CAPACITY TO CONTRACT

According to Section 10(1) of the Contracts Act, a party's right to conclude a contract

is an important element for a legal contract. All agreements are contracts if they are
signed, inter alia, by "contracting parties." Section 10(1) of the Contracts Act also
provides that “all agreements are contracts if they are concluded by the free consent
of the contracting parties, with a valid reason and with a lawful intent, and are not
explicitly declared void”. On the other hand, Section 11 of the Contracts Act lays out
the conditions for persons willing to contract that each person is competent to
contract, who is of majority age as per the law to which he is subject, who is of
sound mind, and is not excluded from contracting under any law to which he is
subject.

Age of majority
Section 2 of the Age of the Majority Age stated that the age of the majority of the
person is 18 years old in Malaysia. According to the provisions of Section 4, at the
age of eighteen years, the minority of all males and females shall cease and decide in
Malaysia, and each such male and female shall have a majority age. Section 4 of the
Age of Majority Act specifies that nothing in this Act limits any person's right to act
on the following issues such as marriage, divorce, dower and adoption, for the
purposes of that written law, the religion and religious practises and uses of any class
of individuals within Malaysia and any clause of any other written law included the
age of majority. In the case of Kandasamy v Suppiah, the term 'any law to which he is
subject' was considered in Section 11 of the 1899 Contract Enactment. In this case
the defendant was charged on a promissory note that he signed at the age of 18. The
issue emerges as to what law should be applied in deciding the defendant's age of
majority, because there was then no statute in the Federated Malay States that
established the age of majority for general purposes. In Section 11 of the Contract
Statute 1899 the Magistrate interpreted the words "any law to which he is subject"
as meaning the personal law of the individual whose contract is at issue. In this case
the defendant's legal rights was Hindu law, which sets the majority age at age 16.
The Judge, however, found that the defendant was applicable to contracts and
passed judgement on him. The defendant appealed, and accepted his appeal. The
Court ruled that common law applied, and that the age of majority was 21 years old
under common law.
Pursuant to Section 2 of the Act, the age of majority became 18 years of age, and
according to Gregorian calendar, Section 3 of the Act provides for the way in which
age is to be calculated for all age calculations under this Act and in calculating any
individual's age, the day on which he has been born shall be included as a day, and at
the early part of the eighteenth anniversary of the day that he shall be considered to
have attained the age of eighteen years.

EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL RULE ON CAPACITY TO CONTRACT

There are also several exceptions to the general rule that an individual is competent
at most 18 years of age to sign a contract. These includes the marriage contracts,
scholarship agreements and contracts of employment provided under special
statutes.
Marriage contracts: Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976
In the case of Rajeswary & Anor v Balakrishnan & Ors, The High Court held that a
marriage contract did not fall within in the general principle set out as in Mohori
Bibee v Dharmodas Ghose, that minors contracts are void. In this case the parties
were Hindus, the first plaintiff and the first defendant who performed a betrothal
ceremony following the arranged marriage arrangements arranged by the second
plaintiff and defendant. Eventually, the first defendant rejected his promise to marry
the first plaintiff who sought damages, inter alia, against the first defendant for
violation of promise to marry. The first defendant alleged, inter calia, with the first
plaintiff's failure to enter into the marriage contract, since she was a minor at the
time. In this case , the Court separated marriage contracts signed by minors from
other groups of contracts, and in specific exempted them from the enforcement of
the principle set out in the case of Mohori Bibee. In the case of Taraporewala J in
Fernandes v Gonsalves, stated that marriage contracts are usually concluded in India
between minors or between an adult and a child, and such contracts must, in the
nature of things, number thousands every day of the year, made pursuant to the
Indian population. It's hard to imagine it was the Legislature's intention to refuse any
redress for its violation to a minor party to such a contract. Therefore, the first
plaintiff on the agreement signed into between her father, acting as her guardian
and on her behalf, and the first defendant by whom the latter agreed to marry the
first plaintiff, held that an action was sustainable. Section 10 of the Act states that
"any marriage claimed to have been ratified in Malaysia shall be invalid and void if
either party is below the age of eighteen at the date of the marriage". The Law
Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act is also completely irrelevant under Muslim law to
a Muslim or to any person who is married. In the case of Rajeswary v Baiakrishnan,
an undertaking of marriage made by a minor. The agreement was concluded with
dowry provisions and breach penalty provisions. Then he repudiates the vow to
marry. The defendant sued for breach of promise to get married. The defendant
argued that the arrangement is invalid, because the complainant is a minor. It was
held that marriage contracts signed by minors were legal. Because one party breaks
the contract the other party is entitled to sue.

Scholarship agreements: Contracts (Amendment) Act 1976

Section 4 of the Contracts (Amendment ) Act 1976 states that, despite anything to
the contrary found in the main Act, no scholarship agreement shall be nullified on
the ground that the scholar who concludes that agreement is not of a majority age.
In acts for violation of scholarship agreements, the protection of the lack of
contracting capacity of minors was raised. In the case of Government of Malaysia v
Gurcharan Singh & Ors, In action of violation of the scholarship agreement, the
protection of the minors' inadequate capacity to contract was raised. The High Court
found the scholarship arrangement to be null, void and also unenforceable. The
meaning of the “scholarship agreement” provided under section 2 of the Contracts
Act is that such contract or agreement between the competent authority and any
person, referred as a scholar concerning any scholarship, grant, bursary, loan,
sponsorship or appointment to a courses of study, leave with or without pay or any
other facility, whether provided directly by the competent authority, or by any other
person or body, or by any government outside Malaysia, for the purposes of
educating or learning any description. 

Employment contracts: Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act 1966

Any child or adolescent may enter into and be employed on a service contract but
provided that person can't be an employer is stated under Children and Young
Persons (Employment) Act 1966. Section 13 of the Children and Young Persons
(Employment) Act provides that despite anything to the contrary found in the
Contracts Act 1950 or any other written statute, any children and young people shall
otherwise be eligible as an employer to enter into a service contract under this Act
and may sue as a defendant without his next friend or defending any action without
the need for a guardian ad litem. Given no damages and no payments pursuant to
s13 of the Employment Act 1955 are retrievable from a child or young person for
violation of any service contract. Under the Act, "child" refers to any person who has
not reached his or her 14th year of age or of the age that the Yang di Pertuan Agong
will recommend by notification in the Gazette, and "young person" means any
person who has not reached his or her sixteenth year of age without being a child.
One issue of this law is the legitimization of child labour. On the other hand, it can
not be argued that children and young people enter jobs and the Act helps the minor
involved to enforce the contract and sue for compensation by granting recognition
to such contracts. They are, at the same time, covered from claim for damages and
compensation under Section 13 of the Employment Act 1955 (Revised 1981) Act 265.
Under Section 18 of the Children and Young Persons (Employment), furthermore, the
act provides also that minor would not be comforted of any rights, duties or
liabilities granted on him or enforced by any other written laws.

EFFECT OF AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY MINORS

The consequence of minors making agreements under the Contracts Act is distinct
from that of common law. Under common law, all contracts signed by
minors, known as "infants" are voidable at the minor 's discretion, either during
becoming an adult. The way they would escape such contracts relied on the form of
contract. For contracts whereby, for instance, the minor has acquired an interest of
a permanent or continuing nature, interest in land, such as  contracts that grant
benefits or rights on the minor,  the contract is binding unless the minor disclaims.
For contracts that are not constant in effect, such as a commitment to pay for
goods, contracts that impose obligations on the minor, the contract is not valid
unless accepted by the minor within a fair period of time after reaching the
majority age. The contract can be imposed in all cases by the minor as he does not
usually have the right to demand particular performance of the contract, but can
only claim damages for violation. This is because the court would not award clear
performance where it is not prepared to enforce the contract at either party's suit. In
the case of Mohori Bibee v Dharrnodas Ghose, the respondent, then a minor,
conducted a mortgage in favour of money-lender Brahmo Dutt. Subsequently, the
respondent began an action against Brahmo Dutt by his mother and guardian as a
next friend, alleging that the respondent was a minor when he executed the
mortgage, and praying for a judgement that it was invalid and rendered inoperable
and it should be delivered up to cancellation. The Privy Council claimed that the
respondent's executed mortgage was void, as well as the moneylender was not
allowed to refund the money on a judgement that found the mortgage invalid. The
effect of agreements signed by minors is not provided for in Sections 10 and 11 of
the Indian Contract Act. However, reading both sections together that a minor is
incapable of contracting, the Privy Council held that any such contract would
therefore be null and void. The Malaysian courts have adopted the part of the
decision in the case of Mohori Bibee.

REMEDIES FOR AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY MINORS

According to section 66 of the Contracts Act, provides that any person accepts any
benefit from an agreement which has been found to be void must reinstate the
benefit received. On the other hand, Section 69 provides for an assertion for
necessaries supplied to persons unable to enter into contracts. Section 65 equivalent
to Section 66 of the Contracts Act provides that, when an agreement is found to be
invalid or a contract becomes invalid, any person who receives some benefit under
the agreement or contract is obliged to restore or compensate the person from
whom the agreement or contract was received. According to the Privy Council, it
begins with the existence of an arrangement or contract between the responsible
parties and does not refer to a situation in which there has never been, and may
never have been, a contract. In the case of Leha binte Jusoh v AwangJohari bin
Hashim, The respondent charged that it had entered into an agreement to buy some
lands belonging to an estate controlled by the appellant. The respondent had been a
minor at the time of the supposed arrangement. The purchase price was fully paid,
and the respondent was let in control. The Federal Court held that the agreement
was null and enforced Section 66 of the Contracts Act to require the minor to be
reimbursed for the purchase price, provided the minor vacated the land he had
occupied.

Necessaries under section 69 Contracts Act

According to Section 69 of the Contracts Act, that if a person who is unable of
entering into a contract or someone whom he is legally required to help is supplied
by another person with needs suitable to his lifetime condition, the person who
supplied such supplies is entitled to be compensated from the property of such
incapable individual. Related to Section 66 which provides relief for agreements that
are invalid and unenforceable, Section 69 is also a compensation provision. However,
Section 69 explicitly provides for a demand for necessaries for supplies provided to
persons unable to enter into a contract, that is to say minors and unsound minded
individuals. In the case of Government of Malaysia v Gurcharan Singh & Ors, the
Government of Malaysia sued the first defendant as that of the promisor and the
second and third defendant as security for breach of the contract concluded
between 1960-4961 with the plaintiff to provide a training course at the Malayan
Teachers ' Training Institution. The action was based on the first defendant's breach
of the contract to serve the Government as a teacher five years after his training.
The first defendant argued that the contract was null and void as it was signed all
through his minority. The High Court agreed that agreed the contract was null and
void. However, it also claimed that, under Section 69 of the Contracts Act, the
training and education provided to the first defendant fell within the description of
"necessaries." Consequently, the first defendant was held liable for repayment of the
sum spent on his training and education.

Meaning of "necessaries suited to his condition in life"

In the case of Chappie v Cooper, that held that necessaries were things and services
that were essential to a reasonable presence in life. In this case, the burial expenses
borne for the funeral of her late husband by the defendant, a widow who was a
minor, were deemed appropriate. Section 69 of the Contracts Act on the assertion
for necessaries incorporates the common law on this subject, which states that the
goods provided must be "adapted to their living conditions. In the case of Nash v
Inman 30, it was claimed that the clothes given to the defendant, a minor who
included fancy waistcoats among other items, were not necessaries. In this case the
defendant was an undergraduate from a well-to-do family at Cambridge University.
There's been evidence to prove that the defendant was already supplied with
appropriate and required clothes for his situation in life and for his role as a
Cambridge University undergraduate at the time the clothes were being shipped. In
the case of Ryder v Wombwell, the defendant has been the younger son of a wealthy
deceased baronet. During the infancy of the defendant, the plaintiff presented him
with a silver-gilt goblet that he had ordered to make a gift to a friend and also a set
of jewel solitaires, or ornamental studs, made of diamonds and rubies. No evidence
is provided in the defendant's station of anything strange that rendered it
exceptionally necessary for him to get such items. The Exchequer Chamber Court
dismissed the complainant's claim and held that the articles provided to the
defendant were not necessaries. In the case of Roberts v Gray, The defendant, an
infant, signed a contract with the plaintiff, a professional billiard player, to go out on
a world tour. The plaintiffs argued that he had spent a lot of time and trouble under
the contract, and that he had accrued liabilities in arranging for billiard matches. A
conflict ensued and the defendant repudiated the contract. The plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant for breach of contract damage caused. The English
Court of Appeal held that perhaps the contract was enforceable on the defendant
and that no part of it could be repudiated.
Nevertheless, contracts for necessaries that contain harsh and burdensome terms
against an infant would not have been binding. In the case of De Francesco v
Barnum, The defendant, an infant, entered into an apprenticeship contract for seven
years, to be trained the plaintiff's stage dance. The contract provided that, without
her master 's permission, the infant would not allow any professional involvement or
marry during the seven year term. No stipulation was made that the master should
provide infant with dancing engagements or retain her while she was unemployed.
The baby pursued a formal partnership with a third party to act as a stage dancer.
The claimant filed an case against the defendant in order to enforce the contract and
seek damages for its violation.

A minor's obligation to pay for supplied necessaries exists not because there is a
legitimate contract between the minor and the supplier but because the minor has
gained an advantage. Therefore he should be forced to pay for the gain he has
received in order to avoid unjust enrichment. The second theory is that obligation is
founded on "consensus," that is to say contract. A minor can sign into a valid
contract for the supply of necessaries according this theory. The necessaries contract
is a derogation from the law that minors are not eligible to contract. In the case of
Nash v Inman 30, it was claimed that the clothes given to the defendant, a minor
who included fancy waistcoats among other items, were not necessaries. In this case
the defendant was an undergraduate from a well-to-do family at Cambridge
University. There's been evidence to prove that the defendant was already supplied
with appropriate and required clothes for his situation in life and for his role as a
Cambridge University undergraduate at the time the clothes were being shipped. In
cases of executory contracts the basis of liability is relevant. If the reason is "re" then
there is no obligation because the minor still has to get a profit. If the basis is
"consensus" the minor may have contractual obligations. In the case of Government
of Malaysia v Gurcharan Singh & 0rs, Chang Min Tat J claimed that “If a child is
utterly incompetent and unable to enter into a contract, so there is no contract on
which to sue him. In addition, an infant's responsibility for the necessaries given to
him does not occur ex con tractu and the duty is not consensus. It's indeed re and
section 69 of our Ordinance, which reflects English common law on an infant's duty
to pay a fair amount for necessities, makes it plain that this is so in this nation.”

Specific performance of contracts entered into on behalf of minors

A contract concluded on behalf of minors can be expressly implemented if it is for
the good of the minor that the contract is well within the capacity of the person
concerned to sign on behalf of the minor so as to bind him or her. In the case of Sri
Kakularn Subrahman yam & Anor v Kurra Subba Rao, the mother of a minor, on
behalf of the minor, signed into a selling contract for immovable property belonging
to the minor. The purchase price was added to clear those debts left by the father
who died of the child. The minor claimed to have the lands secured for sale and for
income. The Privy Council held that he was uneligible to regain possession of the
property and declared that, in the present case, the conduct of the mother and
guardian in signing into the sales contract was an act performed on behalf of the
minor appellant.

Recovery of benefits received by minors

In addition to the remedies provided for in the Employment Act, the fair remedies
specified for in the Specific Relief Act were considered to restore benefits received
by the minors. Under Section 40 of the Specific Relief Act, when adjudicating the
cancellation of an instrument, the court may demand that the party to whom the
compensation is provided make some restitution to the other party that may be
necessary by justice. In the Mohori Bibee’s case, as to whether this will extend to
contracts signed by minors. The Privy Council did not specify its position but merely
stated that it would not intervene with the Appellate Court's jurisdiction, which
decided that, in the circumstances of the particular case, justice did not involve them
to order the return of money advanced to him by the respondent with clear
awareness of his infancy. In the case of Tan Hee Juan next friend Tan See Bok and Lai
Soon v Teh Boon Keat, The plaintiff, a minor signed a land transfer to the defendant
in this case, and obtained the purchase price. The minor later decided to postpone
the transfer. Hereford J stated that the move in compliance with Sections 10 and 11
of the Contracts Act and Mohori Bibee had been invalid. The issue emerges whether
the court could require the minor to refund the purchase price on the
discontinuance of the transfer contract, pursuant to s 41 of the Specific Relief
Enactment. In the case of K Leslie Ltd v Sheill, the plaintiffs are moneylenders who
offered the defendant minor a loan of £ 400 which misrepresented his age. Although
it appeared regrettable that no remedy could be offered to the plaintiffs, the English
Court of Appeal ruled that the plaintiffs could not sue for restitution, as to do that
would be to implement the void contract.

Minor recovering benefits conferred to another

Under common law, the minor can be successful in obtaining benefits bestowed on
another if he can show that there has been a complete failure to consider. In the
case of Pearce o Brain 52, The child plaintiff traded his sidecar and motorcycle for a
second-hand motorcar owned to the defendant. The vehicle broke down after a 70-
mile drive from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to reject the contract on the basis
that when he signed into it, he was a child. He pleaded for his motorcycle 's return,
and offered the defendant to return the damaged vehicle. The defendant declined,
and the claimant filed a lawsuit against him. The contract was considered to be
invalid but the plaintiff was not permitted to reclaim the motorcycle. There was no
complete consideration deficiency in this case, since the complainant had used the
car for 70 miles. Swift J claimed that "there is clear authority which money spent
under a vacant contract cannot be retrieved unless there is a complete failure of the
consideration.” In the case of Valentini v Canali, The Court held that, if a minor has
earned any gain under the contract, he can not rebound. A minor took a house lease
in this situation, and decided to pay £102 to the landlord for the furniture. He paid
£68, and issued the remainder a promissory note. He decided to set back the lease
after a few months of using the house and furniture, and recover the money paid.
The Court ruled that the lease had been revoked and the promissory note had been
returned but the minor was unable to recover the money paid. Lord Coleridge CJ
claimed that when a child has paid, consumed or used something, it is contrary to
natural justice that he must recoup the money he had paid.

Minor's false representation of age - fraud bcs the person tipu the age
In which a minor has made a misrepresentation of his age, the issue emerges as to
whether he should be prevented from increasing the defence that he was a minor
when the contract was signed. Section 115 of the Evidence Act 1950 (Revised 1971)
Act 56 states that If a person has deliberately induced or allowed another person, by
his action, act or omission, to believe something to be true and to act on that belief,
rather than for that conviction he might have acted, only he and his representative
shall have a right to refute the truth of that thing in any conflict or proceeding
between himself and that individual or his representative. In the case of Mohori
Bibee, according to the false misrepresentation of the age, In this situation, the
Privy Council held that estoppel shall not adhere, since the other party was aware
of the minor 's inability to enter into the transaction. The Board also stated that, in
the basis of misrepresentation and fraud, the contract will not be voidable in the
same way, since this would be a case where the fraud or misrepresentation did not
induce the consent.
 In the case of Natesan v Thanaletchumi & Anor, decision held from the case of Khan
Gul v Lakha Singh AIR, It was claimed that even though the first defendant had
persuaded the complainant to sign an agreement with her and the second defendant
by falsely representing that she has been of full age, she would not be prevented
from preventing the agreement by pleading with her minority. In the case of
Mahomed Syedol Arffin v Yeoh Ooi Gark, The respondent, the moneylender, brought
action against appellant in respect of such amounts. In defence, the appellant
claimed that he was an child at the time the transactions were sued. At that time the
respondent had demanded majority proof from the appellant and the appellant had
issued a doctor's certificate certifying that, in his judgment, the appellant was 21
years old, upon been examined.  It was stated that an action against appellant for
causing the respondent to lend him money by falsely representing himself as being
of full age could not be sustained. In the case of Stocks v Wilson, By fraudulently
claiming that he was of full age, the defendant, a minor, coerced the complainant to
sell and send those goods to him. The plaintiff refused to discharge the burden of
arguing that these items were necessary items, and could thus not sue for the price
on the contract. Lush J held that neither is the infant prevented from demonstrating
the true facts which would again dispossess the infant of the security required for his
safety if such an estoppel were allowed. If the infant has acquired property by
deception he may be compelled to recover it; if he has acquired capital he may be
compelled to repay it. If he has not received either, but has only claimed to be bound
by an obligation to transfer properties or to pay money, neither in the Court of Law
nor in the Court of Equity can he be required to fulfil his undertaking or to fulfil his
infringement. 

AGREEMENTS BY PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND

According to Section 11 of the Contracts Act, persons eligible for contracting should
be of sound mind. Section 12(1) of the Contracts Act spells out what a sound mind is
for contract purposes. For aim of making a contract, a person is said to have been of
sound mind if, at the time he makes it, he is able to fully understand it and to form a
reasonable opinion as to its effect on his interests. Section 12(2) of the Contracts Act
provides that a person who is normally of unstable mind but sometimes of sound
mind can enter into a contract when he is of sound mind. Section 12(3) of the
Contracts Act provides that a person who is generally of a sound mind, but
occasionally of an unsound mind, if he is of an unsound mind, may still not make a
contract. Under common law; a contract signed by an unsound minded person could
be revoked if it can be demonstrated that he was unable to comprehend his conduct
at the time the contract was entered into, and the other party was aware of his
condition. The individual who is unsound in mind has the choice of continuing with
the contract or revoking it. In the case of Imperial Loan Company Ltd v Stone, an
action was taken on a promissory note executed as protection by the defendant. The
court concluded that the defendant was incompetent when he signed the note, but
could not agree about whether the plaintiffs' representative who was there at the
signing of the note knew about this incapacity. Lord Esher MR claimed that when an
individual enters into a contract and then argues that he was insane at that time that
he did not even know what he was doing and confirms the accusation, the contract is
binding on him in all respects, whether enforceable or enforced, as if when he made
it, he was sane, if he can further show that the entity he contracted with realised he
was so insane as to not be able to comprehend or understanding what he was doing.
In the case of Hart v O'Connor, the appellant-contracted to acquire the New Zealand
farmland which was the focus of testamentary settlement. The arrangement was
made between both the appellant and Jack O'Connor, who has been the only trustee
of the estate at that time. The respondents, the estate's trustees and heirs
consequently demanded that the arrangement be set aside on the ground, inter alia,
that Jack O'Connor was of unsound mind when he signed the contract. The Privy
Council held that the contract was not invalid and voidable as the unsound mind of
Jack O'Connor was not evident to the other negotiating party at the time he signed
the contract. In the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Yap Bee Lee, to the
advantage of the plaintiff, the first defendant signed a letter of assurance. The
plaintiff had secured a default judgement against the first defendant. The husband of
the first defendant applied as his guardian ad item for the default judgement to be
set aside on the basis that at the moment she signed the guarantee the first
defendant was of unsound mind. A Hospital Bahagia specialist study revealed that
the first defendant had bipolar disorder. The plaintiff rejected the application on the
basis that they had not been told that the first defendant had an unsound mind. The
High Court referred to the case of Imperial Loan, and ruled that the contract was null
and void only if first defendant were unsound and the claimant was aware and had
knowledge of this fact. In the case of Che Som Binte Yip Alias Mrs Som Ismail &2 Ors
v Maha Private Limited & 2 Ors, the first and second plaintiffs have taken suit on
behalf of the third plaintiff to claim that a mortgage deed supposedly executed by
the third plaintiff in favour of the third defendant bank is null and void and has no
legal impact.  It was argued also that third claimant was an unsound mind and
unable to control himself and his affairs at the period the time of the execution of
the mortgage deed. The Court applied the case of Imperial Loan Co Ltd v Stone and
Hart v O'Connor and declared that the general rule is that an act performed by an
individual who has no mental ability or an unsound mind u to do so is invalid as well
as voidable.  The defendant had Parkinson's disease, causing both physical and
emotional disabilities. In the case of Chemsource (M) Sdn Bhd v Udanis bin
Mohammad Nor, The plaintiff was said to have been completely aware of the
circumstance of the defendant at all material moments. This was the case of the
defendant that the plaintiff took full advantage of the illness of the defendant and
compelled the defendant to conduct different agreements for the good of the
plaintiff and to the defendant's loss. Section 11 and 12 of the Contracts Act and the
case of Imperial Loan Co Ltd v Stone were referred to by the High Court as a
landmark case and found that the problems of Parkinson's disease and the
defendant's ability to contract were triable concerns that warranted a complete trial.
Under the law a psychiatric or mental patient does not make a legal contract. This
would be of vital significance to assess if the defendant was suffering from a type of
mental deficiency at the time of the contract that he was so inebriated and unable to
comprehend the meaning of the contract. In the case of Sim Kon Sang Peter
(administrator of the estate of Chong Yu Tai , decd) v Datin Shim Tok Keng, the
plaintiff alleged that, while she was alive, the deceased had passed some undivided
shares of her land to the defendant when, as the defendant well knew, she was of an
unsound mind. Consequently, the plaintiff argued that the transfers were invalid,
void and of no consequence. The defendant argued that the contracts were void and
not invalid.