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A DISAGGREGATE MODEL OF AUTO-TYPE CHOICE

cHARLEt A. hVE
Dept. of Economics,University of California,Irvine, CA 92717,U.S.A.

and

KENNEM TRUN
CambridgeSystematics Inc., Berkeley. CA 94704, U.S.A.

(Retched 8 November 1!477;in mkdfonn 11April 1978)

AbdPr&Previous models of auto-type&ice have not been abk to disentaqtk very much of the structureof tbc
bousebold’sauto-c&ice decision: the models assumed that very few auto characteristicsa&t &ok-e, and often
these few parameterswcte estimatedwith low pfecih. Hence the models had only limited we io forecastiagthe
effects of govenuuellt policiesto infiucacetraasportatinenergy consumption.The present paper introduces8
multinomiailogit model for the type of car that householdswill choose to buy. The model includes a large variety
of auto characteristicsas explanatoryvariabks, as well as a large numberof characteristicsof the bousebold and
the drivirutenvironment.The model fits the data suite well, and all of the variablesenter witb the correctsigns and
plausibleLgaitudes.

The primary limitation of these aggregate econometric


This paper presents a disaggregate model of the house- models is that they do not include as explanatory vari-
hold’s car buying decision: what type of car will be ables the whole array of automobile characteristics
bought, choosing among the great number of new cars which affect consumers’ choices of type and number of
available. Such a model has very direct relevance for automobiles to own. The only automobile characmtistics
U.S. energy plan&g: automobiles consume about a they use as explamuory variables are price and fuel
quarter of our energy; there are many cars available economy. Other characteristics, such as weight, external
which would reduce this energy consumption by more dimensions, passenger space, horsepower, and so on, are
than 50%; and hence it is of interest to know the sensi- not included in the models.
tivity of car choices to the various possible government The omission of these variables was not an oversight
policy instruments. Although there have been many on the part of the researchers using the aggregate
aggregate models in this area, the model presented here econometric approach: inherent problems with the ap-
is the first one with a rich enough specification to be able proach make inclusion of these variables diflicult, if not
to explore the consequences of alternative policies. impossible.
The model is estimated on a stratified random sample The tist problem is that the automobile characteristics
of 1976 new car buyers in seven cities. The universe of do not vary substantially over time or across regions.
new car types is classitkd into ten size/price categories. The weight, horsepower etc. of new automobiles in each
Multinomial logit analysis is used to estimate the prob class are the same for all regions of the United States for
ability of choice among these ten categories, as a a given year. Furthermore, these characteristics do not
function of a variety of car characteristics, household change much from one year to the next. However, in
characteristics, and characteristics of the driving en- order to estimate the effect of automobile characteristics
vironment. on consumers’ buying patterns, some variation in the
The resultant model fits the data quite well, and all of characteristics must exist. When little variation exists in
the variables enter with the correct signs and reasonable explanatory variables, they cannot be expected to
signitkance levels. Preliminary sensitivity checks in- explain much variation in the dependent variables.
dicate that changes in the policy variables infhtence This problem of insufhcient variation in automobile
market-shares in the expected direction, and with characteristics was encountered by the aggregate model-
plausible magnitudes. builders even though they included only the characteris-
tics price and fuel economy. If insufficient variation
exists in an independent variable, then the standard error
All previous econometric models of auto-type choice for the estimated coefficient will be very large. The
have used aggregate data. To our knowledge, a total of aggregate models evidence this problem.
six such models have been estimated: Chamberlain Chamberlain obtained an extremely large standard er-
(19741, Chase Econometrics (1974), Energy and En- ror for the variable she used as a proxy for auto price
vironmental Analysis, Inc. (1975), Difigho and Kulash (the standard error was more than 17 times the sixe. of.
(19761, Ayres et al. (1976) and Wharton (1977). These the coefficient in one equation). D&ho and Kulash also
models are comprehensively reviewed in Train (1978). obtained fairly large standard errors for their price vari-
T&A Vd. 13, No. I-A 1
2 C. A. L.AVEand K. TFAN

able, stating that “the estimated own-price coefficient for impact on sales of one price element relative to others.
medium car shares and large car shares are only On the other hand, automotive fuel economy price
significant at a 25 and 40% level of error respectively”. proposals would influence various combinations of
Other models leave some important variables out of each of these elements, making it essential that the
some of the equations, indicating that their standard effect of each be isolated.”
errors must have been too large to allow inclusion. For
example, the model of Chase Econometrics does not Diliglio and Kulash were forced to specify a “general-
include the price of compacts in the equation for the ized” price combining auto price, gas price, and fuel
market share of compacts; the equation for the market economy; and then entered this single variable into their
share of subcompacts includes neither the price of sub- model rather than estimating the separate effects of auto
compacts nor the fuel economy. Similariy, the EEA1 price, gas price, and fuel economy.
model does not include fuel economy of compacts in the Because of these two problems (lack of sufficient
compact auto share equation or the price of subcompacts variation over time and across regions in automobile
in the subcompact auto share equation. characteristics, and large correlations among automobile
A second problem confronting the builders of aggre- characteristics) the possibility seems small of any aggre-
gate models is that, over time, automobile characteristics gate econometric model being able to include a full array
tend to vary together. Weight and external dimensions of automobile characteristics. Consequently, it seems
tend to move in tandem, with both increasing or that a disaggregate econometric approach should be
decreasing at the same time. Similarly horsepower and attempted.
price tend to be correlated. To obtain reliable estimates
of the relationships between variables, however, each m OF THEDATA
explanatory variable must vary fairly independently of Householddata
the other explanatory variables. Otherwise, it is not We utilized a stratified random sample of new car
possible to determine which variable’s variation is buyers, collected during the Summer of 1976 by Arthur
explaining the variation in the dependent variables. D. Little. Inc., in seven cities: Atlanta, Buffalo, Chicago,
The only automobiie characteristics which Difiglio and Denver, IndianapoGs, Los Angeles and New Orleans.
Kulash entered were price and fuel economy. Yet, with The stratification produced an equal number of house-
only these two variables, the problem of collinearity was holds who had purchased small, medium and large cars
encountered. Kulash (1975) stated the difficulty expli- (classes l-4/5-6/7-10; as explained below). Each home
citly: interview recorded the type of auto purchased and a
variety of household characteristics. The means of some
“Car prices, gasoline prices, and fuel economy aLl of the socioeconomic variables are shown in Table 1.
have a bearing on the overall cost of owning and
operating a vehicle. But over the last 15 yr, these three Automobiledata
measures have all changed in highly interrelated ways, Information on various physical characteristics for
as reflected by simple conelation coefficients between each type of car was taken from the 3976 Automotiue
them of 0.9 or greater. These interrelations make it News Ma&et L&a Book FVice data for each car were
diGcult to use statistical techniques to separate the constructed as the sum of (a) sticker price, (b) destina-

Table 1. Socioeconomiccharacteristicsof sample

Standard
-
:&an Deviation

Number of people tn household who are 18 years and over 2.36 .92

Number of people in household who are O-17 years old .94 1.13

Number of ltcensed drivers in household 2.28 .96

Number of autos owned by household members 1.93 .72

Number of employed persons fn household 1.68 .97

(1 - urban __ ._
Location of home (2 - suburban 1.78 .48
(3 = rural

Age* 3.55 1.35

Education' 2.78 1.00

Income** 4.06 1.22

l CodIn shown in footnotes 4.5 of Table 2.

-1 = less than $7500; 2 = 7.500-9.999; 3 = lO,OOO-14,999;

4 = 15.000-24.999; 5 - 25,000-34,999; 6 = 35,000 and over.


A disaggregate
modelof auto-typechoice 3

tion charges specitk to each city and (c) taxes specihc to AIulxxLoFAmm.cE
each city. Destination charge information was obtained The model estimates the probability that a given
from the auto manufacturers. Tax information (regis- household will choose to buy a new auto within a parti-
tration fees, personal property taxes, local sales tax and cular class of auto types (where the classes are defined
state sales tax) was obtained from various federal pub- as above), conditional upon the household’s choice of a
lications, and from individual cities. new auto over a used one. The model is thereby restric-
tive in two ways: (1) only the choice of new auto types is
Lkjinitionof choice categories considered and (2) classes of autos rather than makes
All of the makes and models of cars were classified and models are the choice alternatives. The former
into ten categories, with cars in each category chosen to restriction was imposed by the data: only a sample of
be relatively homogeneous in size and price. The house- new auto purchasers was available for analysis. The
hold is then choosing between these ten categories. We latter restriction was imposed by computer capacity:
constructed a “representative” car for each category by estimation of a model with a separate alternative’ for
taking a sales-weighted average of the characteristics of each make and model would entail more computer space
the cars in that category. The categories are summarized than is available.
at the top of Table 2. The model is multinomial logit (MNL) with the prob-

Table2. A modelof auto-typechoice


Alternatives:

Class 1: Subsubcompact (e.g. VU Beetle)


Class 2: Sports Cars (e.g. Porsche)
Class 3: Subcompact-A (e.g. Vega)
Class 4: Subcompact-B (e.g. Mustang II)
Class 5: Compact-A (e.g. Valjant)
Class 6: Compact-B (e.g. Granada)
Class 7: Intermediate (e.g. Cutlass)
Class 8: Standard-A (e.g. Impala)
Class 9: Standard-B (e.g. Riviera)
Class 10: Luxury (e.g. Cadillac)

Hodel: Multinaaial Logit, Fitted by the Maximus Likelihood klethod

Independent Variable
(The vartable takes the described value
in the alternatives listed in parentheses Estimated T-
and zero in non-listed alternatives). Coefficient Statistic

Initial +uto cost divtded by household


income (l-10) -9.35 3.23

Inftial Auto cost divided by household


income, quantity squared1 (l-10) 2.61 2.81

Auto operating cost per mile2 (l-10) - .350 1.58

Ueighted seats' (l-10) .558 1.79

Dunrnyvariable for whether the household


owns more than two autos (l-4) .815 3.53

Dway variable for whether the household's


income exceeds $25,DOO/year (g-10) .474 1.52

Number of persons In household (1,3) .590 2.45

Number of persons rn household (4-10) .378 1.44

Vehicle miles traveled per month by the


household (8-10) .000348 1.55

Auto weight times age of respondent4 (l-10) .0527 2.58

Auto weight times age of respondent,


quantity squared4 (l-10) - .0000545 1.39

Auto weight lmes education of


responden&' (l-10) .0282 0.971

Auto weight times ducation of respondent,


quantity squaredf (l-.0) - .000152 1.94

Auto "performance" times age of respondent'


(l-10) 1.12 1..22

Auto "performance" timessage of respon-


dent, quantity squared (l-10) - .0230 1.38
C. A. LA’JE and K. TRAIN

Table 2 (Contd)

Estimated T-
Independent Variable Coefficient Statistic

Dummy variable for sports/specialty (2) 1.80 ,621

Dumny variable for subcompact A (3) -3.46 ,340

Dummy variable for subcompact 6 (4) ,273 .148

Dummy variable for compact A (5) 1.62 ,718

Dummy variable for compact 6 (6) 1.75 ,758

Duaanyvariable for intermediate (7) 3.10 . a38


Duaanyvariable for standard A (5) 1 .a6 .4ia

Dumny variable for standard 6 (9) 2.82 .564

Dummy variable for luxury (10) 4.67 .773

Likelihood ratio index .I257

Log likelihood at zero -1246.

Log likelihood at convergence -1089.

Percent correctly predicted 24.77

Sample size 541

1 .
Imtlal auto cost is sticker price, taxes, and destination charges, in
dollars. Income is in dollars per year.

'Auto operating cost per mile is in cents per mile and is defined as
the price of a gallon of gasoline divided by the auto's miles per gallon.
Prtce for each city from the Oil and Gas Journal.

3
Weighted seats is a variable which gives a *eight of one for each
seat in an auto up to the number of persons in the household and a weight
of one-half for each seat in an auto more than the number of persons In
the household. Thus, a household with three members will have a value
of 2 for auto classes with 2 seats, a value of 3 for auto classes with
3 seats, and a value of 3.5 for auto classes with 4 seats.

4
Weight is in hundreds of pounds. Age is coded as follows:
1 = teens
2 = twenties
3 = thfrties
4 = forties
5 = fffties
6 = sixties and above.

5.
Wetght ts in hundreds of pounds. Education Is coded as follows:
1 = high school not complete
2 = high school complete
3 - one to three years of college
4 = four or more years of college.

6vPerformance" is defined as horsepower divided by weight, which is an


excellent predictor of relative acceleration abiltty. See footnote 4 for
definition of weight and age.

ability of choosing a new auto within class i delined as: of the household, I is a vector-valued function of xi and
eb’2Wi.S) S, and fl is a vector of coefficients. The term /?‘z(x,,S) is
Pi = _ (1) called the “representative” utility of auto class i. The
eB’rCx*I,
MNL model and a method for estimating the model
c-1
parameters are discussed in McFadden (1973J.t
where P, is the probability of choosing a new auto in Table 2 presents the model of new auto class choice.
class i, xc is a vector of attributes of autos of class i (e.g. The independent variables are the elements of z(x,, S) in
cost, weight, horsepower, etc.), s is a iector of attributes (1).
The second and third columns record the estimates
tThc modelwas estimatedas if the sample were drawn exo- and r-statistics, respectively, of the elements of /3. The
genously, ~hcrcas the sa~~ple was actually choice-based. This independent variables are fairly complex and require
inconsistcn~y is duscusscd below, in “Problemswith the Mode”. explanation.
A disaggregatemodel of auto-typechoice 5

SRKlElCATIONoFTBE- will increase the “representative” utility of that class,


In broad terms the probability of choosing some given and hence increase the probability of choosing that class.
car type can be thought of as depending on three hinds An increase in the price of gasoline decreases the
of explanatory variables. Pi = F (household characteris- “representative” utility of all auto classes, yet it in-
tics; car characteristics; environment). Breaking down creases the probability of choosing fuel-efficient autos
each of these main categories still further, we get Pi = F relation to inefficient autos.
(income, education, age, family size, No. cars, No. miles The positive sign for the coefficient of the weighted
driven; car price, m.p.g., horsepower, interior size, seats variable indicates that an increase in the number of
weight; local price of gasoline). And these are, in fact, seats, in autos of a particular class, results in an increase
the variables which are included in the final model. But in the probability of that class being chosen. (See note 3
the actual specitication of the model is a good deal more of Table 2 for the definition of this variable.)
complex for two reasons: first, the relation of many of It was thought that households which own many autos
‘the variables to the choice-probabilities is quite non- are more likely to choose a small auto when they buy an
linear, and hence a number of “squared” terms are extra one (they can afford to have special purpose cars).
included in the equation; second, since the objective The dummy variables for whether the household owns
attributes of cars do not vary across households (hence more than two autos enters the “representative” utility
there is no variance in these explanatory variables across of the first four auto classes but not that of other auto
the observations), we must use s&jccrjue/y-perceived classes. The positive estimated coefficient con5ms this
car characteristics in the equation. That is, since two hypothesis.
households looking at, say, a class 7 car are both faced A dummy variable for incomes greater than S25,OOO
with identical objective car characteristics, we must look per year enters the “representative” utility of auto clas-
at the subjective car characteristics in order to obtain the ses 9 and 10 only. The positive sign for this variable
variance necessary to estimate. our equation. indicates that high income people are more likely to
We assume that subjectively-perceived attributes choose large, expensive autos independent of the fact
result from the interaction of household characteristics (expressed in the lirst two variables of the model) that
and car characteristics. For example, a low income high income peopk care kss about cost. The effect beii
household will perceive an SMtOOprice tag in quite a captured in this dummy variable is perhaps a prestige
different manner than would a high income household. effect, and the positive coefficient would be expected.
Thus, the subjective cost can be approximated by using The number of persons in the household enters the
the vatiabk “cost/iime”. L&wise we have reason to “mpresentative” utility of classes 1 and 3 with a
suspect the following other interactions between house- coefficient of 0.R aud classes 4-10 with a coe5cient of
hold characteristics and car characteristics: family sixe 0.37. Thii indicates that increasing household size
and car size, age and performance (accekration), age and decreases the probability of choosing a sports/speciality
weight, income and weight. Thus the equation to be auto (class 2) independent of the issue of how many
estimated then becomes seats are in the auto (which is already represented by the
weighted seats variable). This effect could perhaps be
Pr = F income, family size, No. cars owned, No. miles u&d a ‘Yamily man” effect.
( Vehicle miles traveled per month enters the
driven;
“representative” utility of classes g-10. The positive
cost No.seats gasprice wetit xage
estimated coefficient indicates that, as expected, house-
& ’ No. people ’ m.p.g. ’
holds which drive a lot tend to choose large autos.
weight Xeducation, performance x age To examine the effect of auto weight on choice prob
abilities we used two interactive variables: a weight-age
Results of the estimation interaction term, and a weight-education interaction
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients. We discuss term; both in non-linear form.
each variable in turn. The weight-education interaction has a complex,
Dividing auto cost by income allows the importance of though quite plausible pattern; and it is shown in Table 3.
auto cost to vary across households according to their The numbers in the table can be regarded as relative
income; and we include two terms (one squared and one utilities. Reading across the rows we see that, all eke
not) to allow for a non-linear relation between initial cost held equal, people with littk education (row 1) place a
and “representative” utility. The estimated coefficients high value on big cars: the greater the car weight, the
indicate that, over all the combinations of initial cost and greater the “representative” utility. Whereas for the
income ‘observed in the data, an increase in initial cost most educated group (row 4) the highest utility is asso-
makes the “representative” utility of an auto class lower, ciated with cars in the 2000-3000 lb range; and the value
and an increase in income makes the “representative” of larger cars drops off quite rapidly. At intermediate
utility higher. That is, a rise in initial cost for an auto levels of education, the pattern of size preferences lies
class decreases the probability that an auto in that class between these two opposite taste patterns.
wig be chosen; and a rise in income increases the prob- We can examine the weight-age interaction by cal-
ability of choosing an expensive auto class. culating a similar table. It shows a simpler pattern. For
Auto operating cost per mile has a negative sign, any given age class, all else held equal, there is a positive
indicating that an increase in the m.p.g. of a given class effect between the choice probability and the weight of
6 C. A. Love and K. TRAIN

Table 3. The interaction of auto weight and respondenteducation in “representative” utility

Auto Weight
(in hundreds of pounds)

Education Level (coded)_ 20 30 40 so

(High school not complete) .503 ,709 a84 1.03

(High school complete) .a85 1.45 i .2a 1.30

(One to three years of college) 1.14 1.31 1.91 .a10


(Four OP more years of college) 1.28 1.20 ,621 - .440

Each element in the table is

[.0282 l WEIGHT l EDUCATION] - [.000152 l (WEIGHT l EDuCATI~N)~]

where WEIGHT and EDUCATION take the values given in the POW and
column heads.

the car. But the degree of positive slope increases greatly fashion was that we could not do so. A variety of
with age: an increase in car weight has a much stronger alternative specitications to accomplish this were tried,
positive inlhrence on old people than it does on young but they simply did not yield sign&ant results.
people. In particular, entering “auto cost per mile divided by
The “performance” variable approximates the relative income” rather than “auto cost per mile” decreased the
acceleration of different cars; and again we have allowed log liielihood of the model; the t-statistic for this new
for a possible non-linear relationship. The results seem term was only 0.49. This indicates that the importance of
quite reasonable: for any given age class of people, auto cost per mile does not vary with the inverse of
performance has a positive slope; i.e. an increase in the income.$
performance of autos in a particular class increases the It was thought that, perhaps, households consider auto
probability that the class will be selected. But the degree cost per month when choosing an auto rather than the
of positive slope goes down with increasing age: young cost per mile. That is, the importance of auto cost per
people are much more influenced by an increase in mile varies with the vehicle miles traveled by .a house-
performance than older people. hold. To test the proposition, the model of Table 2 was
In summary, the flexible form allowed by our various estimated with “auto cost per month” replacing “auto
non-linear interaction terms has enabled us to discover a cost per mile”, the former being defined as the product
number of complex, but highly plausible interactions of the latter and the vehicle miles traveled by the
between household characteristics and car choices. household. This model again attained a lower log likeli-
A dummy variable was included for each auto classt hood than the model of Table 2, and the t-statistic for the
to capture the common effects, on all consumers, of coefficient of “auto cost per month” was only 1.25.
variables which are not included in the model. In parti- Finally to test whether the importance of auto cost per
cular, these variables capture the effects of the relative mile varies with both vehicle miles traveled and income,
prestige and comfort of the autos in each class. Since the model of Table 2 was estimated with “auto cost per
these variables cannot be measured, they cannot enter month divided by income” replacing “auto cost per
the model directly. mile”. This model also attained a lower log likelihood
than the model of Table 2, and the t-statistic for the
coefficient of “auto cost per month divided by income”
The “auto operating cost” variable
was only 0.18.
Autopurchase price was divided by income to allow
the importance of cost to vary with income, but auto
operating costs were not divided by income. The reason PRoutXMJwtTETnEiWnEL
we did not treat the two kinds of costs in a parallel Several problems limit the plausibility and
consequently the applicability of the model. First is the
problem of the restrictions implied by muhinomial logit
tA dummy variable was not included for auto class 1 since
doing so would produce an identihcationproblem. Not including
(MNL). The MNL model, expressed in eqn (11, assumes
the variable is equivalentto normalizingthe representativeutility that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any two
function such that the coefficientof this variable is zero. alternatives is independent of the availability or attri-
SThe correct specificationtest is to include both variables in a butes of other alternatives. This property is called the
more general model and test the hypothesisthat the coefficientof independence from irrelevant alternatives (IL% property
the “auto cost divided by income” variable is zero. This pro-
cedure was not possible, however, because the capacity of the and can be demonstrated as follows. Consider the ratio
computer was insufficientto allow estimation of the model of of the probability of a person choosing alternative i to
Table 2 with an extra variable added. that of choosing alternative k, given that set C of alter-
A disaggregatemodel of auto-typechoice 1

natives is available: for use with exogenously chosen samples (and was used
for estimating the model of Table 2) is not appropriate if
the sample was chosen on the basis of the household’s
chosen alternatives. They demonstrate two differences
between the maximum likelihood estimator which is ap-
propriate when the sample is choice-based and the
McFadden estimator. First, the estimated altemative-
This ratio is constant for any C which contains i and k specific constants are d&rent with the two estimators
(including, of course, the set containing only i and k) and (though all the other estimated parameters are the same).
any attributes of alternatives (except i and k) in C. Second, the estimated standard errors of all the
The model of Table 2 seems particularly likely to parameters are different with McFadden’s method than
violate the IIA assumption. For example, it seems with the method which is appropriate for choice-based
doubtful that the probability of choosing a class 9 auto samples.
over a class 3 auto remains tbe same whether or not the As a result of these findings, the estimated altemative-
possibility of owning a class 8 auto exists. If the prob- specific constants and the t-statistics in Table 2 should
ability is not constant, then the property of independence be viewed with caution. Unfortunately, a software rou-
from irrekvant alternatives does not hold and the MNL tine with the appropriate correction for choice-based
model is inappropriate. samples was not available at the time the model was
Two factors mitigate the severity of this probkm. estimated.
First, it has recently been found that if altemative- A last, and fundamental, problem with the model lies
speci6c constants are inchakd as explanatory variables in the fact that most of the auto attributes do not vary
when an MNL model is being estimated, then these over the population. That is, the weight, size, horse-
constants partially “correct” for violations of the IIA power, number of seats, and so on, of a particular auto
property. That is, if a MNL model is estimated in an type is the same for all households in all parts of the
application in which the IL4 property does not hold, then country.? Because of this, auto attributes cannot enter
the estimated values of the alternative-specific constants directly into a model which has alternative-specific
are automatically adjusted partklly to correct for this constants for each alternative (since the attributes are
probkm. (See Train (1977) for a full discussion.) Since collinear with the constants). The only way an auto
the model of Tabk 2 was estimated with an alternative- attribute which does not vary over the population can
apecifkconauuuforeacbautockss,theprobkmofIIA enter the model is by interact& with some charac&atic
is kss severe than it would be if ascb con&ants were not of the household (which do vary over the population, of
idJdCd. course) and/or by removing one or more of the alter-
Tbc second reason to d&count the probkm of the IIA native-specific constants. Both of these approaches have
property is baaed on empirical testing. McFadden d al. drawbacks.
(1976) developed methods for testing the IIA property of Fiit consider the approach of removing one of the
MNL models. These tests were applied to the model of constants. Say that auto weight is included as an
Table 2, and in all cases the model passed. That is, the explanatory variable and that the constant for auto class
hypothesis that the IIA property holds was not rejected 10 is removed to allow the weight variable to enter. The
with any of the tests, indi&ng that perhaps the IIA estimated coefficient of the weight variable would be
property does not present a problem in this application. exactly equal to the constant which had previously been
(The details of these tests are available from the estimated for class 10 autos divided by the difference
authors.) However, it must be mentioned that the power between the weight of class 10 and class 1 autos (since
of these tests seems to be low. Consequently, it is quite the constant for class 1 autos is normalized to zero). All
possible that violations of the IIA property exist in this of the constants for the other auto classes would be
application but were not detected by the tests. adjusted such that the sum of the new constant and the
Another problem with the model concerns the method weight term would equal the previously-estimated
by which the model was estimated. As mentioned above, constant. All the other estimated parameters would
a stratified sampling procedure was used to obtain the remain the same with this change in model
households upon which the model was estimated. The specification.
stratitication was based on auto size so as to obtain an Two points are important with regard to this approach.
equal number of households who had purchased small, Fit, the coefficient to the weight variable can be cal-
medium and large cars. As a result, households were culated without actually entering it. Second, the
selected on the basis of their chosen auto, rather than on coefficient of the weight variable would be different
the basis of some variable which is exogenous to the depending on which alternative-specilic constant is
decision process being modeled. removed.
Manski and Lerman (1976) show that the estimation This discussion shows that entering an auto attribute
method given in McFadden (1973), which was developed by removing one constant tells us nothing about the
value of that attribute to consumers. It is simply a
Wtial cost varies because of differencesin taxes and destina- different, but equivalent, method for entering an aher-
tion charges. Operatingcost varies because of diierences in the native-specific constant.
price of gasoline. If two or more alternative-specific constants are
a C. A. LAVE and K. TRAIN

removed and one attribute is entered, it is possible that The basic question is simply: how much can be learned
the estimated coefficient of this variable contains about the effect of changes in auto characteristics from a
meaningful information. The more constants that are sample in which such attributes do not vary? No simple,
removed when one attribute is entered, the more in- definitive answer to that question is available at the
formation might be contained in the estimated moment; and hence the estimated coefficients must be
coefficient. However, two problems occur in this regard. used with some degree of caution.
Fast, as mentioned above, the alternative-specific
constants are useful in correcting for violations of the
IIA property. If they are removed (and an equal number WPLICATIONSOFTBEMOWL.

of attributes are ‘not entered), then violations of the IIA We have begun the lengthy process of exploring
property could cause important problems for the model. alternative policy scenarios with the aid of the model,
Second, the auto type choice model contains only nine and have two preliminary results: the effects of an in-
alternative-specific constants (the tenth is normalized to crease in gasoline taxes, and the effects of an excise tax
zero). Consequently, even if ah the constants were on larger cars. Utilizing the model of Table 2, we cal-
removed, few auto attributes could be entered with culate each household’s individual probabilities of buying
meaningful results. t a new car in each of the ten car classes. When these
Because of the drawbacks involved with adding auto probabilities are summed across ah households in the
attributes by eliminating alternative-specific constants, sample we obtain the lirst column of Table 4, the initial
the approach was adopted of interacting the attributes market shares of new car types.
with the socioeconomic characteristics of the household. To calculate the effects of a change in gasoline prices
This approach allows the auto attributes to enter the we make a 10% increase in the variable “auto operating
model without eiiminating the constants, but it has other cost per mile” for each separate household, and sum
drawbacks. The variation which occurs in an explanatory across households. These results are shown in the
variable, that is defhted as an interaction of an auto second column. The strong gainers are the subcompacts,
attribute with a socioeconomic variable, is entirely due to classes 1 and 3; and the biggest losers are the inter-
variation in the socioeconomic variable. Consequently, it mediate and large cars, classes 7-10. The market share of
is questionable whether the estimated coefficient of such compacts, classes 5 and 6, remains about the same, in
an explanatory variable contains any information about apparent terms. But what is happening is that the in-
the effect of the atrribute on the choice of the decision- crease in gasoline prices is shifting the entire profile of
maker, rather than the effect of the decision-maker’s car choices downward. That is, the results are compati-
tastes as captured by his socioeconomic characteristics. ble with the notion that the tax causes people to move
down one or two classes, rather than making a major
shift: some luxury car buyersshift down to class 9; some
tMNL models have been estimated that include several attri- intermediate buyers shift down to class 6; the net down-
butes of the akcmatives which do not vary over the popuhtion; shift from the compacts is balanced by the net down-
destination choice models in urbantravel demandanalysis are an
shift into the compacts; and more people are piling up at
example. However, these models describe choice situations for
which there are numerous dternnti~~~ (and dtcmati~~-~p~cifk the bottom end, in the smahest cars.
constants are not included). For the model of auto type choice, The results of a 10% excise tax on intermediate, large
there are only ten alternatives. and luxury cars is shown in Column 3. The excise tax has

Table4. Marketshare sensitivities of new cars


Market Share Market Share
After 10% After 10% Excise
Market Share Gas Tax Tax on Class 7-10
Class (X) (%I Purchase Price

1 11.1 14.2 11.1

2 3.1 4.7 4.8

3 15.3 18.2 15.9

4 5.2 5.6 5.6

5 19.4 19.2 20.2

6 11.1 10.6 11.2

7 19.0 15.5 16.3

8 3.1 2.3 2.7

9 9.2 7.3 9.0

10 3.3 2.1 3.2

Note: Quota sampling was used to generate equal samples of


classes l-3/4-6/7-10.
A disaggregatemodelof auto-type choice 9

the smallest effect on the shares of luxury cars, and


expensive-large cars; presumably because peopk who Ayrcs R., mtt R., Dussec D., Humpstone C. and Landen I.
(1976) Automobile F~nc~rtbtg Modds. Prepared by Inter-
buy such cars have little sensitivity to purchase price in
nationalResearchand Technology Corporation for the Oflice of
the first place. The greatest change is in the sale of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Workmg Paper IRT-
intermediate cars, with most of the “defectors” moving 4461.
to class 2 sports cars, which seems plausible. Chaa~berhin C. (1974) A Pnliminary Modd of Auto Choice by
The gasoline tax increase has much broader effects Class of Car: Aggregate State Dola. Unpublisheddiiussion
paper. Transpo~tion Systems Center, U.S. Dqartment of
across classes. But neither the excise tax change, nor the Transportation.
gasoline tax change, causes large changes in market Chase Econometric Associates (1974) The E&t of Tax and
shares; and this is consistent with the observed change in Regulatory Akmatiocs on Car Safes and Gasoline Consump-
market shares over the past four yeari. Much large-t tion. NTIS Rep. No. PB-234622.
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc. (1975) Gasoline
taxes than these will be necessary to cause substantial
Conrumpfion Modd. Unpublished report of EEAI, Arlington,
movements. Virginia, done for the Federal Energy Administration.
It must be pointed out that our mode1 is for the new Di6glio C. and Kulash D. (1976)Matiering and Mobility. Report
car market only, and obviously there will be some feed- of a panel of the Interagency Task Force on Motor Vehicle
back effects with the used car market. For example a Goals beyond MO; available through the Otlicc of the
!kcretary of Transportation. Publishing Section, T-3.1,
sign&cant excise tax on new large cars can be expected Washington, D.C.
to increase the likelihood that consumers will decide to Kulash D. (1975) Forecasting long run automobile demand. In
keep their existing large cars for a longer period of time. St~legies for Redwing Gasoline Consumption thnwgh Im-
And any general increase in new car prices is going to prowi Motor Vrhiclc E&iency. Transportation Research
Board Special Report 169,14-19.
operate to somewhat reduce the total sales of new cars.
Manski C. and Lorman S. (1976). The estimation of choice
The total effects of the two kinds of taxes will also be probabiitics from choice-based samples. Econometrica 4S(8)
somewhat Metent if we consider both the new and used (1971).
car markets simuhaneously. We would expect that the McFadden D. (1973) Conditional logit analysis of qualitative
gas tax increase will operate to push people into smaller choice behavior. In Frontiers in Econometrics (Edited by P.
Zarcmbka). Academic Press, New York.
cars, in both markets. While the down-shift effects of an McFadden D.. Tve W. and Train K. 11976).IXammstic tests for
excise tax on large new cars will tend to be offset by the the indoper&& from irrelevant aitcn&vcs~property of the
decision of existing large car owners to keep their cars multinomial logit model. Working Paper 7616. Urban Travel
for a longer period of time. Thus the gasoline tax ap Dunend Forecasting Project, Institute of Transporwion Stu-
paoach would appear to have much broader effects. dies, University of C&for& Berkeky.
Train K. (1977) Auto Owntrship and Mode Ckoice WI-~&
Houscho&. sbpn paper No. SL7703, Chap. 2, Depwtment of
Ackwm4~enrs-we wish to eckwwkdgc the tinwcii Economica, Univa-sity of Californ& Berkeley.
SopporI of the U.S. &partment of Energy; and the ideas, Train K. (1mS) Consumers’ reponsc to fuel &Gent vehicles:
enco\lrs%ewnt and assiamncc of Philip Patterson. The basic critical lituaturc rcvkw. Unpublished manuscript.
survey -&ate were provided through the gcneroaity of 1. K. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (1977).An Analy-
Pollard of the Transuortation Research Center/DOT, and Anton sis of the Automobile Marka: hioddbtg the Long Run L&w-
lnorton of mur Ij. Little, Inc. Data on destination charges minonts of fhc Lknand for Automobiles. 3v. Prepwed for U.S.
were provided by the various auto companies. Dept. of Transportation,TransportationSystems Center.

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