Evidence Group 7 Case Digests

EVIDENCE – MODULE 4
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY; ADMISSIBLE HEARSAY

- Oral, Written, or Non-Verbal Hearsay
- Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
a. Independently Relevant Statements
LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 161745; September 30, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: Exception to Hearsay: Rule on Independently Relevant Statements: A report made

by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements.
Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has
been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply.
FACTS: Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for
the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at ₱565,000. Consigned to Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila. On
25 October 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer.
During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.
Respondent, as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. To recover the amount paid
and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer,
which refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a Complaint with the RTC-Manila for
the collection of ₱565,000 representing the amount that respondent had paid Vulcan.
RTC: dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the cause of the loss was a fortuitous event
(typhoon Trining). The court ruled that petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming
typhoon, and that the vessel had been cleared by the PH Coast Guard to travel.
CA: reversed the ruling of the RTC and held that the vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed for
Manila. Thus, the loss of the cargo was occasioned by petitioner’s fault. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the survey report of Jesus Cortez (cargo surveyor) is admissible in
evidence.
HELD: No. However, the survey report was not the sole evidence; and even without the Survey
Report, petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of fault that applies to common carriers.
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of its defense of fortuitous event was sorely
insufficient. It had to show that it was free from any fault -- a fact it miserably failed to prove.
 First, petitioner presented no evidence that it had attempted to minimize or prevent the loss
before, during or after the alleged fortuitous event.
 Second, the alleged fortuitous event was not the sole and proximate cause of the loss. There is a
preponderance of evidence that the barge was not seaworthy when it sailed for Manila.
Respondent was able to prove that, in the hull of the barge, there were holes that might have
caused or aggravated the sinking.
 The submission of the Philippine Coast Guard’s Certificate of Inspection of Judy VII did not
conclusively prove that the barge was seaworthy. It could be contradicted by competent
evidence.
Admissibility of the Survey Report: Petitioner claims that the Survey Report prepared by
Jesus Cortez, the cargo surveyor, should not have been admitted in evidence. The Court partly
agrees. Because he did not testify during the trial, then the Report that he had prepared was
hearsay and therefore inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents.
The Survey Report Not the Sole Evidence: The facts reveal that Cortez’s Survey Report was
used in the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses -- Charlie Soriano; and Federico Manlapig, a
cargo marine surveyor and the vice-president of Toplis and Harding Company. Soriano testified
that the Survey Report had been used in preparing the final Adjustment Report conducted by
their company. The final Report showed that the barge was not seaworthy because of the
existence of the holes. Manlapig testified that he had prepared that Report after considering the
findings of the surveyor, as well as the pictures and the sketches of the place where the sinking
occurred. Evidently, the existence of the holes was proved by the testimonies of the witnesses,
not merely by Cortez’ Survey Report.
Rule on Independently Relevant Statement: That witnesses must be examined and

presented during the trial, and that their testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is
required by the rules on evidence.
On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez’s Affidavit, which
respondent had offered as evidence. Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented
as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay. An exception to the foregoing rule is that
on "independently relevant statements." A report made by a person is admissible if it is
intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements. Independent of the truth or the
falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the
hearsay rule does not apply.
In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only as part
of the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses. The referral to Cortez’s Report was in relation to
Manlapig’s final Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey Report that
was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the testimonies of the witnesses was
correctly ruled upon by the trial court.
As to the Issue on Common Carriers: Petitioner is clearly a common carrier, because it offers to
the public its business of transporting goods through its vessels. The Contract in the present
case was one of affreightment, as shown by the fact that it was petitioner’s crew that manned
the tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
b. Dying Declaration
PEOPLE v. GERARDO DE LAS ERAS alias “Gerry”

G.R. No. 134128; September 28, 2001
PARDO, J.
DOCTRINE: The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to her death constitutes
evidence of the highest order of the cause of her death and of the identity of the assailant.
FACTS: On 30 March 1992, assistant city prosecutor of Tagbilaran City filed with the RTC an
information charging accused de las Eras, with murder. It was alleged that on 17 February
1992, in Cortes, Bohol, Gerry - with intent to kill and with the use of a club (hard wood) –
attacked the victim (Ursula Calimbo) who was a defenseless 73-year-old woman, and unarmed.
He hit the latter on the head and other vital parts of her body, thereby causing her immediate
death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount to be proved during
the trial. He pleaded not guilty to the charge.
RTC: Found the accused de las Eras guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder,
imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Hence this appeal.
The RTC, in convicting accused-appellant, considered the following circumstantial evidence:

 A week before the incident, Gerry was hiding behind the fence of the victim's house, near the trunk of a
jackfruit tree. He was observed to be surveying the premises of the house.
 Ursula received her monthly pension of P3,000.00, five days before the incident.
 She lost her money, and she suspected accused Gerry as the culprit.
 Accused de las Eras was previously convicted of theft before the MCTC of Cortes, Bohol.
 At about 7:00PM before the incident took place at 8:00PM, accused Gerry was seen by prosecution witness
Jerome Diola. When asked by Diola during the brief and chance meeting as to his destination, de las Eras
seemed unable to give a definite answer as he was giving two different destinations: first, that he was on his
way to his brother's house; and on the second, to a certain bakery, as if he were up for some mischief.
 The place where Diola and Gerry parted ways appears to be some 60 meters away to the house of the
victim or a few meters away from the house of his Lola Naning where he took his late supper.
 Accused has a strong motive to kill the victim because he wanted to silence her for good, at the same time
to exact vengeance on her because she suspected accused him of stealing her pension money.
 When the victim, who was already bleeding on her brows, when asked as to her assailant, first, by her
daughter Hilaria, and later by SPO3 Redulla, she mentioned accused's nickname consistently.
 The accused is known by his nickname “Gerry” in the neighborhood, and that he is the only Gerry in the
community.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in relying heavily on the dying declaration of the
deceased and other circumstantial evidence.
HELD: No. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused if the following requisites
concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must form an unbroken chain showing
beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the accused.
The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to her death constitutes evidence of
the highest order of the cause of her death and of the identity of the assailant. Under the
Revised Rules on Evidence, a dying declaration is admissible provided the following requisites
are present:
(1) the statement concerns the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
(2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending
death;
(3) the declarant would have been competent as a witness had he survived; and
(4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which
the declarant was the victim.
When asked by her daughter Hilaria Binatero and policeman Luisito Redulla, the victim pointed
to accused-appellant Gerry de las Eras as her assailant. This qualifies as a dying declaration.
Denial and alibi are weak defenses and cannot overturn the positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses of the assailant, more so when there are material inconsistencies in the
testimony of the accused denying his participation in the crime. In this case, accused-appellant
gave different response as to his whereabouts when the crime was committed.
However, there was no eyewitness showing how the assailant attacked the victim. In the
absence of specific evidence proving the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength, the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Bohol, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, in Criminal Case No. 7727, convicting accused-
appellant Gerardo de las Eras y Zafra, alias Gerry, with the modification that in lieu of murder,
the Court finds accused Gerardo de las Eras y Zafra, alias Gerry, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of any modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court hereby sentences him to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Ursula Calimbo in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P16,992.50 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages and costs in all instances.
PEOPLE v. PEÑA
G.R. No. 133964; February 13, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
DOCTRINE:
 The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual
occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which
interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of
forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
 A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the
res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Ramil Peña was charged with murder in an Information which
alleged that: On 08 December 1995, in Obando, Bulacan, accused Ramil - armed with a firearm
and with intent to kill Jimbo Pelagio – shot said Jimbo, hitting the latter on the head thereby
inflicting wound which directly caused the latter’s death.
In the early morning of said date, accused hired Jimbo (tricycle driver working the night shift) to
take him to Paco in Obando. When they reached their destination, he ordered Jimbo to get off
the tricycle. Then, accused robbed Jimbo of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head
with a gun. Jimbo fell to the ground unconscious and accused shot him on the head and fled on
board Jimbo’s tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating
that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Sta.
Ana rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Jimbo lying on a stretcher.
 SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a Q&A method, which he took down on two
sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Jimbo affixed his thumbmark on both
sheets. In his statement, Jimbo related how accused inflicted his injuries on him.
 Wilfredo Lampa (the owner of the tricycle) proceeded to the hospital and there, Jimbo told him
that it was accused who shot him and took away his tricycle.
Accused’s defense: he claimed that he was in San Luis, Pampanga together with his wife on the
date of the incident. He went into hiding in the house of his uncle for 9 months because he
allegedly killed a certain Roger Wininsala. He came to know that he was being accused of the
murder of Jimbo - whom he did not know - only while he was in detention on a drug charge.
RTC: found the accused guilty of murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio – as well as the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses on the victim's declaration – can be considered as part of the res
gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.
HELD: Yes.
The statement or declaration made by Jimbo Pelagio, taken by SPO1 Bautista, reads:
T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital at kinukunan ka ng salaysay?
S: Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha and tricycle kong
minamaneho.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Muntik na ho.
T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko ho.
The trial court ruled that Pelagio's statement was a dying declaration since it was uttered at the
point of death and with consciousness of that fact due to the serious nature of his wounds.
Thus, it admitted Jimbo’s statement in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in a long
line of cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if:
(1) at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact;
(2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;
(3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to testify to;
(4) the declarant thereafter died; and
(5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of the inquiry.
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty whether
Jimbo uttered his statement with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain
when he made his statement, he expressly stated that Ramil only pistol-whipped him and
almost shot him.
Granting that Jimbo, after giving his statement, later on realized that he was dying, his
statement still cannot be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to consider is the
contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made, and the moment of the
realization of death. The time the statement was being made must also be the time the victim
was aware that he was dying.
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Jimbo's statement may nonetheless be
admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the

res gestae when:
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and
3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual
occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval
certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or
deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Jimbo’s declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly
after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof . Under the circumstances, the
victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.
Indeed the defense admitted as much when it stated, thus: the handwritten statement's contents
are rather detailed in terms of the specifics of the circumstances before, during and after the
subject incident which elicits guarded conclusion that notwithstanding Jimbo Pelagio's physical
condition at the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital, he was conscious and lucid enough to
intelligently respond rather spontaneously on the questions propounded to him by SPO1
Bautista. These acts and statements made by Jimbo definitely constitute part of res gestae and
not the testimonies and/or written statements of the three prosecution witnesses in this case.
By stating, however, that the testimonies or the written statements of the three prosecution
witnesses were taken into consideration by the trial court as part of the res gestae betrays a
misapprehension of said principle. This Court agrees with the Solicitor General that: the witness
who merely testifies on a res gestae is not the declarant referred to in the second requisite
whose statements had to be made before he "had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood."
In his Investigation Report, 16 SPO1 Bautista gathered that accused shot Jimbo:
 from the Radiologic Report conducted at the Valenzuela District Hospital wherein the presence of metallic
fragments was discovered
 from results of the C.T. Scan which showed the presence of metallic fragments in his skull
 from Jimbo’s Death Certificate, the underlying cause of death was indicated as gunshot wound to the head.
The straightforward and consistent testimonies of the three vital prosecution witnesses bear the
earmarks of credibility. Further, there exists no ill motive on their part to prevaricate.
However, the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of the qualifying circumstances with
concrete proof to the charge of murder. The crime proved was only homicide.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision is MODIFIED.

Accused-appellant Ramil Peña is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of the victim Jimbo Pelagio the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P26,000.00
as actual damages.
PEOPLE v. PO3 AKIB NORRUDIN

G.R. No. 129053, January 25, 2002
KAPUNAN, J.
DOCTRINE: Even if a declarant did not make a statement that he was on the brink of death, a
dying declaration may be admissible if there are circumstances from which it may be inferred
with certainty that such was his state of mind.
FACTS: On 08 July 1995, in Surigao City, the accused – armed with a firearm – with grave
abuse of authority he being a member of the PNP (assigned at Surigao City PNP Station), shot
Vidal Avila, Jr., hitting the latter on the vital part of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious
gunshot wound which caused his death.
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented nine witnesses: PO2 Eleazar Carias, Dorothy Rivera, Ramil Llorado,
PO3 Ruperto Deguino, Senior Police Inspector Edgardo Leva, PO3 Eutropio Paltinca, Police
Inspector Armada, Dr. Audie Relliquete and Mrs. Florentina Avila.
The accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted in his testimony that
on the night of 07 July 1995, after his duty, he went to Brgy. Lipata, Surigao City with Police
Inspector Morales, PO2 Carias, and PO2 Rivas to inspect the police detachment located
therein, and thereafter, to have a few drinks, he insisted that after they returned to Surigao City
at about 2:00AM on 08 July 1995. Then, he asked PO3 Gloria who was driving the vehicle to
drop him off at his house in the PNP Compound in Borromeo St. He said that when he got
home, he changed clothes, ate supper and then went to sleep.
The accused-appellant also denied that Maritess, the GRO from Casa Blanca, is his girlfriend.
He maintained that he does not know the woman and he has not gone inside the said
restaurant.
RTC: found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused filed a notice of appeal from the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged dying declaration uttered by Avila, Jr. shortly before his
death is inadmissible because it was not reduced into writing.
HELD: No. The Court affirms the RTC’s ruling. In the case at bar, the lower court did not err in
ruling that there is direct – as well as circumstantial – evidence to prove accused-appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The rule is that the following elements must concur for the dying declaration to be admissible in
evidence:
1) the dying declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death;
3) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness; and
4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant was the
victim.
Although Avila, Jr. did not expressly state that he was dying when he made the declaration, the
circumstances surrounding such declaration show that the same was uttered by him under the
consciousness of impending death. It has been held in a number of cases that even if a
declarant did not make a statement that he was on the brink of death, a dying declaration
may be admissible if there are circumstances from which it may be inferred with
certainty that such was his state of mind.
Deguino and PO3 Tinio proceeded to the hospital where Avila, Jr. was brought to ask the latter
some questions regarding the shooting. Upon arriving there at around 3:00AM, they found
another policeman surnamed Cabada trying to interview Avila, Jr. Sensing that Avila, Jr. was
dying, Deguino requested Cabada to allow him to ask the questions as he and the victim were
friends.
The trial court did not err in admitting the following testimony of SPO3 Deguino in whose
presence Avila, Jr. made the dying declaration:
Q: What is the condition of the victim at the time questioning the victim?
A: He was dying.
Q: And what did you do?
A: And then I told this is Jun, this is Bebot. I placed my mouth near his ear.
Q: And what did you say?
A: Jun, this is your friend Bebot, then after that his eyes opened and then demonstrated by raising his hand and then
resuming his former position.
Q: And then after that what happened? If any?
A: And knowing his serious condition I hurriedly asked him, Jun I asked him do you know the person who shot you?
Q: Will you please demonstrate how you asked the victim?
A: I placed my mouth close to his ear and I was practically embracing him.
Q: Was there any answer from the victim?
A: In my third question, he answered yes.
Q: And after hearing that reply, what did you do next?
A: Then I again asked him, 'kinsa man? who is he? a policeman?
Q: Will you please demonstrate how did you ask the victim?
A: The same position my mouth in his ear and.
Q: And did you receive the reply?
A: And he answered, "yes".
Q: And after that what did you do?
A: He was breathing hard after that I still try to question him and I still ask him, 'was it Akib?'
Q: When you used the word 'Akib' to whom are you referring?
A: A policeman.
Q: How many Akib in the police force and who is this?
A: (Witness referring to the accused).
Q: Did you receive a reply immediately?
A: I kept on repeating the question. About 8 times. He answered yes.
And then I stood up and my body hair rose as I could not believe it.
In addition to the dying declaration of the victim, there are several circumstances which, taken
together, indubitably point to the guilt of accused:
 he was present at Casa Blanca in the early morning of July 8, 1995, the date and approximate time of the
murder;
 he and his girlfriend Maritess (GRO) were arguing near the gate of Casa Blanca at the time Avila, Jr. was
leaving the restaurant;
 as Avila, Jr. was turning to the right side of the gate of Casa Blanca to Narciso St., a lone gunshot was fired,
and at that time the accused-appellant was only a few meters away from the victim;
 shortly after the gunshot was heard, Akib’s girlfriend Maritess went back inside Casa Blanca told both
Dorothy and Kit that Akib had fired a warning shot and asked them not to tell anyone about it;
 Akib had in his possession a .38 revolver issued to him by the PNP
 His right hand as well as the aforementioned revolver tested positive for gunpowder residue as found by the
forensic analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory; and
 shortly after Avila, Jr. was shot, he confided to witness Ramil Llorado that he was shot by a policeman
The Court has previously held that circumstantial evidence will suffice to support a conviction
where:
1) there is more than one circumstance,

2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is sufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In other words, when the circumstantial evidence is not only consistent with guilt but also
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent and with every other reasonable
hypothesis except guilt. The facts prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of
the crime of murder.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 24, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. 4564 is hereby AFFIRMED.
c. Dead Man’s Statute / Survivorship Disqualification Rule, “Statement of a Decedent”

as an exception to the hearsay rule, as amended
d. Declaration Against Interest
PEOPLE v. BERNAL
G.R. No. 113685; June 19, 1997
ROMERO, J.
DOCTRINE: DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST: A statement may be admissible when it

complies with the following requisites, to wit "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
FACTS: Accused Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping.
On 05 August 1991, around 11:30AM, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in
a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them. After a few minutes,
Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his child.
Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat."
When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him
and told him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a
score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the
house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to
establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive
behind the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the
police and hence, was never kidnapped.
RTC: found Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction
and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267, RPC
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC decision should be overturned.

HELD: No. The SC found no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The
Court notes that neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does not
preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what is important is to
determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not
exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid
punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victims' bodies.
The prosecution has proffered sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his
two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on 05 August 1991.
WITNESSES:
 Adonis Sagarino (childhood friend and neighbor of the victim) testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall
at about 11:00AM with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's Store"
to check if a certain person was still there. After the latter's presence was confirmed, the 3 men left the
billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernal's
companions.
 Roberto Racasa (Bernal’s neighbor and compadre) narrated that he and the victim were drinking at
"Tarsing's Store" on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes,
Bernal decided to leave, after which, 2 men came to the store and asked for "Payat." When Openda, Jr.
confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," he was handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.
 Salito Enriquez (tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr.) testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda,
Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave
Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again
because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason for Bernal
to contemplate revenge.
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person

deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's
own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision,
it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:
1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify.
His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest – since his
affair with Naty Bernal was a crime – is admissible in evidence because no sane person
will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
Bernal's position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made
by pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is

DISMISSED and the appealed decision dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.
DANILO PAREL v. SIMEON PRUDENCIO

G.R. No. 146556; April 19, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
DOCTRINE: A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute.
FACTS: On 27 February 1992, respondent Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of

possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC-Baguio alleging that:
 he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation
near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City;
 such property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under a Tax Declaration;
 he commenced the construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later;
 when the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner's parents, Florentino
(now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the
ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials;
 when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent allowed petitioner's parents and
children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat;
 it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner's parents have no house of their own and since
respondent's wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner's father;
 in November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former
was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner's parents heeded when they migrated to
U.S. in 1986;
 however, without respondent's knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession
of the ground floor of respondent's house; petitioner's refusal to vacate the house despite repeated
demands prompted respondent to file the instant action for recovery of possession.
 Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month
thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and surrender possession thereof.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the
said residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor
pertains to petitioner's parents.
RTC: ruled in favor of petitioners stating that the house is owned in common by the parties and
hence, Simeon Prudencio cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel
from said property. Respondent appealed to the CA.
CA: reversed the trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house.
Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his
father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house.
HELD: No. The issue raised by petitioner is mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions
of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, considering that the findings of the
RTC and CA are contradictory, the review of the case is in order.
The SC agreed with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his
complaint for recovery of possession of the house’s ground floor as the exclusive owner thereof.
Respondent presented the affidavit dated 24 September 1973 executed by Florentino and
sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City. In said affidavit, Florentino
categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not
the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner's father and had adequate
knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his statement. It is safe to presume that
he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to
himself as well as to his children's interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the
best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
Notably, during Florentino's lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989,
the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a
criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house.
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made by a person

deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the
reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.
Other proof of ownership:

 The building plan of the residential house was in the name of respondent and his wife.
 Respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared under his
name
 The house had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent.
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to contravene respondent's claim.The fact that not one of the
witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that
petitioner's father and respondent co-owned the house.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31,
2000 and its Resolution dated November 28, 2000 are AFFIRMED.
ALEJANDRA LAZARO v. MODESTA AGUSTIN

G.R. No. 152364; April 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE: ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST v. DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST

FACTS: On 04 November 1998, herein petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint
for partition with the MTCC-Laoag City. It alleged that:
 That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late Simeon Santos, married to Trinidad
Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Natividad in Laoag.
 Santos and Duldulao begot 4 children: (Basilisa, Alberto, Leoncio, and Alejandra).
 Basilisa (+) was married to Petronilo Agustin; Alberto (+) married to Rizalina Guerrero; Leoncio married
Dictinia Tabeta; and Alejandra married to Isauro Lazaro, are still living.
 In the desire of the children of Simeon from whom the parcel of land originated as owner, his children,
namely: Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, consented that the parcel of land be titled in the name of Basilisa,
the latter being the eldest and so the OCT was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not
and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land.
 A residential house was constructed on the lot and in the construction of which plaintiff Alejandra Santos,
then still single, spent P68,308.60, while Basilisa Santos and her children spent P3,495.00.
 Afterwards, Alejandra Santos got married to Isauro Lazaro who was employed in a private company and
when he retired from the service, some additional constructions were made on the residential house and lot
(bedroom, azotea, 2 toilets, 2 kitchens, a car garage). The money spent for these additional constructions
came from the earnings of the spouses Santos-Lazaro.
 The said residential house is now covered by a Tax Declaration in the names of Basilisa and Alejandra
Santos.
 Without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot was transferred into another title with
a TCT in the names of Modesta Agustin, etc. (children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin) herein named as
defendants. Herein defendants are heirs of Monica Agustin (sister of Modesta; daughter of Basilisa)
 The plaintiff initiated a partition in the barangay court where the lot is situated .
 The heirs of refused and opposed the partition claiming that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the
lot being that the lot is now titled in their names, and hence there was no settlement as shown by the
certification of the barangay court.
That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to partition the lot in accordance
with the law on intestate succession and to partition the residential house.
MTCC: dismissed the complaint holding that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit
allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the
subject property with her siblings. Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC-Laoag City.
RTC: Affirmed the judgment of the MTCC, with modification. It held that the house erected on
the lot was made in good faith. Hence, the petitioners were entitled to indemnity representing
the costs of the construction and renovation of the said house. Petitioners filed a petition for
review with the CA.
CA: Affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa Agustin is a declaration against interest
which establishes the co-ownership of the subject lot by and among the heirs of Simeon Santos.
HELD: No. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a
declaration against interest. It is not. Instead, it is an admission against interest.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share
in the disputed property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly
notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and
authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and
convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public
cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized
documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.
VITAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST AND DECLARATIONS

AGAINST INTEREST.
 Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation OR by one in privity
with OR identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the
declarant is available as a witness.
 Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in
privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule. They are admissible ONLY when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness.
In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus,
in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement – if proven genuine
and duly executed – should be considered as an admission against interest.
A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of land
denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On this
basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn
statement is the same property claimed by petitioners.
Whether the subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property being disputed in
the present case, can be given full faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its
genuineness and due execution. The Court rules in the negative.
A question involving the regularity of notarization as well as the due execution of the subject
sworn statement of Basilisa would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court. It is not the function of this Court to review a question of fact.
Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized

documents. While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a
deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not
absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima
facie validity was overthrown by:
 the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed;
 the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution of the sworn
statement,
 the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned document was
supposedly executed.
The trial and appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies of these
witnesses. The Court will not interfere with such determination. Considering the foregoing, the
Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although the
questioned sworn statement is a public document having in its favor the presumption of
regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by competent witnesses.
AS TO THE NOTARY PUBLIC’S DUE DILIGENCE:

In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the
true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement. However, the notary public did
not comply with this requirement. He simply relied on the affirmative answers of the person
appearing before him attesting that she was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn
statement are true; and that the thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers. Thus,
the lower courts did not commit any error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject
sworn statement.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321 is AFFIRMED.
e. Act or Declaration Against Pedigree
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE DEZOLLER v. CA and TEODORA DOMINGO

G.R. No. 121027; July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.
DOCTRINE: DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE; CONDITIONS:

2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not before the commencement
of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has
arisen thereon.
FACTS: The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein
petitioners against herein private respondent before the RTC-Quezon City, over a parcel of land
with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and
which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
 Petitioners are the niece and nephew of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
the sister of petitioners' father, Hermogenes Dezoller.
 Teodora died on 05 March 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was
survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners'
father, Hermogenes, died on 03 October 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
 Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the
land in dispute. Then, a TCT was issued in his name.
 Then, Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter,
a TCT was issued in the latter's name.
 Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-
half of the property in question by right of representation.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon was presented as the lone witness, with the ff
documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and aunt, to
wit:
 a family picture;
 baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller;
 certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora and Hermogenes;
 death certificates of Hermogenes and Teodora;
 certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene;
 joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
 joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin
Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and
 the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a
Comment was filed by herein private respondent. Subsequently, private respondent filed a
Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code.
RTC: dismissed complaint and granted demurrer; CA: upheld the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of
the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation.
There are two points for consideration: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is
the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
HELD: No. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken
separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor
even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the
case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that:
 the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and
 petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy.
 The presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
 The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is
aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate
in favor of petitioners UNLESS and UNTIL it is rebutted.
AS TO PRESUMPTIONS
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests
not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private
respondent who is disputing the same. When private respondent opted not to present
countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. She overlooked the evidential rule
that presumptions – like judicial notice and admissions – relieve the proponent from presenting
evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
AS TO PETITIONER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TEODORA DEZOLLER GUERRERO

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon to the effect that Teodora – in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946 – categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece . Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions:

2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for
analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora in her lifetime regarding the pedigree
of petitioner Corazon or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
THE GENERAL RULE, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant – but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant's estate – the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be
proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.
AS AN EXCEPTION, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the
declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
some other member of the family.
The SC is sufficiently convinced that the exception applies in this case. Petitioners are claiming
a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
Teodora that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of
such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof,
the reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. It may thus be safely concluded, on the sole
basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners
are the niece and nephew of Teodora.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For
while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on
their admissibility, they may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-
examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At
no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection
thereto, ever raised.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage, Certificates of Baptism of Teodora and Hermogenes,

and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes can be deemed to have sufficiently established the
relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule
that: a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required.
Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that
both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname
Dezoller.
Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property in
questions; and in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
thereof, respectively.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of

Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent
are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-
fourth (3/4) share therein, respectively.
RENATO LAZATIN v. HON. JUDGE JOSE CAMPOS, JR., ET AL.

G.R. No. L-43955-56. July 30, 1979
TEEHANKEE, J:
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: On 13 January 1974, Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by:
 his wife, Margarita de Asis, and
 his adopted twin daughters, respondents Nora de Leon (married to Bernardo de Leon)
and Irma Lazatin (married to Francisco Veloso).
One month after Mariano's death, his widow Margarita, commenced an intestate proceeding
before the CFI-Pasay, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin
with one Helen Muñoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to
be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Two months after, Margarita also died, leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of:
 cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon (granddaughter);
 support to Rodolfo Gallardo (son of her late sister);
 education to Ramon Sta. Clara (son of petitioner Renato Lazatin)
During her lifetime, Margarita kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust
Company, which either she or respondent Nora could open. Five days after Margarita's death,
Nora – accompanied by her husband Bernardo, opened the safety deposit box and removed its
contents:
a) shares of stock
b) her adoption papers and those of her sister Irma; and
c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother.
Respondent Nora claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it
was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to
get her stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close the
box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in
view of her mother's death and so, she removed everything from the box.
In June 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita. Days
after having learned that respondent Nora had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son,
Ramon, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for
the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora admitted that she opened the box but
there was no will or any document resembling a will therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, the safety deposit box was opened and was found to be
empty, because prior thereto respondent Nora had already removed its contents.
Seven months after the death of Margarita, petitioner intervened for the first time in the
proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano Lazatinas an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the
estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the
safety deposit box. Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent
Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court.
Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P,
Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L. de
Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety
deposit box and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the
period ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items
themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of
the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on the
basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin, that petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him.
This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent Nora L. de Leon guilty of contempt
of court for not complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her
to produce and deliver to the court all the papers and items removed from the safety deposit
box. Her former counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00
and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin,
and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon,
acted upon his advice. llcd
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of
adoption in his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents'
objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents: he had been
supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence
of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy
Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously
resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g.,
photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of
deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that
petitioner's real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the admission of
petitioner's evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could not present evidence on
the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the
parties time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be
introduced by petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence because:
"All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through their counsel do not prove
or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the
parties above named were taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the
presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of the above named
persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child
which however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this
proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into consideration the evidence heretofore presented
by the petitioners, any further introduction of similar evidence, documentary or oral, would not
prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural child."
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the
fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of
respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita
de Asis. As authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, since according to him, the order of the court for the production of the items in the
safety deposit box can be considered as an order for production and inspection of documents
under Rule 27. LexLib
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court denied
petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent
court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by
respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces
of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3, 1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioner's motion for definite resolution on his
previous motion to declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the following order:
"As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is concerned and his Petition to establish his status as
an adopted child, the Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The Court
denies any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof."
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, 2 which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99
of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and
entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried
out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed but
must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a
public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise
to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to

be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. 7 Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is
effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such
adoption may be established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial
adoption. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court
decree of adoption in his favor. Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time
or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated
by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records
of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner
merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years
1928 and 1932. By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition
heard, petitioner does not even manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that
adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption
was commenced in Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of First
Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported "(T)hat among the salvaged records
now available in this Office, there has not been found, after a diligent search, any record
regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in
the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis de
Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records
relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either destroyed or burned during the
Liberation of the City of Manila," does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption
in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in
Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the
deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court.
Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy
of the newspaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court (formerly Section 4 Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect.
Petitioner's failure on this point is another strong indication of the non-existence of the adoption
paper. We also observed that the identity of the one who gave the written consent to the
adoption (Section 3, Rule 99. Rules of Court), whether the parents or orphanage, does not
appear in the trend of petitioner's evidence. The collation of proof on this point is not so difficult
and such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the adoption. And of
course, if the adoption records were indeed destroyed or burned during the war, the clear right
and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute,
cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and
has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the
deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had
adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family,
from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. 10
Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to
one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the
attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not
discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of
petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an
adopted child — which status of an admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his petition
for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at
page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth.
12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and
because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 13 But,
in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The
whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and
investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an
adoption order, if indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor of receiving
hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth
as a condition upon which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the
family. Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to
prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the
family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by competent evidence.
15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or declaration of a person deceased, or outside of
the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration "
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings

were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as
follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary
in the discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the
admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case. 17 "As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the
former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof
may only be introduced if it has first been established that such adoption paper really existed
and was lost. This is indispensable. 18 Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by
him and is allegedly to be testified to by a brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others
who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was
really made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or
subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the
case, adduced. 19 Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their
child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the
spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to
consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de
Leon to produce the document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of
petitioner's adoption had not been established; second, there is no proof that such document of
adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the
court for Nora de Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be
treated as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and
fourth, the items deposited in the safety deposit box have already been surrendered by
respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976 and no document of adoption in favor of
petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box. cdll
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot
properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as
an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding,
it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an
heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child by adoption cannot
inherit from the parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord
with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed
adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of proof in establishing
adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the
statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori, if no
hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof,
whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in
unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be legitimate, legitimated, adopted,
acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious
child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show that
petitioner sought to intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged
adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of Margarita de Asis,
widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the
basis of the affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed on
August 19, 1975 (which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed
to state by "oversight" that Dr. Lazatin and his wife had "jointly adopted" petitioner, but stated
that affiant knew petitioner to be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted
(him) as a son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928
and 1931") and prescinding from the question of whether a natural or spurious child may be
legally adopted by the putative father, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law
as committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March 26,
1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in this proceeding
the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this
proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact of your
petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates
as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his inheritance." LLjur
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary restraining order;
which as amended on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with the
hearing scheduled on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to
establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate of the Late
Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No. 2341-P, entitled 'Testate Estate of the late
Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and from proceeding with the probate of the alleged
holographic will of the deceased Doña Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29,
1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on any other dates." With the Court's determination of the
issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need for restraining the proceedings below and
the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow
respondent judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies
pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course
on the admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby permitted in effect the advance
testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, principally among them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L.
Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's
motion of January 11, 1977:
"Substantially, the testimony of the above named witnesses will be on the fact that they had
been informed by the deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner
was their [Mariano's and Margarita's] judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the
fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin
family."
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was but in
application of the Court's longstanding admonition to trial courts as reaffirmed in Lamagan vs.
De la Cruz 26 , "to be liberal in accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to
accept the evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded
evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The Court therein once again stressed the
established rule that "it is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions
and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may
not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors
and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the
merits of the case," 27 and that a party's recourse when his proferred evidence is rejected by
the trial court is to make a formal offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have
testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the record any rejected
exhibits. cdphil
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the
alleged holographic will of the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, petitioner who has
failed to establish his status as an alleged adopted child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as
reserved to him by the court below, he can show some documentary proof) and whose
intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate
child, will have to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the status of such
admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his course of action
and whether or not he may be duly allowed to intervene in the proceedings below as such
alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against him is
to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a
reversal on an appeal in due course. prcd
DISPOSITIVE RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders
denying petitioner's petition below " to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his]
adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and
amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.

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EVIDENCE – MODULE 4

INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY; ADMISSIBLE HEARSAY

a. Independently Relevant Statements

LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.

DOCTRINE: Exception to Hearsay: Rule on Independently Relevant Statements: A report made

Rule on Independently Relevant Statement: That witnesses must be examined and

PEOPLE v. GERARDO DE LAS ERAS alias “Gerry”

The RTC, in convicting accused-appellant, considered the following circumstantial evidence:

RTC: found the accused guilty of murder. Hence, this appeal.

A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision is MODIFIED.

PEOPLE v. PO3 AKIB NORRUDIN

1) there is more than one circumstance,

c. Dead Man’s Statute / Survivorship Disqualification Rule, “Statement of a Decedent”

d. Declaration Against Interest

DOCTRINE: DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST: A statement may be admissible when it

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC decision should be overturned.

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is

DANILO PAREL v. SIMEON PRUDENCIO

FACTS: On 27 February 1992, respondent Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made by a person

Other proof of ownership:

ALEJANDRA LAZARO v. MODESTA AGUSTIN

DOCTRINE: ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST v. DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST

CA: Affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this instant petition.

VITAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST AND DECLARATIONS

Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized

AS TO THE NOTARY PUBLIC’S DUE DILIGENCE:

e. Act or Declaration Against Pedigree

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE DEZOLLER v. CA and TEODORA DOMINGO

DOCTRINE: DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE; CONDITIONS:

AS TO PETITIONER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TEODORA DEZOLLER GUERRERO

1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage, Certificates of Baptism of Teodora and Hermogenes,

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of

RENATO LAZATIN v. HON. JUDGE JOSE CAMPOS, JR., ET AL.

Hence, the petition at bar.

to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to

4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings

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