Blockchain Adoption among Multi-Stakeholders

under Government Subsidy: From the Technology

Diffusion Perspective
Shishu Ding 1; Hao Hu 2; Lei Dai 3; and Wen Wang 4
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Abstract: Despite the well-documented benefits and encouraging policy environment for blockchain technology (BT), its extensive
adoption in the construction industry is still unsolved. The interorganizational diffusion of BT is not explored in existing studies, requiring
a comprehensive investigation for better government policymaking. Thus, from the technology diffusion perspective, this paper proposes an
evolutionary game-based system dynamics (EG-SD) model to describe the complicated relationships between government and construction
enterprises in the process of BT adoption. Through theoretical analysis, the main stakeholders, influencing factors, and diffusion channels in
the process of BT adoption are identified. Further, a simulation collecting data from China’s construction industry is conducted to evaluate the
diffusion performance under different scenarios. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a quantitative perspective for
understanding BT adoption behaviors among construction enterprises and revealing the diffusion mechanism of BT from a multilevel
perspective. Also, this paper for the first time combines evolutionary game theory with system dynamics into explaining BT adoption,
providing practical implications to both government and construction enterprises on policymaking and promoting BT adoption practices.
DOI: 10.1061/JCEMD4.COENG-12637. © 2023 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Blockchain technology (BT); Technology diffusion; Government subsidy; Evolutionary game (EG) theory; System
dynamics (SD).

Introduction and Literature Review
With the increasing pressure from the decline in labor and resources,
the last decades witnessed a great transformation in the construc-
tion industry from labor-intensive to digital and automatic (Dou
et al. 2020). Blockchain technology (BT), as an emerging technol-
ogy holding the promise of transparent, traceable, and reliable in-
formation management (Yoon and Pishdad-Bozorgi 2022), has
been viewed as an important booster for this global transformation.
In the last few years, BT has been widely implemented in various
fields of construction management such as information integration
(Yang et al. 2020), quality management (Lee et al. 2021), and gov-
ernmental supervision (Lu et al. 2021). The decentralized nature of
BT prevents issues such as information asymmetry, falsification,
and tampering, making it a desirable method to mitigate risks
1
Ph.D. Candidate, School of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Civil
Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai 201100, People’s Repub-
lic of China. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6328-423X. Email:
dss514324152@sjtu.edu.cn
2 encouraging policy environment, the adoption process of BT in the
Professor, School of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Civil Engineering,
Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai 201100, People’s Republic of China
(corresponding author). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1103-0243.
Email: hhu@sjtu.edu.cn
3 holders. Given the characteristics of BT, its adoption is a techno-
Associate Professor, School of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Civil
Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai 201100, People’s Repub-
lic of China. Email: dailei1989@sjtu.edu.cn
4
Ph.D. Candidate, School of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Civil
Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai 201100, People’s Repub-
lic of China. Email: wangwen2018@sjtu.edu.cn
Note. This manuscript was submitted on April 29, 2022; approved on
September 8, 2022; published online on February 16, 2023. Discussion
period open until July 16, 2023; separate discussions must be submitted
for individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9364.
and uncertainty in construction management (Xu et al. 2022). It
has been regarded as a breakthrough innovation which reforms mu-
tual trust among different participants in the construction industry.
Consequently, considering the disruptive benefits of BT, coun-
tries worldwide have proposed specific programs to embrace its
adoption. In 2016, the UK took the lead in issuing the white paper
“Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Blockchain,” raising the
research and development of BT into the national strategic level
(GOS 2016). The Industry and Technology Minister in Turkey
issued “Turkey’s 2023 Industry and Technology Strategy,” target-
ing the year 2023 by when a national platform will be established to
apply BT into the public administration and infrastructure manage-
ment (ITMMV 2019). In 2021, the State Council of China issued
the “National Standardization Development Outline” which clearly
proposes to strengthen the research on standards of BT, applying it
to improve quality governance (SCPRC 2021). Since then, local
governments in China have launched numerous incentive policies
and set up relevant supporting funds for promoting BT adoption.
However, despite the well-documented benefits of BT and the
construction industry is much slower than expected. In general,
incorporating BT into the construction industry is a lasting process
through which BT is adopted and developed among various stake-
logy diffusion phenomenon, which is defined as “the process by
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels
over time among the members of a social system”(Rogers 1983).
Technology diffusion has been a hot research topic in many fields
such as diffusion of green technology (Tian et al. 2014) and manu-
facturing mode (Wang et al. 2020a). In the construction industry,
diffusion of information technologies such as building information
modeling (BIM) (Yuan and Yang 2020) and computer aided design
(Kale and Ardit 2005) has also gained much attention.

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 To comprehend BT diffusion, it is important to investigate how
the innovation (BT) is adopted and developed through what chan-
nels among which members. Existing studies have investigated BT
diffusion to some extent, mainly focusing on the identification of
influencing factors such as opportunities, challenges, barriers, and
drivers (Clohessy and Acton 2019; Teisserenc and Sepasgozar
2021; Wang et al. 2019). However, in those studies, BT diffusion
was explained from a static and qualitative perspective, ignoring the
changing and dynamic nature of technology diffusion. In practice,
BT, as an emerging innovation, is mainly adopted among construc-
tion firms through the motivation of the economic benefits brought
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by BT implementation, including reduction in costs, additional
profits, and government subsidy (Cao et al. 2015). Among those
benefits, government subsidy plays the dominant role since the
additional profits brought by BT implementation are relatively low in
the early stage of development. Under this circumstance, qualitative
descriptions of BT diffusion in existing studies without real-world
data support failed to provide practical guidelines on policymaking.
Many prior studies have applied game theory in investigating
the technology diffusion phenomenon across different fields
(Cheng et al. 2020; Jia et al. 2021; Yuan and Yang 2020). These
studies have provided the groundwork for quantitative analysis of
BT diffusion while they mainly considered the interactions between
limited participants. Literature indicates that BT diffusion is a
complex process, involving multiple stakeholders such as local
governments, project owners, general contractors, and subcontrac-
tors, whose decisions would be pivotal in influencing technology
adoption (Yuan and Yang 2020). This paper argues that it is impor-
tant to take more stakeholders into consideration when analyzing
BT diffusion to provide more practical implications on policy-
making. Meanwhile, literature reveals that besides government
subsidy, market competition is also an important factor affecting
technology adoption significantly (Zhu and Weyant 2003) which
existing studies ignored. Those research gaps result in the ineffi-
ciency of incentive policies provided by the governments, which
will further limit the BT adoption in the construction industry.
Regarding these insufficiencies, this paper aims to investigate
how is BT diffused among various stakeholders in the construction
industry under government subsidy. The primary objective of this
paper is to describe the complicated relationships of BT adoption
among multiple stakeholders to deepen their understandings of how
to enhance BT adoption. Specifically, this paper proposes an
EG-SD model to identify the relevant factors influencing stake-
holders’ decisions on BT adoption, and quantitatively analyze
how different stakeholders’ decisions influence with each other.
This research contributes to the body of knowledge by providing
a quantitative perspective for understanding BT adoption behaviors
among construction enterprises and revealing the diffusion mecha-
nism of BT from a multilevel perspective. Also, through the quan-
titative analysis, this paper will provide practical implications to both
government and construction enterprises on how to promote BT
adoption in a more efficient way.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: The next
section reviewed the current works of BT diffusion in the construc-
tion industry. Further, an analyzing model was proposed to describe
the diffusion process comprehensively, followed by a numerical
simulation of diffusion performance under different scenarios.
Based on simulation results, both theoretical and practical implica-
tions were concluded. Finally, conclusions, limitations, and future
research were discussed.
In recent years, upon practical needs, increasing studies have
been conducted on BT adoption and diffusion. For instance, Wang
et al. (2017) investigated the technical, business-related, and
human-related challenges of BT adoption in the construction
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016
industry. Khan et al. (2021) identified ten critical factors influen-
cing BT adoption through a systematic literature survey. Kar and
Navin (2021) reviewed both academic literature and industrial prac-
tices to understand the actual levels of BT adoption. Vu et al. (2021)
conducted a literature review to identify the drivers, barriers, and
implementation stages of BT. In those studies, BT diffusion was
mainly discussed based on qualitative descriptions. While in
practice, despite these claimed factors, the main motivation for
enterprises adopting emerging technologies is the visible economic
benefits from government subsidies, cost savings, and additional
profits (Cao et al. 2015).
To author’s knowledge, there has been no research quantita-
tively studying the BT diffusion from the economic perspective
which may be owing to the short time of BT development and
adoption in the construction industry. Nevertheless, many prior
studies have explored the technology diffusion phenomenon across
different fields. Owing to cooperative and competitive characteris-
tics of technology diffusion phenomenon, game theory has been
widely applied to find a balance of interests between different par-
ties (Eissa et al. 2021). In recent years, more and more studies have
applied game theory into technology diffusion field with the rapid
development of simulation methods (Yuan and Yang 2020). Espe-
cially, evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been widely used.
Compared with classical statistic game theories, it takes the limited
rationality of organizations into consideration and helps to explain
behavioral relations between those parties in a more practical and
realistic way (Lv et al. 2021). By combing game theory and
dynamic evolution process analysis, it has been proven to be more
suitable for investigating long-term dynamic game processes
(Cheng et al. 2020). By proposing a tripartite game model using
prospect theory and EGT, Jia et al. (2021) discussed the diffusion
of BIM among various stakeholders in public-private-partnership
(PPP) projects. Liu (2020) constructed an evolutionary game model
to explore diffusion of BIM between government and developers in
the construction industry. A numerical simulation was conducted to
analyze the decision-making development under different scenar-
ios. Zhang et al. (2019) studied how the low-carbon policies pro-
mote diffusion of related technologies among alliance-based firms
in China based on EGT and complex networks. All those studies
have proven the effectiveness of EGT for exploring technology dif-
fusion across multiple industries.
Those aforementioned studies have provided the theoretical
foundations for investigating BT diffusion in construction industry
while they mainly focus on interactions between limited parties,
generally government and general contractors. The literature indi-
cates that BT diffusion is a complex process, involving multiple
stakeholders such as local governments, project owners, general
contractors, and subcontractors, whose decisions would be pivotal
in influencing technology adoption (Yuan and Yang 2020). Mean-
while, the literature reveals that besides government subsidy, mar-
ket competition is also an important factor affecting technology
adoption significantly (Zhu and Weyant 2003). Thus, not only sub-
sidizing & subsidized relations between government and contrac-
tors should be considered, but also cooperative & competitive
relations between different contractors. However, the latter has
rarely been explored in extant studies. Meanwhile, the analysis
of BT diffusion based on EGT is relatively complicated, consisting
of multiple participants and evolution phases (Guo et al. 2018).
System dynamics (SD), as a structural modelling technique capable
of understanding, simulating, and analyzing complex systems
(Peña-Mora et al. 2008), has proven to be effective in performing
stable analysis and identifying equilibrium solutions in simulating
the evolutionary game process (Liu et al. 2015). For instance, Tian
et al. (2014) applied SD to simulate the evolutionary game model of
04023016-2 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 green supply chain diffusion in the Chinese manufacturing industry
under government subsidy.
To sum up, despite the importance of BT diffusion, it has rarely
been studied in extant studies owing to the complexity of interor-
ganizational relationships and difficulty in data collection. This
paper’s literature study showed that limited studies have identified
influencing factors of BT diffusion while no study quantitatively
explains the dynamic interactions among stakeholders. When
reviewing the literature on technology diffusion, it was discovered
that most studies centered on the contacts between government and
general contractors but ignored the inter-organizational interactions
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among different contractors, failing to provide comprehensive
implications on BT diffusion and policy-making. The macrome-
chanism and microfeatures of the interorganizational diffusion of
BT are not clearly revealed, requiring further exploration.
Therefore, this study combines EGT with SD and constructs a
comprehensive model to analyze the complicated relationships
between government and construction enterprises. The proposed
EG-SD model illustrates the holistic evolution process from the
external to the internal, revealing both macromechanism and micro-
characteristics among various stakeholders.
Development of the EG-SD Model
Analytical Framework
To better understand this study, the structure of the proposed model
is presented in Fig. 1. In short, this study analyzed BT diffusion
under different scenarios among local government (LG), general
contractor enterprises (GCEs), and subcontractor enterprises (SEs).
Through modeling, simulating, and discussing, both practical and
theoretical implications were concluded.
First, multiple scenarios for analyzing BT diffusion were iden-
tified. In general, subsidy from the government has been indicated
as a critical factor for promoting technology adoption in the con-
struction industry (Eadie et al. 2013). Static subsidies, on the other
hand, have been criticized for their low promotion efficiency and
Scenarios Evolutionary Game-based System Dynamics Model
LG
Limited rationality & Invariable population
Static subsidy
Hypothesis
Dynamic subsidy
GCEs GCEs
(Develop BT)
Adoption degree
Reward Subsidy
Revenue sharing
Penalty
Cost-sharing
Penalty for default
SEs (Apply BT)
Fig. 1. Structure of the evolutionary game-based system dynamics model.
© ASCE
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016
excessive financial burdens for local governments. Recently, some
studies have claimed that dynamic subsidy may balance the diffu-
sion performance and fiscal expenditure (Ji et al. 2019). However, it
requires exploration in other fields for further validation. Thus, in
this paper, scenarios of LG aimed to investigate the efficiency of
static and dynamic subsidies on diffusion performance to analyze
which is preferable. Also, within the project perspective, methods
of supply chain collaboration such as revenue-sharing (Zhang and
Ma 2020) cost-sharing (Wang et al. 2020a), and penalty for default
(Zhang and Ma 2020) have attracted much attention in existing
studies of technology diffusion. Specifically, scenarios of GCE
aim to discuss the effects of those collaborative measures on dif-
fusion performance.
Then, the EG-SD model was proposed. In the EG part, some
important hypotheses were made according to characteristics of
EGT, technology diffusion in construction industry, and BT imple-
mentation. The EG model aimed to illustrate the interorganizational
interactions from the economic perspective. Also, it served as the
input of the simulation in the SD model. Further, the SD model was
constructed to reveal the diffusion mechanism comprehensively.
The complicated relationship among tripartite stakeholders was
revealed, including evolution between different groups in GCEs and
SEs; competition and cooperation between GCEs and SEs, and
subsidy from LG toward GCEs. Meanwhile, relevant factors influ-
encing BT diffusion and their causal relations were also identified.
Some factors have positive effects on BT diffusion while others
have negative. Finally, based on inputs from the EG model and data
collected from literature and industry references, a numerical sim-
ulation was conducted. Diffusion performance under each scenario
was evaluated by conducting a sensitivity analysis regarding impor-
tant variables. Based on the discussion of simulation results, both
practical implications on policymaking and theoretical implications
on technology diffusion were concluded.
Evolutionary Game Model
To comprehend the model for better analysis, some assumptions are
made as follows:
Implications
Main stakeholders
Practical
Subsidy
Individual interest maximization
policymaking
Payoff-based conditional probability
Collaborative
Dynamic changing rate
measures
Compete
GCEs
Evolve (Not Develop) Theoretical
Diffusion mechanism
Government Compete of BT
Prototype model of
Compete
SEs (Not Apply) BT diffusion
Evolve
04023016-3 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Assumption 1: In this model, the LG, GCEs, and SEs are Macrodiffusion Module
selected as the main stakeholders in the construction industry.
In this module, the diffusion mechanism of BT among GCEs is
SEs refer to all other participants such as manufacturer and
modeled, with two level variables (GD and GN), one rate variable
supervisor.
(DR1 ), and other variables included. Those links represent the
Assumption 2: In this model, the total number of GCEs and SEs
causal associations between variables where links with + mean that
are assumed to be invariable. Within every time period, each GCE
the increase of variable A (end of the arrow) will lead to the in-
or SE will stick to a certain strategy. In the condition of market com-
crease of variable B (head of the arrow) while − mean the decrease
petition, they are assumed to seek maximization of their interests.
of B. Further, the implementation of BT is a lasting process and
Assumption 3: Adoption of BT, as a market activity, is to maxi-
GCEs take different time owing to the difference in scale, resource,
mize its economic benefits. Thus, the behaviors of the GCEs and
and culture. Thus, in this model, the implementation time is
SEs are determined by their payoffs (Chen et al. 2017). Suppose
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assumed to be a normally distributed variable. Based on some prac-

that each GCE or SE randomly samples an agent from the corre-
tical policies launched in China, the maximization of implementa-
sponding population with equal probability, observes the respec-
tion time is set to be 2 years, and average to be 1 year. The main
tive strategy, and compares its payoff with the sampled one.
equations are presented as follows:
In the condition of market competition, they are assumed to seek
maximization of their interests. The average expected payoff (U) of DR1 ¼ GT × TR1 ð4Þ
GCEs for choosing the “develop” strategy is U GAD , and U GAN for
“not develop”. Further adjustment parameters are supplemented to TR1 ¼ DELAY FIXED
introduce randomness: U GD ¼ U GAD þ εGD and U GN ¼ U GAN þ
εGN , and εGD , εGN are normally distributed random variables. ðBR1 ; RANDOM NORMAL ð0; 2; 1; 0.1; 0Þ; BR1 Þ ð5Þ
Similarly, the average expected payoffs of SEs for choosing
“apply” and “not apply” strategies can be obtained as: U SA ¼ BR1 ¼ xð1 − xÞ½∅ðU GD − U GN Þ − ∅ðU GN − U GD Þ ð6Þ
U SAA þ εSA and U SN ¼ U SAN þ εSN respectively, and εSA , εSN
are normally distributed random variables. If an i-enterprise sam- GDt ¼ GDt−1 þ DR1 ð7Þ
ples a j-enterprise, then the i-enterprise will possibly switch to
GN t ¼ GN t−1 − DR1 ð8Þ
j-enterprise’s strategy if the observed payoff difference is positive
(Tian et al. 2014). The conditional probability of GCEs deciding to where DR1 = the promoting rate of BT in the population of GCEs;
switch from strategy i to j is ∅ðU Gi − U Gj Þ calculated as GT = the total number of GCEs; TR1 = the dynamic changing rate
8 after implementation time; BR1 = the basic changing rate of prob-
< U Gj − U Gi ; if U − U ≤ 0
>
ability of GCEs for choosing develop strategy; GDt = the number
Gi Gj
∅ðUGi − UGj Þ ¼ U Gi ði; j ¼ D; NÞ of GCEs choosing the develop strategy after time period t; and
>
:0 ifU Gi − U Gj ≥ 0 GN t = the number of GCEs choosing the not develop strategy after
time period t.
ð1Þ

Assumption 4: Assuming the probability of GCEs to choose the Microdiffusion Module

“develop” strategy is x, and 1 − x for choosing “not develop.”
Similarly, the probability of SEs to choose “apply” strategy is y,
and 1 − y for “not apply”; and x and y are the functions of time t.
The basic dynamic changing rate of x and y be expressed as
replicator dynamics equations (Weibull and Press 1997):
ẋ ¼ xð1 − xÞ½∅ðU GN − U GD Þ − ∅ðU GD − U GN Þ
ẏ ¼ yð1 − yÞ½∅ðU SN − U SA Þ − ∅ðU SA − U SN Þ
Assumption 5: Owing to the distributed nature of BT, its adop-
tion requires fully cooperation from all participants involved.
Thus, GCEs choosing the develop strategy are cooperating with
SEs choosing apply while GCEs choosing not develop strategy
can only cooperate with SEs choosing not apply.
Assumption 6: Unlike the diffusion of other ICTs such as BIM,
Barcode, and radio frequency identification (RFID) which have
direct and visible effects in improving management performance,
the main benefits brough by BT implemented come from the
reinforcement of mutual trust among various stakeholders (Qian
and Papadonikolaki 2021). Thus, the additional profits brought
by BT in initial stage are low and increase quickly with BT diffu-
sion, and finally slow down till the limitation.
System Dynamics Model
The SD model describes the evolutionary path of BT diffusion with
four modules: Macrodiffusion module, Microdiffusion module,
GCEs’ payoff module, and SEs’ payoff module.
Compared with macro module, micro diffusion module illustrates
the diffusion of BT among SEs from the project level. Implemen-
tation time is set to be 1 year (maximization), 0.5 years (average),
while others are similar with those in the macrodiffusion module. It
shares a similar structure with the macrodiffusion module because
ð2Þ different stakeholders make decisions in the process of BT diffu-
sion in a similar way, based on the principle of interest maximiza-
ð3Þ tion. The main difference lies in the diffusion rate which is
fundamentally determined by the SEs’ payoff module
DR2 ¼ ST × TR2 ð9Þ
TR2 ¼ DELAY FIXED
ðBR2 ; RANDOM NORMALð0; 1; 0.5; 0.1; 0Þ; BR2 Þ ð10Þ
BR2 ¼ yð1 − yÞ½∅ðU SA − U SN Þ − ∅ðU SN − U SA Þ ð11Þ
SAt ¼ SAt−1 þ DR2 ð12Þ
SN t ¼ SN t−1 − DR2 ð13Þ
where DR2 = the diffusion rate of blockchain in the population of
SEs; ST = the total number of SEs; TR2 = the dynamic changing
rate after implementation time; BR2 = the basic changing rate of
probability of SEs for choosing the apply strategy; SAt = the
number of SEs choosing the apply strategy after time period t; and
SN t = the number of SEs choosing the not apply strategy after time
period t.

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 Payoff Module of GCEs
In this module, the average expected payoff of GCEs choosing the
develop strategy U GAD and not develop strategy U GAN are estab-
lished. Payoffs of GCEs consist of two parts: the basic part and the
BT part. Basic part refers to the basic profit of GCEs without BT
adoption. BT part refers to the additional benefits and costs in-
curred by BT implementation. In general, initial investment cost,
which may include procurement cost and training cost, decreases
gradually with time passing and technology development (Yuan
and Yang 2020). Conversely, given the information storage char-
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acteristics of BT, operation cost increases gradually with time.
Additional profits brought by BT embody in enhancement in mutual
trust among various stakeholders. It contains two main parts:
(1) improvements in supply chain management efficiency. Owing
to the automated characteristics of BT, labor cost, inventory cost,
quality cost and delivery cost can be decreased significantly (Wang
et al. 2020b); and (2) reduction in projects disputes. Owing to trans-
parent and traceable characteristics of BT, each procedure in con-
struction projects can be traced by each participant at any time.
Under this circumstance, costs for dispute resolution can be
reduced since BT provides a trustworthy platform (Li et al. 2018)
SN
U GAN ¼ ðB − BS Þ ð14Þ
GN
SA
U GAD ¼ ½B − BS þ ð1 − αÞPB − ð1 − βÞC þS ð15Þ
GD
t
C ¼ C0 e−qt þ C1 eq ð16Þ
P1 þ P2
PB ¼ ð17Þ
1 þ e−qt
U GN ¼ U GAN þ εGN ; U GD ¼ U GAD þ εGD ð18Þ
εGN ; εGD ¼ RANDOM NORMALð−100,100; 0; 50; 0Þ ð19Þ
where B = the total profit of project without BT implementation;
BS = the basic profit for SEs without BT implementation; PB =
the additional profit with implementation of BT, P1 = the
Fig. 2. BT diffusion modules of GCEs and SEs.
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016
improvements in supply chain management efficiency, P1 for
the reduction in potential risks; α; β = the coefficient of profit-
sharing and cost sharing between GCEs and SEs; C = the total cost
of BT adoption, C0 = initial investment cost, and C1 = operation
cost; and q = the degree of BT implementation.
Payoff Module of SEs
In this module, the average expected payoffs of SEs choosing apply
U SAA and not apply strategy U SAN are constructed. Similarly, SEs
choosing not apply can only obtain basic profit from project while
SEs choosing apply share additional costs and benefits with GCEs
GN
U SAN ¼ BS  ð20Þ
SN
GD
U SAA ¼ ðBS þ αPB − βCÞ ð21Þ
SA
U SN ¼ U SAN þ εSN ; U SA ¼ U SAA þ εSA ð22Þ
εSA ; εSN ¼ RANDOM NORMALð−25; 25; 0; 10; 0Þ ð23Þ
Based on the previous analysis, the system dynamics model of
BT diffusion among tripartite organizations is established and pre-
sented in Fig. 2, with 4 level variables, 2 rate variable, 8 constant
variables, and 16 auxiliary variables.
Simulation Results and Discussions
The proposed EG-SD model is customarily designed for the BT
diffusion in the construction industry. In this section, a numerical
simulation collecting data from the China’s construction industry
was conducted. Since precast construction has been trending up
rapidly in China owing to its technical, economic, and environmental
advantages, incentive policies for promoting adoption of advanced
technologies are highly related with the precast construction mode.
Thus, this paper collected data from the China’s precast construction
market for further simulation. It is important to note, the simulation
results in this paper are supposed to be applicable for analysis of
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Table 1. Initial values of the simulation performance and reduction in risks. Wang et al. (2020b) con-
Variables Type Value Unit ducted a comprehensive simulation for analyzing the improve-
ments of BT implementation in construction management such
GD Level 35 1
as reduction in operation times and lead times. Further by collect-
SA Level 70 1
GT Constant 100 1
ing data from industry practices, the economic benefits of BT
ST Constant 330 1 implementation were quantified. Results in the study indicate
PB Constant 1.2 Million RMB that BT can decrease supply chain cost by 38%. The second part
S Constant 1 Million RMB of additional profits brought by BT lies in the reduction in dis-
B Constant 1 Million RMB putes in construction projects. Gebken and Gibson (2006) col-
BS Constant 3 Million RMB lected practical data from 46 construction projects to quantify
C0 Constant 0.7 Million RMB the costs for disputes resolution in the construction industry. Re-
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C1 Constant 0.2 Million RMB sults in the study indicate that costs for disputes take 1.75% of the
total benefits. Combining the simulation results of existing stud-
ies with interviews with the related staff in Shanghai Jiangong
construction company, this paper assumes the additional profits
BT diffusion in the construction industry, not limited for precast
of BT account for 40% of the total profit of project. The rest of the
construction.
values were collected based on the interviews also. The initial
The initial values in this model were set up based on the situa-
values of the simulation are shown in Table 1. Working with
tion of technology diffusion in Shanghai’s AEC sector, with some
those values, the initial simulation results of BT diffusion among
specific modifications. In the model, the degree of BT adoption
GCEs are presented in Fig. 3 (q ¼ 1). It shows that GD (the num-
among multiple stakeholders was simplified as a variable owing
ber of GCEs choosing the develop strategy) increases gradually,
to its immeasurability. The subsidy for GCEs with BT implementa-
and after approximately 30 years of diffusion, all GCEs will
tion was set up according to “Policies for Promoting the Upgrading
adopt BT eventually. Meanwhile, the diffusion performance of
and Development of Blockchain Industry” issued by Shanghai,
different strategies is evaluated from both time and cost perspec-
China. According to statics published by the Ministry of Housing
tives. From the time perspective, diffusion performance is evalu-
and Urban-Rural Development of the People’s Republic of
ated by the time it takes when the adoption of BT in the
China, there were 9834 GCEs qualified for First Grade in China,
construction industry reaches the mature state. From the cost per-
with 7061 in architectural engineering construction. For Shang-
spective, diffusion performance is evaluated by the total amount
hai, there were 152 GCEs, with approximately 104 in architec-
of subsidies provided by the local government when the adoption
tural engineering construction. For the sake of perspicuity in
of BT reaches the mature state. Specifically, some criteria are se-
evaluation, there were assumed to be 100 GCEs and 330 SEs
lected in this paper, shown as follows:
in Shanghai, and respectively 35 and 70 of them have already
applied BT in their operations. It represented the initial values T 80 ∶diffusion time when 80% of totoal GCEs choose to
of xðtÞ and yðtÞ respectively. As for the additional profits of
BT, as aforementioned, it contains two parts: improvements in develop BT ð24Þ

Fig. 3. Simulation of BT diffusion under different implementation degrees.

© ASCE 04023016-6 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016

 Z T 80
S80 ¼ St  ðGDtþ1 − GDt Þdt ð25Þ
o
In this model, it was assumed that the diffusion of BT has tended
to mature when 80% of total GCEs choose to adopt BT. The
remained part was believed to be caused by inherent resistance to
new technologies in construction industry and perceived lack of
suitability of BT for all construction project management (Reza
et al. 2018). Specifically, diffusion performance of some strategies
was evaluated by the T 80 criterion. The lower value of T 80 , the more
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Natl Inst. Of Cons. Mgmt & Rsrch (nicmar) on 04/09/23. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
efficient the strategy is. For those subsidy-related strategies, an-
other criterion S80 , the total amount of subsidies till T 80 , was also
used for evaluation. The lower value of S80 , the more efficient the
strategy is.
Simulation under Different Scenarios
Impacts of Implementation Degree on BT Diffusion
Performance
In this situation, the degree of BT implementation (q) was changed
from 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% to simulate its effects on
diffusion performance. The curves of GD with time are shown
in Fig. 3. In the initial scenario with q of 100%, it takes approx-
imately 11 years to achieve mature diffusion in market and more
than 30 years to fully diffused (fully diffusion is only for theoretical
reference, not represents practical situations in reality). At imple-
mentation degrees of 20% and 40%, the number of GD will sta-
bilize at 38 and 64 respectively after long-term diffusion process,
failing to reach maturity. At degree of 60% and 80%, market matu-
rity is achieved eventually while T 80 are much higher than that in
the initial scenario. According to the simulation results, degree
of BT implementation which represents the level of cooperation
among various stakeholders, positively influences the diffusion
Zoom in
Fig. 4. Simulation of BT diffusion under different subsidy strategies.
© ASCE
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016
performance. These results are convergent with technical character-
istics of blockchain: decentralization. In blockchain networks,
all participants are bookkeepers, participating collaboratively to
improve network security and efficiency.
Impacts of Static and Dynamic Subsidy on BT
Diffusion Performance
In static scenario, government subsidy will not change with time.
The curves of the number of GD are shown in Fig. 4. It clearly
shows that the increase of subsidy amount will accelerate the
diffusion process, which is convergent with previous experience.
In dynamic scenario, the subsidy from government varies with
the development and implementation of blockchain, presented as:
S ¼ ð1 − xÞS0 e−qt ð26Þ
In the simulation, three pairs of comparisons between static
and dynamic subsidy strategies were selected and compared:
(1) S ¼ 100 versus S ¼ ð1 − xÞ300e−qt ; (2) S ¼ 150 versus
S ¼ ð1 − xÞ400e−qt ; and (3) S ¼ 200 versus S ¼ ð1 − xÞ
500e−qt . The curves of GD under different subsidy strategies were
shown in Fig. 4. Apparently, all dynamic subsidy strategies have
advantages over corresponding static strategies on diffusion time.
Further, Fig. 5 illustrates the cumulative amount of subsidy with
time under those strategies visually. Compared with static subsidy,
expenditure under dynamic scenarios increase rapidly in initial
stage but stabilize at a relatively lower level. Thus, it can be con-
cluded dynamic subsidy is more appealing from the whole life
cycle perspective of technology diffusion. Meanwhile, to evaluate
the diffusion performance quantitatively, the exact data of evalu-
ation criteria are collected and summarized in Table 2. Comparing
the three sets of simulation, it can be observed that the time to reach
market maturity (T 80 ) under the dynamic subsidy has been short-
ened by 1.80%, 2.17%, and 0.95% respectively. Meanwhile, S80 of
04023016-7 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Natl Inst. Of Cons. Mgmt & Rsrch (nicmar) on 04/09/23. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

Fig. 5. Total subsidy amount under different subsidy strategies.

Table 2. Diffusion performance under different subsidy strategies In this simulation, the penalty was increased from 0 to 200 with
T s80− T d80 Ss80 − Sd80 the step of 20. The number of GD with time are presented in Fig. 6.
T d80 Sd80
However, T 80 has never changed under different scenarios. It seems
Subsidy T 80 S80
that penalty-settings have no influence on BT diffusion, inconsis-
100 11.31 — 4,795.3 — tent with previous studies.
ð1 − xÞ300e−t 11.11 1.80% 4,442.8 7.93%
150 10.35 — 6,750.7 —
ð1 − xÞ400e−t 10.13 2.17% 6,688.0 0.94% Impacts of Revenue Sharing Strategies on BT
200 9.56 — 8,996.6 — Diffusion Performance
ð1 − xÞ500e−t 9.47 0.95% 8,462.9 6.31%
In this simulation, the coefficient of revenue-sharing (α) between
GCEs and SEs was increased from 0% to 100% with the step of
10% to evaluate its influences. The curves of GD with time are
dynamic subsidy strategies in each group are also less by respec-
shown in Fig. 7. It can be found T 80 decreased remarkably with
tively 7.93%, 0.94%, 6.31%. In other words, it takes less time and
increase in α but rebounded slightly in the end. Similarly, exact
less financial expenditure for government to promote BT adoption
data of evaluation criteria were collected and summarized in
under dynamic subsidy.
Table 3. When α is less than 70%, increase in α will shorten T 80
prominently, from 11.31 to 8.54 years. It proves the positive effects
Impacts of Penalty-Settings on BT Diffusion on BT diffusion. But to mention, the marginal increase in diffusion
Performance performance brought by α is also decreasing, which means diffu-
sion performance increases slower and slower with continuous
In practice, some safeguards are always taken to secure the effec- increase in α. When exceeding more than 70%, an increase in α
tiveness of government subsidies. Besides deterrence from admin- will cause longer time for market mature. It is natural to conclude
istrative measures, the penalty for breach of contract is always that there exists an optimum proportion of revenue-sharing between
recognized as an effective method. In following simulation, effects GCEs and SEs for BT diffusion, between 60% to 80%. However, in
of penalty-setting for GCEs were evaluated. GD obtain direct sub- practice, it is difficult to distribute such additional profits from
sidy from government while a penalty will be imposed if breaching GCEs to SEs to achieve the optimum diffusion of BT.
the contract (switching to the Not develop strategy). In this model,
penalty-setting is directly associated with payoffs of GCEs, influ-
encing the conditional probability function of switching from Impacts of Cost-Sharing Strategies on BT Diffusion
strategy j to i. The equations are represented in the followings: Performance
8
< U GN − U GD − PG ; if U − U − P ≥ 0 In practice, cost-sharing has been viewed as an effective collabo-
∅ðU GD − U GN Þ ¼ U GD GN GD G rative measure to bind the interests of different organizations up to
: foster common goals among upstream and downstream enterprises
0 if U GN − U GD − PG ≤ 0
in the construction supply chains. In following simulation, the
ð27Þ effects of cost-sharing strategies on diffusion performance were

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J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016

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Fig. 6. Simulation of BT diffusion under different penalty-setting strategies.

Zoom in

Fig. 7. Simulation of BT diffusion under different profit-sharing strategies.

analyzed. The coefficient of cost-sharing between GCEs and SEs cost-sharing strategies hinder BT diffusion process. Compared with
(β) was increased from 0 to 0.5 with the step of 5% and the curves profit-sharing strategy, conversely, the marginal decrease in diffusion
of GD under each scenario were shown in Fig. 8. It can be found performance brought by β is increasing. In other words, diffusion
that T 80 increased continuously with increase in β, which indicates performance decreases much faster with continuous increase in β.

© ASCE 04023016-9 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016

 Table 3. Diffusion performance under different profit-sharing strategies incentive policies to balance financial burdens and promotion
a T 80 Margin (%) performance.
3. Sharing of additional profits brought by BT adoption between
0 11.3 0
GCEs and SEs promotes the diffusion performance while sharing
0.1 10.25 9.4
0.2 9.6 6.3
of implementation and operation costs hinders it. Meanwhile,
0.3 9.17 4.5 strategy of penalty will also not contribute to the BT diffusion.
0.4 8.88 3.2 However, there remained a question: Why did cost-sharing and
0.5 8.69 2.1 penalty-setting strategies fail to contribute to BT diffusion? Driven
0.6 8.58 1.3 by this doubt, we further investigated into the payoffs of GCEs
0.7 8.54 0.5 and SEs and the reasons behind them were revealed. This is owing
0.8 8.57 −0.4 to the higher capacity of cost-bearing of GCEs compared with
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0.9 8.64 −0.8
1 8.78 −1.6
Discussion
Based on the simulation results of the proposed model, some
important conclusions regarding better diffusion of BT can be
obtained as the follows:
1. Degree of BT implementation affects its diffusion performance
significantly. The higher degree of BT implementation, which
also means higher level of cooperation among stakeholders,
could bring more additional profits, and accelerate the diffusion
process prominently. This finding is also consistent with the
technical characteristics of blockchain: decentralization, which
requires fully coordination among participants.
2. Dynamic subsidies are proved to be more effective in promot-
ing BT adoption and implementation than static subsidies.
Static subsidies can be replaced with dynamic ones which
provide higher subsidies when the potential benefits of BT
implementation are not appealing and decrease gradually
with the influx of adopters. This finding will provide practical
suggestions for local governments as they issue relevant
SEs. Compared with GCEs which obtained direct subsidy from
government, SEs were more vulnerable to costs incurred by BT
adoption. Any increase in costs will decrease SEs’ enthusiasm for
adopting BT. As for the invalidity of penalty-settings strategies,
since the payoffs of GCEs choosing develop strategies were higher
that of GCEs choosing not develop from the beginning of the
simulation to the end, it is not rational for GCEs breaching the
contract of subsidy. Thus, the conditional probability functions of
GCEs were not influenced. Consequently, it failed to promote BT
diffusion eventually.
Implications
Theoretical Implications
Based on the previous theoretical and numerical simulation analy-
sis, this study provides theoretical implications to further research
in the technology diffusion field from three aspects.
First, based on the combination of evolutionary game theory and
system dynamics, this study has revealed the main stakeholders
(LG, GCEs, SEs), the diffusion channels (industry-level diffusion
channel: diffusion within GCEs’ population; and project-level
diffusion channel: diffusion within SEs’ population), the related

Fig. 8. Simulation of BT diffusion under different cost-sharing strategies.

© ASCE 04023016-10 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016

 influencing factors (additional profits, investment costs, gov-
ernment subsidy, profit-sharing coefficient, and cost-sharing coef-
ficient), and the interorganizational interactions among main
stakeholders (evolution within GCEs’ and SEs’ population; com-
petition and cooperation between GCEs and SEs choosing different
strategies; and subsidizing and subsidized relations between LG
and GCEs) of BT diffusion. Such findings contribute to a new
perspective for understanding BT diffusion process, serving as
theoretical foundations for further research into the comprehensive
diffusion mechanism.
Second, findings in this paper further validate the feasibility of
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dynamic government subsidy in promoting technology diffusion
performance. On one hand, the conclusion echoes earlier studies
emphasizing the government’s significant role in promoting emerg-
ing technology adoption and implementation (Reza et al. 2018;
Yuan and Yang 2020) and the efficiency of dynamic subsidy in
balancing diffusion performance and financial burdens of local
governments (Tian et al. 2014). On the other hand, this paper pro-
poses a representation of dynamic government subsidy which
varies with time and technology implementation. Further investi-
gation into policy-making efficiency could be achieved based on
modifications of this representation. Meanwhile, this study pro-
posed some criteria for efficiency evaluation of government sub-
sidy (e.g., T 80 ; S80 ). More complicated cost-effectiveness analysis
of government subsidy can be conducted by referring to the pro-
posed criteria and simulation results.
Finally, the stakeholder identification, parameter and variable
settings; simulation scenarios, data collection, and the analytical
process in this paper could provide references for research of tech-
nology diffusion in other countries whose situations are similar
to China.
Practical Implications
Meanwhile, analysis and findings in this study have significant
implications for both local government and construction enterprises
in industry practices.
For government, the simulation results prove that dynamic
government subsidies are more effective in promoting BT diffusion
than static subsidies. The findings are very inspiring for the local
governments since it indicates the current paradigm of uniform sub-
sidy policy for construction firms is not optimal from both time and
monetary perspectives. Conversely, dynamic subsidy policy varies
with time and technology development is more appealing. In prac-
tice, government should provide high fiscal subsidy to appeal
GCEs for BT adoption in the initial stage, owing to the resistance
caused by technology barriers and difficulty in development. With
the rapid development of BT, technical and economic thresholds for
new enterprises adopting BT decrease. Consequently, government
may adjust its subsidy policy since more GCEs will adopt BT even
less subsidies provided. When the market maturity is achieving,
GCEs will adopt and implement BT spontaneously driven by com-
petition from market. To conclude, the government is suggested to
design appropriate policies according to BT diffusion characteris-
tics to balance the effectiveness of incentive policies and techno-
logy promotion needs, and develop pilot projects to examine the
efficiency of different dynamic subsidies (linear, polynomial, or
exponential).
The industry-level diffusion of BT mainly relies on government
subsidy, while the project-level diffusion requires efforts from gen-
eral contractors. Thus, authors highly suggest local government
to attach more deterrent clauses for diffusion performance when
subsidizing construction enterprises, shifting part of pressure to
them. Also, findings from this study may help local government
© ASCE 04023016-11
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2023, 149(5): 04023016
issue guidelines for better BT diffusion to those subsidized
enterprises.
For construction enterprises, the simulation results also show
that the supply chain collaboration measures significantly influence
BT technology diffusion. The profit-sharing strategy successfully
binds the interests of GCEs with SEs to form a common goal in
the BT diffusion process. Therefore, it is recommended that an ap-
propriate division of additional profits between GCEs and SEs,
generally not the optimum in practice, is needed to promote the
diffusion performance. While how to balance the interests of differ-
ent organizations in the technology promotion process requires
further investigation. GCEs are also suggested to adjust the profit-
sharing strategies dynamically to balance their profits and the social
responsibility of technology promotion. Another noteworthy impli-
cation is that the degree of technology implementation plays an
important role in promoting BT adoption. In real practice, the
degree of implementation (q) would depend on various factors such
as the information compatibility and interchangeability (Wang et al.
2020b), price volatility (Hamledari and Fischer 2021), organiza-
tional culture (Kar and Navin 2021; Khan et al. 2021), and stake-
holders’ involvement (Khan et al. 2021). Thus, construction firms
are suggested to conduct explorative projects for blockchain
research, development, and maintenance collaboratively to improve
their BT adoption efficiency.
Conclusions
Owing to the revolutionary reform of mutual trust brought by
blockchain technology, its diffusion mechanism, as a new-developing
stream of research though, has attracted considerable attention from
both practitioners and scholars worldwide. The primary objective
of this paper was to explore the complicated relationships of BT
diffusion among multiple stakeholders to deepen their understand-
ings of how to enhance BT adoption. Through an in-depth inves-
tigation, some theoretical and practical contributions of this study
can be concluded as follows:
1. This study for the first time introduces the evolutionary game
theory and system dynamics into explaining the BT diffusion
in the construction industry and further proposes an EG-SD
model to identify and analyze the influencing factors, related
stakeholders, spread channels, and interorganizational interac-
tions in BT diffusion processes. It provides theoretical founda-
tions for further investigation into BT adoption;
2. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a
quantitative perspective for understanding BT adoption behav-
iors among construction enterprises and revealing the diffusion
mechanism of BT from a multilevel perspective; and
3. This study simulated the diffusion performance of BT under dif-
ferent strategies through data collection in China’s construction
industry. Based on simulation results, some important implica-
tions are drawn to provide practical help to governments for bet-
ter policymaking and construction firms to promote BT adoption
in practice. Also, this model can be modified and further applied
in construction industries of countries similar to China.
Nevertheless, there are also some limitations in this study. For
instance, the stakeholder network in this model is relatively sim-
plified. Consideration of the upstream and downstream enterprises
in a construction supply chain has not been involved. In practice,
there are additional stakeholders who play important roles in the
diffusion of BT, such as banks, insurance companies, and other
financial institutions. Another limitation is the simplification of
preference and unique characteristics of different subcontractors
toward BT implementation. Different subcontractors hold different
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 views toward adoption of advanced ICTs. Thus, in the future, a
more complicated model will be needed to explore the path of
BT diffusion more comprehensively, considering more stakehol-
ders and their various preferences.
Data Availability Statement
Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this
study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable
request.
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