mistic scenario advanced by ASEAN and some of its
state (i.e. ARF) and corporate supporters (i.e. emerging
markets) consists of extrapolations from the NIC
model (Chan et al., 1998; Stein, 1995), albeit post-
crisis with some modest human-development dimen-
sions added on: renewed high levels of growth and
cooperation based on revived Asian values (Higgott,
2000; Mastanduno, 2000).
Second, the still unfamiliar yet all too realistic
preview is that of instability; i.e. Indonesia on a
regional scale, reflective of growing inequalities and
the increasing ability or determination of elements in
civil society to so articulate or even orchestrate. Given
the prevalence of Asian ‘corporatism’ between states
and corporations, the third point of the triangle –
civil society – has been largely marginalized and over-
looked .… until the fallout from the crisis (Soros,
2000)! Now a range of human (and national) security
threats is both apparent and escalating, such as ethnic,
ideological, racial, regional and religious identities and
claims (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and
Hernandez, 2001).
Third, in response to the above, a rather ideal-
istic, ‘green’ or ‘civil society’ future is possible,
however unlikely at the regional level as a whole:
sustainable human development/security in which
states and companies are restrained by pressures from
the other point of the triangle, reinforced by pres-
sures of ecology and equity, let alone extra-regional
conditionalities about greenhouse gases, etc. This
corresponds to a synthesis of think-tank, Track Three
ideals (Kraft, 2000).
Fourth, if inequalities and insecurities persist
through the first decade of the new century, then a
reversion to Asian values of a militaristic variety may
occur. To contain either overly liberal reform or funda-
mentalist reactions, the ‘secular’ and ‘rational’ military
may come to intervene to restore the dominance of
the state against civil society, possibly exacerbating
tensions over arms races, nuclear and chemical tech-
nologies, etc. (The Economist, 2000a, 2000b).
Finally, fifth, given reverberations from Africa, an
‘anarchy’ nightmare might yet impact on this region:
a combination of ecological decay, economic decline,
exponential corruption, exhaustion from unwinnable
regional wars, privatized security, human and finan-
cial capital flight, and unstoppable viruses leading to
communal/racial/regional/religious clashes (i.e. the
other side of human security) too widespread for
traditional ‘peace-keeping’ or ‘humanitarian’ inter-
ventions from within and/or outside the continent
(MacLean et al., 2001; Soros, 2000, pp. 208–34).
Clearly, the last pair of possibilities serve as
cautions lest some mix of the more attractive Asian
miracle projections fail to materialize post-crisis. If,
in the first years and decades of the twenty-first
century, the region is to avoid the unattractive
prospect of an ‘unpacific Asia’ (The Economist, 1994,
p. 77) then respect for non-state actors in governance
and in Tracks Two and Three is imperative (Asian
Regionalism …, 2000). In brief, if the Asian crisis
leads towards more sustainable, democratic and
humane forms of human development/security then
the region’s unhappy as well as unanticipated fall
from grace may in the long run be beneficial (Dewitt
and Hernandez, 2001): a welcome prospect outside

as well as inside Asia, with implications for devel-
opment analysis and practice elsewhere (Gills, 2000;
Payne, 1998, 1999; Shaw, 2001a, 2001b).
6. Implications for established perspectives
and practices
I conclude with a few tentative reflections on impli-
cations of the Asian and related cases for established
disciplines and emerging interdisciplinary fields, with
theoretical and applied implications. Such analytic
challenges have intensified with the end of the Cold
War, even if (still!) hegemonic discourses from the
United States fail to so appreciate. As indicated at the
start, the character and tone of the discourse inside
and around Asia have been transformed in the last
five years (Gills, 2000; Higgott, 2000).
First, triangular forms of governance involving a
range of mixed actors confront established assump-
tions in political science about the efficacy of state-
centric forms of government. Similarly, notions of
regional ‘crisis’ confound orthodox regional notions
about the developmental state and the NIC model.
Second, the emergence of Tracks Two and Three
along with the roles of non-state actors in general
undermine the realist orthodoxies of international
relations (Berger, 2000). Non-state actors such as
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MAIN CHALLENGES FACING
THE PROMOTION
OF HUMAN SECURITY IN ASIA
by Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan,
Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS),
Dhaka, Bangladesh
1. Introduction
The concept of human security has been in existence
for centuries. As early as 1705, the German philoso-
pher Leibniz expressed the need for the state to
provide common security (la sécurité commune) to
its people. The French philosopher Montesquieu
echoed the same sentiment, writing in the eighteenth
century that true political freedom could only be
achieved when people are secure.1 However, the
concept has remained suppressed for so long, espe-
cially during the Cold War, because of overemphasis
on the state-centric geopolitical and military aspects
of security. This security discourse, which actually
flows from the realpolitik paradigm of the 1940s, deals
with war, violence and conflict. Security of the state
or the regime in power is defined in terms of the
absence of such threats. It was believed that
security-related concepts such as containment, deter-
rence, balance of power, mutually assured destruc-
tion, etc., would ensure safety and security of the
state and thereby its people.
Following in the footsteps of the developed
Western world, the impoverished newly emerging
developing countries also placed excessive emphasis
on the military aspects of security threats. They failed
to comprehend that military security cannot respond
to some of human beings’ basic needs – freedom
from poverty, hunger and threats to their individual
lives.
As a consequence, the developing world became
highly militarized, with its defence spending under-
going a sixfold increase since 1960. Thus, the
exhaustion of countries’ resources from the devel-
opmental front to the military front hampered not
only their socio-economic growth but also caused
continuing social and political unrest, with all its
negative regional and international ramifications.
These countries failed to provide their people with
security against internal threats emanating from
hunger, malnutrition, disease, unemployment and
other hardships. According to Michael Renner, 1,300
million people in developing countries live in poverty
and do not have access to safe water, 900 million
Fifth round table 101
Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia
adults worldwide are illiterate and 800 million people
have inadequate food supplies; 500 million of these
people are malnourished and 175 million are under
the age of 5 years.2
Not only was a developing state unable to provide
these forms of security, but the state itself may be
seen as a source of insecurity to its people through
corruption, oppressive instruments for rent-seeking
and extortion, and other forms of bad governance.
This is quite understandable in view of the fact that
the state apparatus itself develops vested interests in
preserving the interests of the establishment entities,
most of which run counter to those of ordinary
people. In the face of dissent and protestation, the
state apparatus, which monopolizes the instruments
of violence, resorts to force and repression.
However, over the last few decades or so, the
changes witnessed in the national, regional and inter-
national arena such as human rights violations,
poverty, economic underdevelopment, political in-
stability, terrorism and proliferation of small arms,
environmental degradation, ethnic and religious
violence, and gender inequity, have led to the
realization that the conventional or traditional security
discourse appears inadequate to capture these
emerging sources of insecurity. These newer sources
of insecurity have had profound consequences for
the individual human being, society, state, and inter-
state relationship. They tend to pose threats not only
to the state but also to the community and the
individual. It is now widely recognized that state
security may not lead to human security.3 In fact,
overemphasis on state security often endangers
human security.
Hence the need for an alternative approach to
security. Such an alternative security paradigm, or an
inclusive security discourse, includes among other
issues those of the security of the individual and of
the community. Here the prime focus is on the people,
the human being. The paradigm of human security
was thus brought to the centre stage because it creates
a space where the issues affecting human beings can
be taken care of. The primary concern here is ‘how
people live and breathe in a society, how freely they
102
Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
exercise their many rights, how much access they
have to the market and other social opportunities –
and whether they live in conflict or in peace.’4 It is
a ‘positive and inclusive concept’ which endorses
people’s universal desire for self-preservation and self-
improvement. Scholars and analysts now believe that
it has the potential to revolutionize society in the
twenty-first century.5
As defined by the United Nations Development
Programme’s Human Development Report 1994: New
Dimensions of Human Security, human security is
the summation of economic, food, health, environ-
mental, personal, community and political security.
A Canadian paper defines human security as freedom
of the individual from fear. It is a condition or state
of being characterized by freedom from pervasive
threats to people’s rights, safety or even their lives.6
The present paper looks into those socio-economic
aspects that threaten individual security in day-to-
day activities.
In recent times human security is threatened
everywhere, including Asia. Hence understanding the
concept is not sufficient. One needs to know to what
extent is human security at stake? What are the existing
challenges to human security? And how do we face
these challenges in order to ensure security now and
in the future? The present paper addresses some of
these questions.
2. Present state of human security
in Asia
Asia comprises a vast territory with each region having
its own characteristics, giving rise to its own variety
of problems and challenges. The concept of security
also varies in different degrees in different parts of
Asia. What may be the main challenges facing East
Asia may not hold true for South Asia or Central Asia.
Although the gap between South Asia and East
Asia was almost non-existent in the 1960s, the remark-
able economic performance of the East Asian coun-
tries in recent years has widened the gap tremen-
dously. As a result of their high gross domestic product
(GDP), the human development index and gender-
related development index of East Asia (excluding
China) are now twice as high as those of South Asia.7
The question that one may ask is whether human
security is ensured in its totality with the high GDP
and high level of income in East Asia. We have
attempted to define human security in terms of
security that encompasses all aspects of the welfare
of a human being – economic, political, social, en-
vironmental – but that nevertheless poses a threat to
direct well-being. If we look at the state of human
security in East Asia from this perspective, it is obvious
that the people are economically secure and that East
Asian economic prosperity has ensured human
development in terms of basic education, health care,
employment and so forth. However, social and
political indicators in these regions may not be so
promising. To be more specific, gun-related crime,
drug abuse, domestic violence, political unrest, etc.,
have endangered human security in these countries.
In all these cases the target is the innocent person.
It is not an overstatement to say that the very social
fabric of these societies is severely threatened by such
factors.
Against this backdrop, we attempt to identify the
main challenges to promoting human security in Asia.
It is threatened by
• poverty and underdevelopment;
• small arms and light weapons;
• landmines;
• drug abuse and trafficking;
• trafficking of women and children; and
• gender violence and human rights violations.
2.1. Poverty and underdevelopment
Poverty affects all aspects of human security. It
is the most serious and persistent threat to human
security. According to the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP), the rise in the total number
of poor from 532 million to 562 million in South
Asia is a great concern. The region is home to
nearly three-quarters of the total number of poor
in Asia and the Pacific, or about half the total
number of poor in all developing countries of
the world.
Even though urban poverty is increasing,
nearly four-fifths of the total number of poor in
the Asia and Pacific region are still in rural areas.
Poverty in the region continues to be primarily
a rural problem.
Although the basic concept of security is
undergoing profound changes all over the world,
as the security of people moves to centre stage,
the policy-makers of South Asia appear to be
undisturbed by this trend. According to the
Human Development Report, soldiers outnumber
doctors by 6 to 1, at a time when many people
are dying of curable diseases. While foreign
exchange budgets are tight the region still
manages to spend twice as much as Saudi Arabia
on the procurement of modern arms from
abroad, although the latter has a per capita
income twenty-five times higher than that of
South Asia. While global military spending was
declining by about 37 per cent during 1987–94,
that of South Asia went up by 12 per cent.8
Needless to say that such heavy military spending
is pre-empting scarce financial resources urgently
needed for human development. In a nutshell,
‘South Asia is fast emerging as the poorest, the
most illiterate, the most malnourished, the least

gender-sensitive, indeed the most deprived
region in the world. Yet it continues to make
more investment in arms than in the education
and health of its people.’9
2.2. Small arms and light weapons
Apart from economic sources of human inse-
curity, the Asian countries are perhaps among
the worst victims of violence, whether politically
or socio-economically motivated. The main tools
of violence in most cases are small arms and
light weapons that have recently received much
attention because of the havoc they are creating
at the national, societal and, most importantly,
at the individual level. These are the weapons
that affect the security of the individual without
nations entering into war. They have been taking
a heavy toll on the lives of people in all coun-
tries, seriously endangering personal safety and
security. The number of human lives lost through
proliferation and trafficking of these weapons is
staggering. In recent years they have emerged
as having one of the most dangerous impacts
on human security.
While the developed countries have been
quick to address the problem, not many devel-
oping countries have given the issue the atten-
tion it deserves. In the meantime, illegal traf-
ficking of arms and drugs has assumed such
enormous proportions that the internal stability
of several developing countries is threatened.
The evils of small arms are manifest in all
parts of Asia. For example, in the countries of
southern Asia, violence carried out by small
arms and light weapons has become the norm
rather than the exception. Sophisticated small
arms and light weapons are smuggled in while
cheap arms are manufactured in local markets.
The state has also been a source of arms supply
in Asia. Although small arms include portable
weapons such as rifles, revolvers, heavy and
light machine guns and chemical grenades, their
size bears little relation to their destructive
capability. Thousands of people have lost their
lives by bomb and bullet in this region. In South
Asia alone, although no data are available on
illegal small arms proliferation, a rough esti-
mation shows that more than 5 million illegal
small arms exist in this region. With the wide-
spread availability of the AK-47 assault rifle in
South Asia, a ‘Kalashnikov culture’ has taken
deep-seated root in society. Improved tech-
nology has pushed children further into warfare.
In 1988, there were around 200,000 child
soldiers under the age of 15 years fully partici-
pating in conflicts all around the world.10
The dangerous dimension to the proliferation
of small arms is that they are in the hands of
Fifth round table 103
Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia
non-state actors. The largest users of small arms
in South Asia are non-state actors comprising
insurgents, separatist groups, terrorists, drug
cartels, extortionists and criminals.
Death and injury as a consequence of small
arms and light weapons is a direct threat to
human security. Reports show that in 1990, as
many as sixteen ongoing conflicts and wars
claimed 2,632,000 civilian lives. In the 1980s, the
proportion of civilian deaths rose to 74 per cent
of the total deaths in armed conflicts and in
1990 it appears to be close to 90 per cent. The
war in Afghanistan cost the lives of more than
500,000 people.11 Currently, the prime target of
the law-enforcing agencies in these countries is
controlling the proliferation of small arms. At
the intellectual level, however, the subject of
small arms and light weapons remains a polit-
ical and security taboo and, as such, not much
systematic work has been done on the extent
and impact of this menace in the region.
2.3. Landmines
Landmines are another form of threat to human
security. Some 120 million active mines are scat-
tered in over seventy countries – one for every
sixteen children or forty-eight human beings on
earth. Eight hundred people are killed and 1,200
are maimed every single month.12 Countries such
as Viet Nam, Cambodia and Afghanistan are
infested with landmines. The impact of land-
mines goes beyond physical suffering. In the
long run, all of society has to pay. According
to a Red Cross report,13 in Viet Nam each hectare
can support roughly two families of five. The
3,500 hectares of farmland infested with mines
in the Gio Linh district could normally support
35,000 people. Instead, these people are reduced
to poverty because of a war fought before many
of them were born. A 1995 study showed that
in Cambodia, 61 per cent of victims go into debt
to pay for their medical treatment, while in
Afghanistan the figures are 84 per cent for resi-
dents and refugees and 87 per cent for nomads.14
The unique characteristic of anti-personnel mines
is that they kill and injure more civilians after
the ceasefire than during hostilities. They fail to
distinguish between combatant and civilian.15
2.4. Drug abuse and trafficking
Asia finds itself at the crossroads, flanked on
both sides by two of the largest drug triangles
(the Golden Triangle in the east, and the Golden
Crescent in the west), not to mention the fact
that the region is swarming with insurgencies
and ethnic conflicts within and beyond its
periphery. Today, Asia has turned into a ‘safe
haven’ for trafficking, producing, and marketing
104
Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
of both small arms and drugs. Being one of the
largest and fastest-growing narcotics market in
the world, it is no longer restricted to drug
smuggling and trafficking to Europe and America.
Drug consumption, especially among the young,
has increased sharply over the years. ‘Asia’s rising
economic tide has made the drug problem worse,
since the demand for narcotics increases with
higher income levels. Higher incomes also lead
to more variety in drug consumption.’16 In
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for
example, addicts consume almost half of the
estimated 200 metric tonnes of opium produced
in the country each year, most of which used
to be exported. There are 1.2 million heroine
addicts in Thailand and 400,000 in Burma, and
500,000 registered heroine addicts in China.17 In
India, there are an estimated 5 million drug users,
but the worst victim is Pakistan which now has
the largest heroine consumer market in the South-
West Asian region.18
2.5. Trafficking of women
and children
Trafficking in and violence against women and
children is directly related to the social and
economic realities of each of the countries of
Asia. It has greatly undermined and would
continue to cause increasingly greater harm to
families and individuals. The misery and agony
of trafficking so many human lives throughout
the world do not only have an impact on those
involved but on society as a whole.
Trafficking of women and children is rampant
in the entire region, not only in South Asia. In
the last two decades, there has been an alarming
increase in trafficking of women and children
from regions of South Asia and South-East Asia.
On average around 10,000 Nepalese girls, most
between the ages of 9 and 16, are sold to brothels
in India every year. Researchers believe that
more than 200,000 Nepalese girls are involved
in the Indian sex trade. A report in Asiaweek19
shows that approximately 4 million under-age
prostitutes operate in the bars and brothels of
Thailand. It further states that of the 2 million
street children in the Philippines, about 60,000
are involved in the flesh trade. Japan, however,
is the biggest market for Asian women.
Trafficking has taken the form of organized
crime. There has been a tendency to stress the
sexual exploitation aspect. While it cannot be
denied that an overwhelming number of traf-
ficked persons end up in brothels or are used
in prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, etc.,
at the same time relatively recent trends such
as organ sales and camel racing using young
boys as jockeys also demand equal attention.
2.6. Gender violence
and human rights violations
Another threat to human security emanates from
gender violence and violations of human rights.
Increasingly, women in all parts of Asia are
becoming vulnerable to various forms of
violence. Rape, gang rape and murder, physical
torture, honour killing, dowry-related violence,
pyre-burning, acid-throwing, forced prostitution,
disappearance, physical abuse and death in
custody are some of the forms of violence against
women. About 74 million women are quite
simply missing in South Asia.20
Human rights are typically understood as equal
and inalienable rights held by every person.21
The manifestation of human rights violations can
vary from country to country and society to
society. Broadly, human rights violations in Asia
cover state repression, death in police custody,
oppression of minorities, women and children.
In many parts of Asia, awareness of individual
rights and dignity is very low, either because of
illiteracy or lack of comprehension of the very
term ‘human rights’. The protection of human
rights in Asia, where most of the population live
below the poverty line and face illiteracy and
socio-economic inequalities, is indeed a very
complex task.
3. Conclusion
Asia’s main challenge is to identify the sources of
human insecurity in the light of the miseries that
punctuate the daily lives of its people. Unless social
and political institutions are improved and strength-
ened, it will be difficult to ensure human security.
Effort is required at both governmental and non-
governmental levels if human security is to be
promoted. There is no denying the fact that these
issues should have been addressed decades ago. The
problems may be internal but they have an external
dimension because no country can deal with them
alone. In Asia, we have not yet learnt to act as a
collective force; we talk of East Asia, South Asia, and
Central Asia as separate continents. The time has
come for the countries of Asia to deal with these
challenges in collaboration. Since human security
requires the nurturing of more stable and coopera-
tive relationships among nations, and depends on
greater cohesion among classes and societies, it
cannot be achieved unilaterally. Now that human
existence has come to be increasingly shaped by
global and local trends, national policies need to be
complemented by enhanced international coopera-
tion among countries and by the strengthening of
civil societies everywhere. We need more discussion,
more studies and more exchanges of ideas and

resources in order to overcome the threats of the
past century that unfortunately linger on into the
twenty-first century.
From the above discussion it is clear that peace
and human security need a shift from militarization to
living economies that have the potential to meet
people’s basic needs and provide day-to-day security.
NOTES
1. Quoted in Hussein Solomon, ‘From Marginalised to
Dominant Discourse: Reflections on the Evolution of
New Security Thinking’, Institute of Strategic Studies
(ISS) Monograph Series, No. 20, February 1998, p. 4.
2. Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environmental
Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity,
p. 81, New York, Norton, 1996.
3. See Jack Donnelly, ‘Rethinking Human Rights’,
pp. 387–94; and Michael T. Klare, ‘Redefining Security:
The New Global Schisms’, pp. 353–8, Current History,
Vol. 95, No. 604, November 1996.
4. Concept Paper, WISCOMP Summer Symposium, New
Delhi, India, 21–26 August 2000.
5. Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, ‘Human Security: A Broader
Dimension’, The Daily Star, 4 August 1999.
6. David Preston and Don Hubert, ‘Towards Freedom from
Fear: An Agenda for Human Security’, BIISS Journal,
Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2000, p. 347.
7. Mahbub ul Haq, Human Development in South Asia,
p. 66, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
8. Ibid., p. 80.
9. Ibid., p. 1.
Fifth round table 105
Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia
True, traditional thinking will not wither away
overnight. It will take sustained education and
empowerment at the grass-roots level, and enlightened
leadership, to overcome the biggest stumbling block
to change of all, the human mind. Since wars begin
in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that
the defences of peace must be constructed.
10. Christopher Louise, The Social Impacts of Light Weapons
Availability and Proliferation, p. 6, Geneva, United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development,
March 1995.
11. For details see Neila Husain, ‘Proliferation of Small
Arms and Politics in South Asia: The Case of
Bangladesh’, RCSS Policy Studies, May 1999, pp. 19–20.
12. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
13. Land Mines Must Be Stopped, a publication of the Mines
Campaign Unit of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, Geneva.
14. Anti-personnel Mines: An Overview, Geneva,
International Committee of the Red Cross, August 1997.
15. Ibid.
16. James Shinn, ‘Asia’s Drug Menace and the Poverty of
Diplomacy’, Current History, April 1998, p. 174.
17. Ibid.
18. ul Haq, op. cit., p. 13.
19. Asiaweek, 7 February 1997.
20. ul Haq, op. cit., p. 24.
21. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 387.
CLOSING SESSION

REPORTS ON THE DEBATES
OF THE FIVE ROUND TABLES
The main challenges
facing the promotion of human security
and peace
FIRST ROUND TABLE
Africa
by Mr Mambaelele Mankoto,
Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO
On the basis of the two main lectures concerning the
region, the discussions focused on the following issues:
– The question of the need to reinforce state-
building versus the strengthening of civil society
with a view to adequately ensuring human
security was discussed in depth. Consensus was
reached on the question of the responsibility of
the state in creating an adequate context for the
strengthening of civil society organizations,
particularly in rural areas, and on the need to
foster pluralism in the framework of the
strengthening of democratic processes in Africa.
It was also emphasized that international organiza-
tions should contribute to enhance the role and
the capacities of NGOs in development and in
the strengthening of democracy.
– The need to reinforce education for peace, in
particular in the framework of the International
Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence
for the Children of the World, proclaimed by the
UN General Assembly, was stressed. Particular
emphasis was placed on the responsibility of
SECOND ROUND TABLE
Europe
by Ms Antonella Verdiani,
Programme Specialist, Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO
On the basis of the main lecture concerning the
region, the discussions focused on the following
issues:
– A comparative analysis was made of challenges
to human security in Africa and Europe: ques-
tions of scale and in particular of urgency were
Closing session 109
Reports on the debates of the five round tables
UNESCO in this field, in the light of its wide-
ranging experience in promoting a culture of
peace and citizenship education.
– Various remarks were made concerning the role
of religion and tribalism as factors of division within
societies: the majority of the participants consid-
ered that religion and tribal origin are often used
by governing elites to create crisis within societies
with a view to maintaining their grip on the state.
– Much stress was laid on the need to support
African initiatives and the national, subregional
and regional ownership of conflict prevention and
human security initiatives and programmes.
– The interlinkages between environmental and
natural resources protection and human security
were repeatedly stressed, in particular concerning
prevention of conflicts over natural resources in
densely populated areas.
– Particular stress was placed on ensuring national
ownership of poverty reduction strategies, taking
into account the negative impact of initiatives
based on conditionalities.
discussed in depth. In that context, various
speakers dealt at length with the human security
dimensions of the crisis in the Balkans.
– Many participants referred to the importance of
the action of NGOs in the field, in particular those
working in education.
110
Reports on the debates of the five round tables
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
– On the basis of a communication made by
Ms Jacqueline Morineau (Mediation and Training
for Mediation Centre, Paris) the participants
debated the lessons drawn from field experience
in Macedonia on mediation, and the need to
accept the realities of the different insecurities
affecting civilian populations in order to take into
account all the factors having an impact on
personal and individual behaviour.
– The impact of globalization on human security
was also stressed, in particular the new divisions
and fractures it is creating. The role of the
weapons trade was also analysed in depth, in
THIRD ROUND TABLE
Latin America and the Caribbean
by Ms Suzanne Diop,
Programme Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO
On the basis of the three main lectures concerning
the region, the discussions focused on the following
issues:
– The obstacles facing demobilization after civil
strife and the need for effective implementation
of social, economic and cultural programmes
following the signing of peace agreements.
– The need to reinforce the capacities of civil society
to deal with growing insecurity within states, in
particular in urban and peri-urban areas.
– The need to reinforce citizenship education, with
a view to deconstructing the culture of violence.
– The importance of confidence-building measures
in the region and the need for strengthening
regional cooperation mechanisms.
FOURTH ROUND TABLE
Arab States
by Mr Luis Salamanques,
Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO
On the basis of the main lecture concerning the
region, the discussions focused on the following
issues:
– Challenges to human security from within the state,
particular regarding the relations between the
more-developed and the less-developed countries.
– Stress was laid on the need to work closely with
civil society, enhancing the role of NGOs and
field projects in the building of human security.
– It was also suggested that the creation of social
science observatories would be most useful for
monitoring, studying and resolving major prob-
lems related to human security, in particular in
multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies.
– The importance of networking was repeatedly
stressed, in particular through the strengthening
of the SecuriPax Forum launched by UNESCO.
– The need to refocus academic research as a basis
for the formulation of alternative conflict-
prevention mechanisms.
– The need to increase dialogue between univer-
sities, research institutions and the armed and
security forces with a view to enhancing peace
and stability.
– Major emphasis was placed on the impact of both
poverty and exclusion on the most vulnerable
populations and the consequences for internal
stability.
– Emphasis was also placed on the complexities of
reconciliation processes, based on the different
reports of truth and justice commissions in the
countries of the region.
such as population growth, economic growth,
water supply and food security, human resources
and environmental issues; and raising public aware-
ness on the impact of these developments.

– Challenges to human security from the inter-
national system: globalization, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and the neglect of
cultural diversity, which is a major problem in
the Arab region both internally and from an
external perspective.
– The negative consequences of sanctions and
embargoes and the need for further international
dialogue and cooperation on both of these
issues.
– The framework for the future: globalization trends
which would give new scope for security in terms
of democratization, evolution of the role of the
FIFTH ROUND TABLE
Asia and the Pacific
by Mr Quang Nam Thai,
Programme Specialist, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
On the basis of the two main lectures concerning the
region, the discussions focused on the following issues:
– In recent times human security is threatened
everywhere, Asia being no exception. This part
of the world has its own characteristics that give
rise to its own variety of problems and challenges.
The concept of security therefore varies in
different parts of Asia – East Asia, South Asia or
Central Asia – as reflected in the presentations.
– During the two last decades, the remarkable
economic performance of the East Asian coun-
tries has considerably widened the gap between
this subregion, on the one hand, and South Asia
and Central Asia, on the other. But the question
could be raised whether, with the high GDP and
high level of income in East Asia, human security
is ensured in its totality? The answer is obviously
no. Although East Asian economic prosperity has
contributed to human development in terms of
wealth, basic education, health care, employment,
poverty reduction (as recognized by the World
Bank); human security and the very social
structure of these societies are severely threat-
ened by new factors, such as gun-related crime,
drug abuse, domestic violence, and political
unrest. Indeed, these countries are also threat-
ened by other factors assimilated to ecological
insecurity, political instability and social disinte-
gration.
– According to security experts (here we refer to
the presentation of Major-General Ahsan from
Bangladesh), human security in Asia is threatened
Closing session 111
Reports on the debates of the five round tables
armed and security forces, and increased partici-
pation of civil society.
– The respect for and development of international
law, in particular concerning water resources
management and further regional integration,
emphasizing conflict-resolution mechanisms.
– The need to enhance the intellectual role of peace
research and training institution networks in order
to devise early-warning mechanisms related to
human security issues and the development of
alternative paradigms on peace, in the light of
the ongoing discussions of Huntington’s and
Kaplan’s works.
by poverty and underdevelopment; small arms
and light weapons; landmines; drug abuse and
trafficking; trafficking of women and children; and
gender violence and human rights violations.
Here, we come back to the concept of compre-
hensive security, a balanced approach between
peace and human security mentioned by Mr Syed
from Pakistan.
Poverty affects all aspects of human security and repre-
sents the most serious and persistent threat to it.
Although urban poverty is increasing, poverty in the
Asia and Pacific region continues to be primarily a
rural problem.
Small arms and light weapons in recent years
have been shown to have one of the most dangerous
impacts on human security.
The impact of landmines goes beyond the phys-
ical suffering of the wounded, as in the long term
the whole of society has to pay the price.
Drug abuse and trafficking: Asia, as one of the
largest and fastest-growing narcotics market in the
world, has turned into a ‘safe haven’ for trafficking,
producing and marketing of both small arms and
drugs.
Trafficking of women and children has shown an
unhealthy increase in the last two decades and has
taken the form of organized crime.
Gender violence and human rights violations are
another threat to human security, as women in all
parts of Asia are becoming vulnerable to various forms
of violence and the awareness of individual rights
and dignity is very low.
112
Reports on the debates of the five round tables
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
What makes Asia so different compared with other
regions is that an unprecedented crisis has occurred,
the ‘Asian Crisis’ following the ‘Asian Miracle’ of the
late 1990s, which transformed the character of ‘security’
issues and discourse throughout Asia as well as
prospects for and optimism about regional coopera-
tion and integration. The result has been a trans-
formation in the definition of and debates about
security within the region towards a more positive,
inclusive and comprehensive notion of ‘human secu-
rity’, which has to overcome the threats mentioned
above.
– Thinking and reflection in Asia on security matters
go far beyond what happens in other regions
since there is an Asian regional dialogue through
three channels:
‘Track One’: which deals with official, inter-state
diplomacy related to conventional notions of
national security;
‘Track Two’: composed of diplomats, academics
and researchers who focus their approach on
functional and technical matters (such as commu-
nications, disasters, energy, oceans);
‘Track Three’: with non-state actors such as local
and national, regional and global NGOs together
with think-tanks and the media. The focus is on
long-term, non-traditional issues of cultural,
economic, ecological, personal, social and tech-
nological threats to human development and
human security.
– The need for good governance for human security:
the crisis of the late 1990s shook confidence in
Asian values and revealed the fragility of links
between the region’s economies, politics and
societies. Pressures for first political and then
economic liberalization, perceived as a means of
overcoming the crisis, helped to change the
balance between state and non-state actors
throughout the region, leading to new patterns
of governance between them. In this context,
good governance in Asia in the future requires a
set of mechanisms which will ensure the appro-
priate roles of companies and civil societies as
well as of states in policy- and decision-making
on all issues, including peace, security and
development.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
presented by Ms Moufida Goucha,
Rapporteur-General,
Director, Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
1. Human security can be considered today as a
paradigm in the making, for ensuring both a
better knowledge of the rapidly evolving large-
scale risks and threats that can have a major impact
on individuals and populations, and a strength-
ened mobilization of the wide array of actors
actually involved in participative policy formula-
tion in the various fields it encompasses today.
As such, it is an adequate framework for:
• accelerating the transition from past restrictive
notions of security, tending to identify it solely with
defence issues, to a much more comprehensive
multidimensional concept of security, based on the
respect for all human rights and democratic
principles;
• contributing to sustainable development and espe-
cially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which
is a denial of all human rights;
• reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different
forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and
internal strife that are taking a heavy toll on mainly
civilian populations in all regions of the world
without exception;
• providing a unifying theme for multilateral action
to the benefit of the populations most affected by
partial and interrelated insecurities. The importance
should be underlined of the multilateral initiatives
taken in this respect by Canada and Japan as well
as by other countries.
2. The ongoing globalization process offers new
opportunities for the strengthening of large
coalitions working to further human security,
at the multilateral and national levels, and in
particular at local level involving all actors of
society. This in turn requires a much stronger
participation of peace research and training insti-
tutions, institutes for security studies, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and other bodies
dedicated to the promotion of peace and human
security, with a view to enhancing the involve-
ment of civil society in all aspects of policy formu-
lation and implementation of actions aimed at
Closing session 113
Final Recommendations
enhancing human security at the local, national,
regional and international levels.
3. The promotion of human security today therefore
requires an enhanced exchange of best expe-
riences, practices and initiatives in the fields
of research, training, mobilization and policy
formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major
role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of pro-
active human security initiatives, in particular in
the framework of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum
website launched in September 2000 for that
purpose (http://www.unesco.org/securipax)
4. The strengthening of the action of the United
Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in
favour of human security is essential today,
taking into account the objectives set out in the
UN Millennium Summit Declaration and
Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, and
the Declaration and Plan for an International
Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence
for the Children of the World (2001–2010),
proclaimed by the United Nations General
Assembly, as well as on the measures being taken
to reach internationally agreed development
targets, in particular in the fields of poverty eradi-
cation; education for all; the preservation of the
environment and notably of water resources; and
the struggle against AIDS.
5. The compounded impact of a growing number
of threats to the security of populations requires
the establishment of innovative interdiscipli-
nary approaches geared to the requirements
of inducing participative preventive action,
involving all social actors. The intimate links
that should exist between research projects and
policy formulation in the field of prevention must
also be stressed from the outset, taking into
account the fact that current research on various
dimensions of security is still largely dissociated
from the existing policy formulation mechanisms,
particularly at the national and subregional levels.
On the basis of a common agenda for action, the
114
Final Recommendations What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
peace research and training institutions, institutes
for security studies and the NGOs working in
related fields can play an essential role in creating
these links, building bridges between the
academic world and the policy formulation mech-
anisms, contributing to the establishment of such
mechanisms wherever necessary, identifying
priority fields to be tackled and the populations
that merit particular and urgent attention.
6. Regional and subregional approaches should
be elaborated for the promotion of human security
in order to more precisely identify the nature, scope
and impact of the risks and threats that can affect
populations in the medium and long term. UNESCO
should contribute to the elaboration of these
regional and subregional approaches, in coopera-
tion with national and regional organizations and
institutions and on the basis of the regional round
tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the
Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean)
held during the First International Meeting of
Directors of Peace Research and Training
Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the
reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, espe-
cially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a real threat
to peace and security, as stated by the United
Nations Security Council.
7. Special attention should be paid to the most
highly populated countries, given the fact that
in these countries the interrelationship between
population growth, diminishing natural resources,
environmental degradation and the overall impact
of ongoing globalization processes is of great
complexity and must consequently be dealt with,
in particular in terms of designing local
approaches focusing on specific population
groups.
8. The development of human resources is a key
factor, if not the most important, for ensuring
human security. Basic education for all and the
building of capacities at the national level must
therefore be placed high on the human security
agenda. Institutes for peace and human security
can play an important role in national capacity
building in fields such as the setting up of early-
warning mechanisms related to major risks and
threats to human security; and high-level training
for the elaboration of regional and subregional
long-term approaches for ensuring human security
and the formulation of preventive action policies.
9. Critical post-conflict issues such as reconcilia-
tion processes and mechanisms and the often
harsh impact of sanctions on populations merit
more in-depth analysis in terms of human security,
in the framework of an enhanced respect for
international instruments, in particular of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Concerning reconciliation processes and mecha-
nisms, due attention should be paid to the
adequate dissemination of best experiences and
practices and to the comparative analysis of these
experiences and practices, especially of the work
of the various truth and justice commissions set
up in the last two decades in various countries.
Concerning the impact of sanctions on popula-
tions, note should be taken of ongoing initiatives
within the United Nations in order to review the
modalities of the imposition of such sanctions and
the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate
their impact on civilian populations.
10. The impact on human security of migrations and
of movements of populations displaced due to
conflict should be highlighted. Concerning migra-
tions, attention should be paid to countering prac-
tices in host countries that discriminate against
legal immigrants, and in the case of populations
displaced due to conflict, the efforts of the inter-
national community should be reinforced, espe-
cially when the displacements take on a semi-
permanent character.
11. Due attention should be paid to countering the
impact of negative paradigms (such as ‘clash of
civilizations’, ‘African anarchy’, etc.), based on
stereotypes and simplistic analyses of the interac-
tions between cultures, societies and civilizations
and which aim at fostering new divisions and frac-
tures at the international and regional levels. The
principles underlying the notions of cultural diver-
sity, cultural pluralism, tolerance and non-discrim-
ination should be stressed and due attention should
be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action of
the World Conference against Racism and Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001).
12. The role of the state in the promotion of human
security must be addressed on the basis of an
exhaustive analysis of challenges in matters
relating to human security, both from within to
ensure sustainable development, and from the
rapidly evolving international processes linked to
economic and financial globalization. States
should be encouraged to establish ways of
enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in
particular with those NGOs and institutions that
can contribute effectively to policy formulation
and collaborative action in the field.

AGENDA FOR ACTION
of the International SecuriPax Network
for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace
The participants in the First International Meeting
of Directors of Peace Research and Training
Institutions, organized by UNESCO on 27 and
28 November 2000, on the theme: ‘What Agenda for
Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’;
Thank UNESCO for this initiative which allowed
numerous peace research and training institutions to
take part in the proceedings by means of a direct
and fruitful dialogue;
Unanimously note that current and future human
security considerations are taking on global propor-
tions, and that all factors in the human security equa-
tion are interacting on a world scale, in such a way
that the need to understand them as one single theme
is a cognitive step that increasingly needs to be taken
everywhere, based on an intensive sharing of
everyone’s contributions;
Aware that peace research and training institu-
tions, through their function as centres of training,
analysis and policy elaboration, have a special respon-
sibility in this respect, undertake to increase their
cooperation in a common research effort to propose
better ways to achieve peace, human security, devel-
opment, respect for human rights and the promotion
of democratic principles;
Anxious to disseminate their conclusions as
widely as possible, adopt as the basis of their contin-
uing project the following Agenda for Action:
• Human security is indivisible. A general
dynamic of equitable and balanced development is
its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of soci-
eties on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates
the overall need for human security, though it is not
yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict.
The world’s future depends upon a growing need
for human security and a better understanding of
all the risks and threats that affect populations and
individuals;
• Awareness of the global and universal nature
of human security necessary to all forms of
progress and acknowledgement of the appropriate
Closing session 115
Agenda for Action
role of the peace research and training institutions
in this respect, call for a considerable evolution in
people’s minds;
• The representatives of peace research and
training institutions share an important
responsibility in this field, through their capacity
to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic
analysis of the world in its current state, a clear
perception of the changes awaiting it and a
constructive vision of the actions to be undertaken
in order to provide general progress with the condi-
tions necessary for human security, that is to say
the possibility of its being of a lasting nature.
Consequently, the participants in the First
International Meeting of Directors of Peace
Research and Training Institutions,
• Decide to create the International SecuriPax
Network for the Promotion of Human Security and
Peace in order to remain united for the purpose of
future activities;
• Welcome UNESCO’s proposal to assign to the
Network they have thus created, the SecuriPax
Forum (http://www.unesco.org/securipax), aimed at
facilitating the exchange of information and best
experiences and practices in the field of human
security;
• Decide to work together with a view to contributing
to the promotion of concrete actions of general
interest, ranging from joint efforts to define human
security indicators to high-level training activities;
• Decide also to work together to mobilize multiple
capacities, and this on the basis of all the contri-
butions and recommendations made at this First
International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions;
• Express their willingness to organize regional and
subregional meetings in the coming years in the
framework of the International SecuriPax Network;
• Invite similar institutions interested in this Agenda
for Action to join them in the Network created and
to share efforts with them.
APPENDICES
 Appendices 119

Organizing Committee
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MEETING
OF DIRECTORS OF PEACE RESEARCH
AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

Ms Moufida Goucha
Responsible for Organization of the Meeting
Director, Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)

Ms Claudia Maresia
Responsible for Coordination of the Meeting
Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)

Ms Mercedes Aldrete
Secretariat of the Meeting
Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)

With the assistance of:

Mr René Zapata
Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting
Bureau of Strategic Planning (UNESCO)

Mr Russ Russell
Responsible for the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum
Bureau of Strategic Planning (UNESCO)
 Appendices 121

Programme
PROGRAMME

First International Meeting

of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions

What Agenda for Human Security

in the Twenty-first Century?
UNESCO, Paris
27–28 November 2000

General objectives (1) to bring together Directors of institutions

‘Since wars begin in the minds of men,
it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace
must be constructed’
(UNESCO Constitution)
In its transdisciplinary programme ‘Towards a Culture
of Peace’, UNESCO advocates the notion of human
security as a matrix in which matters pertaining to
peace and human security could be addressed in an
ongoing manner by all the various forces in society.
Security and conflict-prevention specialists – whether
independent or operating within universities and insti-
tutions concerned with defence, security or strategic
studies – have a major part to play, specifically with
a view to securing fuller acknowledgement of the
real peace and security needs of peoples. The
meeting, scheduled for 27 and 28 November, is
intended:
concerned with peace research and training
who are representative of several countries and
regions, in order that they may present the prior-
ities of their action-oriented research programmes;
(2) to prompt reflection among them resulting in
joint programmes aimed at promoting peace and
human security;
(3) to lay the foundations of steadier cooperation
among such institutions in the form of networks;
(4) to make plans for practical projects, parti-
cularly in the field of education and training for
peace and human security. Special attention will
be paid to educational content and to UNESCO
Chairs.
122 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Programme1
Programme

Monday, 27 November 2000

8.30 a.m. Reception of participants

9.00 a.m. OPENING CEREMONY
Inaugural speech
by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO
read by Mr Ali Kazancigil, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences a.i.
Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations
by Mr Hassen Fodha, Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France
Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security
by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel, Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO

9.45 a.m. Coffee break

10.10 a.m. Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace
by Mr Enzo Fazzino, Programme Specialist, International Year for the Culture of Peace, UNESCO
10.20 a.m. Presentation of the SecuriPax Forum2
by Mr Russ Russell, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO

10.30 a.m.– FIRST ROUND TABLE

12.30 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Africa
Moderator: Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director, Institut d’Études Politiques de
Paris, France
Rapporteur: Mr Mambaelele Mankoto, Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences,
UNESCO
Lecturers:3 Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School as an Instrument
of Peace (EIP), Yaoundé, Cameroon
Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Pretoria, South Africa

12.30 p.m. Free time

2.30 p.m.– SECOND ROUND TABLE

4.30 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe
Moderator: Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme Specialist, Education for Universal Values
Section, UNESCO
Lecturer:3 Mr Bjørn Møller, Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research
Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark

4.30 p.m. Coffee break

5.00 p.m.– THIRD ROUND TABLE

7.00 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Latin
America and the Caribbean
Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education,
UNESCO
Rapporteur: Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO
Lecturers:3 Mr Alejandro Bendaña, President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI),
Managua, Nicaragua
Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias
Sociales (FLACSO) Santiago, Chile
General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales
(CALEN), Montevideo, Uruguay

7.00 p.m. Reception for participants offered by Mr A. Kazancigil, ADG/SHS a.i., UNESCO
 Appendices 123

Programme
Tuesday, 28 November 2000

9.00 a.m.– FOURTH ROUND TABLE

10.30 a.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab
States
Moderator: Mr René Zapata, Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and
Reporting, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning,
UNESCO
Lecturer:3 Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo,
Egypt

10.30 a.m. Coffee break

11.00 a.m.– FIFTH ROUND TABLE

1.00 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Asia and
the Pacific
Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-General, ‘Priority Africa’
Department, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme Specialist, Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
Lecturers:3 Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy
Studies, Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of
International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh

1.00 p.m. Free time

2.30 p.m.– CLOSING SESSION

5.30 p.m. Reports on the debates of the five round tables
presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General, Director, Peace and Human Security
Programme, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
Proposed establishment of a SecuriPax Network
Adoption of the Agenda for Action of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of
Human Security and Peace

1. Working languages were English and French.

2. The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum was open to the participants during the meeting.
3. The lecturers’ presentations were followed by a debate open to all the participants.

WORKING DOCUMENT
The promotion of human security:
The state of play
Drawn up by the
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
Peace and Human Security Programme
Several attempts have been made since the end of
the Cold War to extend the concept of security. In
general, the authors proceed simply by accumulation,
adding on various non-military dimensions of security
to traditional military parameters. Such efforts are
mainly based on a conception of security that gives
precedence to national security, which in most cases
is no more than a defence policy.
1. A new concept?
Of all the attempts to formulate a new concept of
security, two, in our opinion, deserve to be studied
in greater detail.
The first is the notion of human security, as
presented in the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report
1994, while the second is the notion of democratic
security, as promoted notably by the Council of
Europe since 1993, but which has been developed
to a remarkable degree in the Treaty on Democratic
Security in Central America, a little-known but none
the less basic document.
The merit of these two concepts – human security
and democratic security – is that they are first and
foremost integrative concepts of a special kind, in
that they seek from the outset to define security
around a core of non-military parameters.
Accordingly, human security, as set out in the
UNDP Report of 1994, falls within the context of the
promotion of human development defined as a
process of widening the range of people’s choices.
Democratic security, as promoted by the Council
of Europe and other European institutions, seeks to
found security on common values, in particular the rule
of law, observance of human rights and the separation
of powers. In other documents, for example the Charter
of Paris (Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe – CSCE), the principles of the philosophy of
liberal democracy and the rule of law, featuring
adherence to a single system of political values as the
major parameter of collective security, are presented as
the foundation of a broader vision of security.
Appendices 125
Working document
These two concepts are in agreement in one vital
area, that of respect for human rights. However,
despite this common element which seeks to give
full support to the protection of individuals and funda-
mental rights, they are far apart when it comes to
defining the scope of security for individuals and
peoples.
2. From human insecurity
to human security
The UNDP Report of 1994 lists the threats to human
security under seven main categories – threats to
economic security, food security, health security, en-
vironmental security, personal security, community
security and political security – while the various texts
on democratic security refer mainly to the democratic
organization of public life – modelled on the Western,
and especially European, democracies – to the rule
of law and to human rights.
It will be recalled that in the pioneering approach
of the UNDP, human security is the outcome of two
fundamental lines of action, themselves based on two
key principles of the Charter of the United Nations:
from fear to freedom and from want to freedom, or
freedom from fear and freedom from want. The
content of the concept of human security in fact
corresponds to the solutions and measures that are
needed to forestall the various kinds of threats and
risks perceived as obstacles to human development
and to the capacity of human beings to use their
potential to the full. The different aspects of human
security are therefore as follows: economic security
(unemployment, job insecurity, disparities in income
and resources, poverty and homelessness); food
security (expressed in terms of the quantitative and
qualitative availability of food); health security
(diseases, new viruses, including AIDS, respiratory
diseases caused by air pollution); environmental
security (air, water, soil and forest degradation);
personal security (conflicts, poverty, drug-related
crime, violence against women and children,
terrorism); community security (ethnic and cultural
126
Working document What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
conflicts); and political security (violation of human
rights). Many of these threats to human security have
an international or global dimension in that they stem
from events or processes occurring beyond territorial
boundaries. Lastly, human security is meant to create
favourable conditions for the flourishing of human
development, another UNDP approach that was logis-
tical and innovative for its time.
3. A new linkage?
It is tempting to combine the two notions of human
security and democratic security. The first to attempt
this was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada,
Lloyd Axworthy, in a document entitled ‘Human
Security: Safety for People in a Changing World’,
which he submitted for consideration by an informal
group of diplomats from eleven countries, meeting
on 19 and 20 May 1999 in Bergen, Norway. The aim
of the document was to give the human security
concept an operational character and to establish a
precise political agenda.
The contribution by Bertrand Badie, launching
the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum in September 2000,
defines the notion of human security by noting that
the distinction between national security and inter-
national security is now meaningless and that there
can be no international security when civil peace is
uncertain. The article goes on to say that peace is
no longer guaranteed by military power alone, but
is dependent upon development, protection of the
environment, respect for human rights, etc.
The main distinguishing feature of human secu-
rity is that it addresses the issue of war, violence and
physical or psychological constraint from a human
perspective, centred on the individual, unlike the
traditional perspective which takes a state, national
or social approach.
4. A new approach involving
the role of freedom in development
and human security
The notion of ‘freedom’ has always existed in conven-
tional economic and political schools of thought. But
more than any other basic text, the Charter of the
United Nations, particularly in its preamble, lays the
foundations of the notion of ‘freedom’: ‘We the
peoples of the United Nations determined … to
promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom’. Similarly, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights stresses that ‘Member States have
pledged themselves to achieve … the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms’. On this basis, the work
done, more specifically by Amartya Sen, winner of
the 1999 Nobel Prize for Economics, represents an
important stage in the investigation and theory of
development as freedom. In Sen’s opinion, the essen-
tial point is the intrinsic value of human freedom,
which must be the ultimate goal of development (see
Development As Freedom: Human Capability and
Global Need, Sen, 1999).
This new approach to freedom, which is no longer
abstract but centred on human beings and their actual
relations with society, is also inseparable from human
security. In fact, over the last few years, the approach
to security has shifted from the concept of ‘national
security’, based on the military defence of the state,
to that of ‘human security’, which concerns human
beings and their welfare. Human security therefore
has two aspects: in negative terms, it refers to freedom,
liberation from certain threats and risks such as the
lack of basic necessities, hunger, natural disasters,
torture, imprisonment without a fair trial, discrimina-
tion, etc.; while in positive terms, human security aims
at freedom to achieve a goal or the ability or oppor-
tunity for every individual to enjoy life as fully as
possible, starting with such basic needs as the best
possible access to water, food, shelter and education.
This approach to human security covers all political,
economic, social, cultural and environmental dimen-
sions and the many necessary links between them.
It also leads to other approaches and measures
involving action by the entire United Nations system,
including UNESCO, in conflict-prevention and post-
conflict peace-building.
*
* *
In the context of ever-greater globalization, whose
adverse consequences – outweighing the positive
effects – further impair and perpetuate what are now
known in international cooperation circles (the United
Nations, development non-governmental organiza-
tions, regional organizations, etc.) as ‘risk societies’,
within which there is more and more talk of ‘human
vulnerability’, the integrative and profoundly human-
istic concept of ‘human security’ can contribute,
through innovative and exemplary activities, to peace
and development.
 Appendices 127

List of participants
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan Mr Ramdane Babadyt

Director-General Consultant
Bangladesh Institute of International École Instrument de Paix (EIP)
and Strategic Studies (BIISS) 5, rue du Simplon
1/46 Elephant Road Geneva
Dhaka 1000 Switzerland
Bangladesh Tel: + 41 – 22 – 735 24 22
Tel: + 880 – 2 – 831 58 08/831 26 09 Fax: + 41 – 22 – 735 06 53
Fax: + 880 – 2 – 831 26 25 E-mail: cifedhop@mail-box.ch
E-mail: dgbiiss@bd.drik.net
Internet: http://www.biiss.org Mr Bertrand Badie
Director, Graduate Programme in International
Ms Mercedes Aldrete Relations
Secretariat of the Meeting Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris
Peace and Human Security Programme 27, rue Saint-Guillaume
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, 75007 Paris
Peace and Tolerance France
UNESCO Tel: + 33 – 1 44 39 39 75/
1, rue Miollis + 33 – 1 45 49 50 90/-92
75732 Paris Cedex 15 Fax: + 33 – 1 45 48 04 41/
France + 33 – 1 42 22 40 26
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 53 E-mail: bertrand.badie@sciences-po.fr
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: m.aldrete@unesco.org Mr Alejandro Bendaña
President
Mr Joaquín Antuña León Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI)
President Apartado Postal 1747
Fundación Paz y Cooperación Managua
C/ Meléndez Valdés, 68, 4° Nicaragua
28015 Madrid Tel: + 505 – 278 54 13
Spain Fax: + 505 – 267 05 17
Tel: + 34 – 91 – 549 61 56 E-mail: pedro47@aol.com
Fax: + 34 – 91 – 543 52 82 Internet: http://www.ceinicaragua.org.ni
E-mail: pazycoop@eurosur.org
Ms Marlena Bouche-Osochowska
Mr Bernard Aussedat International Consultant
General Verification Coordinator 47-49, rue du Père Corentin
Organization for Security and Cooperation 75014 Paris
in Europe (OSCE) France
Karntnerring 5-7 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 43 37 28
1010 Vienna Fax: + 33 – 1 45 43 37 28
Austria E-mail: mbouche@infonie.fr
Tel: + 43 – 1 – 51 31 630 17
Fax: + 43 – 1 – 51 31 630 32/-33
E-mail: oscear24@atnet.at
128
List of participants What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Mr Robert Bussière Ms Myriam Chantereau

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) 88, rue de la République
18, rue du Pressoir 95100 Argenteuil
75020 Paris France
France Tel: + 33 – 1 34 10 93 80
Tel: + 33 – 1 46 36 29 07 E-mail: mchantereau@hotmail.com
Fax: + 33 – 1 46 36 29 07
E-mail: r.bussiere@wanadoo.fr Mr Jean-Paul Charnay
President
Mr Luis Cardenas Centre de Philosophie de la Strategie (CPS)
President 20, rue de Beaune
Corporación Servicio Paz y Justicia 75007 Paris
SERPAJ-CHILE France
Cienfuegos 85 Tel: + 33 – 1 42 61 06 81
Santiago
Chile Mr Dumitri Chitoran
Tel: + 56 – 2 – 697 20 01 Consultant
Fax: + 56 – 2 – 672 76 08 Higher Education Division
E-mail: serpaj@cmet.net UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
Mr Christophe Carle 75352 Paris 07 SP
Deputy Director, Director of Research France
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 41 07
Research (UNIDIR) Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 58 14
Palais des Nations E-mail: d.chitoran@unesco.org
1211 Geneva
Switzerland Mr Adrián Ciancio
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 917 17 93 Coordinator
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 917 01 76 UNESCO Chair on Peace Philosophy
E-mail: ccarle@unog.ch Enmedio 82
12001 Castellón
Ms Gabriela Castillo Spain
Minister Counsellor Tel: + 34 – 964 – 23 25 51
Permanent Delegation of Costa Rica to Fax: + 34 – 964 – 23 02 12
UNESCO E-mail: caraball@guest.uji.es
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15 Mr Jakkie Cilliers
France Executive Director
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 25 73 Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
Fax: + 33 – 1 42 73 16 45 PO Box 1787
E-mail: g.castillo@unesco.org Brooklyn Square
0075 Pretoria
Ms Caterina Casullo South Africa
Head Tel: + 27 – 12 – 346 95 00/-2
Office in Europe Fax: + 27 – 12 – 460 09 98
United Nations University E-mail: jkc@iss.co.za
UNESCO Internet: http://www.iss.co.za
1, rue Miollis
75015 Paris Mr Philippe Cocquebert
France Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 30 08 (IHEDN-DEPFC)
Fax: + 33 – 1 40 65 91 86 BP 41
E-mail: unuoe@unesco.org 00445 Armées
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 42 31 88
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 42 46 16
E-mail: etudes@ihedn.fr
 Appendices 129

List of participants
Ms Christine Cuvelier Mr Tahir Faradov
Université de la Paix Director
4, Bd. du Nord Center for Peace and Conflict Studies
5000 Namur Nizami Street, 12, Apt. 33
Belgium 370001 Baku
Tel: + 32 – 81 – 22 61 02 Azerbaijan
Fax: + 32 – 81 – 23 18 82 Tel: + 994 – 12 – 92 27 34
E-mail: universite.de.paix@skynet.be Fax: + 994 – 12 – 93 85 28/90 11 80
Internet: http://www.universitedepaix.org E-mail: tfaradov@yahoo.com
tfaradov@iatp.baku.az
Mr Fernando De Salas López
Director Mr Enzo Fazzino
Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI) Programme Specialist
Hortaleza, 104-2 Izda International Year for the Culture of Peace
28004 Madrid (BSP/IYCP)
Spain UNESCO
Tel: + 34 – 91 – 308 49 34/411 18 28 7, place de Fontenoy
Fax: + 34 – 91 – 308 49 34/411 18 28 75352 Paris 07 SP
E-mail: sei@seimadrid.org France
fernandosei@terra.es Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 05 68
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 57
Ms Suzanne Diop E-mail: e.fazzino@unesco.org
Programme Specialist Internet: http://www.unesco.org/iycp
Division for Intercultural Projects (CLT/ICP)
UNESCO Mr Vicenç Fisas Armengol
1, rue Miollis UNESCO Chair on Human Rights
75732 Paris Cedex 15 Escola de Cultura de Pau
France Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 47 68 Edifici G-6 – Campus de la UAB
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 88 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès-
E-mail: s.diop@unesco.org Barcelona)
Spain
Mr Alfredo Dombe Tel: + 34 – 93 – 581 24 14
Instituto de Ralaçoes Internacionais (IRI) Fax: + 34 – 93 – 581 32 94
Largo do Partido E-mail: unescopau@pangea.org
Edificio do Mirex, 7º andar
Luanda Mr Hassen Fodha
Angola Director
Tel: + 244 – 2 – 32 17 17 United Nations Information Centre (UNIC)
Fax: + 244 – 2 – 32 17 17 c/o UNESCO
E-mail: mre.isri@netangola.com 1, rue Miollis
dombealfredo@hotmail.com 75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Mr Daniel Durand Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 49 00/-3
National Secretary Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 46 78
Mouvement pour la Paix E-mail: h.fodha@unesco.org
139, avenue Victor Hugo unic.paris@unesco.org
93400 St-Ouen Internet: http://www.onu.fr
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 40 12 09 12 Mr Fernando Gonzalez Davison
Fax: + 33 – 1 40 11 57 87 Deputy Director
E-mail: ddurand@mvtpaix.org Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales
e Investigaciones para la Paz (IRIPAZ)
1a, Calle 9-52 Zona 1
01001 Ciudad de Guatemala
Guatemala
Tel: + 502 – 250 04 21/232 82 60
Fax: + 502 – 253 15 32
E-mail: iripaz@internetdetelgua.com.gt
130
List of participants What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Ms Moufida Goucha Mr Ali Kazancigil

Director, Peace and Human Security Programme Assistant Director-General for Social and Human
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace Sciences a.i.
and Tolerance Director, Division of Social Science Research
UNESCO and Policies (SHS/SRP)
1, rue Miollis Sector for Social and Human Sciences
75732 Paris Cedex 15 UNESCO
France 1, rue Miollis
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 52 75732 Paris Cedex 15
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52 France
E-mail: m.goucha@unesco.org Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 37 98
peace&security@unesco.org Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 57 20
E-mail: a.kazancigil@unesco.org
Mr Gabriel Guímaraes
Third Secretary Mr Fatehyab Ali Khan
Embassy of Angola Chairman
19, avenue Foch Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA)
75116 Paris Aiwan-e-Sadar Road
France PO Box 1447
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 01 58 20 Karachi-74200
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 00 33 71 Pakistan
E-mail: anginfos@club-internet.fr Tel: + 92 – 21 – 568 28 91/568 60 69
Fax: + 92 – 21 – 568 60 69
H.E. Mr Louis Hamel E-mail: piia@cyber.net.pk
Ambassador
Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO Mr Alwin Kramp
Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO Senior Programme Specialist
UNESCO Division for Intercultural Projects (CLT/ICP)
1, rue Miollis UNESCO
75732 Paris Cedex 15 1, rue Miollis
France 75752 Paris Cedex 15
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 35 17 France
Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 87 27 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 37 57
E-mail: louis.hamel@dfait-maeci.gc.ca Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 88
pesco@dfait-maeci.gc.ca E-mail: a.kramp@unesco.org

Ms Brigitte Huissiet Mr Balkrishna Kurvey

Auditor President
8, Allée des Pins Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament
78730 Saint-Arnoult en Yvelines and Environmental Protection
France 537, Sakkardara Road
Nagpur 440 009
Mr Mangesh T. Karad India
World Peace Centre Tel: + 91 – 712 – 74 58 06
Maeer’s Mit Fax: + 91 – 712 – 74 36 64
S. No. 124, Paund Road, Kothrud E-mail: iipdep@nagpur.dot.net.in
Pune 411 038
Maharastra State Ms Imogen Lamb
India Journalist
Tel: + 91 – 20 – 543 76 81 Radio France International (RFI)
Fax: + 91 – 20 – 544 27 70 104, avenue du Président Kennedy
E-mail: wpcpune@hotmail.com 75016 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 30 83 54
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 30 87 57
E-mail: imogene.lamb@rfi.fr
 Appendices 131

List of participants
Mr Patrick Lecomte Mr François Mabille
Coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Culture Deputy Director
of Peace Centre de la Recherche sur la Paix (CRP)
École de la Paix de Grenoble Institut Catholique de Paris
9, rue des Jardins 24, rue Cassette
38420 Domène 75006 Paris
France France
Tel: + 33 – 4 76 77 15 69 Tel: + 33 – 1 44 39 84 99
Fax: + 33 – 4 76 77 15 69 Fax: + 33 – 1 44 39 52 86
E-mail: Patrick.Lecomte@univ-lyon2.fr E-mail: fasse@icp.fr

Mr Jacques Le Dauphin Mr Joseph Maïla

Research Director Dean
Institut de Documentation et de Recherche sur Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences
la Paix (IDRP) (IFOMENE-CRP)
22, impasse des Champs Fleuris Institut Catholique de Paris
92320 Châtillon 24, rue Cassette
France 75006 Paris
Tel: + 33 – 1 46 55 06 86 France
Fax: + 33 – 1 40 11 57 87 Tel: + 33 – 1 44 39 52 06
E-mail: jacques.le_dauphin@libertysurf.fr Fax: + 33 – 1 44 39 52 86
E-mail: fasse@icp.fr
Mr Antoine Leonetti
Institut du Droit de la Paix et du Mr Jean-Gabriel Makong
Developpement (IDPD) President
39, av. Emile Henriot Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de la Personne
06050 Nice Cedex 1 (LCDP)
France BP 1514 Yaoundé
Tel: + 33 – 4 92 15 71 99 Cameroon
Fax: + 33 – 4 92 15 71 97 Tel: + 237 – 22 47 04/23 48 65/31 66 29
E-mail: balmond@unice.fr Fax: + 237 – 22 62 62/-3
E-mail: lcdp@iccnet.cm
Ms Dominique Levasseur
Political Officer Mr Mambaelele Mankoto
Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO Programme Specialist
UNESCO Division of Ecological Sciences (SC/ECO)
1, rue Miollis UNESCO
75732 Paris Cedex 15 1, rue Miollis
France 75732 Paris Cedex 15
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 35 17 France
Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 87 27 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 40 37
E-mail: dominique.levasseur@dfait-maeci.gc.ca Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 58 04
E-mail: m.mankoto@unesco.org
General Juan Alberto Lezama
Director Mr F. Marchand
Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN) President
Br. Artigas 1488 Institut de Recherche sur la Résolution Non-
Montevideo violente des Conflits (IRNC)
Uruguay 14, rue des Meuniers
Tel: + 598 – 2 – 709 17 76 93100 Montreuil
+ 598 – 2 – 709 49 88/709 89 18 France
Fax: + 598 – 2 – 707 53 14 Tel: + 33 – 1 42 87 94 69
E-mail: calen@adinet.com.uy Fax: + 33 – 1 48 57 92 97
Internet: http://www.calen.gub.uy E-mail: irnc@multimania.com
132
List of participants What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Ms Claudia Maresia Mr Tuomo Melasuo

Responsible for Coordination of the Meeting Docent, Research Director
Peace and Human Security Programme Tampereen Peace Research Institute (TAPRI)
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace University of Tampere
and Tolerance 33014 Tampere
UNESCO Finland
1, rue Miollis Tel: + 358 – 3 – 215 76 92
75732 Paris Cedex 15 Fax: + 358 – 3 – 223 66 20
France E-mail: yttume@uta.fi
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 54
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52 Ms Djalma Miala
E-mail: c.maresia@unesco.org Third Secretary
peace&security@unesco.org Permanent Delegation of Angola to UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
Mr Jean Marichez 75732 Paris
Director France
Action Civile et Defense Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 29 75
45, chemin de la Pérouse Fax: + 33 – 1 45 67 57 48
73800 Arbin E-mail: del.angounesco@gofornet.com
France
Tel: + 33 – 4 79 65 22 82 Ms Pascale Molho
Fax: + 33 – 4 79 65 22 11 Center for Non-Violent Communication (CNVC)
E-mail: act.civ.def@wanadoo.fr 28, rue Parmentier
92200 Neuilly-sur-Seine
Ms Caroline Martinez France
Peace and Human Security Programme Tel: + 33 – 1 41 34 04 42
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace Fax: + 33 – 1 41 34 04 52
and Tolerance E-mail: pascale.molho@online.fr
UNESCO cnvc@compuserve.com
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15 Mr Bjørn Møller
France Former Secretary-General
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 52 International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52 c/o Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org (COPRI)
Fredericiagade 18
Mr Vicent Martinez Guzmán DK-1310 Copenhagen K
Director Denmark
UNESCO Chair on Peace Philosophy Tel: + 45 – 33 45 50 52
Enmedio 82 Fax: + 45 – 33 45 50 60
12001 Castellón E-mail: bmoeller@copri.dk
Spain Internet: http://www.copri.dk/ipra/bm.html
Tel: + 34 – 964 – 23 25 51
Fax: + 34 – 964 – 23 02 12 Mr Rodrigo Montaluisa Vivas
E-mail: martguz@fis.uji.es International Executive Director
Fundacion Ecuatoriana de Relaciones
Ms Nicola McBean Internacionales y Estrategicas (FERIS)
Expert on China 97, Bd. Carl-Vogt
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace 1205 Geneva
(CICP) Switzerland
34, rue Hamelin c/o Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias
75016 Paris Sociales (FLACSO)
France Paez #118 y Av. Patria
Tel: + 33 – 1 47 23 44 76 Quito
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 23 59 80 Ecuador
E-mail: cicpmp@sky.fr Tel: + 41 – 22 – 320 83 79
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 320 83 79
E-mail: feris.ge@bluewin.ch
 Appendices 133

List of participants
Ms Colette Morichard Ms Paula-Ramona Napirlica
Centre de Mediation et de Formation à la Programme Coordinator
Mediation (CMFM) Human Ecological Association (GEEA)
9, rue de La Fayette CP 1634, OP 7
7800 Versailles 6600 Iasi
France Romania
Tel: + 33 – 1 39 49 40 34 Tel: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
Fax: + 33 – 1 39 49 40 34 Fax: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
E-mail: apgro@mail.dntis.ro
Ms Jacqueline Morineau
Founder Mr Martin Ortega
Centre de Mediation et de Formation Research Expert
à la Mediation (CMFM) Institut d’Études de Sécurité de l’UEO
24, rue Tournefort 43, avenue du Président Wilson
75005 Paris 75016 Paris
France France
Tel: + 33 – 1 43 36 70 07 Tel: + 33 – 1 53 67 22 13
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 07 57 15 Fax: + 33 – 1 47 20 81 78
E-mail: cmfm@easynet.fr E-mail: m.ortega@iss-weu.com

Ms Ghada Ali Moussa Mr Christos Papadimitriou

Researcher Deputy Commandant (Major-General)
National Center for Middle East Studies Hellenic National Defense College
(NCMES) Moustoxidi & Evelpidon Str.
1 Kasr El Nile Street Athens 11473
Bab El Louk Greece
PO Box 18 Tel: + 30 – 1 – 882 41 66
Cairo 11513 Fax: + 30 – 1 – 883 75 27
Egypt E-mail: hndc@ath.forthnet.gr
Tel: + 20 – 2 – 577 00 41/-2
+ 20 – 2 – 577 11 25/337 33 02 Mr Richard Petris
Fax: + 20 – 2 – 577 00 63 Director
E-mail: ghada92@hotmail.com École de la Paix de Grenoble
afakhr@idsc.gov.eg 7, rue Très Cloîtres
3800 Grenoble
Mr Jean-Denis Mouton France
Scientific Director Tel: + 33 – 4 76 63 81 41
Centre Mondial de la Paix (Verdun) Fax: + 33 – 4 76 63 81 42
Centre Européen Universitaire E-mail: richardpetris@ecoledelapaix.org
15, place Carnot
54042 Nancy Cedex Mr Daniil Pikouza
France Governing Member Programs Leader
Tel: + 33 – 3 83 19 27 80 Belarus Peace Foundation
Fax: + 33 – 3 83 19 27 87 H-80, Apt. 28
E-mail: mouton@droit-eco.univ-nancy2.fr Brestskaya str.
220099 Minsk
Mr David Mutimer Belarus
Deputy Director Tel: + 375 – 17 – 278 70 01
York Centre for International and Security Fax: + 375 – 17 – 232 92 93
Studies (YCISS) E-mail: egorov_marat@mail.ru
3rd Floor, 363 York Lanes, York University
4700 Keele Str.
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
Tel: + 1 – 416 – 736 51 56
Fax: + 1 – 416 – 736 57 52
E-mail: dmutimer@yorku.ca
134
List of participants What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Mr Alexandre Plevako Mr Philippe Ratte

Second Secretary Senior Programme Planning Officer
Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP/BP)
1, rue Miollis UNESCO
75732 Paris Cedex 15 7, place de Fontenoy
France 75352 Paris 07 SP
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 26 60 France
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 26 61 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 12 16
E-mail: dl_ukraine@unesco.org Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 21
E-mail: p.ratte@unesco.org
Ms Marina Pok
Member of the Board of Directors Mr Jean Ridoux
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace President
(CICP) Association Internationale des Educateurs à la
34, rue Hamelin Paix (AIEP/IAEP)
75016 Paris 13, Allée Maximilien Robespierre
France 92290 Chatenay Malabry
Tel: + 33 – 1 47 23 44 76 France
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 23 59 80 Tel: + 33 – 1 46 30 61 26
E-mail: cicpmp@sky.fr Fax: + 33 – 1 46 30 61 26
PO Box 1007 E-mail: iaep@infonie.fr
Phnom Penh
Cambodia Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena
Tel: + 855 – 23 – 72 27 59 Director
Fax: + 855 – 23 – 36 25 20 Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales
E-mail: cicp@camnet.com.kh (FLACSO-Chile)
Leopoldo Urrutia 1950, Ñuñoa-Casilla 3213,
Mr Giuliano Pontara Correo Central
President Santiago
International University of People’s Institutions Chile
for Peace (IUPIP) Tel: + 56 – 2 – 204 52 06
Palazzo Adami + 56 – 2 – 225 69 55/225 99 38
Piazza San Marco, 7 Fax: + 56 – 2 – 274 10 04
38068 Rovereto (Trento) E-mail: frrojas@flacso.cl
Italy Internet: http://www.flacso.cl
Tel: + 39 – 0464 – 42 42 88
Fax: + 39 – 0464 – 42 42 99 Ms Judit Rónai
E-mail: iupip@unimondo.org Director
László Németh Central-European Folk Academy
Ms Claire Poulin PO Box 40
Counsellor for Political Affairs 9400 Sopron
Canadian Embassy Hungary
35, avenue Montaigne Tel: + 36 – 99 – 31 69 89/288 81 81
75008 Paris Fax: + 36 – 99 – 31 69 89
France E-mail: jronai@sopron.hu
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 43 22 62
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 43 29 95 Ms Isabelle Roy
E-mail: claire.poulin@dfait-maeci.gc.ca Counsellor for Political Affairs
Canadian Embassy
Ms Monique Prindezis 35, av. Montaigne
Secretary-General 75008 Paris
École Instrument de Paix (EIP) France
5, rue du Simplon Tel: + 33 – 1 44 43 22 64
Geneva Fax: + 33 – 1 44 43 29 95
Switzerland E-mail: isabelle.roy@dfait-maeci.gc.ca
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 735 24 22
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 735 06 53
E-mail: cifedhop@mail-box.ch
 Appendices 135

List of participants
Mr F. W. (Russ) Russell Mr Eric Sapin
Responsible for the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum Director
Programme Specialist Citoyens, Défense et Paix
Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP) 16, rue Jean Giono
UNESCO 91000 Evry
7, place de Fontenoy France
75352 Paris 07 SP Tel: + 33 – 1 64 97 83 46
France Fax: + 33 – 1 60 78 28 61
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 12 19 E-mail: cidp@free.fr
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 57
E-mail: f.russell@unesco.org Ms Mady Sarfati
Consultant in Health Communication
Mr Stephen Ryan 10, rue des Bourdonnais
Magee College, Peace Studies Programme 75003 Paris
University of Ulster France
Londonderry BT48 7JL Tel: + 33 – 1 55 80 72 93
Northern Ireland Fax: + 33 – 1 55 80 72 92
United Kingdom E-mail: mady.sarfati@free.fr
Tel: + 44 – 2871 – 37 13 71
Fax: + 44 – 2871 – 37 52 07 Ms Kaisa Savolainen
E-mail: s.ryan@ulst.ac.uk Director
Division for the Promotion of Quality Education
Mr Luis Salamanques (ED/PEQ)
Programme Specialist UNESCO
Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP) 7, place de Fontenoy
UNESCO 75352 Paris 07 SP
7, place de Fontenoy France
75352 Paris 07 SP Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 10 99
France Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 56 39
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 14 39 E-mail: k.savolainen@unesco.org
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 21
E-mail: l.salamanques@unesco.org Mr Timothy M. Shaw
Visiting Professor, Development and
Mr Miguel Sales Figueroa International Relations
Senior Programme Specialist Aalborg University
Programme for Freedom of Expression, Fibigerstraede 2
Democracy and Peace (CI/FED) DK-9220 Aalborg East
UNESCO Denmark
7, place de Fontenoy Tel: + 45 – 96 35 83 49/-92 12
75352 Paris 07 SP Fax: + 45 – 98 15 32 98
France E-mail: shaw@i4.auc.dk
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 42 01 Director
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 84 Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy
E-mail: m.sales@unesco.org Studies
Department of Political Science
Mr Pedro San Ginés Aguilar Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4H6
Instituto de la Paz y los Conflictos Canada
Universidad de Granada Tel: + 1 – 902 – 494 66 30
Rector Lopez Argueta, S.N. Fax: + 1 – 902 – 494 38 25
18071 Granada E-mail: centre@is.dal.ca
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 958 – 24 41 42
Fax: + 34 – 958 – 24 89 74
E-mail: eirene@ugr.es / psgines@ugr.es
136
List of participants What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Mr Gabriel Siakeu Mr Marian Tamas

President Vice-President
Association Mondiale pour l’École Instrument Human Ecological Association (GEEA)
de Paix (EIP Cameroun) CP 1634, OP 7
BP 7715 6600 Iasi
Yaoundé Romania
Cameroon Tel: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
Tel: + 237 – 98 02 06/91 83 09/70 27 75 Fax: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
Fax: + 237 – 22 62 62/22 62 63 E-mail: apgro@mail.dntis.ro
E-mail: eipcam@hotmail.com
Mr Quang Nam Thai
Mr Peter Stania Programme Specialist
Secretary-General Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace
International Institute for Peace (IIP) and Tolerance
Möllwaldpl. 5 UNESCO
1040 Vienna 1, rue Miollis
Austria 75732 Paris Cedex 15
Tel: + 43 – 1 – 505 32 36 France
Fax: + 43 – 1 – 504 64 37 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 39 20
E-mail: iip@aon.at Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 57 20
E-mail: n.thai@unesco.org
Ms Carolyn Stephenson
Associate Professor of Political Science Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos
Matsunaga Institute for Peace Assistant Director-General
University of Hawaii at Manoa ‘Priority Africa’ Department (AFR)
Program of Conflict Resolution UNESCO
Honolulu, HI 96822 7, place de Fontenoy
United States 75352 Paris 07 SP
Tel: + 1 – 808 – 956 81 95 France
Fax: + 1 – 808 – 956 68 77 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 15 35
E-mail: c.stephen@hawaii.edu Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 44
E-mail: n.tidjani-serpos@unesco.org
Ms Elmira Suleymanova
President Mr Batbuyan Tsend
Azerbaijan Alliance for Peace and Development Counsellor
3/6, S. Rustamov St. Embassy of Mongolia
370001 Baku 5, avenue Robert Schuman
Azerbaijan 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt
Tel: + 994 – 12 – 92 79 20 France
Fax: + 994 – 12 – 97 20 73 Tel: + 33 – 1 46 05 23 18
E-mail: elmira@awdc.baku.az Fax: + 33 – 1 46 05 30 16
E-mail: 106513.2672@compuserve.com
Mr Fasahat H. Syed
Senior Research Fellow Ms Nicole Valenta
Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) Associate Programme Officer
20-A, College Road, F-7/2 United Nations Institute for Training and
Islamabad Research (UNITAR)
Pakistan Palais des Nations
Tel: + 92 – 51 – 922 28 13/-6 1211 Geneva 10
Fax: + 92 – 51 – 920 12 04 Switzerland
E-mail: fasahat@ipri-pak.org Tel: + 41 – 22 – 917 84 51
Internet: http://www.ipri-pak.org Fax: + 41 – 22 – 917 80 47
E-mail: nicole.valenta@unitar.org
 Appendices 137

List of participants
Mr Victor M. Valle Ms Karen Weisblatt
Consultant Executive Director
United Nations University for Peace Rotari Centre
Finca del Rodeo – Ciudad Colón Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris
Apartado Postal 138-6100 27, rue Saint Guillaume
San José 75007 Paris
Costa Rica France
Tel: + 506 – 205 90 00 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 49 50 67
Fax: + 506 – 249 19 29 Fax: + 33 – 1 45 49 51 42
E-mail: victoval@hotmail.com E-mail: karen.weisblatt@sciences-po.fr

Ms Laure Veirler Mr Marat Yegorov

Consultant President
Division of Cultural Policies (CLT/CP) Belarus Peace Foundation
UNESCO H-54, Block 2, Apt. 46
1, rue Miollis Kalinovskogo str.
75732 Paris Cedex 15 220086 Minsk
France Belarus
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 40 32 Tel: + 375 – 17 – 239 19 37/264 65 24
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 97 Fax: + 375 – 17 – 269 09 54/239 19 37
E-mail: mediationbalkans@unesco.org E-mail: egorov_marat@mail.ru

Ms Antonella Verdiani Mr Akira Yoshikawa

Programme Specialist Deputy Permanent Delegate of Japan to
Education for Universal Values Section UNESCO
(ED/PEQ/EUV) Permanent Delegation of Japan to UNESCO
UNESCO 1, rue Miollis
7, place de Fontenoy 75732 Paris Cedex 15
75352 Paris 07 SP France
France Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 35 23
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 11 77 Fax: + 33 – 1 47 34 46 70
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 56 33 E-mail: deljpn.ed@unesco.org
E-mail: a.verdiani@unesco.org
Ms Claudia Zampieri
Mr Patrick B. Vidal Counsellor
Director Permanent Delegation of Argentina to UNESCO
Bowman Technologies 1, rue Miollis
30, avenue Franklin Roosevelt 75732 Paris Cedex 15
75008 Paris France
France Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 34 38
Tel: + 33 – 1 53 83 91 47 Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 60 35
Fax: + 33 – 1 42 89 97 96 E-mail: c.zampieri@unesco.org
E-mail: pbvidal@free.fr
Mr René Zapata
Mr George Wachira Director
Director Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring
Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa (NPI – Africa) and Reporting (BSP/PMR)
5th floor, New Waumini-House – Westlands Bureau of Strategic Planning
PO Box 14894 UNESCO
Nairobi 7, place de Fontenoy
Kenya 75352 Paris 07 SP
Tel: + 254 – 2 - 44 14 44 / 44 00 98 France
Fax: + 254 – 2 - 44 00 97 Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 12 77
E-mail: npi@africaonline.co.ke Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 21
wachirag@africaonline.co.ke E-mail: r.zapata@unesco.org

BIO-SKETCHES OF THE LECTURERS
OPENING CEREMONY
Mr Hassen FODHA
Tunisia
Mr Fodha began his career as Chargé de Mission in
the Cabinet of the Tunisian Minister for Information
(1969–70) and as Chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (1970–74). He joined the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Oman in January 1974 as a diplo-
matic counsellor and was named Minister
Plenipotentiary, Chargé d’Affaires of Oman in Vienna,
representing Oman in Austria and at the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO). He served as Ambassador of Oman to the
United Nations Office in Geneva (1975–84) and
concurrently as Consul-General of Oman in
Switzerland.
He was a delegate to the 1970 and 1983 UN
General Assembly sessions. As head of the Permanent
Mission of Oman and Chairman of the Arab Group
in Geneva, he participated in the 1983 International
Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination.
He also served as Chief of the Omani delegation to
the International Conference on the Law of the Sea,
the International Conference on the Question of
Palestine and the first International Conference on
African Refugees.
Mr Fodha joined the United Nations Secretariat
in March 1985 as Director of the Information Centre
in Brussels, and since 1989 he has been Director of
the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in Paris.
H.E. Mr Louis HAMEL
Canada
Mr Hamel joined the Canadian Department of External
Affairs in 1973 and has served in Brussels, Tokyo,
and Paris, where he was Deputy Director of the
Canadian Cultural Centre (1985–89), and again in
Tokyo as Consul from 1992 to 1997.
In Ottawa, he has held a number of positions:
Cultural Affairs Division (1977–79); North Asia
Appendices 139
Bio-sketches of the lecturers
Relations Division (1989–92); Director of Promotion
of the Arts and Cultural Industries (1997–2000).
He is currently Ambassador and Permanent
Delegate of Canada to UNESCO.
FIRST ROUND TABLE
Mr Gabriel SIAKEU
Cameroon
Mr Siakeu, co-founder of the Cameroon Association
of Children’s Rights (ACDE) and Director of the Center
for Children’s Rights within ACDE, organized the first
national training session in children’s rights in 1992.
In 1993 he set up the Cameroon Branch of the World
Association for School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP-
Cameroon), and in 1995 the Cameroon Committee of
Children’s Rights (COCADE) of which he was elected
Secretary-General.
Posted to the Cameroon Ministry of National
Education (Department of Health and Extra-curricular
School Activities) in 1998, he was facilitator in a
number of training sessions on human rights educa-
tion and peace held from 1998–2000 in Burundi. In
1999 he participated in an international meeting organ-
ized by the ANAIS network on the Internet and
development, and in 2000 he was elected as vice-
regional coordinator of education and training
programmes and activities of ANAIS-Cameroon.
The author of many articles on education and
peace, he has also edited the magazine La Tribune
des Enfants.
Mr Jakkie CILLIERS
South Africa
Following his resignation from the South African
armed forces in 1988, Mr Cilliers co-founded the
Institute for Defence Policy, subsequently renamed
the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), during 1990,
and since 1993 he has served as its executive director.
By 2000 the Institute had become the largest
140
Bio-sketches of the lecturers
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
independent body dealing with security issues in
southern Africa, playing a leading role in the trans-
formation of the armed forces and the institution of
civilian control over the military. Its present activities
revolve around small arms, early warning of conflict,
peace missions, crime, policing, corruption and good
governance issues.
Mr Cilliers has presented numerous papers at
conferences and seminars, is a frequent commentator
in the local and international media and participator
at international conferences. He also regularly lectures
on security issues and has published, edited and
contributed to a large number of journals, books and
other publications. His most recent book, edited
together with Christian Dietrich, is Angola’s Resource
War – The Role of Oil and Diamonds (2000).
SECOND ROUND TABLE
Mr Bjørn MØLLER
Denmark
Since 1985, Mr Møller has been (senior) research
fellow, subsequently programme director and board
member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
(COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict
Research), where he is also editor of the international
research newsletter NOD & Conversion.
He served as Secretary-General of the International
Peace Research Association (IPRA) from 1997 to 2000,
and as External Lecturer at the Institute of Political
Studies, University of Copenhagen, since 1994.
In addition to being the author of numerous arti-
cles and editor of six anthologies, he has published
three books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in
Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence
(1991); Common Security and Non-offensive Defense.
A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of
Alternative Defense (1995).
THIRD ROUND TABLE
Mr Alejandro BENDAÑA
Nicaragua
Founder and former Director of the Centro de Estudios
Internacionales in Managua, Nicaragua, between 1979
and 1990 Mr Bendaña served as Secretary-General of
the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador to the United
Nations, and official spokesperson for the Nicaraguan
Government. In 1993, he was Visiting Professor of
History at the University of Chicago and in 1996 at
the Conflict Transformation Program of the Eastern
Mennonite University.
His most recent books are Demobilization and
Reintegration in Central America: A Peace-Building
Perspective (1999) and US Domination in the New
Global Order (1996).
He currently serves on the coordinating bodies
of the International Networks on Small Arms (IANSA),
Forum on Early Warning (Fewer), Jubilee South, the
International South Group Network and on the
International Advisory Council of the Hague Appeal
for Peace, as well as co-chairing the Ethics and Justice
Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines.
Mr Francisco ROJAS-ARAVENA
Chile
Mr Rojas-Aravena, specialist in international relations
and international security, is Director of FLACSO-
Chile, Director of the International Relations and
Military Studies Area of the Faculty and Co-Director
of the Program Peace and Security in the Americas.
A former Professor of international relations, security
and negotiation in diverse universities in Latin America
and Spain, as well as Fulbright Visiting Professor at
the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida
International University, Miami, he currently teaches
at the University of Stanford in Santiago and San
Diego State University. He has also been an adviser
and consultant to different international organizations
and regional governments.
Director of the review Fuerzas Armadas y
Sociedad and member of the Editorial Commission
of the review Estudios Internacionales (Guatemala)
and the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs (University of Miami), he is the author and
editor of several books and has published articles in
specialized journals of various countries. His most
recent publications are Cooperación y seguridad
internacional en las Américas (1999); Argentina,
Brasil y Chile: integración y seguridad (1999);
Globalización, América Latina y diplomacia de
Cumbres (1998); Chile-MERCOSUR, una alianza
estratégica (1997, with Paz Milet and Gabriel Gaspar).
General Juan Alberto LEZAMA
Uruguay
General Lezama is currently Director of the Centro
de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), where he was
a student himself. He is co-author of Testimonios de
una nación agredida [Testimony of an Attacked
Nation].
He took part in the operations of the combined
peace forces (1996, Panama) and has since partici-
pated in a number of national and international
conferences and seminars, including ‘Peace Missions
to the XXI Century’, organized by the Uruguayan
National Defence Ministry (1997, Punta del Este); the

II Interamericana Conference of Directors of High
Strategic Studies (1997, El Salvador); a seminar on
‘Civic-Military Relations between the Americas for the
XXI Century’ (1997, Santa Fé); a seminar on ‘Civic-
Military Relations, Supporting Democracy with
Cooperation’ (1998, Buenos Aires); the III
Interamericana Conference of Directors of High
Strategic Studies (1999, Buenos Aires); and an
Iberoamerican College Meeting (1999, Madrid).
As Director of CALEN, he signed an agreement
with the Uruguayan National Connection Committee
of UNESCO’s Management of Social Transformations
(MOST) Programme and participated in a seminar on
‘Human Security and Development at the beginning
of the 21st century’ organized with the collaboration
of the Committee (1999); followed by a cycle of
debates on ‘National Debt and Hemispheric Security’
(2000, Rio de Janeiro) where he signed an agreement
between CALEN and the Escuela Superior de Guerra
of Brazil.
FOURTH ROUND TABLE
Ms Ghada Ali MOUSSA
Egypt
A researcher at the National Center for Middle East
Studies (NCMES) and Assistant Researcher at the
Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo
University, Ms Moussa has taken part in many confer-
ences within Egypt and abroad. She has recently
presented papers at such conferences as Women in
Politics in the USA; Learning to Live Together:
Coexistence in the Middle East; The Economic
Situation in the Former Soviet Union Republics: The
Slavic Republic and Estonia; The Challenges to
Egyptian Women; Free Trade Zone in the Middle East.
She was also the facilitator of a series of work-
shops concerning the implementation of methods of
conflict resolution in Egypt, held at Cairo University
and the NCMES in the 1990s.
FIFTH ROUND TABLE
Mr Timothy M. SHAW
Canada
Mr Shaw, currently Director of the Dalhousie
University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada;
and Visiting Professor at Aalborg University, Denmark,
has been Professor at the Dalhousie University
Department of Political Science since 1971, and at its
Centre for International Development Studies since
1990. Having lectured in international politics and
development at a number of African universities, he
also served as Director of the Centre for African
Appendices 141
Bio-sketches of the lecturers
Studies at Dalhousie (1977–78 and 1983–89) and as
Director of its Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
(1993–2000).
General Editor of the International Political
Economy Series (Palgrave, previously Macmillan/St
Martin’s Presses) since 1985, and Series Editor of
International Political Economy of New Regionalisms
(Ashgate Publishing) since 1998, he has also been
coordinator of the International Political Science
Association Research Commission #40 on ‘New World
Orders?’ since 1994.
Mr Shaw’s most recent publications include contri-
butions to such journals as Third World Quarterly,
Politeia, UNU Work in Progress, New Political
Economy, and to a number of books: ‘Oceans
Governance and Human Security Towards the End
of the Century: Regional Approaches’, with Glen
Herbert, in The Aegean Sea after the Cold War: Security
and Law of the Sea Issues (2000); ‘NGOs and Peace-
building in the Great Lakes Region: States, Civil
Societies and Companies at the Turn of the
Millennium’, with Pamela Mbabazi, in New Roles and
Relevance: Non-governmental Organisations and the
Search for Development Alternatives (2000); ‘Conflicts
in Africa at the Turn of the Century: More of the
Same?’ in Les Conflits dans le Monde/Conflicts around
the World 1999–2000 (2000).
Major-General Jamil D. AHSAN
Bangladesh
Major-General Ahsan is currently Director-General of
the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic
Studies (BIISS) in Dhaka, a think-tank on interna-
tional affairs and security under the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Decorated with the gallantry award,
Bir Protik, in the War of Liberation of 1971, he has
also served as Chief Instructor at the School of
Military Intelligence in Bangladesh (1983–84);
Director of Staff at the Defence Services Command
and Staff College (1986–88); and Director-General of
a Special Security Force assigned to the President
and the Prime Minister (1991–96); His areas of
interest are security and strategic issues with specific
relevance to Bangladesh conflict studies, peace-
keeping, and nuclear issues.
Chief Editor of the BIISS Journal, a quarterly publi-
cation of the institute, Major-General Ahsan has partici-
pated in a number of international meetings: Peace-
keeping (Austria, 1987); Senior Defence Management
Course (India, 1990); Pacific Area Senior Officers’
Logistics Seminar (New Zealand, 1998); and various
national, regional and international courses on mili-
tary tactics, weapons and intelligence. He also
presented a paper at a seminar on ‘Small Arms in
South Asia’ (Sri Lanka, June 2000).
 Appendices 143

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RESOLUTION ADOPTED
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
53/243. Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace
A
Declaration on a Culture of Peace
The General Assembly,
Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, including
the purposes and principles embodied therein,
Recalling also the Constitution of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
which states that “since wars begin in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences
of peace must be constructed”,
Recalling further the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights1 and other relevant international instru-
ments of the United Nations system,
Recognizing that peace not only is the absence of
conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic
participatory process where dialogue is encour-
aged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual
understanding and cooperation,
Recognizing also that the end of the cold war has
widened possibilities for strengthening a culture
of peace,
Expressing deep concern about the persistence and
proliferation of violence and conflict in various
parts of the world,
Recognizing the need to eliminate all forms of discrim-
ination and intolerance, including those based on
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property, disability, birth or other status,
Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997,
by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the
“International Year for the Culture of Peace”, and
its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by
which it proclaimed the period 2001–2010 as the
“International Decade for a Culture of Peace and
Non-Violence for the Children of the World”,
Recognizing the important role that the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
continues to play in the promotion of a culture
of peace,
Solemnly proclaims the present Declaration on a
Culture of Peace to the end that Governments,
international organizations and civil society may
be guided in their activity by its provisions to
promote and strengthen a culture of peace in the
new millennium:
Appendices 145
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
Article 1
A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, tradi-
tions and modes of behaviour and ways of life based
on:
(a) Respect for life, ending of violence and
promotion and practice of non-violence
through education, dialogue and cooperation;
(b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence
of States and non-intervention in matters
which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and inter-
national law;
(c) Full respect for and promotion of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms;
(d) Commitment to peaceful settlement of
conflicts;
(e) Efforts to meet the developmental and envi-
ronmental needs of present and future gener-
ations;
(f) Respect for and promotion of the right to
development;
(g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights
and opportunities for women and men;
(h) Respect for and promotion of the right of
everyone to freedom of expression, opinion
and information;
(i) Adherence to the principles of freedom,
justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, coop-
eration, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue
and understanding at all levels of society and
among nations;
and fostered by an enabling national and
international environment conducive to
peace.
1. Resolution 217 A (III).
146 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Article 2
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
Progress in the fuller development of a culture of
peace comes about through values, attitudes, modes
of behaviour and ways of life conducive to the pro-
motion of peace among individuals, groups and
nations.
Article 3
The fuller development of a culture of peace is inte-
grally linked to:
(a) Promoting peaceful settlement of conflicts,
mutual respect and understanding and inter-
national cooperation;
(b) Complying with international obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations and
international law;
(c) Promoting democracy, development and
universal respect for and observance of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(d) Enabling people at all levels to develop skills
of dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building
and peaceful resolution of differences;
(e) Strengthening democratic institutions and
ensuring full participation in the development
process;
(f) Eradicating poverty and illiteracy and
reducing inequalities within and among
nations;
(g) Promoting sustainable economic and social
development;
(h) Eliminating all forms of discrimination against
women through their empowerment and
equal representation at all levels of decision-
making;
(i) Ensuring respect for and promotion and
protection of the rights of children;
(j) Ensuring free flow of information at all levels
and enhancing access thereto;
(k) Increasing transparency and accountability in
governance;
(l) Eliminating all forms of racism, racial discrim-
ination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
(m) Advancing understanding, tolerance and soli-
darity among all civilizations, peoples and
cultures, including towards ethnic, religious
and linguistic minorities;
(n) Realizing fully the right of all peoples,
including those living under colonial or other
forms of alien domination or foreign occu-
pation, to self-determination enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations and embodied
in the International Covenants on Human
Rights,2 as well as in the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples contained in General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
Article 4
Education at all levels is one of the principal means
to build a culture of peace. In this context, human
rights education is of particular importance.
Article 5
Governments have an essential role in promoting and
strengthening a culture of peace.
Article 6
Civil society needs to be fully engaged in fuller
development of a culture of peace.
Article 7
The educative and informative role of the media
contributes to the promotion of a culture of peace.
Article 8
A key role in the promotion of a culture of peace
belongs to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists,
religious bodies and groups, intellectuals, those
engaged in scientific, philosophical and creative and
artistic activities, health and humanitarian workers,
social workers, managers at various levels as well as
to non-governmental organizations.
Article 9
The United Nations should continue to play a critical
role in the promotion and strengthening of a culture
of peace worldwide.
107th plenary meeting
13 September 1999
2. Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind the Declaration on a Culture of
Peace adopted on 13 September 1999,
Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997,
by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the
“International Year for the Culture of Peace”, and
its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by
which it proclaimed the period 2001–2010 as the
“International Decade for a Culture of Peace and
Non-violence for the Children of the World”;
Adopts the following Programme of Action on a
Culture of Peace:
A. Aims, strategies and main actors
1. The Programme of Action should serve as the
basis for the International Year for the Culture of
Peace and the International Decade for a Culture
of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of
the World.
2. Member States are encouraged to take actions for
promoting a culture of peace at the national level
as well as at the regional and international levels.
3. Civil society should be involved at the local,
regional and national levels to widen the scope
of activities on a culture of peace.
4. The United Nations system should strengthen its
ongoing efforts to promote a culture of peace.
5. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization should continue to play its
important role in and make major contributions
to the promotion of a culture of peace.
6. Partnerships between and among the various
actors as set out in the Declaration should be
encouraged and strengthened for a global move-
ment for a culture of peace.
7. A culture of peace could be promoted through
sharing of information among actors on their
initiatives in this regard.
8. Effective implementation of the Programme of
Action requires mobilization of resources,
including financial resources, by interested
Governments, organizations and individuals.
B. Strengthening actions at the national,
regional and international levels
by all relevant actors
9. Actions to foster a culture of peace through educa-
tion:
(a) Reinvigorate national efforts and international
cooperation to promote the goals of educa-
Appendices 147
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
tion for all with a view to achieving human,
social and economic development and for
promoting a culture of peace;
(b) Ensure that children, from an early age,
benefit from education on the values, atti-
tudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life
to enable them to resolve any dispute peace-
fully and in a spirit of respect for human
dignity and of tolerance and non-discrimina-
tion;
(c) Involve children in activities designed to instill
in them the values and goals of a culture of
peace;
(d) Ensure equality of access to education for
women, especially girls;
(e) Encourage revision of educational curricula,
including textbooks, bearing in mind the 1995
Declaration and Integrated Framework of
Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights
and Democracy3 for which technical cooper-
ation should be provided by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization upon request;
(f) Encourage and strengthen efforts by actors
as identified in the Declaration, in particular
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, aimed at developing
values and skills conducive to a culture of
peace, including education and training in
promoting dialogue and consensus-building;
(g) Strengthen the ongoing efforts of the rele-
vant entities of the United Nations system
aimed at training and education, where
appropriate, in the areas of conflict preven-
tion and crisis management, peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, as well as in post-conflict
peace-building;
(h) Expand initiatives to promote a culture of
peace undertaken by institutions of higher
education in various parts of the world,
including the United Nations University, the
University for Peace and the project for twin-
ning universities and the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion Chairs Programme.
10. Actions to promote sustainable economic and
social development:
3. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, Records of the General Conference, Twenty-
eighth Session, Paris, 25 October–16 November 1995,
vol. 1: Resolutions, resolution 5.4, annexes.
148 What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
(a) Undertake comprehensive actions on the
basis of appropriate strategies and agreed
targets to eradicate poverty through national
and international efforts, including through
international cooperation;
(b) Strengthen the national capacity for imple-
mentation of policies and programmes
designed to reduce economic and social
inequalities within nations through, inter alia,
international cooperation;
(c) Promote effective and equitable development-
oriented and durable solutions to the external
debt and debt-servicing problems of devel-
oping countries through, inter alia, debt
relief;
(d) Reinforce actions at all levels to implement
national strategies for sustainable food
security, including the development of actions
to mobilize and optimize the allocation and
utilization of resources from all sources,
including through international cooperation,
such as resources coming from debt relief;
(e) Undertake further efforts to ensure that the
development process is participatory and that
development projects involve the full parti-
cipation of all;
(f) Include a gender perspective and empower-
ment of women and girls as an integral part
of the development process;
(g) Include in development strategies special
measures focusing on needs of women and
children as well as groups with special needs;
(h) Strengthen, through development assistance
in post-conflict situations, rehabilitation, rein-
tegration and reconciliation processes
involving all engaged in conflicts;
(i) Incorporate capacity-building in development
strategies and projects to ensure environ-
mental sustainability, including preservation
and regeneration of the natural resource base;
(j) Remove obstacles to the realization of the
right of peoples to self-determination, in
particular of peoples living under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign
occupation, which adversely affect their social
and economic development.
11. Actions to promote respect for all human rights:
(a) Full implementation of the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action;4
(b) Encouragement of development of national
plans of action for the promotion and protec-
tion of all human rights;
(c) Strengthening of national institutions and
capacities in the field of human rights,
including through national human rights insti-
tutions;
(d) Realization and implementation of the right
to development, as established in the
Declaration on the Right to Development5
and the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action;
(e) Achievement of the goals of the United
Nations Decade for Human Rights Education
(1995–2004);6
(f) Dissemination and promotion of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights at all levels;
(g) Further support to the activities of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
in the fulfilment of her or his mandate as
established in General Assembly resolution
48/141 of 20 December 1993, as well as the
responsibilities set by subsequent resolutions
and decisions.
12. Actions to ensure equality between women and
men:
(a) Integration of a gender perspective into the
implementation of all relevant international
instruments;
(b) Further implementation of international
instruments that promote equality between
women and men;
(c) Implementation of the Beijing Platform for
Action adopted at the Fourth World
Conference on Women,7 with adequate
resources and political will, and through, inter
alia, the elaboration, implementation and
follow-up of the national plans of action;
(d) Promotion of equality between women and
men in economic, social and political
decision-making;
(e) Further strengthening of efforts by the rele-
vant entities of the United Nations system for
the elimination of all forms of discrimination
and violence against women;
(f) Provision of support and assistance to women
who have become victims of any forms of
violence, including in the home, workplace
and during armed conflicts.
13. Actions to foster democratic participation:
(a) Reinforcement of the full range of actions to
promote democratic principles and practices;
(b) Special emphasis on democratic principles
and practices at all levels of formal, informal
and non-formal education;
(c) Establishment and strengthening of national
institutions and processes that promote and
sustain democracy through, inter alia, training
and capacity-building of public officials;
4. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.
5. Resolution 41/128, annex.
6. See A/49/261–E/1994/110/Add.1, annex.
7. Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing,
4–15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex II.

(d) Strengthening of democratic participation
through, inter alia, the provision of electoral
assistance upon the request of States
concerned and based on relevant United
Nations guidelines;
(e) Combating of terrorism, organized crime,
corruption as well as production, trafficking
and consumption of illicit drugs and money
laundering, as they undermine democracies
and impede the fuller development of a
culture of peace.
14. Actions to advance understanding, tolerance and
solidarity:
(a) Implement the Declaration of Principles on
Tolerance and the Follow-up Plan of Action
for the United Nations Year for Tolerance8
(1995);
(b) Support activities in the context of the United
Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations
in the year 2001;
(c) Study further the local or indigenous prac-
tices and traditions of dispute settlement and
promotion of tolerance with the objective of
learning from them;
(d) Support actions that foster understanding,
tolerance and solidarity throughout society,
in particular with vulnerable groups;
(e) Further support the attainment of the goals
of the International Decade of the World’s
Indigenous People;
(f) Support actions that foster tolerance and
solidarity with refugees and displaced
persons, bearing in mind the objective of
facilitating their voluntary return and social
integration;
(g) Support actions that foster tolerance and soli-
darity with migrants;
(h) Promote increased understanding, tolerance
and cooperation among all peoples through,
inter alia, appropriate use of new technolo-
gies and dissemination of information;
(i) Support actions that foster understanding,
tolerance, solidarity and cooperation among
peoples and within and among nations.
15. Actions to support participatory communication
and the free flow of information and knowledge:
(a) Support the important role of the media in
the promotion of a culture of peace;
(b) Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of
information and communication;
(c) Make effective use of the media for advo-
cacy and dissemination of information on a
culture of peace involving, as appropriate,
the United Nations and relevant regional,
national and local mechanisms;
(d) Promote mass communication that enables
communities to express their needs and
participate in decision-making;
Appendices 149
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
(e) Take measures to address the issue of
violence in the media, including new commu-
nication technologies, inter alia, the Internet;
(f) Increase efforts to promote the sharing of
information on new information technologies,
including the Internet.
16. Actions to promote international peace and
security:
(a) Promote general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control,
taking into account the priorities established
by the United Nations in the field of disar-
mament;
(b) Draw, where appropriate, on lessons
conducive to a culture of peace learned from
“military conversion” efforts as evidenced in
some countries of the world;
(c) Emphasize the inadmissibility of acquisition
of territory by war and the need to work for
a just and lasting peace in all parts of the
world;
(d) Encourage confidence-building measures and
efforts for negotiating peaceful settlements;
(e) Take measures to eliminate illicit production
and traffic of small arms and light weapons;
(f) Support initiatives, at the national, regional
and international levels, to address concrete
problems arising from post-conflict situations,
such as demobilization, reintegration of
former combatants into society, as well as
refugees and displaced persons, weapon
collection programmes, exchange of infor-
mation and confidence-building;
(g) Discourage the adoption of and refrain from
any unilateral measure, not in accordance
with international law and the Charter of the
United Nations, that impedes the full achieve-
ment of economic and social development
by the population of the affected countries,
in particular women and children, that hinders
their well-being, that creates obstacles to the
full enjoyment of their human rights,
including the right of everyone to a standard
of living adequate for their health and well-
being and their right to food, medical care
and the necessary social services, while reaf-
firming that food and medicine must not be
used as a tool for political pressure;
(h) Refrain from military, political, economic or
any other form of coercion, not in accor-
dance with international law and the Charter,
aimed against the political independence or
territorial integrity of any State;
8. A/51/201, appendix I.
150
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
(i) Recommend proper consideration for the
issue of the humanitarian impact of sanctions,
in particular on women and children, with a
view to minimizing the humanitarian effects
of sanctions;
(j) Promote greater involvement of women in
prevention and resolution of conflicts and, in
particular, in activities promoting a culture of
peace in post-conflict situations;
(k) Promote initiatives in conflict situations such
as days of tranquillity to carry out immu-
nization and medicine distribution campaigns,
corridors of peace to ensure delivery of
humanitarian supplies and sanctuaries of
peace to respect the central role of health
and medical institutions such as hospitals and
clinics;
(l) Encourage training in techniques for the under-
standing, prevention and resolution of conflict
for the concerned staff of the United Nations,
relevant regional organizations and Member
States, upon request, where appropriate.
107th plenary meeting
13 September 1999

RESOLUTION ADOPTED
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
53/25. International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence
for the Children of the World (2001–2010)
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997
and Economic and Social Council resolution
1997/47 of 22 July 1997 proclaiming the year 2000
as the International Year for the Culture of Peace,1
as well as its resolution 52/13 off 20 November
1997 on a culture of peace,
Taking into account Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1998/54 of 17 April 1998 entitled
“Towards a culture of peace”,2
Recalling the relevant resolutions of the General
Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights
concerning the United Nations Decade for Human
Rights Education (1995–2004),
Taking into account the project of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
entitled “Towards a culture of peace”,
Aware that the task of the United Nations to save
future generations from the scourge of war
requires transformation towards a culture of
peace, which consists of values, attitudes and
behaviours that reflect and inspire social inter-
action and sharing based on the principles of
freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights,
tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and
endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their
root causes to solve problems through dialogue
and negotiation and that guarantee the full exer-
cise of all rights and the means to participate
fully in the development process of their society,
Recognizing that enormous harm and suffering are
caused to children through different forms of
violence at every level of society throughout the
world and that a culture of peace and non-
violence promotes respect for the life and dignity
of every human being without prejudice or
discrimination of any kind,
Recognizing also the role of education in constructing
a culture of peace and non-violence, in partic-
ular the teaching of the practice of peace and
non-violence to children, which will promote the
purposes and principles embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations,
Emphasizing that the promotion of a culture of peace
Appendices 151
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/25
and non-violence, by which children learn to live
together in peace and harmony that will contribute
to the strengthening of international peace and
cooperation, should emanate from adults and be
instilled in children,
Underlining that the proposed international decade
for a culture of peace and non-violence for the
children of the world will contribute to the promo-
tion of a culture of peace based on the principles
embodied in the Charter and on respect for human
rights, democracy and tolerance, the promotion
of development, education for peace, the free
flow of information and the wider participation
of women as an integral approach to preventing
violence and conflicts, and efforts aimed at the
creation of conditions for peace and its consoli-
dation,
Convinced that such a decade, at the beginning of
the new millennium, would greatly assist the
efforts of the international community to foster
peace, harmony, all human rights, democracy and
development throughout the world,
1. Proclaims the period 2001–20010 as the
International Decade for a Culture of Peace and
Non-Violence for the Children of the World;
2. Invites the Secretary-General to submit, in consul-
tation with Member States, relevant United Nations
bodies and non-governmental organizations, a
report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth
session and a draft programme of action to promote
the implementation of the Decade at local, national
regional and international levels, and to coordi-
nate the activities of the Decade;
3. Invites Member States to take the necessary steps
to ensure that the practice of peace and non-
violence is taught at all levels in their respective
societies, including in educational institutions;
1. Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
1997, Supplement No. 1 (E/1997/97).
2. Ibid., 1998, Supplement No. 3 (E/1998/23), chap. II,
sect. A.
152
United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/25
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
4. Calls upon the relevant United Nations bodies, in
particular the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United
Nations Children’s Fund, and invites non-govern-
mental organizations, religious bodies and groups,
educational institutions, artists and the media
actively to support the Decade for the benefit of
every child of the world;
5. Decides to consider, at its fifty-fifth session the
question of the International Decade for a Culture
of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of
the World (2001–2010), under the agenda item
entitled “Culture of peace”.
55th plenary meeting
10 November 1998

OTHER UNESCO PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
I. Publications on the culture of peace
and the new approach to security
The New Page, by Federico Mayor. 1995. Co-published
by Dartmouth University Press and UNESCO
Publishing, 180 pp.
Non-military Aspects of International Security. 1995.
UNESCO Publishing. 260 pp.
Peace!, by the Nobel prizewinners. 1995. UNESCO
Publishing. 570 pp.
Peace and War: Social and Cultural Aspects, by Hakan
Wiberg. 1995. Bel Corp Publishers, Warsaw.
125 pp.
UNESCO and a Culture of Peace. Promoting a Global
Movement. 1996. CAB-95/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing.
206 pp.
The Venice Deliberations – Transformations in the
Meaning of ‘Security’: Practical Steps Toward a
New Security Culture. The Venice Papers 1. 1996.
CAB-96 WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 125 pp.
Final Report of the Second International Forum on
the Culture of Peace (The Manila Forum)
‘Transformation Towards a Culture of Peace’,
23–30 November 1995. Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process, Manila, Philippines.
1996. 103 pp.
Security for Peace – A Synopsis of the Inter-American
Symposium on Peace-building and Peace-keeping
(organized jointly by the Organization of American
States and UNESCO). The Venice Papers 2. 1996.
CAB-96 WS/2. UNESCO Publishing. 32 pp.
Actes du colloque international sur le droit à l’assis-
tance humanitaire (Paris, 25–27 January 1995).
1996. SHS-96/WS/9. UNESCO Publishing. 218 pp.
From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace.
1996. UNESCO Publishing. 276 pp.
UNESCO: An Ideal in Action, by Federico Mayor. 1996.
UNESCO Publishing. 131 pp.
What Kind of Security? 1997. CAB-97/WS/3. UNESCO
Publishing. 156 pp. (French, English)
Proceedings of the International Symposium ‘From
Partial Insecurity to Global Security’ (organized
jointly by UNESCO, IHEDN, CASD, CESEDEN and
the Institute for Security Studies of the WEU).
Appendices 153
Other UNESCO publications of interest
1997. CAB-97/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 208 pp.
(French, English)
Actas del primer foro militar centro-americano para
la cultura de la paz (San Salvador, 26–27 June
1996). UNESCO Office, El Salvador. 1997. 151 pp.
Professional Peacebuilding. A preliminary guide
developed in an International Workshop and
Simulation. The Venice Papers 3. 1998. CAB-
98/WS/04. UNESCO Publishing.
Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention. SIPRI-
UNESCO Handbook. 1998. Oxford University
Press. 230 pp.
Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos, by Vicenc Fisas,
Introduction by Federico Mayor. 1998. UNESCO
Publications and Icaria Antrazyt, Barcelona. 406 pp.
Proceedings of the Regional Symposium ‘Cooperative
Peace in Southeast Asia’ (organized jointly by
UNESCO and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations – ASEAN). 1999. CAB-99/WS/1. UNESCO
Publishing. 220 pp. (English)
The Unit for Peace and the New Dimensions of Security.
December 1999. CAB-99/WS/5. UNESCO
Publishing. 57 pp. (French, English, Spanish)
Letter to Future Generations. 1999. Droit, Roger Pol;
Series: Culture of Peace. 171 pp. (English)
The Culture of Peace: A New Beginning. 1999.
UNESCO Publishing/Oxford & IBH Publishing.
Towards a Women’s Agenda for a Culture of Peace,
by Ingeborg Breines, Donota Griercycz and Betty
A. Reardon. 1999. UN Division for the
Advancement for Women; Series: Culture of Peace.
265 pp. (English)
Women Say No to War, by Ingeborg Breines, Breda
Pavlic and Roger, Dominique. 1999. Series:
Women Plus. 81 pp. (English-French)
Olives from Jericho: Peace in Winter Gardens, by
Anees Jung. 1999. UNESCO Publishing; Series:
Culture of Peace. 166 pp. (English)
Conflict Resolution: New Approaches and Methods.
2000. UNESCO documents; Series: Peace and
Conflict Issues. 167 pp. (English, ISBN 92-3-
103640-8)
Male Roles, Masculinities and Violence: A Culture of
Peace Perspective, by Ingeborg Breines, Robert W.
154
Other UNESCO publications of interest
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?
Connell and Ingrid Eide. 2000. UNESCO
Publishing; Series: Culture of Peace. 288 pp.
(English)
Rethinking Development: Putting an End to Poverty,
by Henri Bartoli. 2000. UNESCO Publishing.
183 pp. (English-French)
World Culture Report 2000: Cultural Diversity, Conflict
and Pluralism, by Lourdes Arizpe. 2000. UNESCO
Publishing. 416 pp. (English-French-Spanish)
World Order and Peace in the New Millennium, edited
by Tai-joon Kwon and Dong-Sung Kim. 2000. Korean
National Commission for UNESCO, Seoul. 357 pp.
2000 World Directory of Peace Research and Training
Institutions/Répertoire mondial des institutions de
recherche et de formation sur la paix/Repertorio
mundial de instituciones de investigación y de
formación sobre la paz. 9th edition. 2000.
UNESCO Publishing. 300 pp.
The World Ahead: Our Future in the Making, by
Jérôme Blindé; Jean Yves Le Saux and Raquar
Gudmundssan. 2001. Zed Books. 496 pp. (English-
French-Spanish)
UNESCO Prize for Peace Education 2000. 2001.
UNESCO Publishing. 56 pp. (French, English)
Report on the Seminar on the Dialogue between the
Three Monotheistic Religions: Towards a Culture
of Peace. Organized under the High Patronage of
His Majesty, King Hassan II, by the Ministry of
Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture,
and UNESCO, Rabat, Morocco, February 1998.
1998. (English-French-Arabic)
II. Publications on science and peace
Science and Power, by Federico Mayor and Augusto
Forti. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 230 pp. (English,
French, Italian)
Peace in the Oceans – Ocean Governance and the
Agenda for Peace. 1997. SC-97/WS/30. UNESCO
Publishing. 266 pp.
Genoa Forum of UNESCO on Science and Society –
Genoa Declaration on Science and Society. First
Reflection Meeting: International Symposium on
Science and Power, Genoa, Italy, edited by
V. Kouzminov, S. Biggin and R. Santesso. 1995.
UNESCO Office, Venice. 183 pp.
Science for Peace Series
Volume 1 Proceedings of the International Meeting
on Military Conversion and Science: Utilisation/
Disposal of the Excess Weapon Plutonium:
Scientific, Technological and Socio-Economic
Aspects, Como, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov,
M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1996. UNESCO
Office, Venice. 469 pp.
Volume 2 Forum ‘Science for Peace’ – Session of the
Genoa Forum of UNESCO on Science and Society
‘Science Ethics’ – Workshop ‘Science, Technology
and National Systems of Innovation’, Como, Italy,
edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and
R. Santesso. 1997. UNESCO Office, Venice. 181 pp.
Volume 3 International Symposia on Science for Peace
(First Symposium 11 December 1995; Second
Symposium 20–23 January 1997), Jerusalem,
Israel, edited by Y. Becker, V. Kouzminov and
R. Santesso 1997. UNESCO Office, Venice. 306 pp.
Volume 4 Illegal Nuclear Traffic: Risks, Safeguards
and Countermeasures, Como, Italy, edited by
V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998.
UNESCO Office, Venice. 159 pp.
Volume 5 Nuclear and Biological Decommissioning:
Management of Global Security Threats, edited by
G. Aslanian, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and
R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice. 276 pp.
Volume 6 Inauguration of the UNESCO International
School of Science for Peace, First Forum of the
International Scientific Panel on the Possible
Consequences of the Misuse of Biological Sciences,
edited by Y. Becke, A. Falaschi, V. Kouzminov,
M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO
Office, Venice. 574 pp.
Volume 7 Energy Security in the Third Millennium:
Scientific and Technological Issues, edited by
G. Aslanian, U. Farinelli, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini
and R. Santesso. 1999. UNESCO Office, Venice.
720 pp.
Volume 8 Nuclear Disarmament, Safe Disposal of
Nuclear Material for New Weapons Developments?
Where are the National Laboratories Going?,
edited by G. Gherard, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini
and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice.
603 pp.
Volume 9 Water Security in the Third Millennium:
Mediterranean Countries Toward Regional Vision,
edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini, R. Santesso
and A. Tilche. 1999. UNESCO Office, Venice.
499 pp.
Volume 10 Nuclearization of South Asia: Problems
and Solutions, edited by P. Cotta-Ramusino,
V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1999.
UNESCO Office, Venice. 388 pp.
 ORDER FORM

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UNESCO, Office B.9.26, 1, rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France

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NOTES
NOTES
NOTES
NOTES
The participants in the First International
Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training
Institutions, organized by UNESCO on 27 and
28 November 2000, on the theme: ‘What Agenda
for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’;
Thank UNESCO for this initiative which
allowed numerous peace research and training
institutions to take part in the proceedings by
means of a direct and fruitful dialogue;
Unanimously note that current and future
human security considerations are taking on
global proportions, and that all factors in the
human security equation are interacting on a
world scale, in such a way that the need to under-
stand them as one single theme is a cognitive
step that increasingly needs to be taken
everywhere, based on an intensive
sharing of everyone’s contributions;
Aware that peace research and UR I P
training institutions, through their C SecuriPax Network for the Promotion
function as centres of training,
SE
analysis and policy elaboration,
have a special responsibility in this
respect, undertake to increase
their cooperation in a common
research effort to propose better
N
ways to achieve peace, human
security, development, respect for ET
human rights and the promotion of
democratic principles;
Anxious to disseminate their conclu-
WO
sions as widely as possible, adopt as the basis
of their continuing project the following Agenda
for Action:
• Human security is indivisible. A general
dynamic of equitable and balanced development
is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of
societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demon-
strates the overall need for human security, though
it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence
or conflict. The world’s future depends upon a
growing need for human security and a better
understanding of all the risks and threats that
affect populations and individuals;
• Awareness of the global and universal
nature of human security necessary to all
forms of progress and acknowledgement of the
appropriate role of the peace research and training
institutions in this respect, call for a considerable
evolution in people’s minds;
• The representatives of peace research and
training institutions share an important
responsibility in this field, through their capacity
to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic analysis
of the world in its current state, a clear percep-
tion of the changes awaiting it and a constructive
vision of the actions to be undertaken in order to
provide general progress with the conditions neces-
sary for human security, that is to say the possibility
of its being of a lasting nature.
Consequently, the participants in the First
International Meeting of Directors of
P e a c e R e s e a r c h a n d Tra i n i n g
Institutions,
• Decide to create the International
AX
of Human Security and Peace in
order to remain united for the
purpose of future activities;
• Welcome UNESCO’s proposal
to assign to the Network they have
thus created, the SecuriPax Forum
K
(http://www.unesco.org/securipax),
aimed at facilitating the exchange of
R
information and best experiences and
practices in the field of human security;
• Decide to work together with a view to
contributing to the promotion of concrete actions
of general interest, ranging from joint efforts to
define human security indicators to high-level
training activities;
• Decide also to work together to mobilize multiple
capacities, and this on the basis of all the contri-
butions and recommendations made at this First
International Meeting of Directors of Peace
Research and Training Institutions;
• Express their willingness to organize regional and
subregional meetings in the coming years in the
framework of the International SecuriPax Network;
• Invite similar institutions interested in this Agenda
for Action to join them in the Network created
and to share efforts with them.