But if in the perception of corporeal phenomena external stimuli strike and impinge on the instruments

of the senses and corporeal passivity precedes mental activity – a passivity which stimulates mental
activity and calls up the dormant forms in the mind – if, I say in perceiving corporeal phenomena the
mind is not passively affected, but judges of its own power the experience subjected to the body,
consider the case of beings which in their mode of perception are free from all corporeal influence. They
can rouse their mind to activity without having to react to external stimuli in order to perceive things.

 They explained that universals could be considered as concepts (universals post rem

—‘following the thing’), as intrinsic to bodily things (universals in re—‘in the thing’) and as
really existing and separate from bodies (universals ante rem—‘before the thing’). In most
of his work, Boethius follows this way of thinking about universals (cf. Cross 2012). But here
he takes a different approach, turning to a train of thought (1906, 161:14 ff.) which goes
back in part to Porphyry himself and, through him, to the great Aristotelian, Alexander of
Aphrodisias.

Is this a plausible solution to the problem of Divine foreknowledge and freewill is it one that you feel
inclined to accept intellectually or does it involve us in accepting claims that are even more dubious than
the denial of human freedom on which the problem itself implicates.

Why do we need to seek our origin to find out our happiness

Because understanding our origin will eventually help us to know our purpose and nature, thereby
fulfilling what we really need. Thus, in the fulfillment will attain happiness. Unless we know our purpose
we would never stop working. As St. Augustine said our hearts will be restless until it rest in you.

The Consolation of Philosophy Summary

Boethius may have written his book, The Consolation of Philosophy, from prison in the year 524 AD, but
the issues he addresses are every bit as relevant to modern life as they were to life in the 6th century. A
philosopher, statesman, and theologian, Boethius was imprisoned by Germanic King Theoderick on
trumped up charges. In his Consolation, Boethius creates a dialogue between his imprisoned self and
Lady Philosophy to examine the true nature of happiness.
Philosophy initially finds Boethius despondent because of his changed circumstances. A respected
scholar and politician, he has lost everthing: his wealth, his position, his friends and even all contact with
his family. He is bemoaning his fate and the false charges that have put him in prison.

Lady Philosophy diagnoses his illness: he has forgotten who he truly is and exactly what is his nature and
purpose. She reminds him that the world was not created by chance but by a divine creator. She then
turns her attention to human happiness. Fortune she asserts, cannot bring true happiness because the
things fortune brings are transient: wealth, power,and honor.

She reminds Boethius that although he is not with his family they are still alive.

She then goes on to examine the ways in which people seek happiness and shows that when humans
have those things they tend to become slaves to them for fear of losing them. She further asserts that
bad fortune is actually good because it frees one from bondage to transient, earthly things. All people
are seeking happiness, Philosophy asserts, but most of them are seeking in the wrong places.

She then equates happiness with the good and further asserts since God the creator is the Supreme
Good, all people are actually seeking him even if they do not know it.

Boethius counters with the questions: how then can there be evil in the world with if it has a Good and
Perfect creator? Philosophy says that evil is really nothing because it has no power over good, because
all men seek good and those who are evil cannot achieve that which they seek. Every action she says,
requires will and power. Those men who seek good but do not achieve it thus have no power. Boethius
still questions this because he is unable to understand why it often seems that the evil prosper and the
good suffer. This is a one of the most difficult problems a philosopher will face, Lady Philosophy admits.
She then explains that what we see as fate, God sees as Providence. We cannot always understand what
God intends but his intentions are always good for the correction of evil and the reward of good.

However, this only brings Boethius to another question: If God knows all things and his Providence
guides all actions, then how can man possibly have free will? Philosophy explains this by showing that
just because God knows what will happen does not mean he wills what will happen. She says that man
cannot put our own limitations on God. He is outside of time so all times look the same to him and his
view is different: he sees a never changing present.

Thus, Lady Philosophy provides consolation to Boethius for his situation. God foreknew it and it is part of
his providential plan. Boethius happiness can be based in his virtue and in his knowledge of truth rather
than in the ups and downs of circumstances. And indeed, good did come out of Boethius' imprisonment
even though he never left his prison save to escape to death, he left us this book to help us learn to rise
above our circumstances and never to let our circumstances controll us. Boethius may have phisically
died in prison but in addition to a place in paradise, he gained immortality through his message which is
still providing consolation to readers today.
THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia
individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical
questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests
the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the Trinity and
the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered
problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the
scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in
St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical
problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It
is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of
the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A.
BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N
estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for
having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the
footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin
quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature
and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and
accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another
be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi
possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes
nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit."
A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances , describes nature
as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens."
Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est
unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is
most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes.
Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus
excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is
between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate
and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into
irrational and rational . Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals),
with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature
(the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by
virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate
beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius:
Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction
of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an
individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: "
naturae rationalis individua substantia ." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature,
namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance
(the fourth meaning of chapter 1) . The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as
a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not
only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the...