COMPILED PALE CASES For LECTURE On 05-27-23

ALFREDO LAGAMON v JUDGE RUSTICO PADERANGA
A.M. No. 08-2123
JULY 14, 2008
FACTS:
Administrative complaint against Judge Paderanga of RTC Mambajao, Camiguin relative

to rape case “People v. Alfredo Simene” for failure to terminate its trial within 60 days from
initial trial and for failure to decide the same within 30 days from the time it was submitted for
decision.
In a letter-complaint, complainant Lagamon alleged that accused was arraigned on June

3, 2003, but the trial commenced more than 6 months thereafter. The case was submitted for
decision 2 years and 43 days from the date the trial commenced, and that the decision was
promulgated 346 days after it had been submitted for decision.
In the respondent’s comment, he contended that complainant was neither the accused
nor the private complainant, hence he has no legal personality to file the administrative
complaint and maintained that the complaint partakes of a harassment suit as the criminal case
had already been tried, decided and brought to a higher court on appeal.
He admitted not having complied with the periods for the resolution of cases, but he
pleaded for the Court’s understanding for his court is the only RTC in Camiguin Province and has
a total caseload of 266 cases, and that he has no Clerk of Court and has only 3 stenographers one
of whom was seriously injured in motorcycle accident and the stenographer assigned for the
case is not computer literate and relies heavily on typewriters. The PAO of the Camiguin District
which handled the defense in the said criminal case had only 1 lawyer during the trial of the
case and appears only on Mondays or Fridays depending on her availability.
OCA: Found respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Paderanga is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
HELD:
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases filed before lower
courts must be decided within three (3) months from the time they are submitted for decision.
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, likewise
enjoins judges to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness". However, it has also been consistently
stressed that whenever circumstances arise that render judges incapable of seasonably acting
on and deciding a case, all that a judge should do is to request the Court, with justification, for an
extension of time to resolve or decide the pending matter. The Court would almost always grant
said request, aware as it is of the caseload of judges and mindful of the numerous difficulties
which a judge may encounter in the timely disposition of cases.
In this case, the Court notes the fact that respondent may have had difficulty in meeting
the deadline prescribed for deciding the Criminal Case on account of the reasons he submitted,
still, he has been remiss in not requesting for an extension of time to decide the said case. His
failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions. It bears stressing that judges must dispose of the court's business promptly. Delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute.
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Undue delay in rendering a
decision or order constitutes a less serious charge under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and a finding of guilt results in either suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Then again, in view of the fact that the Criminal Case
has already been decided, albeit belatedly, which fact shows an effort on the part of respondent
judge to attend to his duties with zeal, the Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the
OCA to impose a nominal fine of P2,000.00.
MONICA PONTIANO v ATTY. FABIAN GAPPI

A.C. No. 13118
JUNE 28, 2022
FACTS:
Administrative case filed against Atty. Fabian Gappi of gross negligence, gross
inefficiency in the performance of his duties and dishonesty. Complainants are clients of
respondent Atty. Gappi in an illegal dismissal case and is alleged that he failed to attend a single
scheduled hearing of the said case. Before the deadline of the submission of their position paper,
complainants went to respondent’s office to inquire the status of their position paper, however,
respondent merely told them , “Ako na ang bahala.”
Respondent did not submit any position paper. Thus, complainants went to respondent’s
office again and asked him to withdraw as counsel for them. He then prepared a document to
formally withdraw as counsel and handed the same for the signature of the complainants. Upon
reading the document, they found out that it did not speak of respondent’s withdrawal as their
counsel but rather their withdrawal of the illegal dismissal complaint. Hence, they did not sign
the document.
The failure of the respondent to file a position paper resulted to the dismissal of the
illegal dismissal complaint of the petitioners.
Respondent failed to file an answer on the administrative case as required by IBP-CBD

who then issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference ordering complainants and respondent to
appear before the commission, but both failed to appear. Hence, a resetting was ordered.
Only complainants attended while respondent did not. Thus, in an Order of even date,
the IBP-CBD required them to file their respective verified position papers within 15 days of
receipt of the said order.
Complainants filed their Position paper while respondent did not.
IBP-CBD: Found respondent guilty of violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and

recommended his suspension of 2 years from the practice of law.
IBP-BOG: Adopted the findings and recommendations of IBP-CBD with modifications increasing
the period of suspension to 3 years and added a fine for failure to attend the mandatory
conference.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is negligent in the performance of his duties.
RULING:
YES.
The foregoing facts, to no controversy, speak of respondent's gross negligence and gross
inefficiency in the performance of his duty as counsel of complainants, as well as of his
propensity to disobey lawful processes of the LA. The facts also testify to respondent's
dishonesty in his dealings with complainants. We, therefore, agree with the findings of the IBP-
CBD, as approved by the IBP-BOG, that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for
violation of Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, Canon 11, and Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR.
Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession's exacting standards. A lawyer is
expected to live by the lawyer's oath, the rules of the profession and the [CPR]. The duties of a
lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the
public, to the bar and to his client. A lawyer who
transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the Court's disciplinary
authority.
Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal
diligence to the cause of the client.
By failing to attend the scheduled hearing of his clients, respondent failed to employ his
best efforts in the protection of his clients' interests. Due to respondent's lack of diligence in the
performance of his duties as legal counsel, his clients gravely suffered and resulted to the
dismissal of their case.
A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the

latter's interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law,
the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but
also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due
preparation, is expected from a lawyer.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.
[ A.C. No. 11959, April 28, 2021 ]

EUSEBIO D. SISON, PETITIONER, VS.
ATTY. LOURDES PHILINA B. DUMLAO, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Sometime in July 2013, Dr. Eusebio D. Sison (Dr. Sison) consulted Atty. Dumlao, his friend,
for the purpose of filing an annulment case against his wife, Dr. Cynthia V. Cervantes-Sison (Dr.
Cervantes-Sison). He deposited P35,000.00 in Atty. Dumlao's bank account for the psychiatric
evaluation fee.
Dr. Sison alleged that after nine months, Atty. Dumlao failed to give any updates on the filing of the
case. Since Dr. Sison already lost interest in filing the case, he instead wrote a demand letter to Atty.
Dumlao for the return of the deposited P35,000.00. When Atty. Dumlao refused, Dr. Sison then filed a
verified Complaint charging Atty. Dumlao with violation of Canons 7, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath.
In her Answer,Atty. Dumlao alleged that she had referred Dr. Sison to Mr. Nhorly Domenden (Mr.
Domenden), a psychologist to whom the P35,000.00 was paid on July 29, 2013. Dr. Sison was able to
meet and consult with him, and a Psychological Evaluation Report9 was later emailed to him on
November 2013.
Atty. Dumlao alleged that Dr. Cervantes-Sison was her fifth-degree relative by consanguinity and that
Dr. Cervantes-Sison's mother, Celedonia V. Cervantes, approached her and asked her not to handle
the case because it would offend the family. This prompted her to decline Dr. Sison's case due to
conflict of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics when she failed to inform
complainant of the status of his case and refused to represent him due to conflict of interest.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics when she failed to inform
It is settled that "[n]o lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his [or her] client[,]” subject to the exceptions provided for Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between
the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal
advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare - and had actually prepared - at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
The Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense
of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
While respondent may later refuse to represent complainant, as in this case when she was requested
by complainant's mother-in-law to refrain from interfering in complainant's domestic issues, it was still
incumbent upon respondent to inform complainant that she would no longer be able to represent him.
Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
When complainant asked respondent for an update on his case on February 26, 2014, respondent did
not inform him that she would no longer be connected with the case due to conflict of interest, even
though she was approached by complainant's mother-in-law sometime before November 2013.It was
only when she filed her Answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that complainant learned
of the reason why respondent would not be representing him.
Respondent's sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his
obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost
attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exerts his best efforts and all his
learning and ability in defense of his client's cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor
to the bar and help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession.
The Investigating Commissioner was correct in finding that respondent did not profit from
complainant, since Mr. Domenden confirmed his receipt of P35,000.00 for the psychological
evaluation fee. This circumstance, however, will not excuse respondent from administrative liability for
violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as her
oath to render "all good fidelity" to her client. As in a similar case, she must be made liable for her
inexcusable negligence.
Therefore, respondent Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)

Facts:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-

in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave
misconduct.
Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land located
in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission. Atty. Ricafort
succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the
proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action for a sum of money before the RTC,
Quezon City.
The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as principal
obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.
An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required
docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.
Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that only a partial
satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In payment for the
latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but was dishonored because the account against which they
were drawn was closed.
Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
MTC, Quezon City.
In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in
favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by
Soledad, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City,
from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had
he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.
The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the favorable action
on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled
Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal
motions for extension of time to submit the comment “smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is
unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.”
The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him. It
recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant” and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to
the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
Held:
YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he
miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good
the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued
defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to
uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even had the
temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his three motions for
extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the
comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution
declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high
degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders.
Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility stating that:
Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.
The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay Soledad
P13,800.
Adelita R Llunar vs Atty Romulo Ricafort

AC No. 6484 - June 16 2015
The Facts:
In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo Ricafort for the recovery of a parcel
of land owned by the Banez family but which was fraudulently registered to a different name. The
lot was the subject of foreclosure proceedings, hence, Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of
P95,000.00 (partial redemption fee, as filing fees, and attorneys fees). Three years later, complainant
learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case with the RTC of Legazpi City, hence, she demanded
the return of P95,000.00. The latter averred that there was a complaint for annulment of title filed
against Ard Cervantes, though not him, but by another lawyer. Thus, he was willing to refund the
amount less the P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria. Adelita refused to recognize the case filed
by Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire him as counsel; also, the complaint was filed three years
late and the property cannot be redeemed from the bank anymore. She also learned that Atty.
Ricafort was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law since 2002 in A.C. No. 5054, thus she
suspected it was the reason why another lawyer filed the case.
The Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable.
The Ruling:
The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in
the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate
penalty of DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct.
First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant’s case. He failed to act
promptly in redeeming the complainant’s property within the period of redemption. What is worse is
the delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The
respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant’s case and wasted precious time and opportunity
that were then readily available to recover the complainant’s property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that “a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.”
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the
complainant for handling the latter’s case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received
from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of
redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard
Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up on the
case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case
had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in
court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was
left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount
has been made. These facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which
mandates every lawyer to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession”1 and to “account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.”2 In addition, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use
to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.3
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he
was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this
fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states
that “a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.” The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he
accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension
imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above
facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been
justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession’s ethical rules; he is a
repeat violator of these rules.
NEW GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
In fine, for the guidance of the Bench, the Bar, and the public, the new clemency guidelines for
reinstatement to the Bar are as follows:
1. A lawyer who has been disbarred cannot file a petition for judicial clemency within a period of five
(5) years from the effective date of his or her disbarment, unless for the most compelling reasons
based on extraordinary circumstances, a shorter period is warranted.
For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution, the Court may dispense with the five (5)-
year minimum requirement and instead, in the interest of fairness, proceed with a preliminary
evaluation of the petition in order to determine its prima facie merit.
2. Upon the lapse of the said five (5)-year period, or earlier if so permitted by the Court, a disbarred
lawyer becomes eligible to file a verified petition for judicial clemency.
The petition, together with its supporting evidence appended thereto, must show on its face that the
following criteria have been met:
(a) The petitioner has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders,
including orders for restitution, as well as the five (5)-year period to file, unless he or she seeks an
earlier filing for the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances;
(b) The petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which he or
she was disbarred. For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution, it is required that the
petitioner show that he or she genuinely attempted in good faith to reconcile with the wronged
private offended party in the case for which he or she was disbarred (if any), or if such is not
possible, the petitioner must explain with sufficient reasons as to why such attempt at reconciliation
could not be made; and
(c) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred lawyer was disciplined, the disbarred lawyer
has the requisite integrity and competence to practice law.
3. Upon the filing of the verified petition for clemency, together with its attachments, the Court shall
first conduct a preliminary evaluation and determine if the same has prima facie merit based on the
criteria above-stated.
4. If the petition has prima facie merit based on the above-criteria, the Court shall refer the petition
to the OBC (or any other fact-finding body the Court so designates) in order to verify the details and
the authenticity of the statements made and the evidence attached to the clemency petition.
If the petition fails to show any prima facie merit, it should be denied.
5. After its investigation, the OBC (or such other fact-finding body designated by the Court) shall
submit its fact-finding report to the Court, which shall ultimately resolve the clemency petition based
on the facts established in the said report. The threshold of evidence to be applied is clear and
convincing evidence since it is incumbent upon the petitioner to hurdle the seriousness of his or her
established past administrative liability/ies, the gravity of which had warranted the supreme penalty
of disbarment.
6. Unless otherwise resolved by the Court sitting En Banc, these guidelines and procedure shall apply
to pending petitions for judicial clemency, as well as to those filed after the promulgation of this
Resolution.
OLD GUIDELINES FOR CLEMENCY

It was in the 2007 case of Re: Diaz that the Court first framed the operative guidelines for judicial
clemency, albeit under the context of a clemency petition filed by a disrobed judge. In the said case,
the Court, "[i]n the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and all personnel thereof, [laid] down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency:"37
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.38
SISON V. ATTY. DUMLAO
[ A.C. No. 11959, April 28, 2021 ]
EUSEBIO D. SISON, PETITIONER, VS.
ATTY. LOURDES PHILINA B. DUMLAO, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Sometime in July 2013, Dr. Eusebio D. Sison (Dr. Sison) consulted Atty. Dumlao, his friend, for
the purpose of filing an annulment case against his wife, Dr. Cynthia V. Cervantes-Sison (Dr.
Cervantes-Sison). He deposited P35,000.00 in Atty. Dumlao's bank account for the psychiatric
evaluation fee.
Dumlao for the return of the deposited P35,000.00.3 When Atty. Dumlao refused, Dr. Sison then filed
a verified Complaint4 charging Atty. Dumlao with violation of Canons 7,5 17,6 and 187 of the Code of
In her Answer, Atty. Dumlao alleged that she had referred Dr. Sison to Mr. Nhorly Domenden (Mr.
meet and consult with him, and a Psychological Evaluation Report9 was later emailed to him on
November 2013.10
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics when she failed to inform
Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics when she failed to inform
It is settled that "[n]o lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his [or her] client[,]"24 subject to the exceptions25 provided for Canon 14 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between
the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal
advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare - and had actually prepared - at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
The Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense
of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing
be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
While respondent may later refuse to represent complainant, as in this case when she was requested
by complainant's mother-in-law to refrain from interfering in complainant's domestic issues, it was
still incumbent upon respondent to inform complainant that she would no longer be able to
represent him. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.i ৷
When complainant asked respondent for an update on his case on February 26, 2014,33 respondent
did not inform him that she would no longer be connected with the case due to conflict of interest,
even though she was approached by complainant's mother-in-law sometime before November
2013.It was only when she filed her Answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that
complainant learned of the reason why respondent would not be representing him.
Respondent's sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his
obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost
attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exerts his best efforts and all his
learning and ability in defense of his client's cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession.38
The Investigating Commissioner was correct in finding that respondent did not profit from
complainant, since Mr. Domenden confirmed his receipt of P35,000.00 for the psychological
evaluation fee.39 This circumstance, however, will not excuse respondent from administrative
liability for violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as her oath to render "all good fidelity"40 to her client. As in a similar case,41 she must be made
liable for her inexcusable negligence.
Therefore, respondent Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
ARNALDO R. BORRE V CFI JUDGE FELIX L.MOYA AND JUDGE GUMERSINFO ARCILLA
FACTS:
Complainant filed a verified complaint on November 27, 1977 charging Respondents with
serious misconduct and grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Moya’s Case
On September 8, 1977, Calvin R. Borre filed with the Court of First Instance of Tagum, Davao
del Norte, a complaint against Arnaldo, et al on voiding the Deed of Sale of a parcel of land executed
by Mrs. Prieto in favor of Arnaldo because the subject parcel of land was already sold to Calvin. On
the same day, the herein Respondent, without raffling the case, issued an order on the service of
summons, set a hearing on the preliminary injunction and issued a restraining order.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Circular No.7 of the Supreme Court dated September 23,1974
which prohibits an Executive Judge from acting on any incidental or interlocutory matter in any case
not yet assigned to any branch by raffle.
Ruling:
Yes, Respondent Judge Moya violated the said circular for taking cognizance on the case
without raffle. As provided in the Circular, in case of urgent matter, the interested party may request
the Executive in writing for a special raffle, if granted, a special raffle is conducted which should be
stenographically recorded.
“ The Executive Judge shall have no authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory matter
in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle.”
The defenses of the herein respondent were he assumed it was already raffled when it was
placed on his table and in order to avoid irreparable injury in ordering a status quo.
Judge Moya should have ascertained if the raffle was done. There was no stenographic
record on the raffle. Thus, he was censured for his failure to comply with the circular and required to
a fine equivalent to his compensation for 10 days.
JUDGE ARCILLA’S CASE
Facts:
Arnaldo alleged Judge Arcilla for notarizing the Deed of Sale excuted by Mrs. Prieto in favor
of Calvin R. Borre which was already sold to Arnaldo and of which prior sale Judge Arcilla was
cognizant. Legal and notarial fee in the amount of P 1400 was collected by Judge Arcilla. Allegedly,
Judge Arcilla wanted have a share in the water project of which Arnaldo has established on the
subject land. Judge Arcilla revealed that he was the legal adviser of his cousins Arnaldo and Calvin
which includes preparation and notarization of several documents for free of charge.
Issue: WON Judge Arcilla engaging in private business and acting as legal consultant are prejudicial to
the public interest?
Ruling: Yes, Judge Arcilla should devote his full time to the performance of his official duties.
Moreover, he was not empowered to act as notary ex officio. A notary ex officio should notarize only
documents connected with exercise of his official duties and the fees collected accrue to the
government funds. In the pursuit of private business, a written permission should be procured from
the court. Arnaldo executed an affidavit of desistance. The case became moot and academic. Judge
Arcilla died prior to the termination of this case.
GOVERNOR TALLADO ET AL VS HON. WINSTON RACOMA
A Verified Complaint filed by the complainant against Judge Racoma for Gross Ignorance of
the Law filed before the Office of the Court Administrator.
Facts:
In July 2015, an administrative charge against Punong Barangay Esturas and Brgy. Kagawad
Delos Santos filed before the Sanggunian Bayan of Capalong Camarines Norte. On July 30, 2015,
Mayor Jalgalado issued a Memorandum approving the 60 days preventive suspension of Punong
Barangay Esturas and Brgy. Kagawad Delos Santos. They appealed to the Sanggunian Panlalawigan
with attached complaint against Mayor Jalgaldo.
On July 28, 2016, Sanggunian Panlalawigan granted the appeal and order for the
reinstatement of Punong Barangay Esturas and Brgy. Kagawad Delos Santos. However, Mayor
Jalgadlo did not implement such decision for the reason that Gov. Tallado had no authority to
approve such because he was under preventive suspension.
On December 19, 2018, Gov. Tallado issued a Notice of Preventive Suspension to Mayor
Jalgaldo pursuant to the recommendation of Sanggunian Panlalawigan relative to the order of
reinstatement of Esturas and Delos Santos.
Aggrieved Mayor Jalgaldo filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before
Branch 41 under Presiding Judge Dating. It was granted but lifted the prohibition against further
proceedings in Administrative Case. Mayor Jalgaldo filed a motion for the suspension of investigation
in reference to the Local government Code that prohibits investigation of elective official 90 days
before the election which was denied. Thus, Mayor Jalgaldo was found guilty of grave abuse of
authority with imposition of 6 months suspension.
Aggrieved Mayor Jalgaldo filed a Petition which was raffled to Judge Racoma after Judge
Dating inhibited from the case. Gov. Tallado filed a Manifestation and praying for dismissal on the
ground that RTC has no jurisdiction.
Judge Racoma granted the petition of Mayor Jalgaldo on the ground that it will strip his
rights and obligations to carry out the duty of his office and serve his constituents and it fell under
the 90 days before the election. Consequently Gov. Tallado filed a administrative case against Judge
Racoma for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and Gross Misconduct.
Issue: WON Judge Racoma is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and Gross
Misconduct?
Ruling:
No. The court rejects the recommendation of the Judicial Integrity Board of finding Judge
Racoma guilty on Gross Ignorance of the Law on taking cognizance of the Petition because
accordingly it is the Court of Appeals has the jurisdiction thereof.
The Complainants failed to exhaust other judicial remedies under applicable rules. An
administrative complaint is not a proper complaint for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or
irregular where a judicial remedy is available. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively
liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous provided he acts in good faith.
The Complainants are directed to show cause why they not be cited for indirect contempt for
their act of filing a premature complaint against Judge Racoma intended to harass or vex the latter.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. The
power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings
and for the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts and for due
administration of justice.
The case is dismissed. A judge who discharges hir or her duties despite being beset with
external pressures, and who manages to fend off corrupt influences and remain true to his or her
oath, save only for occasional error in judgment, should be extended consideration and
commiseration, not condemnation.
[ A.C. No. 11304. June 28, 2022 ]
LEONARDO L. SARMIENTO AND RICHARD G. HALILI, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. GREGORIO

C. FERNANDO, JR., A.K.A. JERRY FERNANDO, RESPONDENT.
This case resolves the petition for disbarment filed by Leonardo Sarmiento and Richard Halili
against Atty. Gregorio C. Fernando, Jr.
FACTS:
Complainants are business associates engaged in buying, developing and selling real estate
and they came to know of respondent during a meet-up set up by one of their broker
friends.
During the meet-up, respondent proposed the sale to the complainants of a 374-square
meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 68952. In order to entice the complainants to push
through with such sale, respondent made the following representations:
1. He is the absolute owner of the subject land. This is true even though TCT No.
68952 was still in the name of his parents—the spouses Gregorio and Natividad
Fernando.
2. That his parents already conveyed the subject land to him by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) dated 14 April 2012. Only an SPA was executed to effect
the conveyance in order to avoid payment of taxes for the transfer from his
parents to him, and another payment of taxes from him to his buyer.
3. Both his parents are still alive, and their signatures in the SPA are genuine.
4. He is the sole heir of his parents. Hence, no other person will make a claim of
ownership over the subject land that is contrary to his.
Persuaded by these representations, the complainants agreed to purchase the subject land.
Hence, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between the respondent, as the supposed
attorney-in-fact of his parents Gregorio and Natividad Fernando, on one hand, and Sylvia
Sarmiento (Sylvia), the wife of complainant Leonardo Sarmiento, on the other. Anent
thereto, TCT No. 68952 in the name of the spouses Gregorio and Natividad Fernando was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 010-2013000507 in the name of Sylvia.
However, a complaint seeking the nullification of the SPA, Deed of Sale and TCT No. 010-
2013000507 was brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City against
Sylvia, complainant Leonardo Sarmiento and the respondent. The complaint was filed by no
other than respondent's mother Natividad Fernando and the heirs of respondent's father
Gregorio Fernando.
The parents of the respondents averred that:
1. Respondent is not the absolute owner of the subject land, and the same was
never conveyed to him. The SPA dated 14 April 2012, upon which respondent
bases his claim of ownership, is falsified.
2. Gregorio Fernando could not have signed the SPA since the latter already died as
of April 4, 1997, as evidenced by a Certificate of Death. On the other hand, the
forgery of Natividad Fernando's signature in the SPA is made apparent from a
comparison between such signature and the latter's legitimate signature as
appearing in her Office of the Senior Citizen Affair (OSCA) card.
3. Respondent is not the only heir of his parents. He has no less than four (4) living
siblings.
Hence, to preserve TCT No. 010-2013000507 and to put an end to Civil Case, Sylvia and
complainant Leonardo Sarmiento were constrained to enter into a settlement with
Natividad Fernando and the heirs of Gregorio Fernando. The complainants equally shared
the burden of paying the settlement amount.
The complainants demanded reimbursement of the settlement amount from the
respondent, but the latter ignored the same.
Prejudiced by the turn of events, the complainants filed two (2) cases against the
respondent: an estafa complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Muntinlupa City, and the instant disbarment petition, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).[15]
Being directed by IBP-BD to file an answer, the respondent filed a letter, claiming that the
petition had been filed solely for the purpose of harassment. And further prayed for the
dismissal of the petition and contended that the SPA is not a falsification.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s actions constitute gross violations of Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
RULING:
Yes, respondent's actions constitute gross violations of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to
discharge the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to prove
himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a
privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality.
Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."
Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship

between him and complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or
professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another.
The Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case.
The respondent deserves the same fate. As said, respondent's employment of deceit and
use of a forged SPA to gain personal wealth at the expense of the complainants was well
substantiated by the evidence. The evidence on record too left no doubt that respondent's
dishonest actions inflicted, not only grave inconvenience to his own mother and siblings
who were forced to file a suit just to undo what he had done, but also tremendous prejudice
to the complainants who practically had to pay for the subject land twice over.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Gregorio C. Fernando, Jr. a.k.a. Jerry C.
Fernando GUILTY of gross violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of
the Bar, and furnish copies thereof to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
TAN VS. PACURIBOT
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
SHERLITA O. TAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
x---------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,

vs.
x---------------------x
ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,

vs.
Consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge Pacuribot) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the following:
1. Affidavit-Complaint filed by Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan), Court Stenographer of RTC, Branch 27,
Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms. Villafranca), Clerk
II, Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual
harassment;
2. Letter dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens," asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot
on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both
casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City
3. An undated letter from "concerned citizens" also asking the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to investigate the illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a certain Sheryl Gamulo.
They informed the OCA that Sheryl Gamulo bore two acknowledged children of Judge
Pacuribot, the eldest of whom named Rexell Pacuribot was born on 15 October 2004, and
the second child was born on 2 September 2005, both at Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro
City.
FACTS:
Ms. Tan was deceived twice by Judge Pacuribot when he offered to take her to the bus
terminal but instead brought her to a motel where he ravished her. Not contented, he rented a room
in the house of Ms. Tan wherein he would order Miss Tan to go to his room when her husband was
not around. Further, Judge Pacuribot during office hours would also request Miss Tan’s presence in
his chamber where respondent would sexually harass her even in the presence of another person.
On the other hand, Ms. Villafranca was also deceived by the said Judge when he made her
believe that they were going to go out for dinner but instead brought her in a motel in Butuan City
where he ravished her and took a nude picture of her. The respondent used such picture to blackmail
Ms. Villafranca and would threaten her that in the event she would refuse to submit to his lustful
desires, he would send the picture to her family. After the incident, the respondent would order her
to bring food at his rented room and would subsequently rape her. Furthermore, the respondent
ordered the complainant to send sweet text messages and write love letters and greeting cards to
him and even ordered her to file an annulment case against her husband.
Both charges were denied by Judge Pacuribot for "lack of factual and legal bases"; and
opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were motivated by revenge and were part of a
comprehensive and sinister plan to drive him out of service. Judge Pacuribot explained that these
administrative and criminal charges filed against him by Tan and Villafranca were part and parcel of a
grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio commentator, to oust him from office. He claimed
that Waniwan was then facing four counts of libel in his sala. Moreover, he claimed that delay in the
filing of the charges against him casted doubt to the truthfulness of their claim and that if they were
truly raped by him why did they not refuse at all but instead continued to submit themselves to him.
He alleged that the charges imputed against him were complainants’ tool of revenge.
After hearing the testimonies of both the complanants- Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca and the
contention of Judge Pacuribot, Justice Flores of the Court of Appeals, finds Judge Pacuribot guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of rape committed on October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan
de Oro City, and guilty of sexual harassments committed in respondent judge’s chamber in RTC,
Branch 27, Hall of Justice, Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan. In sum, Judge Pacuribot should be
made administratively liable for the charges against him.
Justice Flores further emphasized that Black’s Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean "soundness
or moral principle and character." It is said to be synonymous with "probity," "honesty," and
"uprightness." The evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in
dealing with his two subordinates herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standard
expected of a member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of
every person. Judge Pacuribot’s reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and immorality the
depravity of which is quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pacuribot violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court adopt the findings and recommendations relative to the administrative liability
of the respondent judge for grave misconduct and immorality. The Court ruled that the integrity of
the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but also upon the
perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have administered
justice.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct has
the following provisions:
Canon I- Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Canon II- Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion,

and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the
discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday lives.
Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to
observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered to and set
forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every member of the judiciary must
observe. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity
for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
In the instant case, Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting
standards. He behaved in a manner unbecoming a judge and model of moral uprightness. He
betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the Judiciary
in general.
No judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court employee, even from a woman of
loose morals.17 Judge Pacuribot’s conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and immorality.
Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand
no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and
outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because
they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees.
It led to the conclusion that Judge Pacuribot has failed to behave in a manner that will
promote confidence in the Judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the
Judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system.
Those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that "[T]he
administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in
the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all that is right,
just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages
every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs.
This should not come to pass."
WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct
and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave
credits. Respondent judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any
order or decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Mane VS. Judge Belen (A. M. No. RTJ-08-2119) June 30, 2008 • Miranda VS. Atty. Carpio (A. C.
No. 6281) August 16, 2022 (Unjustly withholding the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of an Original
Certificate of Title)
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen, A.M. No. RTJ 08-2119, June 30, 2008. Carpio-Morales, J.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a
lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer
primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in argumentum ad hominem.
The acts and statements of Judge Belen questioning the capability and credibility of Atty. Mane by sole reason
of his alma matter is considered conduct unbecoming of a judge.
FACTS
Atty. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the OCA charging Judge Belen of “demeaning, humiliating and berating”
him during hearing on the case Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Malabanan, et al. in which he was a counsel for
the plaintiff. In the course of the proceeding, Judge Belen asked Atty. Mane if he was from the UP College of
Law to which Atty. Mane answered in the negative and stated that he is from Manuel L. Quezon University.
Judge Belen then told him that since Atty. Mane is not from UP College of Law, he cannot equate Atty. Mane to
himself as not all law students and law schools are not created equal.
To quote:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, you're not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know
this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.
href="#fnt2" 2 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Judge Belen seemingly disregarded the case at hand as Atty. Mane’s motion remained unacted. The
OCA, found that Judge Belen’s statements and actions made during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming
of a judge and a violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, his insulting statements which
tend to question Atty. Mane’s capability and credibility is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct
unbecoming of a judge and a violation the Code of Judicial Conduct. (YES)
RULING:
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of
knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's
oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and
duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an
engagement in argumentum ad hominem
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his
integrity and dignity were being "assaulted", he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the
transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
Disposition:
Respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba
City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Miranda VS. Atty. Carpio (A. C. No. 6281) August 16, 2022 (Unjustly withholding the Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of an Original Certificate of Title)
MIRANDA vs. ATTY. CARPIO September 26, 2011
FACTS:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square meters
located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, the complainant initiated Land Registration
Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged
the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel
Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident. In complainant's Affidavit,[2] complainant and respondent agreed that
complainant was to pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two
Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the
additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said
would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the
subject property as additional fees for his services. Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it
was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he
could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his
co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their
relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and
owner's duplicate of the title of the property. On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's
duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same
had already been claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant
talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had
claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay
him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for
which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the
demand, for not having been agreed upon. On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000,
respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the
payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not
returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to
effect the same.
In 2011 SC Decision, the Court held Atty. Carpio guilty of violating the CPR.
Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely
2020 SC Resolution
Respondent filed a motion to lift suspension, however, the SC ruled that for not following the court order to
return the duplicate copies of the title to the owner, respondent's motion to lift the order of suspension is
hereby DENIED. Atty. MACARIO D. CARPIO is further SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another
six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Likewise, Atty. Carpio is DIRECTED to RETURN the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT No. 0-94 to the
complainant. He is again hereby warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
January 7, 2020, the Office of the Bar Confidant received a letter from complainant Miranda apprising the Court
of the Respondent’s continued defiance and failure to return the Owner’s duplicate copy of title.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Atty. Carpio has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for Unjustly
withholding the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of an Original Certificate of Title
2. Whether or not Atty. Carpio is liable for willful disobedience to the lawful order of the superior court
which is to return the said copy of Original Title
Ruling:
1. Yes. An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur:
(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees. Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the
balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of
the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment. As correctly
found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the complainant and the
respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area
covered by OCT No. 0-94.
2. Yes. It has been 10 years from the Court’s first order demanding Respondent Carpio to return the
withheld Duplicate copy of Original land title of the complainant.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor: - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any·
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, · or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Willful disobedience of lawful court orders also violates Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due the courts and
judicial officers.
In this case, Respondent refused to comply with the orders of the Court for more than 10 years already.
Worse, since Respondent has unjustly held on to the Owner's Duplicate Copy, Complainant expired
without having fully enjoyed the fruits of his labor in successfully applying for the original registration
of their land.
Disposition:
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY for Willful Disobedience of Lawful Orders
of the Court in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Further, ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO is ORDERED, under pain of contempt, to surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-94 to the Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution. ATTY. CHRISTINE P. CARPIO-ALDEGUER, an officer of the Court, is also ORDERED, under
pain of contempt, to ensure that her client/father, ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, promptly complies with the
Court's directive.
SISON Vs. DUMLAO, AC NO. 11959, April 28, 2021
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer-client relationship is established when lawyers consistently manifest to a person consulting

them that they would provide legal representation or assistance, regardless of the close ties between
the parties, or the lack of a written contract, or the non-payment of legal fees. Lawyers who later on
decide not to represent their client have the duty to inform their client. Failure to do so will be cause
for administrative sanction.
FACTS:
Sometime in July 2013, Dr. Eusebio D. Sison (Dr. Sison) consulted Atty. Dumlao, his friend, for the
purpose of filing an annulment case against his wife, Dr. Cynthia V. Cervantes-Sison (Dr. Cervantes-
Sison). He deposited P35,000.00 in Atty. Dumlao's bank account for the psychiatric evaluation fee.
Dumlao for the return of the deposited P35,000.00. When Atty. Dumlao refused, Dr. Sison then filed
a verified Complaint4 charging Atty. Dumlao with violation of Canons 7,5 17,6 and 187 of the Code of
In her Answer, Atty. Dumlao alleged that she had referred Dr. Sison to Mr. Nhorly Domenden (Mr.
meet and consult with him, and a Psychological Evaluation Report was later emailed to him on
November 2013.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the Complaint since there was no
contract to engage in legal services between them and that conflict of interest was a valid ground to
decline an engagement.14 He likewise found that Atty. Dumlao did not profit from Dr. Sison,
considering that the amount he paid was indeed used for the preparation of a psychological
evaluation.
The IBP adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner on dismissing the
complaint.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was a lawyer-client relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
2. WON the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
1. YES, there was a lawyer-client relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
The SC ruled that A lawyer client relationship is established when a lawyer voluntarily
entertains a consultation; regardless of the close relationship between the parties or the
absence of a written contract or non-payment of legal fees.29 Once a lawyer agrees to take
up the client's cause, the lawyer must serve the client with diligence and competence. A
lawyer who is negligent in attending to a client's cause may be grounds for administrative
sanction.
In this case, the conversations between the petitioner and the respondent did not appear
like casual exchanges between friends about a theoretical legal issue. On the contrary, the
series of exchanges between the parties show that respondent voluntarily acquiesced to
representing complainant in his prospective annulment case, or at the very least, render her
legal assistance in his suit. She asked complainant to submit to his documents related to the
case and repeatedly assured him that she would be filing the annulment complaint even
after complainant expressed hesitation due to the lack of action on respondent's part.
2. YES, the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Court has ruled that the Respondent's duty as a lawyer compels her to act not only with
diligence, but with candor as well. She should have been upfront with complainant once she
decided that she would no longer interfere in complainant's troubles.
Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
While respondent may later refuse to represent complainant, as in this case when she was
requested by complainant's mother-in-law to refrain from interfering in complainant's
domestic issues, it was still incumbent upon respondent to inform complainant that she
would no longer be able to represent him.
When complainant asked respondent for an update on his case on February 26, 2014,
respondent did not inform him that she would no longer be connected with the case due to
conflict of interest, even though she was approached by complainant's mother-in-law
sometime before November 2013. It was only when she filed her Answer35 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that complainant learned of the reason why respondent
would not be representing him.
Thus, violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as her oath to render "all good fidelity" to her client. As in a similar case, she must be
made liable for her inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao is hereby REPRIMANDED with a

STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
LAO Vs. CAUSING, AC NO. 13453, October 4, 2022
DOCTRINE:
While freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution, the lawyer's oath and his duties and
responsibilities ultimately serve as a limit thereto. We caution lawyers to be circumspect in their
postings online. They are reminded to always practice restraint in their conduct, be it in real life or
online. Otherwise, the rule of law may very well be completely circumvented and rendered nugatory
by blatantly seeking public trial on social media.
FACTS:
Lao, the Petitioner, alleged that on January 18, 2019, Atty. Causing, the Respondent, published in his
Facebook account a draft and yet to be filed copy of his Complaint-Affidavit for Plunder, accusing Lao
and other persons of the crime of Plunder.
Atty. Causing allegedly resorted to the use of social media to make his sister, Lyndale Causing, one of
the candidates for Representative of the 2nd District of South Cotabato, known to the public. Atty.
Causing's publication in his Face book account of such defamatory accusation of Plunder subjected
Lao to public hate, contempt and ridicule. The publication besmirched Lao's good name and
reputation in the eyes of Facebook users at the time that no such complaint was filed or pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Causing named and referred to Lao as the "Chairperson of the Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) of the DSWD Regional Office No. XII and the one that handled the bidding that ended up in the
awarding of these food packs to Tacurong Fit Mart, Inc.," which allegation, per Lao's submission in
her complaint, is completely and absolutely wrong.
Atty. Causing allegedly repeated his false imputation against Lao and other individuals on January 31,
2019, when he again published his complaint-affidavit in his social media account. On that occasion,
he announced on social media that he already filed his complaint for Plunder before the Office of the
Ombudsman. In her complaint, Lao insisted that Atty. Causing made false imputations against her in
the final copy of the complaint-affidavit he filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
In his Answer-Affidavit, dated June 10, 2019, Atty. Causing did not deny that he is the author of the
questioned Face book posts. He admitted that his main basis in filing the Plunder case was the
investigative reports from the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ). The fact that the
instant complaint for Plunder is supported by evidence, as cited in his Answer-Affidavit, was already a
sufficient justification to dismiss the administrative complaint. He submitted that the Facebook posts
are an exercise of the freedom of the press and freedom of expression.
The investigating commissioner recommended for 6 months suspension from the practice of law,
however, the IBP imposed a penalty of REPRIMAND only.
ISSUE:
WON the Respondent violated the CPR and Lawyer’s oath when he posted his Complaint for Plunder
on his Facebook account to the detriment of herein complainant.
RULING:
YES. Atty Causing violated the CPR and Lawyer’s Oath.
Rule 8.01 of the CPR provides that A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In addition, the Lawyer's Oath provides that “I will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion.” Such oath
mandates lawyers to conduct themselves in a manner which would keep the integrity of the legal
profession intact. In Ong vs. Atty. Unto, the Court enjoined lawyers to conduct themselves in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the legal profession.
As a member of the Bar, Atty. Causing ought to know that Facebook----or any other social medium,
for that matter-is not the proper forum to air out his grievances, for a lawyer who uses extra-legal
fora is a lawyer who weakens the rule of law. In this case, Atty. Causing knew that the proper forum
for his complaint is the Office of the Ombudsman.
Moreover, this is not the first time that Atty. Causing has been sanctioned by the Court. In Velasco vs.
Atty. Causing, the Supreme Court en banc, voting unanimously, suspended Atty. Causing from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violating the confidentiality of an ongoing family court
proceeding.
The aforesaid case and the case at hand show that Atty. Causing has the propensity to divulge
sensitive information in online platforms, such as Facebook, to the detriment of the people involved
in the said cases. Thus, considering that Atty. Causing was already suspended for one (1) year with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely, We
believe that the appropriate penalty to be imposed herein is the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
While freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution, the lawyer's oath and his duties and
responsibilities ultimately serve as a limit thereto. We caution lawyers to be circumspect in their
postings online. They are reminded to always practice restraint in their conduct, be it in real life or
online. Otherwise, the rule of law may very well be completely circumvented and rendered nugatory
by blatantly seeking public trial on social media.
Thus, the Court found Atty Causing to be guilty of GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. And Disbarred him from the practice of law.
Reynaldo Panem and Cesaria Panem vs Atty Carmina M Alejandro Abas and
Atty Joseph M Alejandro
AC No. 13462, January 17, 2023
FACTS:
The respondents forcibly ejected the complainants Panems who were in prior
and actual physical possession of the lot awarded to them through CLOA previously
owned by the respondents sibling Attys. The result of the investigation conducted by
Investigation Commissioner revealed that respondents forcibly entered the subject
property and demolished the structures thereon, intimidated and shouted invectives
at Panems.
Respondents claimed that the issuance of CLOA was attended with several
irregularities. It further argued that the complaints of the Panems was a pure
harassment suit and that a pending case with the DARAB posed a prejudicial
question.
ISSUE:
WON respondents may be disciplined for violations of the provisions in CPR.
RULLING:
Yes, but only Atty Carmina M Alejandro Abas. The Court has ruled in a litany
of cases that any misconduct or wrongdoing of a lawyer, indicating unfitness for the
profession justifies disciplinary action because good character is an essential and
continuing qualification for the practice of law. Rule 1.01 of CPR provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This
provision clearly mandates that every lawyer shall, to the best of their ability, respect
and abide by the laws and legal processes.
Atty Abas’ conduct falls short of the standard expected from the members of
the legal profession. Assuming arguendo that several irregularities attended the
issuance of the CLOA, the fact remains that she cannot forcibly eject complainants
who were in prior and actual physical possession of the subject property. As an
officer of the Court, it was incumbent upon her to observe the proper legal processes
to secure the return of her purported property, and not take the law into her own
hands. It is well settled that, notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to a
property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror – not
even by the owners.
The court also found Atty Abas violating Rule 7.03 which reads: “A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Atty Abbas averred that assuming the acts imputed
against her and Atty Alejandro were true, these were committed in their private
capacities. Her argument is not in place. Part of Atty. Abbas’ duty as a lawyer is to
maintain the dignity owing to the profession. For this reason, a lawyer may be
disciplined for acts committed even in his or her private capacity for acts which tend
to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the
public.
Concerning Atty Joseph M Alejandro, the court did not subscribe to the
Investigating Commissioner’s determination that he could also be sanctioned despite
lack of notice of the disciplinary proceeding against him. Here, Atty Alejandro was
denied a reasonable opportunity to present his defense, either orally or through
pleadings because based on the evidence on record, copies of the Complaint and
Notice of the Mandatory Conference were not served on him either at his office or
purported residence address. The fact that Atty Carmina Abas and Atty Alejandro are
sibling does not dispense with separate notices to be sent to each of them.
Wherefore, Atty Abas was found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of
CPR and was suspended from the practice of law for two years. Meanwhile, the case
is dismissed with respect to Atty Joseph Alejandro for lack of notice, without
prejudice.
Reynaldo M. Siquig v. Atty. Raleston F. Falcutilla
A.C. No. 8986 [Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5442
January 25, 2023
Siquig is one of the defendants in a civil case for Judicial Settlement, Adjudication
and Accounting of Estate filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
Branch 66. In a Decision, the trial court ordered Siquig to render an accounting of the
income derived from the subject property and to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
Within the period for filing an appeal or motion for reconsideration, Atty. Falcutilla did
not file any pleading for Siquig. This prompted the plaintiffs in the civil case to file a
Motion for Execution, citing the finality of the Decision.
In response to the plaintiffs' motion, Atty. Falcutilla filed a Comments and/or

Opposition, stating that there was no proof that his office received a copy of the
Decision considering that the Registry Return Receipt merely stated "December
2006" as date of receipt, with no particular date. Because of this, the period within
which to file a motion for reconsideration supposedly has not yet lapsed. Accordingly,
Atty. Falcutilla prayed that the plaintiff's Motion for Execution be denied and that
Siquig 's Motion for Reconsideration, which Atty. Falcutilla attached in the Comments
and/or Opposition, be admitted instead.
The trial court rejected Atty. Falcutilla's arguments on the supposed lack of proof of
receipt and granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Execution instead. It noted that the
Registry Return Receipt clearly showed that the Decision was received by Atty.
Falcutilla's office in December 2006 and that even if it was received on the last day
of December 2006, the Comments and/or Opposition with the attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was filed only on March 26, 2007, was still belatedly filed.
Hence, Siquig's in a letter filed a complaint against Atty. Falcutilla, where he alleges
that he was informed by Atty. Falcutilla of the adverse Decision only five months after
it was rendered and only after he inquired with the trial court; and that when he
confronted Atty. Falcutilla, the latter promised that he would file an appeal but failed
to do so.
In his Comments, 1Atty. Falcutilla stated that appeal was no longer proper at that
time, and that Siquig's claim is belied by his admission in the Sheriff's Return that he
already partially complied with the Writ of Execution. He nevertheless admitted that
every time he went to Aurora to represent Siquig, he was paid an amount of PHP
5,000.00 for his appearance fee, cost of fuel, food, and accommodation.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines In a Report and Recommendation, the

Investigating Commissioner recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
In a Notice of Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors reversed and set aside the
Commissioner's recommendation, and recommended that Atty. Falcutilla be
suspended from the practice of law for six months instead. The IBP Board of
Governors noted in its Extended Resolution that based on the records of the case,
Atty. Falcutilla indeed failed to file a timely remedy to the adverse Decision and also
failed to inform Siquig of the said judgment
Issue:
Is Atty. Falcutilla negligent in handling his client's case?
Ruling:
Yes.
The court sustained the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[lawyers]

shall serve [their] client with competence and diligence."
Under Rules 18.03 and 18.04, serving a client with competence and diligence entails
not neglecting a legal matter entrusted to them and keeping the client informed of the
status of the case, viz.:
RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to [him/her], and
[his/her] negligence in connection therewith shall render [him/her] liable.
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of [his/her] case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. In
Katipunan, Jr. v. Carrera,28 the Court ruled that the failure of a lawyer to timely and
adequately inform the client of the status of the case destroys the trust reposed on
the lawyer and on the legal profession as a whole. Further, in Spouses Adecer v.
Akut,29 the Court held that a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter, such as the failure to
timely file a motion for reconsideration or appeal, subjects the lawyer to liability for
negligence.30 Hence, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions for failure to
timely inform the client of the status of the case and for the belated filing of a motion
for reconsideration, viz.:
Respondent's agreement to handle complainant's case, as shown by his receipt of

his legal fees, is an assurance and representation to his client that he would be
diligent and competent in handling the case. This includes the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration, constantly updating on the status of the case, and
availing of the proper remedy, such as filing a notice of appeal when the motion for
reconsideration will be denied.
Thus, his actuations are contrary to Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which
state: In this case, it is clear that respondent filed the motion for reconsideration 17
days late. Also, when the motion for reconsideration was denied he, likewise, failed
to file a notice of appeal. Because of this, the judgment has attained finality and
judgment was executed against complainant. Without a doubt, this exhibits his
inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client's cause in violation of
Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR. As such, he neglected the legal matters
entrusted to him for which he must be clearly held administratively liable.
The Court resolves to ADOPT and APPROVE the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Board of Governors
wherein ATTY. RALESTON F. FALCUTILLA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHS , with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Candia v. Tagabucba, A.M. No. 528-MJ, September 12, 1977
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by the petitioner against Municipal Judge Alonzo J. Tagabucba of
Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur for dishonesty, gross misconduct, false representation, and abuse of authority.
Upon investigation, it was found that the respondent acted as counsel for any party whose case would eventually
land in his court. His professional services were engaged by one of the parties (Mr. Manisan) and he
subsequently agreed to act as attorney-in-fact of the other party (herein petitioners) in connection with the very
subject matter of their controversy. It was further discovered that the vendee-a-retro was the respondent’s father-
in-law, Mariano Chupuico whom the complainants never met or had any direct transactions with, since all the
time it was respondent who dealt with them.
As found by the Investigator, respondent was actually the "beneficial vendee", since he was the one who
actually took possession of the property after the ostensible sale to Chupuico. It is also a fact that the judge of
the Municipal Court of Mahayag with whom the complaint for estafa was filed by Paragamac and who
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, as stated in respondent's abovequoted
sworn statement, was none other than respondent himself. Thus, the investigator recommended the dismissal of
the respondent from service.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should be dismissed from the service?
Ruling: Yes, Judge Tagabucba should be dismissed from service for dishonesty, gross misconduct, false
representation, and abuse of authority.
He did not only take personal interest in a litigious matter within his jurisdiction, for he admits that Martin
Manisan discussed the possibility of his filing a estafa case against the Maturans, he actually acted as legal
counsel and adviser for all the parties thereto. According to him, Manisan engaged his services and later he
agreed to be attorney-in-fact of the Maturans. In these premises, it is impossible to countenance respondent's
plea that he merely tried to help the family of complainants save their property from remaining forever with the
PNB. We cannot escape the conclusion that respondent always acted in pursuance of his personal self-interest.
It has been sufficiently shown that an attempt was made by him, as judge, to take advantage of his position in
purchasing property likely to be, if not actually, the subject matter of a case before him by acting as counsel and
adviser for both parties. Such patently deplorable conduct betrays an utter lack of the ethical principles and
sense of propriety, without which any judge cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so
indispensable in any orderly society.
STORY:
Spouses Maturan owned a parcel of land which was mortgaged to PNB, Ozamis City Branch. In order to redeem the
mortgaged property, the petitioner with her mother and other siblings sold a portion of the property to Martin
Manisan. The proceeds were not however applied to redeem the mortgaged property, thus it was foreclosed by the
bank including the portion sold to Manisan.
Manisan allegedly came to the respondent for advice as to the possibility of filing a case for estafa against herein
petitioner but the respondent judge prevailed upon him to take it easy as a legal remedy was still available to him.
Thus, Manisan engaged the services of the respondent.
Respondent apprise the petitioner of the consequences of the loss of his client’s (Manisan) property. Respondent,
however, proceeded further to act for and behalf of the respondent to repurchase the property foreclosed.
When petitioner failed to put up earnest money to be deposited with PNB, the respondent entered into a deed of sale
with right to repurchase with Mr. Chupuico, with the remaining portion of the property.
Later, Justitiano Matura allegedly came to the respondent and confided that the remaining portion of the property
encumbered with Mr. Chupuico was mortgaged by the petitioner to another Juan Paragmac and Ceriaco Picot, who
confirmed the information.
Upon expiration of the period to repurchase, Paragamac and Picot turned over the possession of the property
mortgaged to them to Mr. Chupuico and filed a case of estafa against herein petitioner. Allegedly, Picot also wanted to
file a case against the petitioner but the respondent intervened.
Meanwhile, petitioner and Justitiano again mortgaged the remaining portion of the lot to Mr. Joaquin Yap, although
they were no longer the owner thereof for failure to repurchase the same from Mr. Chupuico.
Petitioner and Justitiano failed to repurchase the property from Mr. Chupuico for failure to raise the agreed repurchase
amount.
A.C. No. 137-J. March 27, 1971
MARCIANA BUENAVENTURA, Complainant, v. HON. MARIANO V.
BENEDICTO, Respondent.
Facts:
- Marciana Buenaventura, offended party in a criminal prosecution for

forcible abduction with rape, and likewise the plaintiff in a civil action for
annulment of marriage, filed a complaint against the Honorable Mariano
V. Benedicto, in whose sala both the aforementioned cases fell, seeking
his removal from office on the basis of verified charges.
- Imputed to the respondent judge are: (1) serious misconduct in relation
to the criminal and civil cases; (2) immorality in connection with both
cases;(3) gross inefficiency and incompetence in relation to the criminal
action; and (4) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the criminal
case.
- The respondent judge filed his answer, denying the charges imputed to
him by the complainant and alleging lack of factual or legal basis for the
administrative complaint.
- The Court referred and assigned the administrative case to the

Honorable Carmelino Alvendia of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation.
- After proceedings and investigation duly conducted on the

administrative complaint, the Honorable Justice Alvendia submitted his
report wherein he states that the complainant failed to prove the charges
against the respondent judge, with four exceptions, to wit:
1. The respondent judge allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro

Tuazon,
to promulgate decisions in criminal cases, in violation of the provisions of

section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The respondent judge formed a committee to solicit

contributions and/or donation of steel filing cabinets, electric fans, and
other office equipment from private parties for his court in contravention
of the spirit of section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics;
3. The respondent judge, considering that the civil case for

annulment of marriage filed by the complainant against one of the
defendants in the criminal action remained pending before his sala,
imprudently received the said complainant in his chambers prior to the
promulgation of his decision in the criminal action; and
4. The respondent judge failed to resolve a motion filed by the
prosecution for the suspension of the hearing of the criminal case until
after trial and resolution of the civil case (on the ground that the latter
raised a prejudicial question), in violation of the provisions of section 5,
Republic Act
296, as amended.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of serious

misconduct
or inefficiency.
Ruling: The respondent judge is not guilty of serious misconduct or

inefficiency. The Court find that the respondent judge:
1. Has been remiss in the supervision of-his court employees by

failing, upon learning that the deputy clerk of court on three occasions
had entrusted to the clerk messenger the promulgation of decisions of
acquittal, to take corrective action and to discipline the erring court
employees;
2. Had involved himself in a program to furnish his court, ill-

equipped at the time of his assumption of office, as presiding judge
thereof, with the necessary facilities, by appointing the members of the
campaign committee which solicited donations and contributions;
3. Failed to exercise requisite care and discretion by receiving the

complainant in his private chambers, considering that the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by the said complainant (against one of the
accused in the criminal action) was yet pending before his sala; and
4. Failed to resolve in explicit unmistakable terms the prosecution’s

motion for suspension of the criminal action based on the ground that
the civil action for annulment of marriage constituted a prejudicial
question.
The Court admonishes the respondent Judge Mariano V.

Benedicto (a) to exercise close and unremitting supervision over his
subordinates, and (b) at all times to adhere to the full intendment of each
and all of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
A.M. No. 1765-CFI October 17, 1980
ARNALDO R. BORRE, complainant,
vs.
CFI JUDGE FELIX L. MOYA of Tagum, Davao del Norte and CITY
JUDGE GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Branch III, Davao City, respondents.
Facts:
- Complainant in his verified complaint, charged with serious misconduct

and grave abuse of discretion Judge Felix L. Moya of the Court of First
Instance of Davao del Norte, Tagum Branch IX and Judge Gumersindo
Arcilla of the city court of Davao City, both Bicolanos and alleged to be
cronies.
Judge Moya’s Case:
- Calvin R. Borre filed with the Court of First Instance at Tagum,

Davao del Norte a complaint against his brother Arnaldo, Inapsa Obon
Prieto and Register of Deeds of Davao.
- When the complaint was filed, Executive Judge Felix R. Moya,

without raffling the case, issued an order wherein he (1) directed the
service of summons, (2) set the hearing on the preliminary injunction and
(3) issued a restraining order.
- After hearing, Judge Moya issued an order of injunction. The next

day, he inhibited himself from the case in order that "the court should be
above suspicion”.
- The case was re-assigned to Judge Silapan who, rendered a

decision approving the compromise settlement between the brothers
Calvin and Arnaldo. Hence, the case was terminated.
- Arnaldo's charge against Judge Moya is that by issuing before

the raffle, he violated Circular No. 7 of the Supreme Court which
prohibits an Executive Judge from acting on any incidental or
interlocutory matter in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Moya violated Circular No. 7 of

the Supreme Court.
Ruling: The Court ruled that Judge Moya violated Circular No. 7 of the
Supreme Court which states that, “The Executive Judge shall have no
authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory matter in any case not
yet assigned to any branch by raffle”.
- Judge Moya's repeated disclaimer that he did not issue a
restoring order but merely ordered the preservation of the status quo and
that he did not violate the circular is belied by his own order.
- His pretension that he thought that the case was raffled to him
because it was placed on is table by his clerk does not justify his
negligence in not ascertaining, as he could have easily ascertained, from
the expediente itself that the case was not yet raffled to him.
- Also, there’s no stenographic notes taken of the raffle and Judge

Moya did not initial the assignment of that case to his sala.
- Jugde Moya’s comment does not do him honor nor enhance his
image as a presumably honest, competent and diligent Judge.
Therefore, the Court ordered that Judge Moya be censured for his failure
to comply with the said circular and required to pay a fine equivalent to
his compensation for ten (10) days.
Judge Arcilla’s Case:
- Arnaldo R. Borre alleged that Judge Arcilla notarized the deed of

sale executed by Mrs. Prieto in favor of Calvin R. Borre covering a parcel
of land which Mrs. Prieto already sold to Arnaldo and of which prior sale
Judge Arcilia was cognizant.
- Borre specifically charged Judge Arcilla, his second cousin, with

having engaged in business and having collected a certain amount as
professional and notarial fees while acting as ex officio notary.
- Judge Arcilla said that Arnaldo's suspicion that the judge sided
with
Calvin was baseless. He endeavored to effect an amicable settlement

between the two brothers but his efforts were fruitless.
- Judge Arcilla revealed that he was the legal adviser of his

cousins, Arnaldo and Calvin. He gave them advice free of charge. He
prepared and notarized several documents for Arnaldo. He denied
having received Pl,400 from Arnaldo.
- He said that the Borre brothers did not honor their written
commitment to pay him five percent of the net income from their water
supply business. He admitted that he was later given a 2.5% equity in
the corporation organized by the Borre brothers and Mariano Nasser for
supplying water.
- Judge Arcilla concluded that Arnaldo's complaint against him,

made after he had gratuitously rendered legal and notarial services to
Arnaldo for more than ten years, is an illustration of the saying that
"ingratitude is stronger than a traitor's arm”.
- Arnaldo requested that his complaint against Judge Arcilla be

considered withdrawn or dropped because it was spawned by a
misunderstanding. He said that he was no longer willing to testify against
Judge Arcilla.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Arcilla committed serious
misconduct.
Ruling:
-Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea believes that Judge

Arcilla's engaging in private business and acting as legal consultant of
the Borre brothers are prejudicial to the public service because he
should devote his full time to the performance of his official duties.
- It was held that respondent city judge was not empowered to act
as notary public ex officio. A city judge is not among the ex officio notaries
enumerated in section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. Neither
the charter of Davao City (Republic Act No. 4354) nor the Judiciary Law
allows a city judge to act as notary ex officio.
- In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should
notarize documents involving private transactions and sign the document.
Also, fees collected by a municipal judge acting as ex officio notary
accrue to the government funds.
- A notary ex officio should notarize only documents connected with

the exercise of his official duties. That is the reason why he is
designated as a notary ex officio. He should not compete with private law
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business.
- As to engaging in business as a sideline, there is no compelling

reason for a city judge to engage in private business. Moreover, a Civil
Service employee he cannot engage in private business without the
written permission of this Court.
- However, before this decision can be promulgated, Providence

terminated this case against Judge Arcilla because died.
REPUBLIC v JUDGE CAGUIOA

[ A.C. No. 5190. July 26, 2022 ]
HON. MANUEL E. CONTRERAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURT, OCAMPO, CAMARINES SUR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FREDDIE A.
VENIDA, RESPONDENT.
DIGEST
Facts:
Judge Contreras alleged that Atty. Venida abused the court’s processes by filing
impertinent motions and manifestations which resulted the delay of the case
because of the latter’s employment of dilatory tactics. He was forced to suspend
Atty. Venida as counsel as he filed numerous pro forma motions and sought for
inhibition of him even there were no valid grounds. He even noted that Atty.
Venida’s language in his pleadings were offensive, disrespectful and defiant of the
authority of the court.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline noted Judge Contreras’ recommendation and
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of Investigating Commissioner.
Further, the Court also takes into consideration Atty. Venida's evasion from the court
proceedings in this case for several years, including his previous administrative cases
where he was meted the penalty of suspension, and eventually, disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Venida is still fit to engage in the practice of law even he was
previously disbarred?
Ruling:
The court ruled that Atty. Venida is not fit to engage in the practice of law.
The court ruled that it bears to reiterate that the penalty of suspension or
disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been disbarred except
for recording purposes.[33] Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could
be imposed regarding his privilege to practice law. Nevertheless, the corresponding
penalty should be adjudged for recording purposes on the lawyer's personal file with
the OBC, which should be taken into consideration in the event that he subsequently
files a petition for reinstatement.
In this case, Atty. Venida acted in bad faith when he was remiss and negligent in
handling his client’s case. Instead of filing of the petition, Atty. Venida gave his client
runaround and led her to believe that the petition had already been filed. He also
evaded the complainant and refused to return her calls when he was asked for
updates and the fees were remained unaccounted for. His actions constitute
dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence and betrayal of his client’s interests.
Further, the court also considered the past disbarment complaints against Atty.
Venida when he was suspended for 1 year from practice of law for blatant disregard
of the court’s order, unduly delaying the complaint against him, and violation of
Canon 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 to 18.04.
The court ruled that the penalty of suspension against Atty. Venida cannot be
imposed since he has already been previously disbarred on the grounds of violation
of Canon 16, 17, and 18 and Rules 1.01. 16.01, 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Hence, the court imposed an indefinite suspension from practice of law against Atty.
Venida.
Doctrine:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, they are in no sense a criminal-prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. Public interest is their primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity
of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proven
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Bartolome v. Rojas, A.C. No. 13226, October 4, 2022
Context: A disbarment complaint against Atty. Remegio P. Rojas for alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and
Rules 1.01, 7.03, and 10.01, and Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Facts:
Version of the complainant
Petitioner asserted that she had known the respondent since college days and they reconnected through social media.
Eventually, they met to catch up and had a chance to discuss about petitioner’s brother’s (Guingab) plan to file an
annulment case. On their second meeting, respondent mentioned that he had a relative who was a judge at Cotabato
and how such person was able to file several successful annulment cases. In return, respondent would only be asking
from Guingab some camera lens for this photography hobby.
Atty. Rojas and Guingab closed their conversation with the agreement that Atty. Rojas will handle the annulment
case of Guingab. Thus, Bartolome sent to Atty. Rojas the necessary documents for the filing of the annulment case.
Upon the insistence of Atty. Rojas, a check payable to the order of "cash" was given as "paunang bayad" for the
judge. Later, it was found that it was Atty. Rojas who was attempting to encash the check.
Atty. Rojas repeatedly guaranteed that the nullity case would be completed and that the decision would be available
soon. When it came, only a photocopy of the decision was given to the respondent and upon checking the National
Statistics Office, no records of the annulment were found. Atty. Rojas then suddenly was out of reach. It was found
that the annulment decision" was a fake.
A demand letter was sent to Atty. Rojas calling out the spurious "decision" and the return of the P90,000.00 she paid,
plus legal interests, which the respondent paid through money transfer.
Version of the respondent
On the other hand, respondent insisted that he and petitioner were romantically involved in a relationship. When they
reconnected, petitioner shared to him that her brother Guingab was mad at her for botching his annulment case since
she contracted a bogus lawyer who had given them a fake annulment "decision." She then asked him to handle the
case but Atty. Rojas refused the request out of ethical considerations and suggested to Bartolome to just refer the
case to her lawyer cousin.
After persistent and fervent begging by the petitioner, respondent agreed to take on the case and caused the parties to
close the deal. He was given a check in the amount of P90,000 and encashed the same to a bank.
Atty. Rojas then proceeded to transact the filing of the annulment case. He demanded for the balance since the court
already rendered a decision. Later, respondent realized that they were scammed and avoided Bartolome. To buy him
more time, he secured a certificate of finality and facilitated the registration of judgment with the LCR.
Atty. Rojas handed Bartolome the decision without disclosing to her that the same was fabricated. When he received
the demand letter from Bartolome’s cousin, he paid the same through a money remittance center.
Atty Rojas was informed that a disbarment case is being prepared against him by the petitioner’s cousin. He met
with such lawyer and was informed that they are filing a disbarment complaint against him unless he pays them
P1,000,000.00. Petitioner decided not to accede to the demands hence this petition.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
The investigating commissioner recommended for disbarment of the respondent for procuring the fake decision. The
IBP BOG adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner but with modification as to penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for five years instead of disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rojas should be disbarred for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Rojas should be disbarred for perpetuating an illegal act of promoting instant annulment of marriage
through fabricated judicial decisions, thus violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.
Atty. Rojas admitted his involvement in the reprehensible practice of perpetuating "annulment packages," albeit
disavowing authorship and with the caveat that he only did so to help the complainant, and in the process, was also
scammed. All these, regardless of his intention, besmirched the legal profession to the highest degree, by making a
mockery of the judicial system. He simply violated his sworn oath to be honest, and to obey the law and the
Constitution. It also created an impression to the public that the judicial process can be trifled with and undermined
the judicial processes of the courts.
Fabricating a judicial decision or perpetuation of acts leading to such, undeniably comes within the prohibitive acts
set by the CPR. Atty. Rojas, in actively and knowingly participating in the procurement of a fake decision in an
annulment case undoubtedly violated the provisions of the CPR. He committed an unlawful act and disrespected the
law and the legal processes. He deprived the judiciary to a rightful resolution of the case for annulment and have
done so in defiance of truth, honor, and of the law.
Atty. Rojas should be held administratively liable and must be considered unfit for the practice of law. To highlight,
"the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does
not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also exercise a special privilege,
highly personal and partaking of the nature of public trust."
ABNER MANGUBAT VS. ATTY. REYNALDO HERRERA
A.C. 9457, APRIL 5, 2022

This administrative case for disbarment arose from a Complaint filed against respondent Atty.
Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty. Herrera) charging him with violation of several provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Gaudencio engaged the services of the respondent Atty. Reynaldo Herrera to institute a
complaint for revival of judgment involving a parcel of land covered by TCT. 6337 against
Orlando Seva, Belen Seva and the Developmental Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Complainant is one of the heirs of Aurelia Relora Mangubat. Aurelia predeceased his
husband Gaudencio Mangubat.
Gaudencio sought the services of the respondent lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Herrera to institute
a complaint for revival of judgment involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6337
against Orlando Seva and Belen Morga-Seva and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP).
the herein complainant Abner was listed as co-plaintiff and together with all the other heirs of
Aurelia, sought the revival of Civil Case p-279 where Gaudencio was identified as
complainant and the other heirs of Aurelia represented by Raquel M. Azada as the attorney-
in-fact for herself and the other heirs of Aurelia.
Atty. Herrera admitted to the court that his engagement was only in the instance of
GAUDENCIO and the said engagement was made verbally. Gaudencio then took steps to
secure SPA from his children; however, no SPA was presented before the Trial Court.
Later, a compromise Agreement was executed by Gaudencio represented by Atty. Reynaldo

Herrera, Belen and the Counsel for the DBP stating that Belen is willing to pay a specific
amount including attorney’s fees in exchange for the transfer of TCT- 6337 to her favor on or
before June 30, 2001.
The Compromise Agreement was then submitted before the Court which upon hearing was
approved by the Court. Atty. Herrera then filed a motion for execution which was granted and
consequently a writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, the sheriff failed to serve the said
WRIT since, Belen was not there in the 5 attempts of the sheriff to serve the said writ.
AFTER THE DEATH OF GAUDENCIO
Incidentally, Gaudencio died on January 31, 2002, Abner, then proceeded to the
office of Atty. Herrera to talk about the long overdue compromise agreement and to
inform him (Atty. Herrera) of his father’s demise.
Abner hired Atty. Gumba, who, on September 10, 2002 filed a motion to substitute
Gaudencio with ABNER and that the sheriff be ordered to explain why no return has
been made. The Trial Court Granted the substitution.
Later on Oct. 30, 2002, Atty. Herrera filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to
Hold in Custody of the Court the Awards in the Case Pending settlement of the
Estate of the Late Gaudencio Mangubat. He prayed that the listed heirs be appointed
as substitute plaintiffs, and the award be released to the heirs of Gaudencio.
On December 2003 Atty. Herrera filed a compliance stating that he received the
amount of 91,280 from Belen’s Son and only on April 7, 2005 did he deposit it with
the Clerk of Court.
“Atty. Reynaldo Herrera’s Part”
Abner filed the complaint against him as a form retaliation and further raised the
estranged relationship between Abner and Gaudencio where in a decision of the
probate Court, Gaudencio disinherited Abner, He further questioned the motive of
Abner in filing the motion for substitution without including his siblings.
FINDINGS OF THE IBP
1. viol. of Canon 5- duty to keep abreast of Legal Development

2. Viol. of Rule 10.1 involving the Duty of Fidelity to the Courts.
3. Violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court by "willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so
4. For Violation of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
5. For Violation of Rule 15.03 involving the Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest
6. For Violation of Canon 16 involving the Duty to be a Trustee of Client's Moneys and
Properties; Rule 16.01 Duty of Accountability; and Rule 16.02 Duty not to Commingle
Funds and Properties.
7. For Violation of Canon 18 involving the Duty to serve with Due Diligence; Rule 18.03
Duty not to be Negligent; and Rule 18.04 Duty to keep Client informed.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the following acts of Atty. Herrera warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. However, the IBP board of Governors
Modified the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and in exchange, rendered
the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR THREE 3 YEARS.
ISSUE: (in relation to the duty of a lawyer when a client dies)

Whether Atty. Herrera must be held administratively liable for his failure to
timely inform the court about Gaudencio's death
RULING:
Yes, Atty Herrera must be held administratively liable for his failure to timely inform
the court about Gaudencio’s death.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and give the name
and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
x x x.
Atty. Herrera failed to promptly inform the court about the death of Gaudencio who
died on January 31, 2002. Noticeably, it was the counsel of Abner, Atty. Gumba, who first
informed the court about Gaudencio's death through the "Motion to Substitute Plaintiff
Gaudencio Mangubat and to Require the Provincial Sheriff to make Return of Execution"
that she filed on September 10, 2002. It was only on October 30, 2002, or approximately
nine months from the date of death of Gaudencio, that Atty. Herrera reported the latter’s
death to the trial court.
FINAL NOTE
In sum, Atty. Herrera committed the following acts: (1) indicating that the heirs of
Aurelia were represented in the suit by Raquel when it was not true; (2) failing to
timely inform the court about the death of Gaudencio; (3) filing pleadings in court
without authority and despite the objections of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio; (4)
failing to immediately remit the money he collected to the clerk of court or to the
heirs; (5) moving for the surrender of the owner's duplicate title and drafting and
notarizing the deed of conditional sale in favor of a party whose interest is in conflict
with that of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio. The seriousness and gravity of these
infractions cannot be denied.
The Court further explained, “we cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Herrera's
repeated and brazen disregard of the provisions of the CPR, CPE, Rules of
Court, and the Lawyer's Oath that shows his indifference to the values a lawyer
ought to live by for his continued membership in the Bar. Atty. Herrera has been
a lawyer for over forty years already. At this stage of his professional career, he is
expected to have a profound understanding of the duties expected of him and should
demonstrate the moral fitness and probity demanded from every member of the Bar.
Accordingly, We impose the penalty of disbarment.
REPUBLIC V. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or
more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person
may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
xx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Facts:
This is a Petition for the ISSUANCE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF QUO

WARRANTO to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.
On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent
with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on
Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of
public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations
in her SALNs.
During the impeachment hearings of the House, it was revealed that respondent purportedly
failed to file her SALNs while she was member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and
that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006.
The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the
ground that the latter failed to show that she is person of proven integrity which is an
indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article
VIII of the Constitution. the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her
SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being candidate for the
position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not proven her integrity which
is requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is
ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold
office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto. Republic justifies its resort to the
unconventional method of quo warranto by stating that it seeks respondent's ouster, not on
account of commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to
assume the position of Chief Justice.
Respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment.
Respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides
that petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the "cause of ouster" and
not from the "discovery" of the disqualification. Moreover, respondent stresses that the
failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no bearing on one's integrity. The
submission of SALNs was simply among the additional documents which the JBC had
required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the
non-filing of SALN is not ground for disqualification unless the same was already the subject
of pending criminal or administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally
convicted for criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case, respondent
points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012 that respondent had not
submitted to the JBC her SALNs as U.P. professor and yet none of them invoked Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule."
Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position of Chief
Justice is person of "proven integrity" is question "constitutionally committed to the
JBC" and is therefore political question which only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the
affirmative when it included respondent's name in the shortlist of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice.
The Republic cites respondent's gross misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-
submission of SALNs was because she could no longer retrieve all of such SALNs.
According to the Republic, respondent's allegation seems to imply that she did file her
SALNs when the Certifications from the U.P. and the Ombudsman state otherwise.
Integrity, the Republic claims, is simply faithful adherence to the law, and the filing of
SALN is qualification implied from the requirement of integrity. The filing of SALN is
not an additional requirement unduly imposed on applicants to positions in the
Judiciary. When respondent failed to file her SALN, she did not comply with the
Constitution, laws and appropriate codes of conduct. There is no need to allege or
prove graft and corruption in order to prove an aspiring magistrate's lack of integrity.
Respondent maintains that whether respondent was person of "proven integrity" when she
applied for the position of Chief Justice is political question outside the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, which only the JBC and the President as the appointing authority could
determine. She avers that the application of the political question doctrine is not confined to
the President or Congress, as the Republic supposedly argues, but extends to other
government departments or officers exercising discretionary powers, such as the JBC which
uses its wisdom and discretion in determining whether an applicant to the Judiciary is
person of "proven" integrity.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole

and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination partakes
of the character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and
review powers;
b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution

and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so,
whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of
respondent as Chief Justice;
c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as
required by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the
JBC voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;
d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief

Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment
by the President cured such ineligibility.
Ruling:
1. Respondent is INELIGIBLE as Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief

Justice.
a. NO. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained

away by the JBC
In interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is
consistently held that the Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it
that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Furthermore, while
a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates,
the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and
legal requirements. The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the
requisite qualifications is determined based on facts and therefore does not
depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on the part of the
nominating body. Proceeding from this, qualifications under the Constitution
cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such qualification is
the requirement of possession of proven integrity required not only in the
Constitution, but also mentioned in administrative cases, in the Canons of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the Code of
Professional Integrity, and in the JBC009 Rules.
b. YES. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of

SALN intimately relates to person's integrity.
Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to a person’s integrity. Contrary to Respondent’s postulation
that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the
filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement, under
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful
compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even more
exacting when the public official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.
Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s

integrity. To be of proven integrity, as required by qualifications under the
Constitution, means that the applicant must have established a steadfast
adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line, failure to file the SALN
is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear
breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It
disregards the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and
corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with
the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and
the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public office.
Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate integrity
does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent accumulated unexplained
wealth is not in issue at this time, but whether she, in the first place, complied
with the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs.
Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the
Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of
proven integrity. Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as to the
filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Respondent opted to withhold such information or such evidence,
if at all, for no clear reason. Her defenses do not lie: 1) The Doblada doctrine
does not persuade because in that case Doblada was able to present
contrary proof that the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA,
thus rendering inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file SALNs for a
number of years, as opposed to the present case where no proof of existence
and filing were presented; 2) Being on leave from government service is not
equivalent to separation from service such that she was still required to
submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While Respondent is not required by law
to keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates that she should have obtained a
certification to attest to the fact of filing; 4) That UP HRDO never asked
Respondent to comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to
comply with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was
no duty for the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at
that time; 5) That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement was
reflected in the matrix of requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is
dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes into her qualifications which
were mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should have been
disqualified at the outset.
Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements. The SALNs filed by Respondent covering
her years of government service in U.P. appear to have been executed and filed
under suspicious circumstances; her SALNs filed with the UPHRDO were either
belatedly filed or belatedly notarized, while SALNs filed as Chief Justice were also
attended by irregularities. This puts in question the truthfulness of such SALNs, and
would amount to dishonesty if attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements.
c. YES. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants
who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have
been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. The established and
undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit the required number of SALNs in
violation of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The JBC
determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as
remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was already
required. There was no indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the
years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by Respondent for her 20 years as a
professor in the U.P. College of Law and two years as Justice, as substantial
compliance. Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants
for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P.
College of Law. In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require only
the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for applicants to the
Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away with the
requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e.,
the submission of the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all
SALNs, was deemed sufficient. Records clearly show that the only remaining
applicant-incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to have
substantially complied was Respondent, who submitted only three SALNs, i.e., 2009,
2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so.
Her justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs are old
and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able to retrieve some of the SALNs
dating back to 1985. Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as having
complied with the submission of the SALN by submitting a Certificate of Clearance
issued by the U.P. HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as a substitute for
SALNs. Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to
disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any
claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. For these
reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Respondent for interview as it
already required the submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the
immediately preceding 10 years up to December 31, 2011.
Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means
that her integrity was not established at the time of her application. Contrary to
Respondent’s argument that failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC is not cause for
disqualification, the requirement to submit the SALNs, along with the waiver of bank
deposits, is not an empty requirement that may easily be dispensed with, but was
placed by the JBC itself for a reason — in order to allow the JBC to carry on its
mandate of recommending only applicants of high standards and who would be
unsusceptible to impeachment attacks due to inaccuracies in SALNs. Without 9
submissions of such requirement, the JBC and the public are without opportunity to
measure the candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty.
Respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not able to
prove her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
d. NO. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
As the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under
the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and
appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other
words, the inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the
President cannot override the minimum Constitutional qualifications. The Court has
ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without the necessity of impleading the
JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members
and the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO), as regards the circumstances relative
to the selection and nomination of Respondent submitted to this Court. Neither will
the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Respondent. The action of the
JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member, is reflective of
the action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted
and nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC,
commits the same mistake and the President’s subsequent act of appointing
Respondent cannot have any curative effect. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such
discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is
qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which,
the appointment is susceptible to attack. The Court also took into account, while
conceding that the petition is not an administrative case or an inquiry into tax evasion
against her, that Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions
demonstrating dishonesty and lack of forthrightness are discordant with any claim of
integrity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY
HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial
and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for
casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.
A.C. No. 8986

Reynaldo M. Siquig v. Atty. Raleston F. Falcutilla
Facts:
Siquig is one of the defendants in a civil case for Judicial Settlement, Adjudication and Accounting of
Estate filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 66. The trial court ordered
Siquig to render an accounting of the income derived from the subject property and to pay the
plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Within the period for filing an appeal or motion for reconsideration, Atty. Falcutilla did not file any
pleading for Siquig.
The plaintiffs in the civil case filed a Motion for Execution, citing the finality of the decision.
In response to the plaintiffs' motion, Atty. Falcutilla filed a Comments and/or Opposition, stating that
there was no proof that his office received a copy of the Decision.
The trial court rejected Atty. Falcutilla's arguments on the supposed lack of proof of receipt and
granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Execution instead.
Siquig alleges that he was informed by Atty. Falcutilla of the adverse Decision only five months after it
was rendered and only after he inquired with the trial court; and that when he confronted Atty.
Falcutilla, the latter promised that he would file an appeal but failed to do so.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of evidence. The
Investigating Commissioner noted that Siquig failed to submit any evidence to support his letter, and
that he failed to appear or explain his absence in the proceedings.
In a Notice of Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors reversed and set aside the Commissioner's
recommendation, and recommended that Atty. Falcutilla be suspended from the practice of law for
six months instead.
The IBP Board of Governors noted in its Extended Resolution that based on the records of the case,
Atty. Falcutilla indeed failed to file a timely remedy to the adverse Decision and also failed to inform
Siquig of the said judgment.
Issue
Is Atty. Falcutilla negligent in handling his client's case?
Ruling
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[lawyers] shall serve [their]
client with competence and diligence."
Under Rules 18.03 and 18.04, serving a client with competence and diligence entails not neglecting a
legal matter entrusted to them and keeping the client informed of the status of the case, viz.:
RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to [him/her], and [his/her]
negligence in connection therewith shall render [him/her] liable.
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of [his/her] case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
In Katipunan, Jr. v. Carrera, the Court ruled that the failure of a lawyer to timely and
adequately inform the client of the status of the case destroys the trust reposed on the lawyer and
on the legal profession as a whole. Further, in Spouses Adecer v. Akut, the Court held that a lawyer's
neglect of a legal matter, such as the failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration or appeal,
subjects the lawyer to liability for negligence.
Hence, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions for failure to timely inform the client of
the status of the case and for the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration, viz.:
Respondent's agreement to handle complainant's case, as shown by his receipt of his legal
fees, is an assurance and representation to his client that he would be diligent and competent in
handling the case. This includes the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration, constantly
updating on the status of the case, and availing of the proper remedy, such as filing a notice of
appeal when the motion for reconsideration will be denied. Thus, his actuations are contrary to
Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR.
In this case, it is clear that respondent filed the motion for reconsideration 17 days late. Also,
when the motion for reconsideration was denied he, likewise, failed to file a notice of appeal.
Because of this, the judgment has attained finality and judgment was executed against complainant.
Without a doubt, this exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client's cause
in violation of Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR.
Accordingly, the Court sustains the IBP Board of Governor's recommendation to suspend
Atty. Falcutilla from the practice of law for six months. He is reminded that being a lawyer is a
privilege burdened with conditions, among which is to serve the client with competence and
diligence. When lawyers fail to comply with such condition and exhibit negligence in handling their
clients' case, they may be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and imposed administrative
sanctions.
Arthuro S. Barsobia v. Atty. Pendatun C. Abubacar
Before the Court is an administrative case initiated by Arthuro S. Barsobia (Arthuro) against Atty.
Pendatun C. Abubacar (Atty. Pendatun) for the latter's alleged grave misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Section 20, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Facts:
On October 5, 2006, Arthuro filed a complaint for grave abuse of authority before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao against Sabdullah Abubacar who was then the Regional Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau in Region
10, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City.
According to Sabdullah, the allegations of Arthuro in his complaint before the Ombudsman were
unfounded. Resultantly, its filing discredited his honor and reputation as an honest and faithful public
official. Thus, on December 18, 2006, he filed a Complaint to claim damages against Arthuro before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City, Branch 10.
At this juncture, it bears noting that Atty. Pendatun, Sabdullah's brother, served as the latter's
counsel in both the administrative and civil cases.
On August 17, 2011, in relation to the civil case, Arthuro received a Pre-Trial Brief for the Plaintiff
filed by Sabdullah through Atty. Pendatun. Paragraph 4 thereof alleged:
4. That the office of the Ombudsman after judiciously look to the existence of probable cause failed to
merit the imputation thereby dismissing all those cases which were found to be maliciously hatched
by the defendant.
Thus, on August 20, 2011, Arthuro requested for a status update of his complaint before the
Ombudsman to verify the truthfulness of the aforesaid allegation. In an August 22, 2011
Certification, the Ombudsman informed Arthuro that his complaint is still pending in their office for a
fact-finding investigation.
Consequently, on August 23, 2011, Arthuro immediately filed the present Complaint against Atty.
Pendatun for fabricating an allegation in his client's pre-trial brief. He contended that Atty.
Pendatun's act of lying is a breach of the peremptory tenets of ethical conduct.
Defense of the Atty. Pendatun:
As to the allegation of lying in his client's pre-trial brief, he maintained that allegations made on a
lawyer's pleading are just allegations as confided by a client, the falsity or truthfulness of which are
matters proven during trial. Thus, a lawyer who alleges the same does not and cannot guarantee
their truthfulness.
Issue:
Did Atty. Pendatun violate the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 10 of the CPR, Sec. 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice?
Held:
Atty. Pendatun violated the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the CPR, and Sec. 20, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
"Before lawyers are admitted to the bar, they must first solemnly swear to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court. This oath, to which all lawyers subscribe in solemn agreement
to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every
lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. This duty is expressed in general terms in the
CPR, thus:" CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. It is codified
further in the following rule of the CPR:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. In addition, Sec. 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court states that it is the duty of an attorney, among others, "to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and
never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.
Here, We uphold the IBP's findings that Atty. Pendatun deliberately lied in the pre-trial brief of his
brother and client Sabdullah. His defense that allegations on a pleading are just allegations as
confided by a client deserves scant consideration. First, it bears stressing that he served as
Sabdullah's counsel both in the administrative and civil cases. Consequently, he cannot feign
ignorance as to the status of the administrative case. Second, as counsel, his responsibility is
governed by Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the prevailing Rules at the time the
pleadings were filed), which reads:
Sec. 3. Signature and address. - x x x. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him [ or her]
that he [ or she] has read the pleading; that to the best of his [ or her] knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
Indeed, the provision signify the duty of lawyers to conduct due diligence before signing their
pleadings. Atty. Pendatun should be reminded that as counsel, he should not just have accepted his
client's allegations hook, line, and sinker. As an officer of the court, the lawyer's high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at a correct conclusion. Courts meanwhile are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
The use of offensive language in a pleading constitutes a violation of Rule 11.03 of the CPR Rule
11.03 of the CPR mandates that "[a] lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts."
"On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive
personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language, even in his [ or her]
pleadings, must be dignified.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Pendatun's act of calling Arthuro "arrogant" and "ignorant" of procedural rules in
his Comment constitutes a violation of Rule 11.03 of the CPR. Admittedly, "[t]hough a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place
in the dignity of the judicial forum."
MARCIANA BUENAVENTURA vs. HON. MARIANO V. BENEDICTO
38 SCRA 71 Adm. Case No. 137-J

March 27, 1971
DOCTRINE
Serious misconduct as ground for removal, defined. —Section 67 of Republic Act

296, as amended, provides two grounds for the removal of judges; serious misconduct and
inefficiency. “Serious” means “important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling,” and
“misconduct” refers to “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.” “Misconduct” also
implies “a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.” Leniency of judge in
administrative supervision of his employees is inclined to an undesirable trait. The slightest
breach of duty by and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees
detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
Canons of Judicial Ethics require judges to refrain from private business ventures or
charitable enterprises.—Section 24 requires a judge to refrain from private business ventures
or charitable enterprises so as not to give occasion for any suspicion that he utilizes the power
of his office or the influence of his name for the success of such undertakings or to give rise
to any situation wherein his personal interest might conflict with the impartial performance of
his official duties.
FACTS
On January 9, 1969, Marciana Buenaventura (hereinafter referred to as the

complainant), the offended party in a criminal prosecution for forcible abduction with rape,
and likewise the plaintiff in a civil action for annulment of marriage, filed with this Court a
complaint against the Honorable Mariano V. Benedicto (Respondent Judge) in whose sala
both the aforementioned cases fell, seeking his removal from office on the basis of verified
charges: Imputed to the respondent judge are: (1) serious misconduct in relation to the
criminal and civil cases; (2) immorality its connection with both cases; (3) gross inefficiency
and incompetence in relation to the criminal action; and (4) knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment in the criminal case The complainant seeks the removal of the respondent judge on
the first ground and enumerates a number of facts allegedly constituting the imputed charge
of serious misconduct, five of which acts the Honorable Justice Alvendia found unsupported
by evidence. The remaining one—that the respondent judge sanctioned the practice of his
deputy clerk of court of delegating to the clerk-messenger the promulgation of decisions of
acquittal in criminal cases is tantamount serious misconduct.
ISSUE
W/N the Respondent Judge is guilty of serious misconduct and inefficiency.
RULING:
It was found out that the respondent judge:
1. Has been remiss in the supervision of his court employees by failing, upon learning
that the deputy clerk of court on three occasions had entrusted to the clerk-messenger
the promulgation of decisions of acquittal, to take corrective action and to discipline
the erring court employees
2. Had involved himself in a program to furnish his court, ill-equipped at the time of his
assumption of office, as presiding judge thereof, with the necessary facilities, by
appointing the members of the campaign committee which solicited donations and
contributions
3. Failed to exercise requisite care and discretion by receiving the complainant in his
private chambers, considering that the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
the said complainant (against one of the accused in the criminal action)was yet
pending before his sala; and
4. Failed to resolve in explicit unmistakable terms the prosecution’s motion for
suspension of the criminal action based on the ground that the civil action for
annulment of marriage constituted a prejudicial question.
The respondent judge is not guilty of serious misconduct or inefficiency. We nevertheless are
of the considered view that the acts of commission as well as of omission properly imputable
to him, while not warranting the imposition of any disciplinary sanction, clearly demonstrate
the need for greater care, prudence and discretion in his future actuations.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court admonishes the respondent Judge Mariano V. Benedicto (a) to
exercise close and unremitting supervision over his subordinates, and (to) at all times to
adhere to the full intendment of each and all of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
MARYANNE MERIAM B. GUEVARRA-CASTIL VS. ATTY. EMELY REYESTRINIDADAC NO. 10294,

JULY 12, 2022
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Maryanne Merriam B. Guevarra-Castil filed a Complaint, accusing her husband,Orlando L. Castil, Jr.,
and Atty. Trinidad, of maintaining an extramarital affair. Both Orlando and Atty. Trinidad are officers
of the Philippine National Police. Sometime in January of 2009, Maryanne confronted
Orlando, and Orlando confirmed his infidelity with Atty. Trinidad - likewise a married woman.
Desperate to save her marriage, Maryanne contacted Atty. Trinidad to beg her to stop seeing
Orlando, and end their romantic entanglement. However, instead of showing remorse,
Atty.Trinidad allegedly insulted and demeaned Maryanne, bragging about her being a lawyer and a
ranking PNP personnel.
One day, Maryanne stumbled upon a birth certificate. Upon perusal, Maryanne seethe child's name
and the indicated parents - Atty. Trinidad and Orlando. The birth certificate also contained an
"Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity "executed by Orlando. Eventually, Orlando
admitted that the child, whose details are indicated in the birth certificate Maryanne found, belongs
to him and Atty. Trinidad. Maryanne likewise alleged that Atty. Trinidad shamelessly flaunted online
the fruit of their unfaithfulness by uploading, and posting photos of her with Orlando, and their
child.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Trinidad should be disbarred for the acts complained of.
RULING: Yes. She is disbarred from the practice of law, and her name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. Atty. Emely Reyes Trinidad is guilty of Gross Immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The fitness to be
a lawyer is a continuing requirement, measured against the standards laid out in the Lawyer's
Oath and the CPR, and apply to all facets of their life, including private dealings. Needless to say, the
same standards of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer apply to all, whether privately or
publicly employed. There is no denying that Atty. Trinidad's actions of maintaining an adulterous
affair with Orlando, which even produced a child, falls under the definition of grossly immoral
conduct. As correctly found by the Commission, these acts are not only grossly immoral and
unlawful, but more importantly, "adversely reflects on Atty. Trinidad's fitness to practice law."
MARYANNE MERIAM B. GUEVARRA-CASTIL VS. ATTY. EMELY REYES
TRINIDAD
A.C. NO. 10294
JULY 12, 2022
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Maryanne Merriam B. Guevarra-Castil filed a Complaint, accusing her husband,

Orlando L. Castil, Jr., and Atty. Trinidad, of maintaining an extramarital affair. Both Orlando
and Atty. Trinidad are officers of the Philippine National Police.
Sometime in January of 2009, Maryanne confronted Orlando, and Orlando confirmed

his infidelity with Atty. Trinidad - likewise a married woman. Desperate to save her marriage,
Maryanne contacted Atty. Trinidad to beg her to stop seeing Orlando, and end their
romantic entanglement. However, instead of showing remorse, Atty. Trinidad allegedly
insulted and demeaned Maryanne, bragging about her being a lawyer and a ranking PNP
personnel.
One day, Maryanne stumbled upon a birth certificate. Upon perusal, Maryanne see the
child's name - and the indicated parents - Atty. Trinidad and Orlando. The birth certificate
also contained an "Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity" executed by
Orlando. Eventually, Orlando admitted that the child, whose details are indicated in the birth
certificate Maryanne found, belongs to him and Atty. Trinidad. Maryanne likewise alleged
that Atty. Trinidad shamelessly flaunted online the fruit of their unfaithfulness by uploading,
and posting photos of her with Orlando, and their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Trinidad should be disbarred for the acts complained of.
RULING:
YES. She is disbarred from the practice of law, and her name stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys. Atty. Emely Reyes Trinidad is guilty of Gross Immorality, in violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The fitness to be a lawyer is a continuing requirement, measured against the standards

laid out in the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR, and apply to all facets of their life, including
private dealings. Needless to say, the same standards of honesty and fairness expected of a
lawyer apply to all, whether privately or publicly employed.
There is no denying that Atty. Trinidad's actions of maintaining an adulterous affair
with Orlando, which even produced a child, falls under the definition of grossly immoral
conduct. As correctly found by the Commission, these acts are not only grossly immoral and
unlawful, but more importantly, "adversely reflects on Atty. Trinidad's fitness to practice
law."
LEONARDO L. SARMIENTO AND RICHARD G. HALILI, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.

GREGORIO C. FERNANDO, JR., A.K.A. JERRY FERNANDO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Complainants are business associates engaged in buying, developing and selling real estate. In 2013, they came
to know of respondent during a meet-up set up by one of their broker friends.
During the meet-up, respondent proposed the sale to the complainants of a 374-square meter parcel of land
(subject land), located in Parañaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 68952.3 In
order to entice the complainants to push through with such sale, respondent made the following representations:
1. He is the absolute owner of the subject land. This is true even though TCT No. 68952 was still in the
name of his parents—i.e., the spouses Gregorio and Natividad Fernando. His parents already conveyed
the subject land to him by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated 14 April 2012.
2. Both his parents are still alive, and their signatures in the SPA are genuine.
3. He is the sole heir of his parents.
Persuaded by the foregoing representations, the complainants agreed to purchase the subject land for
₱3,740,000.00. Not long after, however, a complaint seeking the nullification of the SPA, Deed of Sale and TCT
No. 010-2013000507 was brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque. It was filed by no other
than respondent's mother Natividad Fernando and the heirs of respondent's father Gregorio Fernando.
In Civil Case No. 14-040, the complainants learned of the falsity of respondent's representations, to wit:
1. Respondent is not the absolute owner of the subject land and the SPA dated 14 April 2012, upon which
respondent bases his claim of ownership, is falsified.
2. Gregorio Fernando could not have signed the SPA since the latter already died as of April 4, 1997. On
the other hand, the forgery of Natividad Fernando's signature in the SPA is made apparent from a
comparison between such signature and the latter's legitimate signature as appearing in her Office of
the Senior Citizen Affair (OSCA) card.
3. Respondent has no less than four (4) living siblings.
Hence, to preserve TCT No. 010-2013000507 the complainants were constrained to enter into a settlement with
Natividad Fernando and the heirs of Gregorio Fernando for ₱2,992,000.00. They demanded reimbursement
from the respondent but to no avail. Prejudiced by the turn of events, the complainants filed two (2) cases
against the respondent: an estafa complaint, and the instant disbarment petition.
Defense of the respondent:
1. The complainants lack legal personality to file the petition for disbarment as they do not come to IBP-
CBD with clean hands. The complainants themselvesare guilty of perjury when, in the petition's
verification/certification, they stated that: "[they did not] commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in xxx any [other] forum." Such statement is clearly false, however, in light
of the pendency of the estafa complaint before the OCP.
2. The SPA dated 14 April 2012 is not a falsification; it is merely a reiteration of an SPA31 dated 22
December 2002 and another SPA dated 22 November 1978. The SPA dated 22 November 1978,
however, is currently in the possession of his brother, Rene Fernando.
Issue: Is the disbarment case meritorious?
Held:
Yes. The evidence on record is damning against the respondent. Taken together, the complainants' evidence
engendered reasonable conclusions that the SPA dated 14 April 2012 was falsified, and that respondent used
such falsified SPA, along with other deceitful representations, in order to sell and profit from a property that he
knew was not his or his to sell.
Neither could respondent's attack against the personality of the complainants to file the present administrative
case be given serious consideration. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the complainants did not perjure when
they stated in their petition's verification/certification that they did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in any other form. The reason is obvious. Though they may be based on the same
facts, the preliminary investigation for estafa initiated by the complainants is distinct from and does not involve
the same issues as the present administrative case. The purpose of the preliminary investigation proceedings is
the determination of whether there is probable cause to file a criminal indictment against the respondent for
estafa, while the issue underlying this administrative case is whether the respondent may be administratively
sanctioned as a lawyer. Hence, the complainants' mere filing of an estafa complaint against the respondent
cannot, as it did not, preclude them from instituting disciplinary proceedings against the respondent.
It is indubitable that respondent's actions constitute gross violations of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), viz:
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a
member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up
to the exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a
privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."
Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as
recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. x x x39 (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted).
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1204 July 28, 2008
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-355-MTJ)
GERONIMO C. FUENTES, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROMUALDO G. BUNO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC),
Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, Respondent.
DIGEST
DOCTRINE:
1) MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of
documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and They may not, as
notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only
enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of
conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private
practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
2) MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries
public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the
competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the
account of the Government and turned over to the municipal; and, (2) certification be made
in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit.
3) Judges are enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct to regulate their extra-judicial
activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. 4
FACTS:
Geronimo Fuentes alleged that Judge Romualdo Buno prepared and notarized an Extra
Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale of an agricultural land located at
Talibon, Bohol. According to the complainant, Judge Buno abused his discretion and
authority as well as he committed graft and corruption when he notarized the said
document as ex-officio Notary Public. Judge Buno admitted that he notarized the said
document while he was the Presiding Judge of the MCTC Talibon-Getafe. He said that he did
the notarization with the authority of brothers and sisters with respect to Eulalia de Fuentes
as the latter selling her share of the conjugal property. He also contended that he could not
be charged of graft and corruption since there were no notary public on the said place. A
municipal judge is allowed to notarize documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public. He
supported his contention with two certifications from Atty. Azucena C Macalolot, Clerk of
Court of RTC Bohol, certifying that there were no petition for commission and/or renewal of
commission as notary public was granted by the said RTC court and no appointment as
notary public was issued for that year, and the other from Mayor Juanario Item of Talibon
Bohol who also certified that no notary public was staying and residing in the said place.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Buno was qualified to notarized as ex-officio Notary Public considering
that he is a presiding judge of MCTC Talibon-Getafe.
Ruling:
No, he is not qualified to notarized as ex-officio Notray Public.
While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296,1 as amended, and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code2 authorize MTC and MCTC judges to perform the functions of notaries
public ex officio, the Court laid down the scope of said authority in SC Circular No. 1-90.
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties
They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment
of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation
to the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only
enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of
conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private
practice of law
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which
have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to
municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries
public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to
the municipal treasurer, and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting
to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the document itself, entitled
"Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" and the acknowledgment
of the said document, which had no relation at all to the performance of his function as a
judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent
judge’s territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court
and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a
certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or
circuit be made in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the
Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to
indicate in his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was charged for that
transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of
Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the MCTC,
Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC
Circular No. 1-90, even if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of
any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.
Further, Respondent judge was silent as to whether he charged fees when he notarized
documents and if so, whether he turned over the notarial fees to the municipal treasurer.
Moreover, contrary to Rule IV, Sec. 6(a) of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, 3
respondent notarized the said document without the SPA of the attorney-in-fact of the
vendors which gave rise to the legal problem between the vendors and the vendee
concerning the scope of authority of the aforesaid attorney-in-fact. By failing to comply with
the conditions set for SC Circular No. 1-90 and violating the provision of the Rules on
Notarial Practice of 2004, respondent judge failed to conduct himself in a manner that is
beyond reproach and suspicion.
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and
GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO
G. CANTERO, respondent.|||
(Apiag v. Cantero, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070, [February 12, 1997], 335
PHIL 511-527)
Facts:
- Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom
and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo
G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan,
Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed
bigamy and falsification of public documents.
- Respondent and complainant Maria joined together in holy matrimony
in marriage after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they
begot a daughter||| and then on a son.Thereafter, defendant left the
conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff
Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager income as a public
school teacher at Southern Leyte. They suffered a lot after respondent
abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. For several years,
respondent was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.|||
- After few years, defendant surfaced at Southern Leyte, whereupon,
complainants begged for support, however, they were ignored by
respondent.
- A letter was sent by the complainants towards the respondent judge
asking for the performance of his duty as a father and husband as
afforded by the law but such letter elicited no action nor response from
respondent.
- Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had
another family.
- In all of the public documents required of Judge Cantero to be filed
with the Supreme Court such as his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, his personal data sheet, income tax returns and his insurance
policy with the Government Service Insurance System, he
misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom
he contracted a second marriage when the truth of the matter is that
defendant is married to Maria Apiag with whom they have two legitimate
children.
- Respondent explained his side admitting the existence of the attached
married certificate but vehemently deny the validity of its due execution,
for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot their wishes and
purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a matter of
fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to our town at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's
birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to appear
in a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our
signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract. That was
46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year
high school days, he said.
- Complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man
during her public service as public school teacher and have begotten a
child.
- That respondent did not file any annulment or judicial declaration (of
nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the contention and honest
belief, all the way, that the said marriage was void from the beginning,
and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so will be
inconsistent with the stand of the respondent.
- Respondent and the complainant have signed a compromised
agreement, stating among other things that respondent will give a
monthly allowance to Terecita Sacurom and the complainant will
withdraw their complaint from the Supreme Court.,
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge can be charge of Grave

Misconduct.
Ruling: NO.
- The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge
comprises the following: abandonment of his first wife and children,
failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and
falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for
administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
- By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his
performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his
character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all
times, it is necessary to separate the character of man from the
character of an officer. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official
duties.
- In the case at bar, the Court stated that, the acts imputed against
respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have
no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds
directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. Therefore,
said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in
office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero to warrant
disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the
performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate the
character of the man from the character of the officer.|

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ALFREDO LAGAMON v JUDGE RUSTICO PADERANGA

A.M. No. 08-2123

JULY 14, 2008

Administrative complaint against Judge Paderanga of RTC Mambajao, Camiguin relative

In a letter-complaint, complainant Lagamon alleged that accused was arraigned on June

OCA: Found respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

WON Judge Paderanga is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

The Court adopts the findings of the OCA.

MONICA PONTIANO v ATTY. FABIAN GAPPI

JUNE 28, 2022

Respondent failed to file an answer on the administrative case as required by IBP-CBD

Complainants filed their Position paper while respondent did not.

IBP-CBD: Found respondent guilty of violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the

[ A.C. No. 11959, April 28, 2021 ]

ATTY. LOURDES PHILINA B. DUMLAO, RESPONDENT

Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)

An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-

Adelita R Llunar vs Atty Romulo Ricafort

Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable.

OLD GUIDELINES FOR CLEMENCY

EUSEBIO D. SISON, PETITIONER, VS.

ATTY. LOURDES PHILINA B. DUMLAO, RESPONDENT

Judge Moya’s Case

JUDGE ARCILLA’S CASE

[ A.C. No. 11304. June 28, 2022 ]

LEONARDO L. SARMIENTO AND RICHARD G. HALILI, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. GREGORIO

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship

TAN VS. PACURIBOT

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007

JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,

ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,

Members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion,

No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.

No, you're not from UP.

I am very proud of it.

MIRANDA vs. ATTY. CARPIO September 26, 2011

SISON Vs. DUMLAO, AC NO. 11959, April 28, 2021

A lawyer-client relationship is established when lawyers consistently manifest to a person consulting

2. YES, the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao is hereby REPRIMANDED with a

LAO Vs. CAUSING, AC NO. 13453, October 4, 2022

AC No. 13462, January 17, 2023

WON respondents may be disciplined for violations of the provisions in CPR.

Reynaldo M. Siquig v. Atty. Raleston F. Falcutilla

A.C. No. 8986 [Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5442

January 25, 2023

In response to the plaintiffs' motion, Atty. Falcutilla filed a Comments and/or

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines In a Report and Recommendation, the

Is Atty. Falcutilla negligent in handling his client's case?

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[lawyers]

Respondent's agreement to handle complainant's case, as shown by his receipt of

Candia v. Tagabucba, A.M. No. 528-MJ, September 12, 1977

A.C. No. 137-J. March 27, 1971

MARCIANA BUENAVENTURA, Complainant, v. HON. MARIANO V.

- Marciana Buenaventura, offended party in a criminal prosecution for

- The Court referred and assigned the administrative case to the

- After proceedings and investigation duly conducted on the

1. The respondent judge allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro

to promulgate decisions in criminal cases, in violation of the provisions of

2. The respondent judge formed a committee to solicit