VII.

Possession
A. Characteristics

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. METRO INDEX REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012

PROPERTY: 3 parcels of land located at Barangay Alulod/Mataas na Lupa, Indang, Cavite with a consolidated area of
39,490 sqm.

FACTS:

Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation filed an application for judicial confirmation of title over three (3)
parcels of land located at Indang, Cavite.

Respondent’s witnesses testified that: (a) the respondent bought the subject properties from Herminia, Melinda Sicap
(Melinda), and Hernando Sicap (Hernando); (b) the subject properties had been declared for tax purposes in the
respondent’s name since 2006; (c) the subject properties are alienable and disposable as evidenced by the certification
issued by the DENR; (d) as shown by their respective affidavits, the adjoining lot owners had no adverse claim and
objections to the respondent’s application; and (e) the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject properties for more than fifty (50) years. Herminia, on the other hand, testified that: (a) she
and her siblings, Melinda and Hernando, inherited the subject properties from their parents, Brigido Sicap and Juana
Espineli; (b) their parents had been in possession of the subject properties since 1956 as shown by the tax declarations
in their name; (c) from the time they inherited the subject properties, they had actively cultivated them and religiously
paid the taxes due; and (d) the subject properties are planted with coconut, banana, santol, palay and corn.

RTC: Granted respondent’s application ruling that the possession of herein applicant as well as that of its predecessors-
in-interest has been open, public, continuous, notorious and adverse to the whole world and therefore, the applicant is
entitled to the relief prayed for.

CA: Denied the appeal ruling that while only a few trees are found on the subject properties, this fact coupled with the
diligent payment of taxes since 1956 sufficed to substantiate the claim that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession in the manner and for the length of time required by law.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent and its predecessors-in-interest has been in open, public, continuous, notorious possession of the
subject property.

HELD:

Yes.

It may be true that only few trees are planted and grown on the lots, but this does not mean that appellee and their
predecessors-in-interest do now own them. Surely, ownership is not measured alone by the number or kind of crops
planted on the land. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of its entirely is a constructive possession of
the entire tract, so long as no portion thereof is in the adverse possession of another. At any rate, some owners may be
hardworking enough to fully utilize their lands, some may not be as hardworking. But both do not retain or lose their
ownership on the basis alone of the degree of hard work they put into their respective lands.

This Court finds that while appellee’s predecessors-in-interest may not have fully tilled the lots, this does not destroy
their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, in the concept of owner. They have proven their
particular acts of ownership by planting crops on the lots, declaring them for tax purposes in their names, religiously
paying taxes thereon since 1956 onward, and retaining peaceful, open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious
possession of it for over 50 years. x x x:6 (Citation omitted)

HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ABALOS

G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001

PROPERTY: A parcel of land containing an area of 24,550 square meters, more or less (Nipa with an area of 8,410 sqm;
fishpond with an area of 14,000 sqm; and residential land with an area of 1,740 sqm, more or less) located in Lingayen,
Pangasinan

FACTS:

A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land was originally owned by
one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years to the Spouses David and Consuelo with
RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting as caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration
of the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he owned was divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots
inherited was sold to the Spouses ABALOS. The other lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not
completely (only ¾ of the lot). The lots in question were subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses Abalos. The
courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so
filed cases against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in possession of the land claiming rights of “Security of Tenure”
as a tenant of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether a winning party in a land registration case may effectively eject the possessor thereof?

HELD:

No.

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to
exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.

Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of
another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived
without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership,
therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.

There is no dispute that private respondents' title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality.
However, such declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially so in
the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural
tenant.

The Tenancy Act provides that agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on
their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an
agricultural tenant.
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of
tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land
registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an
agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.

BUENAVENTURA vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007

PROPERTY: Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, Parañaque Cadastre, located in San Dionisio, Parañaque
City, with an area of 3,520.92 square meters, more or less

FACTS:

Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa Buenavengtura are the applicants for registration of title over the subject property.
They are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) from whom they acquired
the subject property.

They presented five witnesses, in order to establish the fact that petitioners and their predecessors have acquired
vested right over the subject property by their open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any adverse claim, meaning, their possession of the subject
property was in the manner and for the period required by law; likewise, to prove the alienable and disposable character
of the subject property.

Trial Court: Granted the application.

Feeling aggrieved with the order of the trial court, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to the
Republic, petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-
interest and by themselves; hence, the trial court erred in granting petitioners’ application for registration of the subject
property.

CA: Rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners’ possession can be characterized as open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner

HELD:

Yes.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did
not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of
"those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

It becomes crystal clear that even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12
June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.

It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because
of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and
whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right
to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June
1945.

The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while petitioners’ possession over the
subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subject property
became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, 32 years
to be exact, reckoned from the year 1968, when the subject property was finally declared alienable and disposable by
the DENR to the time they filed an application for registration of title over the subject property on 5 June 2000.
Petitioners’ possession of the subject property since 1968 has been characterized as open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.

JOSE MA. T. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. MAGPAYO AND PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 133140. August 10, 1999

PROPERTY: A parcel of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati

FACTS:

Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II
Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma.
Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).

"On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a
loan. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at
the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the land.

The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title
over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's.

On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-731, which Branch 148 thereof granted. Upon service of the writ
of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor
it and filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied.

Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and
damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia,
and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. He asserts that ownership over the disputed property was not transmitted
to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual
and adverse possession thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner’s possession could ripen into ownership.

HELD:

No.

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia
and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the
Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.

Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. "A
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so." On the other hand, "one
who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong." The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an
owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents.

We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that
petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a
valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother's
share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate
submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer
considered owned by petitioner's parents.

ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE vs. SPS. MAGLUNOB and ROMEO SALIDO

G.R. No. 178906, February 18, 2009

PROPERTY: A parcel of land situated in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, consisting of 7,176 sqm.

FACTS:

Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the subject
property. Respondents Martin (Martin II) and Romeo are first cousins and the grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-
Dailisan (Esperanza), from whom petitioner acquired the subject property.

Petitioner and her husband against the respondents for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and Possession,
Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order stating that on 24 June 1985,
Esperanza executed a Last Will and Testament bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it
was never probated. On 9 June 1986, Esperanza executed another document, an Affidavit, in which she renounced,
relinquished, waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever in the subject property
in favor of petitioner and her husband.

In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject property. On 26 March 1993, OCT No. CLOA-
1748 was issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the name of petitioner, married to Ray
Mars E. Arangote. However, respondents, together with some hired persons, entered the subject property on 3 June
1994 and built a hollow block wall behind and in front of petitioner’s house, which effectively blocked the entrance to its
main door.

Respondents averred that they co-owned the subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her siblings, Tomas and
Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in equal shares, from their father Martin Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas
and Inocencia passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance to respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively.
Hence, the subject property was co-owned by Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and
respondent Romeo, each holding a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not validly waive her
rights and interest over the entire subject property in favor of the petitioner.

MCTC: Declared petitioner and her husband as the true and lawful owners of the subject property.

RTC: Reversed the MCTC Decision and adjudged respondents, as well as the other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the
lawful owners and possessors of the entire subject property.

CA: Denied the Petition for Review of petitioner and her husband and affirming the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is a possessor in good faith.

HELD:

No.

The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:

Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor by extraneous
evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Every possessor in good faith becomes a possessor
in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he believed to be true is not so.

In the present case, when respondents came to know that an OCT over the subject property was issued and registered in
petitioner’s name on 26 March 1993, respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993 before the Lupon of Barangay
Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, challenging the title of petitioner to the subject property on the basis that said property
constitutes the inheritance of respondent, together with their grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no authority to
relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner. From that moment, the good faith of the petitioner had ceased.

DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG

G.R. No. 159578, February 18, 2009

PROPERTY: A parcel of irrigated riceland with an area of 1,896 square meters located in Numancia, Aklan

FACTS:

During their lifetime, the spouses Candido and Gregoria Macahilig were the owners of seven parcels of land, all located
in Numancia, Aklan.

Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her
deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio Macahilig, over the seven parcels of land.

One of the properties partitioned in the Deed was a parcel of irrigated riceland with an area of 1,896 square meters
declared in the name of Maxima under Tax Declaration No. 644 which was denominated as Parcel One. This Parcel One
was divided between Vicenta Macahilig Galvez for the heirs of Mario Macahilig, who was given the one half southern
portion of the land; and Adela Macahilig for the heirs of Eusebio Macahilig, who got the one half northern portion.

On May 23, 1984, Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale.

On December 16, 1991, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, cancellation of
documents and damages against Maxima and petitioners alleging that they were the lawful owners and previous
possessors of the one half northern portion of Parcel One by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition; that since they
were all residents of Caloocan City, their land was possessed by their first
cousin, Penicula Divison Quijano, Maxima's daughter, as tenant thereon.

RTC: Declared the Deed of Sale executed by Maxima in favour of the petitioners null and void.
CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether owned the subject land as shown by her actual and continuous possession of the same.

HELD:

No.

Maxima's possession of the subject land was by reason of her request to her daughter Penicula, who was installed by
respondents as tenant after the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, as Maxima wanted to farm the land so
that she could have a share in the produce, to which Penicula acceded out of pity. It was also established that after the
execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Penicula as tenant was able to farm the subject land for one cropping
year before she allowed her mother Maxima to farm the land thereafter; and, at that time, Penicula gave the
corresponding share of the produce of that one crop year
to Adela,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/159578.htm - _ftn16 one of herein respondents, thus
establishing respondents' ownership of the subject land. Evidently, Maxima's possession of the land was not in the
concept of an owner.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION:

Petitioners: They contend that they are possessors in good faith, thus, the award of damages should not have been
imposed. They further contend that under Article 544, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before
the possession is legally interrupted; thus, if indeed petitioners are jointly and severally liable to respondents for the
produce of the subject land, the liability should be reckoned only for 1991 and not 1984.

HELD:

There is partial merit in this argument.

Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character, except in a case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly
or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors,
by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the
fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it
must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. Such interruption takes place upon service of summons.

Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
possession is not legally interrupted. Records show that petitioners received a summons together with respondents'
complaint on August 5, 1991; thus, petitioners' good faith ceased on the day they received the summons. Consequently,
petitioners should pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum beginning August 5, 1991 instead of 1984.

LIU VS. LOY

FACTS:

Teodoro Vaño (Teodoro), as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vaño, sold seven lots to Benito Liu, throughpetitioner Frank Liu
(Frank), and to Cirilo Pangalo. The lots sold to Benito Liu were Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14,and 15 while the lots sold to Cirilo
Pangalo were Lot Nos. 14 and 15. When Jose Vaño passed awayBenito Liu stopped further payments but after the Supreme
Court declared valid the will of his father,Teodoro informed Frank that he could already transfer the titles to the
buyers’ names upon payment of the balance of the purchase price.

It was only after nine years that Frank responded that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price of the seven
lots after he had purchased the lots formerly sold to Benito Liu and Cirilo Panglao. He requested for the execution of a
deed of sale of the lots in his name and the delivery of the titles to him. Despite repeated demands by Frank, Teodoro sold
Lot No. 6 to respondent Teresita Loy. Frank then filed a complaint against Teodoro for specific performance, execution of
deed of absolute sale,issuance of certificates of title and construction of subdivision roads, before the Court of First
Instanceand a notice of lis pendens on the seven lots was filed before the Register of Deeds. A year after,Teodoro sold Lot
No. 5 to respondent Alfredo Loy.

When the complaint filed by Frank was dismissed, he filed his claim to the probate court whichwas subsequently granted.
Milagros Vaño, who succeeded as administratrix of the Estate of Jose Vaño,executed a deed of conveyance covering the
seven lots in favor of Frank. The probate court, however,also approved the sale to respondents Teresita and Alfredo Loy
upon their motion and new titles wereissued under their name.As a result, Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance
or annulment of title of Lot Nos. 5 and6.

The trial court confirmed the unilateral extrajudicial rescission of the contract by the late TeodoroVaño and it was later
on affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the registration by the Loys of their contracts of sale made them the first registrants in good faith to defeat
petitioner’s claim as prior buyers.

RULING:

No, registration by the Loys of their contracts of sale did not defeat the right of petitioner as prior buyers because the person
who signed the Loys’ contracts was not the registered owner. The registered

owner of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 was the “Estate of Jose Vaño.” Teodoro Vaño was the seller in the contract of

sale with Alfredo Loy, Jr., while the Estate of Jose Vaño was the seller in the contract of sale withTeresita Loy.

Teodoro Vaño signed both contracts of sale. The rule is well-settled that “one who buys from a person who is not the registered
owner is not a purchaser in good faith. This is because purchasers were under notice to inquire why the land was not
registered in the name of the person whoexecuted the contracts of sale. In this case, the Loys were under notice that the
lots belonged to the “Estate of Jose Vaño” and any sale of the lots required court approval.

Moreover, the contracts of the Loys did not convey ownership of the lots to them as againstthird persons because there
was no approval of the sale by the probate court and registration with theRegister of Deeds. The Court ruled that
registration of the contracts without court approval would beineffective to bind third persons, especially creditors of the
estate. Otherwise, this will open the door tofraud on creditors of the estate.

TECNOGAS VS. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Technogas Phils is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Paranaque, purchased from Pariz Industries
together with all the buildings and improvements, including the wall existing thereon.

Respondent purchased a lot adjoining the petitioner’s land, upon learning of the encroachment by its building and wall
of a portion of the defendant’s land, the petitioner was offered to buy from the defendant particular porton of 770 sq m
more or less but the defendant refused.

In 1973, both parties came into an agreement that the petitioner Technogas shall demolish the wall at the back portion
of its land.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering the latter to sell that portion of land. CA reversed and set aside the decision
RTC appealed from.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in holding the petitioner a builder in bad faith because it is presumed to know the meters and
bounds of his property.

RULING:

We disagree with respondent Court. The two cases it relied upon do not support its main pronouncement that a registered
owner of land has presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of its own land, and is therefore in bad faith if he
mistakenly builds on an adjoining land. Aside from the fact that those cases had factual moorings radically different from
those obtaining here, there is nothing in those cases which would suggest, however remotely, that bad faith is imputable
to a registered owner of land when a part of his building encroaches upon a neighbors land, simply because he is
supposedly presumed to know the boundaries of his land as described in his certificate of title. No such doctrinal statement
could have been made in those cases because such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the contrary, we have
rejected such a theory in Co Tao vs. Chico, where we held that unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can
determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title.

Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a
narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching
structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith.[21] It is presumed that possession continues
to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.[22] Good faith consists in
the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.[23]
Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Parizs successor, petitioner in this case. Further, (w)here one derives title
to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former.[24] And possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except
in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully.[25] The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.

In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it acquired
the property from Pariz Industries. We agree with the trial court that various factors in evidence adequately show
petitioners lack of awareness thereof. In any case, contrary proof has not overthrown the presumption of good faith
under Article 527 of the Civil Code, as already stated, taken together with the disputable presumptions of the law on
evidence. These presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that the person is innocent of
a crime or wrong; and under Section 3 (ff) of Rule 131, that the law has been obeyed. In fact, private respondent
Eduardo Uy himself was unaware of such intrusion into his property until after 1971 when he hired a surveyor, following
his purchase of another adjoining lot, to survey all his newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the encroachment,
petitioner immediately offered to buy the area occupied by its building - - a species of conduct consistent with good
faith.

B. Acquisition of possession

CIR VS. SOLIDBANK

FACTS:

Solidbank filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns reflecting gross receipts amounting to P1,474,693.44. It alleged that
the total included P350,807,875.15 representing gross receipts from passive income which was already subjected to
20%final withholding tax (FWT).

The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) held in Asian Ban Corp. v Commissioner, that the 20% FWT should not form part of its
taxable gross receipts for purposes of computing the tax.


Solidbank, relying on the strength of this decision, filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund or tax credit. It also
filed a petition for review with the CTA where the it ordered the refund.

The CA ruling, however, stated that the 20% FWT did not form part of the taxable gross receipts because the FWT was not
actually received by the bank but was directly remitted to the government.

The Commissioner claims that although the FWT was not actually received by Solidbank, the fact that the amount
redounded to the bank’s benefit makes it part of the taxable gross receipts in computing the Gross Receipts Tax. Solidbank
says the CA ruling is correct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the FWT forms part of the gross receipts tax.

RULING:

Yes. In a withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed. The payor, a separate
entity, acts as no more than an agent of the government for the collection of tax in order to ensure its payment. This
amount that is used to settle the tax liability is sourced from the proceeds constitutive of the tax base.

These proceeds are either actual or constructive. Both parties agree that there is no actual receipt by the bank. What
needs to be determined is if there is constructive receipt. Since the payee is the real taxpayer, the rule on constructive
receipt can be rationalized.

The Court applied provisions of the Civil Code on actual and constructive possession. Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly
provides that the acquisition of the right of possession is through the proper acts and legal formalities established. The
withholding process is one such act. There may not be actual receipt of the income withheld; however, as provided for
in Article 532, possession by any person without any power shall be considered as acquired when ratified by the person
in whose name the act of possession is executed.

In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by the payor as the withholding agent of the government, because
the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for the government. There is thus constructive receipt.

The processes of bookkeeping and accounting for interest on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes that are subjected
to FWT are tantamount to delivery, receipt or remittance. Besides, Solidbank admits that its income is subjected to a tax
burden immediately upon “receipt”, although it claims that it derives no pecuniary benefit or advantage through the
withholding process.


There being constructive receipt, part of which is withheld, that income is included as part of the tax base on which the
gross receipts tax is imposed.

VILLAFUERTE VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Reynaldo Villafuerte and Perlita Villafuerte operated a gas station known as Peewees Petron Powerhouse
Service Station and General Merchandise on the premises of 3 adjoining lots at the corner of Gomez Strees and Quezon
Ave in Lucena City. One of these lots, is owned by several persons namely, Edilberto de Mesa, Gonzalo Daleon and his
brother Federico Daleon and Mrs. Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of Perlita Villafuerte.

Appellants Edilberto De Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon acquired their respective lots subject to the lease by Petrophil Corp.
which has built thereon the gasoline station being managed by the Villafuerte spouses. When the lease of Petrophil
expired on Dec. 31, 1988, the Villafuertes obtained a new lease on the lot of Edilberto de Mesa for a period expiring on
Dec. 31 1989.

As regards to the lot of Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes were not as lucky. For instead of obtaining a lease renewal,
what they received were demand letters from the brothers counsel ordering them to vacate the premises. Instead of
complying therewith, the Villafuertes simply ignored the demand and continued operating the gas station.

Gonzalo Daleon filed a complaint against the Villafuertes in the Office of the Barangay Caption of Lucena City. No
settlement was reached.

Villafuertes, upon exporation of lease contract with Edilberto de Mesa, the same was not renewed. The spouses
continued to operate their gasoline station and other businesses on the lot of De Mesa despite the latter’s demand to
vacate.

Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of several person and without the knowledge of the Villafuertes,
caused the closure of the latters gasoline station by constructing fences around it. Villafuertes countered with a
complaint for damages with premliminary mandatory injunction against both Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon.
The complaint seeks vindication for the alleged malicious and unlawful fencing of the plaintiff’s business premises.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it was improper for private respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order to remove
petitioners from the premises.

RULING:

No.

The continued occupation by petitioners of the two lots belonging to private respondents, despite the expiration of the
lease contracts over the same, petitioners had become undesirable lessees. However, it was improper for private
respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order to remove petitioners from the premises in the light of the clear
provision of the New Civil Code:

Art. 536 - In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid
of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law, private respondents were held accountable to petitioners for the
various damages prayed for by petitioners in their amended complaint.

Their continued occupation of private respondents properties was based on their belief that their lease contract with
private respondent De Mesa was modified and extended whereas private respondent Daleon had verbally agreed to allow
them to continue with their possession of his lot for as long as the Petron Corporations equipment remain in the premises.

Article 536 of the Civil Code previously quoted explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one who claims to be entitled
to the possession of a thing. When private respondents personally took it upon themselves to evict petitioners from their
properties, which act was in clear contravention of the law, they became liable for all the necessary and natural
consequences of [their] illegal act.

As expected, petitioners instituted this action praying that private respondents be held liable for actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of litigation. We shall resolve their right to these damages in
seriatim. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he
suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. Except as provided by
law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven.
It is hornbook doctrine that to be able to recover actual damages, the claimant bears the onus of presenting before the
court actual proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered.

A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award
must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne.


OLEGARIO VS. MARI

FACTS:

As early as 1916, Juan Mari, the father of Pedro Mari, declared his ownership over a parcel of land in Nancasalan,
Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planting
various fruit bearing trees and bamboos and constructing a house thereon. Tax Declarations in 1951 show that the
subject realty as a residential land with an area of 897 sq. m and as having the following boundaries: North – Magdalena
Fernandez; South – Catalina Cacayorin; East – Camino Vecinal;a nd West – Norberto Bugarin. In 1974, the subject realty
was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari, by virtue of a deed of sale.

In 1974, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a
new tax declaration for a certain 50-sq m parcel of land, then on May 1961, he executed a Deed of Quit-claim of
Unregistered Property”. In favor of Arsenio transferring to the latter the 50-sq m parcel of land.

In 1988, respondent filed with the DENR a protest against the petitioners because of their encroachment into the
disputed property. DENR decided in favor of the respondent and found the latter to be the owner of the 50-sq m lot.
Petitioners did not appeal and the decision became final and executory.

In 1989, Arsenio caused the amendment of his tax declaration for the 50-sq m property to reflect an increased area of
341 sq m. In 1990, after discovering the amended entries in Arsenio’s Tax Declaration, respondent filed a complaint with
the RTC for recovery of possession and annulment of tax declaration. RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
CA reversed the RTC’s findings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in its decision in adjudicating ownership of the said lots in favor of the respondent.

RULING:

No.

All these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly
and peacefully since 1916 or long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from his father's
tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other
hand, petitioners acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.

Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, petitioners did not acquire ownership. Firstly, they had no
just title. Petitioners did not present any document to show how the titles over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17533 were
transferred to them, whether from respondent, his predecessor, or any other person. Petitioners, therefore, could not
acquire the disputed real property by ordinary prescription through possession for 10 years.

Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of
hostility towards the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse
possession. In other words, possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under
claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely
tolerated by the owner - did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession is continued, it does
not start the running of the prescriptive period.

Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless
such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and
exercised under such circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.
Petitioners have failed to prove that their possession was adverse or under claim of title or right. Unlike respondent,
petitioners did not have either the courage or forthrightness to publicly declare the disputed lots as owned by them for
tax purposes.

Respondent showed through his tax declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he, through his
predecessor, had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916. "Open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period - ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property."

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years. For
purposes of deciding the instant case, therefore, the possession by respondent and his predecessor had already
ripened into ownership of the subject realty by virtue of prescription as early as 1946.

DE VERA-CRUZ VS. MIGUEL

FACTS:

Petitioners Agueda de Vera-Cruz, Mario, Evangeline, Edronel, Angelito, Teodoro, Jr., and Fernando, all surnamed Dela
Cruz, are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at the Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela.

A portion of the land was part of a homestead applied for in 1921 by Angel Madrid, after the death of Madrid, his widow
and children extra judicially partitioned his estate wherein a portion was adjudicated to the widow and another portion
was given to his children. Then, on Sept 1955, Cipriano Madrid, the widow, sold the entire lot to spouses Teodora Dela
Cruz and Agueda De Vera.

On 01 June 1956, Teodoro Dela Cruz commenced an accion publiciana in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Isabela against
Silverio Corpus and 23 others for alleged illegal occupation of the property.

On 18 January 1957, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed Civil Case in the CFI
of Isabela for reversion of homestead consisting of the property against the widow and heirs of homesteader Angel
Madrid, Agueda de Vera, Teodoro Dela Cruz and others.
Teodoro Dela Cruz likewise filed an accion publiciana (BR. II-79) with the CFI of Isabela against other occupants of the lots
he bought. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Teodoro Dela Cruz the absolute owner of the property.

On 30 June 1987, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Cauayay, Isabela, for Recovery of Possession with
Damages against respondent for allegedly occupying two hundred (200) square meters, more or less, of the property
without any legal right to do so, much less their consent or permission, and has failed and refused to vacate the premises
despite repeated demands.

On Aug 1987, respondent alleged that the land being claimed by petitioners is different from the land where her house is
standing and such land was awarded by the municipal govt to her, and also she claims that she has been occupying the
land since Feb 1946 and no one molested her in her actual possession and use thereof except the claims of petitioners
which she came to know only on July 1987 when she received the summons. Petitioners denied the allegations and
asserted that the land was registered land was duly titled in their names. They said that since their predecessor-in-interest
was declared as the true and legal owner, the municipality had no power or authority to dispose or award any portion of
the land in favor of third parties.

On 27 April 1988, the RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring petitioners the owners of the land in question and
ordered respondent to vacate the same and to remove whatever improvement she has introduced on the lot. CA rules
that plaintiffs-appellees are guilty of laches for their unexplained and unreasonable delay in asserting their right to the
subject land and instituting action to recover the same from defendant-appellant who has been in possession thereof
for more than forty years (40). The records show that the complaint for recovery of possession was filed only on June 30,
1987 despite the fact that defendant-appellant has occupied the subject land since February 14, 1946 up to the present.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in finding that the equitable doctrine of laches applies to the present case

RULING:

No.

The law provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,

the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a
right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations
of the property or parties.

Respondent argues that petitioners, despite all the opportunity they had to implead respondent in the cases they filed in
1956 against those occupying Lot 7035-A, deliberately ignored and failed to do so. In doing so, petitioners slept on their
rights and practically allowed laches to set in.

We find this feeble. Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent already occupied the lot in question in 1956, we
cannot put all the blame on petitioners if respondent and her husband were not impleaded. It must be remembered that
there were many people who occupied the subject land. If petitioners committed an oversight in not impleading
respondent, she, having an interest on the land, should have intervened in the cases just like what the other occupants
did. This, she did not do. It is simply impossible for her not to know that there were on-going court cases involving the
land she is occupying.

This Court has ruled that unless there are intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a
decision directing the return of the lot to petitioners, the equitable defense of laches will not apply as against the
registered owners. In the case at bar, there being no intervening third persons whose rights will be affected or
prejudiced if possession of the subject lot is restored to the petitioners, the return of the same is in order.

SPS ISMAEL AND TERESITA MACASAET vs. SPS VICENTE AND ROSARIO MACASAET
G.R. Nos. 154391-91. September 30, 2004

PROPERTY:Two parcels of land in Banay-banay, Lipa City

FACTS:

Petitioners Ismael and TeresitaMacasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet arefirst-degree
relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.

On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an ejectment
suit against the children.Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land situated at
Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in
March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite
repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents had
invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near
one other. They added that the lot is allotted to Ismael as an advance inheritance.

MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises contending that their stay
was by mere tolerance, thus they are necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate lots upon demand. RTC
upon appeal upheld the lower Court’s decision, however it allowed respondents to appropriate the building and
other improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in
relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.

The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the subject
lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners became
illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to vacate it. Hence, this petition.


ISSUE:

W/N Ismael and Teresita occupied the subject lots by mere tolerance

RULING:

No. This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latters toleranceor
permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise thatthe
occupants will vacate the property upon demand.A summary action for ejectment is the properremedy to
enforce this implied obligation.The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession isto be counted from the
date of the demand to vacate.

Toleration is defined as the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not whollyapproved of.Sarona
v. Villegasdescribed what tolerated acts means, in this language:

Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are those which by reason ofneighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person todo on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which onesproperty can give to another without material injury or prejudice
to the owner, who permitsthem out of friendship or courtesy. x xx. And, Tolentino continues, even though this
iscontinued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription. x xx. Further expoundingon the concept,
Tolentino writes: There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which aremerely tolerated. Thus, not every
case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor canbe considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization,permission or license, acts of possession are realized or
performed. The question reduces itselfto the existence or non-existence of the permission.

We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere tolerance.
Petitioners were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots inorder that
they could all live near one other and help in resolving family problems.By occupyingthose lots, petitioners
demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there was a meeting ofminds, and an agreement
regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose between the parties.

The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely something not wholly approved
of by respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as neighborliness or familiarity. Inpoint of
fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the complete approval ofrespondents, who desired
that their children would occupy the premises. It arose from familial loveand a desire for family solidarity, which
are basic Filipino traits.




SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES EMMANUEL CHUA
and EDNA L. CHUA
G.R. No. 125375. June 17, 2004

PROPERTY:Two parcels of land

FACTS:

On September 3, 1993, respondents, Sps. Emmanuel and Edna Chua filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the petitioners, Sps. Apostol for unlawful detainer. The respondents alleged, inter alia,that they had
contracted with the Spouses Paulo and Georgina Pascua for the purchase of a parcel ofland. The petitioners,
who were present during the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents thatthey would vacate the
property within ten (10) days from the execution of the sale. The petitionersthen acknowledged that their stay
in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners.On June 7, 1993, the Spouses Pascua executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and theimprovements thereon in favor of the respondents for
P1,000,000. On the basis of the said deed, therespondents were issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over
the property on June 8,1993. Despite demands, however, the petitioners refused to vacate the property.

In their answer, respondents alleged that Luz B. Pascua was the owner of the parcel of land located inQuezon
City with an area of 315 square meters. She sold a portion of theproperty, an area of 285.32 square meters, to
the respondents on July 8, 1976 for P45,548 of whichP15,548 was paid. On the same day, the parties executed
a memorandum agreement covering theproperty, in which the respondents agreed that the balance of the
purchase price would be paid ininstallments. Thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the
respondents over anunsegregated portion of the property, with an area of 29.68 square meters, for P7,350 and,
later, adeed of confirmation of deed of absolute sale with waiver over the said property. On June 20, 1979,the
respondents executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the property, stating, inter alia, that theycould not
cause the registration of the said deeds because the owners duplicate of TCT was in the possession of Teresita
B. Jimenez, a former co-owner of the property. The respondentsfurther alleged that Luz Pascua, in her letter to
the Register of Deeds dated August 6, 1979, confirmedthat she failed to turn over the owners duplicate of TCT
because the same was in thepossession of Jimenez, who, in turn, gave it to Jose J. Burgos. Thereafter, on May
15, 1980, LuzPascua filed a Complaint against the petitioners in the RTC of Quezon City for rescission
anddamages but the same was dismissed on December 19, 1983 forlack of interest to prosecute. Paulo Pascua
filed a similar complaint against the petitioners in the RTC, but the same was, likewise, dismissed. Finally, the
petitionersalleged that the Spouses Pascuas possession of the property after the sale thereof to the
respondentswas by mere tolerance.

The MeTC ruled that having acquired the property from the Spouses Pascua, and being the registered owners
of the property, the respondents, Sps. Chua are entitled to the possession thereof.
For its part, the CA held as follows:

The respondent court erred in dismissing the action for unlawful detainer on the sole groundthat
the private respondents are possessors in the concept of an owner of the subject premisesand
cannot, thus, be dispossessed of the same. The subject property is registered under theTorrens
System in the names of the petitioners whose title to the property is presumed legaland cannot be
collaterally attacked, much less in an action for unlawful detainer. No title toregistered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner may be acquired byprescription or adverse
possession. Thepresumption of ownership granted by law to a possessor in the concept of an owner
underArticle 541 is only prima facie and cannot prevail over a valid title registered under theTorrens
System.

ISSUE:

W/N the respondents are entitled to possess the subject property

RULING:

Yes. The Court agrees with the CA. In Pangilinan v. Aguilar,we held that it is an accepted rulethat a person who
has a torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is entitled to thepossession thereof. We reiterated
our ruling in the Pangilinan Case in Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, and declared that the registered owners are
entitled to the possession of the property covered by thesaid title from the time such title was issued in their
favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondentswere never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of
no moment, as prior physicalpossession is necessary only in forcible entry cases.


C. Effects of possession
1. Possessor in Good Faith
a. Right to pending fruits
b. Right to be reimbursed
i. Necessary and useful expenses
ii. Expenses for pure luxury

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by Romeo T. Acosta(formerly Jose D. Malvas), Directorof Forest
Management Bureau,Department of Environment andNatural Resources, vs. HON. NORMELITO J.
BALLOCANAG,Presiding Judge, Branch 41,Regional Trial Court, Pinamalayan,Oriental Mindoro and
DANILOREYES
G.R. No. 163794 November28, 2008

PROPERTY:182,941-squaremeter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro

FACTS:

Sometime in 1970, Danilo Reyes bought the subject property from One Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase,
Reyes introduced improvements and planted the land with fruit trees, namely mangoes, mandarin citrus and
guyabanos.

Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it turned out thatabout 162,500 square
meters of this land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoroand, therefore, cannot be subject to any
disposition or acquisition under any existing law,and is notregistrable.

Thus, OSG filed a complaint explaining that the source Certificate of title issued was spurious, fictitious and
irregularly issued. RTC decided in favor of the state declaring the land to be part of the public domain. Reyes
then filed a motion to Remove Improvements made by him, praying that he be given at least one year from
issuance of order to remove the fruit trees he planted and all the unharvested fruit be appropriated by him.
Subsequently, a Complaint for Injunction With an AncillaryPrayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order againstReyes for allegedly encroaching upon and taking possession by stealth, fraud
andstrategy some 16 hectares of his leased area without his permission or acquiescenceand planted trees
thereon in bad faith despite the fact that the area is non-disposableand part of the public domain, among others.

RTC granted Reyes’ petition and CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

W/N Reyes, vis--vishis improvements, is a builder or planter in good faith

RULING

Yes. Theissue assumes full significance, because Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Codegrant the builder or planter
in good faith full reimbursement of useful improvementsand retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made. A builder or planter ingood faith is one who builds or plants on land with the belief that he is the
ownerthereof, unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds or plants on it.

On this issue, we are disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter in goodfaith. Reyes was of the
belief that he was the owner of the subject land; in fact, a TCTover the property was issued in his name. He tilled
the land, planted fruit trees thereon,and invested money from 1970. He received notice of the Republics claim
only whenthe reversion case was filed on May 13, 1987. The trees are now full-grown and fruitbearing.

To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State --because the decision in
the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienableforest land and belongs to the State is already
final and immutable -- would inequitablyresult in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a
planter in good faith.

Nemo cum alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest.This basic doctrine on unjustenrichment simply means that a
person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himselfinequitably at anothers expense.

2. Possessor in Bad Faith
D. Loss or Unlawful Deprivation of a movable

FRISCO F. DOMALSIN vs. SPS. JUANITO and AMALIA VALENCIANO
G.R. No. 158687 January 25, 2006

PROPERTY:parcel of land at sitio Riverside, Camp 3 Tuba, Benguet

FACTS:

Domalsin claims to be the lawful owner of the subject parcel of land since 1979 up to present. He declared the
same for tax purposes and introduced improvements thereon consisting of levelling, excavation, riprapping of
the earth and a private road to the river, fruitbearing trees and other agricultural plants of economic value. He
was in continuous, adverse possession and in the concept of an owner for the past nineteen (19) years.

On 1998, Sps. Valenciano allegedly entered the premises thru force and strategy and began to construct a
building made of cement and strong materials. Respondent protested and demanded that petitioners Sps.
Valenciano halt construction of said building, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, he filed the instant case.

Petitioners Sps. Valenciano, on the other hand, claimed that the ongoing construction was with the consent and
conformity of the DPWH and in fact the improvements found in the property were introduced by the residents
thereof, including its first residents, William and Gloria Banuca, and not by respondent. The premises on which
petitioners Sps. Valenciano are constructing their house were leveled after the earthquake in 1990 by the
Banuca spouses. Petitioners Sps. Valenciano are just starting the construction because the permission was only
given now by Gloria Banuca.

Domalsin filed a complaint for Forcible Entry before the MTCC. MTCC favored him and ordered the sps to vacate
the land and remove the structures introduced thereon. RTC affirmed the decision of MTCC saying that the act
of paying taxes by Domalsin was a clear manifestation of non-abandonment of the property. However, CA
reversed and set aside RTC’s decision saying that the property is a portion of right-of-way of Kennon Road which
is a public dominion.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in its decision

RULING:

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred when it preferred the present and actual possession of respondents vis--visthe
prior possession of petitioner on the ground that the parties do not and cannot own the lot in question.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not
be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed.
Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in
his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him.

The fact that the parties do not and cannot own the property under litigation does not mean that the issue to
be resolved is no longer priority of possession. The determining factor for one to be entitled to possession will
be prior physical possession and not actual physical possession. Since title is never in issue in a forcible entry
case, the Court of Appeals should have based its decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing
to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.
Inasmuch as prior physical possession must be respected, the Court of Appeals should have ruled squarely on
the issue of abandonment because it gave precedence to the actual present possession of respondents. If,
indeed, there was abandonment of the land under consideration by petitioner, only then should respondents
be given the possession of the same since abandonment is one way by which a possessor may lose his
possession.

Abandonment of a thing is the voluntary renunciation of all rights which a person may have in a thing, with the
intent to lose such thing. A thing is considered abandoned and possession thereof lost if
the spesrecuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi (the intention of returning) is
finally given up.

In the case before us, we find that petitioner never abandoned the subject land. His opposition to the
construction of respondents house upon learning of the same and the subsequent filing of the instant case are
clear indicia of non-abandonment; otherwise, he could have just allowed the latter to continue with the
construction. Moreover, the fact that the house petitioner built was destroyed by the earthquake in 1990, was
never rebuilt nor repaired and that same was leveled to the ground by Gloria Banuca do not signify
abandonment. Although his house was damaged by the earthquake, Gloria Banuca, the person who supposedly
demolished said house, had no right to do the same. Her act of removing the house and depriving petitioner of
possession of the land was an act of forcible entry. The entry of respondents in 1998 was likewise an act of
forcible entry.



DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the firm name "Pawnshop of DominadorDizon" vs. LOURDES G.
SUNTAY
G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972

PROPERTY:

FACTS:

Lourdes G. Suntay and one Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction wherein the Suntay’s three-carat diamond
ring, valued at P5,500.00, was delivered to Sison for sale on commission. Upon receiving the ring, Sison executed
and delivered to the receipt to Suntay. After the lapse of a considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having
returned to the ring to her, Suntay made demands on Clarita R. Sison for the return of said jewelry. Clarita R.
Sison, however, could not comply with Suntay’s demands because on June 15, 1962, Melia Sison, niece of the
husband of Clarita R. Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, pledged the ring with the petitioner
DominadorDizon's pawnshop for P2,600.00 without Suntay’s knowledge. When Suntay found out that Clarita R.
Sison pledged the ring, she filed a case of estafa against the latter with the fiscal's office. Subsequently, Suntay
wrote a letter to Dizon on September 22, 1962 asking for the return of her ring which was pledged with the
latter’s pawnshop under its Pawnshop Receipt.

Dizon refused to return the ring, so Suntay filed an action for its recovery with the CFI of Manila, which declared
that she had the right to its possession. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision.

ISSUE:

W/N Suntay has right of title over the ring

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the
Civil Code which provides that “[T]he possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from
the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.” The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good
faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without, reimbursing the
price. Hanging on to said exception as his basis, Dizon insisted that the principle of estoppel should apply in this
case but the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.

In the present case not only has the ownership and the origin of the jewels misappropriated been
unquestionably proven but also that Clarita R. Sison, acting fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of them and
pledged them contrary to agreement with no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of Suntay, who was
illegally deprived of said jewels and who, as the owner, has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the
possession of whosoever holds them, which in this case is Dizon’s pawnshop. Dizon ought to have been on his
guard before accepting the pledge in question, but evidently there was no such precaution availed of and he
has no one to blame but himself. While the activity he is engaged in is no doubt legal, it is not to be lost sight of
that it thrives on taking advantage of the necessities precisely of that element of our population whose lives are
blighted by extreme poverty. From whatever angle the question is viewed then, estoppel certainly cannot be
justly invoked.

ELISA ALCANTARA-PICA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IV, QUEZON
CITY, ANATOLIO CARIGO Y TAMBONGCO
G.R. No. L-36434 October 27, 1973

PROPERTY:1996 Toyota 1600 S. car

FACTS:

Elisa Alcantara- Pica, is the lawful owner of the subject property, having purchased the same on installment
basis from Delta Motor Sales Corp to which she mortgaged the same to secure payment of the balance of the
price thereof which amounted to P12,252.87, interests included, as of July 2, 1972.

Private respondent AnatolioCarigo in turn claims ownership of the same vehicle by purchase on July 30, 1971
for$11,000.00 from one MonicoManiquiz. The latter traced his title to the vehicle by purchase for P6,500.00
onDecember 28, 1970 from one Rafael Pica who held special power of attorney from petitioner.

The car in question was impounded by the PC Metrocom, Camp Crame in connection with a Criminalcase for
illegal possession of firearms.

Upon motion of the two parties, both claiming ownership of the car, the trial fiscal thus recommended that the
car be released to Carigoon the grounds that,Anatolio T. Carigo is a purchaser of the Toyota car in good faith,
and therefore, his possession of thesame is equivalent to a title (Art. 559, NCC). The Court then approved the
fiscal’s recommendation and ordered the release of the car to Carigo. Pica filed MR which was subsequently
denied.
.

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court erred in its decision

RULING:

Yes. Article 559 of the Civil Code was correctly cited but wrongly applied by respondent court to order release
of the carto respondent, when as stressed by the Court in Aznar vs. Yapdiangco8 dealing similarly with a car
which awrongdoer had succeeded in registering in his own name and selling to a third party who acquired the
same in goodfaith, for valuable consideration and without notice of any defect in the vendor's title, under the
cited codal article,"the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived
of it, he has a right torecover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may
have acquired it in good faithfrom such finder, thief or robber." The only exception provided - which is not
applicable here — is where such thirdparty has acquired in good faith the article "at a public sale" in which case
"the owner cannot obtain its returnwithout reimbursing the price paid therefor." The Court therein added that
"the right of the owner to recover personalproperty acquired in good faith by another is based on his being
dispossessed without his consent" and cited themaxim that "no man can transfer to another a better title than
he has himself.


Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86051, [September 1, 1992]

CIVIL LAW; POSSESSION; REQUISITES TO MAKE POSSESSION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY EQUIVALENT TO TITLE.
— It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can
recover the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title
thereto for under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are
three (3) requisites to make possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should
be in good faith; (b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in
the concept of owner. (TOLENTINO, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 ed., 275-276, citing 2-II Colin
and Capitant 942; De Buen: Ibid., 1009, 2 Salvat 165; 4 Manresa 339). Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable
or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof.
This is the justification for the exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code

FACTS: A man pretending to be a member of the Consunji family was able to deceive Citywide Motors into
selling and delivering to him two cars in exchange for fraudulent checks. Citywide sought to recover the cars,
recovered one, but found the other one in the possession of Jaime Ledesma who claims to have purchased it in
good faith and for value from one Armando Suarez. The CA awarded Citywide the right to repossess the car to
which Ledesma takes exception arguing that Art. 559 of the New Civil Code invoked by Citywide is inapplicable
to this case as it was not unlawfully deprived of the cars.

ISSUE: Was Citywide unlawfully deprived of the cars?

HELD: NO. The rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Ownership in the thing
sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that
effect. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks.
Here, it cannot be said that Citywide was unlawfully deprived of its cars as it voluntarily delivered the car to the
deceiver and thereby transferred ownership thereto. It could not therefore, invoke the remedy granted by the
provision it invokes as the same applies only to the owner of a thing.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 753

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building. Two units were leased (now
unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T. Dizon.

Said lease was originally covered by written contracts and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a ‘month to month’ basis. One of the terms of the lease,
that of monthly payments, was violated by respondent.
Upon failure of respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for
conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond
U. Ledesma (who is not a lawyer) during the Barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological ailments as can be seen from prescription and receipts by her psychiatrist.

Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to retain the
services of a lawyer to initiate the ejectment proceeding.
MTC ordered respondent to vacate. RTC affirmed the MTC.

Respondent however found favor in the CA because of lack of cause of action. CA held that petitioner failed
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.

Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by respondent in the court below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.

HELD: When respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay, he, in effect,
was stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation
and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC.

Moreover, petitioner tries to show that her failure to appear before the Barangay was because of her recurring
psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1998, there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see
her psychiatrist. The only conclusion is that 1998 was a lucid interval. There was therefore no excuse then for
her non-appearance. Therefore, she cannot be represented by counsel or by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.

Her non compliance with PD 1508 legally barred her from pursuing case in the MTC.









BPI Family Bank vs. Franco 538 SCRA 184 , November 23, 2007

Civil Law; Property; The movable property mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a specific or
determinate thing – a determinate or specific thing is one that is individualized and can be identified or
distinguished from others of the same kind. – BPI-FB’s argument is unsound. To begin with, the movable property
mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a specific or determinate thing. A determinate or specific
thing is one that is individualized and can be identified or distinguished from others of the same kind.

FACTS: Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI with the total amount of P2,000,000.00. The said amount used to
open these accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco. The funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was
part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI from FMIC’s account (with a deposit of P100,000,000.00) and credited
to Tevesteco’s account pursuant to an Authority to Debit which was allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC.

Tevesteco effected several withdrawals already from its account amounting to P37,455,410.54 including the
P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.

Franco issued two checks which were dishonoured upon presentment for payment due to garnishment of his
account filed by BPI.

BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which consisted of part of the money allegedly fraudulently
withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Franco’s account. BPI urges us that the legal consequence of
FMIC’s forgery claim is that the money transferred by BPI to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was
able to recover possession of the same when the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up
its ownership thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts.

ISSUE: WON the bank has a better right to the deposits in Franco’s account.

HELD: No. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a
movable to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPI simply claims ownership of the
equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC’s account and
credited to Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s account.

Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant
case which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand
as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title. Money, which had been passed through various
transactions in the general course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.

1. Period to recover

Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost,
unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Articles 1132,
and without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years. (1957a)

Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.

Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through prescription by the offender.

2. Finder of Lost Movable

Art. 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If the latter
is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding
has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.

If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or without expenses which considerably diminish its value,
it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing found, or its
value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse
the expenses.

Art. 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged to pay, as a reward to the finder, one-tenth of
the sum or of the price of the thing found
3. Distinguished from voidable title

Art. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time
of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and
without notice of the seller's defect of title.

E. In Concept of owner, holder, in one’s own name, in name of another
F. Rights of the possessor
G. Loss/Termination

VIII. Usufruct
A. Characteristics
B. Classification
C. Rights and obligation of usufructuary
D. Rights of the owner
E. Extinction/Termination

Bachrach vs. Seifert and Elianoff, 87 Phil 483

USUFRUCT; RIGHT OF USURFRUCTUARY TO TRANSFER. – Impairment of her usufruct is also alleged by the
administratrix. How can she now complain of the alleged impairment after alleging that she gave her conformity
to the agreement, the basis of the order of October 2, 1940, as “an act of pure liberty on her part?” Was she not
the owner of her usufruct? Could she not give away her usufruct or any part of it in favor of any person? If she
disposed of a portion of said usufruct for the benefit of the sisters of her deceased husband, without being subject
to compulsion, fraud, or mistake, but freely and conscientiously, there is no reason for her complain now.


FACTS: The will of E. M. Bachrach provided for the distribution of the considerable property which he had left.
The sixth and eighth paragraphs of the provisions of the will provide as follows:

Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise to my beloved wife Mary McDonald
Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all my estate after payment of the
legacies, bequests and gifts provided for above; and she may enjoy such usufruct and use or
spend such fruits as she may in any manner wish.

Eighth: It is my wish that upon the death of my beloved wife, Mary McDonald Bachrach, all my
estate, personal, real and otherwise, and all the fruits and usufruct thereof which during her life
pertained to her, shall be divided as follows:

 One-half thereof shall be given to such charitable hospitals in the Philippines as she may
designate; in case she fails to designate, then said sum shall be given to the Chief Executive of
these Islands who shall distribute it, share and share alike to all charitable hospitals in the
Philippines excluding those belonging to the governments of the Philippines or of the United
States;

One-half thereof shall be divided, share and share alike by and between my legal heirs, to the
exclusion of my brothers.

The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining
Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000
shares. Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court
to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
her the said 54,000 share of stock dividend by endorsing and delivering to her the corresponding
certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income
and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs
of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income
but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman.
And they have appealed from the order granting the petition and overruling their objection.

ISSUE: Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or part of the
corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainderman?

HELD: The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock
dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may
be sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold
independently of its mother.

Reyes v. Grey, G.R. No. 6969, [December 20, 1911], 21 PHIL 73-77
1. USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT; SALE UNDER EXECUTION; "PROPERTY," UNDER SECTION 450, CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, DEFINED. — The term "property," in section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
comprehends every species of title, inchoate or complete, legal or equitable. The said code authorizes the
sale, under execution, of every kind of property and every interest in property which is, or may be, the subject
of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests, as it deals with legal, without
anywhere expressly recognizing or making any distinction between them.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF USUFRUCTUARY, UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. — Article 480 of the Civil Code
provides that: "The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another person, or
alienate his right to the usufruct, even for a good consideration . . . ."
 3. ID.; ID.; A USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT IS AN "INTEREST IN LAND. — If the usufructuary right is one
which may be leased or sold, it must logically follow that such a right is an "interest" in real property, within
the meaning of section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. ID.; ID.; ATTACHMENT; REAL TEST AS TO WHETHER PROPERTY CAN BE ATTACHED AND SOLD. —
The real test, as to whether or not property can be attached and sold upon execution is: Does the judgment
debtor hold such a beneficial interest in the property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? If
he does, then the property is subject to execution and to the payment of his debts. The right of usufruct is
such an interest and when the sheriff, in this case, sold the plaintiff's usufructuary right by virtue of an
execution, the plaintiff had no further interest in the property.

FACTS: Remedios Grey, wife of the plaintiff, died intestate in 1905 without ascendants or descendants, leaving
a surviving husband and one sister and three brothers. Under the law, the sisters and brothers are called to
inherit all of the estate of the deceased, subject only to the right of the surviving husband, the plaintiff, to a
usufructuary interest in one-half thereof.

Administration proceedings in the estate of the deceased wife not taken out until June 15, 1907, when Jose
Grey, one of the defendants, was appointed administrator. In these administration proceedings, the Court of
First Instance of this city issued a decree on December 3, 1910, declaring that each one of the defendants in the
case at the bar was entitled to one-fourth part of the estate of the deceased Remedios Grey, subject to the
plaintiff’s (Vicente Reyes’) right to usufruct.

Prior to the appointment of the administrator for the estate of Remedios Grey, and as the result of certain
judicial proceedings had against her surviving husband, his usufructuary interest in the estate of his deceased
wife was sold under execution and deeds issued therefor to the purchaser, the defendant Jose Grey. Such deeds
still subsist in full force and effect, no steps ever having been taken either to annul or set them aside or to
redeem the interest of the plaintiff thus sold.

The plaintiff, as surviving husband of the deceased Remedios Grey, now sues the sister and brothers of his
deceased wife, claiming of them the payment of his usufructuary interest in the property of the deceased, basing
his claim upon two grounds: first, that the execution sale and the sheriff’s deeds executed pursuant thereto did
not divest him of his usufructuary interest in the property and that the defendants still remain charge with its
payment; and second, the defendants having failed to appear from the order of the probate court dated
December 3, 1910, which order was issued some three years after an attempt was made to sell under execution
the plaintiff’s usufructuary interest, and that order having become final, it settled the plaintiffs right to a
usufructuary interest, and the defendants cannot now deny this fact.

ISSUE: W/N a usufructuary interest in real property is not such an interest or right as can be sold under
execution.

HELD: No

RATIO:

Section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 450. Property liable to execution. All goods, chattels, moneys, and other property, both real and personal,
or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property seized
 and held under attachment in the action, shall be liable to execution. Shares and interests in any corporation or
company, and debts, credits, and all other property, both real and personal, or any interest in either real or
personal property, and all other property not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution, in like
manner as upon writs of attachment.

The term “property” as here applied to lands comprehends every species of title, inchoate or complete; legal or
equitable. This statute authorizes the sale under execution of every kind of property, and every interest in
property which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and
interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere expressly recognizing or any distinction between them.

Article 480 of the Civil Code reads:

The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another person, or alienate his right to
the usufruct, even for a good consideration; . . . .

If the usufructuary right is one which may be leased or sold, it must logically and necessarily follow that such a
right is an “interest” in real property within the meaning of section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was
the plaintiff’s usufructuary right in real property which was sold under execution. This right was conferred upon
him at the death of his wife by operation of law, and by virtue of such a right he was entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of said real property in usufruct. He was entitled to hold the actual, material
possession of such property during his lifetime, and was obligated only to preserve its form and substance. In
other words, he was entitled, subject to his restriction, to use the property as his own. He was the real owner
of this interest, and article 480 conferred upon him the right to enjoy the possession of the property or lease it
to another or to sell such interest outright.

We think the real test, as to whether or not property can be attached and sold upon execution is does the
judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for
value? If he does, then the property is subject to execution and payment of his debts. The right of usufruct is
such an interest, and when the sheriff sold the plaintiff’s usufructuary right by virtue of an execution, he had no
further interest in said property.
The plaintiff’s second contention that the defendants, by failing to appeal from the order of the court in the
administration proceedings dated December 3, 1910, wherein the right of plaintiff to a usufructuary interest in
the property was recognized, have lost their right to refuse such payment to him at this time, is not well founded.
The plaintiff had no interest in this property at the time the probate court issued this order. The order only set
out the fact that under the law the plaintiff was entitled to a usufructuary interest in one-half of the estate of
his deceased wife. It was not a finding that in the meantime the plaintiff had not sold, leased, or otherwise
disposed of or lost such right of participation. This order merely fixed the legal status of the plaintiff and did not
have the effect of canceling or annulling the sale made by the sheriff. Again, the plaintiff instituted the action in
the case at bar on June 1, 1910, several months prior to the order of December 3, 1910. The right to recover
was traversed by the defendants on July 1 of that same year, and the question was pending and undetermined
at the time the probate court issued its order.

Moralidad vs. Pernes, August 3, 2006

FACTS: This case is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the decision of CA, affirming the decision of the
RTC, which reversed the decision of the MTCC in an action for unlawful detainer commenced by the petitioner.
This controversy stemmed from a parcel of land located in Davao City and owned by petitioner Mercedes Moralidad.
While working abroad, she bought said property for the purpose of letting Arlene Pernes, her niece and one of the
respondents, to move in Davao City proper as the latter told her that the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA
rebels. She executed a document permitting the respondents to build their house therein and stay long as they like.
She also made said property available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City, with condition that
they should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another.

When petitioner retired, she went back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents. However, their relationship
turned sour. The respondent’s family became impervious to her suggestions. She even experienced harassment,
threat, and defamation from said family. She went to the Lupon ng Barangay to seek remedy. The Lupon favored her
and ordered Pernes family to vacate petitioner’s property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of the house
they built thereon. The parties could not agree on the amount.

Petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful detainer suit against the respondent spouses. The MTCC,
resolved the ejectment suit in petitioner’s favor and declared that the respondents’ spouses, although builders in
good faith vis-à-vis the house they built on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse for not
complying with the demand to vacate. To the MTCC, respondents’ continued possession of the premises turned
unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to vacate, such possession being merely at petitioner’s tolerance, and
without any rental.

Respondents appealed to the RTC and the former reversed the MTCC decision. It held that respondents’ possession
of the property in question was not by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent, making
Articles 448 and 546 of the NCC applicable.

Petitioner went to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision as regards the applicability of Articles 448. But it ruled that
it is still premature to apply the same considering that the issue of whether respondents’ right to possess a portion of
petitioner’s land had already expired or was already terminated was not yet resolved. It further ruled that what
governs the rights of the parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that respondents’ right to
possess had already ceased.

Petitioner appealed to the SC.

ISSUES:

WON the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished.

WON Respondents has the right to be reimbursed on the improvements they have built.

HELD:

YES. The document executed by the petitioner constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of the
usufruct. The loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering, or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the
usufruct.
NO. If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. By express provision of law,
respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have
 introduced on the property. The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have
introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner’s property.

NOTE: Review Article 562 of the NCC. Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s
property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.

G.R. No. 148830. April 13, 2005
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
versus
COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.

FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 481 (1968) setting aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA
as reserved property for the site of National Government Center (NGC). Subsequently, he issued Proc. No. 1670 (1977), which
emoved a 7-hectare portion from the 120-hectare land, giving the usufructuary rights to the “xxx Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future survey, under the
administration of the Foundation. This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future survey
based on the technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most particularly on the original survey of the area
dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the subdivision survey dated April 19-25, 1968.” Over the years, MSBF occupied the area
but it exceeded the 7-hectare subject of the usufruct and occupied 16 hectares instead. By then the land occupied by MSBF was
bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek
o the north. On 1987, MSBF leased a portion of its area to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA
which occupies 4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area. On November 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino issued MO 127 which
evoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved
as site of the NGC. It also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public. On August 1988, acting
pursuant to MO 127, the NHA gave BGC 10 days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of the
10-day period will be demolished by NHA. BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court. On
26 May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff. Both the NHA and MSBF conducted survey on the
subject parcel of land.

SSUE: Whether or not the MSBF has the right to determine the subject 7-hectare portion of land

HELD: Yes. Art. 565 states that, the rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title constituting the
usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed
n the present case, Proc. No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. It categorically states that the 7-hectare area shall be
determined by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if there be any. It authorized
MSBF to determine the location of the 7-hectare area. This authority, coupled with the fact that Proc. No. 1670 did not state the
ocation of the 7-hectare area, leaves no room for doubt that Proc. No. 1670 left it to MSBF to choose the location of the seven
hectare area under its usufruct. However, the Court cannot countenance MSBF’s act of exceeding the 7-hectare portion granted
o it by the proclamation. A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s
nterests. Article 601 of the Civil Code states: the usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person
of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so
or damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault. The controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the
 imit of the beneficial use given to it. Hence, there is a need for a new survey, conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, conside
existing structures of MSBF and as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the 7-hectare portion withou
sacrificing contiguity.

Another point in the case: Article 605 of the Civil Code states: Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, o
association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned
or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof.Proc. No. 1670 was issued in
1977, or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.MO 127 released approximately
50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved site for the NGC. However, it does not affect MSBF’s 7-hectare area since unde
Proc. No. 1670, MSBF’s 7-hectare area was already excluded from the operation of Proc. No. 481, which established the NGC
Site.

IX. Easements

ELISEO FAJARDO JR., V. FREEDOM TO BUILD INC.
G. R. No. 134692, 1 August 2000


FACTS:
Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a house
and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to sell executed between
the parties contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit:

“Easements. For the good of the entire community, the homeowner must observe a two-meter
easement in front. No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front
easement.

“Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But the second storey expansion must be placed
above the back portion of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original
building.

“Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in the front beyond the line as designed and
implemented by the developer in the 60 sq. m. unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is
6 meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just as
provided in the 60 sq. m. units.”

The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot issued
in the name of petitioner-spouses. The controversy arose when the petitioners, despite repeated demand from
the respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their
house to a point directly above the original front wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an action to demolish
the unauthorized structures. The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner ordering them to immediately
demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the
Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this decision at the expense of
the defendants. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review. The spouses
contend that:
a) Adjacent owners reportedly have no objection to the construction, and have even expressed interest in
undertaking a similar expansion in their respective residences. Moreover, the couple's two children, a
son and a daughter, might soon get married and then share, with their families, living quarters with
petitioners.
b) The latter also assail the personality of private respondent to question the construction which have
effectively relinquished its ownership, right or interest over the subdivision upon the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the individual homeowners. Per the contract between Freedom to Build
Incorporated and the De la Costa Low Income Project Homeowners' Association (hereinafter
homeowners' association), petitioners aver, the enforcement of the prohibitions contained in the
"Restrictive Covenant" originally residing on respondent is now lodged in the homeowners' association.
c) Lack of a specific provision prescribing penalty of demolition in the “Restrictive Covenant” in the event
of a breach thereof, so the prayer of respondent to demolish the structure should fail.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid
2. W/N petitioners must be held to be bound thereby

HELD:
1. Yes, the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid.
Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. It can also be contended that such
covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property,do not result in true
easements, but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal
negative easements. Negative easement is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement
whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would
be entitled to do.Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on the
use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained themwhere the covenants are reasonable,not contrary to
public policy,or to law,and not in restraint of trade.Subject to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to
the same extent that will lend judicial sanction to any other valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline
restrictions on constructions have been held to be valid stipulations.There appears to be no cogent reasons for
not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent
overcrowding.

2. Yes, petitioners must be held accountable.
Viewed accordingly, the statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not opposed the
construction is unavailing to their cause, the subject restrictive covenant not being intended for the benefit of
adjacent owners but to prescribe the uses of the building, i.e., to ensure, among other things, that the structures
built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision would prevent overcrowding and promote privacy among subdivision
dwellers. The argument then of petitioners that expansion is necessary in order to accommodate the individual
families of their two children must fail for like reason. Nor can petitioners claim good faith; the restrictive
covenants are explicitly written in the Contract To Sell and annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of
Title.

Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association

Petitioner: EmetriaLiwag
Respondent: Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association
Ponente: J. Sereno
Short Facts:
F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo
over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. Marcelo
represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only
source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes
LiwagPetitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the
removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land.
SC held thatan easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision. Easements
or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging
to a different owner, for the benefit of a community, or for the benefit of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong. In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the
Subdivision for the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly
without human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which
reveals its use to the public. The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility
has already been acquired through prescription.
Issue/s:
1. W/N an easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision. YES
2. W/N Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision forms part of its open space. YES
Ratio:
2.Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner, for the benefit of a community, or for the benefit of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
The law provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and apparent or non-apparent. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are quoted below:
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the
intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of
man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by
external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the
community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and
because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
Contrary to petitioners contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated,
we find that the easement of water facility has been voluntarily established either by Marcelo, the Subdivision
owner and developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and the original developer of the
Subdivision. For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the residents sole source of water.
The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility has already been acquired
through prescription.
3. The term open space is defined in P.D. 1216 as an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds,
recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangaycenters and other similar
facilities and amenities.
The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Therefore, we resort to statutory
construction to determine whether these areas fall under other similar facilities and amenities. The basic
statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically
mentioned.
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the enumeration refers to areas
reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities
should be interpreted in like manner. Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the
community. Water is a basic need in human settlements, without which the community would not survive.
Therefore, based on the principle of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of the law to
create and maintain a healthy environment in human settlements, the location of the water facility in the
Subdivision must form part of the area reserved for open space.

Heirs of Joaquin Limense vs Rita Vda. De Ramos

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his property into five and gave the divided
lots to his daughters through a deed of donation on March 9, 1932.

In 1981, Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his property but could not because a
substantial portion of the respondent's building encroached upon portion of Limense property.

Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent ignored both oral and written demands.

In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of the Lozada daughters. After subdividing
the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero
Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs
of Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of
way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it
could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to respondents.

RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of
respondents. The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew
that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley.
Joaquin filed a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin died. His heirs
then elevated the case to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that respondent's ot has an
easement of right of way.

Held:

In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal of
obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the
nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does
not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an
indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin
Limense’s ownership over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-
owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.

Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest,
may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used
and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.

The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length; the
stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by their donor Dalmacio
Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built
portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between petitioners and
respondents.

2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further proceedings without
further delay to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code.

BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) vs. OBIAS, et al.

Facts:
The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur.
In the same year, BISUDECO constructed a road ("the disputed road") – measuring approximately 7 meters wide
and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and
from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations.
Respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones
across it, preventing petitioner’s and the other sugar planter’s vehicles from passing through the disputed road,
thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the
owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children
and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner
contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way
over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO’s
assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed
road and from obstructing its free passage.
Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and
the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and
consent, constructed the disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and
discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents
claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial Law.
Respondents likewise denied that the road has become a public road, since no public funds were used for its
construction and maintenance.
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was an
agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, it held
that petitioner did not acquire the same by prescription.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the
existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed
road. Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be
acquired by prescription.
Issue:

1. Whether or not there is an existing agreement between BISUDECO and Respondents

2. Whether or not the principles of prescription, laches and estoppels is applicable in this case

Held:

1.No. In order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with the owners of the lands that said road
traversed.

Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is established either by law (in which case
it is a legal easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be
continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of way – the privilege of persons or a particular class of
persons to pass over another’s land, usually through one particular path or linen – is characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.

Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.

It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was such an
agreement between BISUDECO and defendants.

The lower court correctly disbelieved the plaintiffs-appellants’ contention that an agreement existed
because there is simply no direct evidence to support this allegation. BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial
evidence that are not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than an agreement existed. By themselves,
the circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited – i.e., the employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the
defendants-appellants; the defendants-appellants’ unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of the
agreement is known to everyone, etc. – are events susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not necessarily
lead to BAPCI’s desired conclusion.

2. No. , "It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."

Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according
to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the
intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuousif it is used at intervals
and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets
foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way
of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person
passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.

The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a
road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.

It has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the right of way a continuous one; it
is only apparent. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription. It was also been held that a right of passage
over another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is discontinuous and can be
established only by title.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the existence
of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner
Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation,
testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition
of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be
acquired by title and not by prescription.

Easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not
according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Hence,
even if the road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its
discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states
that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

Abellana vs. CA, G.R. No. 97039, April 24, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the northwest side of Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu. They sued to
establish an easement of a right of way over a subdivision road, which they claim they have acquired through
prescription since their ancestors have been using these since time immemorial. They pray that the concrete
wall surrounding the village be taken down to allow easy access to the public highway.
RTC held in favor of the petitioners ordering the respondents to demolish the subject fences or enclosures at
the dead ends of the subject lot at their expense and to leave them open for the use of the plaintiffs and the
general public.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision averring that road lots in subdivisions are
private property and may only be used as a public highway once acquired by the government through
donation, purchase or expropriation. The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. Hence, the petition of the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD:
No. Article 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by
prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals
and is dependent on the acts of man.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for review, the same is DENIED with costs against the petitioners.






Lunod et al vs. Meneses | Torres, J.
G.R. No. 4223 | August 19, 1908

FACTS

• Plaintiifs (Appellees) Nicolas Lunod and 7 others are owners of farmlands on the upper estates near a
lake (Calalaran).
• Defendant-Appellant HignoMeneses is the owner of a fishpond and a strip of land in Paraanan adjoining
said lake on one side and a river on the other. Paraan is the only outlet of water to the river from the
lands of Lunod et al during rainy season.
• In 1901 Meneses converted the land in Paraan to a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net
prevented the free passage of water through Paraan causing flood and damage of plantations in the
upper estates.
• Lunod et al filed a complaint alleging that there exists in favor of their rice fields a statutory easement
for more than 20 years before 1901 and praying that Meneses be ordered to remove the obstructions
that impede the passage of water through Paraanan.
• TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE

WON Meneses can be permitted to obstruct the flow of waters through his lands.

HELD

NO. But Lunod et al cannot prevent the defendant from building works to prevent his lands against influx of
waters.

RATIO

• Where a statutory easement exists between adjoining estates, the owner of the lower lands must not
construct any work that may impair or obstruct an easement which consists in receiving the waters which
naturally, and without the intervention of man, descend from more elevated lands; neither shall the
owner of the latter construct any work that may increase the easement.
 • The Civil Code allows that every owner may enclose his property by means of walls, dikes, fences, or any
other device, but his right is limited by the easement with which his estate is charged.
• Since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt
water; but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands
to the river during the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded,
thereby impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates; the court advised that it is perhaps
useful and advantageous to all parties that Meneses be made to build a another dike in addition to the
old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, for the purpose of preventing the
salt waters of the river flooding (at high tide) not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones
of Calalaran and its lake.



ANDRES v. STA. LUCIA REALTY
G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent before the RTC on
November 28,2000. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels
of unregistered agricultural A few years back, however, respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject
property, developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built
a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were denied access from subject property
to the nearest public road and vice versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis
East in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road.


ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.

RULING:

The Petition has no merit. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded
by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.



A. Characteristics
B. Classification
1. Legal easements
a. Rights of way
2. Voluntary easements
a. Effect of Zoning ordinance
C. Modes of acquiring easements
1. Compulsory easements
2. easement of light and view


Quimen v. CA

257 SCRA 163

DOCTRINE: Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the
one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these
two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used,
even if it will not be the shortest.

FACTS:

Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a
piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they
did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots
of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into
two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of
private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt
Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix.

According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access
to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way
on her adjoining property.

Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a
portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to
accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.

Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari
store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage
of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it
is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs
the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.

Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The
report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway,
starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left
for about five (5) meters to avoid the store.

TC dismissed Yolanda’s complaint, but the CA reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of
way on petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the
servient estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public road than to
make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. -- YES


HELD:

The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to
pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although
this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as
when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance
may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may
be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in
a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred.

Encarnacion v. CA

195 SCRA 74

FACTS:

The servient estate of respondent heirs are what stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed
the servient estate at no particular point.

When a fence was constructed, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and a meter wide was constituted to provide
access to the highway, with one-half meter taken from the servient estate and another one-half from another lot.

Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and he bought an owner-jeep which he
could use for transporting his plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the roadpath. He offered the servient
estate owners that they sell him one and one-half meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway. His
request was turned down.

During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit, a dried river bed, to
the highway, only eighty meters away from the dominant estate.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way. -- YES

HELD:

Just because the second egress is nearer to the highway by a difference of only 65 meters, are not amount the
conditions specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code. While there is a dried river bed closer to the dominant tenement, that
access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be demanded:(1) when there is absolutely no access to a
public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.

The river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway.
For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four to five meters up. During the rainy season, the
river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. The river bed which make
passage difficult, if nor impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all. There is a real and compelling need for such servitude
in his favor.

Article 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs
of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.” It is the needs of the dominant property
which ultimately determine the width of the passage, and these may vary from time to time. To force petitioner to leave
his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the
improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all
the people concerned.

Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable
and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.

Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation vs. Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Kleto Chung G.R No. 173252
July 17, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the Original
Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.

As Sandico's property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a

voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title
covering Sandico's property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioner's favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo's
property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No.
121488.

On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right
of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access toa public road which is Matienza Street.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property.

On August 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement
of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the dominant estate has no
more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is Matienza Street.

Issue:

Whether or not to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.

Held:
 No, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents.
In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that the
easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of
described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco
Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and
definitely not an easement created by such court order because `[the] Courtmerely declares the existence of an
easement created by the parties." In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner
reiterated that "[t]he annotation found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement."

As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of
the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the
benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former
are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.

LAO vs. ALBURO

G.R. No. L-10372

Facts:

In 1914, the counsel for the petitioners filed a written application with the Court of Land Registration for
registration of four parcels of land. After due service of notice, counsel for the administrator of the estate of the deceased
Lorenza Albruo filed in court an objection, alleging that in the part of the application relative to the second parcel of the
plan No. 1, a stone wall shown in that plan had been improperly included; that this wall belonged to Alburo, since 1881
and his successors were in peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the said wall.

In the judgment appealed from it is held that the applicants-petitioners, conclusively proved that they were and
had been for about 40 years, the lawful owners of the four properties sought to be registered; but ordered that record be
made in the decree that the wall marked on the plan of the parcel No. 2 as a stone wall was a party wall.

Issue:

Whether or not said wall belongs to the petitioners.

Ruling:

Yes. Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or
exterior mark or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. As
the court held judgment appealed from that the wall which lies between the properties of the applicant and the objectors
was a party wall, and as the applicants appealed from this ruling, it devolves upon us to decide whether it is in fact a party
wall, as counsel for the administrator of the estate of the deceased Alburo or for her heirs finally admitted that it was in
assenting to that decision, although he averred in his written objection that it was the exclusive property of the objectors;
or whether, on the contrary, this wall is a part of property marked No. 2 on the plan Exhibit A, as the applicants claims.

Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there are exterior signs which conflict with the
easement of party wall, when, among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots and not on the line
dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being constructed of stone and cement, has stone projecting
at intervals from the surface on one side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the
roof timbers of one of the houses but not of the adjoining building.1awphil.net
The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to the
applicants, is much higher than the adjoining building of the objectors; that along the top of the said wall there is a gutter
which catches the rain water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants' building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna
through an iron pipe fastened to the said wall; that one-half of the top of the said wall is covered by the roof of the
applicants' building; that the supports of the said wall project toward the side of the applicants' land and that none of the
buttresses are on the side of the objectors' lot; that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear enclosing
wall of the applicants' property in such wise that the two walls that inclose the lot form but a single construction, the
exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party wall, but that it forms a part of the applicant's building
and belongs to them.

The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in litigation was erected on the land that belonged
to the deceased Lorenza Alburo. The fact that the owners of the objectors' property may have surreptitiously inserted
some of the timbers or joists of their building in the wall belonging to the applicants is not enough to convert this latter
into a party wall, when there are so many exterior signs to indicate the exclusive ownership of the wall and to conflict with
the existence of the easement that the objectors endeavor to establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record
to belong exclusively to the applicants.

All of the applicants' properties, including the wall in question, should therefore be registered.

Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag

G.R. No. 194336

Facts:

On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly
building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at Daisy Road,
Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as
an open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision
residents.5 In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 respondents denied the material allegations of the Complaint and briefly
asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them.

On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint, finding that the land being occupied by
respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the
three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article 502 7 of the
New Civil Code (Code), which could not be owned by petitioner.

The appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form
of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact,
which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement.

Anchoring its pleadings on Article 63012 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject property
occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since
the strip does not form part of the public dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful
possession, hence, the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with
Articles 42813 and 53914 of Code.
Issue:

Whether or not the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement is owned by the petitioner.

Ruling:

No. An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner
of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her property, for
the benefit of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively
belongs, indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law.15 The Code
defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.16 There are two kinds of easement according to source: by law or by will of the owners the former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easement. A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted
by law has for its object either public use or the interest of private persons.

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the
ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect
the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning easements established
for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence
thereof, by the provisions of this Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes.

Thus, the above prove that petitioner's right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to
the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial court's
opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the
land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes.

Alolino vs. Flores

G.R. No. 198774

Facts:

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari sari store
on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino’s house. Since they were
constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only about two (2)
to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino’s house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents’
construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress
to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Alolino insists (1) that he acquired an easement of light and view by virtue of a title because the respondents
constructed their house on a barrio road; (2) that the provision of Sec. 708 of the National Building Code and Article 670
of the Civil Code prescribing the setbacks is inapplicable because the property is adjacent to a barrio road; (3) that he has
a right of way over the lot occupied by the respondents because it is a barrio road; and (4) that the respondents' house/sari
sari store is a nuisance per se.

In its comment, the respondent counters (1) that Alolino has not acquired an easement of light and view or an
easement of right of way, by either prescription or title; (2) that Alolino is at fault for constructing his house up to the edge
of his property line without observing the setbacks required in Article 670 of the Civil Code and Section 702 of the National
Building Code; and (3) that their house/sari sari store is not a nuisance because it is not a serious threat to public safety
and the Sanggunian has already reclassified the lot as residential.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner's argument is tenable.

Held:

Yes. An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong.25Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of
ten years.26 Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones can only be acquired by virtue
of a title.27 Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical justification for the acquisition of a right. It may refer to a law, a
will, a donation, or a contract.

We must distinguish between the respondents' house and the land it is built on. The land itself is public property
devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and cannot be burdened with voluntary easements. On the
other hand, the respondents' house is private property, albeit illegally constructed on public property. It can be the object
of prescription and can be burdened with voluntary easements. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the respondents have
not voluntarily burdened their property with an easement in favor of Alolino.

An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription.28 On the other hand,
an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the owner of the
dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the
dominant estate.29

Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to
their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through prescription. Thus, only
easements created by law can burden the respondents' property.

Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property, (emphasis supplied)

A barrio road is designated for the use of the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage
thereon. Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed house, are injurious to
public welfare and convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use
constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se.
De Guzman vs. FILINVEST DEVT CORP

G.R. No. 191710

Facts:

Petitioners are co-owners in fee simple a parcel of land situated in Cainta, Rizal which was later subdivided among
them for which individual titles were issued. One of its adjoining properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A,
owned by respondent which has a potential direct access to Marcos highway. Petitioners subsequently filed a Complaint
for Easement of Right of Way against respondent.

Respondent alleged in its Answer that petitioners have an access to Sumulong Highway through another property
adjoining the latter's property. the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed the said Order to the CA. It contended that under Articles 64915 and 65016 of
the Civil Code, the measurement of the land comprising a right of way should be the distance of the dominant estate to
the public highway. Thus, respondent argued that the right of way should not pertain only to Road Lot 15 as held by the
RTC, but should also include Road Lots 3, 10, 6, 4, 2 and 1 which petitioners would likewise use or traverse before they
could reach Marcos Highway. It thus contended that the total area to be indemnified is 23,500 square meters and not the
mere 264-square meter area of Road Lot 15. Respondent likewise insisted that petitioners should also share in the costs
of the construction and maintenance of these road lots.

The CA agreed with respondent and granted the appeal through its Decision17 of September 25, 2009. It held that
the RTC erred in concluding that the right of way pertains only to Road Lot 15. It gathered from the April 30,1993 RTC
Decision that what was actually granted to petitioners as a right of way from their property all the way to Marcos Highway
had an approximate distance of 2,350 meters. This fact was not disputed by petitioners when they appealed the said RTC
Decision. And as per evidence, such distance of 2,350 meters covers not only Road Lot 15 but also Road Lots 3, 10, 6, 4, 2,
and 1. Hence, the proper indemnity, per the case of Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc.,18 should consist
of the value of the entire stretch of the right of way, which measures 2,350 meters in length and 10 meters in width or of
a total area of 23,500 square meters at a price of P1,620.00 a square meter, plus damages caused to the servient estate.

Issue:

What is the extent of the right of way granted to petitioners under the April 30, 1993 RTC Decision as affirmed by
the CA in its February 13, 1996 Decision?

Ruling:

The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads within respondent's subdivision and not
merely Road Lot 15.

Petitioners aver that the right of way granted them under the April 30, 1993 RTC Decision pertains only to Road
Lot 15 based on the following portion thereof:

Whereas if [petitioners] would pass through the [respondent's] road lot particularly Lot 15 access to the Marcos
Highway is readily available to [petitioners'] property. Only a fence [separates] the Filinvest Subdivision and the
[petitioners'] property [which] could be removed x x x anytime.

They argue that the CA in effect improperly reversed and set aside the above final ruling of the RTC when it declared
instead that the right of way is composed of the road network within respondent's subdivision.

Petitioners' argument is untenable.

 To the Court's mind, the cause of confusion as regards the extent of the right of way granted to petitioners is the
absence in the said RTC Decision of any categorical statement with respect thereto. Be that as it may, it is not difficult to
conclude therefrom that what was intended to serve as petitioners' right of way consisted of the road network within
respondent's subdivision and not merely of Road Lot 15. As may be recalled, the RTC then in resolving the complaint for
easement of right of way was confronted with the contentious issue as to which between the two routes from petitioners'
property, i.e., the one passing through respondent's subdivision leading to Marcos Highway or the one passing through
another property leading to Sumulong Highway, is the more adequate and less prejudicial route pursuant to the
requirement of the law. Thus, when it made the following comparison and eventually concluded that the route passing
through respondent's subdivision is the more adequate and the less prejudicial way, what it obviously had it mind was the
road network in respondent's subdivision since the measurement thereof in meters corresponds with that mentioned by
the RTC, viz:

While in the survey of the property of the [petitioners] it is shown that the distance from the subject lot to the
Marcos Highway is approximately 2350 meters and the distance from Sumulong Highway to the subject lot is
1,400 meters, such short distance could not be used as absolute basis to deny the [petitioners] the relief prayed
for.

On the other hand, the portion of the RTC Decision relied upon by petitioners can in no way be taken to mean
that Road Lot 15 alone comprises the right of way granted. By its context, it was only intended to support the RTC's
conclusion that the route within respondent's subdivision is the less prejudicial between the two considered routes
because it would only take the removal of the fence therein for petitioners to have access to respondent's network of
roads which, in turn, would make Marcos Highway accessible to them.

Moreover, petitioners already admitted during the remand proceedings that that the right of way granted to them
affects several road lots within respondent's subdivision. As borne out by the records, respondent formally offered as part
of its exhibits a scale map of its subdivision for the purpose of proving the identity of the road lots affected by the right of
way.39 In their Comment on the Formal Offer of Exhibits,40petitioners did not proffer any objection to the said exhibit, but
merely averred that they find irrelevant respondent's submission of the fair market value of the said roads and that the
same were also being used in common by the subdivision dwellers.