2.

For movables
a. Accession continua
b. Rules for determining principal and accessory

Montelibano vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling

Property: Sugar sacks

Facts:

Plaintiffs are sugar planters, members of the Bacolod-Murcia Planters' Association, Inc., or assignees of sugar
planters. The former have contracts with the defendant corporation, hereinafter known as the Central, for the delivery of
their sugar cane to the sugar mill of the defendant for milling and processing into sugar. In accordance with the contracts,
which the planters had signed with the defendant, the sugar processed from the sugar cane delivered by each planter was
to be divided between the planter and the Central in the following proportion, namely, 60% for the planter and 40% for
the Central. The Central was to furnish the planter, from time to time as the milling progressed, with information as to the
share of sugar that the planter was entitled to receive, furnishing the planter with quedans or warehouses receipts
therefor. After the milling, and for a period of 90 days, the Central was to keep the sugar in its warehouse free of charge;
thereafter the planter was to pay five centavos per picul per month for storage,. aside from such expenses of conservation
and repacking as may be incurred in relation to the sugar upon presentation of his warehouse receipt.

At the time of the occupation of Negros Occidental by the Japanese forces on May 21, 1942, the Japanese
Military Administration, Visayan Branch, designated Fidel Henares, president of the Sugar Planters' Association, with the
following authority:

. . . hereby authorized to sell and dispose of all sugar to the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, the authorized purchaser of the
Philippine Military Administration, and in addition granting the following powers:

To contract, deliver, to receive payments, to pay various accounts to the members of the Planters' Association; and to
open accounts, to contract overdraft accounts with the Bank of Taiwan, and perform such other powers as may be
necessary in the premises.

After liberation (around March to June, 1945) and before the proration above set forth, plaintiff Alfredo
Montelibano withdrew from the warehouse some 12,789 piculs. Of these around 5,115.60 piculs were the share of the
defendant Central. Montelibano received a bill of P45,273.06 for the value of this sugar, and he proposed to pay the said
amount in installments. A first payment of P10,000 was made. The amount of the bill was based on a basic price of P8.85
per picul. The balance of the price has not yet been paid by plaintiff Alfredo Montelibano. Plaintiffs-appellants rely on the
following legal propositions: that the purchase of plaintiffs' sugar during the Japanese Military Occupation was neither an
act of confiscation nor of requisition, but a voluntary sale, but as there was no consent of the plaintiffs thereto or
consideration paid for the sugar, none of plaintiffs' sugar should be considered as sold; that, on the other hand,
defendant's sale of its sugar was validly made and it had received in full the value thereof, hence the sugar remaining in
the Central's warehouse at the time of the liberation should belong to plaintiffs, to the exclusion of the Central.

Issue:

Whether or not the sugar belongs to plaintiff.

Ruling:

The sugar of the plaintiffs and of the other planters and of the Central were stored together in one single mass,
without separation or identification, and as it appears that the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha made withdrawals of sugar from the
Central's warehouse without express statement as to whose sugar was being withdrawn, whether the planters' or the
Central's, it is absolutely impossible, physically or legally, to determine whose sugar it was that remained after the
withdrawals. There is no legal basis for plaintiffs' proposition that as the taking of their sugar was without their consent,
and that of the defendant's with its consent, all that remained is theirs. The only legal solution is, as the mass of sugar in
the warehouse was owned in common, and as it is not possible to determine whose sugar was withdrawn and whose was
not, the mass remaining must pertain to the original owners in the proportion of the original amounts owned by each of
them. This is the solution expressly indicated by the law (article 381, Spanish Civil Code), and the one most consistent with
justice and equity.

ART. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture
occurs accidentally, and in the latter case the things can not be separated without injury each owner shall acquire a right
in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or commingled.
(Spanish Civil Code)

Lastly, article 393 of the Civil Code, referring to common owner- ship, provides that the share of the participants in the
benefits, as well as in the charges, shall be proportionate to their respective interests.

This being the rule, it is obvious that whenever an undivided property gains an increase in its area, all the co-owners shall
be entitled to participate in the benefits to be proportionate to their shares; if it suffers diminution they shall have to
share, too, the charges in accordance with their interests.

Santos vs. Bernabe

Property:Palay

FACTS:
Plaintiff Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and appellant Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of the same grain in defendant Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse. It does not appear that the sacks of palay
deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse bore any marks or signs nor were they separated one from the other.

Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Jose C. Bernabe, to recover the cavans
and kilos palay he deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ
of attachment was granted, and the attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay
found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to said
defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.

Plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper bond, the
sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the present complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff acquired right over the mixture of cavans and kilos of palay. -- YES

HELD:
The sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay in said warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof
and there being no means of separating form said 924 cavans and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and those
belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is
applicable:

Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs
accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the
mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or commingled.

The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of
palaywhich were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo
Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at at the rate of P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.



FACTS:
On June 28, 1954, Vicente Aldaba and Teresa V. Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel tank with a
capacity of 5,000 gallons, for the sum of P900.00, for which the latter delivered to the sellers duly endorsed, Security Bank
& Trust Company check No. 281912, in the amount of P900.00. Aguirre, however, failed to, take physical possession of
the tank, having been prevented from doing so by the municipal authorities of Los Baños, Laguna (where the tank was
located), in view of the claim of ownership being made by the Bureau of Public Highways. It appears, however, that Vicente
and Teresa Aldaba again sold the same tank on December 2, 1954 to Zosimo Gabriel, for P900.000. Gabriel, in turn, sold
it to the Leonora & Company on December 5, 1954, for P2,500.00. After some alterations and improvements made on the
tank, Leonora & Company was able to sell the tank to National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (Nassco), for P14,500.00.

ISSUE:
1. WON Aguirre can take ownership of the property -- YES
2. WON Aguirre should reimburse Leonora for the improvements -- YES

HELD:
It is clear that we have here a case of accession by specification: Leonora and Company, as purchaser acting in
good faith, spending P11,299.00 for the reconditioning of the tank which is later adjudged to belong to petitioner Aguirre.
There is no showing that without the works made by Leonora & Company, the tank in its original condition when Aguirre
paid P900.00 therefor, would command the price of P14,500 which Nassco was willing to pay. Although ordinarily,
therefore, Aguirre, as owner of the tank, would be entitled to any accession thereto, the rule is different where the works
or improvements or the accession was made on the property by one who acted in good faith.2 And, it is not contended
that the making of the improvements and incurring of expenses amounting to P11,299.00 by Leonora & Company was
done in bad faith. Furthermore, to uphold petitioner's contention that he is entitled to the sum of P14,500.00 the price of
the tank in its present condition, would be to allow him to enrich himself at the expense of another. The lower courts,
therefore, acted correctly in ordering the reimbursement to Leonora & Company of the expenses it made on the tank.

V. Quieting of title to/interest in and removal/prevention of cloud over title to/interest in real property
A. Requirements
B. Distinction between quieting title and removing/preventing a cloud
C. Prescription/non-prescription of action
Bank of Commerce vs. San Pablo G.R. No. 167848

EMERGENCY RECIT:

Natividad executed an SPA in favor of Santos, authorizing the latter to mortgage a real property registered under
her name. The spouses San Pablo were co-mortgagors for the sole benefit of Santos as they were close friends.
Subsequently the respondents received a letter informing them that Santos failed to settle his obligation, but Santos
complied thereafter. Now the respondents demanded the TCT of the subject property but Santos failed to do so. They
discovered that the property was again used by Santos as a collateral for another loan obligation from the Bank of
Commerce. Respondents filed for quieting of title claiming that their signatures were forged while the petitioner bank
asserted that they are in good faith. Court ruled in the negative, stating that as banks, they are to exercise higher prudence
in dealing with its clients, as well as the fact that they cannot be classified as a mortgagee-in-good-faith because in the
instant case, the Bank of Commerce dealt with the mortgagor (Santos) and the law requires that the mortgagee must
transact directly with the owner of the real property to be mortaged with them.

Facts:

On 20 December 1994, Santos obtained a loan from Direct Funders Management and Consultancy Inc. As a
security for the loan obligation, Natividad executed a SPA in favor of Santos, authorizing the latter to mortgage to Direct
Funders a paraphernal real property registered under her name. In the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage8 executed in favor
of Direct Funders, Natividad and her husband, Prudencio, signed as the co-mortgagors of Santos. It was, however, clear
between the parties that the loan obligation was for the sole benefit of Santos and the spouses San Pablo merely signed
the deed in order to accommodate the former. The aforesaid accommodation transaction was made possible because
Prudencio and Santos were close friends and business associates.

Sometime in June 1995, the spouses San Pablo received a letter from Direct Funders informing them that Santos
failed to pay his loan obligation with the latter. When confronted with the matter, Santos promised to promptly settle his
obligation with Direct Funders, which he actually did the following month. Upon learning that Santos’ debt with Direct
Funders had been fully settled, the spouses San Pablo then demanded from Santos to turn over to them the TCT of the
subject property but the latter failed to do so despite repeated demands. To their surprise, they discovered that the
property was again used by Santos as collateral for another loan obligation he secured from the Bank of Commerce. In
order to free the subject property from unauthorized encumbrances, the spouses San Pablo, on 22 December 1995, filed
a Complaint seeking for the Quieting of Title and Nullification of the SPA and the deed of real estate mortgage.

In their complaint, the spouses San Pablo claimed that their signatures on the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage allegedly executed to secure a loan with the Bank of Commerce were forged.

The appellate court granted the petition filed by the spouses San Pablo and reversed the decisions of the MTC and
RTC. In setting aside the rulings of the lower courts, the Court of Appeals ruled that since it was duly proven that the
signatures of the spouses San Pablo on the loan documents were forged, then such spurious documents could never
become a valid source of title.

The Bank of Commerce posits that it is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore entitled to protection under the
law. It strenuously asserts that it is an innocent party who had no knowledge that the right of Santos to mortgage the
subject property was merely simulated.

Issue:

Whether a forged SPA or Deed of Real Estate Mortgage could be a source of a valid title.

Ruling:

No. This is the doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that all persons dealing with property
covered by the Torrens Certificates of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the
face of the title. The public interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of lawful ownership
of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who, in good faith, relied upon what appears
on the face of the certificate of title.

Indeed, a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property
given as security, and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake
further investigation. This doctrine pre-supposes, however, that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the
property, has already succeeded in obtaining Torrens title over the property in his name and that, after obtaining the said
title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies on what appears on the title. This is not the situation
in the case at bar since Santos was not the registered owner for he merely represented himself to be the attorney-in-fact
of the spouses San Pablo.

In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered owner of real property, the law requires
that a higher degree of prudence be exercised by the mortgagee.

The Bank of Commerce clearly failed to observe the required degree of caution in ascertaining the genuineness
and extent of the authority of Santos to mortgage the subject property. It should not have simply relied on the face of the
documents submitted by Santos, as its undertaking to lend a considerable amount of money required of it a greater degree
of diligence.

Top Management Programs vs. Fajardo G.R. No. 150462

Facts:

In 1964, Gregorio registered lots 1 to 4 situated at Las Pinas, Rizal with the CFI. 1965, Jose Velasquez filed an
application for registration of title over six lots situated in the same locality. In 1966, the said court issued an order
declaring as abandoned the reserved oppositions of Jose and Pablo Velasquez.

Subsequently, CFI issued a decision declaring Gregorio be the absolute owner of lots 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, the
same court also declared in favor of Velasquez, the lots 1, 7, 9 and 11. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) called the
attention of the Director of Lands regarding the overlapping lots of Velasquez and Gregorio. Velasquez petitioned the CFI
to set aside the award made in favor of Velasquez. The same court ruled in favor of Velasquez and rendered the award to
Gregorio as null and void. The CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Gregorio.

In 1986, the heirs of Gregorio subdivided the said property into two lots and were registered in the name of
Herminia Galman with the Registry of Deeds, Las Pinas.

Meanwhile, Velasquez entered into an agreement with Fajardo wherein the latter would finance the former
regarding his claim over the said property, whereupon after finality, Fajardo would be entitled to one half of the property.
Ultimately, the CA ruled in favor of Velasquez.

Herein petitioners Top Management Programs now seeks to annul the ruling in favor of Velasquez on the ground
of extrinsic fraud. Petitioners claimed that Gregorio has sold the subject property to them evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. The CA however denied the petition, averring that no extrinsic fraud was found which would justify the annulment
of the questioned orders. Petitioner then filed with the Makati RTC for Quieting of Title with Damages, alleging that the
issuance to Fajardo without the knowledge of the petitioner who was not a party therein constitutes a cloud upon the
petitioner, and claiming that it acquired the property in good faith and for value from Gregorio, the original owners
thereof. The Makati RTC dismissed the same. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject property can be subject to Quieting of title.

Ruling:
 No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to
real property. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest
over the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it. The court is tasked to determine the respective rights
of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who
has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that
whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce
the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.

Petitioner anchors its claim over the disputed lot on TCT No. T-8129 issued on February 20, 1989 which is a transfer
from TCT No. 107729 in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, from whom it bought the property in January 1989. On
the other hand, private respondent acquired the same land by virtue of the Officers Deed of Conveyance dated August
15, 1989 executed in their favor pursuant to the final judgment in Civil Case No. 35305 of the RTC of Pasig, Branch 164
and was issued TCT No. T-27380 in his name on December12, 1991. In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite we held
that if two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to
trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived.

Where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two different persons, for the same
parcel of land even if both are presumed to be title holders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds
the earlier title should prevail. On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual
issuance of subject transfer certificates of title, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the
certificates of title in dispute were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of
title, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity
tainting the process of registration.

From the recitals in the transfer certificates of title respectively held by petitioner and private respondent, as well
as the records of the LRA, there appears not just one but two different original certificates. TCT No. T-8129 on its face
shows that the land covered was originally registered as OCT No. 5678 under Decree No. N-111862 (Velasquez), while TCT
No. T-27380 indicates the original registration as OCT No. 9587 under Decree No. N-141990 (Gregorio). Both the LRC and
CA found TCT No. 107729 and its derivative titles TCT Nos. 4635 and T-8129 as void and inexistent since OCT No. 5678 in
the name of Velasquez had been nullified under the order for execution of the final judgment in LRC Case Nos. N-5053
and N-5416 in which Gregorio prevailed. Consequently, the lower courts upheld the title of private respondent which
alone can be traced to the original certificate in the name of Emilio Gregorio (OCT No. 9578).

Titong vs. CA 287 SCRA 102

FACTS:

Mario Titong filed an action for quieting of title against Victorico and Angeles Laurio. Petitioner alleged that he
was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land. He claimed that private respondents (Laurios), with heir hired laborers,
forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately 2 hectares; and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. The Laurios denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-
hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa, an adjoining owner
of Titong’s land. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents, declaring Laurio as the true and absolute owner of the
property. Petitioner appealed to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed and the MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for quieting of title should have prospered.

HELD:

No. The SC held that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly
dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances
enumerated in the Civil Code:
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet
the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.”
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. The
ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding." Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons
outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of action under
the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding"
beclouded the plaintiff's title over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the respondents, together with
their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and
plowed the same. He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees.
Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the property were private
respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered
grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title. In addition, when the issues were joined
by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary
dispute.

De Aviles vs. CA 264 SCRA 273

FACTS:
Petitioners aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
more particularly described as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles;
on the E by Malawa River, on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, with an area of
18,900 square meters and declared under Tax Declaration No. 31446. This property is the share of their father, Eduardo
Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents.
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957. Defendant Camilo Aviles
asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by
constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and
Eduardo. The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before the execution of the agreement but he
was not present when the measurement was made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo
asked him that he wanted a bigger share because he has several children to support. The portion in litigation however is
part of the share given to him in the agreement of partition.
The trial court disposed of the case thus ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land Surveyor of the
Bureau of Lands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine the extent and the boundary limit of the
land of the defendant on its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470) square
meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be determined. It ordered the complaint dismissed for lack of basis
and merits
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent appellate Court. In its now-
assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court, reasoning that a special civil action
for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted
an ejectment suit instead. It affirmed the decision of the trial court in dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it opined that the complaint for quieting of title
instituted by the petitioners against private respondent before the court a quo is not the proper remedy but rather, it
should be a case for ejectment.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute. Quieting of
title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
property.
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property of any interest
therein."

In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or
interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that
respondent Court erred in holding that there was “no xxx evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written
contract, xxx”, and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, (i) the Agreement of Partition executed by
private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners’ father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their
respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by
petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way
constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties’ failure to
situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement
of partition and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was alloted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is whether
these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant “which is apparently valid, but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable” and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the
moving of earthen dikes are not the “clouds” or “doubts” which can be removed in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. The
precedent on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is herewith reproduced in full.

Chacon vs. CA

Facts:

In 1932, Ramon Chacon was granted a Fishpond Lease Agreement over a 15 ha mangrove swamp, which he
developed into a fishpond, in Barrio Lapasan, Cagayan, Oriental Misamis. After his death in 1957, his heirs entered into a
partnership agreement, under the name Chacon Enterprises, for the purpose of acquiring title over the fishpond.
Subsequently in 1968, Chacon filed an ejectment suit against the Galasino group (respodents) who were then in actual
possession of an area of 43, 792 sq.m. of the eastern portion of the land. The trial court dismissed this action because the
respondents' houses constructed in the premises show that they were staying and living there for more than a year already
(old and dilapidated condition of houses).

Chacon Enterprises filed a civil case to recover the eastern portion alleging that the respondents occupied the
land without their consent and that they refused to vacate despite repeated demands. Galasino group assert absolute
ownership (1) they inherited the land from Santiago Ebora, their deceased predecessor-in-interest, who had been in
continuous, public and exclusive possession as the owner since time immemorial; (2) they continuously, openly and
exclusively possessed the land as owners since Eboras death; (3) they have planted coconuts thereon, which now bear
fruit; and (4) that Chacons certificate of title is null and void. Respondents also filed a civil case against Chacon for
annulment of the said certificate of title and reconveyance of the land outside of the circumferential dike of the fishpond.

CFI dismissed Galasino groups complaint and ordered them to vacate the land and to surrender possession to
Chacon Enterprises. Upon appeal in 1976, the CA reversed the decision of CFI, holding that the certificate of title in the
name of Chacon Enterprises was null and void insofar as it covered the portion in litigation. Chacon filed for MR on the
grounds that the action filed by Galasino group was barred by prescription. CA denied this motion holding that the action
by Galasino group. albeit denominated as one for reconveyance, is in essence an action to quiet title, which is
imprescriptible. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action by the private respondents have already prescribed.

RULING:

No. The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting
some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land,
claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action,
proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to any superior equity in. his favor. He may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complaint when
he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy
within the statutory period.

"There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the
reason for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession."

That herein private respondents were indeed in actual and physical possession of the land in dispute at the time
they filed Civil Case No. 3218 against petitioner on April 10, 1969 can be deduced from the fact that the latter had earlier
filed an ejectment suit in 1968 and an action to recover possession (Civil Case No. 3171) on January 9, 1969, against private
respondents over the same property. As correctly pointed out by private respondents, the filing of the said cases is
tantamount to an admission on the part of petitioner that it was not in material possession of the land in question.
Parenthetically, it may also be added that the 1968 ejectment suit was dismissed after trial by the City Court of Cagayan
de Oro with a finding that herein private respondents had been "staying and living in the premises for more than one year
already.

VI. Co-ownership
A. Characteristics of co-ownership
1. In general

MANUEL T. DE GUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, HermenegildaAbejo- Rivera
G.R. No. 120864 October 8, 2003

PROPERTY:fishpond in Meyacauayan, Bulacan

FACTS:

The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond situated in BarrioUbihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by PrimitivaLejano and Lorenza Araniegomarried to Juan Abejo.The
fishpond is registered under the names of PrimitivaLejano and Lorenza Araniego under TCTNo. 6358 of the
Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:

PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - share; and LORENZA ARANIEGO,Filipina, of legal
age, married to Juan Abejo, share, ---

The fishpond has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters. ABEJO is seeking torecover
possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.DeGuia (along with a
certain AnianoVicta) acquired possession of the entire fishpond by virtueof a document captioned Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan(Lease Contract) executedbetween him and the heirs of PrimitivaLejano. The
Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974up to 30 November 1979 for a consideration of P100,000.

The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir ofLorenza
AraniegoAbejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza AraniegoAbejos undivided share in thefishpond by intestate
succession. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his undivided share in the fishpond to his son on 22November
1983.

DeGuia continues to possess the entire fishpond and to derive income from the property despitethe expiration
of the Lease Contract and several demands to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and byhis successor-in-interest,
Abejo. The last demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.

Thus, Anejo was prompted to file his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against De Guiaon 12
May1986.

ISSUE:

W/N the parties are co-owners

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undividedthing or
right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner ofthe whole, and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the ownerof a portion which is truly
abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the differentportions owned by different people
are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, evenif not yet technically described.

2. Special rules:
a. Concept of condominium
i. Condominium corporation
ii. interest in real property
iii. Concept of common areas, amendment
iv. Documents to consider
b. Rights and obligations of condominium owner
i. Contributions/Dues
ii. PD 957 and RA 6552

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 957 July 12, 1976

REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONSTHEREOF

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and toprovide
them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellershave
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads,
drainage,sewerage,water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health
andsafety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetratedbyunscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers ortitles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same
subdivisionlots to different innocent purchasers for value;

WHEREAS, these acts not only undermine the land and housing program of the government but also defeat theobjectives
of the New Society, particularly the promotion of peace and order and the enhancement of the economic,social and moral
condition of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and condominiumbusinesses be
closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices andmanipulations committed in
connection therewith.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me bythe
Constitution, do hereby decree and order:

Title I
TITLE AND DEFINITIONS

Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVEDECREE.

Section 2. Definition of Terms When used in this Decree, the following terms shall, unless the context otherwiseindicates,
have the following respective meanings:

(a) Person. "Person" shall mean a natural or a juridical person. A juridical person refers to a business
firmwhether a corporation, partnership, cooperative or associations or a single proprietorship.

(b) Sale or sell. "Sale" or "sell" shall include every disposition, or attempt to dispose, for a
valuableconsideration, of a subdivision lot, including the building and other improvements thereof, if any, in
asubdivision project or a condominium unit in a condominium project. "Sale" and "sell" shall also include
acontract to sell, a contract of purchase and sale, an exchange, an attempt to sell, an option of sale
orpurchase, a solicitation of a sale, or an offer to sell, directly or by an agent, or by a circular,
letter,advertisement or otherwise.

A privilege given to a member of a cooperative, corporation, partnership, or any association and/or
theissuance of a certificate or receipt evidencing or giving the right of participation in, or right to, any land
inconsideration of payment of the membership fee or dues, shall be deemed a sale within the meaning of
this
definition.

(c) Buy and purchase. The "buy" and "purchase" shall include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwiseacquire for a valuable consideration a subdivision lot, including the building and other
improvements, if any,ina subdivision project or a condominium unit in a condominium project.

(d) Subdivision project. "Subdivision project" shall mean a tract or a parcel of land registered under Act
No.496 which is partitioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots with or without
improvementsthereon, and offered to the public for sale, in cash or in installment terms. It shall include all
residential,commercial, industrial and recreational areas as well as open spaces and other community and
public areas
in the project.

(e) Subdivision lot. "Subdivision lot" shall mean any of the lots, whether residential, commercial, industrial,
orrecreational, in a subdivision project.

(f) Complex subdivision plan. "Complex subdivision plan" shall mean a subdivision plan of a registered land
wherein a street, passageway or open space is delineated on the plan.

 (g) Condominium project. "Condominium project" shall mean the entire parcel of real property divided or to
bedivided primarily for residential purposes into condominium units, including all structures thereon.

(h) Condominium unit. "Condominium unit" shall mean a part of the condominium project intended for any
type of independent use or ownership, including one or more rooms or spaces located in one or more floors
(or part of parts of floors) in a building or buildings and such accessories as may be appended thereto.


(i) Owner. "Owner" shall refer to the registered owner of the land subject of a subdivision or a condominium
project.

(j) Developer. "Developer" shall mean the person who develops or improves the subdivision project
orcondominium project for and in behalf of the owner thereof.

(k) Dealer. "Dealer" shall mean any person directly engaged as principal in the business of buying, selling or
exchanging real estate whether on a full-time or part-time basis.

(l) Broker. "Broker" shall mean any person who, for commission or other compensation, undertakes to sell
ornegotiate the sale of a real estate belonging to another.

(m) Salesman. "Salesman" shall refer to the person regularly employed by a broker to perform, for and in his
behalf, any or all functions of a real estate broker.

(n) Authority. "Authority" shall mean the National Housing Authority.



Title II
REGISTRATION AND LICENSE TO SELL

Section 3. National Housing Authority The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.

Section 4. Registration of Projects The registered owner of a parcel of land who wishes to convert the same into
asubdivision project shall submit his subdivision plan to the Authority which shall act upon and approve the same, upona
finding that the plan complies with the Subdivision Standards' and Regulations enforceable at the time the plan
issubmitted. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a plan for a condominium project except that, inaddition,
said Authority shall act upon and approve the plan with respect to the building or buildings included in thecondominium
project in accordance with the National Building Code (R.A. No. 6541).The subdivision plan, as so approved, shall then be
submitted to the Director of Lands for approval in accordancewith the procedure prescribed in Section 44 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended by R.A. No. 440):Provided, that it case of complex subdivision plans, court
approval shall no longer be required. The condominiumplan as likewise so approved, shall be submitted to the Register of
Deeds of the province or city in which theproperty lies and the same shall be acted upon subject to the conditions and in
accordance with the procedureprescribed in Section 4 of the Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726).

The owner or the real estate dealer interested in the sale of lots or units, respectively, in such subdivision project
orcondominium project shall register the project with the Authority by filing therewith a sworn registration
statementcontaining the following information:

(a) Name of the owner;
(b) The location of the owner's principal business office, and if the owner is a non-resident Filipino, the
nameand address of his agent or representative in the Philippines is authorized to receive notice;
 (c) The names and addresses of all the directors and officers of the business firm, if the owner be
acorporation, association, trust, or other entity, and of all the partners, if it be a partnership;
(d) The general character of the business actually transacted or to be transacted by the owner; and
(e) A statement of the capitalization of the owner, including the authorized and outstanding amounts of its
capital stock and the proportion thereof which is paid-up.

The following documents shall be attached to the registration statement:

(a) A copy of the subdivision plan or condominium plan as approved in accordance with the first and second
paragraphs of this section.
(b) A copy of any circular, prospectus, brochure, advertisement, letter, or communication to be used for the
public offering of the subdivision lots or condominium units;
(c) In case of a business firm, a balance sheet showing the amount and general character of its assets
andliabilities and a copy of its articles of incorporation or articles of partnership or association, as the case
may
be, with all the amendments thereof and existing by-laws or instruments corresponding thereto.
(d) A title to the property which is free from all liens and encumbrances: Provided, however, that in case any
subdivision lot or condominium unit is mortgaged, it is sufficient if the instrument of mortgage contains
astipulation that the mortgagee shall release the mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit as
soonas the full purchase price for the same is paid by the buyer.

The person filing the registration statement shall pay the registration fees prescribed therefor by the Authority.Thereupon,
the Authority shall immediately cause to be published a notice of the filing of the registration statementat the expense of
the applicant-owner or dealer, in two newspapers general circulation, one published in English andanother in Pilipino,
once a week for two consecutive weeks, reciting that a registration statement for the sale ofsubdivision lots or
condominium units has been filed in the National Housing Authority; that the aforesaidregistration statement, as well as
the papers attached thereto, are open to inspection during business hours byinterested parties, under such regulations
as the Authority may impose; and that copies thereof shall be furnished toany party upon payment of the proper fees.
The subdivision project of the condominium project shall be deemed registered upon completion of the abovepublication
requirement. The fact of such registration shall be evidenced by a registration certificate to be issued tothe applicant-
owner or dealer.

Section 5. License to sell. Such owner or dealer to whom has been issued a registration certificate shall not,however, be
authorized to sell any subdivision lot or condominium unit in the registered project unless he shall havefirst obtained a
license to sell the project within two weeks from the registration of such project.The Authority, upon proper application
therefor, shall issue to such owner or dealer of a registered project a licenseto sell the project if, after an examination of
the registration statement filed by said owner or dealer and all thepertinent documents attached thereto, he is convinced
that the owner or dealer is of good repute, that his businessis financially stable, and that the proposed sale of the
subdivision lots or condominium units to the public would notbe fraudulent.

Section 6. Performance Bond. No license to sell subdivision lots or condominium units shall be issued by theAuthority
under Section 5 of this Decree unless the owner or dealer shall have filed an adequate performance bondapproved by said
Authority to guarantee the construction and maintenance of the roads, gutters, drainage,sewerage, water system, lighting
systems, and full development of the subdivision project or the condominiumproject and the compliance by the owner or
dealer with the applicable laws and rules and regulations.

The performance bond shall be executed in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and shall authorize the Authorityto
use the proceeds thereof for the purposes of its undertaking in case of forfeiture as provided in this Decree.

Section 7. Exempt transactions. A license to sell and performance bond shall not be required in any of the following
transactions:

(a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of land among co-owners and co-heirs.
 (b) Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original purchaser thereof and any subsequent sale of the
samelot.
(c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for the account of a mortgagee in the ordinarycourse
of business when necessary to liquidate a bona fide debt.

Section 8. Suspension of license to sell. Upon verified complaint by a buyer of a subdivision lot or a condominiumunit in
any interested party, the Authority may, in its discretion, immediately suspend the owner's or dealer's licenseto sell
pending investigation and hearing of the case as provided in Section 13 hereof.

The Authority may motu proprio suspend the license to sell if, in its opinion, any information in the registrationstatement
filed by the owner or dealer is or has become misleading, incorrect, inadequate or incomplete or the saleor offering for a
sale of the subdivision or condominium project may work or tend to work a fraud upon prospectivebuyers.

The suspension order may be lifted if, after notice and hearing, the Authority is convinced that the registrationstatement
is accurate or that any deficiency therein has been corrected or supplemented or that the sale to thepublic of the
subdivision or condominium project will neither be fraudulent not result in fraud. It shall also be liftedupon dismissal of
the complaint for lack of legal basis.

Until the final entry of an order of suspension, the suspension of the right to sell the project, though binding upon
allpersons notified thereof, shall be deemed confidential unless it shall appear that the order of suspension has in
themeantime been violated.

Section 9. Revocation of registration certificate and license to sell. The Authority may, motu proprio or upon
verifiedcomplaint filed by a buyer of a subdivision lot or condominium unit, revoke the registration of any subdivision
projector condominium project and the license to sell any subdivision lot or condominium unit in said project by issuing
anorder to this effect, with his findings in respect thereto, if upon examination into the affairs of the owner or dealerduring
a hearing as provided for in Section 14 hereof, if shall appear there is satisfactory evidence that the saidowner or dealer:

(a) Is insolvent; or
(b) has violated any of the provisions of this Decree or any applicable rule or regulation of the Authority, or
anyundertaking of his/its performance bond; or
(c) Has been or is engaged or is about to engage in fraudulent transactions; or
(d) Has made any misrepresentation in any prospectus, brochure, circular or other literature about
thesubdivision project or condominium project that has been distributed to prospective buyers; or
(e) Is of bad business repute; or
(f) Does not conduct his business in accordance with law or sound business principles.

Where the owner or dealer is a partnership or corporation or an unincorporated association, it shall be sufficientcause
for cancellation of its registration certificate and its license to sell, if any member of such partnership or anyofficer or
director of such corporation or association has been guilty of any act or omission which would be causefor refusing or
revoking the registration of an individual dealer, broker or salesman as provided in Section 11 hereof.

Section 10. Registers of subdivision lots and condominium units. A record of subdivision lots and condominiumunits shall
be kept in the Authority wherein shall be entered all orders of the Authority affecting the condition orstatus thereof. The
registers of subdivision lots and condominium units shall be open to public inspection subject tosuch reasonable rules as
the Authority may prescribe.

Title III
DEALERS, BROKERS A ND SALESMEN

Section 11. Registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen. No real estate dealer, broker or salesman shall engage inthe
business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has registered himself with the Authority inaccordance
with the provisions of this section.

If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with the applicable rules of theAuthority,
including the payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer, broker orsalesman upon filing a
bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by the Authorityconditioned upon his faithful
compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided, that the registration of asalesman shall cease upon the
termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.

Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of December of each year. Renewal ofregistration
for the succeeding year shall be granted upon written application therefor made not less than thirty normore than sixty
days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without thenecessity of filing further
statements or information, unless specifically required by the Authority. All applicationsfiled beyond said period shall be
treated as original applications.

The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen shall be recorded in a Registerof
Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public inspection.

Section 12. Revocation of registration as dealers, brokers or salesmen. Registration under the preceding section maybe
refused or any registration granted thereunder, revoked by the Authority if, after reasonable notice and hearing, itshall
determine that such applicant or registrant:

1. Has violated any provision of this Decree or any rule or regulation made hereunder; or
2. Has made a material false statement in his application for registration; or
3. Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with any sale of a subdivision lot or condominium unit;or
4. Has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business of dealer, broker, or salesman, as the casemay
be.

In case of charges against a salesman, notice thereof shall also be given the broker or dealer employing suchsalesman.
Pending hearing of the case, the Authority shall have the power to order the suspension of the dealer's, broker's,
ofsalesman's registration; provided, that such order shall state the cause for the suspension.

The suspension or revocation of the registration of a dealer or broker shall carry with it all the suspension orrevocation of
the registrations of all his salesmen.

Title IV
PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE

Section 13. Hearing. In the hearing for determining the existence of any ground or grounds for the suspensionand/or
revocation of registration certificate and license to sell as provided in Section 8 and 9 hereof, the followingshall be
complied with:

(a) Notice. No such hearing shall proceed unless the respondent is furnished with a copy of the
complaintagainst him or is notified in writing of the purpose of such hearing.
(b) Venue. The hearing may be held before the officer or officers designated by the Authority on the date
andplace specified in the notice.
(c) Nature of proceeding. The proceedings shall be non-litigious and summary in nature without regard
tolegal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. The Rules of court shall not apply in said hearing except
byanalogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(d) Power incidental to the hearing. For the purpose of the hearing or other proceeding under this Decree,
theofficer or officers designated to hear the complaint shall have the power to administer oaths,
subpoenawitnesses, conduct ocular inspections, take depositions, and require the production of any book,
paper,correspondence, memorandum, or other record which are deemed relevant or material to the inquiry.

Section 14. Contempt.

(a) Direct contempt. The officer or officers designated by the Authority to hear the complaint may summarilyadjudge in
direct contempt any person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the said hearingofficials as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same or of refusal to be sworn or to answer asa witness or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so. The person found guilty ofdirect contempt under this section shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding Fifty (P50.00) Pesos orimprisonment not exceeding five (5) days, or both.

(b) Indirect contempt. The officer or officers designated to hear the complaint may also adjudge any person inindirect
contempt on grounds and in the manner prescribed in Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 15. Decision. The case shall be decided within thirty (30) days from the time the same is submitted fordecision.
The Decision may order the revocation of the registration of the subdivision or condominium project, thesuspension,
cancellation, or revocation of the license to sell and/or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of the performancebond mentioned
in Section 6 hereof. In case forfeiture of the bond is ordered, the Decision may direct the provincialor city engineer to
undertake or cause the construction of roads and of other requirements for the subdivision orcondominium as stipulated
in the bond, chargeable to the amount forfeited. Such decision shall be immediatelyexecutory and shall become final after
the lapse of 15 days from the date of receipt of the Decision.

Section 16. Cease and Desist Order. Whenever it shall appear to the Authority that any person is engaged or about
toengage in any act or practice which constitutes or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this Decree, or ofany
rule or regulation thereunder, it may, upon due notice and hearing as provided in Section 13 hereof, issue a ceaseand
desist order to enjoin such act or practices.

Section 17. Registration. All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments relative to the sale orconveyance
of the subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall beregistered by the
seller in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.Whenever a subdivision
plan duly approved in accordance with Section 4 hereof, together with the correspondingowner's duplicate certificate of
title, is presented to the Register of Deeds for registration, the Register of Deedsshall register the same in accordance with
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided,however, that it there is a street, passageway or
required open space delineated on a complex subdivision planhereafter approved and as defined in this Decree, the
Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of titlecovering the street, passageway or open space, a
memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favorof a city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, or open space so delineated on the plan shall beclosed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner
without the requisite approval as provided under Section 22of this Decree.

Section 18. Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior
writtenapproval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the
mortgageloan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures
havebeen provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall
bedetermined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his
option,pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the
correspondingmortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said
buyer toobtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereto;

Section 19. Advertisements. Advertisements that may be made by the owner or developer through newspaper,
radio,television, leaflets, circulars or any other form about the subdivision or the condominium or its operations
oractivities must reflect the real facts and must be presented in such manner that will not tend to mislead or deceivethe
public.The owner or developer shall answerable and liable for the facilities, improvements, infrastructures or other forms
ofdevelopment represented or promised in brochures, advertisements and other sales propaganda disseminated bythe
owner or developer or his agents and the same shall form part of the sales warranties enforceable against saidowner or
developer, jointly and severally. Failure to comply with these warranties shall also be punishable inaccordance with the
penalties provided for in this Decree.

Section 20. Time of Completion. Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements,infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are
offered andindicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters
or inany form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision
orcondominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.

Section 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to
theeffectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominiumproject
to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two yearsfrom the date of
this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond isfiled in accordance
with Section 6 hereof.Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shallconstitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree.

Section 22. Alteration of Plans. No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces,
infrastructures,facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the approved
subdivision planand/or represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written
conformity orconsent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by the majority of
the lotbuyers in the subdivision.

Section 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominiumproject
for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer,after due
notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developerto develop
the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit forcomplying with the
same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortizationinterests but excluding
delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.

Section 24. Failure to pay installments. The rights of the buyer in the event of this failure to pay the installments duefor
reasons other than the failure of the owner or developer to develop the project shall be governed by Republic ActNo.
6552.Where the transaction or contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6552 on August
26,1972, the defaulting buyer shall be entitled to the corresponding refund based on the installments paid after
theeffectivity of the law in the absence of any provision in the contract to the contrary.

Section 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon fullpayment
of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry ofDeeds, shall be
collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding atthe time of the issuance
of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or thecorresponding portion thereof within
six months from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot orunit may be secured and delivered to the
buyer in accordance herewith.

Section 26. Realty Tax. Real estate tax and assessment on a lot or unit shall de paid by the owner or developerwithout
recourse to the buyer for as long as the title has not passed the buyer; Provided, however, that if the buyerhas actually
taken possession of and occupied the lot or unit, he shall be liable to the owner or developer for suchtax and assessment
effective the year following such taking of possession and occupancy.

Section 27. Other Charges. No owner or developer shall levy upon any lot or buyer a fee for an alleged communitybenefit.
Fees to finance services for common comfort, security and sanitation may be collected only by a properlyorganized
homeowners association and only with the consent of a majority of the lot or unit buyers actually residingin the subdivision
or condominium project.

Section 28. Access to Public Offices in the Subdivisions. No owner or developer shall deny any person free access toany
government office or public establishment located within the subdivision or which may be reached only bypassing through
the subdivision.

Section 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existingpublic road
or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be developedand maintained
according to the requirement of the government and authorities concerned.

Section 30. Organization of Homeowners Association. The owner or developer of a subdivision project orcondominium
project shall initiate the organization of a homeowners association among the buyers and residentsof the projects for the
purpose of promoting and protecting their mutual interest and assist in their communitydevelopment.

Section 31. Donations of roads and open spaces to local government. The registered owner or developer of thesubdivision
or condominium project, upon completion of the development of said project may, at his option, conveyby way of
donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or municipality wherein the projectis located.
Upon acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality concerned, no portion of the area donatedshall thereafter be
converted to any other purpose or purposes unless after hearing, the proposed conversion isapproved by the Authority.

Section 32. Phases of Subdivision. For purposes of complying with the provisions of this Decree, the owner ordeveloper
may divide the development and sale of the subdivision into phases, each phase to cover not less thanten hectares. The
requirement imposed by this Decree on the subdivision as a whole shall be deemed imposed oneach phase.

Section 33. Nullity of waivers. Any condition, stipulation, or provision in contract of sale whereby any person
waivescompliance with any provision of this Decree or of any rule or regulation issued thereunder shall be void.

Section 34. Visitorial powers. This Authority, through its duly authorized representative may, at any time, make
anexamination into the business affairs, administration, and condition of any person, corporation,
partnership,cooperative, or association engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots and condominium units. For
thispurpose, the official authorized so to do shall have the authority to examine under oath the directors,
officers,stockholders or members of any corporation, partnership, association, cooperative or other persons associated
orconnected with the business and to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum in relation to any investigation thatmay
arise therefrom.

The Authority may also authorize the Provincial, City or Municipal Engineer, as the case may be, to conduct an
ocularinspection of the project to determine whether the development of said project conforms to the standards
andspecifications prescribed by the government.The books, papers, letters, and other documents belonging to the person
or entities herein mentioned shall be opento inspection by the Authority or its duly authorized representative.

Section 35. Take-over Development. The Authority, may take over or cause the development and completion of
thesubdivision or condominium project at the expenses of the owner or developer, jointly and severally, in cases wherethe
owner or developer has refused or failed to develop or complete the development of the project as provided forin this
Decree.

The Authority may, after such take-over, demand, collect and receive from the buyers the installment payments dueon
the lots, which shall be utilized for the development of the subdivision.

Section 36. Rules and Regulations. The Authority shall issue the necessary standards, rules and regulations for theeffective
implementation of the provisions of this Decree. Such standards, rules and regulations shall take effectimmediately after
their publication three times a week for two consecutive weeks in any newspaper of generalcirculation.

Section 37. Deputization of law enforcement agencies. The Authority may deputize the Philippine Constabulary orany law
enforcement agency in the execution of its final orders, rulings or decisions.

Section 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesosfor
violations of the provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to theAuthority
and enforceable through writs of execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Section 39. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulationthat
may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twentythousand
(P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, That in the case ofcorporations,
partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the person whohas charge of the
administration of the business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decreeand/or the rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

Section 40. Liability of controlling persons. Every person who directly or indirectly controls any person liable underany
provision of this Decree or of any rule or regulation issued thereunder shall be liable jointly and severally withand to the
same extent as such controlled person unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did notdirectly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.

Section 41. Other remedies. The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to any and all otherrights
and remedies that may be available under existing laws.

Section 42. Repealing clause. All laws, executive orders, rules and regulations or part thereof inconsistent with
theprovisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 43. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon its approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.





REPUBLIC ACT No. 6552

AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO BUYERS OF REAL ESTATE ON INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS

Section 1. This Act shall be known as the "Realty Installment Buyer Act."

Section 2. It is hereby declared a public policy to protect buyers of real estate on installment payments againstonerous
and oppressive conditions.

Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of real estate on installment payments,including
residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales totenants under
Republic Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixtythreehundred
eighty-nine, where the buyer has paid at least two years of installments, the buyer is entitled to thefollowing rights in case
he defaults in the payment of succeeding installments:

(a) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments due within the total grace period earned by
himwhich is hereby fixed at the rate of one month grace period for every one year of installment payments
made:Provided, That this right shall be exercised by the buyer only once in every five years of the life of the
contractand its extensions, if any.

(b) If the contract is canceled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments
onthe property equivalent to fifty per cent of the total payments made, and, after five years of installments,
anadditional five per cent every year but not to exceed ninety per cent of the total payments made: Provided,
That the actual cancellation of the contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of
the cash surrender value to the buyer.

Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the computation of the total number
ofinstallment payments made.

Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace periodof not
less than sixty days from the date the installment became due.

If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contractafter
thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contractby a notarial
act.

Section 5. Under Section 3 and 4, the buyer shall have the right to sell his rights or assign the same to anotherperson or
to reinstate the contract by updating the account during the grace period and before actual cancellation ofthe contract.
The deed of sale or assignment shall be done by notarial act.

Section 6. The buyer shall have the right to pay in advance any installment or the full unpaid balance of the purchaseprice
any time without interest and to have such full payment of the purchase price annotated in the certificate oftitle covering
the property.

Section 7. Any stipulation in any contract hereafter entered into contrary to the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6,shall
be null and void.

Section 8. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, no other provision shall be affected thereby.

Section 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 26, 1972.

c. Grounds for partition of common areas or dissolution of the condominium

B. Source of co- ownership
C. Rights of co-owners
1. Distinction between right to property owned in common and full ownership over his/her ideal share
2. Right to oppose acts of alteration
3. Right to partition
4. Right to contributions for expenses
5. Waiver
6. Right to redemption of co-owners share

VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR,
G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993

PROPERTY:house and lot in Paranaque

FACTS:

Brothers, Virgilio and Senen Aguilar bought a house and lot for their father with an agreement that Virgilio owns
2/3 while 1/3 belongs to Senen. By virtue of a memorandum, the two agreed that their interests to the house
shall be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of original owners with the SSS, in
exchange of his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their father.

Since Virgilio is disqualified in obtaining a loan from SSS, they agreed that the deed of Sale would be executed
and registered in the name of Senen. Upon their father’s death, Virgilio demanded from Senen to sell the
property and divide the proceeds amongst themselves which the latter refused prompting Virgilio to file an
action to compel Senen.

In his answer with counterclaim, Senen alleged that he has no objection for the sale and that the proceeds must
be divided among them equally and since he is a co-owner he has the right to the use and enjoyment of the
property.

The trial court ruled in favor of Virgilio and ordered Senen to pat rent. However, CA set aside this rule. Hence,
the petition

ISSUE:

W/N CA is correct in setting aside the lower court’s rule

RULING:

Yes. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and
that eachco-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned.Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible
and the co-ownerscannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be
sold and its proceedsaccordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is
invoked by any of the co-ownersbut because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its
subdivision would prejudice theinterests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to
who among them shall be allotted orassigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.
In one case, this Court upheld the orderof the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties
owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of theCivil Code.

However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation
topetitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for
which it isintended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of
property held proindiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no
other limitation thanthat he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division
is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint
ownershipover the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of thesame.

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot
andrespondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his
continuedoccupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the
property so thatthe sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental
of P1,200.00 permonth, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and
enjoyment of the otherhalf of the property appertaining to petitioner.

LEONOR B. CRUZ vs. TEOFILA CATAPANG
G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008

PROPERTY:parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay MahabangLudlod, Taal,
Batangas.

FACTS:

Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land in Batangas. With the consent
of Norma Maligaya, Teofila Catapang built a house adjacent to the parcel of land owned by the three in 1992,
however, it intruded a portion of the co-owned-property.

On 1995, Leonor Cruz discovered the same and demanded Catapang to demolish and vacate the intruding
portion which the latter refused. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for forcible entry to ehich the
Court ruled in favor of her, ruling that consent of one co-owners is not sufficient to justify the encroachment.
RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling in toto. CA however reversed the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

W/N a co-owner can give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property

RULING:

No. It is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or herexclusive use.Furthermore, Articles 486 and
491 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided hedoes so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a wayas not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-ownersfrom using it according to their rights. The purpose of
the co-ownership may bechanged by agreement, express or implied.

Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,make alterations in the
thing owned in common, even though benefits for allwould result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one ormore of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common
interest, the courtsmay afford adequate relief.

Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in commonprovided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended andin such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
theother co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a thirdperson to construct a house
on the co-owned property will injure the interest ofthe co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using
the property inaccordance with their rights.

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of theothers, make alterations in the thing
owned in common. It necessarily follows thatnone of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-
owners, validlyconsent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, inthe thing owned
in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion orownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be anact of alteration.

The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an actof dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling
under Article 491 of the Civil Code.There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to
constructher house on the co-owned property.

NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth
Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO
G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009

PROPERTY:2.6360 hectarescoconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte

FACTS:

In 1974, petitioners, Plasabas and Malazarte filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages
before CFI of Maasin, Leyte against respondents, Lumen and Aunzo praying for the confirmation of their rights
and legal title to the subject property and ordering respondents to vacate the same and to pay damages.

Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners allegation of ownership andpossession of the premises, and
interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common
ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. However, in the course of trial it was discovered that Nieves Plasabas was not the
sole and absolute owner. Based on the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, the property passed on
fromFrancisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves grandmother;then to Antonina Talam,
her mother; and then to her and her siblingsJose, Victorand Victoria.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed the ruling of the court. The CA,further, declared that the
non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the
Civil Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title
or a reivindicatory action. With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1,
2004 Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

W/N Art 487 of NCC is applicable.

RULING:

Yea. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring anaction for ejectment. The
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery ofpossession, including an accionpublicianaand a
reivindicatory action. A co-ownermay file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffsbecause the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment ofthe court in favor of
the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if thejudgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights
of the unimpleadedcoowners.

With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners complaintis one for ejectment or for
recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Codeapplies to both actions.

Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners asparties. The only exception to
this rule is when the action is for the benefit of theplaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus,
entitled to thepossession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiffimpleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the soleowners of the property in litigation is
immaterial, considering that theyacknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and
hersiblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue thecase on the latters
behalf.Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, notmandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is
deemed to be instituted forthe benefit of all.


JOSEPHINE MARMO, NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR and MARISA DEL PILAR vs. MOISES ANACAY
G.R. No. 182585 November 27, 2009

PROPERTY:house and lot in Dasmarinas, Cavite

FACTS:

On September 2003, Anacay filed a case for annulment of Sale, recovery ofdamages against petitioners and the
Register of Deeds of Cavite. Thecomplaint states that Anacay and his deceased wife is a co-owner of aparcel of
land and house built in Regency Homes, Cavite. They authorizedMarmo to sell the property, Marmo then sold
it to Danilo del Pilar for 520kpayable in monthly instalments from May 2001 to June 2006. Danilo defaultedin
his payments from December 2002 onwards.
Anacay later discovered that the title was cancelled and issued in Marmo'sname by virtue of a falsified deed of
sale. The same title was subsequentlytransferred to Danilo.Marmo averred that the children as co-owners of
the property, should havebeen included as plaintiffs because they are indispensable parties. Anacayargued that
his children are not indispensable parties because the issue inthe case can be resolved without their
participation.

RTC ruled in favor of Anacay, noted that the motion to include thechildren was simply filed to delay the
proceedings. Petitioners thenelevated their case to the CA. However, CA dismissed the petition, affirming the
RTC; the children arenot indispensable parties.

ISSUE:

W/N the children are indispensable parties

RULING:

Yes. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensableparties as parties-in-interest without
whom there can be no finaldetermination of an action and who, for this reason, must be joined eitheras
plaintiffs or as defendants.

When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of theCivil Code explicitly provides that
“any one of the co-owners may bring anaction in ejectment.”

We read these cases to collectively mean that where the suit is brought bya co-owner, without repudiating the
co-ownership, then the suit is presumedto be filed for the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed
withoutimpleading the other co-owners. However, where the co-owner repudiates theco-ownership by
claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit
is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties andmust be impleaded as party-
defendants, as the suit affects the rights andinterests of these other co-owners.

In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below,never disputed the existence of a co-
ownership nor claimed to be the soleor exclusive owner of the litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he isa
“bona-fide co-owner” of the questioned property, along with his deceasedwife. Moreover and more
importantly, the respondent’s claim in hiscomplaint in Civil Case No. 2919-03 is personal to him and his wife,
i.e.,that his and his wife’s signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor ofpetitioner Josephine were falsified.

The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require theparticipation of the respondent’s co-
owners at the trial; it can bedetermined without their presence because they are not parties to thedocument;
their signatures do not appear therein. Their rights andinterests as co-owners are adequately protected by their
co-owner andfather.


REYNALDO BALOLOY and ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE vs. ALFREDO HULAR
G.R. No. 157767 September 9, 2004

PROPERTY:esidential land In Sitio Page, Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon

FACTS:

Alfredo Hular filed acomplaint for quieting of title of real property with damagesagainst the children and heirs
of IluminadoBaloloy andpetitioners Reynaldo and Adelina. The respondent alleged inhis complaint that his
father, AstrologoHular, was the ownerof a parcel of residential land located in Juban, Sorsogon, withan area of
287 square meters, and that such lot was part ofLot No. 3347 of the JubanCadastre. The respondent allegedthat
IluminadoBaloloy, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent over the
propertythrough fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which theRegister of Deeds issued Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No.P-16540 in his name. Subsequently, the respondent later discovered that in thecadastral survey
of lands in Juban, the property of his father,which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made toform
part of Lot No. 3353, the property of IluminadoBaloloy.According to the respondent, even if the residential land
wasmade to form part of Lot No. 3353 registered under the nameof IluminadoBaloloy, he had acquired
ownership of theproperty by acquisitive prescription, as he and hispredecessors had been in continuous,
uninterrupted and openpossession of the property in the concept of owners for morethan 60 years.Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

W/N all indidpensible parties were impleaded by the respondents in the trial court

RULING:

It is the contention of the respondent that the subjectproperty was sold by Lagata to his father, AstrologoHular,
in1961. Hence, when his parents died intestate, they weresurvived by their children. Article 1078 of the Civil
Codeprovides that where there are two or more heirs, the wholeestate of the decedent is, before partition,
owned in commonby such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of thedeceased. Until a division is made,
the respective share ofeach cannot be determined and every co-owner exercisestogether with his co-
participants, joint ownership over the pro-indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of thesame.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-ownersmay bring an action in ejectment. This article
covers all kindsof actions for the recovery of possession, including an accionpubliciana and a reinvidicatory
action. A co-owner may bringsuch an action without the necessity of joining all the otherco-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to beinstituted for the benefit of all.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint,claiming sole ownership over the subject property and
prayingthat he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proofthat the other co-owners had waived their
rights over thesubject property or conveyed the same to the respondent orsuch co-owners were aware of the
case in the trial court.







MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

CASE DOCTRINES

Co-owner may file an action against a co-owner; purpose

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also againstanother co-owner who takes exclusive
possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the lattercase, however,the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of
the co-ownership.

The plaintiff cannotseek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot
recover any material or determinate part of the property.

Co-ownership; right of enjoyment

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to
his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if thesubject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their
respective families to the extentpossible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without
opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely,if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells inthe house

FACTS:


Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. Abejo’s contends that he is the owner of half of the
undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and he claims to have ownership over
approximately 39,611 sq m out of the fishpond’s total area of 79,220 sq m. De Guia continues to possess and use the fishpond without any
contract and without paying rent to Abejo’s damage and prejudice. De Guia refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the fishpond
despite repeated demands to do so after De Guia’s sublease contract over the fishpond had expired. He asked the trial court to order De Guia to
vacate an approximate area of 39,611 sq m as well as pay damages.

De Guia alleged that the fishpond was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with PrimitivaLejano as her only heir. Abejo is
not the owver of the entire fishpond but the heirs of Primitiva who authorized him to possess the entire fishpond. Abejo’s ownership of the ½ of
the undivided portion of the fishpond as void and claimed ownership over an undivided portion of the fishpond for himself. De Guia sought
payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.

RTC decision: In favor of Abejo

CA Decision: Affirmed RTC

ISSUE: WON a co-owner may file an action for ejectment against a co-owner.

RULING:

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” This

article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer (accioninterdictal),
recovery of possession (accionpubliciana), and recovery of ownership (acciondereivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physicalpossession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from
dispossession.However, accionpubliciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper
regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Acciondereivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership,
also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trialcourt.Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third
person, but also againstanother co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the lattercase,
however,the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership.The plaintiff cannotseek exclusion of the defendant from
the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession.

The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De
La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, wereiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property
prior topartition as follows:It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all thatthe co-owner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has noright to demand a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division iseffected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal
portion.As such, the onlyeffect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtainrecognition of the co-ownership; the
defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the propertybecause as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot
recover any material or determinatepart of the property.

Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half (½) of the buildingin favor of private respondent.Following the inherent
and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equalshares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the
same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the
right of dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition,
such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the
entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying orsegregating their respective portions.

Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is theproper recourse. An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner maydemand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-
owner has repudiated the co-ownershipunder certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the
conditions set bylaw.To recapitulate, werule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such actionis a recognition of the co-
ownership.

The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-ownedproperty. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect
physical division of the FISHPOND betweenABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits
received by DE GUIAfrom the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equalright to
possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND

Issue 2: WON it is proper for a co-owner to pay for rents while using the property.

Ruling:

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to
his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if thesubject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their
respective families to the extentpossible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without
opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely,if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells inthe house.

The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail toexercise any of these options, they must
bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner topay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the
property.In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his usewithout paying the proper
rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-ownersfor the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners
become co-participants in the accessions of the propertyand should share in its net profits. /

ARECLONA VS. CA

Doctrine: A co-owner cannot maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. All co-owners in
an action for security of tenure of a tenant must be impleaded. Failure of such will bar the court from making a final
adjudication.

FACTS:

Farnacio filed an action for peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure and damagesagainst three fishpond
co-owners PacitaArcelona-Olanday, Maria Arcelona-Arellano and NatividadArcelona-Cruz. The case was intended to
maintain him as tenant of the fishpond. 3 other co-owners,petitioners herein, are naturalized Americans, residing in
California, USA. Judgment was rendered by thetrial declaring Farnacio as tenant-caretaker, which was affirmed by the
IAC and the Supreme Court.Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for annulment of said judgment with the Court of
Appealsclaiming that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. They claimed that being co-owners,
they should all be impleaded as indispensable parties. The CA rendered judgment dismissingthe petition on the ground
of petitioners' failure to allege the sole and only ground of extrinsic fraud intheir petition for annulment of judgment.

ISSUE:

WON the final judgment may be annulled for lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/orover the person of
indispensable parties) and denial of due process?

RULING:

YES. Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners maybring an action in
ejectment." It was subsequently held, however, that a co-owner could not maintain anaction in ejectment without
joining all the other co-owners. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest
without whom there can be no final determination ofan action. It is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his
status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final determination of the
action. In other words,a tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the
entireco-owned land. Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed withinthe definition
of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.In the case at bar, petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond.
It is impossible to pinpoint which specificportion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs
to petitioners. Thus, it isnot possible to show over which portion the tenancy relation of Farnacio has been established.
Indeed,petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties. Obviously, the failure toimplead
petitioners barred the lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the presence ofindispensable parties to a
suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality. The Court,through former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,
held that a person who was not impleaded in thecomplaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no
man shall be affected by aproceeding in which he is a stranger.

CRUZ VS. LEIS



FACTS:

Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrude acquired a 100-sqm parcel of land
from Dept. of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Adriano died on Dec. 1973, Gertrudes obtained a loan from
petitioners, Spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, the loan was secured by a mortgage over the property. For failure to
repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of Petitioner, Alexander Cruz.

Gertrudes died on June 1987, her heirs, the private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises.

RTC held that the land was conjugal property, and concluded that Gertrudes could only sell her one-half share in the
property. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: May the co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

RULING:

Yes.

The right of re-purchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone. While the records show that
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses thereof, that did not make him the owner of
all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. There is no doubt that redemption of
property entails necessary expenses.

Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is
sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name
of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The
rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted
on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of
the Torrens system.

TAGHOY VS. TIGOL

FACTS:


Spouses FilomenoTaghoy and Margarita Amit owned an 11,067 sqm parcel of land (subject property) in LapuLapu City
Cebu. The spouses executed a special power of attorney appointing FelixbertoTigol as their Attorney in fact. Tigol
executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property to secure a loan with the PNB. Spouses obtained the loan to
fund the shellcraft business of their children.

Filomeno died and his wife and children were named as heirs. They sold the subject property to Rosita and Felixberto.
Filomeno’s heirs executed two Deeds of Confirmation of Sale, confirming the supposed sale in favor of Respondents,
Rosita and Felixberto.

The respondents obtained a loan with Philippine Banking Corp. and secured a real estate mortgage on the subject
property as well. The heirs filed a complaint against the respondents for declaration of nullity of the respondents TCT
and for judicial partition. They alleged that the deeds of confirmation of sale became the bases for the transfer of the
title in the respondents' names, but the sale was fictitious or simulated, as evidenced by the respondents' own
explanatory joint affidavits attesting that the transfer was for the

purpose only of convenience in securing a loan, not for absolute conveyance or sale.

The respondents admitted that they executed the joint affidavits but countered that they acquired a valid title to the
subject property through the Extrajudicial Settlement of Heirs and Sale. They claimed that when Filomeno died without
the PNB loan being paid, the heirs agreed that the respondents will advance payment of the loan, subject to
reimbursement, to save the foreclosure of the subject property; the heirs then executed the Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale in the respondents' favor as their way of reimbursing the amount the latter paid; the respondents executed the
joint affidavits out of generosity, expressing their willingness to be reimbursed, but when the heirs failed to reimburse
the amounts advanced by them, then they caused the registration of the title in their names.

RTC ordered the partition of the subject property after reimbursement of the amount the respondents paid for the loan.

CA found that the contract between the parties was relatively simulated; the respondents payment of the PNB loan was
the real consideration for the transfer of title.

ISSUE:

Whether the sale of the subject property between the parties was absolutely or relatively simulated.

RULING:

[29]
In the interpretation of contracts, the intention of the parties is accorded primordial consideration; such intention is
[30] [31]
determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
When the parties do not intend to be bound at all, the contract is absolutely simulated; if the parties conceal their true
agreement, then the contract is relatively simulated.
In the present case, the parties never intended to be bound by their agreement as revealed by the two (2) joint affidavits
executed by the respondents simultaneous with the execution of the deeds of confirmation of sale.

The failure of the other heirs to reimburse the amounts advanced by the respondents in payment of the loan did not
[41]
entitle the latter to claim full ownership of the co-owned property. It only gave them the right to claim
reimbursement for the amounts they advanced in behalf of the co-ownership. The respondents' advance payments are
in the nature of necessary expenses for the preservation of the co- ownership. Article 488 of the Civil Code provides that
necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining
[42]
co-
owners. Until reimbursed, the respondents hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount they advanced.

SANCHEZ VS. CA

DOCTRINE:

Co-ownership; Characteristics

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.

Co-ownership; relationship

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with
a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act
prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

FACTS:

Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot wasregistered under TCT No. 263624 with the
following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, MarilynSanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita
Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married toFernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No.
289216 in the name of private respondentVirginiaTeria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995
by all six (6)co-owners in her favor.Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused tovacate
the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot withtheMeTC.MeTC decision: in favor of
Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot andthe other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of
her signature in the Deed of Absolute Salehaving been established as a forgery.RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit
their pleadings.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of privateVirginiaTeria, buyer of the property. On
4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by thesheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house

without any special permit of demolition from the court.Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was
forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.

On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground

that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum.

RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of
merit

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lilia Sanchez has a right to the property.

RULING:

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of the private right
of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is
exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.”

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of ormaterial indivision, which means
that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is theelement which binds the subjects, and, (c) the
recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights andobligations of the co-owners.In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner
to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character andattribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property
or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he
may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an expresstrust among the heirs as co-owners
of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is atrustee for the others.Before the partition of a land or thing
held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to anydefinite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in theentire land or thing.

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives theowner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freelysell and dispose of it, i.e., his
undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third partyindependently of the other co-owners.

But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinatepart of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is
represented by a quota or ideal portionwithout any physical adjudication.

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes a

nd bounds of petitioner’s lothas not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into
by theother co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected.Partition needs to be effected to protecther right to her definite
share and determine the boundaries of her property.Such partition must be donewithout prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia
Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot underdispute.

HELD:Petition is GRANTED. Remanded to the MeTC for partition

APPLICABLE NCC PROVISION:

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER SERVACIO and RITO GO
G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011

PROPERTY: 5,560 sqm. portion of two parcels of land

FACTS:

Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 sqm.to Protacio B. Go, Jr. On March 29, 1999,
Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father,
Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the said property.

On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go, wife of Protacio Sr., died. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito
B. Go sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the
petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay
proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City,
Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.

The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the same became conjugal property; and that the sale
of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta
was null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether the sale of the portion of the land is void.

HELD:

No. Petitioners’ contention that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code is WITHOUT MERIT.

Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.Thus, their property
relation was one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of
the Civil Code.
A co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without
the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.

To reiterate a sale of the entire property by oneco-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.

Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not
secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is
an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.

APPLICABLE NCC PROVISION:

Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be
valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of
the thing owned in common, when to do so would render unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-
ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498.

Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of
them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.

THE HEIRS OF CESAR MARASIGAN vs. MARASIGAN

G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008

PROPERTY: 2/21 shares of Hacienda Sta. Rita

FACTS:

Alicia died intestate leaving behind her 2/21 shares 13 parcels of land called Hacienda Sta. Rita in Pili and Minalabac,
Camarines Surwith an aggregate area of 496 hectares. Shewas survived by her
siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a sister-in-law; and the children of her brothers who predeceased
her: Francisco, Horacio, and Octavio.

On 17 December 1997, a Complaint for Judicial Partition of the Estate of Alicia Marasigan was filed before the RTC by
several of her heirs and private respondents herein against Cesar

As the parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition among themselves Alicias estate, private
respondents filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners following the procedure outlined in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
The Commissioners, stating that the physical division cannot be done because of the different locations and conditions
of the properties, recommended that the heirs may assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the
sameprovided he pays to the heir[s] willing to assign his/her 1/7 share.

Cesar opposed the findings maintaining that he does not expect that he would be forced, to buy his co-owners share or
to sell his share instead. He alleged that the estate is not indivisible just because of the different locations and conditions
of the parcels of land constituting the same. Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court can only be availed of if the
partition or division of the real properties involved would be prejudicial to the interest of any of the parties. He asserted
that despite the segregation of his share, the remaining parcels of land would still be serviceable for the planting of rice,
corn, and sugarcane, thus evidencing that no prejudice would be caused to the interests of his co-heirs.

Countering Cesars arguments, private respondents contended that physical division is impossible because Alicias estate
is equivalent to 2/21 shares in Hacienda Sta. Rita, which is composed of 13 parcels under different titles and tax
declarations, situated in different barangays and municipalities, and covers an area of 496 hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether the property may be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties.

HELD:

No.

Articles 494, 495, and 498 must be interpreted so as to give effect to the very purpose thereof, which is to put to an end
to co-ownership in a manner most beneficial and fair to all the co-owners.

In this case, the Commissioners found, after a viewing and examination of Alicia’s estate, that the same cannot be
divided without causing prejudice to the interests of the parties. This finding is further supported by the testimony of
Apolonio Marasigan that the estate cannot be divided into smaller portions, since only certain portions of the land are
suitable to agriculture, while others are not, due to the contours of the land and unavailability of water supply.

The impracticality of physically dividing Alicias estate becomes more apparent, considering that Hacienda Sta. Rita is
composed of parcels and snippets of land located in two different municipalities, Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur. The
actual area representing Alicias 2/21 pro-indiviso shares in Hacienda Sta. Rita is 422,422.65 square meters, more or
less. Each of Alicias heirs is entitled to 1/7 share in her estate equivalent to 67,496.09 square meters or roughly seven
hectares. Cesar and his heirs are entitled only to his 1/7 share in the yet unidentified, unsegregated 2/21 pro-
indiviso shares of Alicia in each of the 13 parcels of land that comprises Hacienda Sta. Rita. Dividing the parcels of land
even further, each portion allotted to Alicias heirs, with a significantly reduced land area and widely scattered in two
municipalities, would irrefragably diminish the value and use of each portion, as compared to keeping the entire estate
intact.

APPLICABLE NCC PROVISION:

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

TABASONDRA vs. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO

G.R. No. 196403, December 7, 2016

PROPERTY: 100,352 sqm. land

FACTS:

The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two marriages.

Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra, siblings, were the registered owners of the three (3)
parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City.

They all died intestate and without partitioning the property. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-
Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

On August 22, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents claiming that the parcels of land are
owned in common by them and the respondents but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof.
Hence, they asked for partition which was refused without valid reasons. They filed a suit praying that the subject land
be partitioned, that new titles be issued in their respective names, that the respondentss be ordered to render an
accounting on the fruits thereon, and that such fruits also be partitioned.

In their Answer, the respondents averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same should be made
only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the
subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their favor on August 18, 1982.

ISSUE:

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Valentina and Valeriana without Cornelio’s consent in favor of the
respondents is void.

HELD:

No.

There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana was
100,352 square meters; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-third of such total area.

Thus, Valentina and Valeriana to alienate their pro indiviso shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without the knowledge
or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in
the common property. According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners as the successors-in-interest of Cornelio could not
validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares in favor of the respondents.

To reiterate: Under a co-owners/tip, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each
co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.

NORMA C. MAGSANO vs. PANGASINAN SAVINGS & LOAN BANK

GR No. 215038, Oct 17, 2016

PROPERTY: 418 sqm. parcel of land located in Dagupan City

FACTS:

Spouses Roque Magsano and Susana Capelo, the parents of petitioners, purportedly executed in favor of respondent
bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a 418 square-meter parcel of land as security for the payment of their P35,000.00
loan.[10]

The mortgagors, however, defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation when it fell due, causing respondent bank to
extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property and in the process, respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder in
the public auction sale. The latter subsequently sold the same to Sps. Manuel.

Despite repeated demands, the mortgagors refused to vacate the premises; hence, respondent bank applied for and
was granted a writ of possession over the subject property and, thereafter, a writ of demolition, resulting in the
demolition of petitioners' houses.

Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Sheriff's Final
Sale, Deed of Sale, and TCT No. 48754 against respondent bank, Sps. Manuel, and Sheriff Daroy averring that Roque had
already passed away prior to the execution of the Real Estate Mortgage on July 1, 1991; hence, the said mortgage was
null and void, and could not have conferred any right on the subject property in favor of respondent bank which it could
pass to Sps. Manuel.

ISSUE:

Whether the real estate mortgage is valid.

HELD:

It is valid only as to Susana’s portion, in the event of partition.

It is undisputed that at the time the Real Estate Mortgage was constituted, Roque was already deceased. Upon his
death, the conjugal partnership between him and his spouse, Susana, was dissolved pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the
Family Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership arose among Susana and the other heirs of Roque with respect to
his share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership is
governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code.

Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in the conjugal partnership, she
could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first
done either by agreement or by judicial decree. While she herself as co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell
her undivided interest in the subject property, she could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety
without the consent of the other co-owners.

Therefore, the validity of the subject Real Estate Mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor
conducted in favor of respondent bank should be limited only to the portion which may be allotted to it, as Susana's
successor-in-interest, in the event of partition, thereby making it a co-owner with petitioners pending partition.

MELECIO DOMINGO vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA AND ELENA B. MOLINA

G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016

PROPERTY:One-half undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land

FACTS:

In June 15, 1951, spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half
undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land.

During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina. On September
10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora's death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his
debts. In 1986, Anastacio died.

In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967 and
transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Ownershipagainst the spouses Molina.

Melecio claims that AnastacioAnastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's
consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.

ISSUE:

Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora's consent is valid and legal.

HELD:

The sale was not totally void.

There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code's effectivity on August 3,
1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. Hence, pursuant to Article 175 of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968.

The properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse, however, has an actual
and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties
until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora's
share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the
original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.

Pursuant to Article. 493, Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but
not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,Anastacio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the
other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred,
making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might
belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition.

Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for partition
under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.

D. Termination/extinguishment
1. Effect of partition
2. Rights against individual co-owners in case of partition
3. partition in case co-owners cannot agree