Churchill , Whitehall and the Soviet Uni on, 1940-45

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Churchill, Whitehall and
the Soviet Union, 1940-45
Martin H . Fo lly
L«tllrt'f;/1 liJl' Dl'ptlr'"I1'I1/ of Aml.'ri(mJ Studies Iwd History
Unllle1 UlliwfSity
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© Martin H. Folly 2000
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For A lan and Marjorie
Contents

Preface
List of AbbreviatiOIlS x
Introdu ction
2 ' Let us expect nothing good from the Soviet' 7

3 'The New Russia ' 39

4 Wolf, Bear or Ret ri ever Puppy? 76
5 ' Probable Tendencies of Soviet Foreign Poli cy' 11 6
6 Towa rd s Postwar Cooperation: 'Difficult but not
Impossible' 142
7 Concl usion 167
Notes mul Referellces 172

Bibliograplly 206
Illdex 217

vi]
Preface

Thi s book a rose o rigina ll y out of an interest in explaining appar-

e nt Briti sh 'appeasement' of the Sovie t Un ion at th e e nd of the
Second World War, and to reconcile it with the popular image of
Churchillian ' toughness', From this beginning grew a desire to
understand how British foreign policy-makers encountered and COIl-
ceptual ised the Soviet Un io n throughout the period o f th e wartime
alliance. Too oft en the events that followed t he end of the war
have oversha dowed ou r understanding of th e tho ught.processes of
th e war years, but now the distance of time and cha nging geo-
politics ca n allow th em to be assessed on their own terms. I found
o n examinatio n that ve ry little study had been done of what was
know n, or believed to be known, by Brit ish po licy-makers about
w hat was goi ng on in the Soviet Union, and how that shaped thei r
approaches. Thi s book attempts to rectify that situation.
Unde rtaking a work of thi s kind incu rs many debts. It is fitting
that for my first book r shou ld look back with gratitude to those
who spa rked my inte rest, particula rl y the history staff of Minchenden
School, Sou thgat e - now sadly defunct - and notably Ri c hard
Grunberger. Working in an interdiscip li nary team has bro ught me
fresh insight s and perspect ives and my thanks go to m y past and
presen t cO lleagues in Ame ri can Studies at Brun eI University and
the o ld West Lo ndo n In stitute, especially inderiect Pa rma r, Niall
Palmer and Stephe n Wa nt. The thesis on which this book is based
would never have been completed without th e input of my super-
visors at t he LSE, Do nald Ca mero n Watt and Antony Best. The
staff at all the arch ives I have worked in have been uniformly cour-
teous and helpful. Crown copyright mate ria l in the Public Record
Office is reproduced by permission of th e Con troller of Her Maiesty's
Stationery Office. Fi nally, no long-term proiect can be finished without
the support and encourageme nt of fri ends and family. Thank you
then to Cori nne a nd Sh aron, to Pete and Li z, and of cou rse to my
parents, to whom this book is dedicat ed.

ix
List of Abbreviations

The full na me is given on first reference, abbreviat ions thereafte r.

They arc all listed together here for convenience.

AI Air Intelligence
APWC Cabine t Arm istice and Post-war Committee
BBK Beaverbrook papers
BNLO British Naval Liai son Officer
BoT Board of Trade
CA Confid ential Annexe
CAS Chief o f the Air Staff
CCS Combined Ch iefs of Staff (US/U K)
CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff
COS Chiefs of Staff Committee
DEA Departm ent of Euro pean Affai rs, US State
Departm ent
DMI Di recto r of Military Intelligence
DDMT Deputy Director of Mi litary Intelligence
DN I Directo r of Naval Intelligence
DO Dominions Office
Do P Director of Plan s
EAM Greek Co mm un ist Movement
FO Foreign Office
FORD r orcign Office Resea rch Depa rtment
FR PS Foreign Research and Press Service
GKO Soviet State Defence Council
H M RR His Majest y's Representatives Abroad
HPC Home Policy Co mmittee, Ministry of In formatio n
JCS joint Chi efs of Staff (US)
JI C joint Intelli gence Sub-comm ittee of COS
JPS joint Pl anning Staff
JSM Briti sh j oint Staff Miss ion (Washington)
MEW Mini stry of Economic Warfare
MI Military In telligence
MSC Military Sub-committee of th e Mini ste rial
Committee on Reconstruction Problems (Jowitt
Com mittee)

x
 Lisl of Abbrcv;aliv" s xi

Narkomindel Soviet People's Comm issariat for Foreign Affairs

NKVD Soviet People 's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
NI Naval Intelligence
ass US Office of Strategic Services
PHPS Post Hostilities Pla nning Staff
IlHPS/c Post Hostilities Planning Sub-committee
rID FO Political Intelligence Department
rWE Political Warfare Executive
SBNO Senior British Naval Officer
urr Union of Polish Patriots
VCIGS Vice-Chief of the Imperial Genera l Staff
wa War Office
WOlD War Office Intelli gence Directorate
1
Introduction

The end of th e Cold Wa r has offered opportunities to rewrite the

h istory of the Secon d World War: not just the Soviet sid e of th e war,
but also the Allied side of the Grand Alli ance. For years the histo ry
of the diplomacy of the waf years has been dom inated by the search
for Cold Wa r origins, and hindsight concerning the ' lost peace' has
affected ou r approach to thi s period. [t is now possible to view this
e ra in its own rig ht - in pa rticu la r to st udy attempts to develop
inter-A llied coopcratio n fr ee from an overriding concern to show
that it was a doomed venture. It has become somet hin g of an his-
torica l t rui sm t h at the so-ca lled Grand Allia n ce of Britain, the USSR
and t he United States was a m arriage of conven ience which was
united o nl y by shared enmity towards Nazi Germany, and that
con seque ntly its disso lution was in evitab le after the enemy was
defeated. Officia l British policy during the war was based, however,
o n a d ifferent assumptio n. It was stated by Anthony Eden , the Foreign
Secret ary, that the a ll iance with the USSR would be t he cent re of
Bri ta in 's European policy, providing the overarching element to link
eastern and western Europe and therefore serve Britain's a im of
prevent ing a resurgence of German dominance of the Co ntin ent
and at the same time ensure some British influence in even t s
throughout Europe. Moreover, in a pape r approved by the War
Cabinet in August 1944, it was strongly asserted that as far as the
policy of the Soviets was concerned, cooperation with Britai n and
the Un ited States was by fa r the most likely choice of all their
policy options. 1 Th e key question is, beneath the official pronounce-
men ts, was there a genu ine th esis of a coopera tive USSR - not ju st
for wa rti me, but fo r 20 years after the wa.r, as the Anglo-Soviet
Treaty declared?

1
2 CllllfChill, WJlilellall !HId IIII.' 5f1l'il.'l Union

To plan on the basis of friendly relations, let alone close collabora-

tion, was a radical depa rture for British policy. Historians have tended
to be eit her sceptical about the sincerity of the assertion that co-
opera tion was really possible, or to explain it by reference eithe r to
the short-term needs of the wartime situatio n or to the activities
of Soviet sympathisers who attained positions of infl uence during
the war. The basic historical approach to the broad issues of Britain's
wartime policy to the USS R fo r a long time followed t he lead set
by Churchill in his war memoi rs. British policy was pragmatic and
unideological: the British did their best to fo rge good relations, but
were never deluded about the chances. 2 Soviet uncooperative ness
made it ultimately impossible. Until some wh ile after the release of
British official documents in 1971, there was no significa nt British
revisionism such as took place in the USA. It was not until the
mid-1980s that the revisionist theme t hat cooperation was never
really feasible because of Anglo-America n hostility to the Left was
picked up by some wri t ers on British policy, no tabl y Gabriel
Gorodetsky.3
Three broad tendencies are now evident in British writing on the
subject. Two arc sharply critical of British policy from opposite angles.
Nco-revisionists find British policy dominated by political concept s
that meant that Whitehall never seriously attempted to gain co-
operation or believed that it was possi ble or desirab le.4 Subversion
theorists claim the opposite : that Britain appeased the Soviets, making
large concessions to them, principa ll y because of the influence of
Soviet agents and fellow-travellers and of those taken in by Sta lin ,
such as Beaverbrook and Eden. s British policy, it ha s been claimed,
was not based upon a ser ious assessment of Soviet objectives; they
were dupes of their own 'Wishful th inking,.6
The thi rd tendency comprises the majority of writers in the field
and is less critical. This school has t ended to focus on the minu-
tiae of policy-making, using the vast amoun t of detai l available in
the archives of Britain and the Uni ted States. It does not seek to
criticise British policy in the same way. Instead, it finds it to be
'pra gma tic' ~ essentia lly echoing Churchill that the British did the
best they cou ld . This argument builds on the commonplace that
the all iance was bound to fall apart after the war because of the
fundamental difference in outlook and interests of the Soviets and
the British, and the pr incipal concern of British policy- makers was
to keep it together at least until vict ory was assured. They had to
work with the Soviets to that e nd, and so made the best of it . The
 IlItw(ll/cliOIl 3

driving force is seen as Britain 's imperatives - Britain needed the

Soviets for the purposes of victo ry over Germany and to partici-
pate in the postwar policing of Germany. In order to keep the alliance
going, bad thoughts were eschewed, though with little conviction,
given the social and political background of most of the individ-
uals concerned and the institutional traditions of the Foreign Office
(FO), mil itary and other parts of the Government. Statements about
long-term collaboration were merely expedien t. 7 Thus, in answer
to the subversion argument, Robert Ceci l asserted that the mem-
bers of the Brit ish Government were never really convinced the
USSR would be cooperative, and did not build their policy on that
assumption; they hoped for it but did not expect it. Nobody was
deluded - though strangel y many of these writers refer to 'di sillu-
sion ment' after Yalta, wh ic h implies some internalisation of the
idea that t he USSR could genuinely be a collaborative partner. H
These three approaches have one point in common. Th ey judge
British actions in te rms of the subsequent course of AnglO-Soviet
relations, and ca nnot resist making judgements in relation to the
issue of the blame for the Cold War. Those studies which co nce n-
trate most specifically on AnglO-Soviet relations in the war as a
topic in itself, when they go beyond narrative, do not attempt to
assess British policy in terms of the way the USSR was perceived.
The possibility that the commitment to the cooperative idea was
real is not addressed. A co ntempo rary of Cecil , Gladwyn Jebb,
recollected differently: that many in the FO sincerely believed in
1944 that the USSR would try collaboration, and could be cooperated
with. 9 However, historians have tended to disparage or di scount
many of the ideas expressed during the war in the British Govern-
ment about the USSR, often on the basis of a subsequent image of
Stalin that saw him as set, even in 1941, on clea r·cut and detailed
objectives, which he then co nsiste ntly followed. Thus ideas about
a Soviet inferiority co mp lex, se nsitivity to other states' actions, of
different schools of thought among Soviet leade rs affecting their
actions, or of Soviet c hangeab ility are passed over as odd or
'diverting', with no attempt to assess their origins or indeed their
relevance. 10
The re is plenty of documentary evidence to show the process by
which such theories were formulated. Brit ish 'p ragmati sm' can be
placed in the context of what was known or assumed - of what
the image of the USSR actually was in the British Government.
Even if Briti sh po licy-makers conceived a strong imperative to
4 CJlllf,hil/, WJriteJllI1/ (md the MJI'ie/ Union

maintain cooperat ion with the USS R, to base po licy upon this re-
quired estimates of the possibility of achieving it. Th e Cold War
assumption that the Soviets were not cooperative, and co nseque ntly
that any assumption that they were coopera tive was eit her a plant,
a delusion or a glossing over of the facts for the needs of the moment,
is simply not adequate. Explorat ion must be conducted to see what
was actually assumed about the USSR, a nd on what evidence and
under whose influence.
In order to explore the development of the thesis of a coopera-
tive USSR, analysis will commence at the point when the idea was
introduced into the British Government and serious discussion of
it began: the appointment of Si r Stafford Cri pps as Am bassador to
the Soviet Union. This was done soon after Churchill became Prim e
Minister, in May 1940. In terms of the individuals involved, it also
makes sen se to begin with the establis hm ent of th e Churchill
Coalition, rather than is convention al, with the German invas ion
of the USS R, Operation BARBAROSSA. Some of the key perceptions
that made up the thesis of the cooperative USSR were in place before
the co-belligerency period. This point is sign ificant in view of the
tendency to deal with the question eit her in terms of the situa tion
in 1941 - 45, or of personnel introduced duri ng that peri od.
The focus will be on individuals who had influence in some way
within the Government on the formula t ion of policy decisions re-
garding the USSR, in particular those who can be identified as
contributing to the cooperative image. Within th e Government, there
were two avenues of influence, the forma l and the informal. Th e
formal were the official Governmen t institutions. Here, fairly junior-
ranking and apparently unimportant individuals were required to
evaluate the raw material on the Soviet Union - in Military Intelli-
gence (MI), in the FO political departments, in the Moscow (or
Kuibyshev) Embassy and the Russian Section of the Ministry of
Economic Warfare (M EW) . Th ese assessments would be approved
or revised as they passed up the in stitution or laterally to other
inte rested departments, until th ey reached a level at which a
decision could be made. Th us many issues of Anglo-Soviet relations
never went beyond Deputy Under-Secretary level in the FO or th e
Director of Military Intelligence (OM!) in t he War Office (WO). Senior
officials certainly did not simply endo rse the views of their subor-
dinates - but these views often provided the start ing-point for debate,
and in more arcane areas carried the weight of their authors' sup-
posed expert ise. Indeed, the nature of the FO was such that its
 Illtrot/Ilctioll 5

experts were usually of fairly ju nior rank; the senior officials were
by contrast 'all-rounders'. This was true even for heads of the pol-
itical departments; Chri stopher Warner, Head of the Northern
Depa rtmen t, 1941-46, often prefaced a comment with 'as those who
know Russia tell me' - a stra nge admission for someone who was
in charge of the department that dealt with the USSR and who
should, one would think, have had such specialist knowledge him-
self.]] Th e lack of ex tensive and unambiguous material on Soviet
policy-making meant that politicians and senior officials tended to
lean more on 'specia lists' than they did for other countries where
they felt more able to reach conclusio ns unaided. This raised the
importance of more junior officials like Fitzroy Maclean, Geoffrey
Wilson and Armi ne Dew in the Northern Department or others
regarded as experts, like Si r Robert Bruce Lockhart. While senior
figures formed impressions from direct contacts (messages and meet-
ings), these stil l left plenty of uncertainties requiring contributions
from those regarded as experts. Focus on fair ly junior clerks, who
provided extensive interpretations of fragmentary and confUSing Soviet
evidence, is therefore essential. Conversely, at the highest level,
Churchill dealt with some issues without reference to the bureau-
c racy, relying upon his informal advisers, War Cabinet ministe rs
and the military for advice, depending o n the matter at hand.
Decision-making in the Coalition was fragmented, with distinct centres
in the FO, 10 Downing Street and the Chiefs of Staff (COS)
organ isation rather than a unitary pyra mid structure. 1Z
Each seni or figu re, moreover, had other sources which they re-
garded as authori tative. These informal advisers could be far more
influential than those formally charged with giving advice. Bruce
l ockhart, for insta nce, was called upon frequently as a Soviet ex-
pert, though this was not his official status. His influence is clear
from hi s excellent diary, an under-used source, and also papers in
the public records a nd the Beaverbrook pape rs. Other informal in-
fluence is less easy to detect. The social context for debate is difficult
to t race except in a fragmentary way, though it was a factor in the
spreadi ng of assu m ptions within what was a fairly sma I[ and socially
cohesive elite (even allowing for wartime inductees).
British politicians and officials did not, of course, operate in a
vacuum, isolated from political pressu res and movements in public
opinion. There Wi ll, however, be little discussion of these in this
book. On the subject of the USS R, public opinion provided little
more than a background noise. Policy-makers were more concerned
6 CJlll f,ilil/, WJlileilal/ {HId /lIe S{)\'i('/ Union

about the impact that Soviet pe rception s of Briti sh opinion would

have on Soviet policy than they were influenced in their own as-
sumptions or indeed policy formulation s by the public mood or
the views of House of Commons backbenc hers, both of which could
be managed. Public opinion on the USSR in the wa r is a significant
subject in its own right, and has been covered elsewhere. For the
purposes of this study, its influence on views with in the Govern-
ment was small: its significance for the Government lay in fears
about the impact of Soviet successes o n the popularity of British
Commun ists.1J
Instead of following the conventional approach of outlining policy
in a ch ronological or country-based framework, this study will analyse
the central aspect s of the image of the USSR. It will argue t hat the
thesis of a cooperative Soviet Union was based on perceptions of
that state, its policy and its leader, and was not ju st an empty set
of phrases designed to susta in the temporary wartime relation ship .
These perceptions cou ld be described as the Brit ish eq Uivalent of
what Daniel Yergin called t he US 'Yal t a Ax ioms'.14 Certai n key con-
cepts can be id entified which made up the thesis of a cooperative
USSR. The main ones were Sta lin's sagaCiOUS realism, Soviet fear of
Germany and concern to prevent postwar German resurgence, the
centrality of the security motivation, Soviet suspiciousness and Soviet
reconstruction needs, which reinforced the longer-sta nding desire
to achieve security in order to focus on inte rn al development. The
development of these ideas within the Brit ish Govern ment between
1940 and 1945 and their implications for policy-making arc the
subjects of thi s book.
It should perhaps be made clear he re that a basic assumption of
thi s study is that attitudes of policy-makers matter. Wh ile the structure
of international politics sets the envi ronment in wh ich decisions
are made and limits the range of choices t hat policy-makers can
make, these choices arc not always predetermi ned . SpeCific policy
decisions and broad strategy are t he product of the way that actors
in interna tional relations perceive t his e nvironment, and of their
assumptions and expectations of the policies of other states and
actors . This study makes no cla im to describe fu lly and explai n al1
aspects of Britain 's wartime policy towards t he USSR, but is an exam-
ination of the images of the USSR and the deba tes upon them that
were Significant influences on the reactions of policy-makers to the
e nvi ronme nt of internationa l events.
2
'Let us expect nothing good from
the Soviet'

Prior to the st art of the Second World War there had been some
discussion in British Government ci rcle s o f the possibilities of Anglo-
Soviet coope ration. The Nazi-Soviet Pact , followed by the Soviet
invasion of Fi nland and evidence of Soviet supply of waf materials
to Germany, brought all th is to an end. It had anyway never been
believed w it hin t he policy-making elite that such coopcration was
very important for Brit ish interests, eve n if the vast gulf of idcol-
0b')' and diplomatic methods cou ld be bridged,l The events of 1939-40
reinfo rced this. The rapidly changing war situation, however, was
to alter the context in wh ich the Soviet Union was viewed. More-
over, Soviet policy itse lf had to adapt to the changed international
e nvironme nt.

Perceptions of the USSR, 1940--41

Within the FO, primary analysis of the USSR was conducted by the
Northern Depart men t, headed since 1933 by Si r Laurence Collier.
The official responS ib le for the USSR under Collier was Fitzroy
Maclea n, who had served in Moscow during the show-tria ls.! The
Department's viewpoi nts were channelled through Deputy Under-
Secretary, Si r Orm e Sa rgent, to the Permanent Under-Sec re tary, Sir
Alexander Cadogan, and from thence to the Foreign Secretary, Lord
Hal ifax. 3 In early 1940 the major issue of debat e was the Soviet
relationship to Germany and the underlying motivations that shaped
it. Prior to t he Russo-Fi nni sh War ma ny, including Churchill , had
thought that German and Soviet interests would easily c1ash.4 The
Northern Depart ment now, in January 1940, asserted that the USS R
was Germany's ally. Maclean strongly argued that the alignment

7
8 Clmrcllill, Wllileimll and tile SOI'iet Union

with Germany was a natural consequence of the affinity of the two

regimes and of their shared enmity towards Britain. The USSR,
however, looked like the weak link, and it was claimed that Ger-
many could be defeated by striking at the fragile Soviet economy.
The attraction of this was twofold: apart from indulging feelings of
hostility to the Soviet Union, it offered an easy path to victory
wit hout directly confronti ng Germany on the Western Front. 5
By no means everyone accepted thi s theory, and once the Russo-
Finni sh War ended, there was less pretext for striking at the USSR.
Opinion swu ng behi nd another inte rpretation. Already Sargent,
Churchill and to a degree Collier, felt that Soviet- German collab-
oratio n was unnatural and likely to be of short duration. 6 By the
e nd of the 1930s, Soviet policy had come to be characterised as
driven by motives of self-preservation, not Marxist ideology - though
there were residual effects of the latter in their amorality, their
untrustworthiness and the underhanded, subversive methods they
were prepared to employ. This produced an essentially opportunistic
policy.7 By April 1940 the most common explanation for Soviet
policy was the 'mu tual exhaustion' theory. Sta lin was believed to
be aiming to avoid hostiliti es with a Great Power wh ile at th e same
time working to prolong the war in order to weaken both sides.
The resulting exhaustion of both belligerents would ensure Soviet
survival as well as provide ideal conditions for the Soviets to ex-
tend their influence into a disordered and weakened Europe. As an
ex planation for Soviet support of Germany, this theory depended
on the assumption that the Soviets saw Germany as the weaker
power, and were supplying aid to ensure the war lasted. 8
The belief that ultimately they wished for the defeat of both
Germany and the Allies meant that there would be limits on the
extent and permanence of th ei r cooperation with Germany.9 While
Maclean , and some others, thought othe rwise, the genera l inclina-
tion was that Hitler and Statin were uncomfortable bed-fellows,
brought into such a position by a temporary coincidence of interests,
not political affinities. When Germa n successes in the west made it
hard to assert t hat the Soviets were support ing Germany as the
weaker power, therefore, the widespread interpretation was that fear
of Germany now impelled Stalin to continue coopera tion. He would
be pleased by the collapse of the British Em pire, but this would
not completely o utweigh the dangers of a victorious and powerful
Germany. Sargent summarised departmental views in July 1940. The
USSR was seen to ha ve both defensive and expa nsive motivations.
 'LeI liS exp(;'c/ I/o/iJillg good (rom Ille 50I'i(;'/' 9

Stalin was upset by the fall of France and was frightened of Ger-
man expansion, but would also himself seize the opportunity to
expand . Stalin intended to keep on good terms with Hitler because
he could not stop him . Ge rman y and the USSR had a common
interest in not fight ing each other and in th e Soviets staying out
of the war. However, there were dearly tensions amid th e continu-
ing co llaboration. 1O Thus, when Stal in annexed the Baltic states,
these moves were seen as defensive - and that could on ly be against
Germany." Th e FO believed he would want to keep on good term s
with the German victor, hoping that Germany might not be
entirely stable wit h so m uch territory to assimilate and that Hitler
would not attack the USSR while gain ing economic advantages from
the existing relationship.' 2
Th rough the rest of 1940, the sense that Soviet policy was prin-
cipall y designed to avoid a dash with Germany strengthened. Stalin
was depicted as an 'appeaser' - now a term of derision in British
Govern ment circl es - and by the last mont hs of 1940, seemed to
be getti ng into the kind of mess that appeasement produces. He
was still seekin g to buy time, but the spread of German influence
and control in cou ntries like Bulgaria and Ro mania was impinging
into a reas of traditional Russian /Soviet interest. The FO Southern
Departm ent had lo ng perceived Soviet ambitions in these areas; at
least partly these were defensive, in t hat t he Soviets were concerned
that no other power shou ld be in control there Y
After Molotov met Hitler in Berlin in November 1940, it was
initially assumed that agreement had been reached on dividing up
the Ncar and Middle East. H Further information, however, suggested
that in fact Soviet- German relations were becoming more difficult
and that the predicted clas h of interests was developing. Collier
remarked that the Soviet position on the fence was becoming in-
creasingly uncomfortable, and their long-cherished freedom of
manoeuvre was being compromised. Commen ts reveal a certain sense
of poetic justice about this: Churchill remarked that their position
was 'unenviabl e'. IS
By early 1941, the Soviets were cl early seen to be in a serious
position. Th eir policy was believed to be driven principally by a
desire to stay out of the waf - which by now meant avoidi ng pro-
voking the Germa ns. This involved cont inued, indeed increased,
economic aid and keeping the British at arm's length so that t he
Germans would not become suspicious. Fear for Soviet securi ty,
directly threate ned by Germany, was the principal motivation. Thus
10 Clmrcllill. IVllite/wll (11111 lile Svviet Ullioll

Soviet appeasement of Germany, right up to the mo ment of the

attack, was perceived by most in the Government - especially once
Maclean left th e FO in March 1941 - to be a co nsequence of Soviet
fear, and this perception was not shaped by a political concept of
Nazi- Soviet affinities. 16
While there was no sympat hy with such appeasement, the driving
force for it on Stalin's part was see n to be his own realism about
Soviet weakness. Th e British wished the Soviets, as Collier wrote,
to 'take courage' (largely because it was in Britain 's interest), but
they also believed Stalin had very good reasons for wanting to avoid
a fight. Probably the most important fundamental assumption about
the USSR was of Soviet weakness. The Soviet Union was characterised
throughout the elite as incompetent, inefficie nt and corrupt. Com-
munism had sapped initiative and pat ri otism. The purges and
collectivisation had created such c haos that the Soviet economic
infrastructure was expect ed to co llapse very quickly if mobi lisation
for war was attempted. Moreover, the regime's hold on its own
people was tenuous, only having any strength at all in the cities,
and even there Stalin and his terror regime were believed to be
unpopular.1 7
The British military concurred entirely with thi s assessment. Early
in the 1930s, British services opinion was that Soviet forces, whose
quality had previously been regarded as low, were im proving. It
was felt that the Soviets were making great strides in equipment
and training, especially of armoured and parachute divisions. When
air and military attaches were appointed for the first time in 1934,
they were able to attend manoeuvres and ga in first-hand knowl-
edge. They found Soviet officers reasonably good, but tac tics
disorganised and primitive; morale was very high and overall the
forces seemed more resilient than those of 1914. Even if not effec-
tive in attack, the WO concluded that it would 'be a risky matter
for any . . . Power to attempt a war of aggression against the Soviet
Union'. Observers at the manoeuvres at Minsk in 1936, who in-
cluded Wavell and Martel (both to revisit the USSR in the war),
reported that the use and development of mechanised and para-
chute forces were good, th ough staffwork and coordinati on were
somewhat suspect. III
It was just these aspects that were be lieved to have suffered in
the subsequen t purges of officers. Th e 1937 manoeuvres, at which
no foreign observe rs were allowed, were rumoured to have been a
shambles. In view of poor Soviet administration and the appalling
 'Lt'l liS expeCl lIo/hillg gooli {rom Iht' Soviet' II

state that communications were believed to be in, the COS con-

cluded in 1 9:~9 that the Red Army was an unreliable, un certain
quantity, and that with in two or three weeks of hosti lities the USSR
would be forced to suspend mobilisation to avoid a complete break·
down in indust ry and nat ional life. They were prepared to concede
that t he Soviet forces would probably fight reasonably well when
defending their own soi l. Th ey had no ent husiasm for cooperation
with t he Soviets; many senior officers had been involved in the
Intervention against th e Bolshevik Revolution in 1919, and in plan-
ning for the defence of Indi a against a potential Russian enemy.19
Soviet performances in Poland in September 1939 were reported
to be unimpressive, with a lack of di scipline (believed to be partly
the result of the system of political commissars), poor reserves and
widespread breakdowns in transport, all of which served to confirm
expectation s based o n t he latest reports of the attaches in Moscow.
Littl e notice was taken of the more creditable performance against
th e Japanese in August 1939. These perceptions received further
confirmation in t he first month of the war with Finland. Once again,
Soviet tact ics were see n as unsophisticated in th e extreme a nd their
inter-service cooperation poor. zo
In Novem ber 1940, M12b, the sectio n of MI that dealt with Soviet
matters at that tim e, noted that attempts had been made to im-
prove the Red Army after the Finni sh fiasco , chiefly by decreasing
political control within mil itary units.zl However, at the turn of
the year, MI were strongly of the op inion that the Soviet leader-
Ship would give in to th e Germans a nd would not resist an advance
into th e Uk raine. Th e DMI thought they would fight, but deferred
to MI2b's 'j udgem ent and up to date knowledge'. When the Military
Attach e in Moscow, Co lonel Gree r, asserted that the Soviet people
were being prepared for war against Germany and that any form of
occupat io n of the Soviet territory would be reSisted, indeed that
dissatisfied elements would unite behind the Soviet Government,
MI2 were sceptical. They dismissed the idea, originating with Cripps,
that the Red Army was developi ng an anti-German attitude, or any
kind of view of its own .22 Maj or Tam plin of MI2b thoug ht such a n
idea to be the resul t of a dangerous wishful thinking. It is clear
that the department the Bri ti sh military relied upon for interp reta-
tion of th e Soviet situation was of the opinion that the Soviet Union
count ed for little, that its regime would do anyth ing to secure its
own surviva l, and that the Soviets were looki ng to the mutual ex-
hausti on of the belligerents, partly for the opportunistic gain s that
12 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 tile Soyiet Union

might result, but also in the hopes of avoiding attack. A Soviet-

German clash was quite possible event ually, but not while the
Germ ans had the British as their main enemy, and whi le the Soviets
were too weak to follow any policy other than submission. MI as-
sumed the lat est territorial acquisitions added nothing to Soviet
defences; the Lithuania-East Poland line was indefensible, where
the pre-war frontiers had presumably been strongly fortified. Soviet
troops were now deployed a/lead of those fortifications in the new
(a nd politically unreliable) territories. Z3
Nothing was to alter the services' low opi ni on of the Soviet forces
up to the time of the German invasion. The reforms made by Marshal
Timoshenko were not considered to have brought Soviet forces to
a level where they could face the Welmllac/lt on anything like equal
terms. The earlier caveat about Soviet defen sive ca pabilities was no
longer certain, given the effect of the purges on the one hand, and
the offensive abilities of the Germans on the other. The Joint Plan-
ning Staff UPS) found the Soviet Air Force t o be inefficient and its
equipment obsolescent. Soviet tanks were technically bette r, but
like the aircraft suffered from poor maintenance. These forc es were
certain ly large, but their fighting value, the Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee UI C) asserted, was low, even taking into account that they
were best in defence and that they had vast territories to fall back
on . The weakest points were tactical a nd logisti ca l organisatio n,
supply and maintenance. Afte r major operation s strategic retreat
would be found impossible as organisation of formations would
break down . The Soviet Genera l Staff was no match for the German.
MI2 thought that traditional Russian pat ri otism and fighting spirit
had been eroded by the years of Commun ist rule and were not
countin g on protracted irregular resistance. H
While these attitudes reproduced many of those held by the FO,
it would be incorrect to say that the FO had forced them on the
military. They sprang from MI's own analysis, found ed on percep-
tions of Soviet policy and military weakness.
It was this fundamental weakness that brought most to sec fear
of Germany - and anxieties about future secu rity - to be the driving
Soviet motivation. Stal in 's concern for self-prese rvation made him
obsessed with secu rity, and given his vulnerability it was expected
in May-June 1941 that he would give up a great deal, including
territory, in order to avoid a war that could only mean total defeat
and the end of himself and hi s regime. This also guided British
policy, for it offered little incentive to chase the Soviet s or offer
 'Ld liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 13

th em ind ucemen t s such as recogn ition of their annexa t ion s of

Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and th e Baltic states, in order to
buy their neutrality or support. Few in the Fa, military or War
Cabinet would have disagreed with Cadogan 's warning, ' Let us expect
nothing good from the Soviet.'25

Alternative Views

The re was not, however, com plete consensus. When he became Prime
Minister in May 1940, Church ill agreed with the Fa that th e fall
of France shou ld be causing ago nising reappraisal s in the Krem lin
of the wisdo m of supporting Ge rmany, since do in g so was shorten-
ing, not prolonging the wa r. A long-standing Soviet request for trade
talks was take n up, though t he aim of the British mission was pol-
iti cal - to discover if Soviet attitudes were, at thi s mo ment, amenable
to c hange. The man sent to Moscow was Sir Staffo rd Cri pps. Cripps
was a pro mi nent left -winge r, though also, as a baronet a nd KC, a
mem ber of the elite. He had been expell ed from the Labour Party
fo r advocatin g a popu lar front with Co mmuni sts agai n st Fascism.
He had already opened contacts with the USS R, having visited there
ea rly in 1940 (acco mpani ed by Geoffrey Wilson, later to be a clerk
in th e Northern Department). He more or less pushed himself for-
ward fo r th e post . Church ill was willing to indu lge him, partly
because few people were inte rested in going to Moscow, part ly hoping
that ' left would speak to left ', a nd pa rtly for politica l reasons; it
wou ld balance t he despa tc h of Samuel Hoare to Madrid. It wou ld
also remove a potentia l crit ic, though t h is could not have been a
major reason , for Cripps' mission was inten ded to be a short one.
Neit he r the Fa nor t he MEW trusted h im to represent their views,
but the Soviets insisted they cou ld only receive a permanent Am-
bassador, not a specia l e nvoy, so as not to raise Ge rman suspicions.
So the installation of Cripps in Moscow did not rep resent a new
d irection in British policy, but it did force a co ntinued debate on
Soviet policy in th e FO and Cab in et, for Cripps energetically ex-
pressed hi s d issent from the prevailing consensus in Whitehal1. 26
Cri pps' at titudes, as show n in hi s writings in Triblille, were
almost completely unaffected by the Nazi- Soviet Pa ct, which had
d isillusioned so many o n th e Left. He believed that the Soviets
were essentia lly peace-lovi ng, and that th ey in no sense threatened
British interests. He believed t hat British policy before the wa r, in-
cluding that of his own pa rty leaders, had been misguided . The
14 C/mfelli/i, WllilelU/1i 11111/ tilt! Soviet Union

gen uine Soviet commitment to collective securi ty had been igno red;
instead the Fascists had been appeased, which had resulted in war
and driven the Soviets to look to t heir own security. Cripps be-
lieved the Soviets we re fo rced into the pact wi th Germany and thei r
late r actions in Finland and the Bal tic sta tes because thei r previous
and preferred policy had depended on coope ration with Britain and
France, which they had been unable to achieveP He was not blind
to t he nature of the Soviet regime, but saw it to be qui te diffe rent
to Nazism. This set of basic perceptio ns brought him to radically
different conclusions from those of the FO.
Cripps' cent ral thes is in June 1940 was t hat the Soviets we re
potentially friendly and that a cooperative rel atio nsh ip was poss-
ible and desi rable both for the purposes of the war and the lo nge r
term. He saw the German- Soviet entente as neithe r permanent nor
unbreakable, and since he retained h is view that the Soviet s had
been forced into it by ma ladroit Anglo- Frenc h diplomacy it coul d
therefore be broken by renewed Brit ish efforts.28 To h im , Soviet policy
was 'fundamentally against t he Ax is and Japa n ' and they desi.red
an Allied Victory. He did not accept the mutual ex ha ust ion theory.
Soviet close relations with Germany were realpolitik to buy time t o
improve their strategic position in pre paration fo r the inevitab le
conflict.29 This gave some communi t y of pu rpose wit h Britain. It
had yet to be drawn out from beh ind t he barrier of 20 years of
British anti-Soviet policy.30 After France collapsed, he believed th is
had become harde r to achieve. It removed any ch ance of a Soviet-
German rupture for as long as a rapid German victory seemed li keJy,
as the Soviets were not ready t o repel an attack . They also believed
tha t no action of theirs would influence Britai n 's resistance, so al-
though they wanted friendly relations wi t h Britai n as insurance for
the future, t hey would not do anything t o provoke German y. At
t he same time they would seek to strengthen their defen sive posi-
tion. Soviet moves in the Baltic states were part of this pol icy: 'acti vely
opportunist' with the aim of protection fr o m a Germa n attack.l l
Cripps bel ieved the Soviets (except Molotov) had not lost their
fundamen tal enmity towards Nazi Germany.32 The predominant Soviet
aim was to ensure the surviva l of the Soviet state and system, and
Soviet policy was guided by a real istic assessment of the th reats to
it, against t he background of the experience of the past 20 years .
Their attitude to Britain was t hus not ideological, but was shaped
by their perception of t he British attitude. Cripps c redited th e
Soviets with a sensitivity that affected this assess men t of interest,
 'Lt'! liS expe(! l/o!hillS soor! {rom OJ/' Soviet' 15

while ot hers assumed a largely internal dynamic for Soviet policy-

making, independent of the attitudes of other states. He maintained
the Soviets were sensitive on two counts and because of this could
be affected by what he called a 'psycho logica l improvemen t ' in the
atmosphere.
First, he believed the Soviets we re sensitive about British policy
and suspicious of it s motives (wit h so me justice, Cripps though t).
They believed Britain sough t to embroil th e USSR with Germany
and play tertius gaudell s. This factor was aggravated by what he saw
as the clum sy manner of handling that policy by th e ro, in the
continual leakages (which he refu sed to acknowledge came from
the Soviet Embassy), and 'wishful thinking' in the press about a
Soviet-German break. There was a fear that a victorious Britain would
lead a postwar a nti-Soviet coal ition. Cri pps felt that a removal of
thi s fea r shou ld be a target for British policy, for doing so might
alter Soviet policy towards GermanyY
Second, he believed they were concerned abou t their international
status. Cripps asserted that the Sovie ts, as a newly establi shed
regi me, we re anxious to be accepted as th e legi timate rulers of a
powerful nat ion, both for internal and for international reasons.
They felt that they had been treated as inferiors and outsid ers,
especially at Mun ich in 1938. If they were now treated as equals,
then progress co uld be made in improving relations.34 Cripps was
assuming the Soviet s took th e same view of Briti sh pre-war po licy
as he did. It was what he called th e 'old diplomacy' that had caused
the cool ness in relations. He took Stalin's comments about a 'new
equ ilibrium ' in their fi rst int erview to be confirmation of this. Cripps
recommended that the Governm en t go 'all out' for better relations
to divorce the Soviet Union gradually from Germany, wit.h a thorough·
ness equal to that of the German s, and a preparedness to ' make
some sacrifice':

I beli eve that given adequate e ncou ragement such an evo lut ion
might be gradually brough t about from the mome nt when Great
Britain shows herself capable of resisting German attack, but ground
mu st be prepa red in advance. l5

These argume nts made little impression on the established view

in Whitehal l, where Stalin's 'authoritative and discouraging state-
ment' had been interpreted differently.l6 When Cripps asserted that
the Soviet s we re sensit ive about the European status of the USSR
16 C/mrr/lili, Wilite/IIIII 11111/ I/le Soviet Ullioll

and had the Orientals' conce rn for 'face', Maclean answered that
they possessed the equally Oriental trait of assessing their ow n
interests very cold-bloodedly, disregarding past policies or agree-
ments if necessary. If they liked to bargain, they equa lly appreciated
displays of strength and firmness of will. They looked for motives
of self-inte rest in others and preferred them to be open ly displayed.
These c haracte ri stics implied the Soviets had little time for purely
ideological considerations eithe r; though their attitude to Britain
had an ideological aspect, their basic motivations were of an olde r
vintage. While stressing the Georgian and Jewish origi ns of the Soviet
ruling clique (Geo rgians and Jews being classed as 'Asiatic'), Stalin
was at the same time cha racte ri sed as a traditional-style Great
Russian nationalist. 37
The fundamental divergence of viewpoints between Cripps and
the fO was in no se nse reproduced in the War Cabin et . Soviet
Ambassador Maisky frequently voiced his d isappointment with the
Labour members of the Coalition, whom he had assiduously courted
when they were in opposition. Notwithstanding the Labour Party's
traditional regard for the Soviet Un ion and the continued enthusi-
asm for that state on the part of the rank-and-file and the intellectuals
of the Left, Attlee, Bevin and Greenwood made no attempt to pro-
pose an alternative policy to that of Halifax and the fO. To them,
Stalin's policy appeared selfish, short-Sig hted and opportunistic. After
the Soviet attack on Fin land, the Daily Herald, the vehicle for the
views of the leadership, proclaimed that the socialist USSR was dead,
having been replaced by St alin's new imperia list Russia. However,
they were less interested in attacking the USSR than using the op-
portunity to rou t their own left-win gers, who were in considerable
disarray.l8
There was support for Cripps ' interpret ation from th e Ministry of
Economic Warfare. The dons and busi nessmen called into service
th ere, and the Minister, Labour's Hugh Dalton, found FO methods
infuriating and their cond uct of diplomacy inapplicable to the
circumstances of the war.39 The MEW's Soviet expert, Michael Postan ,
argued for a radically different interpretat ion of the USS R from tha t
of the FO. Postan was by no means pro-Soviet, but his attitude was
typical of the academic or commercial detachment towards the USSR
of the Ministry experts . Postan and hi s associates founded their
argum ents on a belief that British policy should be framed in the
context of the imm ed iate needs of the wa r with Germany, and they
saw cooperatio n with the Soviet Union to be more feasible than
 'Ld liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 17

did Co lli er or Maclean. ~o The key divergence in perceptions was a

higher esti mate of the likelihood of a Soviet-German clash of interests.
Greater hope was derived from Soviet opportunism and the interest-
based nature of thei r policy, and there was no emphasis on innate
Soviet hosti lity towards Britain, apart from justifiable caution on
the Soviets' part. ~l The MEW argued that the FO view of the response
of the Soviet s to external st imul i was undul y pessimistic, and that
concession s cou ld indeed be effective. ~2
Postan st ated that whatever Sov iet policy was now, a future
elltellte was not inconceivable. He argued that Soviet policy sin ce
July 1938 could be explain ed without refere nce to such ' ill~defined
conceptions as "imperial ist tradition" or "communist ideology" ' . If
Sta lin was mainly driven by hostility to the British Empire, why,
Postan asked, were h is advances in the Baltic states, not Persia or
Afgha n istan? All Soviet actions could be explained by reference to
fear of futu re German design s on the USSR, tempered by a fear of
present German power. It wa s this that made Stalin reluctant to
improve relat ions with Britain .~3

The Policy of ' Rese rve'

However, in 1940-41 policy to th e Soviet Union largely lay in the
ha nds of the Foreign Office. Ch urchill made occasional interven-
tions, and importa nt decisions were approved by War Cabinet, but
until June 1941 policy essentially followed lines formulated in the
FO. Cripps and the MEW proposed alternatives, based on their
different views of the Soviet Union , but with little impact on policy.
The policy of ' passive hostili ty' followed during the Russo- Finni sh
War had been replaced by the time Churchill became Prime Minister
by a po licy best described as 'reserve '.44 This was to be the funda-
mental British policy down to June 1941, and indeed a little way
beyond: though on a number of occasions short-lived attempts were
made to fi nd a more active policy. The basic logic for the reserve
policy could be found in Cadogan 's statement:

I personally attac h no importance whatever to Russia. Russia is

in no event going to do us any good: and [ am optimistic enough
to think she won 't do us much harm.45

This was possible because for most policy-makers, the USS R was
a wea k power and one on the periphery as far as significant Briti sh
18 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 tile Soyiet Union

interests were concerned. Moreover, Soviet policy was believed to

be outside Brit ish influence - at least until t he threat to bo mb Soviet
oil-wells in the Caucasus became plausible again. 46 The Soviets, it
was believed, would on ly respond to force: 't he on ly language the
Kremlin understands.'47 Gestures made to gain goodwi ll would be
futile - o r indeed counter-productive, for th e Soviets would sec them
as signs of weakness. 48 Stalin was see n to assess his interests co ld-
bloodedly and be difficult to influence through no rmal diplomacy.
It was better, as Eden put it after he became Foreign Secreta ry at
the start of 1941 , to 'possess ou r souls in pat ie nce'.49
There were those who attempted counter-a rguments. R. A. Butler,
Parliamentary Unde r-Secretary at the FO in 1940, asserted that the
USSR, o r Russia, had always counted in the balance of power, and
might well be needed to complete t he e nci rclement of Germany
and to free Poland and Czechoslovakia from German domination. 5o
Cripps took such arguments much further. He clearly felt that a
close relationship with the Soviets was possible and desirable, and
that sin ce British policy was responSible for Soviet suspicions of
British long-term intentions, it was up to Britain to take action to
improve relations. A concession on the Baltic would show the Soviets
British goodwill, and in particular show that the British agreed that
the Soviets had a right to security.5l He was supported by the officials
of th e MEW. They did not share the view that the USSR did not
matter, since in their field of interest, Soviet econom ic aid to Germany
was clearly of great sign ificance as it was a loophole in the blockade.
Like Cripps, they argued against the idea that nothing could be
done. They felt Britain could not afford not to try - and perceived
the USSR in such a way that action could succeed .52
These arguments made little impress ion in th e FO. Halifax, in
fact, was ready to consi de r a concession on the Baltic states if it
would work, but no one in the FO thought that it wou ld. 51 Cripps
himself by the end of 1940 had become a st rong advocate of a
'firm and dignified attitude of reserve'.54 Indeed, he interpret ed the
policy in a much sterner way than d id Sargent or Collier, and called
for a 'firm, negative attitude'.55 Cripps still believed that British
actions mattered to the Soviets (w here the FO did not) and that
Britain could use threats and rewards to change their pol icy. He
the refore advocated that 'reserve' be quite aggress ive; the aim was
clearly to move Soviet policy, not simply to wait on events while
being 'suave and uncontentious' as Sargent argued.56 So Cripps, while
pressing for 'aloofness', continued to argue that a con cession on
 'Ld liS expect lIothillS som! {rom thl' Soviet' 19

the Baltic states would also bring about a movement in Soviet policyY
The FO re jected th is idea in January and Februa ry 1941: instead,
Sargent advocated a 'distant am iability', allowing Soviet-Germa n
riva lry to develop natura ll y. s8
However. by early 1941, FO attitudes were based firmly o n the
idea that th e Soviets were anxious about the steady advance of the
Germans, especiall y into t he Balkans. Whe n the anti·Nazi coup took
place in Belgrade in Marc h 1941 , it loo ked for a short t ime as if
the Soviets were going to 'take courage' and openly support the
opponen ts of the German s. This prompted a departure from the
reserve policy. This had been tried twice before, though both attempts
were s hort~li ve d .
The first occas ion was immediately after Churchill became Prime
Minister. Ch urch ill 's fi rst message to Stal in laid ou t in fairly basic
terms what th e im pact of Germa n victori es in the west should mea n
to Soviet interests. 59 Sta lin had interpreted it to mean Churchill
was trying to enli st th e Soviets to defend the stat/ls quo in Europe. 60
Since Sta li n was supposed to be a hard-headed realist, it had been
thought possible he might respond differently, but expectations had
been low, except on the part of Cripps, and the effect was to confi rm
the policy o f reserve.
Cripps co nt inued to argue for concessio ns, and o nce aga in , in
Octobe r 1940, th e Cabin et was prepared to allow an a pproach, to
see if eve nts had yet had an impact o n the Soviet attitude to coop-
e ration with Germany. Although the Americans suspected the British
of concocting an appeasement deal, in fact Cripps was left to design
the approach h imsel f. The result was so me ill-judged wording
regard ing 't he former Po lish state', but no response from Vyshins ky.
Molotov did not even bothe r to sec Cripps. As in July, the British
reaction was to beco me ma rc 'reserved', this time main ly on the
part of Cripps.6! He took his rebuff h a rd, a nd took a pesS im istic
view of Molotov's trip to Berli n.62 The third time when reserve was
tem pora rily dropped also produced such a res ponse, and o ne that
spill ed over into reactio ns to BARBAROSSA. When the Soviets reacted
positively to the Belgrade coup (it was noted that oi l supplies to
Germany were reduced), Eden was in the easte rn Mediterranean,
and had just conferred with Cripps.63 Away from his advisers, Eden ,
who saw himself as having a good reputation in rel ations with the
Soviets and was eager for an active dipl omacy towards th em, took
Cripps' ideas on board. 6~ The FO despatched a very long telegram
to him , reiterating th e grounds for reserve, but Ede n began to move
20 C/mfelli/i, WllilelU/iI 11111/ lilt! Soviet Unioll

forward. 65 On his return to London, he and Sargent explored ways

to exploit Soviet anxieties about developments in the Balkans. Sargent
argued that Brit ain could no longer afford to take the line she had
in the 1939 Moscow negotiations. 66 After di scuss ion in Cabinet, it
was hinted to both Maisky and the America ns (th rough Halifax,
now Ambassador in Washington), that a concession regarding rec-
ognition of the Soviet annexations of the Baltic states was a
worthwhile exchange for a movement to Soviet neutrality, a cessa-
tion of Soviet supplies to Germany and the closure of the loophole
in the blockade. Collier and Cadogan were doubtful, but even when
coining the strongest stat ements of 'reserve', Sargent had always
conceded the likelihood of a Soviet- German clash of interests.
The breach in reserve was actually threefo ld, for in addition
Churchill and Cripps attempted to seize the moment. Indepe ndently,
Churchill had decided on his own departure from the policy. He
had supported reserve, but did not exclude the possibility of the
Soviets and Germans falling outY As he had in June 1940, he felt
that a simple setting out of the facts might impress a realist li ke
Stalin. This time, his message to Stalin described German troop
movements, based on material gai ned through the decrypt ion of
German signals traffic (though Sta li n was told it came from an
agent).68 The aim was to show Stalin that his appeasemen t policy
was not working, for the Germa ns had been preparing an invasion
anyway, only to be delayed by the problem in Belgrade. Churchil l
let the facts speak for themselves and suggested no threat or
reward. The message, however, was se nt to Cripps accompani ed by
a 'line' from the FO on which he was to speak, which tended to
reflect the continued pessimism of most of the FO and minimised
the significance of the message .69 Cripps instead made hi s own
approach, believing that Eden had given him the go-a head. 70 This
was a much more complicated demarche, involving hints of threats .
Churchill was later fur ious with Cripps for delaying hi s message,
and the FO blamed Cripps for 'spiking ' Eden 's approach by moving
too quickly for the cautious Soviet s, though in fact the rapid dete-
rioration in events in the Balkans meant that the Sovie ts would
always have done what they did, and swung back into full- blooded
appeasement. 7 1 The significance of this short phase was not, how-
ever, Cripps' handling of Churchi ll 's message, though historians'
focus has tended to follow Churchill on that. More important was
that it emphasises that Eden, Churchill and some in the FO, such
as Sarge nt, did not see tile Soviets and Germans as in any way
 'Lt'I liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 21

natural partners and were prepared to act on that perception. After

the a ttempt ca me to nothing, once again the inclination to reserve
was reinforced. Churchill , who had cha racterised the Soviet att i-
tude in the Balkans as ' loyal and friendly', told Eden that it was
wise r t o let the force of events work further rather than to make

frantic efforts to assure t hem of your love. This only looks

like weakness and encourages them to believe they arc stronge r
than they are. Now is the time for a sombre restraint on alit
part, and let them do the worrying. 72

Th is mood continued th rough June 1941. No political offers were

considered then, when a German attack seemed imminent, only
rather vague mi lita ry assistance. What had been confirmed in April
was the determinatio n of Stalin to avoid war at all costs. This rein-
forced the impression of ch ronic Soviet weakness and was to shape
init ial reactions to the prospect of alliance by establishing the ex-
pectation of precipitate collapse.

Facing the Prospect of a German Attack o n th e USS R:

Could the Soviets be Allies?
As information and rumours of German pressure on the Soviets
increased, the new Head of the Northern Departme nt, Christophe r
Warner, summarised the position as it looked from Whitehall. Much
as the Governm ent might wish to influence the Soviets in fav our
of the Allies, he wrote on 14 May, Stalin's policy was governed by
his fear of Germany and his estimate of the concessions he could
make without brin gi ng the collapse of his regime. It was assumed
that negotiations were 'a lmost certainly proceeding'. Stalin's assump·
tion of the Presidency of the Counci l of People's Commissars was
believed to indicate serious decisions were at hand. The re was little
doubt Stal in wou ld go to great lengths to avoid war. On thi s issue
Cripps' reports from Moscow matched views in Whitehall. 73
The US Governm ent was apprehensive that the British were again
contemplating concessions on the Baltic states and other issues. In
contrast to his stance in April, Eden assured Halifax that the Govern-
ment had no int ent ion of giving in to the Soviet Union and was
only exploring what course to follow if war carne. No polltical moves
were th ought worthwhil e. As Butler put it, a move in the direction
of the Soviets wou ld recognise that they could be a 'great makeweight
ZZ C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

in the balance of power', but on the ot her hand a continuance of

the policy of negation meant that 'we have no bargain with the
devil and can become hi s adversary later with a clear record', Halifax
was told the Fa had good reason to believe Hitler wished to put
an end to the USSR as a potential menace and inte nded to force
the issue immediately. The planned British response was:

while we should not becom e the allies of the Soviet Un ion, we

should have a common enemy and a co mmon interest - Le. to
do Germany all the harm we ca n. Our presen t approach has thi s
situation o nly in view. 74

On the eve of BARBAROSSA all the Fa were thinking of in this

connection was a rather distan t co-belligerency. In the fairly likely
event of a German attack, closer relations were deSi rable, but ']tl hat
we should not welcome or hug the Soviet as an all y also seems
desirable'. 7S Perceptions of the Soviets suggested two possible out-
comesi Soviet acqUiescence to Germa n demands, or, if Germany
attacked, rapid Soviet defeat. The question of long-term relations
seemed academic, since prolonged Soviet resistance was not expected
and the unpleasant implications of close cooperation did not have
to be faced. Th e general inclination of the Government was towards
a limited responsei in effect fighting sepa rate but para llel wars and
continuing to a certain degree the policy of reserve until matters
were clarified by Soviet collapse. 76
The JPS concluded that if the USSR was attacked, there would be
little mate ri al assistance Britain could give, if only for geographic
reasons. They informed the Fa that they saw no reason to refu se
collaboration if the Soviet s asked for it. They wou ld be told, how-
ever, that Britain was already doing all she could against the common
foe , and would continue to do so. Air Chief Ma rshal Portal, the
new Ch ief of the Air Staff (CAS), made it clea r that strategiC di scus-
sions could only take place once the Soviets had revi sed their policy
and decided to fight the Germans instead of appease the m.77 The
COS concurred in Eden's offer to Maisky of increased air acti vity in
the west and a military mission should the Germans attack. How-
ever, the military were none too enamoured of the idea of an alliance
with the Soviets, notwithstanding th e fact that they had advanced
it in 1939 on strategiC grounds . Whatever the advantages to Brit-
ain of even the momentary respite afforded, they disliked the prospect
of the extra military commitments that might be found necessary,
 'Lt'I liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 23

the possibi lity of s hari ng US material aid, and of joint planning

with t he Soviet s. They also found it distasteful. The ClGS, General
Dill, thought t he idea was ' fou l', and the VClGS, General Pownall,
wrote in h is diary:

1 avoid the expression 'Allies' for the Russ ians are a d irty lot of
murderi ng thieves themselves and double crossers of t he deepest
dye. It is good to see the two biggest cut-t hroats in E.urope, Hit ler
and Stal in, goi ng for each other.

From a persona l point of view, like many other members of the

elite, most high-ranking servicemen would have been happy to watch
the Soviets and the Nazis mutually exhaust themse lves. However,
it was feared that the Germans would win all too quickly, so they
fou nd themselves placing thei r hopes in the unli kely direction of
the Soviet leader. Pownall 's comment continued:

I on ly hope Sta lin wi ll make a deep gash in Hitler's throat. With

a b it of luck he wil l. It's impossible to say how long Russ ia n
resistance wi ll last - th ree weeks or three months? The mai n
thing is that even when they fi nd t he mse lves forced to pack up
that they st ill maint ain a fro nt somewhere - even in the Urals. 78

However, prolonged resista nce seemed unlikely. The JIC and J PS

had, by 9 Ju ne, come to expect either agreement o r war by the end
of t he month and bel ieved that if war came the Soviets wou ld ho ld
out for 4- 6 weeks. E.dward Grigg, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at
the we, howeve r, told Haro ld Nicolson that 80 per cent of the
WO gave t he Soviets on ly te n days. Dill said the Germans would
go throug h them li ke 'a knife through butter', and gave them odds
of S- 4 on. 79

Initi a l Reactio n s: Churchill Fa vours an End to Reserve

The unexpected fact of Soviet surviva l thus inevitably forced ce r·
tain c hanges in views of the USSR - moreover that survival left it
aligned with Brita in a nd an important pa rt of the Allied war effort.
An exception was Churchi ll , fo r his approach was changed by the
simple fact t hat the Soviets were now co-belligerents. He wanted a
more active response than a continuation of reserve. Days before
the event , he had told Roosevelt that he would t ry to help the
24 C/mrcllili, Wllile/wll (11111 tile Soviet Union

Soviet Union should it become Germany's enemy. This did not sig-
nify a change in Churchill's view of the USS R. His attitude was
governed by his pursuit of defeat of Germany.so
Churchill believed the British people shared h is views of the pri-
macy of the struggle against Hitler and would respond unequivocally
to an appeal expressed in such terms. He took t he view that 'Russia
was now at war: innocent peasants were being slaughtered and we
sho uld forget about Soviet systems or t he Cominlem and extend
our hand to fellow-human beings in dislress.'81 Hitler was counting
on stirring up class divisions, he sa id, and t his was all the more
reason to 'to go all out to help Russia '. Eden, Cra nborne and Duff
Cooper, who were by no means Chambcrla inites, we re not so certain.
Eden and Cranborne said that if there was to be a Commons debate
it should be confined to the purely military aspect as, politically,
the USSR was as bad as Germany and half the country would object
to being associated with it too close ly. Duff Cooper also (wrongly)
expected resistance amongst the public to the idea of a close asso-
ciation with the Soviet Union.82
Churchill's attitude was born of his firm belief that Britain was
Hitl er's ultimate target. If the USSR was holdi ng up h is plans for
invasion and exhausting his military resources, then it should be
helped. If the Germans were to be prevented from returning to the
attack in the west that autumn, this help had to be immediate. In
this context, the Soviet system was irrelevant; 'Russia' was fight ing
in her national interest, not Communist interest, and that was all
that was important to Britain at that t ime. 83 If this reflected the
nature of his interest in the USSR as a part ner-i n-arms against Ger-
many, it also reflected his perception of Soviet policy as it had
developed under Stalin. It was realist and self-interested; nationalistic
and not revolutionary, more ' Russian ' than 'Soviet' . This is not to
say he was not alive to the domestic angle: even before any Sovie t
victories, he was worried about the effect close association with the
Soviet Union would have in increasing the credibility of British
Com munists. The issue was immediately put to Altlee and Herbert
Morrison, who shared his anxiety.8~
Churchill's reject ion of the policy of reserve did not derive from
a firm belief in Soviet victory - but a lesser hope that the Soviet
peoples would put up a stern fight in defence of their homeland. It
was not based on a different perception of Soviet capabil ities from
that of his colleagues and advise rs. John Colvi lle later claimed that
Churchill believed the Soviets would fig ht well a nd perhaps win,
 'Ld liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 25

but at the time he noted that Churchill believed the USSR 'would
certa inly be defeated'.Ms He agreed it was iust a breathing space,
but one that Britain shou ld exert herself to ex tend . On 23 June, he
exhorted the COS to ' make hell while the sun shines' . He spurred
others into action which they themselves considered wou ld be wasted
by an ea rl y Soviet collapse . Th e COS attitude was that thi s was the
time to build British strength, in stead of sq uandering it on a cause
they could not help. They were cold to Soviet demands for help,
telling Lieutenant·General M a so n~Macfarlan e, the Head of the new
Military Mission to Moscow (30 Mission), they 'm ust save them+
selves just as we saved ourselves in the Battle of Britain and in the
Atlantic'.86 Macfarlane was instructed to encourage the Soviets to
resist as long as possible, retreating if necessary into Siberia, ensur·
ing they destroyed im portant oil installations before the Germans
overran them , and then himself to escape to safety over the Pamir
mountains. ~ l
Likewise, the first reaction to BARRA ROSSA in the FO was to
maintain th e policy of rese rve. Cripps in itially agreed. Harold
Nicolson 's impression that the Fa would welcome a futl alliance
was incorrect. 8I! Thi s shaped Cripps' preference that the first formal
agreement wi th the Soviets wou ld me rely be concerned with
mutual assistance: to make a political agreeme nt, he said , should
wait until confidence had grown, though he also felt an agreement
of so me so rt was advisable to remove mistrust. [t would give the
Soviet leaders internationa l respect and make them 'entirely man·
ageable' at the peace conference. To most , the anticipated Soviet
defeat meant a potentially embarrassing political agreeme nt was
unnecessary. Eden took a similar line to Cripps in discussions with
Maisky, though he favoured active measures in the military and
economic sphe res. The FO attitude was characterised by caution
and a reluctance to make commitments ahead of events. This was
to change as Soviet resistance failed to crumble; the longer they
survived, the more anxiety there was that they wou ld continue to
fight, and to cast around for methods by which Britain could exert
influence to this effect. 89 The preconditions that supported the
reserve policy began to c hange as the Soviets survived; this was a
more important development than the actual German invasion in
changi ng British attitudes towards the Soviet Union, including some
individuals' fundamenta l perceptions.
26 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

Beaverbrook

Strident Soviet complaints about British act ions - or the lack of

them - from September 1941 reopened the deba te on how fa r Soviet
policy was influe nced by such exte rnal factors as British policies .
The ind ividual who more than anyone brought th is question into
prominence in the agencies where policy was made, when many in
the Cabinet and FO preferred to ignore it in expectation of a German
Victory, was Beaverbrook. The military situation and the repercussions
of the lack of British victories on th e Government's domestic pol-
itical position rendered Beaverbrook's stress on the prominence of
Soviet morale and susceptibilities hi gh ly perti nent, wi th profou nd
implications for the developmen t of attitudes and policies during
the rest of the war in Europe.
Beaverbrook has been margina lised in accounts of the course of
British po licy to the Soviet Union duri ng the Churchill Coalition.
Studi es of Beaverbrook have tended to view his support of aid to
the USSR in 194 1-42 in terms of h is persona l ambitio ns, and give
the impression that this was merely a piece of pol itical calculation .
This is unfortunate, for Beaverbrook's attitude was im portant for
British policy ,md by no means was it purely a fu nction of dom-
estic politics.
Oliver Harvey, Eden 's Pri vate Secretary a t t h is t im e, fo und
Beaverbrook obsessed wit h Ru ssia. 9(I Beaverbrook's ea rlier attitude
had not suggested any such obsession. His guiding principle in fo reign
affairs was the continued surviva l a nd integrity of the Empire. His
concept of the Empire cent red on the Engl ish-speaking Dominions;
he cared nothing for Asia, so his imperialism ca rried with it no in-
built hosti lity to the USSR deriving from concern about India. From
the perspective of an isolation ist, he cou ld see no area where Brit-
ish and Soviet vita l interests clashed, which was not the case, he
felt, with Britain's ot her maior ally, the Un ited States. Beaverbrook
had opposed interve ntion after the October Revolution, a nd ac-
cepted Bruce Lockhart's line that th e Bolshevik state should be
regarded as an acco mplished fact o n the internat ional scene. 9 1 Th is
did not mean Beaverbrook cheri shed a ny en thusiasm fO f, or indeed
interest in, the USS R before the end of the 19305. He visited the
coun try briefly in 1929 and was not impressed. The key fact was
that the USSR, eastern Europe, indeed Europe as a wh ole, were
peripheral in his world-view. 92
For Beaverbrook in 1939-40, the Soviet Union moved slightl y
 'Ld liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 27

nearer the centre of his mental map, as a potential ally to deter

Germany in 1939 or to fight them in 1940. Beaverbrook seems to
have been largely unaffected by the Finnish War. His newspapers
argued strongly for a rapprochement with the USSR after the Finnish
War ended, and the London Evellillg Stall dard, in particular, cons is-
tent ly put the best cons tru ction on Soviet actions , under the
prompting of Michael Foot.n Beaverbrook also, however, saw the
Soviet Un ion as a useful partner in the war, which he believed
needed to be won as quickly as possible in Britai n 's own interest.
While Beaverbrook's approach may have been influenced by the
left-wing journalists who were his proteges - Foot, Tom Driberg
and others - a stronger influence was probably Bruce Lockhart, a
close associate. Lockhart had long held that the Bolshevik state
shou ld not be treated as a pariah nation , but at the same time was
not as uncritical as individua ls on the Left, and did not have such
a high opi nion of Soviet military power. Thus while Beaverbrook
favoured improving relations, he did not hold the USSR to be of
great account. Despite his own su bsequent claims to the contrary,
he did not have hi gh expectations of Soviet resistance when they
were attacked by Germany, and it is unlikely that his influence was
at all significant on Churchill 's broadcast of 22 June align ing Britain
with the Soviet struggle. His 'obsession ' with the USS R only became
evident once they had su rvived the first six weeks, possibly influ-
encl..>(1 by the conclusions drawn by Roosevelt's first e nvoy to Moscow,
Harry Hopkins, whom he met in August 1941. 9~ Beaverbrook's strong
desire was like Churchill and the COS to make the most of the
respite provided by the failure of the Germans to do as expected
and destroy the Soviet Union in the firs t six weeks of the campaign.
Like C hurch ill , he sought an active policy. Unlike Chu rchi ll ,
Beaverbrook did not change his attitude once it became impossible
for the Germans to turn to t he west to invade Britain that year.
Beaverbrook was also among Maisky's wide circle of acquaint-
ances. He voiced a c ritique of British policy reminiscent of the
Ambassador, a nd he fou nd Maisky's frequent assertions about Soviet
sensit ivi ty persuasive. 95 However, for Beaverbrook, the point about
sensitivity gained it5 st rength from a line that Maisky certainly did
not argue. Beave rbrook ca red about Soviet morale becau se he
believed the USSR to be decrepit; it was the will to resist of the
populace and its leade rship that was in need of bolstering. His
demands for increased supply for the Soviets, accepting Stalin's state-
ment of his needs without question, was as much to keep the Soviets
28 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

resisting sp iritually as to suppl y them with the means to do so

physically. It is this essentially critical basis of Beaverbrook's con-
cessionary policy that distinguishes it from Maisky and the Briti sh
Left. The 'soft' or concessionary approach to the Soviets was thus
based in th e beginning on the assumption of Soviet weakness, and
was hardly appeasement of a strong potential ene my.
Beavcrbrook's assertions about Soviet morale before his trip to
Moscow were largely based on pre-existing perceptions of the USSR,
strength ened by his own conce rn , as Minister of Supply, to be at
the cen tre of events. The larger the role that could be claim ed for
supply on grounds of e ncou raging Soviet resistance, the more im-
portant became Beave rbrook's own posit ion vis-a-vis h is rivals. 'Stalin
must be sustai ned ' proclaimed the poster for 'Tanks fo r Russia', but
the prominent figure on it was Beaverbrook.% His stance, however,
was not entirely cyn ica l, for he undoubtedly grasped quicker than
othe rs that BARBA ROSSA cha nged the whole nature of the war and
that the Germans cou ld only be defeated if the Soviets were victo-
rious. Britain 's fate the.refore lay in Soviet hands. These were hands
in which he placed no reliance. Underneath considerations of his
own position were his perceptions of the Soviet Union; a bankrupt
and rotten political system unlikely to supp ly that will to resist
that was to be found in Britain and its Dominions. Morale had to
be bolstered, for it was this that would defeat Germany. Thus his
perceptions meshed with his political ambitions.
Before his Moscow mission, Beaverbrook was argUing for supply
to the USSR, because ot herwise their resistance would crumble and
Britain would have to fight an enemy whose strength had been
3ugmented. 97 Howeve r, his att itude from before the war made it
easy for him to move on from such considerations, which had earlier
guided Churchill, to a policy of politica l concessions. Without under-
standing his pre-war attitude, this docs appear simply political
opportunism, but it is clear that Beaverbrook was being consistent
with his own established perceptions of the USSR . By this time,
September 1941, Church ill occupied a sort of middle ground; he
appointed Beaverbrook, knowing his Views, to head the mission to
discuss supply with Stalin, and then warned Beave rbrook just be-
fore he left that he would not stand for Britain being 'bled white',
and that Beaverbrook should not al low himsel f to be affected by
the atmosphere in Moscow. Th is proved to be a vain hope. 98
 'Lt'I liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 29

Beaverbrook Steals Cripps' Thunder

Cripps agreed with Beaverbrook on the need for politica l conces-
sion to st rengthen Soviet morale and assuage their suspicions. They
disagreed o n the supp ly question. Cripps' advocacy of concession
derived from his perceptions of sensitivity and suspicion. However,
he continued to believe the Soviets appreciated a ' haggle', so he
did not believe a tactic of exchangi ng inform ation for information
would damage relations. On the contrary it now offe red the oppor-
tunity to get those relations o n a regular footing based on the
coincidence of interest he had long perccived. 99 Cri pps was not
suggesti ng bargai ning for purposes of establishing goodwill, but argued
for it as the best way to achieve a logica l distribution of all ied
resources. Th e corollary was that the absence of such a hard-headed
approach would ra ise doubts in Soviet minds as to the seriousness
of the British in making the offe rs. Open-handedness would bring
no increase in respect and, as a sign of weakness, wou ld induce
the Soviets to make increasingly exorbitant demands with little
attempt to justify them. He did not apply this dictum to the politica l
sphere, where he saw prestige as a very influential factor.
Cripps had a much less negative view of the Soviet Union than
Beaverbrook and was thus less disposed to pamper them now they
had been forced into belligerency. The hard-bargaining approach
which both he and Macfarlane advocated for the supply mission
was anathema to Beaverbrook and he kept them on the sidelines
while he was in Moscow. Their arguments that nothing would be
gai ned in return and that the Soviets would see weakness in a fail -
ure to bargain were to Beaverbrook irrelevant in th e face of his
chief aim, which was to show that the British mean t business. He
was prepared to promise virtually anything the Soviets asked for,
and to eschew any haggl in g such as wou ld give any impress ion of
reluctance. This unusual met hod of negotiation was the product of
his belief that Soviet morale needed supporting, that materiel was
their main concern and therefore assurance of supply and of British
sin ce rity would increase their will to resist. He credited Stalin with
his own si ngle-minded preoccupation with the war and th erefore
brushed aside Cripps' demand for talks on postwar reconstruct io n.
Anything that wou ld bri ng co ntention should be avoided: a propa-
ganda and mora le-boostin g coup in six days was his stated aim
from the outset . Th ere was the refore little di scussio n of strategy
though General Ismay, Chu rchill's Chief of Staff, went for this purpose;
30 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

Beaverbrook wanted nothing to detract fr om the main impact of

the Protocol or dilute its effectYX>
These tactics set an important precedent which was su bsequently
to make it diffi cult to initiate a firmer approach without aggravat-
ing Soviet suspicions. The mission was also important for further
developments in Beaverbrook's perceptions. He had seen them in
fighting mood and now believed they wou ld su rvive. He felt his
mission did much to lift morale - but he also experienced at first
hand th e wall of suspicion regarding British policy, which st rength-
e ned his belief in the error of that policy. On h is return he moved
into the political field, believing that the all-important military
coope rati on cou ld not be achieved unless thi s situation was recti-
fied. Stalin's negative attitude in thei r second meetin g made a strong
impression on Beaverbrook and he now beca me the champion of
poli tica l concessions to the Soviet Union in addition to the supply
of materiel. His observations convin ced him that the British sta nce
on political issues was a test for them of the sincerity of British
support. Interested only in the short term, he tended to discount
the future effects of concessions beyond t he immediate aim of vic-
tory. He pressed for compliance with the Soviet request for a
declaration of war on Finland, Hungary and Roman ia, and after
Eden's trip to Moscow in December, for acceptance of Stalin's fron-
tier demands. l o l
Beaverbrook had in any case little interest in eastern Europe: the
Soviet claims were to him justified by the part they were playing
in the war. He thus readily viewed the Baltic annexations as a matter
of security. His justification of it ou tdid even Cripps in realpolitik
and employed terms he knew would be understood by his political
and military colleagues. In depicting the Ba ltic states as the ' Ire-
land of Russia ' he was putting a purely military (a nd imperialistic)
viewpoint, but one that would strike a chord with those who like
Churchill were regretting th e loss of th e Western Irish ports. This
was th erefore a clear attempt to play on the preoccupations of
Churchill and the COS and to try to get them to sec Soviet strategic
defence needs in the same ligh t that they viewed their own .102

The Military Opposition to Beaverbrook

Bcaverbrook's assertion that the nature of the war had c hanged
brought o nly qualified agreement in the services departments. Their
personal antipathy towards Beaverbrook and his irregular met hods
 'Ld us expr(/ I/o/hillS SOQd {rom the Soviet' 31

was strong. They answered Beaverbrook with arguments based on

what they co nsidered mi litary practicalities, but the root of the
trouble was that they did not accept the assumptions from which
their protagonist argued. What to him gave the ove rriding force
and urgency for his ideas, to the m were incorrect interpretat ions
of the Soviet situ ation and character or else irrelevant to a military
strategy based on an assessment of resources and strategic priorities
that had been laid down prior to BARBAROSSA.
To be sure, the fa ct of Soviet resistance and the need to sustain
it in a material and mora le sense brought them to accept the Sup-
ply Protocol and to work hard toward s its fulfilment (despite
Beaverbrook's asse rtions to the con trary).IIH Th ey saw they had t o
accept a Protocol that was not based on information as to needs
nor assessment of priorities, though with misgivings. They had not,
however, assimi lated t he USSR into their strategic vision of the war,
and in this sense Beaverbrook's criticism was close to the mark.
Their priorities placed the USSR below other fronts. II).! The Soviet
role in British mi litary eyes was as yet on ly to survive as long as
possible - another form of the attrition strategy - and provide a
breathing-space for the build-up of Briti sh arms. The despatch of
arms to the USS R would divert muc h needed British and American
material from the defence of Britain, the Middle East, the bo mbing
ca mpaign and the blockade. If the Sovie ts were fighting for their
own survival then such a quixotic gesture could hardly make them
fight any harder. lOS General Brooke, the new CIGS, deeply resented
the supply of tanks to the USSR, where he believed they WCfC poorly
used and unlikely to make a great difference to tile outcome of the
campaign. 106
At a lower level, the WO in particular docs not appear to have
revised its pe rceptions from earlie r in the yea r. Warner described
the attitudes of M13c, the new Sovie t section of MI, as so ' anti-
Russia n as to be dangerous'. Cavendi sh-Bentinck of the FO Services
liaison Department, who chaired th e J le, added:

Whenever the Russians achieve so me success or even succeed in

stemming the German advance, these officers become plunged
in gloom. A Russian defeat fills them with joy.

However, he felt that even if the officers of the Soviet section had
been less prejudiced, MI would still have been anti-Soviet - and
added that Sill em and Tamplin, transfeHed from M12b, though
32 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

'fanatical' in their anti-Soviet views, were at least less stupid than

many in ML In the absence of full papers for the Intelligence sections,
it is hard to know how accurate these complaint s were. M13 were
certainl y pessimistic about the outcome on the Eastern Front. Polish
pessimism was endorsed, as was Polish concern that the press were
exaggerating the importance of the Soviet Union in the war.l07
A further point made by Cavendish-Bentinck on the same paper,
that the WO regarded Soviet officers as ' not being nice people to
associate with ', is borne out by ot her eviden ce, as is the British
military's sense of superiority towards t hem. This may well have
been e nhanced by the origin of the WO's Russia n-speaking office rs,
many of whom were born and raised in Tsaris t Russia, as sons of
expatriate British businessmen or the like, and most had served
with the lnte.rventionist forces in 1919. 106 To be fair to the COS,
these factors probably only served to predispose them towards stra-
tegic decisions they would have made anyway. It must, though, be
borne in mind that such decisions always rested on a set of pri-
orities, and military attitudes by the e nd of 1941 were remarkably
unaffected by the alteration in the basic facts of the Anglo-SOViet
relationship.

Developments in Foreign Office Perceptions and the

Decline of Rese rve
There was a greater an d more notable shift in FO attitudes led from
the top by Eden. Eden sided with Beaverbrook in the Cabi net and
Defence Committee. In doing so, he was strongly supporting a line
that in the FO was still the subject of lively debate. Cadogan as-
cribed Eden's attitude to the influence of Harvey, reappointed as
his Private Secreta ry in a voluntary demotion, and some historians
have tended to follow 5u it. [()9 Harvey's diary gives vivid testi mony
to his own views, bllt his actual infl ue nce on Eden is more prob-
lematic. Eden's stance was consistent with his long-standing view
of Soviet suspiciousness and fitted in with his aspiration towards
improving relations. In the FO debate he appears at times to belong
to both sid es, for the reservations in h is attitude had also by no
means disappeared.
The No rth ern Department had not acquired a Soviet specialist to
replace Maclean until July 1941, with the appointment of Armin e
Dew, who had previously succeeded him in both his posts at Paris
and Moscow. He was to prove a knowledgeable official on the sub-
 'Ld liS expect lIothillS so(}(i {rom thl' Soviet' 33

ject of th e USSR. He was by no means a Soviet sympath iser - he

was no Crippsite - though he did believe in the need to draw the
USSR out of iso lation . In autumn 1941 he was a rguing like hi s
coll eagues and superio rs for a ca utio us but defini te movement away
from reserve. 1 10
By mid-October, FO offi cia ls were, like Ueaverbrook, finding the
reserve policy unsatisfactory.]]l Contrary to expectations, th e USS R
had survived, but the Germans continued to press forward towards
Moscow, Le nin grad and the Ca ucasus. Far from making relations
easier, t h is meant tha t the postponed consideration of long-t erm
Anglo+Soviet relati ons not only now had to take place, but did so
aga in st the backdrop of continued Sovi et demand s fo r assistance.
In t he last q uarte r of 194 1, the re was little study as yet of the
likely shape of Soviet foreign policy in the new situat ion. Crucial
developments in the FO image of th e USS R were, however, in the
process of taking place. Soviet suspicions a nd sensitivity now be·
gan to be acknowledged - and it was not only Cripps and Beaverbrook
who found the m to have so me justification. This was particularly
so in the FO for military questions. Soviet susp icions that the Brit-
ish saw their conflict as separate, a nd hoped for Ge rman-Soviet
mutual exha ustion we re considered to be a n important determi-
na nt of their actions. II!
Earlier, the FO had not been interested in a political rapproche-
ment when Cripps had suggested it on 29 Ju ly. Military action seemed
to be what t he Sov iets wanted. ll3 It was the Beave rbroo k mission
which first ra ised a potential pOliti cal d imen sio n to the quest ion.
At the fina l banqu et , discussion between Beaverbrook and Sta lin
had ranged fa r and wide, and Stali n suggested an Anglo-Soviet postwar
allia nce, declaring that all Soviet officials favoured it. IH Beaverbrook
had not imm ed iately taken this idea up on his return; it was Eden
who ra ised the issue with the War Cabinet, o n 13 October. ll5 He
was aut horised to discuss it with Maisky, but discussions quickly
beca me bogged down on the issue of t he Soviet request that Brit-
ain decla re war on Fin land, Hun gary a nd Roman ia. 116 Thi s request
had been made in September, as a gestu re to show so lida rity in the
absence of military acti vity. No one in the British Gove rnment had
been ve ry keen at the tim e; whe n the issue was discussed again in
Cabinet after Maisky's comme nts, Beaverbrook and Eden now favoured
it, as a substitute for sending troops to the USS R or opening a
second front. Chu rch il l an d the La bour ministers opposed it, o n
th e grounds that it would si mply drive the three countries further
34 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

into coalition with Hitler. Th e real difference was that Bcaverbrook

and Eden felt that Soviet mora le was a key facto r and needed bol-
steri ng, and that Soviet suspicions that the Britis h hoped to play
tertius gam/ells were strong and likely to have an effect on Soviet
resistance and might even affect their readiness to make peace with
Germany.11 7
Some of Cripps' inte rpreta tions now struck a chord within the
FO. In particular, he claimed that the Soviets were not being treated
on the equal terms that their efforts warra nted. Greece and Turkey
had been favoured with visits by the CIGS and the Foreign Secre-
tary, every effort was made to meet US susceptibilities, but the USSR,
which was fighting the battles on which Britain 's survival rested,
was fobbed off with lame excuses. At the least they deserved a state-
ment delivered in person by someone in authori ty as to why no
second front or troops to the Easte rn Front were possible - some-
thing Ismay could have done while in Moscow. Their politica l requests
should be given sympat hetic cons ideration. Cripps did not believe
that there was a risk of driving them to make a separate peace, but
did believe that it might make the difference in ensuring their morale
held through the winter and they continued fighting. lIS [n addi-
tion, looking ahead, as was his wo nt, h e saw that if postwar
collaboration was desired, now was the best time to make a firm
arrangement; with success, the Soviets were not likely to be so modest
in their requests. 119
The FO refu ted the analogy with Greece and Turkey, but on having
the issue put squarely before them, came to the conclusion that
they did ind eed desire postwar collaboration. That being th e case,
something clearly had to be done to improve relations. That they
were in a parlous state was demonstrated forcefu ll y by a message
from Sta lin to Ch urchill o n 8 Novem ber. Alongside a number of
compla ints, made in the most brusque tone, Stalin raised once again
the question of a postwar arrangement. 120
To Cripps' telegrams, Stalin 's impo rtunin g, the inactivity on th e
military front and Eden 's personal sense that policy to the USSR
was drifting aimless ly must be added a further facto r in shaping
the FO's attitude. Soviet demands that there should be an inter-
national reconstruct ion bureau were ta ken as a sign that this was
an important issue for th em, a view endorsed and expanded upon
by Brigadier Skaife at the start of November. Although attached to
PID, Skaife was regularly ca lled upon to offer opi nions on Soviet
questions, and eventually this role was formalised by his being moved
 'Lt'! liS expr(1 IIolhillS SOQlf {rom Ihe Sovirl' 35

into FORD, alongside academics such as Humphrey Sumner from

the RIIA . He was a Russian speaker, with experience o f the country
going back to before the First World War, and had been th e first
Mi lita ry Attache to the USSR in 1934. Ska ife a rgued that Soviet
reco nstructi on needs would be vast and would sha pe their postwar
re lationship with Britain. Their need for cred its and import s, and
for a peaceful international e n viro nment , we re seen by Skaife to
offer an opportunity for a successful collaboration. 121
All th ese co nside ratio n s were bro ug ht together in a series of
meet ings of senio r FO o ffi cia ls between 14 and 19 November. The
conclusions [cached at these meetings demonstrate how percepti o ns
o f th e USSR were developing an d beginning to reshape Britain's
po licies . There was consensus that the Soviets were suspicious of
British mo ti ves, a nd that they were, in Warner's words, 'very touchy'
abou t being left o ut of any discussions o n the postwa r world. 122
The a nswer seemed to be a two-stranded military a nd political ap·
proach. Th ere was regret that Ism ay had no t been able, as had
been intended, to expla in the military situa tion fully to Stalin. The
Sov iets felt their request for 2S- 30 Divisions to be se nt to their
fig h ting front had not been answered, and Sargent conced ed there
was someth ing in this; though the suggestio n was unrealistic, they
deserved a clear explanation. Stalin wa s a realist who would face
fact s, it wa s claimed, a nd th e reluctance of the COS to give such
inform atio n had to be overcom e. m An offer to re lieve Soviet troops
occupying nort hern Iran and to send a British corps to the Ca ucasus
had in addition a roused deep suspicions tha t the Brit ish were a im-
ing to subvert Soviet power in th is region whi le they were distracted. 124
The COS were a lready beginning to feci they had given enoug h
with no return , b ut the Fa saw Soviet resistance as the ma in re-
turn. Mo reover, fighting two separa te wars did not seem strategica lly
sound. Eve n Cad oga n co nceded, 'we shall have to have frank po l-
itical and military discussions with the Sov iet .'l ZS
This p reference fo r fra nkn ess was not matched for the political
sphere, the second clem en t of the problem . Th e trouble was that
Britai n 's own views were still at an ea rly stage, though a lready in-
hibited by com mitments to the Americans. Littl e definite was known
of Soviet thoughts about t he postwar e ra, and this was a furthe r
problem . 126 Th e Soviets had publicly committed th emselves to th e
Atlanti c Charter, though stating that they wou ld have stiffened the
wording o f some clauses and c hanged others, without specifying
which. Sta lin 's statement of war aim s on 6 November had been
36 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Union

'qu ite unexceptionable' denying as it did any territorial ambitions

or intention of interfering in the affairs of ot he r cou ntries. 1Z7 There
was some discussion , however, of whet he r this was the limit of
Soviet aims.
Warner felt Stalin was deeply suspicious of the British desire to
cooperate; these sllspicions were long-standi ng and not easy to al-
lay. The problem with attempting to conciliate Stalin was t hat he
would be likely to raise his demands; but if no response was made
he would hoard up his complaints and use them as an excuse wit h
his own people and the world (including impressionable British
public opinion) in the event of defeat. Britain in any case needed
Soviet cooperation in Iran, Afghanistan, possibly against Japan, and
certainly if Germany turned its military forces westwards again. Britai n
must do what she could to reduce th ese suspicions. The problem
was that Soviet peace aims might well run counte r to Britain's.
They might want restoration of t hei r 194 1 frontiers , control of the
Dardanelles Straits, an opening onto t he North Atla ntic at the expense
of Norway and large reparations from Germa ny. The Soviets had to
be brought in to any discussions on North Atl antic security (which
the Norwegians had proposed), but the problem was what they would
then demand. Warner favoured frankness on the military question ,
and the offer of a meeting between Eden a nd Stann. But since Stalin
was heavily engaged in the defence of Moscow, this could not happen
for some time, so they cou ld have their suspicions all ayed while
avoiding embarrassing discussions. 128
This pessimism was not reflected at the FO meetings that fol-
lowed. There was a clear sense that reserve was now obsolete, and
opinion was uncert ain about the possibil ity of such Wide-ranging
Soviet demands . Senior officials concluded that Stalin could be sa t-
isfied with something indeterminate - some kind of 'Volga Charter'.l29
Cripps had asserted that it would be easier to get a satisfactory
agreement now, whi le Stalin was weak, but the officials felt Stalin
wanted an agreement because he feared he wou ld be in a weaker
position afte r the war and a wanted firm Briti sh commitme nt that
would ensure he was not excluded from peace-making. [t was be-
lieved the Soviets would want a warm water port, probab ly on the
Persian Gulf, protection of their in terests in the Baltic and Black
Seas, and bases in Finland, Norway and the Ba ltic states . Th e prin-
cipal Soviet aim, however, was described as security, and it was felt
that if a workab le intern ational settlement was reached regarding
protection against future aggression , they might not feel the need
 'Ld us expr(/ I/o/hillS SOQd {rom the Soviet' 37

to resort to th e absorption of th e Baltic states, eastern Poland and

Bessarabia. llo
In contrast to 1940, th e level of cooperation that could be ga ined
with the USSR was beginnin g to seem a vital fa ctor in the shaping
of post war arra ngements. The ideal settle me nt, it was fel t, would
depend on Anglo-A meri can-Soviet cooperation, but the ex ten t to
whi ch the Soviet s would be cooperative would be conditioned by
Soviet ex haust ion, a nd how fa r they felt dependent on American
fa vo urs. Reconstructi o n needs might preven t the Soviets from
Soviet ising eastern Europe, though they might be in occupation of
Europe as far west as Berlin at the end of the war. This made it
even more important to treat the Soviets as equal partne rs now,
and to tr y to get their agreement to th e establishment of confed-
eratio ns in easte rn Europe a nd the Balkans.131
Ove rall, t he indinati on of the PO was to avoid a specific and
detailed t reaty, w hile identifyi ng a need to make a pape r commit-
ment beyo nd the mutual assistance agree me nt of 12 J uly. As Dew
had noted o n 3 November, this mig ht help insure aga in st Soviet
isolat ioni sm after th e war, but it might involve Britain committing
hersel f to restorin g a certain regime or frontier s. His indination
had bee n to go slow. ll2 St alin 's 8 Novembe r message made this
difficult . but all were agreed that a vague statement of principles
was best; this 'Volga Charte r' wou ld, it was hoped. flatter the Soviets,
convince them that they were to be treated as equal s and that they
would be o ne of the powers shaping the postwar settl eme nt, w hile
avoiding a ny prior co mmitm ent t o the shape of that settlemen t
such as migh t cause cont en ti on betwee n Britain and the USSR or
with other allies. Cooperation cou ld then build grad uatly.'33 This
was the policy recom men ded to th e Cabinet, and approved after
co nsi derable discussion which rei nfo rced the ai m of avoiding an
ag reement o n Soviet frontiers. 134 The diffi cul ties if Stalin did raise
thi s issue were not really confronted. Thus it came as a shock when
Stalin did raise the issue as h is mai n desideratum with Ed en in
Moscow. The inadequacy of what was offe red to Stalin (he did ac-
cept t he 'Charte r', bu t wan ted somet h ing mo re co ncrete, albeit in a
secret protocol) was o nly partly a consequence o f the need to sat-
isfy the America ns by avoiding co mmitm ents on frontiers. It was
also a reflect ion of the vest igial unwillingness to co nsider seriously
Sovi et poi nts of view which led th e British to suppose that the
Soviets wou ld be satisfied wit h less territory at th e end of the war
with Germany than they started it with. Stalin was depicted repeatedly
38 C/mrrllili, Willie/mil {/II/I Ille Soviet Unioll

as a realist wllo appreciated hard facts, but the implicat ions of this
were not yet being thought through.
The position at the end of 1941 was that FO perceptions of the
USSR, unlike those of the military, were in a state of flux , and
indeed some confusion, as the old ce rtain ties were undermined.
The alliance that few in the Gove rn ment had wa nted in Ju ne 1941
was now believed to be essential. There was lack of agreement on
what exactly this shou ld e ntail. This reflected a greatly broadened
range of perceptions of the Soviet Union concerning key areas. The
crucial question was whether the USSR was a potentia lly coopera-
tive partne r, and if so, whether the cost to be paid would in any
way jeopardise British interests. The concepts wh ic h now began to
appear as guiding principles were not enti rely new, but fo r the fi rst
time they gained influence with th e formulators of policy: with
the Northern Department , Sargen t, Eden and in the Moscow Em-
bassy. The result in the medium and long term was that even the
theories that pre-dated and helped for m t he 1940 view, which had
been part of FO traditional th inking, were no longer unquestioned .
The theories that security and sensitivity gu ided Soviet policy seemed
more accurate. These two hypot heses formed a central part of the
wartime assumption that the USS R was not on ly potentially co-
operative, but was actively going to pursue a policy of collaboration
with Britain.
3
'The New Russia'J

Views of Soviet fo reign policy derived from images of the Soviet

Un ion itself, far mOTC than was the case for a ny othe r state. How-
ever, th is aspect of the wa rtime image of the USSR has rarely been
explo red. Instead it is implied tha t the C hurchil l admi ni strati o n
was na'ive and ignora nt about Soviet intern al affairs; that its po licy
was based upon cert ain misinformed assumptions that bore no rc-
lation to rea lity, a nd were not based o n solid ana lysis. Yet Chu rchill
himself placed t h is aspect in the forefront when conSidering wh y
good relations with th e USSR now seemed possible:

The t remendous victories of the Russian armies, the deep-seated

changes wh ic h have taken place in the character of th e Russia n
state a nd govern ment , the new confidence which has grown in
ou r hearts towards Stalin - these have all had their effect. 2

The two major monographs on wartime Ang lo-Soviet relations

pass over views of internal developme nts lightly. Victor Rothwell
asserts that the British suffered from 'an almost pitiful lack of knowl-
edge' about the military and economic position in the Soviet Union.
He con tends that the Soviets rel eased informatio n on the German-
occupied parts of t he USSR o nly, and t he Brit ish did not believe
most of it, especia ll y whe n it related to atrocities. Marti n Kitche n
gives little more space to British ana lys is of internal developme nts,
apparently e ndorsi ng t he customary approach , which is tha t com-
men ts about changes in t he USS R were made in ignorance. Hence
Churchill 's remark is accounted for by h is ann oyance wit h t he Poles,
and there is no exp loration of wha t he was actually referring to .l
The t hesis of a cooperative USSR was explicitly based on a set of

39
40 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

assumptions about domestic d eve lopme nts. Assumptio n s about

Soviet reconstruction needs derived from a connected series of
interpretations of what had happened in the USSR since the out-
break of war, which were taken to shed light on the nature of the
Soviet regime and its fundamental motivations. Th ere is, moreove r,
plenty of evidence that an effort was made to assess internal develop-
ments in the USS R, and to ta ke adva ntage of the possibility of
acquiring better information which was afforded by t he increased
number and intimacy of contact s. By examin in g British assessments
of the Soviet military and of socia l a nd eco nomic change, it can be
seen how an overall impression developed of an undogma tic, flexible
regime, with serious economic problems. These newly ascribed charac-
teristics were at the heart of the thesis of a cooperat ive Soviet
Union.

Sources of Information
An important factor in developi ng the warti me image of the USSR
was the increased amount of information availab le. [t was still lim-
ited, but was more extens ive than before. The Embassy in Moscow
(in 1941-42, most of the staff were evacuated, to KUibyshev) was
the primary source of information on Soviet interna l developments.
Embassy reporting was patchy in quality, and under Cripps rela-
tively little background material was sent. Th e Embassy cla imed in
mitigation that Moscow was unlike a ny other diplomatic posting.
There were few informa l social contacts, and none of the political
gossip that in other states provided so much in the way of in sight
into developments. The Embassy did its best to satisfy the dema nd
for solid information. The quality of despatches on interna l devel-
opments improved with the appoi ntm en t of Cripps' successor, Sir
Archibald Clark Kerr. If the selection of Cripps had been unfortu-
nate, the choice of Clark Kerr was in spired. He had been a success
a t a number of difficult post s in non-democracies, culminating in
his period in China from 1938 t o 1942. He appears to have brought
with him few if any of the anti-Soviet prejudi ces cha ract eristi c of
many British diplomats at this time. For him the main drawback
of life in Moscow was its drabness and lack of social life; but he
seems to have come to Moscow with a fairly open mind . Clark
Kerr's observations of the Soviet Union were to be perceptive, if
couched often in colou rful metaphors that may have lessened their
impact.
 'TlH' New Rllssia' 41

Clark Kerr's deputy was initially Lacy Bagga ll ay, forme rl y Head of
the Eastern Department in the FO. Upo n hi s death in 1943, he was
succeeded by Joc k Balfour, an eq ually astute re porter whose scepti-
cism balan ced Clark Kerr's optimism. Of the junior diplomats, John
Russell and Jim Lambert , and later Tho mas Brimel ow and Frank
Robert s, plus Charl es Gifford and Thomas Barman, despatched by
the MEW and the Politi cal Warfare Executive (PWE) respectively,
were contributors of perceptive observations. In 1944, Barman 's wo rk
was suppl emented by a press rea ding bu reau, headed by George
Bo lsover of Ma nc hester Univers ity (later Director of the School of
Slavonic a nd East European S tudie s) . ~
The main sources for internal developments were newspapers, visual
ev idence such as dress, sudden appearance or disappearance of cer-
tain consumptio n goods and cho ice of theatr ical themes. Much of
it was th erefore indirect, as Clark Kerr pointed out. Th e continual
Embassy dil emma was to satisfy the Northern Depa rtm ent and other
clie nts wh o we re hun gry fo r information and analysis, but who
mi ght easily place too much reliance on what was inferen ce and
informed guesswork. Lack of archives (burnt during the evacuation
of Moscow in October 194 1) and of trained staff to assess the press
did not help. Bot h Ambassadors in their diffe rent ways chafed at
th e lack of social contacts in Moscow. Balfour and Cla rk Ke rr noted
later in th e wa r that the contacts pos itio n occasionally appeared to
be improving, but this never lasted, and Soviet ci ti zen s remained
ca utiou s of striking up acquaintances with for eigners, fearfu l of
attracting t he attenti on of th e NKVD. ~
The Soviet press, if read carefully and syste mat ically, was actually
a fairly good source. [n its coverage it was more weighty than mu ch
of the British press, and th ere was ple nty of statistical data and
revealin g articles to process, always bearing in mind th eir purpose
and source. Churchill complained that Clark Kerr in despatching
Soviet press materia l was sending 'froth and fluff'. The FO and MEW,
however, fo und suc h material va luable. 6
In Moscow, th e main pe rso nal sou rces of in formati o n, in the
absence of good con tacts wit h Soviets, were other foreigners. Jour-
nal ists found their task even more frust rating than the diplomats,
as their reports were heavily ce nsored by th e Soviet Government.
They tended eit he r to develop a festering discontent, aggravated
by persona l clashes with the authorities, as did th e Daily Telegral,/I's
Cholerton , or else went native, as did Tile Times' Pa rke r. ? Th e many
British service personnel who were posted to the USS R as techn ica l
42 CJmrciJil/, WJritchal/ (lilt! the Soviet Union

experts, o n convoy support or other liai son duti es, became equa lly
fru strated. Such individuals, however, could provide plenty of in-
formation from contacts and experiences of a kind never available
before to Britons in the USSR, in spite of t he dete rmin ed efforts of
the Soviet bureaucracy to limit them . Their observations were all
grist to the mill; and it ca n be seen from the above that muc h of
th is info rmation was coming in to Whitehall from sources that were
hardl y pro-Soviet.
One source that does not qualify for thi s descripti on was th e
SOE representative in Moscow from 194 1 to 1945, Brigadier George
'Pop' Hi ll. Hill 's ecce nt ricities are well known; Clark Kerr neve rth e-
less regarded Hill as th e best inform ed of British personn el in the
USSR about conditions and attitudes . He made plenty of co ntacts,
including within th e NKVD, wh ile at the sa me tim e making no
attempt to hide his interventionist past, indeed proudly disp laying
hi s Tsarist medals. H
The othe.r major source for information in the USSR was the dip-
lomatic community in KUibyshev and Moscow. Views were exchanged
regularly with the Czechs, whose Military Attache, Colonel Pika,
quickly gained a reputation for accuracy by predicting th e outcome
of the 1941 cam paign. Bruce Lockh art regarded him as th e best-
informed of all foreigne rs in the USSR, describing hi m as objective
and possessing extensive knowledge, while being under no delu-
sions about the 'Soviet paradise' (unlike his colleague Fie rlinger).
The Fa and MI3c came to attach some reliance to his reports. The
Poles, who had tended to be pessimistic in 1941 , thereafter lost
c redibility, being regarded as biased. 9 Co ntacts below the Ambassa-
do r leve l were close with th e US Embassy. The Australian and
Canadian Emba ssies (formerly High Com missions) passed on infor-
matio n and inte rpretations, and the Canadian Dana Wil gress was
highly regarded.
In Whitehall, this material was suppl emented by readings of th e
Soviet press and offi cial pronouncements. Most of the informatio n
on the course of the actual fighting on th e Eastern Front cam e
from covert sources, principally signals intelligen ce about the Ger-
man side; these sources also prOVided a certain amount of other
informatio n, particularly in the areas of interest to the MEW. Th e
Soviets were incons istent in the a mount of information they were
prepared to give on th e fighting; occaSiona lly full details of the
Germ an order of battle were given, but thi s was infreq uent and
depended on the pOlitical cli matc. 10 Information on the Soviet order
 'TlH' New Rllssia' 43

of battle from t he Soviet s was even less regu lar. They would usu-
ally refer e nquirers to the official communiques. The jlC, however,
were a ble to supp lement the occasiona l information the Soviets
supp lied, a nd actually bui ld up a fairly accurate picture of develop-
men ts on the Eastern Front from about August 1941 from decrypts
of Ge rman wireless t raffic; and from late 1942, of decrypts of the
German signa ls intell igence orga n isation, which was itself doing
th e sa me thing with rega rds to Soviet wireless traffic.]] jlC reports
and predict ions rega rding th is front were usually prefaced with the
statement t hat t heir conten ts were to be taken with reserve, in view
of the lack of direct a nd reliable information from the Soviets.12
Gene rall y, their papers were rema rkabl y accurate (not always true
of those of MEW), and they need not have been so modest. Doing
so, of course, helped to hide t he ultra-secret source of most of this
material. Actual visits to the front did happen more frequently than
30 Mi ssion co mplaint s wou ld suggest, though often these were to
quiet a reas and were closely supervised . Th e major except ions were
Hill 's t rips in 1944 to Leningrad and to the front area in Bye lorussia;
he see ms to have been free to see almost all he wanted and to talk
to whomsoever he wished. In add ition, some naval personn el went
into combat on Red Navy wa rships.ll
Whatever t he limitatio ns of these sources of information, and
there were many, t his st ill represented an unpara lleled si tuatio n in
compari son to that obtaining eit her before or after the war. With
such new sources available, it is ha rd ly surpris ing that images of
the USS R should be modified , even without taking into accoun t
the actua l cha nges th at were taking place in the USSR itself.
A number of agencies and individuals in Whitehall were involved
in processing information on Soviet interna l developments. The main
ones were the No rth ern Depa rtment, MEW Russian Section (later
USSR section of German Europe and Russia Department, Enemy
Branch), NID16 and M13c. PWE and the Ministry of Information
were interested too, from the point of view of propaganda and morale.
The Northern Departme nt received interpretatio ns from all these
agencies, and t heir extensive papers in the F03?1 series in the Public
Record Office arc an inva luab le source for their views as well as
those o f t he FO itself, particularly in view of the patchy records of
MEW and t he limi ted amount of material released for the j le and
MI. Init ia l interpretat ion on this material was provided by Dew
and Geoffrey Wilson, who joined the Nort hern Department in 1942.
Wilson, a pacifist barrister of Quaker origins, was much closer than
44 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

Dew to the views of Cripps, whom he had accom pan ied to the
USSR. He was one of the few diplo mat s not to be jaundiced to-
wards the USSR by his stay in th e country. Skaife was asked frequently
to comment on internal devc!opments, and emerges as far less c ritical
even than Wilson. FRPS and its successor organisation FORD were
intended to supply only historical and factual background, though
often this spilled over into political analysis. This was fed into
Northern Department discussions, but with t he exception of con-
tributions by Skaifc on reconstruction, was not particularly influential.
Material on internal devc!opments mai nly went on ly as far as Sa rgent,
except that pertaining to morale, the military situation and the
food crisis, which went right up to Eden. However, Clark Kerr's
despatches were circulated within the FO and to the War Cabinet,
so Churchill was fami liar with the basic material, if not with the
FO's commentary.

Stereotypes of Russians
British altitudes to the USSR were imbued with and to an extent
even shaped by a set of racia l assu mptions. The key racial issue
concerning the Soviets was whether t h ey could be con sidered
European at all. There were frequent references to 'Oriental' traits,
which conjured up an apparently clea r set of characteristics; though
on closer analysis these traits were many and va rious, a nd at limes
contradictory. The most com mon use of the term 'O riental' was to
denote deviousness and cunning. Ori entals were supposed to favour
comp lex and convoluted plans, never quite mean what they said,
expected to haggle and bargain, and distru sted apparent stra ight-
forwardness; they seemed to e nj oy protracted a nd tortuous negotia-
tions. To an extent, they were even 'i nscrutable' . It was often remarked
of Soviet officials how they adopted a stony- fa ced expression and
were devoid of all apparent emotion w he n deali ng with official
business or negotiations, and this was explained as a con sequence
of their ethnicity. Anthony Haigh of the Northern Department
summed up the prevailing view when he wrote: ' Russia has never
had more than a veneer of Western civilisation and in the Soviet
Union that veneer has been scratched off and Asia predominates.'
Other Asiatic characteristics included a tendency to exaggerate and
an obsession with prestige. But 'Oriental' could also mean an almost
vulgar directness, crudity and lack of refi ne ment . The ethnic theme
was pushed furthest by Owen O'Malley, Ambassado r t o the Polish
 'Tile New Rllssia' 45

Government, who wrote of the ' cruel and heatheni sh tyranny' of

Russia com pared to the Roman and Byzantine civilisations of eastern
and south-eastern Europe. Churchill was to make similar comments.
Li eutenant-General Martel, Head of 30 Mission in 1943, found the
Asiati c idea to be the key to understand ing the USSR; oth ers too
found aspects of it useful. Bruce Lockhart believed Russia to move
between ex tremes of humaneness and cruelty, energy and laziness
~ Europe versus Asia. 14
The eth nic Russian s themselves were identified as possessi ng to
the full the attributes of the Slav. This meant that th ey were taken
to have a 'peasant mentality' : stow-thinking and dull. It was a sup-
posed Slav characteristic to have brief fits of frenetic activity, followed
by a reversion to inact ivity. 'The Russ ian t emperam ent still find s
sustained exertion d istasteful,' wrote Clark Ke rr, th ough th ey were
capab le of useful work in spurts of acti on. Skaife, certainly no anti-
Sovi et figure, found th e Russian by nature to have a poor se nse of
discipline, a fa ct he thought well recogni sed by the Soviet aut hori-
ties. Th ey were presented as a stark ethni c contrast to the equally
stereotyped Germans wit h their Teutonic thoroughn ess and machine·
like efficiency. Bagga llay commented in February 1942 that it was a
good th ing t hat they did not have the Teutonic characteristics as
well as th eir ow n . He added that despite th e success of fact ory
relocation, 'the idea that they can really be efficient is ... difficult
of accepta nce. Th e imaginatio n boggles at the idea, as at th e idea
of a la nd where two and two make five. liS Ru ssian s, it was com-
monly observed, wefe unm et hodical. Th is was confirmed in a number
of areas; by their unpunctuali ty, their lack of routine, the way their
mechanics flitt ed fro m one unfinished iob to another, the way their
destroyers avoided the boring monotony of escort duty. Stalin himsel f
e ncouraged th e idea, saying to Cripps that Russ ian s lacked o rder
and met hod .!6 As Slavs, they were also blessed with a deeply roo
manti c tempe rament and a simple love of country. Their tende ncy
to den igrate foreign achievements led Dew to comment: ' as always,
th e Russian considers himself superior to anyone el se.' According
to Lockh art, Russians were traditiona.lly xenophobic, partly a racial
characte ristic, partly a consequence of cen turies of despotism; a sense
of infe ri ority to th e cul tu re of th e West co mpeted with the Slav
sense of messia n ic vocation . They had the Slav sensitivity to criti-
cism and the Slav capacity for suspicion of th e motives of othe rs.!7
They were techn ologi cally maladroit, incapable of sophistication,
but resourcefu l in im provisation. Their inefficiency and romanticism
46 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

made them difficult to organise, and it was felt that the problems
e ncountered by the Soviet Government in trying to industrialise
and modernise the country before the war derived greatly from
these racial charact eristics.
The tyranny was therefore in a sense necessary; soft e r methods
would not have succeeded. The Russians were anyway used to suc h
methods throughout their history; such achievements as they had
were due to an efficient autocracy able to harness their qualities
while diminishing the effects of their defects. Russians, an SOE paper
declared, 'want a bit of leading'. IS Baggallay commented that 'Rus-
sian patriotism and self-sacrifice have always shone brightest at the
worst moments even under rulers whose hand lay heavy upon them',
and added that they bore hardship because they were accustomed
to it. 19 There was indeed some sense that these eth nic characteristics
had been overlain by further ones that were a conseq ue nce of the
autocracy, particularly secrecy and unfriendliness towards foreigners.
Prior to BARBAROSSA, Thomas Preston. w ho had been Consul in
Ekaterinberg in 1918 and in Kovno in 1940, had claimed that under
Bolshevism the Russians had become aggressive, stubborn, distrust-
ful and offensive to foreigners and even physically shru nk, now
being slovenly in gait and puny, compared to the giants of Tsarist
days, and Collier and others had been ready to believe it. Such
views went out of fashion after June 1941, when it now appeared
the regime had done wonders with this unpromising ethnic mate-
rial; Lambert, for example, found the USSR an improveme nt in
efficiency terms on old Russia, though still with much ground to
make up, inefficiency being cha racteristic of Slav peoples. 20
New characteristics were observed in the war; an ability in im-
provisation and quick organisat ion to cope with new problems were
remarked upon, particu la rly in connection with the relocation of
industry and the organisa tion of reconstruction in the liberated
territories. Russian improvisation was somet imes seen as a fai ling,
especially in technological matters, but there was some apprecia-
tion of their resourcefulness under severe conditi ons, and of their
ability to move quickly and decisivelyY
The Caucasian peoples of the USSR were clearly identified as
'Orientals'. Georgians and Azeris were characterised in terms that
seemed to put them on a par with Afghan hill tribes. In 1940,
Butler had been puzzled by PO references to 'typical Caucasian
behaviour' by Mikoyan, and was told by Collier that Armenians
were the product of a sem i-Oriental, commercial envi ronment, which
 'TlH' New Rllssia' 47

created a racial inferiority complex, suspicion and an indirect ap-

proach to any question. He suggested Butler could find out more
by reading Lcrmontov and the 1914 Baedeker guide, which says much
about the kind of material these racial stereotypes were based upon.
These Ca ucasia n peoples were seen as the source of the 'Georgian-
Armen ian ru ling cliquc'; to observers this accounted for the 'almost
oriental suspicion' of Soviet officia ls, the hard bargaining attitude
and the refusal to compromise . It was, noted Lambert, a tyranny '11
l'orientale '.22
It is notable how frequently references to such traits were made.
At first they tended to appear as supportin g arguments for the idea
that th e Soviets were no match for the Ge rmans. Surprise resulted
when the Soviet s apparently rose above th ei r basic ethn ic nature.
They sti ll ope rated to explain certain behaviour. They also, signifi-
ca ntl y, served as a st rong mitigating factor for Soviet methods. If
the Slavs were inhe rentl y lazy and inefficient, then such methods
were the on ly way by which Stalin was going to bring them into a
state of readiness to face the Germa n onslaught; regrettable of course,
but the outcome was the right one - and of course, 'the Russians
arc not like us. !ll If for them the end justified the means, there
was cause to be thankful fo r the miracle that Stalin was able to
achieve in bringing his people to be able to stand up to the effi-
cient German war machin e that had overrun so many others.

Soviet Mora le and Self-confiden ce

As we have seen, the general expectation through out the British
Government, with few exceptions, was that morale within the USSR
would quickly crumble after the fi rst Ge rman victories. Th e regime's
hold o n its people was supposedly only sustai ned by terror, and
this was no basis for popular resistance in modern warfare, when
the autocracy itself was so inefficient. Having seen morale collapse
in the face of the Ge rman Blitzkrieg in mo re advanced European
nations, such as France, how much mo re li kely was this to happen
in the USSR, particularly among the non-Russia n peoples who would be
the first to experience German invasion. A breakdown of the trans-
portation a nd commu nicatio ns system was predicted and the con-
sequent shortages of food would , it was felt, quickly sprea d the
collapse of moral e to the major cities, including Moscow. [n the
first two weeks, this seemed close to realisation. Few expected an
upsurge of pa trioti sm to be possible after 20 years of Communism,
48 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

even Churchill, despite the phrasing of his 22 Junc broadcast. Probably

the fir st maiar concern in the FO, MEW a nd the military was to
find evidence of the stat e of Sovi ct morale. 2~ Onl y slowly did pes-
simism disappear, with signs that the regim e had regained its nerve
and that it was planning for a long war. The acid tests in this a rea
were the de termination wit h which the scorc hed earth policy was
being carried o ut and th e read iness to move resources out of reach
of the Germans. 25
It was o bse rved that the successful defence of Moscow and th e
Soviet count er-attacks of the winter of 1941 - 42 did wonders for
Soviet self-co nfiden ce. That Moscow held o ut and morale did not
c rack were attributed to the harsh measures take n. Thi s was seen
as a revelation of the unsuspected efficiency of the regime. Even
mo re surprising, Stalin was seen to have taken a statesmanlike, popular
stance by remaining in Moscow, and his combi nation of coercion
and patriotic ex hortation was increasingly see n as skilful and we ll
conceived .26 The regim e, whi ch had commonly bee n depicted in
Whitehall as unpopula r, was seen to have stre ngthened its stand-
ing with public opinion. As the war progressed, it beca me axiomatic
in Whitehall that th e regime 's posit ion after the war would be se-
cure and unchallengeable, provided that it achieved victory and
maintained good relations with th e armed forces.
Soviet military m o rale was o bserved to rise, fall and rise agai n
dramatically through 1942. In February, Sta lin rashl y promised hi s
people that the war wo uld be won in 1942, carried away by the
successes of his winter counter-offcnsiveY The British did not share
this confidence and in the sum mer both Stalin 's increasingl y fren-
zied pleas fo r a second front and rumo urs of disastrous collapses of
mora le on the Southern Front confi rmed th is view. The British re-
ceived on ly fragmentary informati o n of the harsh measures taken
to stiffen the resistance of Soviet for ces - th e infamo us Order 227
('Not A Step Back') - but concluded that Stalin had acted person-
ally and decisively to avert catastrophe.28 From th e time when Soviet
fo rces counter-attacked at Stalingrad , Red Army morale was consis-
tently regarded as exce ll ent .
Uncertai nty continued , however, about mo rale o n the ho me front ,
and about the whole isslLe of the influence of publiC o pinio n. Central
control of the communications media by the state and Party meant
there was no o bvious m ean s for its expression. However, many of
th e Soviet Government's action s appeared to indicate a concern
about publi c opinion and mo rale. Th ere was some discussion by
 'Tile New Rllssia' 49

the Britis h about the ext ent to which the evident need s and con-
cerns of the populace would put pressure on the regime, and as to
how the regime would respond. It was possible to argue that the
war had shown the regime the advantages of liberal methods over
blatant coercion. It was also poss ible to argu e that having stirred
up public opinion for the purposes of total war, it would be impos·
sible for the Govern ment simply to ignore its public immediately
after the war. Ska ife, for one, suggested that the Soviet Government
would not even wish t o do so, assuming that their professed aim
of raising the lot of the Soviet masses was in some part genuine. 29
The sacrifice of 'use less mouths' in the rationing system se rved
to increase the constant perplex ity as to how the Soviet people's
mo rale remained as high as repo rts suggested. 30 It was felt that
subjugated peasants could not have e ndured this situati on without
breaking. The solution was found in attachment to rodilla ('mother.
land'), part of the deep Slav romanticism identified as an ethn ic
characte ristic.)1 It was clear right at the start that as the jI e re-
ported, the 'nationa list drum was being beaten louder than the
communist one,. n Eric Berthoud, an MEW oil expert who wa s an
active observer while in th e USSR in 1941 - 42, suggested that patri-
otic fe eling must have been very stro ng to overcome the debilitating
effect s of forced industrialisatio n, purges and labour ca mps. Oth ers,
in asking why th e Soviets were doi ng so well against the effiCient,
well-armed German s, agreed ; the main reaso n had to be attach-
ment to the motherland, which brought into play til e toughness
and resi li ence o f a somewhat backward peo pl e used to roughing it.
They were believed to be accusto med to a ' heavy hand ' and being
esse ntially an indo lent people, responded best to firm treatm ent Y
On th e ot her hand, it was felt in th e Embassy and in the North-
e rn Departm ent tha t public opinion could not e nt irely be ignored
by t he Soviet Government. Th e e m phasis on patrioti sm demo n-
strated clearly that in a war sit uation the Government had to
an ti cipate and shape publ ic opi nion even more than in peace time.
Public opini on may not have directly made decisions, but it could
offer constraints on the regime's policy, and even on occasions shape
the particu lar course foll owed. The essentially pragmatic regime would
be concern ed to initi ate po licies that stood a c hance of success;
and in t hat sense public mood wa s of importance. This wa s a logical
conclusion; but it gradually and almost imperceptibly developed
into the more contentious idea that public mood could actually
d etermine th e policy itsel f. Thus in 1944, Skaifc felt that the
SO Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

constitutional changes givi ng increased autonomy to the republics

were a result of popular pressure. l~
One consequence was that Brit ish policy- makers - and this in-
cluded Churchill - became very concerned that the Soviet Government
educate its public about the Allies. One of the acid tests of the
attitudes of the Soviet regime to collaboration wi th the Allies was
the extent to which they publicly recognised t he Allied war effort,
and in particular the contribution made by Britain and the USA in
the form of supplies to the Red Army. The resent ment caused when
t his contribution was downplayed, den igrated or ig nored was quite
remarkable. Equally, the satisfaction with recognition was great. The
complaint that the Soviets showed no gratitude is repeated again
and again in documents of the period and in memoirs written sub-
sequently. Often these comments were simply made to make the
point that the Soviets s/lOuld be grateful. On occasion, deeper concerns
were voicedi amongst them that the Soviets were leavi ng t hemselves
scope for a separate peace, that they were urging the Allies on to
greater efforts, or that they were concerned about interest being
shown in the Allies by the Soviet people, which might lead to
unhealthy demands for reform. l5 Wit h all these considerations in
mind, except the last, there was concern to generate a pro-Ally mood.
This was a desire for an accolade t hat cou ld be of propaganda use
at home, but it also stemmed from a genuine feeling that the Soviet
people needed to appreciate the aid t heir allies were giving. This
would help them to get over t heir dislike of foreigners, a nd implied
that t he creation of such a mood, even t hough it would clearly in
the first place have been inspired by the regi me itself, would apply
pressure on the regime to be coope rative with t he Allies. 36

Develo ping Assess m ents o f the Ca pa bilities and

Equipment of Sovi et Armed Fo rces
It was to an extent inevitable that t he image of t he Soviet military
machine would undergo a change, given the way in wh ich the war
developed. British publiC admiration fo r the Red Army knew few
bounds. In view of the importance of t he Soviet victories to British
operations, it might have been expected that there would have been
a corresponding attitude in Whiteha ll in official and military circles .
The image of the Soviet military certai n ly altered, but by no means
as far in the same direction as it did for the general public. Admiration
was limited by continuing scepticism about the level of sophistication
 'Tile New Rllssill' 51

of the Soviet forces. The old im age of the Russian steamro ller proved
very enduring. Soviet staff methods and technologica l expertise were
still criti cised. British personnel found it hard to understan d how
th e Soviet s actually managed to beat the Germans, about whom to
the end the Briti sh military had a very high opinion. Indeed, an-
noya n ce was expressed in response to suggestions in the Briti sh
press and from th e Soviets themselves that th eir efforts had won
th e war; suggestion s wh ich th e Fa by contrast felt were ju stified Y
There was a number of factors that shaped the way that attitudes
developed . One was the ethnic stereotype. This had always been
influe ntial on British mil itary assessments and continued to be so.
Anot her fa ctor was the treatm ent of British personnel in the USSR.
The lack of respect towards th em, or gratitude for British efforts to
help, and the failure to provide facilities for them to do their d ut ies
or live in what the British regarded as conditions of basic comfort,
influe nced the underlying attitude towards the Soviets as a w hole.
Thi s rei nforced the view that they were 'savages', in the words the
Soviets attributed to Major-General Burrows, the Head of 30 Mis-
sion in 1944 .38
A further factor was the nature of the info rmation available. Much
of it came from sources that w ith the except io n of the Czechs were
not friend ly to the Soviets . These sources did little to redress the
balance aga inst the preconception s in the WO regarding Soviet
sta ffwo rk a nd inter-service coo rdinatio n. Failings in these areas co n-
tinued to be remarked upon throughout the war in Ml3c and JIC
commentaries. MI, 30 Missio n and the Embassy all reported sep-
ara tely the opinion t hat junio r officers were good, and that staffwork
at the highest level was competent, but that in between, at Divi-
sion and Corps leve l, it was, in Baggal lay's words, ' rotten '. Tra ini ng
was seen to be rudime ntary, especially in the Ai r Force, where the
j lC described the situation as t he 'surviva l of the fittest'. In 1942
the jl C thus praised Soviet morale, which had 'confounded the
prophet s', but felt that it was too much to hope that their funda-
mental weaknesses in planning, organisation and admi ni stration
had been e nti rely overcome. O n rece iving their report the COS felt
they were even then being over-opti mistic. l9 Those who were able
to make first-ha nd observations tended to confi rm these conclusions.
The renowned defensive ca pabilities of the Soviet soldi er continued
to be asserted; but it was not until 1943, and th en grudging ly, th at
his (or her) ability to mai ntain an offensive were conceded. The
JIC at th e end of 1942 described the Soviet sold ier as first class in
S2 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

defence. Given a rifle and some food and ammunition he would

prepare his own position with skill and fight until either he or hi s
opponent was dead. Th ere was great admiration for this quality,
though at the same time a se nse that it was a result of his 'primi-
tiveness'.~o Howeve r, these qualities could only delay, not halt, the
powerful Wellr/nucllt. Soviet equipment was not rated highly, ex-
cept for some Soviet aircraft, notably the ll-2 Stormo vik. Naval
equipment was believed poor, except the subma rines, many of which
were built from German designs. Th e Soviets were credited wit h
the same characteristic as the Japanese; of being good copiers of
othe r people's desig ns, but of tending to lack a grasp of the techni-
cal complexities. The on ly area where Sovie t superiority to the
Germans was conceded was in the area of clothing; there was great
admiration for Soviet winter equipment .4 1 Soviet successes from 1943
were seen at least partly to be a resu lt of the influx of Allied materiel
and the design lessons the Soviets would have learnt from it.
From the Soviet counter-attacks in 1941- 42 onward, the question
was posed as to how the Soviets had managed to hold thei.r ow n
and then defeat the Germans. As well as high morale and a deep,
if romantic, patriotism, the military ascribed this to overstretch by
the German s and traditional Russian abilities in winter warfare. They
felt that the revival of the political commissars (politmki) enabled
the regime to usc coercion to keep their troops fighting. Salutary
measures were believed to have been appli ed after the Rostov debiicle
in July 1942, and rumours abounded that the politmki had orders
to shoot officers who allowed retreats. This was seen, however, as
in the long run a weakness, and the British mi litary felt a major
problem with the Red Army was political interference that magni-
fied th e deficiencies of the higher command structure. 42
There was considerable sa tisfaction, therefore, when it was an-
nounced that the system was once more to be abolished . Clark
Keff felt that this move was the result of a struggle between the
Army and the Comm unist Party, and that the Army had gained
valuable ground . There was widespread interest in the relationship
between the two, now that th e Army was assum ing such an impor-
tant role. Party membership in the armed forces before the war
had not been high, and it was assumed there was military resent-
ment about the purges. The lIkase of 17 July 1941 restoring th e
politmki had been seen as a sig n of Party concern to maintain its
control, even at the risk of efficiency (taken as the reason for abol-
ition after the Finnish War). The Soviet High Co mmand (Stavk a)
 'Tile New Rllssia' 53

was not likely to be ha ppy with this. The new abo lition suggested
that the Army had scored a notab le vic tory in internal power poli-
tics, though Clark Kerr noted that the Party was also developing its
influence in the Army by maki ng enrolment in the Party by sol·
diNS much easie r. It was certainly reported as pleasing to units at
the front , and in th e Navy too, when abolition was extended there. 4)
However, on reflection, analysts in Whitehall disagreed with Clark
Ke rr. Th e North ern Departme nt, MI3c and NI016 agreed that there
were three mai n reason s for the reform. Fi rst, to increase efficiency
by removing the impediment to commanders' actions. Second, to
remed y the shortage of officer personnel caused by war losses and
the expansion of the Arm y. The Soviets announced that many of
the po/itruki would be retrained as line officers. Third, it was felt
that th ere was an atte m pt to iden tify the Army and Pa rty as part-
ners in the same cause, without one needi ng to supervise the other.
It was not, therefore, a victory of th e Army over the Party. H
Se rvice observers in the USSR were anxious to counter the im-
pression given in the British press that the com mi ssa rs had completely
disappeared ; all that had happen ed , they felt, was that an anomaly
had been removed. The politica l officers who now served with units
wou ld do the same job their predecessors were doing in practi ce
since BARBAROSSA - acting as morale officers, with their main task
the prevention of cowardice and defeatism; still giving political
in struction , but unable to interfere with command deci sions. It was
reported from North Ru ssia that their naval counterparts continued
to sport their special badges and to t hrow their weight around in
the Red Navy Clu b at Polyarnoe. The d iffe re nce was that the new
'deputy captain ' no longer stood at his captain 's shoulder and re-
viewed h is decisions. Air Vice-Marshal Babington, head of the Ai r
Mission in 1943, who had a low opinion of th e intellectual capa-
bility of the Soviet soldier, felt the continued existence of the political
officers, far from being a disadvantage, might have been crucial to
Soviet successes t hat year. Clark Kerr agreed th e high morale in the
forces in 1943 was a resu lt of t he activities of the new political
officers. Ge ne rally it was fel t that a potentiall y damagi ng system
had been modified, t o give a simpler and more efficient lin e of
command, which would remove the fatal tendency to indecisiveness
on the part of com manders always conscious of the po/itruk examining
their actions.45 All agreed that it was an important development,
indicating the regime's flexibility and willingness to make changes
to increase effiCiency, and demonstrating that the regime was prepared
54 CJmrciJil/, WJlileJwl/ (lJ/{1 JiJe Soviet UniOIl

to trust the military to know its own busi ness best. Sin ce political
interference had long been seen as a major weakness of the Soviet
armed forces, the image of t hose forces' effectiveness increased with
abolition.
Thus, in accounting fo r Soviet victories, increased efficiency was
conceded, though there were distinct li mita ti ons to this. The em-
phasis was still on the vi rility of the individual Russia n soldier.
The military saw a maj or Soviet strengt h to be vast manpower
reserves, though both the FO and MEW fel t that this cou ld be
exaggerated, as the Soviet economy was fully mobilised and there
was by 1944 no manpower su rp lus ava ilab le. 46 It was sti ll aspects
of this kind that were stressed. The Ge rman s co ntin ued to be see n
to have the edge in terms of sophist ica ti on. Soviet tactics were
observed to evo lve beyond direct fronta l assault , but they were not
credited with much ingenUit y in terms of attack, though their de-
fensive techniques were much adm ired Y The abilities of the Air
Force we re seen to be limited to ground support, and the absence
of a bombing force indicated their lack of capabilities or amb it ion .
[t was believed that the Allied strategiC bombing of German y and
the in vasion of Italy had played a crucial role in giving the Soviet s
air superiority in the east; litt le cred it was given to Sovie t ai r
actions for this. Naval tactics were seen as li mited and lacking in
offensive spirit. Naval liaison officers in the Black Sea and North
Russia saw a good deal of Soviet units, a nd were no t impressed by
their eqUipment or their methods. 48
Thus, the main Soviet st rengths were nu m bers, bravery, inspired
improvisation, resil ience in the face of huge losses on the part of
front-line soldie rs and some fine supreme commande rs. These were,
however, accompanied by deficiencies at the brigade and divisional
level and by poor doctrin e in coordination of different arms of
service. Th e British military were rel uctan t to acknowledge that the
Soviets had , or could have, defeated the Germa ns una ided , though
when it suited them, they were prepa red to assume a Soviet mili-
tary machine of unlimited capa bilities and resou rces .49

The Revival of Nationalism, ))atri otism and Tsarist

l)ra ctices

The suppleness of the regime evidenced by the reform of the politruk

syste m was not an isolated instance. It was o ne of a number of
developments that were carefu lly noted. Whitehall resisted the notion
 'Tile New Rllssia' SS

put forth in some areas of the press that the USSR had moved
wholesale away from Communism, but such developments were
seen to be more than just transitory. While to an extent expedient,
they were not necessarily short-term. In addition, and probably most
significa ntly, they were indications of the nature of the Soviet re+
gime; under Stalin it appeared to be undogmatic, pragmatic and
responsive to changi ng circum stances, free from any ideological
straitjacket . This was now here more noticeable than in the revival
of nationalism and particu larly the conscious reference to the pre-
Revolut iona ry past in an uncritical, indeed laudatory, way.
Long-term observers of the Soviet scene, such as Skaife and Dew,
were aware that the regime had for some time been using patriotic
themes to bolster its public support. They saw this as a consequence
in the first insta nce of the victory of Stalin over Trotsky, supple-
mented by the perception of the growing threat from Nazi Germany.so
They were not therefore surprised at t he usc of such themes by
Stalin at the start of the German- Soviet conflict. By 1943, how-
ever, t hey found the extent and direction of this phenomenon had
gone fa r beyond what had previously been observed. Moreover, to
those focusing on the USSR afresh and with an image formed in
the earlier days of revolutionary internationalism, including Churchill,
these developments seemed all the more noteworthy and pointed
to the possibility of wholesale reform within the USSR.
The Soviet Government began by reminding its citizens of the
past feats o f the Russian people in defending their homeland, par-
ticularly in t he Napoleonic period. References to fighting for Socialism,
or for the 'workers' paradise' were notable by their absence. in-
stead , the achievements of the builders of the Russian Empire were
recalled as an inspi rat ion, with d ue rega rd to the deeds of ordinary
Russians. Aleksande r Nevs ki, victor over invading Teutons, was
nat urally given special promine nce. The new bravery awards to go
alongside the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banne r
were named aft e r Suvorov, Kutusov and Nevski. When he visited
Leningrad in 1944, Hill observed that Suvorov's tomb had been
transformed into a shrine. 5 1
All this was remarkable e nough, though explicable in terms of
wartime propaganda. However, it seemed that the regime felt it
had hit upon a rich vein of supportive material , for it did not stop
at words and images, but began to revive old practices of the pre-
Revolutionary era that had been swept away after 1917. Significantly,
this was done with overt reference to the Tsarist past.
S6 ClmrciJill, Wllitelwll ami tiJe Soviet UniOIl

This began first with the Army. At the start of 1943, soo n after
the abolition of the politmki, the weari ng of epaulettes (pogol/i) was
revived. Th ese had been hat ed symbols of the o ld regime, emb lems
of rank and privilege torn from the shoulders of office rs during the
Revolution and discarded as having no place in the army of the
prol eta riat . Now they were rein stated, fo ll owing closely the pre-
Revo lutionary pattern, so that anyone over 40 might recogn ise them,
with a clear reference in the ukase to restoration of the traditions
of the glorious Russia n Arm y of the past. No mention now of that
army's role as defender of the ancien regillle and ene my of revo lu-
tion. Again, it was noted that steps towards this change had been
made before the war, for instance, with the revival of Cossack units
and distinctive regimental uniforms. This however was clearly a
reform of much broader scope. Th e open reference to tradition struck
many observers as highly significan t and symbolic of the categori-
ca l movement of the Soviet regime away from its revolut ionary
status to the government of a trad itional nation-state. 52
That this meant more than simply decoration was soon appar-
ent. turther IIkases made clear that deferential behaviour was expected
from iunior office.rs and ot her ranks towards their su periorsi a st rict
code of behaviour was laid down on saluting and the proper de-
portment expected of a Red Army officer, which would not have
been out of place in any monarchist a rmy. Tsarist rank nomen-
clature was rein stated, and use of the word offitsier was revived,
instead of tovarisclt komal/elir. Obse rvers noted that usc of the term
offitsierski sostav in the press clearly implied the existence of an
officer corps along the old lines. Th e establishmen t of officers' clubs
and the reinstatement of batmen (officers' orderlies), were addi tional
signs of this return to tradition. 53
This was interpreted as a furthe r attempt at improving effiCiency,
by improving discipline and building an esprit de corps. It was also
seen as another attempt by the Party to win favour with the mili-
tary, while at th e same time, political fig ures were given uniforms
and rank, associating the Party with the Army's glory.H Such devel-
opments clearly, however, had broader socia l sign ificance, in th e
positive references to the pre· Revolutionary past and the introduc-
tion of the tra ppings of privilege.
Traditionalist, nationalist reforms were observed to con tinue apace
through 1943 and 1944 . A noteworthy example was the natio nal
anthem. Th e revolutionary llltcmatiollaic was replaced by a patri-
otic song. In announCing the cha nge, Pravda decla red that the old
 'Tile New Rllssill' 57

anthem was no longer re levant in view of the 'radical changes'

that had taken place in the USSR; as clear a statement as one could
wish for that the revolutionary days were over. There was not a
single reference to revolution or Socia li sm in the anthem; instead
it was a ca ll to natio nal pride. S5 Thus the war was observed to be
spawning many wholesale changes in the USSR, changes that were
openly in contradiction to the declared aims of the Bolshevik state
in the years immediately following the Revolution. The big ques-
tion in Whitehall was what significance to attach to these changes .

'The Elimination of the Classless Society'?

The FO, MEW, Ministry of Information and MI watched carefully

for sig n s that the war was bringing changes in Soviet socia l
organisation , particu la rly in the direction of libe ral isation, or a
movement towa rds a more 'normal' o rganisation of society; specifi-
ca lly involving private property and the development of a class
system. Any such changes wou ld be important indicators of the
natu re of the regim e and the ideological motivations of its leaders.
Baggallay introduced this topic in a despatch of 25 February 1942.
He commented that the Soviet system was open to those wit h talent,
regardless of bi rth; there was privilege, but it had to be earned.
Thus the 'classless society' that the Soviet Union claimed to be was
not devoid of differences in status, but membe rship of groups was
fluid. 56 However, this proviso tended to be ignored subsequently,
and a ny sign of groups acquiring privileged status was regarded as
a new development and one of deep significance.
By the end of 1942, Cla rk Kerr and Skaife were both drawing
attention to social changes that seemed to be part and parcel of
the revival of various traditional practices and the whole issue of
the appeal to the Russian (Tsarist) past in Soviet internal propa-
ganda. Th e introduct ion of the new military orders was 'anothe r
link in the chain which is being slowly reforged with Russian trad-
itions of the past'. Cla rk Kerr noted the changes were publicly justified
in terms of conti nuity with tradition, now seen as an adequate
reason on its own, qu ite apart from the increased efficiency that
was also supposed to result Y Dew commented:

It is cert ainly Significant that in the interests of effiCiency the

Soviet Govt feel able to dispense with outworn ideological ideas
and to re-shape and re·cast so radically. The officers will form
58 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

another 'class' and we have gone a step further towards the creatio n
of a bourgeoisie.

Dew noted that such trends dated back to 1935; the process was
merely accelerated by the war. Such a percept ion lent st rengt h to
the idea that these were more than warti me expedients and would
be permanent; eve n more so if they proved successful in the war
in firmly establishing the regime, as they seemed to do. 58
The tendency to eliminate the more obvious revolu tionary crudi-
ties, as the Kuibyshev C hancery put it, certai n ly did seem str iking .59
A wholesale system of deference and rank was being introduced, it
seemed. This was only natural for the Army, part icula rly in view of
its earlier problems with morale, but the significant thing was that
this was spread much wider through Soviet society. If this was a
militarisation of Soviet SOCiety, then it was also clea rly a stratifi-
cation according to distinct gradations o f rank. According to Balfour,
writing in 1944, the blending of the Len inist doctrine of a classless
society with ingredients from pre-Revolutionary t imes had reached
a stage approaching the old Russian noti on of clJiIlY, or categories
of rank, to produce a highly stratified form of society based on
service to the state wit h rewards and privileges w hi ch correspond ed
to the value of each category to the commu nity as a whole. 60
Developments in the education system reinforced this impression
most strongly. Reform of educa tion had been o ne of the funda-
mental changes wrought by the Bolsheviks. They saw it as the
foundation for future social progress, and had as a central principle
the idea of free educa tion for all, with equal opportunities for males
and females in a co-educationa l system wh ich aimed to produce
ski lled indu strial workers, profess io nal s and intellectuals. Any
alteration to this syste m was regarded as high ly suggestive of the
regime's broader views of future social development in the USSR.
The wartime period saw many such changes, seen again by some
as continuations o f a sh ift unde r Stalin away from the ideology of
the early Revolution . Dew com men ted on the fact that the regime
felt able to refer to the continuity of t he new Suvorov schools in
the liberated territories with Tsarist Cadet Schools wi th no explanatory
propaganda; 'The regime has travelled a long way in recent years.'61
Other reforms seemed to underline th is fact. The old stress on
equality had all but disappeared, to be replaced by differentiations
of privilege in eve ry walk of life. Dew compared these develop-
ments to what Bonapa rte had done in Prance in replacing the o ld
 'Tile New Rllssill' S9

class system with a new one. 62 Skaife wrote of the 'steady progress
of the Soviet Union towards the elimination of the classless society' .
He added that 'the emphasising of sharp distinctions between th ose
in authority and those under authority is noticeable in all walks of
lifc'.63 By the sta rt of 1944, it had become a commonplace in Em·
bassy reports and Northern Department commentaries to refer to
this development; it had become an accepted fact that the new
grades of cilillY meant that the USSR was becoming a highly stratified
society. Furthermore, it was observed to be an increasingly con-
servat ive society in terms of the values extolled by the Government
regarding diSCipline, deference and family va lues. 64
The ce ntral q uesti on to be answered was whether any of these
c hanges would be in any way permanent. The view that these re-
forms had begun around 1935 implied that they would, as they
could not be seen as a wartime expedient. Some of the reforms in
educa tion, such as the increase in discipline and the rejection of
revolutionary theories of educatioll, were believed to have long been
desired by Sta lin ; the war simply provided him with the oppor-
tunity. Other reforms were desig ned to rectify deficiencies the war
had thrown into greate r relief. The establishment of a Faculty of
Intern ational Relations at Moscow Un iversity was taken as evidence
that there was co ncern about training the next generation of
Soviet diplomats. It was see n as part of a broader anxiety about the
consequences of the narrow education former ly purveyed; Clark Kerr
believed that Stali n was taking energetic and decisive measures,
unbound by revolutionary dogma , to rectify the situation .65
The ge neral feeling by the middle of 1944 was that the basic
pattern of Soviet society had been permanently reformed and now
confo rm ed to Stalin's own vision. If the reforms brought increased
efficiency then it was clearly in Stalin's interest to retain them. The
regime was believed to be more firmly established than ever be-
fore, so there was no pressing reason to revert to old ways. By
appea ling to the strong Russian se nse of pat ri otism and tradition,
by rcviving t hc system of rewa rd and the possibility of passing on
social positio n to childrcn , Stalin , it secmcd, had found a bette r
basis for his rcgimc and cstablished his power on a more solid foun-
dation than ever before; he had at the same time moved Soviet
society wholesale in the dircction of thc kind of social organisa-
tion the British political elitc felt comfortab le with. If these changes
were not new, what was new was that the attention of a wider
range of British policy-makers had bee.n drawn to them.
60 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

Th ere was curiosity as to how much further these reforms would

go. Skaife drew highly optimistic conclus ions from the departure
from revolutio nary values in a long memora ndum in December 1942.
He concluded that the developments, though sociall y co nservative,
meant an increase in individual liberty, and he detected a 'human-
ising' of the regime. He felt there was a chance at least that the
reforms would continue, until Soviet sodal organisation approximated
to that of th e western de mocracies. [t was to be ex pected that there
would be a concu rrent move towards political liberalisation. 66
This was further than his colleagues in the Fa were wilting to
go, in December 1942 o r later. While accepting and endorsing many
of the conclu sions Skaife drew about the eli minati on of the class-
less society, the No rthern Department we re more cau t ious in
predicting future change. Even Wi lson, often he ld u p as the arch-
optimist in the Fa, did not base his arguments on the idea that
the Soviet regime would become capita list, if this meant private
owne rship and control of land and industry. On the contrary he
asserted that the present system was so taken fo r granted and had
so proved itself in the war that change was inconceivable. Trim-
mings might change, but they were only trimmings Y As Dew
commented , there was a d istinct limit as to how much reform the
regim e cou ld instigate or permit and retain its con trol. Th us, while
a cash economy had been allowed to develop, and most form s of
private property were allowed, there wou ld continue to be restric-
tions on private commercial enterprise, and the regime would not
relinqUish the right to control the econo my from the centre, nor
to dispose of resources and deploy labou r as it saw fit. This implied
an element of coercion, and the basic apparatus of the secret police-
info rmer system was not expect ed to disappear.68
In th e Embassy th ere was also caution about the theory that th e
reforms went so far as a movement towa rds liberal democracy. Balfour
agreed that the war had accelerated new domestic trends in politi-
cal and ideolog ica l spheres. Since it had been decided to build
'Socialism in one country', the state had used th e principle of 'from
each according to his ability, t o each according to his work'; thi s
had been found to work best with an inequality of wages. Conse-
quently the Communist ideal appeared to have been lost, but it
had not.69 Clark Kerr felt reforms of a trad itiona l or military sort
might be preparations for mobil isation of the population for re-
constructio n, but was reluctant to speculate too far o n where they
might eventually lead. He would report chan ges, but hesitated to
 'Tile New Rllssia' 61

draw long-term conclusions. 7o Bruce Lockhart at the end of the war

was to warn of the dangers of believing the USSR had departed
from Com m unism J! The analysts in the Embassy and Northern
Depart ment had not succumbed to th is temptation, though they
did correctly point out that there were different forms of Commu-
nism. They did feel t hat greater freedom for the populace would
have an impact on Anglo-Soviet relations . Patriotism, or as Hill put
it, 'realism', had replaced revolutionary ideas. John Wheeler-Bennett
aptly described t he USSR as now a 'military-socialist state'.72 A Soviet
Naval officer explained how they were restoring the best of their
traditions, wh ile not going back on their principles, as some foreign
newspapers were suggest ingJ3 This became the view of the more
perceptive o bservers in Moscow and the FO; it was a sign of the
maturity of the regime.
The changes were, however, seen to be significant, if not in the
way newspapers were suggesting, and no longer believed to be
irrelevant as Dew had thought at the start of 1942.74 Others in the
FO, a nd elsewhere in Whitehall, including to a degree Warner, tended
to be even more im pressed by the changes, which seemed to them
to depart from t he ideology of the Bolshevik Revolution, failing to
understand t he dyna mic nature of Soviet ideology, shaped by the
inclinations of its leaders. Havi ng a static model of 'Bolshevism',
they thus attached great importance to the changes they could see
taking place, pa rticularly the encou ragement of intense national-
ism, the revival of tradit ions and the emphasis on discipline in the
militarisation of many aspects of Soviet life. Particularly striking
were c hanges taki ng place in the regim e's attitude to religion.

Reli gion
It was clear right from t he start of the Anglo-Soviet co-belligerency
that the treatment o f religion in the USSR was going to be an acid
test for many in Britain (and the United States). When Maisky made
a statement in September 1941 to the effec t that there was freedom
of religion in the USSR, the furore in the press demonstrated the
particu lar significance attached to this issue. Within the Govern-
ment, Maisky's statement was criticised as tactless as much as for
being inaccu rate. Howeve r, there was also a sense that the treat-
men! of re ligion was as strong an indication as anything of the
nature of the regime in the USSR.7s Soviet policies towards the Russian
Orthodox Church were to prove something of a yard-stick, becoming
62 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

a welco me sign that the regime was flexible a nd tolerant . Cha nges
in Soviet rel igious policy, viewed with caut ion, ca me to occupy an
important place in assessments of the ' Iiberalisation' of the regime.
Initia lly, the Northern Department had no time for disingen uous
Soviet claims about religious tolera nce. Th ey were quite fi rm in the
opinion that the Stalin Constitution was a dead letter in religion
as in so many othe r of its civil rights provisio ns. The chu rches
were ope n, to be sure, but thei r activities were st rictly circumscribed
by the state. The active persecution tha t had followed the Revolu-
tion had ceased by \936; priests were granted the vote, for insta nce.
Dew pointed out t hat the fact that chu rches were open was n ot a
sign of any change, as some misinformed members of the public
felt: they had always been open, and since there were few of them,
they were usually well attended . However, church-goers were pena l-
ised in a number of ways. There were strict financi al const ra ints
applied, and most important, t he Church was not allowed to pros-
elytise, run schools or engage in a ny activities t hat were not strictly
liturgical. State-sponsored organisations, such as t he Anti-God
Society, maintained anti-religious propaganda in newspapers such
as Bezbozlmik ('A theist '), and priests were open ly mocked .16
The Russian Orthodox Church adopted a patriotic stance after
the German invasion, and offered its fu ll support t o the Red Army
and the Soviet Government. It ex horted it s fo llowers to resist the
Germans and supported the call for partisa n activity. The contrast
with the attitude of the churches in the Baltic states, which in-
itially regarded the Germans as liberators, was not lost on the Kremlin.
The decline in active persecut ion, wh ich, as Dew noted , pre-dated
BARBA ROSSA, was speeded up. Th e ro, aware that the momentu m
of t he anti-God movement had been fading, did not regard thi s
development as particularly significa n t at fi rst.71
Th is scepticism was strongly in evidence up to t he end of 1942.
Small changes were observed - the extension of t he curfew at Easter
1942 to allow the faithful to attend midn ight services was noted as
unprecedented. 78 Clark Kerr demonstrated t he con ti nuing rese rve
abou t such developme nts in a despatch in September 1942. He
depicted the change in attitude to religion as pragmatic, wi th both
a domestic and an international di me nsion, a nd felt it was too
early to conclude from these sig ns that a fundamen tal change in
the attitudes of Soviet leaders to religion had taken place.19 Dew
was of si milar mind, and not at all co nvinced that religious toler-
ance was in any way permanent. A request from t he Met ropolitan
 'Tile New Rllssill' 63

of Kiev for an exchange visi t with the Church of England was treated
cautiously. It was seen as another attempt to influence opinion in
Britain and the US on this sensitive issue. Even Wilson, who usu~
ally re jected such methods, advocated a hard bargain in this instance.
Dew and Warner thought this a transparent propaganda stunt, though
Sargent saw it a sign of grace that the Soviet authorities would
wish to propitiate the Church leaders. Cadogan was very sceptica l,
writing that 'deathbed repentances are not very convincing', and
stating that he had little faith in a real c hange of heart by the
Soviets towards persecution of the Church. Eden was equally clear
that this was a politica l not a religious gesture. It is noticeable,
however, and characteristic, that once another department, the
Treasury, questioned the wisdom of an exchange of visi ts, the FO
strongly defended the view that there were advantages. 80 The
Soviet accepta nce that an Angli can delegation could go first was
one of the facto rs that by th e start of 1943 was beginning to dispel
the prevailing scepticism.
Through 1943, the feeling grew stro nger in the FO that these
religious cha nges were of some lasting significance. For one thing,
the Soviet Government was believed to understand the utility of
the Russian Orthodox Churc h as an in strument of its foreign policy;
not o nly in the effect on attitudes in the US and Britain, though
that was clearly important, but also in the cou ntri es of eastern
Europe, as a major means of promoting pall-Slavism. 81 Domesti·
ca ll y, the more tole rance was allowed, and the more church
attendances in creased, the harder it would be to revert to persecu-
tion afterwards. In view of th e Church's open support for the regime,
this hardly seemed necessary anyway. With the regime's advocacy
of traditiona l values in many areas of social life, there seemed to
be much less at issue between Church and State than in the post-
Revoluti onary period. Signs were searched for that the new attitude
would be pe rmanent. Major test issues were the establishme nt of a
regular Church organisation and sanction for the education of a
new generation of priests. Developments took place during 1943 in
both these areas.
It became eviden t that the old attitude of aggressive anti-religious
propaganda was dead. President Kalinin demonstrated this in May
1943 when he exhorted Red Arm y soldi ers to desist from mocking
the religiOUS. The regime, he said, did not endorse religion, but
such beliefs were solem nly held and should be respected. Such a
remarkable public statement cou ld not but have an effect; Warner
64 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

regarded it as ve ry suggest ive.S2 It was followed la ter in the year by

weightier eviden ce that a new, long-term position for religion in
th e Soviet sta te was being establi shed . At t he time of the Arch-
bishop of York's visit in Septem ber 1943, it was annou nced that
the Patriarchate, vacant since 1925, was to be revived, and the Holy
Synod (Sabar') was to be re-establish cd.
Overall , this change gave rise to g reat optimism. Cla rk Kerr was
much more hopeful in repo rting the Arch bishop's visit and in his
des patch on religion of October 1943, than he had been in Sep-
tembe r 1942. Freedom of worship, he felt, was increasing, it was
no threat to t he regime and he could sec no likelihood t hat the
aut horities would want to arrest this development. As in other areas,
the rulers of the USSR, 'nothing if not opportun ist in their approach
to problems affecting the welfare of the Communist State', had proved
flexible, adaptable and undogma tic; certai nly not losing con trol,
but recogn ising the needs of their public and being big enough to
allow them. They were reacting to a genuine religiOUS revival and
to the support for the war effort offered by the Church; 'the process
of promoting untrammelled facilit ies for religious wors hip - in itself
an integral part of th e trend towards a reviva l of Russia's h istoric
traditions - has already gone t oo far to be easily arrested when the
immediate occasion for it has passed.' Th is was wit ho ut the regime
relinquishing its commitment to scien ti fic materia lism .S ) Skaife saw
a further reform , the re-establishment of training institutions, to
be of importance; the Soviet Govern ment had accepted publicly
that the Church cou ld be a binding fo rce in the state and had a
permanent place in Soviet soc iety .8~
Thus by the end of 1943, British sceptic ism regarding the Soviet
regime's attitude to religion had been greatly reduced . The increased
tolerance toward s the Russian Orthodox Church and t he explicit
acceptance of its place in Soviet life by granting it educational
facilities clearly were of a piece with the other changes involving the
return to pre-Revolutionary practices and the el im ination of the
classless society . It could now be believed t hat th e acid test had
been passed, beca use such reform was consist ent with these other
phenomena. Co nversely, the regime's attitude to re ligion was taken
as a fi rm indication of the deep-seated nature of the changes and
th e earnestness of the Soviet Govern ment in making them. The
Significance of the public sanctio n of an ideo logically heterogeneous
body by the Soviet regime appeared great. Thus in making the state-
ment dted at the st art of this chapter, Ch urch ill was expressing an
 'Tile New Rllssia' 65

increasingly fi rm perception within the FO and Moscow Embassy,

and a broad sense with in h is Governmen t that the changes in the
Soviet Un ion presaged well for the future. Since Churchill read Clark
Ke rr's despat ches, such a st atement was based on observation and
interpretation, not just wishful thinking. Optimists like Skaife apart,
the FO it self had bee n reluctant to believe in a change of attitude,
most clearly in the case of religion, even when in 1942 they would
have li ked it to have been t rue . Permanent officials were not prone
to optimism about t he USSR, and t heir acceptance tha t changes
were taking place reflected t heir belief that the evidence was good
and the analysis plausible.

The Dissolution of th e Com intern

For many ind ividuals withi n t he policy·making elite, the Comintern
more t han any ot he r aspect of the Soviet regime represented the
revolutionary aims of t he founders of the Soviet state. It was the
instrument of inte rfe rence in other countries' affairs, in Europe, in
India and most importa ntly in Britai n itse lf. It was through the
Comintern that British Co mmunist s were believed to receive thei r
o rde rs from Moscow, which made them in effect too ls of Soviet
foreig n policy. Wh ile close observers of the Soviet scene identified
the Comin tern wit h t he Trotskyite wing of the Bolsheviks, to most,
Stalin was seen to be as culpable as the others for its activities.
When t he warti me collaboration began, the existence of the
Com intern and its deeds became a matter of some interest. Treat-
ment of t his issue would revea l much about Stalin's intentions and
motivat ions. It cannot, however, be said to amount to an acid test,
fo r the abolition of the Comintern in May 1943 did not alter many
individuals' views, with the exception of the uninformed general
public, which relied o n t he excitable reaction of much of the press. 8S
The most t hat can be said is that for those who were already so
in cl ined, it rei nforced the impact of other evidence that Stalin's
motivat ions did not encompass a quest for world revolution, that
he was a rea list prepared to be flexible and that the reforms taking
place within the USSR were gen uine.
There was gene ral agreeme nt that the organisation was practi-
cally defunct. The most satisfactory foreign policy dimension seemed
to be that Stali n was anxious to please his allies and to make an
impression on them by removing such a long-term bogey. The sym-
bolic importance of the Comin tern meant that, in publicly abolishing
66 Clmrcilill, Wllitelwll ami tile Soviet UniOIl

it, Sta lin was admitting that its mission was outdated and the con-
cepts it was based upon were no longer applicable, or indeed were
e rroneous. The sense that the Com intern had been for some time
of peripheral importance to Soviet foreign policy meant that there
was little inclination to sec this as hera lding any change in Stalin's
d iplomacy. M13c, Cla rk Kerr and the Nort hern Department agreed
it was mainly part of the 'nationalistic' policy Stalin was now pur-
suing, fitting in with Stali n 's poli cy o f 'Socialism in one country'.
The Com intern's act ivities had become obstructed by the war, but
it had really become obsolete once official Soviet relations with other
countries had improved. Cadogan, rat he r surprisingly, saw this as a
really positive move: whi le obviously the Com intern could be re-
vived at will , he thought it must be seen as a sign of a rea l desire
by the Soviets to cooperate with frie ndly countries in the recon-
struction of Europe. It was a genuine symbol of a Soviet desire to
renounce any subversive aims in the postwar era. It was al so a sign
they recognised that 'Russian patriotism and a new won self confi-
dence is to mean frank cooperation on the basis of eq uality with
othe r nations and not a resort to backstairs endeavours to attain
Russian aims by inte.rnational sabotage and revolutio n .'86
Labour and TUC leaders were much more cautious, suspecting
that this was a subtle attempt to aid infiltration by British Com-
munists into the labour movement by enabli ng them to claim they
no longer had any tics to a foreign power. Warner found Labour's
attitude to be ridiculous; they could see nothing in the abolition
except an awkward problem regarding the Communist Party and
believed that this was the motiveY
There was interest as to how this move would be taken within
the USSR. It would be more popular with the Army and the gen-
era l populace than wi th the Party and particularly elements of the
NKVD . A certain amount of shock and resentment was reported.
Old Commun ists were seen as bitter about the sacrifice of a cher-
ished principle, coming as it did at a time when many revolutionary
practices were being swept away. This supposi ti on added to the
strength of the developing th esis of two or more schools of thought
with in the Soviet mach ine, divided on issues of reform, coopera-
tion wi th the Western capitalist powers and the future mission of
the USSR. Dew felt quite positive; significan t effects might flow from
events such as this within the USSR. Old dogmas about the behav-
iour of capita li st governments (now allies) and wo rke rs (German
workers were not opposing their Nazi leadershi p or class enem ies)
 'Tile New Rllssia' 67

were being exploded. There would be a great deal of discussion

about the dissolution among the Soviet intell igentsia, and Party
propagand ists and agitators, as publ icity had been widespread; 'official
interment of the Comin tern wi ll help to dissipate some more doc-
trinaire cobwebs and t o induce a more practical outlook towards
the outside world .' It did not , however, mean that Stalin would
not support left ist regimes in Europe, nor that Communist Parties
would not cont inue t o fo llow Soviet d irections slavishly.sa

Sov iet I)ost war Reco nstr ucti o n Need s

One of the central perceptions in the composite image of the USSR
formed withi n t he Brit ish Governmen t in this period concerned
postwar reconstruction needs. Its roots lay in the pre-war assump-
tion of Soviet economic weakness, and in the 1940-41 tenet that
the regime was desperate to avoid wa r because the economy would
not be able to withstand t he pressure. Thus, from the moment of
the German invasion , attention was focused on the economic con-
dition of the USSR, which might be t he key to continued Soviet
resistance.
The destruct ive nat ure of the campaign was soon obvious. The
scorched earth policy attracted interest, initially as an indication
of whethe r t he Soviets were serious in their resistance. Reports on
its effectiveness varied. Poles from the Ukraine claimed that the
destruction had been slig ht. Others were more impressed. Gener-
ally, t he FO and MEW accepted that more had bee n destroyed in
the towns than in the countryside. Skaife pointed out that destruc-
tion was much more noticeable in towns; one could not expect
the w holesale destruction of crops to be very widespread, as this
was extremely difficult to achieve. The point that was missed was
that livestock was being slaughtered on a large scale. To him, scorched
ea rth was effective, and in autumn 1941 he was among the first to
draw attention to the probable consequences. He was already as-
suming a large postwar reconstruction problem for the USSR and
explori ng t he implications of this for Anglo-Soviet relations. He
was to keep this t heme alive throughout the war. 89
Skaife was not alone in making assumptions about the level of
destruction. Others referred to Soviet reconstruction needs as vast,
and saw no need to elaborate on t he pOint, so obvious did it seem.
The food shortages reported in 1942 bore this out. However, the
theol)' was not just based on assumption and supposition. The Russian
68 CJmrciJil/, WJlileJwl/ (lJ/{1 JiJe Soviet UniOIl

sectio n of MEW Enemy Branch produced a number of assessments

on this issue. There was a large amoun t of statis tica l data available,
and the Russian section felt it had enough from wh ich to form
reasonable working hypotheses.'XI Most of it came from Soviet pub-
lished sou rces. The Soviet bureaucracy was addicted to statistics,
and published a great deal of detail about crop yields, industrial
output a nd so on. This had to be treated with ca re, t houg h it is
not true to suggest that the stati stics always gave an exaggeratedly
rosy picture. Th e figures were often published as an indict ment of
underproduction o r inefficiency. A huge amount of cri ticism of t hose
in authority was published: loca l officials, factory managers, kolkhoz
bosses and the like. This was possib le despite the state co ntrol of
the press, because the Kremlin itself was exempt from the criti-
cism, indeed its decisions were universa lly depicted as correct; an y
shortfa lls were thus easily blamed by this method on inefficient or
wrong-headed subord inates . Th is characteristic of the Soviet sys-
tem meant that a careful reading of the press could reveal much
about the interna l workings of a state renowned for its secrecy.9! It
was awareness of this situation that prompted Warner in 1942 to
suggest a press reading bureau in Moscow and a central cl earing
committee in Whiteha ll to deal in a coord inated way with the in-
formation processed by differe nt departments; in fact the latter reform
was only instigated in 1946 with t he formation of the inter-depart-
men tal Russia Committee.92
Another source for the MEW assessments was secret information.
Most of this came from decrypts of Germa n signa ls, though th is
was not openly acknowledged on these papers, wh ich had wide
circu lation. Reports fr om travellers in t he USS R and MEW agen ts
supplemen ted this material, though in a n impressionistic rather than
a quantifiable way.93 Unt il late 1943, the MEW's clien ts were pri-
marily th e military. Most of th eir queries were co ncerned with the
Soviet capaci ty to wage wa r agai nst t he Germa ns, rather than specu-
lation on postwar needs. None the less, the economic material they
assembled in th ese estimates served to unde rpi n and confirm the
assumption that individuals had begun to make when the Germans
invaded; that th e destruction of the Soviet economy was vast a nd
fundamental.
From the outbreak of war, anxious atten tion in Whitehall was
focused on the food situat ion. Wit h the related issue of t ra nsport,
this was seen to be the Soviet Achill es' heel a nd the crucia l factor
in the Soviet- German conflict. The MEW reg ularl y reported to the
 'Tile New Rllssill' 69

COS and Cabi net on the situation . Unawareness that most workers
were fed in works cant eens, thus receiving one squa re meal a day,
meant that the situation, which was anyway very bad, looked even
worse because levels of rationing were used as a guide to the avail~
ability of food. 9~ Throughout 1942 the food si tuati on appeared
desperate, especia ll y to FO analysts .9s The MEW were a little more
optimi sti c, t hough t hey probably underestimated th e burdens caused
by refugees having to be cate red for in deficiency areas. 96 While
there was disagreeme nt between the FO, Em bassy and MEW as to
how much Soviet productive lan d had been lost, all agreed that
there was hardsh ip and famin e, especialty for dependants and agri~
cu ltura l workers, and that Soviet advances in 1943 actually made
the si tuation worse. Food for devastated, doubly scorched areas would
have t o be supplied from existi ng reso urces .97 This situation was
aggravated by the t ran sportation situation and the in evitable pri-
o rit ies given to t he needs of the Red Army out of li mited railway
capacity - needs that m ultipl ied as that army advanced westwa rds. 98
In a number of a reas, however, the Soviet economic infrastruc-
ture was found to be workin g much better than expected. The
evacuati on of factor ies was characterised as a feat of foreSight, plan-
ning and efficient executio n. Scattered hin ts that dismantled factories
were rotting in railway sidi ngs were ignored. The fact that the railways
cont inued operations at all occasio ned 5urpri se.!19 It was acknowl-
edged that this was o nly done by a strict set of priorities which
sacrificed supply of the cities to the needs of the Red Army. That
this did not bring the expect ed collapse was put down to the en-
du rance of the Russian people as muc h as the power of the regi me
to suppress discontent. 100
All this, however, did not outweigh the awareness of the destruc-
tiveness of the war in the east. For two years the USS R was without
both its main food-produci ng area and its main modern industrial
districts in the Donetz and Donbas. The MEW beli eved that the
loss of populatio n to evacuation or to German atrocities in these
areas was great. In May 1943 it was est imated that 1.5 million out
of 46.3 million had been lost due to 'abno rmal mortality' (Germ an
measures) and 7 mill ion transported to Axis Europe. Balfour be-
li eved mortality in t he Ukrai ne to be even higher, and that Nazi
atroci t ies had reduced t he population there by 12 million. WI The
real scope of Soviet problems only became apparent as they pushed
back into the German-occupied territories. Up to that pOint, the
loss of people balanced the loss of food production; but now there
70 CJmrciJil/, WJlileJwl/ (lJ/{1 JiJe Soviet UniOIl

were many more mouths to feed and imme nse destruction t o make
good. lOZ
Once again, MEW and the No rth ern Department wcre impressed
by the evidence of carefu l planni ng as reconstructio n was seen to
begin immediately the Red Army adva nced into the Ukraine. Plans
for the revival of ag ricultu re were swiftly an nou nced.103 However,
agains t this, it was clear that the damage could not be repai red
quickly, whatever Soviet skills in improvisation. In October 1943,
after nine months back in Soviet hands, industrial pla nt at Rostov
was reported to be ope rati ng at 5 per ce nt of pre-war output. Apart
from the reha bi litation of industry, th e two ot her major problems
were see n to be housing a nd lives tock. In t he Smole nsk ob/asf' it
was repo rt ed that 70 per cent of the su rviving popu lation were
li ving in trenches or caves . What housing stock there was, even in
areas that had not been occupied, was woefu lly inadeq uate. It was
believed that crop production cou ld be revived fairl y easily. Live-
stock was anot he r matter. Scorched eart h and the needs of war had
scoured the countryside of pigs, catt le, sheep a nd especially horses.
The shortage of horses was particu larly seri ous as t hey we re needed
for ploughing in the absence of tractors. These deficie ncies cou ld
not be made up quickly.11).!
The basic idea that the Soviets wou ld have vast post war recon-
struction needs rapidly became an unquest ioned assumption. It was
pred icted to be th e main preoccupation for postwar Soviet policy-
making. Thus, BaggalJay suggested the Soviets would devote their
main energies to reconstruction of th eir own devastated a reas. Whole
towns would have to be rebuilt, whole areas refertilised, whole
populations resettl ed . They migh t req uire German labour and
assistance from the Allies, though th ey wou ld prefer to put t heir
house in order themselves. The pace wou ld be slower than before,
beca use t he populatio n would des ire a greater measure of comfort
and happiness . Churchill wrote in his ' Morning Thought s' in early
194 3 that th e USS R had suffered ' horrible devastation ' and recon-
stru ction would occupy them for many yea rs. lOS The MEW fe lt that
production in the heaviest industrial areas had been vi rtually elimi-
nated, and 'the crippled industrial economy . .. ca n be totally restored
o nly afte r years of unrem itting effort.'l06 By 1944 it had become a
commonplace that th e task of economic reconstruction was enOT-
mous. Experts and inexpcrt s treated this idea as axio mati c, and
do mestic preoccupatio n was rega rded as a fai rly certain limitation
o n Soviet e nthusiasm for interfe re nce elsew here.
 'Tile New Rllssill' 71

Three important issues raised by this si tuation occupied the at-

tention of British analysts; how long the reconstruction would take,
what its main focus would be and what effect it would have on
Anglo-Soviet rela tions. Estimates of the duration of reconstruction
greatly varied, wh ich was hardly surprising, given the numbe r of
unknown and unpredi ctable variables, such as the degree to which
Soviet consumer demand would be met, the am ount and type of
reparation exact ed from Germany, and the regime's sense of secur-
ity (a ffectin g level of conversion from armaments production). Some
estimate was needed, given the potential influe nce of the recon-
struction issue on Soviet foreign policy. The MEW took ten yea rs
as a reasonable hypothesis, in advan ce of information on Soviet
priorities or participation in world trade. In ten years, it was felt,
the Soviet economy could be back to pre-war levels of product ion,
provided suffici ent resources co uld be diverted to peacetime act ivi-
ties fr om a rms manufacturing. ! 07
The Soviet Government, however, was expected to aim for better
than t hi s; it would not to be co ntent until the sta ndard of living
of the average Soviet citizen was on a par with his western Euro-
pean counterpart, and Soviet products had reached the same standards.
The size of this task was taken to be colossal. The Post Host ilities
Planning Staff (PHPS), in collusion with the FO, put it thus:

The fu ll exploitatio n of her vast untapped resources of natural

wealth will be a lo ng process, perh aps extending to twenty years.
If it is safe to prophesy in any way as to the probable policy of
the USSR, it may be sa id that she is more likely to expend he r
energy and resou rces upon achieving these aims towards a higher
standa rd of comfort, liberty, culture and con tentment of her people
than to follow a policy of external aggrandisement. 108

The l ie shared the view that the Soviets would desire to raise stan-
dards of living as well as rebuild and develop industry and agriculture,
though feeling that the start already made would enable good progress
to be made in less t han five yea rs. IOll
Publi c opi nion was seen as particularly significant in this area.
For yea rs, the regime had justified austerity and sacrifice, forced
collectivisa t ion of agriculture and industrialisation, in terms of bet-
ter living cond itions in the future. Now there were war sacrifices as
well. The question was, to what extent would the postwar actions
of the regi me be conditioned by the aspirations of a war-weary
72 CJmrciJil/, WJlileJwl/ (lJ/{1 JiJe Soviet UniOIl

people for some of the material rewards they had been promised?
This would be a more potent desire even t han political freedoms.
Would th e regime be able to continue with a policy of guns not
butter? To an extent, it recogn ised such aspirations by allowing
free sale of merchandise which was outside t he quotas. Thi s was
not a black marketi it was officially sanctioned, and allowed peasants
to sel l any su rpluses they produced on the plots they fa rm ed them-
selves in addition to their work o n the collective farms. 11O Townsfolk
with money cou ld supplement thei r meagre rations and the peasants
earned cas h, so me of which the state took in forced loans, the rest
of which was saved. The accumulation of wealth in this way meant
pent-up demand for consu mer goods from t he pre-war period was
aggravated stil l more. 111
Assessment of the level of pressure th is put on the Gove rnme nt
depended on an individual 's idea of how much t he ordinary Soviet
person was aware of standards of living outside the USS R. Skaife
pointed out that many remembered the pre-Revolutiona ry era. Those
who read the Embassy's propaganda sheet, Brila/lski SOYIIZlJik, could
observe British standards from the iJlustrations. ll2 On the other hand,
there was the innate Russian pride in Soviet ach ievements. Skaife
felt that the regime would have to put much effort into the im-
provement of standards of Jiving. The Soviet people, he argued,
had been promised 'better things tomorrow' sin ce the Revolution,
and the demand would become impossible to ignore afte r t he war
was over. He suggested that the Soviet Government actually shared
this aspiration. Stalin in part icu lar, with maybe ten years of power
left, would want to be remembered as the man w ho had made the
Soviet state secure and the man who had redee med the promise of
a better life made in 1917. 11l Sin ce th e Soviet economy had always
been geared towards preparation for war, they would need help in
switching to consumer product io n. ll~
This th eory was the basis of Skaife's bel ief that t he USSR would
foll ow a policy of cooperation with t he West after the war. In the
debate on thi s issue, not everyone accept ed hi s full thesis. Colo nel
Geoffrey Vickers, Deputy Director-General of the MEW responsible
for economic intelligence, accepted the import ance of rehabilita-
tion needs as an influence on Soviet post war pol icy, but d isagreed
that consumer demand would be met. The concen tra tion, he ar-
gued, would be o n heavy industry. In a ny case, in stead of buying
goods from the West, which Skaife saw as t he basis of a 'posit ive
policy' of postwar cooperation, the Soviet s wou ld prefer the ('stab-
 'Tile New Rllssill' 73

li shed route of self-sufficiency, if necessary requiring continued sac-

rifices from their population . This would be supplemented by whatever
they could get from Germany in terms of reparations, transfer of
plant and forced labour.l ls Wi lson agreed that the Soviets would
seek to avoid trade except on the most advantageous terms, and
pointed out t hat the centralised nature of the Soviet economy was
such that they could move to consumer or peacetime production
at least as quic kly as the West. Gladwyn jebb, Head of the Econ-
omic and Reconstru ct ion Department from 1942, agreed with him
that th ough the Soviet Union would not be self-suffici en t, its
degree of dependence on outside trade would not be so large as
the havoc in the USSR might cause one to suppose. They would
certainly want to keep their indebtedness to a minimum .116
Ove rall, Wi lson shared Skaife's optimism and hopes about post-
war economic co ll abo ra ti o n, writing that regardless of whethe r
consumer dema nds wou ld be met or not, if the Soviets were happy
with Britain's wartime aid, it should be possible for Britain to help. ll7
Warner was more cautious, but it was generally felt in 1943 that
the Soviet hope for Bri tish help would encourage them to be coop-
erative. An inter-departmenta l com mittee on postwar t rade with
the USS R was set up, and co ncluded that while self-suffic iency was
the preferred Soviet policy, it involved high eco nomi c cost, and
they would not fo llow th is policy if the international position was
satisfactory. The Soviets might need to compensate consumers fo r
pre-war and wartime sacrifices, and furthermore a class had grown
up with purchas ing power (richer peasants and higher state employees)
which would have an inflationary effect if not checked by imports.
The Soviets would prefer not to do this, but might have to. "8
The re was genera l agreement that after the war the energies of
the Soviet Governm en t would be direct ed towards rehabilitation -
including reconstruction of houses, factories , power plant, bridges,
railways and port facilities. This would need a durable peace. Warner
was almost alone in suggesting that the Soviets could limit the
amount of resources devoted to this task, as they cou ld control
public opin ion . All the same, he accepted that all other things be-
ing equal, the Soviet Government would not be able to drive their
population so hard and would want to raise the stan dard of liv-
ing. " 9 Despite Warne r's cavea t, by 1944 an important shi ft of
emphasis had take.n place. The idea that the Soviets would wel-
come British help, if convinced the British were cooperative, became
transformed into t he notion that the Soviets would th emselves be
74 CJmrciJil/, WJlileJwl/ (lJ/{1 JiJe Soviet UniOIl

cooperat ive in the postwa r era because of their need to co nce ntrate
resources on internal developme nt. Th ey would need a peaceful
e nvironment for this, a nd cooperation offered the best way to solve
the problem of secu rity against Ger ma ny. Less was sa id of thei r
cooperating because they wanted help in that development. 12o Partly,
this may have been because, by 1944, it was clear that Britain would
not be able to supply much of that help. Thus, despite Wil son 's
persona.! hopes, thi s aspect was played down. The fundam ental thesis
of the importance of reconstruction needs was, however, taken as
certain in the FO's a rgume nts in favou r of the thesis of postwar
Soviet cooperativeness in 1944.
The reconst ruction th esis was the product of the var ious inte r-
pretati ons of Soviet internal developments made by different agencies
of the Government . There continued to be discussions of certa in
aspects of it, such as the role of consumer pressures. Howeve r, t here
was a degree of consensus on fundamentals, shared by man y, includ-
ing the military. [n looking at in ternal developments, there was no
inclination to ignore the totalitarian aspects of Soviet society. There
was certainly an cleme nt of grudgi ng adm iration for the capacity
for war mobilisation such a system offered. Skaife's hopes that the
war and cooperation might lead t o a humanisation of the te rror
were shared, but it ca nnot be sa id with any great degree of expec-
tation. No one echoed George Hill's optimistic suggestion that the
liberties in the Stalin Constituti on would be real in ten yea rs. Hill
also depicted the labour camps as a n eXigency of wa r. Balfour was
more typical: when noting all the cha nges a nd the restoration of
trad itional values, he reiterated that the traditiona l form of Russian
governm en t was autocracy, and this was not about to disappear.
The USSR would con tinue to be a ' jealously watchful po lice state' .121
The widespread dissemination of the important reconstruction thesis
reflected the fact that in 1942, and increasingly in 194 3, th ere had
been dramatic developments in the USSR, whic h had come as a
surprise in the light of th e preva iling assumptio ns of th ose who
had not closely observed th e Soviet scene. Whatever continuing
scepticism about individual aspects of thi s remained in different
agencies, this added up to a ge nuine feeling that the USSR had
become a na tionalist, trad itionalist state, wit h a n increasingly con-
servat ive attitude towards social organ isa tion, ind ividual behaviour
and personal moral ity. Si nce these had been areas where the Bolshevik
state had been found especiall y wanting, undoubted ly perception s
of these changes fuelled a ge nera l transformation of image. The
 'Tile New Rllssia' 75

ste reotype of the Russi ans as ineffi cient and slothful had been under-
mined as they roll ed bac k the high ly respected W elmllacllt , th ough
it had not di sappea red e ntirely. Losses and shortages were known
to be vast, and it was reasonable to assume that the ma king good of
these would be a first pri ority. A mobilised, proud, but wa r-wea ry
people would be a new fa ctor. In the acid test area o f rel ig io n, the
Soviet regime had, it seemed, committed itself beyond what was
necessary purely for th e condu ct of th e war.
Percepti on of t hese developments di rectly influenced indivi duals'
vi ews of the attitudes and ro le o f Sta lin, and of th e ai ms a nd
moti vation s of Soviet ext ernal policy (shaped and driven by inter-
na l needs such as morale and reconstructio n), and helped create
an assumptio n t hat the USSR could be expected to try a po licy of
postwar coo pera tion. Purth ermo re, t hese interna l changes, re pre-
sent ing clea r evide nce of th e move away fro m the revolutiona ry
et hos, made such coope ratio n far more likely actually to wo rk. The
USSR did not need to have go ne so far as to become a libera l de-
mocracy for thi s to be credible. Th e jury was st ill very m uch o ut at
th e end of 1944 o n th e issue of ' Iibe ralisati on ' . The re had never-
theless been a genu ine shift in image, based on real observed changes,
not Wishfu l t hinki ng, or even, for the key actors like Sargent, Warner,
Ede n and Ch urchi ll, a desire to look on the bright side. Th is cha nge
in image cru ciall y sh aped respon ses to th e questio n of wheth er the
USSR could or should be a partner in warti me o r postwar cooperation .
4
Wolf, Bear or Retriever Puppy?

This chapter outlines the development of perception s of Soviet ex-

ternal poli cy from the en d of 1941 to 1944, examining the broad
conclusions bu ilt on th e security axiom establ ished in 1940-41.
Three alternative Soviet foreign policies were identi fied . These ca n
be summed up as first, the ' bear' - hostile and aggressively expansive,
either from revo lut ionary or imperialist mot ivations. The second
alternative was the 'lone wolf' - iso lation ist and uncooperative in
the organisation of European securi ty, intent on ga inin g security
by the Soviet Union 's own actions and resources, crea ting a defens-
ive gla cis in eastern Europe and leaving Britain to dea l with the
German proble m. The t hird was what Clark Kerr described as ' a
wet ret riever puppy in someon e else's drawing room, shaki ng he r-
self and swishing her tail in adolescent disrega rd for all except herself'
- cooperative th ough likely in t he in itial stages to be un couth in
its methods and behaviour, through both ignorance and the self-
con fidence generated by victory.!
The core assumptions that will be discussed here have all been
acknowledged by historian s before, but th ere has not been muc h
anal ysis of how th ey deve loped. I n particul a r, the underlying
image of the USSR has not been explored. Nor has it been seen
that the t hird option im plied that coopera tion wou ld not always
be smooth, and that it wou ld not be of the same in timacy as that
with the US, without making collaboration unattractive to British
policy-makers. Such opt im ism that ex isted was by 1944 definitely a
qualified optim ism . The sensitivity thesis is usually brought up only
to be dismissed as evidence of the delusion of British policy-makers.
Yet th e thesis was th e product of much discussio n a nd obse rvation
and deserves more understanding. The issue of how responsive Soviet

76
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 77

policy-makers were to external matters, such as the tone and con-

tent of British policy, was particularly important, and played a
significant part in th e debate on how to handle the Soviets. A major
area of uncertainty was whether Soviet behaviour, if it was unco-
operative in it s daily manifestations (as it often was), was any
ind ication of the possibi lities of long·term coopera tion. Loo ked at
superficia lly, evidence of displeasure at specific Soviet acts can mis-
takenly be taken to indicate nascent Cold War attitudes. Fulle r
examination of underlying perceptions reveals that this was not
the case.
These points have tended to be obscured by either a predomi-
nantly narrative approach, by the focus on Co ld War origins, or by
concentratio n o n specifics (cou ntri es such as Poland or isslles such
as aid). As an alternative approach, this chapte r eschews narrative
and makes no attempt to get involved in the intricacies of British
dealings with the USSR over specific countries, except where gen-
e ral principles ca n be inferred. In stead, focus is on the development
of interpretations regarding the overall shape of Soviet foreign policy
in the context of the alliance.

Uncle Joe
The key issues of British wartime and postwar collaboratio n with
the USSR all cent red on the en igmatic figure of Stalin. The pros-
pects fo r the cooperation that all rega rded as im portant, no matte r
how distasteful, depended to a great deal on how Sta lin was viewed.
The image of Stali n established in the policy-making elite in the
pre-war years and strengthened in 1939- 41 offered little prospect
for any sort of cooperation. From the autumn of 1941, however,
Stalin began to be seen in a d ifferent light. A new side of Stalin
was revealed by wartime co ntacts. The continuing perception of
him as a ' realist' was the foundation for an increasing ly firm and
uncontested view of him as rational and sagacious. Historians have
tended to pour scorn on what they sec as a travesty of the real
Stalin - the 'ma n·m onster' of the purges; to sec it as eithe r delusion
or over-optimism. Negative characte ri stics were not, however, lost
sight of, though many of them could be seen as qualities in a war
leader. For British pOlicy-makers the cent ra l question was whether
Stalin cou ld be cooperated with . The answer to that question had
to be sought in Stalin's personality. his motivations and the nature
and scope of his power in the USSR. It was focus on these areas,
78 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

informed by greatly increased personal contacts, which drew atten tion

away from the acts of terror and estab lished an image that did not
exclude character defects, but tended to accentuate the positive.
Stalin's realism increasingly ca me to be fu sed with a n admiration
for his intelligence, which became almost a mystique; some policy-
makers, including Cadogan, seem to have developed by Yalta an
inferiority complex towards Stalin, in t erms of their belief that he
was far-sighted, extremely well-briefed and knew exactly what he
wanted. 2 There continued to be references to Marx ist aims, but this
was a minor theme, and the emphasis in discussi ng Stalin's motivations
was his oft-quoted realism, ) Stalin's intelligence and grasp of bot h
broad essentials and arcane det ail impressed in direct proportion
to the degree to which he was see n previously as a simp le-minded
peasant or a Georgian brigand , He could quote to Beaverbrook the
exact horsepower of a Spitfire and demonst rate a grasp of the com-
plexities of the Indian political and social situation that put Roosevelt's
ill-informed generalisations to shame, " Nea rly all the British who
met him in this period formed the impression of what Churchi ll
described as his 'cool, deep wisdo m', Stalin also came to be seen,
despite the early disaste rs of the Red Army, as a military geniu s. s
However, while Stalin's real ism was universally assumed, other
traits were identified, which loo ked at logi ca lly appear to ope rate
in contradiction to that theory. In two ways in particular Stalin
was assigned sensitivities which were far from ' hard-headed', He
was assumed to be sensitive of h is status as a world leader and to
be highly suspiciou s. Stal in was characterised as a man eager to be
accepted on the world stage with other world leade rs. Observers
commen ted on his egotism, though it was not manifested in so
extravagant a manner as Hitler's or Mussoli ni's. Baggallay, for example,
believed Stalin wished to go down in history as one of t he grea t
Russ ian figures .6 He was frequently seen as 't he suspicious Bruin ',
though it is worth noting that the attribution of rationality meant
that the depth of these suspicions was underestimated. A suspicion
about Allied post war intention s was not irrationa l, in British eyes,
in the way that suspicion s about British deal ings wit h Rudolf Hess
were, and the latter were discounted .?
Stalin's basic aim continued to be seen to be personal surviva l.
Beyond that, Bruce Lockhart's formu lation , that h is motivation was
to make the Soviet Union the greatest country in the world by a
process of internal deve lopment - the conti nuation of 'Sociali sm
in one country' - accurately summed up the fee lings of most in
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 79

th e British Government, particularly as it did not preclude externa l

interve ntion s to safegua rd and further that development. Sta lin was
believed not to subscribe to theories of world revolution, though
as Cripps put it, he was ' like all of us, not averse to being a mis·
siona ry of his own form of governmen t, which he thinks to be the
best '. Eden now found Stalin to be th e political descendant of
Peter the Great , rather than Lenin (or Gengh iz Khan, as he had
thought earlier).g The Stalin cult was now based o n Ilis identification
with Kutusov and Suvorov, whose pictures rep laced those of Marx
and Engels in his Kremlin office. When Churchiti wrote of 'the
deep-seated chan ges' in th e character of th e Soviet state, he
emphasised 'the new con fiden ce which has grown in our hearts
towards Stalin ' . The observed transformation s in Soviet society were
believed to be directed from the centre, and the conservat ive thrust
of them to correspond to Sta lin 's own prcferences. 9
By 1944, the idea was firmly e ntrenched that these concern s of
Sta lin had led him to decide o n a policy of cooperation with the
West. Any suggestion of Anglophobia in Stalin's motivations had
lo ng sin ce di sappeared. He might sec k reinsurance in east e rn
Europe, with lim ited objectives, but collaboration was his first c hoice.
This co nclu sion was based not on an idealistic visio n of Sta lin, but
on an assessment o f how he would view his interests, and took as
evidence Stalin 's public speeches and hi s cooperative behaviour at
the con fe re n ces at the end of 1943. 10 The s upposition that
BARBA ROSSA established a fundamental enmity towards and fear
of Germany as Stalin 's central motivation was a significant ingredi-
ent of this latter assumption. 11
It was not forgotten what kind of regime Stalin presided over,
but on making his acquaintance, he did not appear as a monster.
Eden told Dalton that he tried hard to think of him as dripping
with the blood of his opponent s, but somehow the picture would
not fiL 1Z Many testified to Stalin's approachability and charm. Sta lin
had, as Churchill noted, 't hat saving se nse of humour, which is of
high importance' , a redeeming trait the more impressive for being
unexpected. Goi ng on appearance and demeanour, the genera l im-
pression, according to Eden, was 'quite a nice and gentlemanly
fcllow!!J 3 He see ms to have enjoyed these mee tings with foreigners,
especialty Churchill, since, as Clark Kerr pointed out, there was no
one in the USSR with whom he could converse as an equal. By
contrast, as Eden observed. ' the strange anima l ... seems to Jack
humour on paper' .14
80 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

Stalin was often found amenable to clea ring up small problems

when no change whatsoever had been got out of his subordinates.
His public pronouncements, w hile it was seen t hey cou ld easily be
reversed since he was not directly accountable to public opi nio n,
were believed significant, and to be a brake on h is future freedom
of action. This is not to say that t he re was no aware ness of his
darker side and of the uncooperat ive ness of which he was capable.
However, the personal image, pa rticula rly his sagacity and rea lism,
inevitably influenced views of his policy, a nd deficiencies in ma n-
ne rs cou ld be ascribed to h is peasant upbringing a nd inexperience
of diplomatic niceties - an explanation Sta li n himself t houghtfully
provided to Clark Ker r on their first meeti ng. It appealed to both
Ch urch ill and to the FO, reinforcing as it did t heir own tendency
to condescen sion towards the 'civilization' of t he Soviets . 15
Thus, wh il e not suggesting the British Govern ment was converted
to a roseate view of Sta lin and his USS R simi lar to t hat of the
fe llow-travellers of the 1930s, it is clear that new images of Stalin,
based partly on new perceptions an d pa rtly on new twists being
given to o ld ones, permeated the assumptions on which much of
British wartime pol icy and postwar p lan ning was made. Stali n had
moved from being a murderous despot to a sagacious and fairly
benevolent patriarch. Th is image of Sta lin was at t he very Ilea.rt of
the thesis of t he cooperative Soviet Unio n. It became accepted wis-
dom in the FO, and also a consta nt ingred ient of Ch urchill 's attitude.
Interestingly, the Americans came independently to very simi lar
conclusions, and on both sides of t he Atlantic elements of the StaHn
image were strong enough to persist even in to t he Cold War era. 16
In a sense, the new Stal in image was also prod uced by compari-
sons . It was when measured against the other dictators that Stalin
appeared humorous, cha rm ing and lacki ng in affectation. It was
when compared to the oth er Soviet leaders or those like the NKVD
who had not mod ified their behaviour towards foreig ne rs t hat he
was the soul of cooperat iveness and open ness . The perception that
t he Soviet autocracy allowed fo r the ex istence of d ifferen t power-
centres - Army, Party, Government - was an importan t factor
underlying this .

' Behind the Horse man Sits Dull Care'

Information on Stalin's associates was never plenti ful. Exact func-
t ions, sta tus in the pecking order, political lea n ings and personal
 Wolf, B('(1r Qr Relril'vt'r I' uppy? 81

character were all unclear. These individuals remained shadowy while

the character o f Stalin , and the subo rdinates with whom British
personnel had direct con ta ct, became better known. Prior to
BARBA ROSSA, they were seen as Stal in's cronies - mostly from the
Caucasus and invested with the eth nic chara cteristics of that re-
gion .17 Lack of contacts with important figures meant that these
images te nded to perSist , except that they became distanced some-
what in people's minds from Stalin himself as national war leader.
The im putatio n of geniu s given to Stalin certainly did not spill
over to the othe r leaders.
The one with whom there was most con tact was Molotov. He
became the antithesis of Stalin. He was viewed as a cold, emotion-
less figure. He had been seen as part of the pro-German faction,
and never quite lost the image of being anti-British. Partly thi s was
pe rsona l: Cadoga n found him to have the 'grace and conci liation
of a totem pole' , and Macfarlane wrote, 'the more I sec of him, the
mo re I distrust him. I try not to be biased by the fact he is one of
the most unpl easant creatu res I have ever met.' It was unclear what
hi s personal standi ng was, but most felt , as Churchill put it, 'he
count s for a lot'.1 8
Unlike Molotov, Vysh in sky's reputation improved. Harold
Macmillan , who worked closely with h im for a time, found him
good company and a com petent, able and not unfriendly colleague. 19
He was, however, clearly of the seco nd rank, and th e more power-
ful Kremlin figu res remained little know n. Th ere was little social
interaction with the oth er members of the State Defence Council
(GKO) or the Politburo, such as Zhdanov, Beria, Malenkov, Kaganovich
or Sil che rba kov. Some of them obvious ly had power-bases. 20 It was
assumed that Malenkov represented Party interests on the GKO,
and was a n emi/lence grise. Silche rbakov was clea rl y a rising star,
amassing eight posts by 1944. 2 1 Beria and Zhdanov we re seen as
powerfu l behind-tile-scenes actors, with power-bases in the NKVD
and Leningrad Commu nist Party respectively.22 The existence and
obvious power of individuals such as Beria or institutions such as
the Red Army led to the conclusio n that they had some infiuence .ll
From this assumption deri ved an important element in Briti sh per-
ceptions of the USSR during the war, the 'two schools' theory.
White Stal in 'S victory ove r Trot sky was seen to have signalled the
end of one important debate on foreign policy within the Soviet
regime, outside observers had perceived continuing signs of debate
during the 1930s. The issue was, basicatty, cooperation with Ger-
82 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

man y, as a co ntinuati on of the Rapallo pOlicy of the late 19205, or

realignm ent with Britain and France in collective security measures
against Germany. Maxim Litvi nov was identified as th e leader of
th e group favourin g the latter. Ede n had perceived two schoo ls in
the Kremlin when he visited in 1935, a fact to which Litvinov hi mself
d rew his attention, Litvinov's replacement by Molotov in May 1939
was co mmonl y taken as a sign that Stalin had fina ll y decided to go
for the German option.
Thus, it was an accepted principle tha t th ere could be warring
facti ons, each seeking to influ ence Stalin's po licy, with in t he basic
framewo rk of the autocracy. Duri ng the Nazi- Soviet Pact period ,
thi s potential opposit ion was believed to have been e radicated at
the cen tre, and now included on ly fringe fig ures like Alexandra
Kollonta i and possibly Ma isky. BA RBA ROSSA th rew th is situation
into flux again . The Army was now importa nt, as were national as
opposed to Party institutions. Stalin's status appea red to sepa rate
him from purely Pa rty leaders. The key question of how much to
cooperate with the western powers was bac k on the agenda .2oI
It was therefore natural when Soviet policy ex h ibited inconsi s-
tencies that the idea should be revived that t he re were two groups
(o r more) influencing policy. The general conclusion from Churc hill
down was that Sta lin was in the 'cooperative' school. Thus evi-
den ce that an uncooperative attitude was sti ll present at the top
see med to demonstrate that members of the formerly pro-Ge rman
school had not lost their power, and that an isolationist or non -
cooperative group had now formed, with sufficient politica l stand ing
to influence Stalin's actions.
This idea thus had a respectable pedigree, and was not simply a
product of frustratio n at Stalin's soft/ hard tacti cs at sum mit meet·
ings. Stalin him self had hinted to Cripps that a pro-German school
existed in July 1941. 2s Cripps and Macfarla ne rai sed the idea of a
' Kre mlin ga ng', implying that the re we re two schools of thought
o n cooperation. Macfarlane suggested that Stali n was bei ng given
biased advice on the quality of Brit ish intelli gence mate rial, and
tha t Stalin had not approved the obst ructioni sm t hat 30 Miss ion
was experiencing: ' I am not at all convinced that Stal in either reali ses
or approves the existing situa t ion .'26 Cripps placed the blame on
Molotov: 'I have a fe eling it may be that Molotov is acting as the
main channel through which all political information reaches Stalin
both as rega rds internal and extern al affai rs and that he is still
adopting the anti-Britis h attitude wh ich I commen ted on in the
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 83

past. /27 At the Moscow Supply Conference, Bcavcrbrook had responded

to such theories by deciding to concentrate on Stalin, believing
that his subordinates had either kept him in ignorance or them~
selves were not aware of Allied efforts. Eden's experiences in Moscow
in December seemed to confirm this judgement; he found Molotov
'pa rticularly unhelpfu l' .2l!
Chu rch ill concluded in Moscow in August 1942 that there were
indeed two schools of thought in the Kremlin . When he encoun-
tered problems with St alin during the conference and became
temporarily disenchanted, Church ill depicted Stal in himself as the
problem in conversations with Colonel Jacob, Clark Kerr and his
doctor, Sir Charles Wilson (later Lord Moran).29 However, he also
raised the possibility that Stalin at t he second meeting might have
been placing views o n record about the seco nd front for the ben-
efit of the Com mi ssars:

We asked ou rselves what was the explanation of this performance

and transformation from the good ground we had reached the
night before. I t hink the most probable is that his Council of
Commissars did not take t he news 1 brought as well as he did.
They perhaps have more power than we suppose, and that he
was putting himself on the record for future purposes and for
their be nefit, a nd also letting off steam for his own.

Churc hill was convinced, as were many others, that Stalin's 'sure-
footed and quick milita ry judgement' meant he himself knew that
the British case was sound . But he did not want to be seen by hi s
coll eagues to acquiesce in this too easily. Churchill's aide, Desmond
Morton, though no expert on the USSR, had already put forward
the idea that there was internal policy debate, and Churchill was
aware of Cripps and Macfarlane's comments on the subject. US envoy
Ave rell Harriman supported the idea in August 1942. 30 It was clearly
an idea that Ch urchill found appealing, for he was to reve rt to it
o n a number of occas ions. Ch urchill's final dinner with Stali n may
well have convinced him of Stalin's in terest in coope rat ion; if this
was so, then when relations sou red, it was concluded that power-
ful individuals were exercising an influence behind the scenes. The
fact that these individuals were shadowy but undoubtedly grim -
people like Be.ri a and Malenkov - made this the more credible. J 1
The FO were considering similar ideas in the last months of 1942.
It was entirely reasonable to make the assumption that this was an
84 C/mrrllili, Willie/mil {/II/I Ille Soviet Unioll

important time for future Soviet policy. Since it had become an

accepted idea that the autocracy sti ll allowed scope for debate at
the top level then it was possible that individuals in the GKO and
Politburo would feel free to express d ive rge nt views in policy
discussions. Inconsistencies in Soviet policy, which had always
had the image of decisiveness and single-mindedness, suggested
this was so. The image of Stalin meant that the alternative - that
Stalin himself was indecisive - was not co ns ide red Y Official
endorsement of these ideas was given in a ci rcular memorandum
prepared in the Northern Department at t he end of 1942 a nd signed
by Cadogan. The Soviets were to be informed on all major matters
of foreign policy to avoid bad blood in view of their decision to
cooperate:

Stalin's speech of November 6th last may safely be taken as

announcing to the Soviet Union t he decision of the Soviet Govern-
ment to give the policy of collaboration with this country and
the United States of America a trial. This pronouncement, fo l-
lowing on a period of somewhat strained relations over the 'second
front' issue, probably represents a major decision of Soviet policy,
taken after a period of much doubt and indecision and pOSSibly
of some internal controv('rsy.33

In February 1943 , Maisky revived interest in the theory by tell-

ing Wilson directly that there were a number of 'highly-placed people,
though not perhaps the highest placed' who suspected that Britain
was deliberately holding back against the Germans, and that they
were able to prevent coope ration taking place. He said this feeling
was especially strong in the Army. Dew thought the Soviet Govern-
ment probably saw this to be not undesi rable, and afte r 25 years of
propaganda there were unlikely to be many pro~Bri t ish elements .
Wilson thought Maisky was trying to show t here were two schools
in the USSR and that Stalin was having an uphill fight to convince
those who were against cooperation. Warner instructed Clark Kerr
to take this up, by assuring Stalin no one soft on Germany had
any influence in Britain. This might throw light on the reports
that there was an influential party opposed to 'Stalin's policy of
cooperation with the democracies in general and th is country in
particular'. Stalin's response caused some interest; he said there were
indeed such elements - he described them as e nemies alike of the
USSR and Britain - but most of them had been dealt wit h. Thi s
 Wolf, H('(1r or Relri('lW I>uppy? 85

caused a flurry of telegrams, the upshot of which was the con-

clusion that Sta lin had been referring to the 1937-38 show trials,
though the con nection to coopera tion with Britain was unclear.34
Opi nio n in the Embassy on the two schools theory was to be
cautious after Cripps had left. Thus, Clark Kerr reported to the JIC
in December 1942 that a 'certain section' in the Soviet Union feared
the possibility of British cooperation with Germany after the war.
On the oth er hand, he told the COS a t the same time that Sta lin
had freedom of action in the USSR; there was some so rt of counci l
behind him ', but what he said usually carried the day. 3s
Continuing inconsist encies in Soviet policy during 1943 kept the
two schools theory very much alive. Stalin may have taken the
decision to opt for cooperation as his prime policy, while main-
taining a freedom to reinsure, but it was felt that dissatisfaction
about thi s was still alive in influential areas of the Soviet hier-
arChy, espedally in the Politburo. These clements at the very least
were believed to wish for a heavier emphasis on reinsurance. More
extre me clement s were see n as out-and-out isolationists, represent-
ing a long-sta ndin g tre nd in Russian foreign policy and reflecting
the continuing deep distrust of foreigners. Churchill wrote of ' two
forces in Russia; a) Stalin him self, personally cord ial to me, b) Sta lin
in Council, a grim thing behind him, which we and he have to
reckon with.'36
The No rth ern Department and Nava l Intelligence Division (N ID)
found that the 'old mentality' regardi ng cooperation seemed very
much to be persisting amongst lesser officials. The Embassy believed
that th e fundamental attitude of those who were the real authori-
ties in the country - the NKVD - had not changed si nce the war
began Y NID were firmly of the opinion that what they persisted
in calling the GPU was hostile and powerful. While Stalin might
well desire good re lations, subordinates were purposefully not
carrying ou t his orders: 'Stalin is not himself a completely free agen!.'
Rushbroo ke, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), noted in
September 1943 t hat 'as long as the GPU function s it will be diffi·
cult to obta in co nfide nce - for their own selfish en ds they do not
want it and unfortunately Mr Stalin is not so all-powerful as to be
able to stand up to this evil body as he might like to.'38 The way
that Stali n excused and distanced himself from such behaviour
when it was brought to his attention reinforced the idea that he
had h is hands full in leading the Soviet regime in this unaccus-
tomed direction.
86 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

The theory was thus useful to account for the obstructive ness of
the Soviet bureaucracy, which was often cleared up after direct appeal
to Stalin.J9 Certainly Stalin's subord inates seemed much less will-
ing to get invo lved in coope ration than he did (probably fo r good
reason, as the Embassy pointed out; they were less likely to be
punished for sta ll ing than for giving something away without spe-
cific instructions). The theory mean t that Stalin cou ld be absolved
of gUilt for unpleasant telegrams a nd for bad turns in policy. It was
actively encouraged by the irrepressible Maisky, who himself was
placed in the cooperative school. Th is idea rested on two percep-
tions; that the sagacious and realistic Stal in had firmly decided by
the start of 1943 that h is best interests lay in trying cooperation
with the West, so long as ce rtain security desiderata were met , and
that the Soviet system, excessive ly centra li sed as it was, stil l allowed
scope for differences of opinion and e ncompassed a certa in time-
lag in passing on the attitudes of the highest one to subordinates .
The FO and Intelligence departments found it a useful explanation
for apparent inconsistencies in Soviet policy, pa rt icu larl y for anti -
western articles in the Soviet press.
Churchi ll, bewildered at the inconsistency of h is personal re-
lationship with Stalin, on which he based much of his Anglo-Soviet
policy, continued to find the interpretation persuasive. At the 'Tolstoy'
meeting in Moscow in October 1944, he again saw evidence that
there was behind-the-scenes debate:

I am sure there are strong pressures in the background, both

party and militllry .. . we have talked with a n ease, freedom and
intimacy never before attained bet ween OllT two countries. Stalin
has made several expression s of persona l regard wh ich I feel slife
were sincere . But I repeat my conviction that he is by no means
alone. ' Behind the horseman sits dull care.'~o

Cold War images of Stalin led to this interpret ation being de·
rided as naive (and its sign ificance ignored), but it is now apparent
that the idea was not entirely baseless. There was in fact some room
for debate in the Soviet political machine. What was furth er from
th e mark was th e image of Stalin's own con sistency, vision and
decisiveness. ~ I
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 87

The Security Motive

The strongest clement of consensus within the Government on Soviet
policy was the belief that its prime aim was security. Secu rity had
developed from being seen as a minor theme in Soviet policy mo-
tivations to a major one during 1940-4 1. This assessment became
firmly established from thence until beyond the e nd of the war,
with few significa nt dissenters. Stalin's main aim was characterised
time after time as securing the su rvival of his own power, of his
regime and of the Sovie t UnionY Most Sovie t external policy
actions were fitted into this interp retation, which was highly flexible
and cou ld accommodate a wide range of Soviet behaviour without
being discredited. Skaife, Wilson, Lockhart and others asserted that
Stalin wan ted if possible to divert Soviet productive capacity away
from armaments and manpower away from the armed forces in
order to continue the internal development of the USSR. Thus, his
preference wou ld be for a security po li cy which removed the need
for th e USSR to maintain itself as a beleaguered fortress. If there
was a reasonable prospect t hat security cou ld be achieved by means
other than a high level of armaments, then he would try itY
Predominance of security did not mean that t.he USSR had ceased
to be seen as an expansive power. Th e expansive urge was, how-
ever, inte rpreted to be defensive, the main aim being protection of
the integrity of the Soviet homeland and ultimately the provision
of sufficient security for interna l development. The policy options
for the Soviets ranged from halting their advance on their 194 1
frontiers and bu ilding up their internal st rengt h wh ile th eir allies
were e ngaged with defeating Germa ny, th rough the exercise of some
form of control through mutual assistan ce pacts, bases arrangements
and the sponsorsh ip of fr iend ly governments, to prolonged mili-
tary occ upation wit h or without commun isa ti on, to provide a
defensive glacis.
While there was uncertainty within the British Government re-
ga rding these options, there was basic agreement in 1941-42 that
Soviet poli cy was d irected primarily at gain ing security against
Germany - by defea ting her and en suring she would not pose a
threat in the future. This was formali sed in the Treaty and repre-
sented what see med to be a strong bond of common interest which
would make wartime and postwar collaboration possi ble. In 1942
there was hope t hat the whole issue of eastern Europe could be left
to the peace confe rencc. 44 By the e nd of th e year it did not appear
88 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

that this was go ing to be possible. Consciousness of Soviet free-

dom of action increased with the victory at Stalingrad. Th is produced
a concern in the FO to discover what Soviet wa r aims were. Doing
this would hopefu lly also serve to al lay Sta lin's suspi cion s that the
British wished to leave everything fo r the peace confere nce in the
hope that the USSR would then be wea k and ex hausted. Churchill
preferred that these matters shou ld be left alone, for they could
easi ly become divisive while the issue of the war was in doubt.
Clark Ke rr opened discussions in February, but they were then
stopped. 45 The consequence was that uncertainty persisted throughout
1943. It seemed obvious that the Soviets wou ld want friendly govern-
ments on their borders. Their neighbours must on no account fall
under German influence. What frie ndly governments would mean
in practice was not, however, certain, and little concrete evidence
of Soviet plans could be gleaned; though it was assumed that Stalin
had plans of some kind (most tho ught two, one of them a
reinsurance). It did seem unlikely that, as Jebb put it, Stalin would
be able or want to 'absorb 110 million tempestuous Balkanics'.46
The Soviet freedom of action in this region caused concern; tempta-
tion would be great. The Southern and Central Departments frequently
referred in a vague way to Soviet ' designs', in areas such as the
Adriatic and the Dardanelles, in addition to the clearly stated ones
in Eastern Poland and Romania .47 Eden and Cadogan in particular
cou ld not rid themselves of the thought tha t it would be open to
the Soviets to 'bolshevize' a great deal of eastern and sout h-easte rn
Europe. 48 They were answered by Northern and the Moscow Embassy
that the Soviets were too 'realisti c' to t ry to impose Com munism
in areas where it had no natural roots. They would prefer to erect
'popu lar front' governments which could draw on popula r suppo rt,
but which, as left-leaning governments, wou ld not be anti·Soviet.49
The primacy of th e security motive that th e British assumed in
Soviet policy calculations meant, however, that the centra l issue
for the Soviets was seen to be Germany. Past Soviet poli cy was
interpreted as a ser ies of varied efforts to deal with thi s overriding
problem .so The key assumption, with which most agreed , was that
the Soviets were rid for good of any inclination to follow an
en tente policy with Germany. There was, of course, one scenario
in which such a policy could feature, and that was the establishment
of a Communist Germany. By 1944 it had come to be co ncluded,
however, that Stalin would not want this - he re the Central
Department agreed with Northern - for such a state, with its industrial
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 89

potential and organised manpower, might easi ly prove uncontrol-

lable. It would soon become a threat to Stalin's ability t o use
inte rnational Comm uni sm as an instrumen t of Soviet policy, as well
as enda nger Soviet security. Sargent was sure that Sta lin 'was aware
that the ete rnal German was waiting to bite the hand that fed
him'. A subservient German state was far preferable. Th e difficul-
ties of controll ing such a large country as Germany by force were
obv ious, especially if th e Soviet s would prefer not to keep a
large proportion of their manpower unde r arm s. The Soviet s seemed
faced w ith a di lemma, which gave a strong incen tive to prefer
a third optio n ; cooperation with their West ern allies to keep
Germany restrained. 5!
The general inclination was to accept the idea that the Soviets,
while preoccupied with their secu rity, were realistic about the measures
necessary, which would thercto re be lim ited. They might st ill be
ve ry large, however, and this is where their sensitivit ies towards
their allies were seen to be crucial. To limit themselves, particu-
larl y when expan sionist options opened up to them, would depend
on their co nfide nce in the ir allies. Thu s, consideration s of Soviet
sensitivity and suspicion became centra l to analysis of Soviet policy.

Soviet Sensitivities
While assumptions about Soviet security motivations had grown in
strengt h during 1940- 41, there had been little sense in the policy-
making elite that there was any need to take into account a ny
Soviet se nsit ivities. As 'grim reali sts', the Soviets were not infl u-
enced by such factors: balance of forces was what counted. All this
underwent a marked change in the alliance period and belief in
Soviet susceptibiliti es was to be a vital element in shaping Brita in's
perceptions of Soviet policy. The range of Soviet suscept ibilities that
was considered expanded beyond specific suspicions about Allied
aims to a sense of psychological, eve n pathological sensitivities. By
1944 these had become bound up in the debate on the key issue of
the Soviet respo nse to external stimu li.
Few would disagree that there were mutual Anglo- Russian suspi-
cions dating back at least 125 yea rs, nor that there was an intense
suspicion of all foreigners. Suspicious ness was common ly taken to
be a c haracteristic inhe rent in the ethnic make-up of the Soviet
leaders, and historically of the Russian political systems. In the Soviet
period it had been reinforced by Leninist doctrine and by the attempts
90 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

of the British to destroy the Bol shevik state at bi rth . To Cripps and
othe rs who were c ritical of inter-war British policy, the situation
had been made worse by appeasement, which appeared to th em to
give Germany a free hand in the cast and thus secure peace in the
west at Soviet expense.sz Alon gside this, there were seen to be
suspicions that derived from specific foreign policy issues - these
were easier to understand and hopefully easier to deal wit h, and if
they were assuaged then in time the habitual suspicions would be
reduced. The principal suspicion that caused concern was that the
British and Ame ricans inte nded to play the same ' mutual exhaus-
tion' game that had been att ributed to Sta lin ea rlier. Expressions of
friendliness and admiration were viewed as mere ca mouflage for
determination if not to destroy the USSR, then once more to keep
it in isolation behind a cordon sanitaire. Briti sh perception of this
suspicion was in evidence soon after BARBAROSSA . In so far as the
suspi cion derived from the British inability to supp ly relief in the
form of military ope rations, it was understandable, and officials in
the FO saw that the failure to supply information and discuss plans
fed these suspicions and that close Anglo-American cooperation fue lled
them further. 53
These suspicion s were seen to have an impact at every level of
policy-making. It appeared, for instance, from comments in the Soviet
press and from Maisky that the Soviets held their own version of
the 'two schools' theory: that ekments in Britain - usuall y cited as
the ' Cliveden set ' - were still inimical to the USSR. [n SOE it was
felt there was a vicious circle: Soviet perception of Briti sh suspicion
produced Soviet suspicion.54 This acute sensitivity about British policy
was a nuisance, part icu la rly as importa nce was being attached to
periphe ral figure s or newspapers over wh ich the Govern ment had
no con trol. It was a perverse sign, though , that the Soviets weTe
serious about cooperat ion; why else would there be such concern
about the British commitment to it?
The discussion of how to respond to the demands Sta lin made to
Eden in December 1941 shows Soviet sen sitivities to be at the cen-
tre of the debate on Soviet poliCY, where they were to re main for
the duration of the war. When he returned from Moscow, Eden
firmly believed that Stal in's frontier request should be granted. He
had given no prior hint that he looked fa vourabl y on such a de-
mand, and he knew the Cabin et wished t o avoid discussion of the
topic. The sensitivities he had come to perceive led him now, how-
ever, to claim that it would be impossible to get any kind of
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 91

collaboration if Stalin was not satisfied on this. Moreove r, he re was

the chance to assuage Stalin's lo ng-standing suspicions. Eden told
th e Wa r Ca binet:

It must be re membered that, if we won the war, Ru ssian forces

would probably penetrate into German y and that at a later date
she might well want more than her 194 1 fron t iers . It would seem
that Stalin's keen ness on our recognition of the Soviet 1941 fron t ier
was partly d ue to Russian suspicio n of our cou ntry and partl y
beca use he wished to be sure that we were prepared to trea t
wit h Russia on eq ual terms.55

Ch urch ill disagreed with th e poin t about Soviet sen sitivities. He

asserted that concessions never had any effect on realists like the
Soviets and t h is especially appl ied to po litical measu res in a re-
lationship that he conceived, and believed the Soviets also conceived,
to be based o n mil itary interests. These interests were strong and
separate from pol itical matters. It was part of Soviet character to
try to gai n polit ica l advantage fro m th e si tuation , but if it was not
forthcoming t his would make no difference to th eir military policy.
They would accept that their bluff had been call ed and fa r from
being det ri me ntal it wou ld increase respect for th e Briti sh as
defe nde rs of thei r own interests.56
Beaverbrook shared Eden's view of the impo rtan ce of Soviet sus-
picions. He pa rticula rly wished to make sure that nothing prevented
th e Soviets from whole-heartedly continuing the struggle and be-
li eved t hat Britai n should ma ke large concessions to achieve thi s.
His read ing of the Soviets durin g h is Moscow mission was that
they were extremely sensiti ve to outside stimuli : British actions could
c rucially affect their co nt inued will to fight and th ei r readin ess to
take the war to the e ne myY
Attlee's refusal to accept t he point about Soviet sensitivities brought
him into open opposition to Ede n and Beaverbrook, and provoked
o ne of th e few instances when the Wa r Cabinet was ope nly div·
ided over a Soviet issue (res ulting in Beave rbrook's resignati on).
Un til the end of 1941 the Labour leade rs, with the exception of
Dalto n at the MEW, had played little part in the formulation of
policy towards the USS R. Th e frontiers issue was the first to draw a
strong response from t hem . They had concurred in Churchill's policy
thus far and Attlee had supported Soviet supply requests in the
Defence Comm ittee. 58 Howeve r, t heir perce ption of th e USSR had
92 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

been SO lidly established by the events of autum n 1939 and they

were unconvinced that a policy of politica l concessions could build
goodwill. The labour leaders did not p ress their opposition once
Church ill changed his mind, accepting hi s view of the pressing
reasons for doing 50. 59
Some officials, such as Cadogan and Cavendish-Ben tinck, were
doubtful at this point about the chances of Soviet survival and of
the cooperative intentions of Stali n, and felt that a concession on
the frontie rs was not necessary, o nce the 1942 German offe nsive
began. 60 The Northern Department, however, thought the issue was
Stalin's acid test of British sincerity. Eden agreed, and one of the
fundamental divisions within those parts o f the Government which
shared the cooperative assumption began to be in evidence at this
time. 61 Th ere were those who, though they came to it from a variety
of perspectives, agreed that the main problem with Anglo-Soviet
relations in the past had been British policy. Thus man y of the
diJficulties now were of Britain's making. This view was marked in
individuals on the Left, but was also held by others who followed
Cripps interpretation such as Wilson and Jack Wa rd of the Economic
and Reconstruction Department, and some distinctly non-Left figures,
notably Beaverbrook. Their policy contributions were to be imbued
with the belief that what was necessary to bring lasting Anglo-Soviet
cooperation was a carefully formulated British poliCY, because the
sensitive Soviets were deeply affected by outside fac tors. This hyper-
sensitivity led the Soviets to certain uncooperative behaviour, but
did not mean that they were inherently uncooperative. What was
important was that Britain should pass the tests they were setting
to discover whether British cooperatio n was a realistic possibility. 62
The majority of the professional po licy-makers did not accept that
past policy had been wrong, nor that a ll the faults in t he present
were on th e British side . But significantly many of them, including
Nige l Ronald (Superintend ing Under-Secretary for the Economic and
Reconstruction Department), Jebb, Sargent and Warner, together with
non-professional diplomatists like Lockhart and Eden, accepted some
of th e interpretations offered by the Crippsians, as a result of their
own belief in the security and rea li sm axioms, and in particular
accepted the hypersensitivity theory ~ argued persuasively by Lockhart,
the bridge between followers of Cripps or Beaverbrook on the one
hand, and the establishment on the other. In particular, Soviet sus-
picions were of central concern. Eden later in the yea r spoke for
most of the FO when he wrote:
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 93

If we can contrive on all possible occasions to treat the Russians

as partners & do so as a matter of course we stand the best
chance of breaking thro' this crust of suspicion. We can never
wholly succeed; but we mllst succeed far enough to make coop·
e ration possible, or this war may have been fought in vain. 63

However, it was also fel t that the Soviets often manufactured such
gri evances in an attempt to win concess i ons . 6~ The problem was
determining which concern s were genuine and which were simply
try-ons. This had to be done without aggravating genuine suspi+
cion s, or poison ing the atmosphere. The effect of this perception,
because of the way such suspicions were now seen, was to diminish
conSiderably the negative effect of Soviet behaviour, for the opera-
tion of suspicion mea nt that even ostensibly uncooperative actions
fitted into the overa ll interpretation of Soviet cooperativeness; the
way to avert such actio ns was to reduce suspicion.

Deve lopments in th e Perce ption of Soviet Sen sitivity

Stalin explained manifestations of a less than coope rative spirit by
Soviet officials in term s of thei r inexpe rience and the lack of
adequately t rai ned person nel. While this was seen by the British to
be somewhat disingenuous, it was not dismissed out of hand for it
corresponded to their own assessme nts of Soviet personnel, and it
sounded like a cry from the heart by Stalin, striking becau se it was
not usual for the Soviets to highlight their own inadequacies. Those
who took Stalin's (and Ma isky's) apologies for Soviet behaviour at
ncar to face value concluded t hat the Soviets now wanted to break
out of isolat ion. Wilson and Clark Kerr likened the Soviet desire
for inclusion in Allied decision-making to the desire of 'country
cousins' to joi n a London club. 6s In putting the issue in this way,
Clark Kerr was expressing the common view that the Soviets fclt
excluded from decis ions that materially affected them. The FO fclt
that th is was a ra tional attitude from the Soviet pOint of view. 66
The metaphor also, however, had a further dimension, in that it
encapsulated a se nse of a more pathological, psychological attitude:
a Soviet desire for the respectability that membe rship of the inter-
national communi ty brought. Th ey resented their pariah status, not
on ly because it was a materia l danger, but because. of a desire for
their power and legitimacy to be acknowledged.
94 C/mrcllill, WI/ile/mll (11111 Ille Soviet Unioll

This thesis of a psychological dimension to Soviet sensitivities,

which coexisted st rangely with assertions of hard- headed Soviet
realism, developed gradually. In Apri l 1941 whe n Cripps had stated
that the Soviets would let affronts to their amour propre shape their
po licy, it had received short shrift from Co ll ier and his colleagues,
and fr om Church ill , who all held that the Soviets judged matters
pu rely from the sta ndpoin t of their practical interests. 67 Thi s posi-
tion was not maintained after June 1941 , eve n th ough reali sm was
still e mph asised . By the time of the February 1942 discussions of
the frontier issue, all/our propre was now acknowledged as p layi ng a
role. That the Soviets desired the USSR to be treated as an equal
for its own sake was implied in the FO's Cabi net paper o n the
frontiers , WP(42)48, and in Warner's remarks that the Soviets re-
sented being sin gled out for specia l trea tm ent, even though they
were in fact pecuJiar. 68 Bruce Lockhart linked such attitudes to trad-
ition al Ru ss ian xe nophobia, strengt hened by the humiliations of
the previous 24 years. Lockhart's views are notable for their exclusion
at thi s tim e of any influ ence of id eology, fo r their ethnic assump-
tions about ' Russian' character and the pa tronising ton e, however
much he wished to avoid it. He was also, however, argUing that
past re lations need not be a gU ide to the future and was trying to
find a policy that would get the best out of the Soviet s.69
The psychological point was explici tly recognised in a War Cabi-
net telegram to Halifax on 26 March 1942, though only as an clement,
at this pOint, of the sensi ti vit y about damage to pra ctica l interests.
The telegram stated that the issue of the recognition of the 1941
fronti ers

has a psychological c haracter wh ich derives from th e fa ct that

for 20 years th e Soviet Government has not been in relatio ns of
equali ty or confidence with any of the grea t West ern Powers .70

The perception of this sensit ivity about the Baltic states issue was
subsequently to be broadened in to a gene ral theory co ncerni ng the
overall conduct of the Soviets in t he all iance, but here, already,
was a n idea of sensit ivi ty to exclusion and a Soviet search for signs
of acceptance - not just for th e practical gain s but as evidence of
status.
Further developme nt of the psychological paint did not take place
until 1943, with the introd uction o f the notion that the Soviet s
 Wolf, Be(1f or Relrjevt'r Puppy? 95

had an inferiority com plex . This had been an expression used oc-
casionally before to explain Soviet clumsiness in international affai rs,
wit h the implication that t he cause of this was at least partly the
treatment of the Soviet Union as an in ternatio nal outcast. Since it
was n ot entirely comp lime nta ry it had ra rely been used by Soviet
sympa thi sers, but it was t o be advan ced by Maisky in August 1943,
and a t this stage it fitted in sufficie ntly with perceptions of Soviet
sensitiviti es, a nd also the rea lity of thei r con tinuing exclu sion, to
generate some d iscuSS ion , though still littl e sympathy. [t was in-
deed too close t o a long-standing t heme of Maisky's - that Soviet
uncooperat ive ness was due to past mi shandling and hostility by
th e British - to gain much accepta nce at this point. Ma isky com-
pla ined that a British superiority complex caused them to tread o n
Soviet toes and mad e the Soviets, with th eir inferio rity co mplex,
feel they were bei ng treated as unco uth country cousin s. Clark Kerr
refu ted this argum ent in discussion with Maisky, though he did
w rite to t he PO that Britain was ho lding the Soviets at arm's length;
they were indeed treated as country cousins, though they had earned
th eir place on t he club committee. Maisky had appealed to Clark
Ke rr that the British should bear Soviet psychology in mind. He
cited the peculia rities of th e Sovie t system and the immaturity of
the regim e to explai n the rest riction of personal contacts,?1 He com-
plained to Eden on 3 1 August that the British were not trying their
hardest to wi n the war and that some people in the USS R were
apprehensive, though at present these people were unimportant.
He added that suspicion was easi ly aroused in Moscow, though oft en
not just ified, as he knew with hi s greater knowledge. He was thus
pleading for pat ie nce and sens itive han dling. Th is was the legacy,
he claimed, of an unhappy past which had th e effect of making
his count ryme n scrutinise any British or America n action to see
whether any sligh t was intended. The Soviets wished to be treated
as absolute equal s. Mai sky o minously linked the matter to the issue
of two sphe res of interest in Europe or one. Th e Soviets would
prefer treating Europe as o ne, but this mea nt that the right of each
of the powers must be admitted to take an inte rest in all parts of
Europe. It was clearly th e developing Italian situation whic h he
had in mind .72
Dew remarked that it was an admira bl e alibi to be so sensitive
and have an infe riority compl ex as a justification fo r a permanent
grouse. Warner agreed, commen ting that whatever th e excuse in
each case, th e Briti sh were always asked to s how understanding of
96 C/mrrllili, Willie/mil {/II/I Ille Soviet Unioll

the Soviet dete rmination to have th eir own way. n Mai sky's attempt
to put across a se nse of gene ral sensit ivi ty of a psychologi cal rathe r
than material nature thus met at this time little response in Whitehall,
thoug h the establi shed idea of rese ntment about ex clusio n from
decision-making remained. Despite the answers he made to Maisky,
Clark Kerr had, however, beco me convinced that the re was some-
thin g in th is id ea and fea red it might affect overall policy, muc h of
which was a matter of building or sustai n ing mutual confidence
for which th ere was no hi storical fou ndation ,74
Sign s of a sh ift in th e FO att itude began to beco me morc evident
later in th e year. While still seeing th e Kremlin mind as working in
a cynical, oppo rtunist way, Dew o n IS Octobe r post ula ted a quest
for respecta bility as an important fact or in Soviet po licy-ma ki ng.
He believed Soviet suspicions to be genuine, even though misguided.
He felt as did man y in the FO before t he Moscow Con ference, that
the Soviets had not yet fixed their policy; t hey had been moving
towards colla borat io n, but th eir actions could still bear two inter-
pretations, cooperation or unilateralism. However, a factor in shaping
a movement to cooperation was the desire for respectabi lity; the
Soviets would prefer approval of th eir territorial gains (th e 1941
frontiers) to be ga in ed from the All ies rather than from the Ger-
mans for this reason .7S
The Sovi et demeanour at th e Moscow Foreign Min ist ers Confer-
e nce in October 1943 (especially th e cordiality of Molotov) and
the enthusiasm about its resu lts in t he Soviet press gave a great
boost to suc h theorisations. Clark Kerr ascri bed Soviet behaviour to
the fact that they felt they were admitted for the first time and o n
terms of complete equality to the most inti mate counsels of Brit-
ain and th e Uni ted States. The fact that Secreta ry of State Hull and
Eden went all the way to Moscow st irred their van ity. They were
surprised by th eir all ies' candour. Sa t isfacti on of thei r (III/o ur propre
was demonstrated in the rise in co nfid ence and the qual ity of co-
operation, and thi s served to confirm that such things were influential.
Cla rk Kerr warned that the situation was still delicately poised, and
the British shoul d be carefu l to take no libert ies, even at the cost
of some forbearance. Ede n similarl y remarked that he had not be-
fore the Confe rence fully grasped t he extent to which th e Soviet s
had genuinely felt excl ud ed: it was important now to bring th em
to feel equal s,76
It was in 1944 that th is notio n received fu llest consideration as a
factor in shapi ng Soviet foreign policy actions a nd responses. Interest
 Wolf, B('(1r Qr Relril'vt'r I'uppy? 97

in the idea needs to be seen in the context of the sense of Sovi et

freedom of man oeuvre and the tendency to try to seek clues to
Soviet policy objectives in Soviet day+to-day behaviour, in the ab~
sence of ot her sources . Interestingly, it was Wilson who sound ed a
note o f caution about this. He warned against getting too excited
about the post~Teheran Co nference mood in Moscow, or t oo de·
pressed by Soviet obstructiveness and discourtesy. He developed the
th eme of Soviet inexperience in internati onal affairs. One should
not, Wilson warned, take Soviet professions of cooperation at fa ce
value. By thi s he meant that one should not assume that because
th ey were co mmitted to cooperation, they would immediately start
behavi ng in every respect like a civilised Western nation versed in
all the diplomatic n icet ies. Th e Soviets, he wrote, were on ly now
e mergi ng as a Great Power; Britain cou ld not reasonably expect
the m to exercise that power with a moderation which the British
lea rn ed after two or three hundred years and accord in g to rules
drawn up by themselves. By habit, Soviet methods were more robust
and bruta l than those of their allies. Mix ing pragmatism with the
condescension that usually accompanied British discussions of the
inferiority complex theme, he saw the n,ltuTe of possible cooperation
in a ' realistic' light - it was not necessary to think and ,let the
same, to hug one anoth er as friends , to ha ve a meaningful allian ce.
Attempts to get o n such terms with the Soviets, for in sta nce by
Churc hill's telegrams to Stalin, had failed, because the Soviet s had
not responded in kind (a nd Wilson implied were culturally incapable
of do in g so at th is stage). To Wilson, backgrounds and meth ods
were irrelevant , it was interests and intentions that mattered, hence
his postscript, 'too bad Molotov and Stali n were not at Eton and
Harrow. What can we do about it?177 He was convinced the Soviets
wanted to be reasonable but influ entia l membe rs of the 'club',

eve n though they think that some of the rul es arc damn si ll y
and want to change them. Th ey arc members now, but are not
allowed into some of the rooms and I'm worried that they may
get fed up with wai ting and being mucked about and may go off
and start another club of their own. The fault seems to me to be
about equal on both sides but I think you've got to go on going
out of you r way to make the new member feel at home if you
want to keep him inside. 7s

With the Americans becoming concerned at signs of unilateral

98 C/mfelli/i, WllilelU/iI 11111/ lilt! SOI'iel Unioll

acti on by the Soviets, Sargent demonst rated tha t he shared muc h

of Wilson 's viewpo int. Bad incidents, he wrote, arose out of ignor-
ance a nd clu msiness, not ill-will. Coopera ti on between a ny two
governm en ts was difficult a nd th e Co mmi ssars and ot her Sovie t
officials had been taught for 20 yea rs t hei r duty was not to cooperate
with foreigne rs. First efforts to unlearn this were very clumsy, fo r
their ignorance was profound a nd qual ified personnel were lac king:
'there is no evi dence to show that th e incidents from which we
have been suffering arc due to the fact t hat the Soviet Government
do not wish to co-operate'. Eden noted that he hoped th at thi s
was the real explanation - he at thi s ti me was in a state of some
uncertainty, interp ret ing Soviet unilatera l acti ons in t heir dea lings
with the Badoglio Gove rnm ent in Italy to indicate dangerous am-
bitions, but arguing to Church ill (who him self in th e Italian case
drew different conclusions) that there were few inst ances in wh ich
the Soviets were actually not coope rating after th eir own fas h ion. 79
The theory, however, was not incorporated in the FO policy papers
of summer 1944, in which references to sensitivities were limited
to specific Soviet sus picions of Allied treat men t of Germany. Clark
Kerr, though, was developing the theory and voiced it in a colourful
fashion in his despatch of 31 August. Looking at Soviet fore ign
policy as a whole, Clark Kerr wrote that the available evidence pointed
strongly to th e conclusion that 'the whole approach of t he Soviet
Gove rnment is strongly influ enced by a morbidly developed sense
of inferiority'. The Soviets were prompt to take offence at cri ticism
and were imbued with an 'a lmost desperate' determination that
the USSR should be thought no less respectable, cultured o r ef-
ficient than the cou ntries of the West. They limited visits to fa ctories
and the front to avoid unfavourable comparison s. As was com mon-
place, Clark Kerr found th is fecling of inferiority, often accom panied
by sulle n mistrust and an abnormally se nsitive pri de, to owe much
to inbred ethni c Russian characteristics. Thi s had been given a nearly
pathological bias after 191 7 by acu te resentment at the attitude of
the rest of the world.
Clark Kerr added that whereas before the wa r the Soviets had
been rega rded by western opinion as well-nigh bandi ts, they were
now treated as honourable equal s by the govern ments of their grea t
allies. Sta lin and his associates accept ed their new status 'with be-
comin g pride'. In ternal reforms showed a desire to st rength en thi s
respectability. Th ey were, however, 'as sensitive of th ei r re putation
as is a prost itute who has married into th e peerage':
 Wolf, Ue(1r or Retriever Puppy? 99

it seems safe to infer that the tactics and perhaps strategy of

Soviet for eign poli cy will depend in no small measure upon
whether the Soviet Government are satisfied that the Western
democracies arc treating their country with all the deferen ce to
which they now consider her entitled by vi rtue of her military
victo ries and newly found prestige and respectability. It is no
exaggeration to say the most important thing about the Moscow
Conference was that it was held in Moscow.w

Clark Kerr felt that the Soviet s believed there were influential circles
who sti ll looked upon the USSR as an international outlaw, which
expla ined the Soviet demand for unanimity in the UN Security
Council. They were resolved not to be thought less worthy of con-
fidence than the other Great Powers:

Havi ng until very recently been judged unfit for the structure of
an internat ional order, they aim today at see in g themselves as
't he stone which the builder rejected, the same has become the
head of the corner'. S!

Similarly, he remarked rega rding the Soviet reaction to Burrows'

alleged 'savages' remark, that ' these people have memories as long
as the elephant's vi ndictiveness when th eir se nse of inferiority has
been pri(ked. '82
Overa ll, no one in Whitehall took th e inferiority co mpl ex idea
as far as this, though elements of it were certainly endorsed; the
desi.re for respectability, sensitivity to rea l or imagined slights, ig-
no rance of proper forms of behaviour, arrogant assertion of their
own achievements. Sa rgent was among those who felt the 'savages'
point was germane and it was widely accepted that there was some
such psychological dimension to the Soviet suspiciousness. The basic
idea of ext reme Soviet sen sitivity to external attitudes was firmly
esta bli shed in the FO and in the Embassy.s3
The most important aspect of these n ew considerations of Soviet
hypersensitivity was the link to security concerns in sensitivi ty about
British policy towards Germany. A central precept of the 1940- 41
view was that Soviet policy was outside British influence, driven by
an internal dynamic. Strong internal forces remai ned in the 1941 -44
interpretation, but now th e Soviets were seen to be extremely
sensitive and likely to shift their whole policy in reaction to Brit-
ish actions and attitudes on certai n key issues. The Soviets were
100 Clmrrllill, Wilitellllll mul /II(' Soviet UI/ioll

perceived to be deeply suspic iou s about the Anglo-America n desire

to coopera te and the refore sensitive to any signs to the contrary. If
they felt that the British and Americans were attempting to 'gang
up' on them, dictate the policy of t he Grand Allia nce and impose
their own post war settlement, then they would be tempted at the
least to attempt a 'rei nsura nce policy' as a concu rre nt alternative,
or else to turn their backs entirely and retreat into isolation. Their
com mitm ent to cooperation, despite its foundation in self-interest,
was not therefore irreve rsibl e and could be shaped by their sensi-
tivity about others' motives and commitmen t. The theory of sensitivity
and its linkage to the secu rity motivation is critical to understanding
the nature of the British image of the USSR in the all iance period,
and of the policy that flowed from it.

Lone Wolf

The Soviet alternative to cooperation given most attention by British

policy-makers in 1941-43 was isolation ism. It was a distinct possi-
bility that Soviet leaders would be satisfied with their minimum
war aim: the recovery of Soviet territory. Whether they made this
choice depended on a number of variables, the major ones being
their attitudes towards Germany and towards their allies, and the
strength and outlook of the Red Army. Uncertainty about these
factors meant that a separate peace between Germany and the Soviet
Union was something that could not be discounted, though con-
cern ranged more broadly than that, for such lim ited aims carried
serious implications for Britain.
An isolationist tendency was identified as a long-standing ele-
ment in Soviet policy. Partly, it had been forced on them by the
interwar cordon sallitaire. It had been enhanced by the policy of
'Socialism in one country', which was believed to have focused Soviet
attention internally. The only foreign policy requirement for this
was security from outside interference. In the context of the war,
Dew dubbed this tendency the 'lone wolf pol i cy'.~~ That the Sovi-
ets would go their own way in response to the Allies' apparent
unwillingness to treat th em as equa l partners in the war, or a re-
fusal to accept their basic war aims, was seen as a highly possible
outcome at times.
Bruce Lockhart, in his memorandum on Stalin's 1942 Red Army
Day Order, saw Sta lin to have the lone wolf policy as an option,
feeling that at a pinch he could do without Britain, and that he
 Wolf, Bear or R('lrieva I'uppy? 101

was considering it because they had re jected his modest political

demands and d id not seem to accept the conce pt of equal sacrifice
in the war.8S Baggallay saw it as axiomatic that the Soviets would
not make a separate peace unless Germany was unable to renew its
attack in t he foreseeable fu ture, but did see in Stalin's Order hints
of an isolationist po licy : the threat that the Soviets would only
fight t o fr ee th e mselve s.~6 This possibility seemed more dangerou s,
because it was more likely than that Stalin and Hitler could agree
te rms. Sargent agreed that Stalin was not hinting at a sepa rate peace,
but the possibilit y had always existed that he would stop on his
frontiers; indeed, he mig ht have difficulty urging the Red Army to
go furtherY The t heme was central to the di scussions of fr ontier
recognition in early 1942. Halifax was told that a separate peace
was a possibi lity, but was not expected. The proposed concession
was not designed to stop such a development, for it could not do
so: the object of discussions would be to find out whether the Soviets
aimed to defeat Germany or merely recove r their lost territory_ sa
The Anglo-Soviet Treaty was not designed to prevent a separate
peace, but to bring t he USS R out of isolation in the interest of
postwa r Europe. Frank Roberts of the Central De partment noted
th e mai n ai m was to ensure the Soviets did not repea t their Rapallo
policy.89
It was certainly believed poss ibl e that Stalin was ca pabl e of con-
cludi ng a separate peace, should Hitler offer acceptable terms, though
as he ca me to be viewed as more trustworthy this belief faded (the
increased anti-German , as opposed to anti-Nazi to ne of Soviet pro-
paganda supporting t h is change). The corollary of thi s was, howeve r,
much mo re worrying and came to appear relevant whenever the
Red Army scored some victories; the Soviets would either cease
fig hting once the Germans had been expelled from th e USSR, or
make th eir own settlements of eastern European quest ions and not
take any interest in co ll aboration with the western Powers. The
All ies would be faced in th e first instan ce with a Germany sti ll
intact and with armies in th e fi eld , and in the seco nd with the
destruction of hopes of bui lding up strong independent units in
th e east with t he German problem still un solved. Shou ld the US
also withdraw into her own regi on, th en Britain would face the
proble ms of Europea n reconstruction and German resurgence wit h
no powerful ally.90
These were regarded as rea l possibilities because of Soviet sus-
picions and t heir overriding concern to ach ieve security against
102 Clmrrllill, Wilitellllll mul /II(' Soviet UI/ioll

Germany, which wou ld lead th em to take whatever cou rse seemed

most likely to ach ieve it. Soviet policy-make rs appeared to have a
definit e choice of policies invo lving a greater or lesser d eg ree of
collaboration with the Allies, and a choi ce of ex act ly w hat their
war aim was to be: expulsion of th e Germa ns (by force or negotia-
tio n ), the removal of th e 'Hit lerite' regime, or occupation and
destruction of Germany itself. Li n ked wi th the qu esti on of whether
they would continue the war w it h Germa n y beyond th ei r frontier s
was whether they wou ld p refer to rely o n t heir ow n resources to
e nsu re th ei r security, and take uni latera l act ions in th e limitroph e
states. The victo ri es o f the sum mer of 1943 and the advances that
followed opened up their option s. There was a rough-and-ready
consensus that actual Soviet o bject ives we re limit ed and rooted in
the quest for security. )ebb was o f the opin ion t hat w hile th e US
was ripe for expansionist activity, ' Ru ssia will , I feel pretty certain,
retain her state socialistic machine, a nd I very much d oubt whet her
thi s is really sui ted to any fo rm o f " imperialistic" expansion, even
if this was going to be th e instinctive Russia n urge after t he war -
and I personally do not believe it is.'91 The signs were anxiously
read to discove r what the Soviets had dec ided . The evidence was
no t definite, but the broad concl usion the FO reached by the start
of 1944 was that Stalin had decided to relegate independe nt action
to the statu s o f a rein sura nce policy.92 By contrast, t he US State
Departm ent suspected the Soviet s favoured unilate ralism. 93 Theor-
ie s of se n sitivity meant that un coo perative actions were not
necessarily viewed as clear evidence of such a policy - a nd the idea
o f the reinsurance policy implied that some mea sures wou ld be
taken to ha ve it ready and that there were certa in fund amenta l
actions that would be taken whether a lo ne wol f o r a coope rative
policy was to be followed . In additio n, it was thought that the
Soviets had probabl y only made p rovisio nal d ecisions abo ut post-
war policy; as pragma ti sts they wou ld wait to see how t hi ngs shaped
for a year or so after the end o f the war befo re finall y co mm itting
the m selves."·

The USSR as a Po tentia l Enemy

The prospect of Soviet isolation ism carried wit hin it the possibility
that Soviet policy would move a stage fu rther, to host il ity towards
Britain. Stalin 's Anglophob ia had bee n a cen t ral pa rt of Maclean's
thesis in 1940, a nd t he mutua l exhaustio n theory was fo unded o n
 Wolf, Bear or R('lrieva I'uppy? 103

the idea t hat Sta l.in saw that h is best interests lay in the reduction
of British (as well as German) power. After BARBAROSSA, Stalin's
need for all ies against the overwhelming German threat meant that
thi s option of Soviet policy was no longer considered an active
o ne. Stalin was seen as d riven by security motives, and ideological
fa ctors no longe r appeared in Briti sh anal yses. Through to the end
of the Church ill Coa liti on, there was to be no serious advocacy of
the idea t hat Stalin saw that his interests at present lay in hostility
towards Britain, beyond the possible coo lness in relations that might
follow from the lone wolf policy. However, this did not mean that
this was enti rely discounted as a possible scenari o for some point
in the future.
Given the st rategic positio n of the USSR, particularly if a Ger+
man defeat was postulated - and this was the only reaso nable basis
fo r planning - the issue of possible Soviet e nmity arose as soon as
postwar defence issues began to be discussed. Defen ce planning had
to consider possible enemies and if the destruction of the war-making
potentia l of Germa ny a nd Japa n was assumed there weTe few choices
left at t he level of major powers. In ear ly 1942, before the Anglo-
Soviet Treat y strengthen ed belief in Soviet commitment to
cooperatio n, the FO desired t hat the implications of future Soviet
e n mity be con sidered . Th e milita ry at this point were reluctant to
do this, having no inclination to specu late about a postwar world
that was a lo ng way Off. 9S A consequence of this mood was that
th e Mi litary Sub-Co m mittee (MSC) that was set up to di scuss mili-
tary aspect s of postwar problems was isolated from th e established
services plann ing orga n isation. 96
Later, th e military were more ready to conside r thi s Soviet op-
tion as a possibility; con currently the FO we re coming to believe
Soviet sensit ivit ies were such that if th ey sensed the British were
planning on thi s basis th ey would opt for unilateralism. Th e COS
and their planners accepted th e need for cooperation with the
Soviets as much as the FO, but their experi ence of wartime liaiso n
was not salutary. This led them at the best of t imes to be less than
optimistic. 11 is clear that by mid-1943 they were approaching the
Soviet question differently from the diplomatist s. [n August they
began to co nsi de r the problem s of postwar strategy, and in orde r
to do so, en larged and upgraded the MSC into the Post Hostilities
Planning Sub-Com mittee (PHPS/C).97 From the first PHPS/c papers
it is obvious t hat t he military h ad become concerned with how
Soviet and British interests might dash in a postwar world in which
104 Clmrrllill, Wilitellllll mul /II(' Soviet UI/ioll

they would face each ot her as victo rs in many areas. Any consider-
ation of strategic interests has to consider potential enemies, but
the particular cha nnels their investigation followed owed much to
their view that the USSR not only possessed the means, but also
that there was sufficient uncertainty about its intentions that it
had to be considered as a potential enemy. The non-inclusion of
the USA in such studies indicates that assumptions about inten-
tions werc as important as means in this selection . Furthe rmore,
they felt that thc options available to the Soviets, their past record
and their present equivocal attitude to the actual conduct of coop-
e rati on made this a reasonable assumption. 98 Th e first PHPS/c papers
dealt with specific subjects rather than broad strategy. They made
no global assumption about a Soviet threat; the USSR was simply
dealt with as the power against which a defence had to be main-
tained in a ce.rtain area and in a certain scena rio. 99
At this time the COS were sensitive to the 'awkwa rd repercussions'
if it became known outside official ci rcles that they were engaged
on such studies, and for their part the FO accepted the need for
continge ncy plans. Jebb noted that the Soviet attitude was a basic
factor in any postwar plans. If a friendly USSR was assumed, then
some involvement by it in Middle Eastern security would have to
be contemplated, for example. If there was any possibility of the
USSR being unfriendly, plans needed to be ready. Wa rner thought
the present omens were favourable; but that cooperation would
continue to the end of the war was 'on t est'. British policy was
certain ly to go all out for Soviet cooperation, and the response
was encouraging; a friendly and cooperative USSR should be the
working hypothesis. Britain , however, needed alternative plans to
meet the possibility of an uncooperative USSR. The FO assumed
this would be kept secret. lOO Th e important point for th e FO was
that they shoul d guide this process, for postwar strategy was on an
awkward bureaucratic interface between diplomatic and military
plann ing. The FO were thu s in volved in the production of the
PHPS/c's major Soviet appreciation, 'The Probable Long-term Impact
of Russian Strategic Policy on British Interests' . In its predictions
of Soviet policy the paper reflected the fe eling that the Soviets had
made a definite step towards the adoption of the third policy option,
cooperation, at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences. The military
were not immune to such feelings, and apart from some comments
by the JIC on matters of detail, the COS expressed no major objections
to the paper. IO! They did, however, feel uncomfortable with policy
 Wolf, Bear or R('lrieva I'uppy? 105

predictions as well as delays caused by FO in volvement in drafting.

Future papers were to avoid est imates of Soviet policy and focused
on what the Soviets amid do if hostile.102 Even this was to cause
disputes with the FO, such was the strength of the conviction that
had developed the re regarding the cooperation option .

The Third O ption: Cooperation - a nd How to Achieve it

The FO had co me to the conclusion that Stalin was interested in
cooperation in November 1941. From th ence, the principal British
concern was wheth er he was changing his mind, and how to dis-
suade him from doing so . The option of collaboration with Britain
over t he long term was viewed as an attractive but also a risky one
from St alin's point of vicw. After Eden's exper ience in Moscow, it
was concluded that Stali n was testing British attitudes with his fro ntier
demands. Stalin was assumed to be realistic enough to sec that in
the event of Victory, the Allies could not prevent him taking what
he wan ted in t he east. Hi s demands must therefore have some other
moti ve: a test of sin cerity, with fu ture collaboration in mind. This
in itself indicated to some what his present inclinations were - to
experiment with cooperation a nd sec how far his a ll ies would meet
hi s basic security req uirements. Th e acid test idea was agreed within
the Northern Department, and appealed to Sargent and Eden. Cadogan
was more sceptica l, but this was the viewpoint argued in Cab in et
by Eden, where it proved eventua lly to be persuasive.
[n t his fo rum, Eden argued fo r a pa rticular way of handling the
Soviets, drawn from his long-standing inclinations, reinforced by
his expe riences in Moscow, and showing signs of influence from
Crip ps and Beave rbrook. Inte restingly, Eden put forward his argu-
ments for concessions to secure long-term political cooperation before
there was much debate in the FO on what method was best to
secu re cooperation under the circumstances then prevailing. He and
Sarge nt developed their ideas quickly from the formulations of
November 1941 into the arguments put to the Wa r Cabinet in January
1942, leaving the rest of the FO to catch up. Thus, FO discussion
of the meaning of ' cooperation with the Soviets' - of what the
Briti sh want ed fr o m it and how to ach ieve it - carne after Eden
had already made t he case for concessions to the Cabi net. 101
Havi ng come to the conclusion that Stalin was considering war
and postwar cooperation with Britain, the prob lem the FO officials
saw was how to bring about working cooperation wit h such a difficult
106 Clmrrllill, Wilitellllll mul /II(' Soviet UI/ioll

and sensitive ally in a form that met British needs. I n this debate,
assumptions about the USS R played a cent ral role. British policy
was shaped by views of how the Soviets would respond to certain
types of action or treatment, and by views of what kind o f coop-
e ration Britain needed, in terms of duration and degree of intimacy.
Cripps and Beaverbrook both argued that the way to secure the
rig ht kind of cooperation was by convi nci ng the Soviets of British
s ince rity by granting concessions a nd t rea ting them as equa ls.
Beaverbrook was principally concern ed with making wartime coop-
e ration work: Cripps had always looked to the long term, and Eden
returned from Moscow both convinced of Soviet suspicions and of
the need to take positive measures to e nsu re coope rati on wou ld
last into the postwar era.
After Cripps left t he Em bassy in January 1942, the Charge d 'Affaires,
Baggallay, sent a num ber of telegrams which questioned the effec-
tiveness of sllch an a pproach. Writing at a time whe n Sov iet
confidence was sky-h igh as a conseq uence of thei.r winte r offensive,
he believed that Soviet sel f-centred ness a nd contempt for weakness
would mean that this approach cou ld not be the fo und ation of a
workable cooperative re lationship. He argued on the basis of the
old concept of the Soviet respect for strengt h: this meant that public
adulation of them needed to be reduced, and concessions shou ld
be linked to performance of cooperative acts, not mad e in advance
of themYI4
Warner picked this up and saw the need for a careful policy, not
on ly to bring out Soviet cooperativeness, but also to institute ac-
tu al co llaborat ion : as a pract ica l matter, not an abstract concept.
To Warner, this meant being both firm, as Bagga llay suggested, but
also frank. He believed the essentially ad /loc policy pu rsued thus
far had been simultaneously too concessionary and too uncoopera-
tive . He felt th e British should not seek to buy cooperati on, for he
assumed th e Soviets were drawn to it in their own interest, but on
the other hand, the British should be cooperative themselves. Soviet
needs had not been considered and they had not been brought
into any real consultati on . Policy shou ld com bine ' frankness' a nd
'fi rmness': this mean t drawing them into discllssions and plan ni ng,
whi le not shrinking from speaking to th em as one would to friends,
stating fr ankly British views and interests. Th is derived from t he
key perceptions of the Soviets - that they distrusted gestures of
goodwill, respected strength, but we re also highly sensitive about
being excluded from Allied decision -making. ' IJS
 Wolf, B('(lr Qr R('lri(>v('r I' uppy? 107

Bruce Lockhart used the same terms - 'firmness' and 'fran kn ess'
- but placed more emphasis on th e need to sat isfy Soviet needs
and desires . His e mphasis on Soviet sensitivity ch imed in with
Beaverbrook a nd Eden's views, and his ex tensive and apparently
authoritative formulat ions suppli ed the latter with a theoretical
foundation to what were effectively gut feelings. lockhart persua-
sively argued that the on ly way to treat the Soviet s was as the
governm ent of a Great Power like the USA . He was the first person
of any real influen ce in Whitehall to put forward a 'therapeutic
trust' argument; the Soviets if treated thus would then try to behave
appropriately. If patronised, however, they would on ly behave badly.
He endorsed Harriman 's view that

the only way is to purify our ow n hearts. If we suspect them,

e rgo they will suspect us. This is not far from my old fo rmu la of
1918: treat them like civilised beings and decent people, and
they will try to behave like civilised beings. Treat them like gang-
sters and they will out-gangste r gangsterdom.l(16

As Sa rgent put it, this did not mean Britain shou ld 't ry to pro-
pitiate Stalin by o ne-sided sacrifices a nd surrenders' . It did mean
c rea ting a sound basis for future rel at ion s by an alliance to cover
the war and postwar reconst ructio n of Europe, wh ic h meant making
some concessions to achi eve it, 'bu t if we want to prepare our re-
lations with the Soviet Govt. against the more d iffic ult pe riod ahead
of us, such concessio ns will be well wort h while', so tong as Stalin
made some too. Th is would form a foundation of confidence and
goodwill on wh ich to build Anglo-Soviet cooperation, a nd which
would help when difficult issues arose.I07
To deal with Soviet suspiciousness and xenophobia Lockhart rec-
ommended 'polite but firm directness'. At present, he thought, Britain
had no policy to the USSR, nor to Europe as a whole. Soviet sus-
picions were if an ything increasing. They felt they we re fighting in
isolation a nd t hat they had no share in the inner counsels of the
Angl o-A merica n al li ance. 'They are treating me', Stalin would think,
'as they treat their natives and negroes.' The variety of approaches
cove red by t he term 'fi rmn ess' is indicated by Lockhart's recom-
mendat ions. To him, 'firm d irectness' did not involve the rejection
of Soviet demands nor tough bargaining. The Soviets, he argued,
shou ld not be treated as infe riors. Britain appeased the Americans,
but did not appease the Soviet s. It was necessary to understand
108 Clmrrllill, Wilitellllll mul /II(' Soviet UI/ioll

Soviet psychology and examine the cond itions on which the part-
nership that Britain needed with the USSR had to be based. Hi s
suggestions therefore involved going further than Warner: giving
the Soviets their security demands, an equal say in the cond uct of
the war, the pooling of resources and a role in the European peace
settlement. It was unpleasant having the Soviets at strategic talks,
but it would be even more unpleasant havin g them wa lk out
of the partnership. Lockhart's doctrine was to 'give concessions
graciously now, and not have them dragged out of us later'. The
perception of Soviet se nsitivity on which Lockhart built this rec-
ommendation was to be a strong fa ctor in promoting this particular
approach over the other 'st raight talking' aspects of the frankn ess
method. los
Warner had wished to forward a paper con taining his and
BaggaJlay's ideas to be agreed upon as policy. He was overtaken by
the Cabinet's decision afte r further reflection to accept Soviet fron -
tier demands, in order to start building Soviet confide nce in
cooperationYl9 To Churchill, the halting of the Soviet offensive and
the prospect of further German advances in the summer made this
seem necessary, though he was not enthusiastic, and Attlee raised
no ob jection. Warner noted that it was decided not to proceed with
any directive on doctrine." o No reason was give n, but this was
clearly inopportune, as a change in attitude to one that would appear
less forthcoming would dispel all the potential advantage of the
concession. The perception of Soviet sensitivity caused the problem.
The concession was to be made to gain confidence - an essent ial
prerequisite if a frankness policy was not to appear retaliatory or
confrontationa l. But this then meant that until confidence could
clea rly be seen to be established, a less accommodating line was
difficult to initiate without raising the suspicions again. The di-
lemma was to appear repea tedly: erstwhile builders of a sound, frank
relationship along the Baggallay-Warner lines, including most FO
professiona ls, were continually having to deal with the in itial bad
impression created in the first months afte r BARBA ROSSA, when
British policy was imbued with the belief that unpleasant decisions
(for example, on declaration of war on Fin land) could be avoided
because th e USSR would be quickly defeated and the Soviet regime
disappear; subsequently the primary task always appeared to be to
expunge Soviet suspicions. Without this, neither 'fi rmness' nor 'frank-
ness' could be initiated. Co n sequentl y, the Government now
proceeded to cnter negotiation s for a Trea ty without an agreed
 Wolf, Be(lr or R.'lriev('r PIIPPY? 109

doctri ne on how to hand le the Soviet sj policy in this area continued

to be improvised a nd nothing was done to dampen down pub lic
adu lation (which was driven by domestic factors) nor to bu ild a
more 'regular' relat ionship such as wou ld permit of frankness and
the occasional argument, without this being interpreted as having
fundam e ntal effects on the issue of cooperation.
Given the perceived importan ce to Stalin of his fron t ier demand
as a test of Bri ti sh attitudes, it was considered a major triumph to
achieve the Anglo-Soviet Treaty in its final form with no mention
of fronti ers in it. This soon had an effect on attitudes without ref-
e rence t o the specia l circum stances that brought th e Treaty about;
the American attitude and the Soviet preoccupation with assuran ces
o f a second front in 1942 after the shock of defeat in the second
battl e of Khar'kov. The Soviets seemed to have moved to a more
accom modating posit ion by affirm ing their commitm ent to postwar
cooperation without a quid pro quO. II ! Th is inc reased the hopes and
dampened the fears evident earlie r. The positive feeling was increased
by relief that a domesti c pol itica l crisis had been avoided.
By the autumn of 1942, th e Brit ish had fina lly begun serious ly
to co nsider postwar plans. The issue of whether th e USSR could be
assumed to be a coopera tive power was central. Anglo-Soviet rela-
tions soured in September and October 1942. Even though this could
be attributed to Soviet anger about the suspe nsion of Arctic con-
voys after convoy PQl 7 suffered disastrous losses, and their anxiety
about the outcome of the battles at Stalingrad and in the foothill s
o f the Caucasus, there was concern with in the Fa that the Soviets
mi gh t be recon sidering the commitment and that they were exam-
ining the lone wo lf option .\\Z There was therefore great sati sfaction
when Sta lin appea red to come out in favour of th e cooperation
policy in h is speeches in November. 11 3 It was concluded, from these
public stat ements and some satis fa ctory telegrams to the Prime
Mi nister, t hat after so me debate within Soviet ruling circles, Stalin's
preference for cooperation had prevailed. IIi
The outcome of the fi rst Fa considerations of postwar planni ng,
under the auspices of the new Economic and Reconstruction De-
partment, was the Four- Power Plan. This assumed the best way to
avoid a repetition of the failures of the post-First World War settl e-
ment was to base any internationa l organisation squarely on the
realities of power. Central to the pla n was the assum ption that th e
Soviet Un ion would be one of the leading powers in the postwar
world and wou ld cooperate with Bri tain and th e United States in
110 Clmrrllill, Wililellllll mul 1/1(' Soviet UI/ioll

preserving t he peace. Th is was based pri ncipally on two fo unda-

tions: Stalin's speeches, and the conclusion that the lone wolf option
would be the more costly policy to the Soviets and would not offer
a comprehensive solution to the overriding problem of the con-
tainment of Germany. Soviet desires were described as two-fold:
to seek to erect some barrier against 'Europe' so as to be able to
restore the Soviet ' paradise' in peace, and to make every effort to
ensure that Europe was not united against them agai n . Th is meant
'making quite certain that t he power of Germany is effectively smashed
for as long a period as possible'. The confidence of the statement
in t he Four Power Plan paper was a reflection of t he strengt h of
the assumption about the way Stalin's security and reconstruction
needs would make the possibility of coope ration with Britain
attractive. I 15
The strength of the security perception did not mean that there
were not many questions t hat remained un answered for the FO
professionals and for Eden. The Northern Departmen t were con-
cerned with the practice of cooperation; Wa rne r and Dew were
sceptical about how this would work . 11 6 Warner warned th at while
the Soviets might be cooperative, they were still capab le of a lot of
what would seem from Whitehall ' m ischief maki ng', though they
should still be involved as much as possible. Warner's attitude, like
those of most his colleagues, was never free from hints of ambiguity
and conflicting emotional and inte llectual incli nations, fo r he was
also concerned to avoid t he impression of 'ganging up' with the
Americans to the exclusion of the Soviets, a nd asserted that it was
important to have the Soviets involved in practical collaboration
from the outse!.1 L7
Although maintaining his tone of scepticism, Warner conti nued
to assert through 1943 that the Soviets wanted coopera tion. More
fundamental doubts were expressed by Cavend ish-Ben ti nck and
Cadogan, who wondered whether the Kreml in would consider a
collaboration policy more profitab le than a volfe face (that is, a
peace with Germany and possibly even a return to a Rapallo policy).
However, Sargent and Eden endorsed the Northern Department view
that the Soviets were extremely unlikely to return to the German
option : this left a choice between iso lation beh ind a glacis or coop-
e ration (both directed against an inimical Germany), a nd the Soviets
seemed to be incli n ing towards the cooperation option . 118
Generally, therefore, FO discussion of the t h ird Soviet option
through 1943 focused not so much on the basic des ire of Stalin for
 Wolf, Bear or R('lrieva I'uppy? J II

good relations with the British, as on what this meant - what kind
of cooperation would he want, could the British accept, or ind eed
themselves want, and how could Sov iet policy be tested as to its
cooperativeness . The limitations of personal con tacts made this
difficult to do, especially since ideology was not regarded as a help-
ful guide to Stalin 's actions.
The diplomatists found the interest in agreements on wa r aims
that Stalin expressed to Clark Kerr in February 1943, and his dis-
conte nt at not being consuited about Allied decisions, to be evidence
bot h that he wished for cooperation and that his sensitivities mean t
that the sooner some structure of cooperation was created, th e bet-
ter. '1 9 The ultimate resuit was the European Advisory Commission
(EAC), which Eden succeeded in getting establi shed at the Moscow
Conference in 1943; though in practice a fo rum for frustration rather
than cooperation, its establish me nt was seen as a step forward in
the long process of accustoming the Soviet s to 'nor mal' diplomatic
cooperat ion. ' 20
The thrust of perceived Soviet views of their interests was seen
to pO int to coope rat io n, but there was less cla rity about what was
meant by 'cooperation ' and what it would involve. Churchill saw
it as a wa rtime co mradeship, though a more distant one than that
with the USA. He was not interested in involvi ng them in struc-
tured three-power cooperatio n, for th ei r obsession with the second
front wou ld damage Anglo-American intimacy as well as produce
strategiC decisions he wished to avoid. '2' The FO ge nerally seem to
have envisaged some kind of consu ltative arrangement that would
produce a joint benign oversight of, but without close intervention
into, the stat es cast and west of Germany - hence their enthusiasm
for a ' self-denying ordinance' o n involvement in eastern Europe,
which was supposed to mean neither Power would reach unilateral
ag reement s with states in the region. '22 Some, such as Wilson and
Ronald , thought th is was not enough, and were exa mining the
possibi lities of trade and cultu rallinks. 123 The aim of this was much
the same as t he consu ltation idea - to get the Soviets used to nor-
mal intercourse between states, in the hopes that th is would prevent
such differences as were bound to e merge from ruining overa ll
relations. Cooperati on would have sufficiently strong foundations
to withstand occasional disagreements, as seen in relations with
the USA.
It was not clear, however, what was the best way actually to bring
working cooperation into being. Dissatisfied with Churchill 's ad Iloc
112 Clmrrllill, Wililellllll mul 1/1(' Soviet UI/ioll

policy, which combined concessions and adulation wit h a refu sal

to discuss issues like t he second fron t fra nkly with the Soviets, Warne r
and othe rs pressed fo r a firm but fair policy that was rationa l and
reciprocal on the individually mundane but cumu latively import-
ant matters that tended to arise, especia lly milita ry ones; not to
close cooperation down, but to make it more productive and sound. l 24
The key words were still 'fi rmness' and ' frankn ess'. They derived
from an esse ntial belief in the possib ilities of cooperation (wha t
Wa rner called the ' broad st rategy'), but a belief tha t methods until
then had been counter-productive: th ey mi ght keep content ion at
a minimum, but they cou ld not lay the foundations for the give-
and-take of real cooperation . 12 S When they advocated 'fi rmness',
FO officials did not mean hard ba rgaining. Wa rn er feared that
Church ill and Ede n tended to see t h is in the crude terms of the
old controversy dating back to th e Beaverbrook mission about bar-
ga ini ng or not bargaining. 126 Th ere were subtle differences, resu lting
from the adm ixture of the ol d view of Soviet policy as self-interested
a nd realist with the new percepti on o f thei.r desire for coopera tion,
with also a concern to mitigate the effect of their sensitivity and
suspicio n. The differentiation fro m bargai ning, which derived from
the same doctrine of se lf-interested ness, was too su btl e for some;
notably Martel, appointed head of 30 Mission at th e start of 1943
as part of the COS's attempt to get better liaison . 1Z7
The military certa inly thought cooperat ion could be improved ,
though they believed it wou ld always be limited. To them it mainly
meant the Soviets providing more intelligence and better coopera-
tion over issues connected with running the convoys . They were
not inclined to give crede nce to th e idea of Soviet hypersen Si-
tivity. Th ey accepted the stereotype that the Soviets, as Asiatics a nd
realists, respected a fi rm interest-based approac h and like an yone
with a propensity to bully responded best to stre ngth . Any sensi-
tivity th ey possessed would be manifested in suspicion at gratuitous
acts and declarations of goodwill. Brooke and his colleag ues wa nted
relations on a fairer basis in which Britain did not do all the giving.
The military therefore emphasised ' reciprocity' as the correct method
for handling t he Sov iets. They reject ed t he Sovie t poi nt of view,
for which t here was some sy mpathy in the FO and in SO£, that
th e rel ation shi p was asymmetrical, in that the Soviet s we re already
doing far more than the British in the war effo rt, and that therefore
if th e British could not get in volved in large-scale ground combat,
they should give what t hey could in othe r ways.121!
 Wolf, Bear or R('lrieva I'uppy? 113

As a concom itant to 'fi rmness', the Embassy and Northern De-

partm ent pressed that it was im portant to discu ss all matters frankly
with the Soviet s, including un pleasant o nes; th e probl em wit h the
concessiona ry policy was that the avoidance of con tentious issues
had mean t that virtually nothing was di scussed with t he Soviets.
Now, Clark Kerr, Wilson, Warner and Lockhart felt that more openness
in confronting and thrash in g out issues would improve coopera-
tion, w hich impl ied di sagreeme nts would not be serious, at least
not so fa r as to imperil cooperation. 129 Eden liked such an approach
to cooperati on, bui lt around plans and agreements, and called it
'bell ing the cat ' .uo
The most prominent new factor was the belief that a regular ra ther
than an ad lwe relationship was possible wit h the Soviets. In a
sense this paralleled Churchill 's bel ief that he could establi sh a useful
working relatio nship with Stali n - though in 1943 he still esch ewed
pape r comm itm ents fo r the postwar e ra and sought to bu ild the
relationship purely on a fighti ng partners hip against l-l it ler.1l1 The
FO officia ls fo r their part wanted to clear up their uncerta inties of
Soviet postwar intentio ns: doing so had th e two-fold function
of puttin g coope ration into practice and clearing potential areas of
futur e d ispute. They came up against Church ill's reluctance to di s-
cuss such contentious issues, and the fact that the British had vague
ideas th emse lves about postwa r political aims. The Atlanti c Charte r
and the agreement with the Americans not to agree any territo ria l
changes until afte r th e wa r implied a preference for the statu s quo
(llIte belllllll . The re was reluctan ce to develop Briti sh attitudes a ny
furthe r. Thi s left the British to react to eve nt s and to appear to be
sta nding in t he way of change. 13Z Without British decisions on what
their own views were, the re was simply no scope fo r a 'frank ex-
c ha nge'; instead , policy continued to be ba sed on avoiding issues
and responding to problems as th ey arose in ways that wou ld not
rock the cooperati ve boat in the short term . Th ere was th erefore
no fo llow-up to th e February 1943 Clark Kerr- Sta lin talks.
'Fran kness' implied t reating the Soviets as equal and trusted allies:
indeed making a special point of it in view of th eir suspicions. But
as Lockh art had fo und ea rlier, th e thes is of sensitivity wo rked bot h
ways: they wanted to be treated fairl y, with not hing kept from them,
but they were al so very suspi cious a nd eas ily offended by unpleas-
ant things wh ich in the normal co urse of coope ration would
occasionally have to be said to the m. The idea of Soviet hypersensi-
tivity regarding British poli cy a nd their own prestige impli ed certai n
114 CJmrclJill- Wititellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Unio u

poss ible effe ct s that were too dangerous to ignore. As issues arose
it seemed se nsible to soft-pedal on 'frankness' for the sa ke of not
upsett ing existi ng cooperation, even on such a major matter as the
Katyn massacre. 1lJ The Soviets, it was st ill felt, wou ld be highly
sensitive about a cha nge of direct ion in British policy. Th ey would
not understand the subtleti es of th e c hange of approach a nd would
think that British policy was hardening in preparation for the postwar
world, a nd would shape their pO licy accordi ngly. While the Sovie t
decision for cooperation was seen as still a provisio nal one, it see med
prudent to be ca reful - and late r in 1943, after the Moscow and
Tehera n confe ren ces when Soviet policy seemed more fir mly set, it
did not seem wise to provoke co ntention wh en cooperation was
proceeding better.
In the absence of in formati on rega rd ing long-term Soviet policy,
actual Soviet behaviour was sti ll taken by Churchi ll and Eden and
the military as a gU id e. Many in the FO did so too, though there
were also warn ings agai nst drawing too large conclus ions from this.
Equ ally, the assumed Soviet fear of 'ga ngi ng up' and their desire to
be involved remained part of the everyday cu rre ncy of debate. These
facts expla in why the course, ch aracter and outcome of the Mos-
cow and Teheran Conferences were construed to indi ca te the result
of the internal Soviet policy debate and a new stage in t he Soviet
comm itment to cooperation, and why at the start of 1944 th e pros-
pects seemed bright. 134 It was not so much that categorica l evidence
was provided at these conferences of the direction of Soviet policy
in important acid test areas, for it was not and much re mained
unclear. Wha t was influe ntial was th ei r general demeanour of co-
operativeness. 1lS A War Cab inet discussion on 2S January indicated
the st rength the cooperative assumption had ga ined , particularl y
sin ce th e con text was a pessimistic di scuss ion about Poland . More-
over, a story in Pravda repeating separate peace rumours had raised
British hackl es. Despite thi s the Cab inet agreed that the re was no
gro und for thinking the Soviet s would not stick to any agreements
reached, nor that th ey took Treat y ob liga tion s lightly: they 'h ad
much to gain by maintaining the good relations established at the
Moscow and Teheran Conferences', and gene rally there was every
reason to believe that the USS R wanted to coopera te with the US
and Britain. 136
There was thus at the start of 1944 a co mplex of assumptions
about the USSR prod ucing a rough agree ment across the War Cab-
inet and the FO that th e Soviets could be involved in postwar
 Wolf, Bear or R('lrieva I'uppy? 115

cooperation; cooperation in terms of a polltical alliance. The actual

process of th is cooperation had not really been discussed, nor its
limitations. It was not clear to what extent the British and Soviets
were expected t o get politically mixed up, or their spheres to be
separated, though there was lip-service to the idea that 'Europe is
one'. The shape a nd pu rpose of future military cooperati on was
even less clear (though it was clear one of th e limitati ons was mili-
tary secrets, incl uding atomic resea rc h). These issues all needed to
be worked through, and much of the debate in 1944 was concerned
with them, building on the basic assumption that Stalin was coop-
e rative. This left plenty of uncertainty as to the kind of cooperation
he or the Britis h wanted . It is clea r, however, tha t the cooperative
option, whateve r that amounted to, was believed to have become
the favoured one for Stalin. While alternative polici es we re open
to him, and he had continuing test s of Allied sin cerity on which
cooperation was co ntingent, it met hi s security needs, his internal
requirements, a nd not least, sati sfied h is vanity by placing him at
th e ce ntre of direction of world affairs. Stalin was seen to fav our
cooperation as h is best option , but not because he loved his allies.
Relations could at t imes be difficult. and there wou ld not always
be a mee ting of mi nds, but as Churchil l particularly felt, thi s was a
relationship based on a strong common interest , not se ntim ent o r
c ulture.
While it was clea rl y in British interest that the Soviets engage in
cooperation , th e belief that t he FO and Cabinet had come to ac-
cept by t he start of 1944 t hat the USSR wo uld give cooperati on a
try was based upon a range of perceptions of the USS R that logi-
cally supported such a conclusion, not just wishful thinking. Rece nt
resea rc h in Soviet archives suggests that thi s conclusio n was a rea-
sonable one to make. The Soviet Government had ind eed made a
decision to ma ke cooperation with the Allies its prime policy, though
thi s was, as Warner perceived, ' on test'. 137 The conclusio n was not
accepted without doubts or careful examination of the various Soviet
policy options, and few of t he profess ional s or politicians had put
aside all thei r reservations. Howeve r, by the end of 1943, th e basic
point was established for the FO, Eden and Church ill, and th e alter-
native Soviet policies for th e time being at least appeared unlikely
to be fo llowed.
5
'Probable Tendencies of Soviet
Foreign Policy'

During 1944 the thesis of Soviet cooperation was developed to its

fullest extent. A range of papers was produced in the cou rse of an
extensive, if unstructured, debate on the assumptions that might
safely be made about future Soviet policy. With in the FO there was
plenty of caution , though in commun icat ions to representatives
abroad and to other parts of the Government, points were stated
more firmly. The crucial core perceptions were well established ,
however, not on ly in the FO, but wider in the Governme nt; par-
ticularly the security motivation and Soviet co ncern about
reconstruction and interna l development. What were less certain,
and about which individuals were uncomfortably aware that they
st ill had on ly imperfect evidence supplemented by deduction , were
the details of specific Soviet policies and the cou rse of the assumed
policy debate in the USSR.

Further Analysis of th e Cooperation Option

Between October 1943 and Apri l 1944 the FO Departments worked
on a paper to provide the PHPS/c with guidance regarding Soviet
policy. This required the FO to formulate conclusions on issues about
wh ich there had been some uncertainty. The final paper explored
the extent of knowledge about Soviet extern al policy and its moti-
vations, and identified 'probable t ende n cies' . Ede n found it
'remarkable' . The central tenets were the product of t he debate and
analysis that had been proceeding since November 1941, a nd drew
o n key assumptions that had been established earl ier, in the 1940-41
pe riod . The Soviet Union was now characterised, in contrast to the
ea rly 1940 view, as immensely strong and we ll organised, provided

116
 'Probable Tj'm/t'/Jcil'S or Soviet Furf;'I{IJ Po licy' II?

that satisfa ctory reconstruction took place. It was stated that though
it was difficult to predict Soviet policy, there were certain fix ed points.
Internally, the USSR wou ld remain highly centralised, with publ ic
ownership and planning of the means of production. Its major interest
wou ld be reconstruction and furth e r development. £xternally, the
primary Soviet poli cy would be the search for security against the
Power or Powers that might threaten these internal devel opments,
and the especia l fear would be of a Ge rman recove ry. Si nce it was
further assumed that Soviet leaders were rea lists, not ideologues,
this produced the assertion that security would be attempted through
cooperation with Britain and th e Un ited States. In the pre·war
period foreign affairs had been subordinated to internal needs. With
their domestic preoccupat ions aggravated by the war, the Soviets
were unlikely to fo llow a purely expansionist policy. Th eir overall
aim s were nationali stic, not those of world revolu tion, though they
would not become capital ist. The Soviets co uld be expected to want
th eir 1941 fr onti ers, fri endly governments in eastern Europe and
effecti ve measures to restrain Germany. Th ey would be suspicious
if right-wi ng governments were set up elsewhere in Europe . The
wa r was seen to have consolidated the hold of the regime, whil e at
th e sa me time strengthening t he movement away from revolution-
ary dogma back to the traditional organi sation of society. It had
provided the chance to remove for good th e threat fr om Germany
and Japan, and had given th e USS R the c hance to get o n terms of
eq uality a nd cooperation with the remai ning world powers, thus
providing the opportu nity to co nccntratc on internal problems
without fea r of ex ternal aggression or co unter-revo lution. While
tend ing to apply simple but drastic tests of the real inte ntions of
foreig n cou ntr ies, including allies, the Soviet s were dep ict ed as
sa tisfi ed that cooperatio n wa s the best assu rance of security, so
long as the Briti sh a nd America ns did not threat en their internal
developme nt no r fu el their suspi cio ns abo ut a cordol/ sal/itaire in
east ern Europe such as wou ld prevent them from dealing with any
German problem. The theses of Soviet sensitivity, sense of inferior-
ity and susp iCious ness were also woven into th e analysis, with
some acknowledgement that met hods sh ould not be seen as a guide
to aims. Even if the Sovie ts decided on a lone wolf pol icy, they
were unlikely to take actions that would risk involving them in a
maj or war for at least five years. Sargent added that any friction
with the Briti sh wou ld not be ideological but over the treatment
of Germany.1
118 CJmrclJill- Witilellllll mtll tlt(' Soviel Uniou

There was a note of caution in the state ment that long-standing

suspicions made it necessary to begin building con fidence during
the war to prevent deterioration thereafter. The reasons why it might
become difficult we re the ethnic Russian capaci ty for suspicion and
the legacy of at least 125 yea rs of Anglo-Russian hostility, the progress
of t he USSR to self-sufficiency and impregnab il ity, and the differ-
ence of outlook between a ' war-weary, libera l and ki.ndly Britain'
and 'a vigorous, intensely nationalistic Soviet Union '. The present
wartime situation of mutual need therefore offe red a ch ance that
must not be missed. The FO were clear t hat though Soviets were
realists, thei r estimate of their interests depended upon thei r as-
sessment of the threats from and attitudes of ot he rs. Th is shaped
FO recommendations on how to handle the Sovie ts and was the
source of much of the acrimony in t he subsequen t dispute with
the COS. 2
In a furthe r paper, the possibil ity of d iffere nces of opinion in the
Soviet decision-making elite and t he need to encourage the coop-
erative elements was stressed.] The overa ll sense in the Fa was t hat
Soviet poliCies were developing along favourable lines, but were
not firmly fixed. Unwelcome aspects cou ld sti ll appear, without
necessarily being signs that cooperation had been re jected , though
clearly requiring careful British responses.· The re was a sense t hat
these were still best guesses, as Warner pointed out in a minute on
a dissenting paper from O'Malley, but the weight of opinion after
Teheran was that cooperation was t he preferred Soviet option, COIl-
ditional all their perceptions of British policies. s
These points were developed further in response to views outside
the Fa, notably those of the military and of Duff Cooper, now the
British re presentative with the French Nationa l Com mittee, and a
strong advocate of the format ion of a western Eu ropean group led
by Britain. One of his central justificatio ns for such a po licy was
the potential of the USSR to dominate Europe. He wrote that the
'Bolshevik bogey' was a bogey, but had been succeeded by a real
Soviet danger. The Soviets had it wit hin t heir means, he thought,
to subjugate the whole of Europe. Duff Cooper claimed the alli-
ance with the USSR would be a case o f the wolf lyi ng down with
the lamb, and drew comparisons with Hitle r, Kaiser Wilhelm II and
Napoleon, to which Eden countered, 'but what do the Soviets want?'
and rejected the analogy. The Fa ge nerally accepted t he need to
develop a Western grouping, but re jected the idea of building it as
a defensive measure against a Soviet threat , t hough they did wish
 'Provable Teml"'j(;/:S or Soviet Fl)re(~1I Policy' 119

to limit Soviet influence, and saw that the group would inciden-
tally offer a useful defence against the USSR as well as Germany.1i
Jebb fou nd Duff Cooper's despatch 'maste rly', reflecting as it did
h is own views o n western Europe, but added: 'we think it extremely
unlikely Russia will atte m pt the domination of Europe.' Harvey's
response was to agree that the principa l uncertainty was the Soviet
Union. The test of the alliance would be treatment of Germany.
There was risk of estrangement, since Soviet policy would be tougher
than British public opinion would endorse. The Soviets might then
fall back on the alternative of a Communist Germany, but more
likely was that they would simply entrench themselves in eastern
Europe, stubbornly and uncooperatively. He believed Duff Cooper
was right to advocate a west ern bloc, but that he did so for the
wrong reasons. Th e USSR and France were natural allies against
Germany fo r geographical reasons, and France, the Low Countries
and Norway cou ld share in the task of contro lling Germany. This
need not make Stalin suspicious, for he had suggested such an
approach to Eden in December 1941. Without the Anglo-Soviet al-
liance there was the ri sk of the division of Europe with Germany
playing one half off against the ot her. With it, the mo re effectively
west and cast Europe were 'articulated for cooperation' the better.
Britain shou ld keep western Europe from Germany as the USSR would
keep Poland and Czechoslovakia, both systems bound by the Anglo-
Soviet alliance. Thus, to Harvey, the bloc scheme, which the FO
favoured, could only work to Britain's interest if over-arched by an
Anglo-Soviet collaboration, not as an alternative or reinsurance against
its failure .7
Sargent agreed with Harvey that the western bloc would be wel-
come as part of a n Anglo-Soviet system against Germany but as a
defensive system against possib le future Soviet aggression would be
a dangerous experiment that might precipitate the very evils it was
intended to guard against. Eden summed up the centrality at this
point of the relationship with the USSR in FO thought, writing
that the Anglo-SOViet allia nce was 'the arch of our policy with close
associa tion with Weste rn Europe the Western buttress'. ~ A western
group was seen as a good way to avoid a power vacuum in Europe
which the Soviets would feel they would have to fill in their own
securi ty int erest; the perception that the Soviets feared disorder was
at this time a stronger influence than fear of Soviet expansion for
ideological reasons. Plans shou ld be based on including both Brit-
ain and the USS R in European cooperation. 9 The Anglo-SOViet Treaty
120 CJmrclJill- Wititellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Uniou

was to be the basis of Britain 's European policy, providing the link
that would assuage Soviet suspicions of a n exclusive bloc and as-
su re them that the bloc was directed against Germany, even though
it was considered that if the World Organisation failed and the
Soviets stopped cooperating, a western bloc would then (but only
then) be some defence against the USSR as well as Germany. lO
The FO was to state the same view in response to the PHPS; their
policy was to make the Anglo-Soviet Treaty a reality, draw the Soviet
Union into closer collaboration in world affai rs whenever possible
and desirable, and oppose any renewed tendency on its pa rt to
withdraw into isolation. It was founded on the concept that after
the war the Soviets would be primarily interested in peaceful con-
ditions on their borders (for internal development), and coloured
by fears of the lone wolf policy and an ongoing internal Soviet
policy debate. British consciousness of their own weakness, fears
about containing Germany and uncerta inty about Ameri ca n post-
war poliCies strengthened the resolve to fix upon this policy and
increased the importance of ensuring in every way possible that
British actions did not jeopa rdise the possibilities of its achievement.
The genuine perceptions of Soviet sensit iviti es and suspicions then
came into play to shape FO reactions to others' recommendations. II

The Cooperative USSR Thesis is Put to the War Cabinet

The definitive FO view on Soviet policy was put to the War Cabi-
net in two major papers, WP(44)304 ' Soviet Policy in the Balkans'
and WP(44)436, 'Soviet Pol icy in Europe'. The Balkans paper was
compi led by the Southern Department , which now included Dew.
The or iginal impetuses for this were Eden's worries about Soviet
policy in Italy and the broader expression of concern coming from
Churchill. When Churchi ll expressed such views however, imply-
ing a large Soviet aim in the Balkan s and beyond, Eden had attempted
to moderate such views, and conversely, on the Italian issue, Churchill
had been much less concerned at possible Soviet incursions. 12 The
FO characteristically sought to layout authoritatively what was known
and what cou ld be guessed about Sov iet aims in thi s area, wh ich
woul d provide guidelines to lessen extravagant swi ngs of opinion
between optim ism and pessim ism .
The analysis of the Balkans issue was founded on the assumption
that Soviet policy was based upon realism and directed towards
achieving secu rity for the Soviet state and regime. It was co nsidered
 'Probable Tj'm/t'/Jcil'S or Soviet Furf;'I{IJ Policy' 121

that t he Soviets were certain ly seeking to acquire a dominant influ-

ence in the Balkans, though Eden warned that there must be care
to guard against th e supposition that a clash of interests was inevi -
table. Britain shou ld bu ild up her influence but avoid a direct
c halle nge or a suggestion that this was a direct counter to Soviet
influence. This was in line with the image of the USSR outlined in
th e Probable Tende ncies paper. WP(44)304 distinguished between
the spread of Com mun ism and of Soviet influence:

The Russians are, generally speaking, out for a predom inant po-
si tio n in South-East Europe, and are using the Communist-led
movements in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece as a means to an
end, but not necessarily as an e nd in itself.

As far as Greece was concern ed, the Soviets had agreed to let the
British take the lead, thoug h if things did not work out well there
they might yet fish in troubled waters. Whi le voicing conce rn and
discussing pol icies to cou nter excessive Soviet influence, the FO were
t rying to place Soviet action s in perspective; in term s of historica l
Russia n securit y aims, and in t erms of a Soviet Union not seeking
to propagate world revolution nor confront British interests . 13
This intention was not always picked up. Cranborne, th e Colo·
nial Secretary, commented that Soviet policy was a danger everywhere,
and that t he principles in the Balkans paper needed to be applied
in Eu rope as a whole. Cadogan and Eden agreed on the need for a
paper defi ni ng Bri tish pol icy to Europe as a who le. u The task fell
to Warner, a nd t he result was a paper on Soviet influence in Europe
and t he extent to which purely British influence could be main-
tained against it. So WP(44)436 arose out of the concern being
voiced by ma ny ou tside the FO, such as Duff Cooper and Cra nborn e,
about the likely expansio n of Soviet influence in Europe after the
war. The FO shared that conce rn , but on the basis of the core as-
sumptio ns t hey had formed about Soviet policy they did not share
the pessimism of these individuals. The paper served the dual purpose
of laying ou t a very broad strategy for the maintenance of British
influence a nd also of assuring those who were apprehensive that
there were good reasons for not tak ing a pessim istic view of
the sit uation. Thus t he paper d id not arise out of a mood of wild
optimism; there was sober caution, as Warner had pointed out to
O'Malley, and awareness of the specu lative base of the analysis.
Only certain poi nts seemed definite, but they added together to
122 CJmrclJill- Wititellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Uniou

suggest a strong possibility that the Soviets would try cooperation,

at least for five years.
The argument was based on the reconstruction a nd security theses.
The main Soviet aims we re described as rehabil itation and internal
development. The search for secu rity was shaped by the threat of a
revived Germany: 'both the Soviet Government and the Soviet people
must dread the possibility of Germa n recovery.' The re might be
friction over Soviet behaviour - 't hey dea l in drastic methods' -
and they would be affected by their perceptions of Briti sh and US
attitudes towards Germany and the cou nt ries between Soviet Un ion
and Ge rmany:

their aim of working with us to keep Germany down and their

desire not to combi ne Europe with Germany against Russia would
almost certainly suffice to restrain them both from using the
methods of undisguised power politiCS in their dealings with othcr
countries and from trying to exercise an undue influence in their
internal affairs.

Emphasis was placed on the idea that there wece two schools of
thought in the Soviet policy-making machinei the cooperative school
led by Stalin was seen to be in t he ascendant, but all depended on
the Allies giving satisfaction in the treatment of Germany. The hand
of the co llaborationists should be strengthened by paying regacd to
reasonable Soviet demands and consulting them fr eely and frankly.
It was open to Britain to reduce any da nger by dextrous diplomacy
as well as taking preventative measu res .
The FO did not depict Soviet policy in over-idealistic terms, though
there was surprising optimism over the prospect s for Poland . The
Soviets could be expected to seek to exte nd their infl ue nce, though
they would not Sovietise territories beyond their 1941 frontie rs. An
important attitude ascribed to the Soviet s was that they would see
it was only Germany - and Japan - that could be a direct menace,
whereas th e other Powers neither could nor would wish to do so .
Stalin was a realist not an ideologist: 'before and during the war
the emphasis in Russia has entirely and necessa ri ly been on effi-
cien cy, discipline and achievement, not on political theories.' Thus,
in the case of Ital y,

if the Soviet Government arc interested in post-war Ital y and

arc resolved to exe rcise influ ence the re, th is is not merely or
 ' Probable Tj'm/t'/Jcil'S or Soviet Furf;'I{IJ Policy' 123

even at all because they wish to impose a Commun ist regime on

Italy, but beca use they will see in a strong Comm unist party the
best guaran tee against the dange r of Italy being drawn back into
th e German orbit.

Coopcrati on was their prime policy and other policies would be

tailored so as not to harm it. There would still be rivalry with Moscow,
and the attractions of the Soviet line to Europeans would have to
be counteracted; the problem was to do this without jeopa rdi sing
coopera tion and th e Fa were concerned to keep con trol of this
process, especially when the idea of a western bloc was being rai sed
in d ifferent quarters. If thi s was achieved, the forecasts based on
these assumptions about Stalin and his policy were 'on the whole
favourable' , for the Soviets would 'wish to avoid directly indispos ing
the Anglo-Saxon democracies by undue interference in European
countries'. IS

Th e Deba te between th e FO and th e Mili ta ry

While the Fa were developing and refining this interpretation, they
were involved in exchanges with the COS/ PHPS/c, ostensibly ove r
the issue of th e potential enmity of the USSR. The debate, how-
ever, did not rea ll y hinge o n this issue, for the FO agreed the USSR
might be an enemy at so me paint. It was the perception of Soviet
sensit ivities that created the gulf between the FO and the COS.
The Fa believed the Soviet attitude towards cooperation would be
c rucially affected by their perception of the attitudes and inten·
tions of t hei r allies. The COS disagreed with this basic assumption.
Furthermo re, Fa officials and Eden were annoyed that the military
should plan on the basis that most likely scenario was that a ro-
directed , Cabi net·approved policy would fail.
The PHPS/c's fi rst paper on Soviet policy, PHP(44) 13(O). had re·
fleeted the North ern Department's positive feelings about Soviet
cooperativeness and the limited . realistic nature of their policies.
The jlC concurred, though they voiced so me doubt about the as-
sumpt ion that the Soviets would not under any circumstances
coun tenan ce a revival of German power, even if under their can·
trol. The PHPS/c fully accepted the reconst ruction thesis; the JIC
view was that whi le rehabilitation of Soviet liberated areas would
take at least five years, development elsewhe.re in the USSR had
been going on all the time. To overestimate the need for rehabilitation,
124 CJmrclJill- Wititellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Uniou

th ey warned, might lead to an und erestimate of Soviet defensive

potential. The PHPS/c concluded that t he Soviets would give coop-
e ration a try.' 6 Howeve r, t hey went on in subseq ue nt papers to
loo k at worst cases. They made a po li tical assu m ption to di scount
the chances of US enmity and a furthe r o ne to assume Germany
and Japan would have been rendered powerless. 17 Th ey saw the
USSR as the on ly power with the capacity to be an ene my, though
the PHPS/c and PHPS papers never made m uc h att empt to assess
th at capacity, making instead swee pin g assertions about Soviet
capabilities quite at va ri a nce with the t hesis of Soviet devastation .
Soviet aims were assumed to be security a nd internal develo pment,
but there was no certai nty that th e Soviets would not be a threat
in less than ten yea rs, nor that a world o rga nisatio n would success-
fully guarantee Britain's defence. 18
After May 1944, th e Comm ittee became a Staff of the COS, th e
PHPS, with the in tention of bringing it closer into the machinery
in an analogous role to the J PS. It was restaffed with younger officers.
Jebb was retained as Cha irm an until he was withdrawn by the FO
in August in disagreement over the presentation of the USSR in
PHPS papers. Even befo re that h is position had become somewhat
anomalous. Despite th e changes the PHPS did not rea lly become
integrated with ex isting mac hin ery. It was somew hat out on a limb
through it s involvement only in future strategiC matters rather than
operational issues and it had no lin k to the Intelligence depart-
ments either.19
The PHPS continued to accept the assumption t hat the Soviets
woul d need at least ten yea rs to reconstruct. Basing themselves o n
PHP(44)13(O), th ey al so assumed the Soviet Union wou ld at least
try cooperation . This did not prevent them considering the possi-
bility of Soviet expans ion ism, no r of th e Soviets continuing their
trad itiona l policy of ca using trouble in places vital to the British
Empire. They clea rl y saw the USS R as a t best a difficult pa rtne r,
and in any event as a potentially disrupti ve force in the postwar
world . One of the PHPS's inh erent assumptions was that despite its
domestic needs, of wh ich th e North ern Departmen t made such a
pOint, the USSR would concentrate much of its effort in the recon-
stru ction period on building up those areas of its armed forces in
wh ich it was deficient - a strategi c bomber force and an ocean-
going navy. Thus while agreeing that t here would be a reconstruction
period, they had a different conception of what the order of priorities
would be.zo
 'Provable Teml"'j(;/:S or Soviet Fl)re(~1I Policy' 125

It was on the basis of these assumptions that Britain 's defences

appeared so vul nerable. There was no tech nical appreciation in the
PHPS papers of the actual Soviet capability to achieve such rearm~
ament after the devastation of war, either in terms of industrial capacity
o r tech nological knowledge. The implication was that it would be
given a high priority, as a natural course of action for the Soviet
regime. There was no qualitative assessment of Soviet arms or the
likely deployment of Soviet forces ~ th ey were cred ited with unlim·
ited resources and the ability to develop them all simultaneously.
It is no wonder that the USSR appeared such a dangerolls foe. Each
regional survey assumed unlimited Soviet forces would be available
and deployable in that sector, without regard to needs elsewhere.
None of this bore any relation to what had been learned about the
Soviet forces or inte rnal economy during the war. There was no
indication o f how t he USSR was going to build such huge forces
and sim ultaneously improve the road and rail infra structure of the
country to the level necessary within ten years. These broad as-
sumption s were pe rhaps th e natural resu lt of poor information
(though it was not non-existent and there is little reference in the
papers to factual evidence o r cross-referencing to the many relevant
MEW or jle papers) and of the worst-case scenario which e ncouraged
consi d erat ion of th e worst imaginable situatio n . Th ey were,
however, a serious weakness of the papers which brought the more
tendentious po liti ca l assu mption s into greater prominence and
prompted FO reactions that these papers were 'childish' and 'pre-
paratory schoo l stuff'Y
The mili tary staffs as a whole had developed a grudging admira-
tion for Soviet mili tary achievements. At the same time a patronising
attitude was evident towards the Soviets personally and on matte rs
of technology. The strengt h of the Red Army was its numbers and
the ruthless way it was handled wh ich made up for lack of sophis-
tication in other fields. The PHPS pape rs implied that this situation
would not last a nd Soviet manpower resou rces and morale would
be backed by increasing technical progress. This sat uncomfortably
with the co ntinued tendency to regard Soviet technology as low-
grade a nd to see the educationa l and intellectual deficiencies of
the Soviet soldier to be a real impediment to such progress. The
jlC set out to provide the PHPS with some guidance on this isslLe.
Their paper, JIC(44)366(O), was described by Sloan in the FO Ser-
vices Liaison Department as 'explosive' and it was given vel}' restricted
circulation. Wa rd Oebb's deputy on the PHPS), however, found it
126 ClmrclJill, Wllllellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Union

'most interesting and valuable' and, si nce paragraph 2 endorsed

the FO view, thought it ought to cool the heads of the PHPS, though
he doubted it would. 22
The jle's paper was such as to satisfy both sides of the a rgu-
ment; indeed, it illustrates the different approaches that kept the
servicemen and diplomatists at loggerheads. In commenting on
probable Soviet intentions, the j lC strongl y reiterated their previ-
ous approval of the FO's views, to th e exte nt of directly quoting
three paragraphs of the 'Probable Tendencies' pape r. However, they
then went on to discuss capabilities. Th ere was a serious need for a
well-informed discussion of what the Soviets were capable of achiev-
ing, based on predictions of reconst ruct ion needs, industrial output,
physical resources and transportation infrastructure. The jl C paper,
despite the fact that there was a certain amount of information
available on these issues, fell some way short of this, though it did
set out some genera l comments that were at least better based on
factual assessment than those of the PHPS. The paper assumed that
conscription would provide the USSR with massive manpower for
land and air forces, and clai med there was eVidence, not cited, that
the Red Navy would be expanded into a formidab le force. On the
basis of these assumptions - and this was probably wh at attracted
Sloan's comment - the jlC claimed that the Soviets had the technj-
ca l ability to wage war with the Com monwealt h wir/lill the next
ten years, thus seriously modifying the reconstruction axiom to a
factor on ly in Soviet intentions, not capabilities . Weak points in
the Soviet war machine, which the PHPS were rarely prepared to
acknowledge, were seen to be the concen tration of oil resources in
the Caucasus, and availability of foodst uffs, raw materia ls and
motor transport. Little consideration was paid to war damage,
such as population depletion or destruction of facilities such as the
Oonbas mines or the Dnepropetrovsk dam, for it was predicted that
losses would not only be made good in 'te n yea rs, if not in five',
but industry and transport would be stronger than in june 1941.
Some indication of the remarkable transformation in services' thought
about the USSR is shown by the com ment that there were no weak-
nesses or bottlenecks in the transport and com munication s system.
In 1940--42, this system was regarded as a di saster area. Factory
dispersa l had greatly im pressed and seemed to render the USSR less
vulnerable to strategic bombing than Japan or Germany had been.
The detailed section on the Navy did not back up the opening
statement, for it acknowledged that the Soviets had no expertise in
 '/'robnble Tflldt'/Jcil's or Soviet Fl)rt'iSII I'(}iicy' 127

building capita l ships or aircraft carriers, though it praised their

light units (contrary to many reports by BNLOs), and noted that
th e Red Navy would not be able seriously to challenge the Com ~
monwealth at sea. Military eq uipment was praised; it was crude in
finish, but often innovatory and fit for pu rpose. The deficiencies
in motor t ransport (the Red Army largely travelled in US· made
vehicles) were acknowledged, but no comment was made on how
th ey would be made up. The Air Force was described as a 'rough
and ready affair'; it had plenty of aircraft and got its assigned
job done, usually by improvisation and at great cost. The Soviets
coul d acqu ire a strategic bomber force given t ime to produce the
aircraft. The present t ech nical lag behind Britain, the USA and
Germa ny could be made up; the main lim iting factor would be
tech n ical education and limitations in the Russian character (the
ethn ic ste reotype died hard!). All in all, the body of the report did
not really support the su mmarising statements, for it showed the
Soviets wit h plenty of deficiencies to overcome in all three ser-
vices. While clearly well-placed defensively, the offensive capabilities
that were pa rt of the inherent assumptions of the PHPS papers were
not supported, or indeed discussed. The key issues of replacing over
20 million people, and of whether workers would be deployed in
developing the Navy and Air Force o r rebuilding other parts of the
economy, which were crucial for assessing Sov iet capabilities, and
about which the FO and PHPS made conflicting assumptions, were
not resolved.2:l
The findings of the j lC made no impact, it seemed, on PHPS
deliberations. Th e latter's December 1944 revise of their paper on
the Middle East, for example, assumed baldly that the Soviets were
likely to increase the offensive capability of their Navy and Air Force,
with no consideration of the time this would take and the impact
on other military developments. H 11 is ce rtainly noteworthy that
when it served military interests (in terms of maintaining postwar
British forces at a high level), previous criticism of Soviet forces
was overlooked; onl y a year earlier, Portal had voiced the opinions
of all t he RAF that had come into contact with the Red Air Force
that it was poorly trained and even in ground support, its main
task, had achieved little. Soviet air superiori ty over the Germans
was ascribed to All ied st rategic bombing having drawn the Luftwaffe
back to Germany, and to Soviet use of British and American aircraft. 25
Initially, only Warner objected to the emphasis in the PHI'S
papers on the USSR as a potential enemy, as directed by the COS,
128 Clmrrllill, Wililellllll mul 1/1(' Soviet UI/ioll

seeing it to be typical of the 'rab id ly a nti-Soviet forces'. Others,

such as Jebb, Roberts and Cavendish-Bentinck, at first felt such studies
were appropriate, but as the COS sh arpened thei r focus o n Soviet
e nmity and as the shallowness of the papers beca me apparent, ca me
to share Warner's misgivings.26 Th e re was no real d isagree ment
between the Fa and the services t hat the USSR cou ld possibly become
non-cooperative or hostile in time. Di sag reement centred o n views
of likely Soviet responses, and here it is clear t he re was now co m-
plete cleavage between the Fa view t hat t he Soviet cooperative mood
could be maintained by taki ng into account their aspirations and
sensitiviti es, and the COS view that no cooperative spirit had been
shown and that th ey had no such sensitivi t ies as could be affected
by being amenable.
The difference of opinion was clear in di scuss ion of all t he PHPS
papers, but was most fierce over t hose on the western group and
the dismemberment of Germany. On receipt of the PHPS paper on
western Europe the COS directed a re-emphasis, stating categori-
cally that Germany would be impotent and the US was not a poten tial
enemy, so all military plans for postwar should be based on a po-
tentially hostile USSR. Th ey were scept ica l of the possibility of a
world organisation or of the US helpi ng Britain in time. To the
COS the whole point of both the western group and a dismembered
Germany was their utility as a bu lwark against the USSRY Th ey
did concede that this shou ld not be overt, and t hey and the PHPS
continued to accept that cooperation was the preferred policy, while
implying, by devoting so much space to the idea and by advocating
such measures, that they felt the alternat ive of non-cooperation
more likely to happen . The COS understood the group m ust have
as its immediate objective holding down Germany, ' but the more
remote, but more dangerous, possibilit y of a hosti le Russia using
the resources of Germany must not be lost sight of' .211
The PHPS did continue to accept that the Soviets would be occu-
pied with internal reconstru ction after the wa r. The revise of
PHP(44)17(O) dated 15 Septem ber gave t h is period as five years,
and explicitl y endorsed the conclusion of WP(44 )436 tha t an im-
mediate threat was unlikely for ten years provided Britain and the
US were giving reasonable con sideration to Soviet views. However,
th e tone suggested tha t after this time there wOllld be a danger : th e
USSR was 'the greatest pote ntial da nger we have ever faced '. De-
fence in depth was needed, includin g all or part of Germany, even
if that cou ntry was disarmed. 29 Dismemberment of Germany was
 '/'robnble Tflldt'/Jcil's or Soviet Fl)rt'iSII I'(} iicy' 129

strongly advocated in the PHI'S paper on Germany, I'HP(44)IS (O),

because of its use agai nst the USSR: it would reduce the chance of
a centralised united Germany moving into the Soviet orbit.30 The
Fa argu ed this conception should be 'avoided like the plague', fo r
it would destroy any chance of an enduring Anglo-Soviet allian ce .
In a counter-proposal , APW(44)90, the Fa argued in favour of a
united Germany, which could be a fa ctor in hold ing the Anglo-
Soviet all iance and the weste rn bloc togethe r, so long as the Soviets
wefe co nvinced tha t Britain was not hostil e. The FO in any case
believed that di smemberme nt had to come fr om within Germany;
if it was imposed from outside, it would only create massive irredentist
problems late r on. 3 1
Eden had a co nfrontational meeting with th e COS on 4 October.
Sarge nt briefed Eden that t he Fa d id n ot deny the Soviet Union
was a possibl e ene my - that was not the paint. At worst this could
only ha ppen in a number of years. Every effort must be made without
sacrificing ma jor British interests to get on term s with the Soviet
Governm ent and accustom th em if possib le to the practice of frank
and friendl y relations. Soviet suspi cio ns were a danger and if they
felt th e weste rn bloc was anti-Soviet t hey would immediately work
against it. Knowledge in the Kreml in that Brit,lin was thinkin g of a
war against the USSR was, he warned, the su rest way of bringing
o ne about. Julian Lewis scathin gly dismisses Sa rgent's argument,
sayi ng it suggest s that th e Soviets would only act to negate a west-
e rn bloc and woo Germany if provoked to do so by discovering
about such papers. If one accepts, as Sa rgent d id, that th e Soviets
were suspi cious of th e British military and sensitive about Brit ish
intentio ns in central Europe a nd especia lly regarding the treatment
of German y, then the a rgumen t is not so absurd. 32 Th e basic prob-
lem was that the COS were not co nform ing to the guidelines laid
down in WP(44)436 which the Fa had become convin ced could
work, but only if applied wholeheartedly. Eden po inted out the
proble ms of search ing fo r an enemy to justify military po licy. The
USSR, he felt, was bei ng used as a scarecrowY The degree to which
th e COS re jected the idea t hat Soviet sensi ti vity was rel evant in
modifying British act ions was clearly shown in the discussion o n
4 October; Portal sa id that the British should not worry about breedi ng
Soviet suspicio ns - they were just as e ntitled to take precautions as
the Soviets, who und oubtedly were not bothered by such co nsider-
ations in their own con tingency planning. 3 • The dispute cann ot be
understood unless one sees the cen trality to the whole coope rative
130 Clmrrllill, Wililellllll mul 1/1(' Soviet UI/ioll

USSR thesis of the idea of sensitivity on the German question and

the FO perception that as Ward put it, the Soviets had a remark-
able facility for nosing out hostile thoughts about the Soviet Union.3s
Moreove r, the COS, as jebb had observed, did not accept the Four
Power thesis either. Their idea for the futu re was th at Anglo-American
cooperati on should continue in the CCS, a nd the USSR would have
it s own sphere. They did not take Chi na seriously as a worl d power.36
There was no meeting of minds on 4 October, and t he only con-
cession the FO was able to gain was that t he COS would place
sectio ns of papers dealing wi th a hostile USSR in separate annexes
with limited ci rculati on Y

Qualified Optimism
Within the FO the long debate with th e services firmed up acceptance
of elements of the cooperative thesis. Hopeful signs were identified
despite problems o n a number of specific topics, particu larly I)oland,
whi.Je there also remained a disinclination to be too optimistic a head
of signs that Soviet day-to-day behaviour was becoming more co-
operative and therefore a surer sign of thei r inten tions. It was still
felt that final decisions by the Soviet s had yet to be made, and so
they were open to influence eit her way. Wa rner doubted if the Soviet
Government had been able to give much time to the matter - so
their present act ions were most likely based pa rtly on sh ort-term
considerations in connection with the conduct of the war, and partly
on the 'old outlook'. Even Molotov, he felt , fo llowed the course
dictated by the old Soviet habit of m ind unless inst ructed to the
con trary by Stalin . It was he who was the advocate of cooperation;
Communist Party and Politburo leaders might need some convincing
that cooperation should be followed to any ex tent whi ch invol ved
much modification of the old ideas .38
A similarly qualified view was presented by Clark Ke rr in his re-
sponse to WP(44)436. He warned that the lack of an independent
publiC opinion in the USS R gave the leaders great freedom of ac-
tion and th e ability to change policies quickly. He also cautioned,
as Wilson did, that one shoul d not expect the Soviets always to
behave in a cooperative manner, even if they did intend to follow
a policy of postwar cooperation with Britain and the US . Soviet
policy was 'Ja nus-like', and Com munist Part ies would conti nue to
be used as instruments of Soviet po licy. Coope ration was likely to
be complicated by the Soviet blend of pride, se nsit ivity to criticism
 '/'robnble Tflldt'/Jcil's or Soviet Fl)rt'iSII I'(}iicy' 131

and the Slav capacity fo r suspecting others. The Soviets would try
cooperation, Clark Kerr concluded, but one must expect recurring
tensions deriving from these characteristics. Warner was unimpressed
by thi s cri tique, and the Am ba ssador did simplify his case by
ignoring other constraints on Soviet actions, but the fundamental
point matched the mood in the No rthe rn Department of cautious
optimism, coupled with co ncern that the Soviet style of behaving
wou ld lead people outside the FO to hasty concl usions about Soviet
cooperativeness.39
It was generall y felt that the best way to restrain this behaviour
and commun icate to the Soviets what effect it had was to speak
firmly. Lockha rt warned Sargent that while the Soviets va lued the
postwar alliance, they were intoxicated with success. Britain, he
argued, was no lo nger playing from weakness. Sargent agreed. ~o
However, the perception of Soviet sensitivity continued to operate:
it was difficult to make a change that did not run the risk of Soviet
over- reaction - t he temptation was thus not to take the risk on
any given issue, while co ntinuing to asse rt that frankness was the
right policy, when t he ti me was right. Sargent defended thi s ap-
proach subseq uently, in Ap ril 1945, by saying that at the time,
w ith th e Soviets bearing so much of the brunt of the war and with
th e result still in the balance, the avoidance of content ion was
righ tly th e pri me aim, and it had been worthwhile for the Prime
Minister to continue his effusive messages to Stalin.41 While sug-
gesting that Soviet policy could not be divined from rudeness and
lack of cooperative spi rit, Wilson argued that the Soviets would do
exactly the same for British policy and shape th eir own policy by
it. 42 The logic of the premise of Soviet commitme nt to coope ration
and the perception of Soviet hypersensi ti vity demanded no half-
measures. Whatever individua ls' varying degrees of commitme nt ,
in practice they found themselves acquiescing in conci liatory ac-
tion as the safest course; not now to avoid upset to the war effort,
but to secure postwar cooperation. Sa rgent argued strongly that no
risk must be taken to break the partnership, or indeed to put it
under any stress that was not st rictl y necessary:

we can not afford to quarrel with Russia in present circumstances ....

Such a quarrel might well endanger the security of this coun-
try ... eith er by drivi ng the Soviet Union back into isola tion or,
still worse, forcing he r into collaboration with Germany as soon
as occasion offers.4J
132 Clmrrllill, Wililellllll mul 1/1(' Soviet UI/ioll

Jebb and Wilson combined to produce the statement that the

situation around 1950 might wel l be that the Soviets,

who have during the war emerged as a world power, will exert a
world-wide influence comparable to that of any other similar
powe r but, on present form it seems unlikely that, whatever the
continuing difficulties of working with Russia may be, the Russians
will attempt to extend their cont roll ing influence in Europe beyond
a certain geographical line. They might only be tempted to do
so in the event of complete chaos in Europe West of that line;
and again o n present form this is quite improbable.

Soviet influence would be paramount in Poland, Czechoslovakia,

Hun gary, Bulgaria and probably Yugoslavia, and possibly Austria
too. This did not necessarily mean Com m unist Governments, but
they would look to the USSR for arms and would not take a very
di.fferent line from the USSR in international affairs. Whether Italy
was pro-Soviet depended on how much help the western countries
gave there. Much revolved around whethe r the three Powers could
work together; there was reason for optimism, in that in Europe at
any rate each would seem to have satisfied all possible legitimate
ambitions. Th e kind of sphe re of influence described was obviously
not regarded at this time as a threat to British interests, nor a sign
of sinister Soviet designs. A clash of views on the Straits seemed
unlikely; northern Iran was the area where so me Soviet expansion
might be expected, and the Middle East generally was the area where
it was most possible that interests would clash. In the Far East anarchy
in China might tempt the Soviets into Manchuria and even Korea,
and thus a clash with the Americans, into whi ch Britain might be
drawn. Th e tone was thus reasonably optim istic, seasoned by the
aware ness that this was all highly speculative. H
Despite the bitter dispute between the COS and the FO over the
PHPS papers, there were many points on which they were willing
to agree concern ing the USSR. This is shown graph ica lly in a paper
produced by the ) IC at the end of 1944, ) 1C(44)467 (O) 'Russia's
Strategic Interests and Inte nt ions from the Point of View of Her
Security'. Thi s paper was largely written by Sir Arth ur Noble of the
FO Services Liaison Department and was approved by the JIC and
by the COS .H It represents the closest that is available to a genu-
ine agreed consensus between the services and the FO on future
Soviet policy.
 'Provable Teml"'j(;/:S or Soviet Fl)re(~1I Policy' 133

The jle revisited the issue of actual Soviet military capabilities,

concluding they would be able to deploy very large forces, though
th eir technical efficiency was lower than those of more advanced
Powers. This was likely to increase, as was the growth of a military
trad ition. Most of the resources they needed were within Soviet
frontiers, so the USSR could with less risk than any other European
Power fo llow an isola tionist policy and rely on its own military
power to protect itsel f. The only vulnerable point on the frontier
was between the Balti c and the Ca rpathian s, so they would con-
cen trate defensive force there.
Two main assumptions were made. First, the Soviet Government's
desire for absolute security would be very grea t. Second, and con-
nected with the first, was the desire to raise the standard of living
(many Soviet citizens having seen conditions in other countries),
rebuild devastated a reas and undertake fresh industrial and agricul-
tural development. This would require a long period of peace, though
the process could be speeded up by reparatio ns from Germany and
large import s from abroad. Th e jlC concluded that the USS R would
not be prepared to take any chances, and however small the risk of
aggression, it wou ld seek to build a system of security outside its
borders. Th ey wou ld want in these countries a position similar to
that of th e British in Egypt; they would allow independence so
long as t hey cou ld e nsu re these co untries followed a policy that
protected Soviet strategic interests. Outside this zone of protection,
they would try the ir best to keep Germany and japan incapable of
aggression. They would look to the Western Powers to com plete
the rin g. If the Western Powers accepted Soviet predominance in
the border sta tes, then th e Soviet Union would have achieved the
greatest possible secu rity and could not hope to increase it furthe r
by territorial expansion, nor was it easy to sec what else the USSR
coul d under such co nditions hope to gain from a policy of aggres-
sion (assuming Soviet realism). Problems were more likely to arise
from Soviet 'tactlessness'. There arc elements here of the viewpoint
in the PHPS papers, but this largely followed WP(44)304 and 436,
particu larly the thesis of limited, security-dri ven obiec ti ves.~ 6
The COS themselves were capable of expressing positive feelings
about the alliance. Portal noted at Yalta;

We are all becoming very pro-Russian, as they really do see m

to be nice people, kind and sincere, clean-looking and fright-
fully keen on their show, and with absolutely no 'bounce' or
134 Clmrrllill, Wililellllll mul 1/1(' Soviet UI/ioll

arrogance .... I am absolutely certain that we sha ll have to make

friends with them and that we sha n 't fi nd it d ifficu lt; also we
shall have to be the bridge between them and the Americans,
who really don't get on very well with t hem at present. Quite a
job for the future!~ 7

Likewise, the Cabinet d iscussion of 2S January 1944 and the lack

of recorded opposition to WP(44)436 indicate a qualified optimism
among Ministers. ~8 For Churchill himsel f, his geopolitical outlook
mean t that the rapid advances of the Red Army caused h im to
revise somewhat his preference to avoid co nte nt ious issues. His
approach in 1944 was to try to pin the Soviets dow n to agree-
ments, while he had somet hing to negotiate wi th . Like Ede n he
believed agreeme nts could be reached and t hat Stalin would ad-
here to them if they were negotiated properly. He was not susceptible
to t he 'ganging up' argument accepted in t he FO a nd which led
the Americans pointedly to avoid close consultation with the British
at Teheran and Yalta, writing to Eden, Any division between Britain
I

and the United States will make us power less in this matte r.
Together we can probably control the situation.' Wh ile determined
that the Anglo-American relationsh ip should not be sacrificed to
the niceties of Soviet feelings, howeve r, he also wanted to prevent
this raising Soviet suspicions; as he told Colville in October, by
flying to Moscow (for the 'Tolstoy' meeting, where he proposed
the 'percentages' arrangement to Stalin), he hoped to discourage
the idea that Britain and the US were intimate to the exclusion of
the Soviets.~9 In fact , what he seems to have desired was to act as
the link between an Anglo-American colla bora tion and an Anglo-
Soviet one. He was apprehensive that the t h ree Powers approached
each topic from a different angle an d in a d iffe rent mood : 'as we
can meet only at intervals of six months, it is very hard for any-
one to have a policy.' By 1944 he was seeking a modus vivendi with
the Soviets. This was regarded as possible to ach ieve on a basis of
the mutual and realistic recognition of power and interests.50 Churchill
believed it was needed because of t he ra nge of options that would
be open to the Soviets should they defeat Germany and create a
power vacuum in east and central Europe. The necessary restraints
on Soviet freedom of action would be ach ieved th rough Stalin's
realism. Hence, therefore, his high hopes when Stalin appeared to
be reasonable and to grasp the si tuation, and why he could be, in
Harriman's words, 'a ll for Joe' wh ile stil l apprehensive about the
 ' /'rolmble Tem/('ncies QrSoviet Foreign P(Jlicy' 135

poSsibilities open to the Soviets and determined to limit them where

it was in his power to do SO.51
Church ill's belief in the pressures exerted on Stalin by the 'grim
thing behi nd him' gave a further in centive to grant some of Sta lin 's
requests, whi le being stro ng and firm in all other respect s. He was
hopeful of cooperation with Stalin himself, on the basis of war·
time comradesh ip, but bel ieved he had to be handled a certai n
way o r else the more dangerous side of Soviet policy might come
to the fore .s2 The percentages idea must be seen in this light. Rather
than si m ply a concession of Soviet interest in Bulgaria or Hungary,
which was sel f- evident , it was a n assertion that Britain had an in-
terest in t hose countries too. In areas where Soviet actions were
becoming, or seemed likely to become, a cause for concern, Churchill
was anxious to reach the perso nal agreements which he rated so
highly - as soon as possible - to limit the dangerous effects of the
Soviets perceivi ng lack of interest on the Ang lo·American side.
Churchil l's expectations regarding Greece, and pleasure with the
Yugos lav percentage, reflected h is concern to limit Soviet influence
to the a reas the Red Army was to occupy. C hurch ill told Attlee the
percentages were the best possible, with Greece able to be saved
and a 50- 50 solution in Yugoslavia .S3 He believed a change in the
attitud e of the Soviet officers with EAM in Greece completely vin·
dicated his diagnosis of the proper policy. Whatever the vagueness
of what had actuall y been agreed upon in Moscow, Church ill 's sub·
sequen t attitude showed he believed an arrangement had been made.~~
It is frequently cla imed that the Soviet- Po li sh issue was a major
influence in shapi ng the British Government's attitude to the USSR,
but t he influence the Polish imbroglio played on perceptions of
overa ll Soviet commitment to cooperation is in fact questionable.
Having, in 1943, resisted the temptation to force the Poles to make
a frontier co ncession, one of the co nseq uences of the increased
faith in Soviet cooperativeness that fo llowed the Moscow and
Teheran Conferences was that Churchill, Ede n, the ro and the Labour
ministers saw hopes for a reasonable settlement of the Polish prob·
lem if the Poles did make a concession. Their great fear, now that
it was certain that the Soviets would liberate Poland from Germ an
occupation, was that the Soviets wou ld set up their own regime in
Warsaw. Sta lin's sta te me n t that he wanted a strong, independent
Po land seemed a good sign, but the frontier was still , as Eden had
told Hull in August 1943, his 'main question ,.5S The security ax iom
was at the heart of this belief. Stalin was bel.ieved to be less concerned
136 ClmrclJill, Wllllellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Union

about who was in power in Pola nd than in secu ring th e Curzon

line frontier, provided any regime was friendly - a nd such a Polish
concession would be a good sign of such an attitude. Sta lin was
believed to be more amenable on thi s issue than his coll eagues. 56
Stron g pressure was put on the London Poles at the start and e nd
of 1944, and there was irritation at the lack of movement by them.
The Soviet demands were widely seen in the FO and by Churchill
as not unreasonable; the co ntinued Soviet referen ce to a line drawn
up by a British Foreign Secretary of cou rse helped make this so.
While some Labour Party figures felt that Stali n 's secu rity obsession
was old-fashio ned, most saw his point, and the et hnicity of the
region was on his side too. Churchi ll even went so far as to sta te
the Soviet right was 'inexpungeable', and to add as a further rea so n
(and typically) that th e Soviet sacrifices of blood had strengthened
this right. s7
The Poles refused to budge and British irritation shifted to the
Soviets for their refusal to comprom ise. What irritated most was
the harsh tone of Molotov and Stalin's messages, for the mood
eased when Stalin changed that tone. Differences over Romania and
the cris is among the Greeks added to the tens ion. s8 Then came the
Warsaw rising. Churchill, the FO and the Labour leaders came to
accept that the Soviets were genuinely unable to aid the Poles on
the ground, and anger and frustration were focused on Stalin's re-
fusal to help them by air, or to allow the Allies to do SO. S9 Th is ha s
been seen as a crucia l episode for attitudes to the USSR. This is
actually haJd to substantiate. It certainly confirmed the fear of many
that whatever overall Soviet coopera t iveness, their req uirements in
the sta tes bordering them would be taken regardless of Allied sus-
ceptibil ities . Churchill sa id the Soviet behaviour was 'strange and
sinister', and th e issue one of 'p rofou nd gravity', but he still hoped
an appeal to Stalin, backed by th e increase in prestige brought by
victories in Normandy, would bring success. 60 It was fel t that the
firmness eventually displayed to the Soviet s at the start of Septem-
ber had paid off, an exaggeration of what had been ach ieved. 6 1
These events may well have driven Churchi ll to Moscow, but the
'percentages' arrangement he proposed there was already foreshad-
owed in th e May discussions of Romania and Greece, and Poland,
like Italy, was not included in the percentages. In Moscow, he was
o nce again very forceful in trying to get the London Poles to make
concess ions to Stali n , and continued to support the Soviet claims.
It still seemed to him and Eden that it was the frontiers that mattered
 '/'robnble Tflldt'/Jcil's or Soviet Fl)rt'iSII I'(} iicy' 137

to Stalin, not in sta lling his own set of Poles, the Unio n of Polish
Patriots . The latter made a bad im pression on all - and were clearly
a puppet governmen t-in-waiting - but it was noted that Stali n himself
described them as a nui sance and did not seem very attached to
the m.62
The Polish situation did not dra stically alter perceptions of the
USSR and of Stalin and hi s policy d uri ng 1944; in stead , Briti sh
handl ing of t he issue was shaped by those perceptions (especia lly
the security axiom and views of Stalin), and Poland was see n in
term s of larger Anglo-Soviet relation s, rather than as th e great test
case. Many sharp word s were written about the USSR's Polish policy
(strangely, often not specificall y criticising Stalin), but there was
also much sympathy with Soviet attitudes, whi ch were seen as col d-
bloodedl y rea listic but not grossly unreaso nable, and sin ce not
unexpected, not operating to undermin e th e coope rative assump-
tion s. Thus th e Yalta agreemen t co uld be made in good faith. The
Soviets sacrificed some of thi s evident goodwill by the insensitivity
of their ha nd ling of the issue. It was understood that for security
reason s Poland was a n area of acute interest and sen si tivity for
Stalin; opinio ns differed as to whether Sta lin sho uld be expected in
return to unde rstand and take accou nt of British interest in Poland
- he obviously found it eas ier to understand British interest in
Yugos lavia or Greece. Some argued that if the Soviets wanted west-
ern fri endship th ey had to ac knowledge western interest in the
question and acco mmodate their actio ns to it if th ey wanted to
secure the wider goal of cooperation. Th e general incl ination was
not in 1944 to rega rd t he Soviet attitude on Po land as an absolute
indicati on of their policy to their allies.
Church ill 's satisfactio n with comi ng to an arrangement with Stalin
in Moscow outweighed his concern about th e Polish ques ti on . In
th e period betwee n 'Tolstoy' and Yalta, Churchill was in a positive
mood, largely because of the a ppa re nt adherence by the Soviets to
th e agreemen t not to interfere in Greece. 6J He ca nnot thus be seen
to be out of line with th e FO , nor the general thrust of opinion
through his government, though he had reached this state of qualified
opt imism by a somew hat different TOute, and it was more depen-
dent o n a view of Sta lin than on more compl ex th eo ri zat ions and
assumptions.
Ch urch ill 's oft-voic ed en thusiasm fo r treating the Sovi ets firmly
did not sit ve ry well wit h his own endeavour to build a personal
relationship with Stal in by florid , sentimenta l messages, which he
138 CJmrclJill- Wititellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Uniou

maintained while at the same time finding fault with the American
viewpoint. 64 Church ill's attitude appears to veer wildly from one
ex treme to the other. Moran explained it in terms of his health. 65
A better explanation is that Churchi ll was torn between percep-
tions that had conflicting implications. On the one hand, he believed
Stalin was a realist and was friendly within the bounds of that
realism. On the othe r, he could not rid himself of the idea that
these were still Bolsheviks. f>6 He thus required continual confirma-
tion that the Soviets were coope rative . His acid tests were daily
and sometimes trivial; hence the pendulum swings, for the Soviet s
themselves were far from consistent in their day-to-day policy. The
two schools theory cou ld not completely smooth out the impressio n
left by Soviet 'misbehaviour'. Unlike Eden and some of the Fa, he
was not comfortable with the idea of therapeutic tru st , which
promised long-term results from trusting them and treating them
as if they were already respectable in the hopes they would then
become so. Churchill was prepared to trust Stalin, but he expected
immediate results in manifestations of trustworthiness, cooperativeness
or at least po liteness . When they fa iled to materialise, his aware-
ness of the possibilities open to the Soviets in geopolitical terms
made him apprehensive that the Soviets wou ld revert to type.
Neither Churchill nor Eden was consistent as to British poliCY,
but with Eden keen to build a st ructu re of cooperation on hi s Anglo-
Soviet Treaty and Churchi ll still concerned for the successful
prosecution of the war and pinning his hopes on a personal rela-
tionship with Stalin there was no lead towards ' frankn ess' from
these men who had both at times voiced a dislike for a soft policy.67
Their fluctuations did not please a ny of those in the Fa, who if
they differed on degrees of 'firm ness ' or 'softness' were united in
agreeing that the worst way to handl e the Soviet s was to give them
conflicting, contradictory signals . These would only strengthen their
suspicions and uncertainty of British policy, thereby compromising
their commitment to collaboration and drivi ng them to reinsurance.68
Enthusiasm for firmness might have been expected from Attlee
and Bevin, given their reservations about the frontier issue in 1942.
However, it is remarkably difficult to state categorica lly what th e
attitudes of the Labour Ministers were on the issue of Soviet coop-
erativeness. While it is true that th e nexus of fore ign policy-making
was Churchill- Eden/FO- COS, and that Churchill's style of govern-
ment did not involve the extended exam ination of fore ign policy
issues by the War Cabinet, the Labour Ministers werc ce rtainly not
 'Probable Tj'm/t'/Jcil'S or Soviet Furf;'I{IJ Policy' 139

tota lly excluded from discussion of these issues. Yet their views on
them have to be gathered from inference and occasional (bu t un-
fortunately infrequent) comments recorded officially or informally.69
After the discuss ion of Soviet frontiers in February-March 1942,
they were not moved to dissent from Churchill's handling of rela-
tion s with Stalin, nor with the FO recommendations that came to
Cabinet. Attlec's cha irmanship of the major Cabinet foreign policy
comm ittee, the Armist ice and Post-War Comm ittee, allowed him,
he said, to get his own way, but no strong views on Soviet issues
were de monstra ted by him thereJ o
While, however, supportive of the aims of Church ill and the FO,
in terms of securing, if possible, Soviet fri endship, and voicing no
opposit ion to the price to be paid, the Labour Ministers for whom
th ere is evidence show no sign of having taken o n board a numbe r
of the central perceptions comprising tile wartime 'cooperative' image.
They do not appea r to have been impressed by the internal changes
in th e wartime Soviet Union. They were certainly suspicious of the
di ssolution of the Comintern; this indi cated they had little readi-
ness to see fundamental cha nges in the nature of the USS R and
had a continued suspicion of its association with domestic Co m-
munist Parties. No Labour Minister attended a wartime conference
until Attlee went to Sa n Francisco in 1945. They did not therefore
undergo any of the modifyi ng effects that personal co ntact with
Stalin had. Inst ead Attlee, Bevin and Morrison formed tlleir view
from 'Stali n-an-paper'; a mucll less attractive figure. 7J There was
much less mention by the Labour leaders of the key terms susp i-
cion and realism, and none of Soviet se nsitivity. Attlee, for one,
felt the Soviet heritage was essent iall y Asiatic. Their European am-
bitions were imperia listic, whether ideological or territorial. The
Soviets, like the Ame ricans, he thought, were 'imma ture ' and not
swayed by idea listic consideratio ns. 72 He was convinced that Britain
needed to be involved in Europe to balance Soviet influence, as
part of a policy of being both tough on Germany and 'rea listic' to
the USSR. 73 To Attlce the western bloc would insure against a German
o r Soviet threat and be useful if the US returned to iso latio nism. It
would prevent a power vacuum in Europe, which Attlce and Bevin,
like FO officials, feared the Soviets would try to fill.N Bevin too
favoured a western group, based o n Brita in, and was prepared for a
simi lar set-up in the east, based on the USSR (and did not see. them
to be in co mpetition), and has been seen by Rothwell to be less
ha rshly minded towards the USSR at this stage than Attlee, though
140 CJmrclJill- Wititellllll mtll tit(' Soviet Uniou

the evidence is not strong. 75 Unlike Attlee, Dalton was by no means

convinced of the need or desirability of a German buffer against
the USSR, any more than he was of the need for a buffer between
the USSR and Germany. Dalton was convinced of the centrality of
a continuing Anglo-American-Soviet alliance, and before San Fran-
cisco this was an attitude he shared with Bevin and A ttlee .7~ Thus,
while uneasy about Soviet actions in eastern Europe - described by
Morrison as 'harsh and imperialistic' - the Labour leaders were happy
to follow the policies laid down in WP(44)436 and by Churchill. 77
While the Labour Party leaders looked forward to a const ructive
part being played by the Soviets in the postwar world , they shared
the feelings of those who were conce rn ed that the Soviets' inability
or unwillingness to act as allies, in the way unde rstood in Britain,
might prevent full cooperation. 78 Allied policy should be aimed at
both seeking to ensure they stil l saw interna tional cooperation as
profitable (providing the security they needed) and also binding
them closely into the machinery so that it would be difficult for
them to withdraw. Cooperation might weU be difficult, but by no
means impossible, since it did not have to mean full confidence.
This was an attitude which was to pe rsist in t he Gove rnme nt aftN
Attlee became Prime Minister, until 1947. 79 Attlee himself was later
to prove willing to sec legitimacy in Soviet security aspirations and
to be cautious about seeing them as irrevocably host ile. so
By the beginning of 1945, there had t hus developed an image of
the USSR that gave rise to the belief that fu t ure cooperation was
the most likely Soviet policy option, at least in the immediate postwar
period. The perceptions that made lip this image were formu lated
as the result of contributions from various sectors of the Govern-
ment, though it was the FO which drew them together and formulated
the concept of a cooperative Soviet Union most full y. The idea of
Stalin 's interest in cooperation with the West to provide security,
his sensi tivity about being treated as an equal and the importance
of his reconstruction needs were all central to thi s concept. O n
this basis, the FO argued that the Soviet Union , fo r reasons of
national interest , would follow a policy of cooperation within the
world organisation for at least ten years . This interest was the need
for security while continu ing internal development of State Socia l-
ism and repairing war damage t o the Soviet economy. Un less Stalin
was convinced by British or Ame rican actions that they would be
soft o n Germany, or co nversely that Europe was going to subside
into chaos and disorder again, then collaboration would be tried.
 'Probable Tj'm/t'/Jcil'S or Soviet Furf;'I{IJ Policy' J 41

He wou ld seek to ensure friendly governments on his borders, and

would probably prefer state Socialist or popular front governments
following h is foreign policy lead. He was not expected to want to
communise these areas, though Co mmunist Parties could be ex-
pected to continue to be used as inst ruments of Soviet national
policy. None of this need impinge on Britain's vital interests, which
should be clearly stated, though in a no n-threatening manne r.
Those who approved the FO's concl usions - includin g Eden,
Churchill , Att lee and Bevin - did so because they shared, or at
least conceded th e possibility of, the interp retation s involving
Soviet cooperativeness, security-seeking and sensitivity and some
o f the perceptions t hat strengthe ned these beliefs, such as Soviet
reconstruction needs and the personal amenability of Stalin, and
th erefore accepted t he logi c of working on that basis. This applied
also to the l lC and COS, with the s ignifi cant exception of the sen-
sitivity theory, which the military did not accept. There was a wide
range of views as to the importance to be attached to Soviet behaviour
as an indi cation of their attachment to long-term cooperation. The
cent ral pOint is that appraisa l of Soviet cooperativeness was based
on assessments of how t he Sov iets viewed their interests, and
attempts to reach conclusio ns about what factors shaped Soviet
responses.
6
Towards Postwar Cooperation:
'Difficult, but not Impossible'

The months following the Yalta Conference have been seen as a

period of rapid disillusionment in British Government attitudes to
the Soviet Un ion. This process is taken as startin g soon after t he
end of the Conference, in response to Soviet actions in Romania,
and then in Po land and other cou ntri es, and reach ing such a stage
at VE Day, 8 May, that Martin Gilbe rt can describe the breakdown
in relations as complete.! The Soviet s acted un ilaterally in t he coun-
tries the Red Army overran, denied t heir all ies access to information
about what was goi ng on there and obstructed their representa-
tives. At the same time, the war situation fo r the Allies improved -
th e temporary setback in the Ardennes had passed and the advance
on the Western Front was rapid. The environ ment in which poli-
cies were formulated therefore cha nged, and policy-makers had to
face a new set of challenges . However, disillusionme nt is p robably
too strong a term to apply t o this period. Many of the cen tral
assumptions that supported the cooperative theory were sti ll taken
to hold good, or at the least were not categorically discredited .
Britis h attitudes underwent some ch anges, but vi rtua ll y all in the
Government at th e end of Churchi ll's prem ie rsh ip con ti nued to
see cooperation as a rea li stic policy target; difficult to achieve, and
not necessarily smooth and intimate, but coopera tion none t he less,
based on a fundamental commonali ty of inte rests .
At th e sa me time, confusion a nd uncert ainty were increasi ng and
new questions were being asked. To describe this process as a de-
cline in optimism is a little simplist ic. What was happen ing was
that some of the key assumptions were being subjected to new tests:
particularly the issue of Soviet prio riti sation of coope ration ove r
unilate ral security measures in eastern Europe (their reinsu rance

142
 'Difficu/l, bul 1101 Impossiblt' 143

pol icy), the actual limits of the supposed ly limited objectives, and
the conn ect ion between Soviet methods and aims.

Images of Stalin and the Internal PolHical Situation

The development of th e wartime image of Stalin reached its culmi-
nation at th e Yalta Co nfe rence. Even those who ca n be regarded as
sceptics about the USSR on man y subj ect s, such as Cadoga n and
Portal, expressed admirati on for the way Stalin conducted hi s af~
fairs at the Co nference and the skill with which he handled the
other two leaders. Stal in's sagacity and sense of directi on were never
q uesti oned. Instead his wi llingness to make concession s reinforced
the impression made by his personal demeano ur; once again marked
in it s co ntrast to the to ne that they had become used to in t ele-
graph ic co mmunicatio n and con tact s with lesser officials, including
Molotov. Hi s willingn ess to accommodate the susceptibiliti es of his
allies made an impressio n, so that the Polish agreement, on whi ch
he gave little ground , did not seem so great a concession in return,
and part of a statesmanlike pattern of give-and-take.2
The perception of Stalin d id not depend solely o n such passing
events and persisted though the euphoria of Ya lta was qui ck to
pass away. Such hopes as there were of the arrangements de pended
greatl y on th e image of Sta lin . Churchill was undoubted ly appre-
hen sive, thinking of the geopo litical situati on and the opportunities
open to the Soviets; as he sa id to Sir Arthur Harris, once Bo mbe r
Com mand had fini shed its work, 'What will lie betwee n the white
snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover?' Howeve r, amid all
th e pessimism , his attitude towards Stalin remain ed a strong quali-
fy ing fac tor. Chu rch ill had been impressed o nce again by Stali n at
Yalta, saying to Moran that he did not think th e USS R would move
to a hostil e stance wh il e Sta lin was alive: ' I do not believe he is
unfri e ndl y to us.' Churchill continued to di sti ngui sh st rongly be-
tween Stalin and the ot he r leaders, whom he rega rd ed still as
'Bolshevi ks'. Churchill saw Stalin to be amenable to personal ap-
peals, shoul d the Pri me Minister c hoose to make them . In private,
Churc hill 's remarks reflected the dependence of hi s view o f Soviet
policy o n h is image of Stali n. Hi s remarks to Dalton indicate how
impor tant this was to h im:

The PM spo ke very warmly of Sta li n . He was sure - and Sir Charles
Portal had sa id the same thing to me. that , as long as Stalin
144 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll {//UIIII(' Soviel Union

lasted, Anglo-Russian friendship could be maintained .... [mar-

ginal comment;] PM said, 'Poor Neville Chambe rlain believed
he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I' m wrong
about Stalin.'

Simi la rly, Churchill said to Colville that 'Chamberlain had trusted

Hitler as he was now trusting Stalin (though he thought in differ-
ent circumstances), but taking comfort, as fa r as Russia went, in
the proverb about the trees not growing up to the sky.' Whatever
Churchill's tactical shifts and attempts to usc what means he had
to improve Britain's geopolitical situation, this aspect of Churchil l's
attitude was to remain in place until the end of his premiership,
and represents an underlying consiste ncy in his attitude from at
least August 1942, which can be overlooked, as it was obscured by
tactical shifts and moodswings. 3
The fundamental clements of the Sta lin image remained in place
across the Government. The most sign ificant was the attribution of
sagacious realism. The.re was no serious revision of th is concept.
Even if Stalin had not entirely rejected the Marxist viewpoint, as
Balfour wrote, the central assumption was that he was a shrewd
realist with no desire to overreach himself. His realism would thus
be a limit ing factor on his assumed desire to achieve absolute secur-
ity. ~ Since he was driven by assessment of realities, not ideological
assumptions, and h is assessment was essenti ally a rationa l and in-
telligent (a nd therefore predictab le) one, then he would respond to
the logic of power.
There continued to be diSCUSSion, however, on the extent to which
Stalin was free to impress this vision on the Soviet policy-making
machine. While the war in Europe continued, the idea that Stalin
was not entirely his own master persisted. Balfour, in January 1945,
had rejected the theory, finding Stalin to be of the Kremlin, not
against it. However, his replacement , Roberts, asserted that the
Politburo could influence, even change, Stalin 's decisions. The idea
was also being advanced in the American Embassy, wit hin wh ich
Roberts had close contacts. Harriman, now Ambassador, felt that
after Yalta the Poli tburo had disa pproved of the concession s Stalin
had made there, and that furthermore the Red Army marshals were
now also a force with viewpoints of their ow n that Stalin had to
consider. s Clark Kerr, who had a low opinion of Harriman at this
paint, di sagreed, and wa s never a prominent proponent
of the idea. 6 In Whitehall, however, this expla nation of the un-
 'Difficult, bul /10/ Impossible' 145

cooperative actions by the Soviets, which so quickly followed the

e nd of the Conference, was quite plausible. For it to be acceptable
depended in th e first instance on a favourable view of Sta lin, and
this conti nued despite the doubts and suspicions about aspects of
Soviet policy that developed after Yalta.
Sargent picked up on ideas that were floating around about the
power of the marsha ls, and put them together into a minute for
the Prime Minister, dated 2 May 1945. Sargent endorsed the coop-
e rative view of Stalin, writin g that Stalin tended to take a ' broad
and statesma nlike lin e'. Th e difficulties with Soviet po licy had then,
however, to be expla ined . The prevai ling image in the FO of the
nature of the Soviet pol icy-making process allowed for this. It had
become acceptable that in the Byzantine central power structure of
the USSR, a ny individual o r group that had a power-base cou ld be
influential. Sargent's minute de pended on this assumption, fo r it
was not built on much information about the marshals themselves,
but upon assumptio ns about what their position would be if this
model of the Soviet mach ine held good. Sargent thus argued that
prOble ms of cooperati on in the areas now controlled by the Red
Arm y might be expl icable in terms of the attitudes of the mar-
sha ls, newly powerful, antagonistic to the West and probably fearful
o f it s power. Sargent e nded by suggesti ng that Allied Commanders
try to open contact s with their opposite numbers. Churchill agreed
with Sargent's minute. 7
At the same t ime, Robert s, t rying to service the FO's desire for
more information, attempted an assessment of the figures in the
background. He found the Po litburo to be 'full of tough , tricky
and untrustworthy personalities'. He suggested that they gave Molotov
his orders, from which he could not shift one inch and that they
could modify or reverse decisions of Stalin himself, or at least his
communications to foreign statesmen. This implied, of course, that
the brusquer of Stali n's messages need not necessarily herald a change
of heart o n his pa rt and was a caution against reading too much
into the tone of such messages. Roberts observed the leaders at the
opening of the Supreme Soviet. On ly two, he wrote, were normal
(Shvernik and Andreyev). The rest were tough, fat, prosperous in-
dividuals like the leaders of any other ruthless totalitarian society.
Zhdanov might be a plumper and perhaps more human version of
Hitl er. Beria and Malenkov gave the impression of being at worst
perverts and sadist s and at best reincarnations of medieval inquisi-
tors. 6 In addition to Harriman, the leading State Department experts
146 Cllllrcl1i11, Wllilellllll (lm/I/I(' Soviet Union

Charles Boh len and George Kennan were vOicing similar views;
Ke n nan in September 1944 in a paper passed to the FD had iden-
tified a 'xenophobic group' along li nes mirrored by Roberts' late r
report.!>
Roberts adhered to this interpretation as the war in Europe ended.
He noted that the Soviets we re being ed ucated to adulate t hose
figures in Russia n h istory who were power politicians, like Pete r
the Great, Cathe rine the Great a nd eve n Ivan the Terrible. It was a
mistake, he felt (agreeing with h is predecessor), to sec the Soviet
leade rs as anything but ort hodox Marxists, but he concluded that
this did not necessarily make them uncooperat ive. It is notable of
Roberts' contributions at this time t hat though he had been criti-
cal of Clark Kerr when in the FD, he now endorsed the Ambassador's
fundamental conclusion that the Soviets, though in cl ined to unco-
operative belwviour, were not in thei r illtentiolls uncooperative. 1O
In the Northern Department, a new arrival, Jo hn Ga lsworthy, agreed
that the Politburo was increasingly wi lli ng to let Sta l.i n feel the
reins now and again, as the war in Europe ca me to an end. How-
ever, in response to Bohlen's comment that t he 'boys in the backroom '
were becoming increasingly vocal, Ga lswort hy also suggested that
the Molotov/Stalin dichotomy was deliberately set up to allow with-
drawal from an untenable posit ion without loss of face. Thomas
Brimelow, fresh from the Moscow Embassy, wen t fur t her and ques-
tioned the whole theory, comment ing as Dew had in 1941 that
Stalin was very much of the Politburo. He fou nd no evidence that
the influence of that body had risen or fallen , and pointed out
tha t recent speculation on that score seemed to be without solid
foundation - he might have added t hat it always had been, though
there may actually have been some t rut h in t he basic conce pt. I I
Notwithstanding these doubts in some quarters t hat Stali n could
be excused from the authorship of unfavou rable tu rn s in Soviet
policy by reference to the 'two schools' theory, the image of Stalin
as statesman proved remarkably res ilient. Errors and inconsisten-
cies in h is conduct of the war and of di plo macy were rare ly
recognised. Instead, in July, in a paper t hat was not not able for its
optimism, Sargen t could still write of Stalin's 'statesman like qual i-
ties' . Churchill's description of Stal in in August as a 'wise man '
was not mere hyperbole fo r publ ic consumption, but reflected truly
the enduring image of the sagacious Stalin that was the cen tral
aspect of the Churchill Coalit ion 's own St ali n CU lt. 12
 'Difficult, bul /10/ Impossible' 147

Views of Internal Developments and Reconstruction

Needs
The FD had encouraged the view in other departments of the Govern-
ment, through the widely circu lated Weekly Political Intelligence
Summaries, that a certain degree o f liberalisation had been taking
place in the USSR in the war, though themselves cautious about
how far this would go, and by no means as definite about this as
some British newspapers. Both Wilson and Dew had stressed that
these cha nges should not be taken to mean an abandonment of
Communism or a rejecti on of Marx, and had placed the changes
in the context of t he policy of 'Socia li sm in one country', There
was co ncern that outside the FD , and among the publi c, there was
a tendency to misread these changes. As we have seen, the North-
ern Department had been clear that alongSide wholesale social reforms
which departed from classic Marxist-Leninist practice, the Commu-
nist Party's position in the USSR had been greatly strengthened. Its
hold had been regarded as tenuous before the wa r, but victory had
rendered it internally secure . There was interest as to whether this
wou ld then lead to a relaxation of the tyranny, but the genera l
conclusion was that th is certainly woul d not come before the re-
gime was confident it had achieved external security as well. It was
in reaction to over-optim ism produced by exaggerated press stories
that it was increasi ngly pointed out within the FO that Commu-
nism had not been abandoned. The truth was that there was some
uncertainty exactly what the relationship could be between Marx-
ism and the intense nationalism that had been generated by the
war and energetica lly fostered by the regime.
Roberts warned that whereas there had been a tendency in the
FO to ignore the ideological as distinct from the pure ly nationalist
ele me nts in the Soviet state, they shou ld be noted carefully and
watched for. Roberts stressed that Soviet leaders were still mainly
guided by consideration s of national self-interest, but added that
the combination of intense nationalism and Marxist orthodoxy, which
represented a fundamental difference between Soviet political phi-
losophy and total itarian practices and the outside world, meant it
wou ld be difficult to have normal and easy relations with the USSR.
However, there was still no clash of interests - thi s was, he wrote,
a fundamental truth. In essence Roberts was repeating and endors-
ing Clark Kerr's lin e that it was the Soviet manner of act ing, their
methods, that caused the problems, not their fundamental ai ms.
148 Cllllrcl1i11, Wllilellllll (lm/I/I(' Soviet Union

Roberts placed greater emphasis than the Am bassador o n 'ortho-

doxy', whatever that meant in a Stalin ist context, but it had not
brought him into any disagreement wit h that nostru m. Roberts'
letters in la te April 1945 in fact demonst rate very clearly the par-
ticula r nature of British official attitudes at th is time; wh ile to later
commentators aware of subseque nt events the re arc sig ns of what
would become Cold War attitudes, the use of t he words 'Ma rxism'
and 'ideology' should not obscure the fact t hat these attitudes had
not yet been reached, whatever the growing sense of confusion and
unease. A month later, Robe rts reiterated the view t hat though there
wou ld be difficulties and hard words, t he Soviet attitude to Britain
was likely to remai n at bottom defensive rather than aggressive,
and thus remain based on the alliance. 13
Th e belief that the USSR wou ld have massive reconstruction and
rehabiJitation needs in th e postwar era and t hat these wou ld be a
primary influence on the shape of its fo reign policy con tinued to
be a fundamental component of the Brit ish Govern ment's view of
the USS R up to the end of t he Coa liti on. Most of t he minutes and
memoranda that attempted to fore cast Soviet policy made refer-
ence to reconstruction needs, wit hout the a uthors feeling the need
to prove t he validity of th is assert ion, so much of an accepted as-
sumption had this become . Roberts did so in his despatch of 25
April, adding that the Soviet s now had a fur ther economic prob-
lem in the need to consolidate their new zone of influence and
rebuild it.14 Ward looked at the issue slight ly differen tly, seei ng it
as increasing the possibility of isolationism, since the Soviets mig ht
be dist racted internally. They might, he thought, have to with draw
t heir resources from parts of eastern Europe, except t he d irect line
of communicatio n to Germany, and demobil ise thei r armed forces
because of the manpower shortages at home . IS Ward and Wilson
stressed the Soviet need to recuperate and to raise the populace's
standard of living in discussions wit h the PHPS of d rafts of t he
overall survey of Britain's postwar strategic position, PHP(45)29(O) .16
The PH P5 themselves con tinued to accept that a minimum of five
years would be required by the Soviets for reconstruction .17 In his
paper 'Stocktaking after VE Day', Sargent reached a similar con-
clUSion, asserting that the Soviet Union was weakened by war and
cert ainly cou ld not afford another war in Europe in t he immed ia te
future. ls
Bruce Lockhart still hoped on 11 Apri l 1945 that th ese Soviet
eco nomic needs would offer a lever to influence th ei r pOlicy.19
 'Difficu/l, bul 1101 Impossibll" 149

However, by Ju ly 1945 it seemed more likely that the Soviets wou ld

rat her go short t han make t hemselves dependent on outside eco-
nomic aid. As Wa rn er had argued earlier, t hey could if necessary
suppress consumer demand without incurring serious domestic prob-
lems, given their con tinued control over their populace, and this
gave the m considerable scope to refuse unfavourable terms . Thus
Pi erso n Dixon of t he Southern Department wrote tha t though re-
construction needs wou ld shape Sovie t fore ign policy, this did not
give much scope for Brita in to shape that policy; the Soviets would
aim for self-sufficiency as t hey had always done, and would not
forgo security or politica l aims in order to get economic assistance.
The Nort hern Department agreed , stating:

We doubt whether the Soviets would allow any majo r aim of

their policy to be deflected by our usc of the financia l lever. A
much more potent influence on Soviet policy is likely to be the
need fo r demobi lisation rehabilitation and internal develop ment
in Ru ssia as elsewhe re. zo

Roberts was more optimist ic, building on his point that their
occupation of easte rn Europe was a considerable burden to them.
He wrote t hat the Americans in particular cou ld make effective use
of the fi nancial lever. He t hought that tllough tile Soviets cou ld
resto re t hei r own economy alone (wit h delays and ha rdship) they
could not cope single-handed with their new and heavy respons i-
bilities in Eu rope. They would however find them difficu lt to drop
without im mense loss of prestige. Here was a suggestion of what
was to be an important com ponent of the later containment theory,
namely t hat t he Soviets had act ually become ove r-st retched in tak-
ing over eastern, sout h-eastern and part of centra l Europe, and that
this would im pose all sorts of pressures upon the Soviet economy,
particu larly if it entailed a high level of military mobilisation. l 1
As with t he 'two schools' theory, once the war in Europe ended
questions began to be asked about the factual basis of this e ndur-
ing assumption . This time it was Cadogan who asked the pertinent
question whet her Britai n had any evide nce about actual Soviet re-
construction needs. He felt dubious now about the who le assumption,
and Eden agreed with him, thoug h neither of them had voiced
such doubts earlier; indeed t hey had endorsed it both in interna l
FO d iscussion and by maki ng it a central element of WP(44)436
in August 1944. Lockhart had written that Stalin was faced wit h
150 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll (//UIIII(' Soviel Union

reconstruction problems he coul d not solve without Anglo-Ameri-

can aid, o n which Cadogan commented:

have often heard this said bu t I have never heard it argued in

any detail. Can it be accepted as true, wi thout any qualifica-
tion? lEden: ' I fear not.'l

He went on to state that while t he USSR had received e normous

military aid from the Al li es in the war, it was also a fact that it s
own production was proof of a n astonishing rate of development
which, if mai ntained, might lead it almost anywhere, a point the
JIC had made in JIC(44)366(O). Cadogan failed to take into ac-
count the unevenness of this development, which mea nt the USSR
had been able to achieve such miracles of munitions prod uct ion in
some areas by depending on the Allies for others (such as soft-
skinned vehicles, medical supplies and to a certai n extent, food). 22
Cadogan's comment reflected the fact that Britain 's own economic
weakness meant that she cou ld not hope to have much of an econ -
omic lever at her disposa l. The actua l scope of Soviet reconstruction
needs was backed by a fair amount of data and observation about
the destruction of the Soviet economic infrastructure in the wa r.
However, as the postwar period approached, the precise effect of
this on Soviet fo reign policy was becoming, if anythin g, more
uncertain.

Views of Soviet Foreign Policy: Security and Limited

Objectives
The events of early 1945 necessarily re newed the deba te on the
issue of limited obiectives and focllsed attenti on particul a rl y on
whether th ere should as a conseq ue nce be a revision of views of
t he ways the Soviets defined 'security' . The jle, under FO prompt-
ing, had established that these limited objectives were not threateni ng
to Britain's own vital, non-negotiable interests.2l Th e cru cial area,
where th e 'acid tests' of most individuals were to be a pplied, was
eastern Europe. It was here, it was felt, that Soviet motivations
would be revealed, and in their cooperativeness clear evidence given
of their commitment to postwa r collabora tion . It was Sovi et ac-
tions here that generated most doubts a nd peSSim ism about that
col laboration. However the cooperative thesis was held too st rongly,
and corresponded too much t o British interest s, to be thrown away
 'Difficul/, bll/ I/o/Imposs ible' lSI

lightl y. The inclination was to keep a sense of proportion in terms

of wider interest s and to see Soviet actions in the light of existing
in terpretation s.
Thus, it was pointed out in the FO on a number of occasions
that Stalin would rega rd him self as having been gran ted the righ t
to make h is own dispositions in the region by the October 1944
pe rcentages agreement, which after all had been Churchill's sug-
gesti on, not his own. C hurchill was not alone in read in g the
con tinued (if grudging) passivity of the Greek Communists to be a
sign that Stalin regarded that agreement as still in operati on .
Sta lin, furth e rmore, had been assured that he had a right to fri endly
governm ents on his borders.24
It had already become clear to most Government observers that
the Soviet s were orga ni si ng so me kind of eastern bl oc. Th e appar-
e nt ly ame nable Soviet attitude to a western bloc, fo r insta nce, had
been taken to derive from the idea that it would give justificati on
fo r the ir own. Of itself thi s was not co nside red a problem in 1944;
although ea rlier there h ad been co ncern to avoid this, and th ere
was sti ll a nxiety about d ivi ding Europe too rigidly into two ca mps.
It all de pended on how this bloc was con stitu ted . It see med likely
to be held together by bilateral t reaties and some bases a rra nge-
ments; thi s does not appear to have generated much British concern
in ear ly 1945. Dugga ld Stewa rt of the Southern Department co m-
mented : 'th ey have show n that th ey full y unde rstand the principle
of spheres of influence and are willing to play by the ruIcs.'25 Stewa rt
saw Po la nd to be of the greatest importance, and Yugoslavia also
to be more important than Romania or Bulgaria, justi fy ing the ac-
cepta nce of th ese de facto spheres.
The key question was whether this undou bted sp here was going
to be an 'open ' o ne or o ne totall y closed to outside contacts, es-
pecially economic. Th e developing friction with the Soviets afte r
Yalta on examinat ion can be seen to centre on this issue, as the
British met with Soviet obstructionism when they tried to rega in
cont rol of economic assets in Romania, and to send mil itary missions
into Bulga ria , Poland, Hungary and finally Austria. When Ed en,
Sargent and others complained of ' abominable' Soviet behaviour,
it was th is exclusion that was uppermost in their minds. An FO
paper, 'Examples of Ru ssian Bad Faith ', of 20 July, co mmen ted,

The majority of our complaints in t hese co untri es IRomania and

Bulgarial arise not from violation of agreements, but from complete
152 Cllllrcl1i11, Wllilellllll (lm/I/I(' Soviet Union

failure to accord us the co-operation to wh ic h we are c ntiUed. 26

Beginning with Romania, the Sovie ts were cha racte rised as set-
ting up puppets in the cou ntries they occupied, and using ruth less
methods to deal with those they regarded as u nsound in their atti-
tude towards their 'liberators'. The cent ral issues were, however,
whether these actions were co nsiste nt with their security aim, and
whether they indicated the activatio n of the 'reinsura nce' policy.
Representatives on the spot, like Houstou n-Boswall in Sofia, were
affected by thei r treatment by the Sovie ts and by t heir knowledge
of what had been agreed at Yalta, and equally by their ignorance
of the perce ntages agreement (though word of it reached Maclean
in Yugos lavia).27 It is clear that these diplomats' criti cal stance was
not entirely mirrored in Wh ite hall , where there was a re luctance
to spring to the idea immediately t hat wholesale Sovietisation was
taking p lace. These actions in esta blish ing their own governments,
whi le regrettable, we re not seen necessarily as a n indication of
wholesale Soviet expansionism. In considering this issue, the Northern
and Southern Departments were prepared to draw a clear dist inc-
tion between Soviet actions in thei r sp he re of in terest and those
out side; however unpleasant they were, action s within t he Soviet
sphe re were not to be regarded as t ests of cooperativeness. 28 This
was to prove to be increasingly difficult to sustain, as t he Soviets
showed less and less concern even to keep up appea rances .
While th ere we re mention s of Soviet (a nd hi storical Russian)
expansion ism, these act ions could be fitted into a security interpreta-
tion, which still seemed entirely plaUSible. On t he issue of Soviet
motivations, fear of Germany still featu red as the main asc ribed
motive . Galsworthy saw the Soviet aim as the establi shment of
permanent security by a belt of closely knit satellites. Stewart agreed
in July 1945 that security in this a rea was still the domina nt mo-
tive, with the propagation of Commun ism a long way second. Part
of the problem in Anglo-Soviet relations that this issue rai sed was
that the Yalta Declarati on on Li berated Europe effectively estab-
lished a new yardst ick for Soviet coopera tiveness, pa rticula rly for
those who looked to Soviet behaviour for confirmation of their overall
commit ment to cooperation. Stewart for his pa rt believed it was
not at all clear the Soviets were ru sh ing to remodel the forme r
Axis satellites:
 'Difficu/l, bul 1101 Impossibll" 153

They have had to balan ce the d isadvantages of installing

Governme nts wh ich could be tru st ed to be comp letely pro-
Russ ian, but were not representative, and of permitting th e
establi sh ment of Govern ments which were sufficiently represen ta-
tive to keep order without any expenditure of Russian effort, but
were not so ' trust worthy' as a com pletely Comm uni st-con tro lled
Governm ent.

A scare about th e degree o f Germa n secret service penetration, he

believed , impelled the m to in stall a puppet governmen t in Roma-
nia, but in Hun gary th ey in stal led a compara ti vely bou rgeo is
governm ent with no sign th ey were encouraging Co mmunist at-
tempts to gain predom inance:

we were before Yalta perfectly prepared to allow the Russ ia ns

th e predo minan ce in th e ex-satellite Balkan co untries to which
we agreed in Moscow last October, but it has unfortunately been
quite impossible to pe rsuade them to realise that the Yalta Dec-
laratio n on Liberated Te rritories altered this and not only enti tl ed
us, but even obliged us, to interest ourselves in what the Rus-
sians were doing. z9

Sa rgent put the matte r a littl e differently, believing the Soviets

feared a coa lition of liberal democracies and the revival of Ger-
many, and were respo nding by seeking security by 'ebmsra/llll. Th ey
were, however driven by fear of Germa ny, not a desire fo r furth e r
territorial expa nsion beyond sat isfaction of their long-standing front ier
demands. 30 Sargent had already argued on 13 March that democ-
racy had never fl ou rished in central and south-eastern Europe, except
in Czechoslova ki a. It was no surp rise that the peoples of these states
mi gh t be more inte rested in gaining security and stable govern-
ment s than politica l liberties. The Soviets took the lin e that what
they were doing was part of their general wa r policy; a cordon sanifaire
aga in st Germa ny which would requ ire governments to be modelled
along totalitarian lines. Th ey would conside r this an essential pa rt
of th eir secu ri ty system. )1
The Moscow Embassy agreed with Sargen t's st ress on the signifi-
cance of the Ge rm a n question in interpreting these Soviet act ions;
to Robe rts, th e fear of Germany still meant that for the Soviets
British treat me.nt of that cou ntry was thei.r touchstone. The Soviets
were genU in ely very worried about Ge rmany, so would value the
154 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll {1m/III(' Soviel Union

Anglo-Sov iet alliance a nd the Wo rld Orga nisation. Robert s stressed

the fundamentally defensive o ri ent ation of these Soviet actions. He
attributed recent signs of Soviet doubts about a western bloc to
their fears that Ge rmany would be incl uded in il. 32 Cla rk Kerr and
the Sout hern Department agreed in June that secu rity was still the
main Soviet motive Y Sa rgent himself conceded t hat the Soviets
appeared genuinely to beli eve Britain had no right to interfe re
with their paramount interest in Roman ia, Bulgaria and probabl y
Hungary.34
Some of Ede n 's commen ts revea led a more pessim istic att itude.
[n March he asserted that Anglo-Soviet relations were now co m-
pletely lacking in all confide ncc. 3s In the US, he was influentia l, as
Wilson Miscamble has shown, on President Truman 's famous dem-
onstration of piq ue to Molotov. 36 He was in fact eithe r absent in
the US, ill or preoccupied with House of Com mons busi ness (as
Leade r of the House) through most of April, May a nd June, so t hat
expressions of hi s opinion on Soviet questions are infrequent. The
views he did express, parti cu larly in comments to Church ill prior
to th e Potsdam Conference, were very much on the lines of t he
more pessimistic of his comments d urin g 1944. Eden certai nly ap-
pears among the more disillusioned of the British poli cy-makers.
On th e eve of the Potsdam Confere nce, he wrote:

on any and every pOint, Russ ia t ries to seize all that she can and
she uses these meetings to grab as much as she can get . . . . I am
deeply concerned at the pattern of Russian pol iCY, which be-
comes clearer as they become more brazen every dayY

Co nclusions from Soviet Behaviour and the Decline of

th e Hypersensitivity Model
The aspect of th e 1944 thesis that showed most change was the
doctrine of Soviet hypersensitivity. Whereas in 1944 this had bee n
significan t, as show n in the debate between the FO and the COS
on the treatment of the German question, now even its keenest
advocates had grown scept ical or impati ent. In h is contacts with
British diplomats, Maisky (now a Vice-Commissa r for Foreign Af-
fairs) con tinued to excuse Soviet misconduct by referring to their
inferiority compl ex and lack of mann ers. He asked for patience,
but this was becoming in increasing sho rt supply. Even Clark Kerr
contested Maisky's apologia, claiming that the British had been at
 'Difficu/l , bul 1101 Imposs ibll" 155

pains to be circu mspect, frank a nd honest, and 'a ll we had got in

return was a series of affronts' .3M
Koll ontai - described by Clark Kerr as 'an old and warm fri end of
mine' - was franke r than Maisky, but pressed the same id ea. She
claimed the Soviets were a t the same stage of development as the
Engl ish in Cromwell's t ime. They were also bad psychologists, who
went blundering into situations without thinking. They were con-
scious of their success and wanted the world to pat them on the
back and fee l their strength. They were ch ildren and should be
treated as such - in time their weakness would pass. They knew
they m ust cooperate with Britain, she sa id; the latter should 'prac-
tise patie nce, patience, and more patience'. Kollontai's image of
clumsy Soviet diplomacy, Maisky's commen ts about the bad psy-
c hology of members of hi s Government and Litvinov's similar
cri ticisms make an interesting contrast to the tendency within the
British Governm ent to exaggerated respect for the skill and saga-
cious realism of the Soviets, and their single·minded and well-planned
pu rsuit of goals. Clark Kerr's view of these comments was: 'The
truth is that the Russ ians arc in a hurry to be great and that is
uncomfortabl e.' The FO instructed him to reply stiffly to Maisky
that he of all people should know ample allowances had been made
for t he 'peculiarities of the Russian mentality'. There was frustration
that contacts with Stalin and Molotov and Soviet victories had not
removed the suspiciousness. 39
Maisky's fundamental point, which was that Soviet behaviour and
demeanou r were not a n indication of th e overall direction of thei r
policy, remai ned an issue of debate.-I{I Clark Kerr still argued that
Soviet methods were not sure guides to their policy intentions, but
he felt that their behaviou r was now shaped less by a morbid sense of
infe riority than by an exaggerated sense of co nfidence and powe r
brought o n by the magnitude of their victories, and also in some
part by the adu lation of the western press and political leaders. This
was just an adolescent phase, howeve r, which would be followed
by settled co l laboration. ~1 Clark Kerr found the idea borne out in
Soviet behaviour in subsequent months. The Soviets, he wrote on 10
July, were ' rejoicing in the impulsions of ea rly manhood'. They wcrc
giddy wit h success a nd a scnse of 'bound less strengt h', feeling there
was little or nothing to stop them making their greatness felt and not
disposed to take much account of others' views along the way.42
Clark Kerr d id feel , however, that th is did not betoken a funda-
mental rejection on Sta li n's part of the policy of cooperation. This
156 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll {//UIIII(' Soviel Union

st ill corresponded to Soviet interests, and Britain should be ca reful

not to react to the clumsy way they did things. He found no sign
in the actua l policy content to suggest t hey had become hostile;
like Wilson in 1944 he was prepared to ove rl ook Soviet 'b loodi-
ness', to accept that the Soviets viewed Poland as matter of vital
secu rity, and to try to look at the totality of policy. Thus he ar-
gued that the Soviets were still cooperative, but there would certain ly
be d ifficulties in cooperating wit h them. He co nceded that Anglo-
Soviet relations would never be intimate or always easy. However,
there were solid reasons, most pa rti cu larly mutual fe ars of Germany,
why the Anglo-Soviet alliance would endure; sent iment and com-
mon cu ltural ties aside, mutual interests would provide the firm
foundation for postwar cooperation:

While memories of German aggression and fears of its revival

linge r in Russian minds, as t hey must for some years to come,
these fears, together wit h the need for help in shoulderi ng
the heavy burden of reconstruction, should provide a solid basis
for Anglo-Soviet co-operation in the major tasks of European
reconstruction. H

Others were less disposed to overlook bad Soviet beh aviour. They
believed that if the Soviets wanted cooperation they shou ld act in
a fashion that took account of their all ies' susceptibi lities, particu-
larly now that the military burden was being equally shared . There
was definitely less preparedness all round to put up with what Roberts
described as the Soviet 'dog-in-the-manger attitude' . Some empha-
sised th at the over-confident Soviets we re not perhaps weighing
force s as carefully as in the past. Others int rod uced a new ex plana-
tion of Soviet truculence: the Soviet s had assessed the rea lities of
power and had realised that their position would never be st ronger,
and so were securing as many bargaining counte rs as they could .
This was opportunistic, reflective of defects in their cooperative spirit
and a confirmation of their cont inuing suspiciousness, but fell short
of being irreversi bly uncooperative.H

Frank, Firm , but no t Unfriendly: th e Continuing Debate

o n How to Handl e the Soviets
The movement in perceptions of Soviet policy, while marc con-
fu sed and less definite than is sometimes asserted for th is time,
 'Difficu/l, bul 1101 Impossiblt' 157

was sufficien t to shift the balan ce somewhat in the running debate

on what the best British policy would be. The Allied advances in
th e west and t hen victory in Europe also provided a strong impe-
tus to review the policy alternatives: th e time appeared ripe fo r the
kind of policies that had long bee n advocated but had never come
into operation ; for the milita ry 'strict reciprocity', for th e dipl oma-
tist s ' firm a nd frank exchange of views ' and for so me in addit ion,
in cl uding Eden and Ch urchi ll, what they ca lled showdown s. None
of these involved a re jection of the th esis of a cooperative USSR.
There was a sense from Apri l 1945 that the si tuation offered an
o pportunity, but one wh ic h had to be exploited immediately, for
it could not be assum ed that it would last . The main elements of
this position were the mi litary strength of the Briti sh and Am eri-
ca ns, th eir physical occupation of a large part of the occupatio n
zone in Ge rman y assigned to the USSR, and the Soviets' own ex-
hausti on . The key fa ctor making these diminishing assets was the
declared US policy of ea rl y withdrawal, not o nl y from the Soviet
zo ne, but from Europe as a whole. This sense of opportunity brought
fo rth a widespread advocacy of active and more confrontatio nal
tacti cs. Thi s was intended to build a better basis for cooperatio n,
and wa s not e nvisaged to be a new non·cooperative poli cy, though
that is how it appears o n a su perfi cial reading of th e evidence and
a failu re to identify t he eleme nts of co ntinuity both in the under-
lying images of the USSR behind policy formulation s, and in the
policy debate. The catchphrases of 'firmness' and 'frankness' did
not represent a dramatic break with the establish ed parameters of
discussion.
That this was so was demonstrated in the contributions from the
Moscow Embassy. Clark Kerr and Robe rts emerged as articulate
advocates of a modifica tion in Briti sh policy, which fell, however,
well short of a reve rsal of that previously practised. Moving on in
hi s despatc h of 27 March from hi s remarks about Soviet over-
confide nce and immaturity, the Ambassador pu t forward almost a
definitive statement of the ' frankn ess' line. Brita in, he argued, should
stop t he popu lar adulation t hat only fed the dangerous Soviet sense
o f strength:

we need not, I think, be over nice in ou r approach to her. When

we arc shocked we may say so in all frankness .... they will
judge their partners and conduct their pot icy towards th em by
th eir own realist ic standa rds.
158 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll {//UIIII(' Soviel Union

Britain should sta nd up for her vital inte rests, at th e sa me time

recognising th at it was fruitless to arg ue over Romania and Bul-
ga ria. The Soviets, he argued, respected th e British and va lued their
coope rati on if they stood up for what the Soviets recognised were
British vital interests; Turkey, Greece, Ira n, fo r instance. Even then
there might be so me 'squalls', but th is should be taken in propor-
tion and overa ll the allia nce would 'serve us well and pay a st eady,
though not spect acula r, dividend'. ~5
A month later, Robert s expanded upon the the me . It was poss-
ible, he argued, to forge a useful working relationsh ip wit h the
Soviets, if Britai n was ' tough a nd realistic', the qua liti es he ascribed
to the Sovict5. These realists must be shown that Britain was deter-
mined and strong enough to defend her own interests and that
there was a limit beyond wh ich the Soviets cou ld not safely go. He
fo llowed up Clark Kerr's com me nt on Roma nia and Bulga ria by
advocating a recognition that Soviet action had divided Europe.
Britain shoul d concentrate on organ isi ng th e All ies' hal f. This was
not, however, an argument for building up the West in a Co ld
War-style confronta tion. Robe rts a rgued on the con trary that this
recognition of the facts was, far from being a poli cy of despair, the
best way to avoid either a sudde n or a gradual dete rioration in
Anglo-Soviet relations. It involved a middle course; and as such
was in essence the ' frankness ' approach. On the one hand, the
exaggerated adulation of the Red Army and t he Soviet system should
be cut back. On the oth er hand, policy-ma kers should not follow
the advice of those 'w ho sec a Prussian in every Russia n ' . This was,
he made quite clear, a tactical change, wh il e keeping in place the
long-term strategy based upon th e Anglo-Soviet all ia nce and the
avoidance of conflict , wh ich would be ach ieved by en suring the
Soviets did not make misi udgements on the basis of underestimat-
ing Britain's stre ngth and will ingness to protect its inte rests and
friend s. Then th e Anglo-Soviet alliance, Roberts believed, 'should
con tinu e to se rve us well' .46
In the PO the re was a ma tching sense that the precepts of th e
fra nkn ess approach could now at last be appl ied with a freedom
that was not possible before. This was not a new idea, of course,
and previously it had effectively been rendered tooth less by the
fear that th e Soviets woul d misperceive it as a complete reiection
of cooperation by the British . The notabl e feature of the post-Yalta
period was that this aspect of the Sov iet sensitivity thesis simpl y
ceased to operate. Th e Soviet a rrogance that appeared so much in
 'Difficu/l, bul 1101 Impossibll" 159

evidence largely negated it. As a consequence, there was a tendency

to spea k in terms of showdowns with the Soviets as an imm ed iate
way of alteri ng the relation ship from what was expedient in war~
time to what was more appropriate in peace, and at the same time
attempt to mod ify Soviet behaviour in eastern Europe. This atti-
tude was primarily advocated within the FO by Sargent. Both Eden
and Church ill were to voice their approval of it. In parallel wi th
his views on Soviet pol icy, Sargent's views on handling the Soviets
underwent some development in this period . Two weeks before Clark
Kerr's despatch, on 13 March, he too argued that Britain should
limit its complaint s abou t Soviet behaviour. He wrote that it was
out of all proportion that Britain shou ld endanger its fundamental
pol icy of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union for the sake
of a n issue which, even if it was not entirely academic or quixotic,
was not vital to British interests in Europe. He based himself on
the Soviet secu rity thesis. By criticising the regimes set up in
Roman ia and Bulga ria, Britain was attacking what the Soviet Govern-
ment considered an essent ial part of its security system. Poland
was a separate and specia l case, but, he argued, it was important
not to weaken the case by treating on the same lines other cou ntries
where Brita in was not so committed . Effectively, Sargent was arguing
fo r a concen tration o n British vital interests , and a realistic
approach to the situation in eastern Europe, wh ich was not a vital
area to Britain, and w he re Britain could in any event not influence
what happened, a nd would be sacrificing its larger aim in pursuit
of a chimera. H He expressed some sympathy for the Soviet pursuit
of securityY However, he did not stick to this fatalistic realist line .
On 31 March, Lockhart suggested a heart to heart with the Soviets,
involving h is ideal of ' plain but not unfriendly speaking on both
sides'. Britain 's approach, he felt, was all wrong. It had misled the
Soviets so that it was possible that even Stalin believed they were
very st rong and Britain was weak, which was not in fact the case.
To keep t hem sweet the Soviets had been allowed to believe this,
but the effects of Alli ed air power would be plain to sec in
Germany, a nd Stalin would certain ly not wish to push the USSR
into another war. 49
Sargent agreed that the Soviets underestimated Allied strength;
hence their suspicions about the nature of the victories in the west.
Lockhart warned that unless the USSR curbed what he saw as its
'present pol icy of sovietization and stud ied contempt of U.S. and
Britain', or unless something was done to put a stop to Soviet
160 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll {//UIIII(' Soviel Union

unilateral action, Anglo-American hostility to the USSR would in-

crease to a dangerous extent and we should lose the peace'. Lockhart
reco mmended 'a much more vigorous policy towards Russ ia - not
an unfriendly policy but a frank and firm clearing of views'. There
should not therefore be a squabbling over incidents, but a heart-
to-heart talk with the Soviet s on thei r intentions, it being made
clear to them that if they carried on the way they were going the
Allies would go their own way and there would be no Anglo-American
help for them. When Sargent reiterated that the Soviets were e n-
titled to security, Lockhart argued that Soviet victory policy might
exceed the limits of secu rity if they were not faced with Allied
firmness. so
Sargent was non-committal at the tim e, but this dialogue with
Lockhart seems to have stiffened up his attitude, for his subseque nt
contributions were very similar to the ideas Lockhart advanced . He
attributed the Soviet attitude since Yalta - their truculence and their
determination to give nothing away - to the improvement in the
Allied strength and position . He now, in contrast to h is 13 March
paper, suggested a showdown . Stalin wou ld simply suspect cun-
ning if Britain continued to propitiate from a position of strength
(which assumed Stalin perceived that strength). Soviet reactions to
a showdown were difficult to gauge, but the situation cou ld not be
worse than the present state of drift as Sargent saw it. The aim was
a frank, reali stic and plain-speaking approach , not to bring a break,
but to develop Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation along the right
Jines. 5 1 However, when O'Malley argued that it was now tim e to
'take the gloves off' , Sargent felt suc h an approach was ' truly des-
perate' and ' unnecessary if we play our cards reasonably well ', adding
that th e US would not in any case agree to such a policy at t hi s
time; a consideration that rendered the attempt at any kind of
showdown, o r even much o f a frankness approach, sti ll impossible
to achieve .52
The response to Stalin's opportunism that Sargent recommended
on the eve of the coming to power of the Attlee admi ni st ratio n
bore some surface similarities to the class ic Cold War stance. He
now argued that Britain should take a stand to preve nt the situa-
tion crystallising to her permanent detriment . Britain should maintain
her interests in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugosla-
via and Bulgaria, though she might have to acquiesce in Sovie t
dominatio n of Romania and Hunga ry. If a trial of strength was to
take place it should be now, inst ead of waiti ng fo r it to take place
 'Difficu/l, bul 1101 Impossibll" 161

further west after Stalin had pocketed for good those six states that
he now controlled by pol itical pressure and military force. Brita in
must be anti-totalitarian and at t imes live beyond her means. She
should take the offensive and c hallenge Communist penetration in
as many eastern European countries as possible, and counteract every
attempt by the Soviet Government to communise or control Ger~
many, Italy, Greece or Turkey. He saw the idea of concentrating
on western Europe, put forward by Roberts and Jebb, as a 'policy
of despair' . However, Sargent was not positing any kind of grand
design on Stalin 's part. Such a strategy was designed to get better
cooperation in the long te rm, just as the frankness approach had
always been intended to do. It was not impossible to achieve the
double task of holding the Soviets in check and amicably cooperating
with the United Sta tes and Soviet Union in the resettlement of
Europe. Collaboration with the Soviet Union, and even the United
States, he concl uded, was not goi ng to be easy; neither, however,
was it impossible. 53
The approach that won most favour in the FO was clearly based
on the conti nuin g assumption that Soviet aims had their limits
and that the quest for secu rity was at the heart of the measures
they were taking t o secure friendly governments in the states the
Red Army occupied . It fell short of a direct confrontation, and was
close t o the established 'frankness' approach. Most agreed that, as
Wilson put it, 'we need never be frightened of standing up to the
Russia ns where our vita l interests are concerned .'H It was felt that
while some Soviet behaviour could only be worsened by protest,
Britain should sta nd up for its in terests, and should not overesti~
mate Soviet strengt h.55
Chu rchill was right in line with the general inclination towards
the 'frankness' approach. On 5 April he wired to Roosevelt that the
tone of the Soviet messages suggested they we re vexed or jealous,
and the A n glo~America n response should be a firm and blunt stand.
The aim wou ld be to clea r the air and bring the Soviets to realise
that there was a poin t ' beyond which we will not tolerate insult'.
This was the 'best chance of saving the future'; again a frank ap~
proach was to bring relations back onto a good footing, not to
force a break. The Soviets had to be fo rcibly made awa re of the
consequences of their treating Allied interests and views with such
scant regard. 56 Sha ring the sense that Alli ed strength offered oppor-
tunities, but that it wou ld not last, Churchill continued to press
such a n approach on Roosevelt and then Truman, with little effect Y
162 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll (1m/III(' Soviel Union

By 1945, Churchill believed coope rat ion with Stalin was possible
but that the Allies must respond firmly or the Soviets would be
tempted to take advantage o f th e opportunities offe red to the m by
their military advances. Military necessities had changed: if the Soviets
wanted cooperation, then they would have to pay a price, and behave.
If they wanted to be treated like a civilised power, they had to act
like one and rein in their te ndency to act like a bully. The 'Rus-
sians', as he preferred to call them, were patriots when fig hting the
common foe, but their methods towards neighbou ring states showed
their usual Commu nist techniques, to which Churchill was opposed
as he was to Commun ists in Britain. 's
Churchill felt the American attempt to pretend the specia l rela-
tionship did not ex ist and to deal with the Soviets without prior
agreeme nt on tactics with the British weakened t he Allied posit ion
and encouraged Stalin to be truculent. This was a point he particu-
larly pressed on the new PreSident, Truman , over the Polish question
an d the issue of the withdrawal of Allied arm ies to demarcated
zones, with limited success. S9 He was frustrated by what he saw as
a US failure to understand the dynamiCS of the situation almost as
much as he was by Stalin, who was behaving as would be expected
when faced with such tactics as Roosevelt's in his last months,
w hich appeared to signal Allied dis interest in Soviet actions. In -
deed there was admiration for the adroit way Stalin played Roosevelt
alongSide annoyance that the opportunity to exert influence on
Soviet policy was being lost. A Stalin faced by a united AlJied front
would, Churchill believed, have been far differen t than whe n con-
fronted by this apparent disunity and an unwillingness to state
bluntly what the Allies wanted and wha t the Soviets could not do
without harming relations. Thu s he, like many FO offi cials, though
quite independently, had come to want a 'frankness' approach; also
based on the hopes it would improve cooperation, not as an alter-
native to it.6() Church ill 's pessimism, whi ch Gil bert describes as
'despa ir', following Colville's description, was rea l and well docu-
mented, but we should be careful lest we allow awareness of thi s
to obscure the nature and basis of Church ill's atti tude on how to
handle the Soviet s in th e last months of his administration. 6 1 He
did not reject the idea of postwar cooperation, and clearly re-
garded a bargaining policy as likely to bear fru it. Soviet power
impressed him, indeed someti mes he exaggerated it for effect, but
he still saw there to be mea ns available o f effective behaviour
modification.
 'Difficult, bul 1101 Impossible' 163

The consequen ce of not having followed a 'frankness' approach

ea rl ier ~ of which he was at least as guilty as the Americans - and
thu s giving Stalin the wrong signals, was that Chu rchill believed a
tougher pol icy was now req uired. The show of diplomatic strength
had not been made and it was for t he Allies now to resort to the
realities of power. The Allied armies should press on to take politi-
ca lly importa nt t argets such as Prague, Berlin and Lubeck. The aim
o f this was t wofold: fi rst, to set limits on the Soviet sphe re of in-
fluence, second, to acquire bargaining counters to secure better Soviet
behaviour on Poland, Austria and other issues . Withdrawal to pre-
arranged zones and the release of resources would be linked to
satisfactory performance on the Soviet side and settlement of out-
standing problems. Th e Soviets would appreciate the exercise of
power and would respond . Reality of power was to Churchill by no
means a bad basis for relations - indeed, in view of well-known
Comm unist tendencies it was the only practi ca l one a nd , in a world
of co nflict, hardly an inappropriate one. If Soviet preponderance of
power made t hem so asserti ve in t he absence of this policy, then
Church ill saw another chan ce to try it and bring the Soviet s to
cooperate at Potsdam in the shape of the atomic bomb. 6z Sta lin,
w ith his assumed realistic appraisal of the balance of forces, would
then see it as in his interest to coUaborate better. He must be brought
to realise that there was a price to pay for hi s reinsurance policy
and that the easy option was easy no longer. Yalta had made this
reinsu rance policy potentially more attractive than the 'primary'
o ne o f cooperation because it appeared from the American attitude
that he would get the benefits of the cooperative policy anyway.
The task subseq uently as Chu rchill saw it was to disabuse Stalin of
this misunderstanding if cooperation was to be revived; a difficult,
but not an impossibl e task.
Anothe r bargaining counter was control of egress from the Balti c
and Black Seas; however, when it came to the Big Three meeting at
which Churchill had previously wanted such linkage to be made,
he conceded on this question without securing a qllid pro q1lO. 61
Churchi ll's actual handling of the Soviets continued , in fact, to be
at variance with hi s wo rds uttered both within the Government
and to the US. More than for Eden , Ch urchill's ambivalence re-
mained. He was not yet the fully-fledged Cold Warrior, and the
breach with the USS R was not as total or irrevers ibl e as has been
impJied .M Th is is clear if the t rue meaning of 'frankness ' and even
the tougher approach that followed is understood. It was the question
164 C/lllrclllll, Wlllleill/ll {//UIIII(' Soviel Union

of the most app ropria te strategy to bring cooperation that was still
most hotly debated, rat her than t he question of w hether coopera-
tion was possible at all . Th e frankness approach was based on t he
belief that the right method coul d bring cooperation about. To be
sure, Churchill was quite prepared in t he last month s of the war to
talk sha rply to the Soviets where previously he had restrai ned him-
self. He made it quite clear th at he disapproved of Soviet actio ns
in th e territories they had liberated - doing so most forcefu lly in
an epic tOllr eI'/lOr/zo/l with Ambassador Gusev on 18 May. 6S He al-
ways main tained that he would have had a showdown over the
western border of Poland had he returned to Potsdam. In fact hi s
attitude in the first sessions at Potsda m had hardly been unco m-
promisi ng. His willingness to look ob ject ively at Soviet claims
persisted, to alarm Eden th at he was being too felicitous. He ac-
cepted the Soviets had a legitimate cla im fo r a warm water port
and access to the oceans; the USS R was ' like a gia nt with her nos-
trils pinched'.66 If Sta lin 's image had become a litt le tarnished,
gratitu de at his attitude over Greece in accordance with the Mos-
cow percentages agreement remained. As with the FO, Churchill's
ma in gripe seems to h ave been th at th e percentages were not
being observed, because the Soviets were obst ructing British activity
in the liberated countries, rather tha n concern about the Declara-
tion on Liberated Europe. The effect o f Sta lin's Greek policy should
not be underestimatedi Churchill ke pt referring to it as a point on
the cred it side of the ledger - this was clea rly a major acid test for
him and satisfactory Soviet performance there was a powerful bal-
ancing factor to offset against action s elsewhere Y

l)e rceptions of the USSR at the E.nd o f the Churchill

Coa lition

It has been argued that by the time of th e Potsdam Conference,

British a ttitudes had developed to a point where there were two
ex tremes, with the FO st ill seeking cooperation by concessions, and
the military, o n th e oth er hand , already wishing to plan for the
inevitable confl ict, with people like Church ill in th e middle mov-
ing unce rtainly and un easi ly.68 In this inte rpretation, by July 1945
the balance was sh ift ing in favour of military views as th e outl ines
of the Cold War were beginning to form. Th is is something of a
misrepresenta tion of bot h 'extremes', which actuall y were not so
far apart as this simple dichotomy suggests, for it ignores the frankness
 'IJifficult, bul 110/ Impossible' 165

school into which many fell and involves a misinterpretation of

the meaning of the often-used word 'toughness'. It is th e result of
focusing o n the discussion of British policy and passing over the
actual perceptions of the USSR that gave particular meaning to words
like 'toughness' and 'firm ness'. Moreover, the PHI'S argued that the
USSR had the capability and was in a geographical position to be a
major threat to the Empire at many points. They did not say that
this threat was immin ent. Th ey argued that it was the worst case
that had to be guarded against. This cannot be sa id in it self to be
a movement to the Col d War attitude that held that the Soviets
definitely had the intentions, and indeed a timetable of action, as
well as the capacity. The PHI'S pape rs continued to suggest that in
the reconstruct ion period Soviet interests would point th em in the
direction of cooperat ion, so long as certain security desiderata were
met. Thi s is some way from a doctrine of an irrevocably hostile
USSR, of the kind Maclean had adva nced in 1940. 69
The re was certai nl y some movement in policy recommendations,
particu larly from the beginning of April 1945; a product as much
of a sense of Allied stren gth and optimism as of despair about the
Soviets. This brought a belief that now was a good time for the
long·touted change in strategy, not to non-cooperation but to firm-
ness; toughn ess in negotiation, but not toughness in the se nse of
con fr ontat ion. 70 It is onl y after study of the preceding years, and
knowledge of the nature of the Government debate on the USSR
that thi s becomes evident . British policy was still, up to the end of
the Churchill Coa litio n, geared towards finding a way of getting
on with the Soviets, within the con text of some kind of meaning-
ful cooperat ion and educating them to be civilised members of
the community of nations. In spring and summe r 1945 this was
still seen as a rea lisable goal if diplomacy was skilful and backed
by the newfound strength , and there was a fairly realistic idea of
what cooperation would mean. It would not be the joint military
staffs or cu ltura l exchanges fa voured by Wilson, nor the close econ-
omic collaborati on advocated by Skaife. It would be a relationship
wi th its inbuilt tensions, involving a de (acto division of Europe,
but bound by solid int erest. One of the problems was the inabitity
to devise a policy on Germany that would perpetuate that bond;
Germany had to be strong enough to be a latent threat, but the
act of keeping it so would raise suspicions that would render coop-
eratio n imposs ibl e. Anothe r problem was the perennial one now
assuming great er prominence; even if the Soviets were coope rative
166 CIII/rellill, Wllitellllll (lm/ille Soviet Union

in intention, it was beco ming abundantl y clear that their methods

- what Lockhart called their 'unilateral malfeasances' - left much
to be desi red.71 The problem was that be haviou r was ofte n the only
guide to overall ob ject ives; this was the source of most uncertainty
and doubt in th e summer of 1945.
In the period from Yalta to t he end of Churc hill 's premiership,
developments took place in some of t he perceptions that have been
identified as cent ral. The sensitivity idea was t ra nsfo rm ed in to an
increasing awareness of Soviet over-confidence and arroga nce. The
three cen tra l ideas, realis m as a drivi ng force, the goodwi ll of Sta lin
and the Sig ni fica nce of postwar reco nstruc tion need s, remained
remarkably unaltered in spite of the rocky pat h of relations. These
were strongly held pe rceptions, not claim s made out of the expedi-
ency of the moment in 1944. There was still a sense of a number
of constrain ts on Soviet fr eedom of action , not least of whi ch was
seen to be a consciousness, at least on Stali n's part , of the military
strength of the Allies. This might explain some of his present actions,
as attempts to pick up bargaining cou nters wh ile he was st rong
(before he had to begin reconstruction), but also suggested to all
those who believed Stalin to be a real ist, tha t he would not want
to risk a breakdown in relations, since he could not afford a situa-
tion of armed tension, let alone war. The principal Soviet motivation
was sti ll iden tified as the search for security, th ough the defi nition
of security seemed to be getting drawn very wide, and to involve
crude methods of control in the lim itrophe states. Britain's response
con tinu ed to be based on the assumptio n that it was possible to
find a method to modify Soviet behaViou r, and that this could be
achieved within the context of continued cooperation. There was
certainly a lower level of certainty about some areas of the thesis
and estimates of what coope ration would mean were necessarily
changing, but it was not yet regarded in th e policy-making elite,
across th e spectrum from the military to WilSall and Clark Kerr, as
impossible o r undesirable J2
That British attitudes were by no means yet in Cold War mode is
apparent when we approach the 1945 period from th e earlier tim e
and can see the li mited natu re of developments and cha nges that
had ta ken place and in particular und erstand what specific mean-
ing atta ched to words like 'frankness' and 'fi rmness'. These cha nges
were more ofte n than not responses to the new situation within
the context a nd framework of th e 1944 assumpti on s. They arc
understood best in terms of thei r re lation to the past rathe r than
with our kn owledge of the eve nts and attitudes that were to come .
7
Conclusion

The com mitment to long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union

that developed in the Churchill Coalition was founded upon a certa in
set of images of the USSR. Understandi ng the core assumptions
that wcre made is necessary for comprehending the particular course
of British policy. The thesis of a cooperative Soviet Unio n con-
ceded th at the USSR was a difficult power at times to deal with,
but its l ea der h ad decided o n a poticy of collabora tion . Failure to
ident ify bot h this p repa redness to envisage difficulties within the
overa ll assumption of collaboration and the Significance of the image
of Sta lin has led to the strength of this thes is being und er-
estimated a nd the effects of an image of the USSR on the shape of
British policy durin g the Second World War being largely over-
looked. The fact that they later changed complete ly must not be
allowed to obscure the evidence that these attitudes were genu-
inel y held. Nor must the rational basis for them be underestimated.
It is clea r, from carefu l examinat ion of the documentary reco rd
from the period of t he wartime Church ill Coalition, that there was
a sincere be lief that it was possi ble to build long-term cooperation
with Sta lin'S Soviet Union; indeed, that this was an unprecedented
opportunity to bring t he USSR in from the co ld, into the com-
munity of nat ions. Th is was founded on a certain set of images of
the USSR. The t hesis was built upon a group of interrelated percep-
tio ns of Soviet internal developme n ts, of the personali ty and
motivations of Sta lin, Soviet approach to their position in the world,
and Soviet suscept ibilities and sensitivities.
The re were th ree basic assumption s that sustained the belief in
futu re Soviet co llaboration. These were neither insincere window-
dressing nor 'pla nted', wh ich is not to say that they were not open

167
168 CllIIrcl1ill, Wl1itellllll {lml 111(' Soviet Ullioll

to reinterpretation in the light of events and fresh intelligence,

and all were developed in debate, wit h a demonstrable range of
views and emphases. Th e first assu mption was that Soviet aims were
limited, largely defensive and not likely to im pinge upon areas of
vital British interest. Far from desiring to propagate world revolu-
tion, Stalin simply wanted protection, particularly against a resurgent
Germany, in order to continue the internal development of indus-
trialisation and State Socialism in terrupted by the war and preparation
for war. He assessed these factors with stern realism. Th e second
assumption was that the destruction of the already weak economic
infrastructure of the cou ntry was colossa l, and that the cost of re-
construction would be immense; and eve n if Stalin sought to do
this without foreign help, he would seek the cheapest possible
foreign policy to enable him to concentrate on this ta sk. Collective
security with Britain and possi bl y the USA if it did not return to
isolationism, would provide this cheap option. It was taken as axi-
omatic that this would exercise a strong leverage on Soviet fore ign
policy and that the Soviet s would be anxious to avoid external
conflict or the need to maintai n large armed forces. In effect there
would now be a limit to the dangerous freedom of action perceived
in 1940. Third, Stalin was a wise statesman, a sagaCiOUS realist.
who was trustworthy where it could be seen that hi s inte rests were
clearly engaged in his entering into undertakings, who had become
persuaded of the wisdom of a cooperation policy with the West.
Linked with these assumptions were conclusions drawn from the
changes in the USSR during th e war, especiall y the revival of
nationalism and religion, a nd from the sensit ivity of Soviet leaders
and officials to being treated in a way commen surate with their
status as the government of a Great Power and the leading pro-
tagonist in the war against Germa n y. Th e changes towa rds a
class· based, socially conservative society were seen to have inevi·
ta ble consequences regarding Soviet cond uct on the international
scene. Obviously it made a difference if it was true that the country
was now run by managers not revolutionaries. Sta lin was assumed
to be behind most of these changes; and sin ce he was also viewed
as prime mover behin d the Soviet cooperation policy with Britain,
then the linkage seemed clear.
These were not unreasonable assumptions, and the irrationa lity
of Sta lin 's postwar policies was by no mean s foreshadowed in war-
time internal developments. I Some of these perceptions were also
in evidence in the US Gove rnm ent. The re is no indication that the
 COl/elr/siUI/ 169

Americans were t he sou rce of such ideas for the British, though
there was some sharing of viewpoints, pri ncipally between the Moscow
Embassies. The fact that Ameri can observers arrived at simila r views
about Soviet reconstruct ion needs, security motives and the char-
acter of Stal in is noteworthy, in so much as it supports the conclusion
that these theori es were based on observa tion of real developments,
not conjured out of th e imagina tion. 2 They sometimes put a differ-
e nt e m phasis on such id eas, for instance on the Soviet incl ination
to ' unilateralis m' and the impli ca ti ons of reconstruction needs, and
they oft en did not agree on policy respo nses . They too wished to
avoid 'ganging up' and were conscious of Soviet sensitivit ies - and
like the British fo und a firm approach preferable, but in pract ice
el usive.3
In both the US and British governme nts there continu ed to be
debate as to whether it was better to treat the Soviets robustly be-
cause t hey suspected gestures of goodwill, or co nversely to bring
them to act like civilised allies by t reati ng them as respected equals.~
An assumption based ulti mately on se lf-evident Soviet suspicio ns
and sha red alike by those advocating co ncessions or tough bar-
ga ining, was that Soviet policy was susceptible of modification by
ou t si d e influen ce. No ne o f the interpretations suggested that
Soviet cooperation cou ld be achieved without a correctly formulated
British policy: th is was bel ieved as st rongl y by the COS as it was in
the FO. Agreement on t his basic precept d id not lead to con se nsus
o n method. Different emphases on different elements of the war-
time image of the USS R brought a range of op inions o n h ow
to secu re Soviet cooperation. Th e problem was that the secu rity,
realism and sensitivity assumptions did not produce a clea r and
unambiguous con clusion on what was actually the best method of
doi ng t his. ' Firmn ess' and 'frankness' were easier to advocate in
theory than to put into practi ce. If cooperation was assumed, the re-
fore, questions remain ed on th e proper st rategy to secure and
encou rage it.
How British pOlicy-makers t ranslated such perceptions into Brit-
ish policy depended on their outlook on world affairs, and Britain's
ro le. Undoubtedly t hey assumed that Britain should, and could,
remain a World r OWeL S Their estimates of British 'vita l interests'
were framed on the assumption that t he Empi re and Britain's other
worl dwide comm itments would continue. British policy to the USSR
has been seen as 'pragmati c', and indeed Eden and others liked to
see it that way.6 However, assessments of interests and practicality
170 CllIIrcllill, Whiteill/ll {/I/{IIII(' Soviet Uniol1

arc shaped by appraisal of other powers' int entions and capabili-

ties. British policy cannot simp ly be see n as 'pragmatic' wit hout
reference to the perceptions t hat informed that pragmati sm.
Lord Bullock has pointed out that Gra nd AUiances rarely last beyond
the defeat of the mutual enemy. 7 It is usually a feat of skil l, with
some fortun e, that they remain toget he r tha t long. The Grand Al-
liance of the Second World War, like ot her such allia nces before it,
was certainly the result of a coi ncidence of interests. 8 However,
these interests were not believed by t he protagonis ts to be com-
pletely served by the defeat of Germany. All were conscious that
Germany had been defeated 20 yea rs before, yet the problem had
reappeared. So long as attitudes were st ill dominated by the sca le
of effort required to defeat Hitler it seemed im pe rative that this
situation not be allowed to happe n agai n. To t he members of t he
alliance, this coincidence of interest did not appear so short-term
as it has to subsequent writers, with the benefit of hinds igh t. As
this study has shown, it was the belief that t here was a shared
fundamenta l interest in common action to preven t German resur-
gence that was at the heart of the assum ption that the all iance
cou ld last beyond the war that had created it." For British policy-
makers, while they viewed the USS R wi t h continued uncert ainty
and the suspicions that scholars continue to foctls upon, there also
seemed, from observation and interpretati on, a logica l bas is for
believing that cooperation was a rea l possibilit y. 1O
Moreover, in the present course of Soviet fo reign policy and the
imperatives that seemed to be operating in the Kre mli n, it appeared
tha t there was now an unprecedented chance to add ress t he prob-
lem of the Soviet Union as a rogue player in world pol it ics: to
bring to an end that dangerous situat ion where t he USSR had been
isola ted and had pursued policy objectives by subversive a nd ir-
regular methods. This sense of opportunity to mod ify Soviet behaviour
has often been overlooked, yet it is clea rly evident in t he Brit ish
docum entary sources for the period, as we have seen .11 It is worth
reiterating that th is d id not mean tha t it was believed that the
USSR would become 'civilised' overn igh t, even by t he most e nthu-
siastic for cooperation : as Clark Kerr had warned, one coul d ex pect
'recurring ten Sion/. ll There were, aft er all , ple nty of tensions in
re lationships with other allies, sllc h as the Fren ch, and even t he
Americans . This would all, however, be withi n acceptable limits,
and interests wo uld continue to bind t he Anglo-Soviet alliance. It
was after the war ended that these acceptable limits and the atti-
tudes that went wit h th em changed.
A final point can be made. Wh ile th is study is not concerned
with judging whether Brit ish mistakes or ill-will in this period caused
the Cold Wa r, it is clea r that for all the concern to secure postwar
collaboration some of the seeds of later conflict were planted in
the war. Thi s was not because the British were totally wrong about
the USS R - many of their assumptions were astute (thollgh some,
sllch as Stalin 's military wisdom, were wide of the mark). However,
both Briti sh and Soviet policy-makers had many acid tests of each
others' attitudes, most of wh ich remained in operation at th e end
of the war. I n a positi on of some uncertainty - indeed as Churchill
had predicted, 'deepen ing con fu sion' - both were un prepared to
forgo entirely t heir rein suran ce policies, but could not unambigu-
ous ly convince t he ot he r that these were not primary policies, for
'frank' commu n ication never rea lly took place. 13 The ex istence of
po licy debate within the British Government was well known to a
Soviet leade rsh ip whose tendency was to think th e worst of the
Briti sh estab lishm ent (they knew all about the PH PS views o n dis-
mem berment for instance, through Donald Maclean), so that while
there was a broad consen sus on coopcration , the ex iste nce of those
with doubts o r reservations was probably ultimately of grcater sig-
nificance, not for wartime policy, but for subsequcnt cvc nts; a rcsult
of Sovict perceptions of t he Briti sh, however, more than a rcsult of
the most widcspread pcrceptio ns of the USSR within the Chu rchill
Coal iti o n. 1~ At the e nd of that Coalitio n, despite all the difficultics
of the fi nal period of th e war, the prospects did not seem overwhelm-
ingly bleak, even from the Moscow Embassy, never a posting that
encouraged flights of opti mi sm . rrank Roberts wrote on 30 June
1945 of 'a very welcome detellfe' since the troubles preceding and
follOWing victory in Europe, and that there was 'no reason for undue
despondency over the future of Anglo-Soviet relations'.1 s
Notes and References

Chapter 1
Eden minute 2 July 1944 I'HO F037 1/40696/U5407 (documents are at
the Public Record Office, London. unless stated otherwise); War Cabi·
net Paper (44)436 'Soviet Policy in Europe' 9 August 1944 CAB66/S3
(herea ft er cited as WI' with year, number and date); $tettinius report of
mission to Britain, 7-29 Apri l 1944 Foreign Relalil)lIS or 1111' United SIM es
1944 (h ereafter FRUS with year) vol. Ill, 10-11 ; K.G. Ross, T oreign Of·
fi ce Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45 ', 'Qumlll or CQlltempQf(lry
His/ory, 16 (1981), 538.
Z W.S. Chu rch ill, Till: Second World Wllr (Lo ndon, 1948-54) vol. 3, 346,
vol. 6, 250, 367-74.
3 D.C. Watt, 'Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and
the Cold War', Diplomalic History. 13 (1989), 89; r.M. Carroll, 'Anglo.
American Relations and the Origins of the Cold War: The New Perspective',
OIl1(1(/j(1Il JOllmal o{ Hislory, 24 ( 1989), 206; G. Gorode tsk y, SlIIflord Cripps'
Miss ioll 10 Moscow 1940-42 (Cambridge, 1984), idem, 'The Origins of
the Cold War: Stalin, Church ill and the Formation of the Grand Alii·
ance', TIl(' Russiall Rrvkw, 47 ( 1988), 145-70.
4 Go rodets ky, Stafford Cripps, 96, 138-9, 164.
5 N. To lstoy, Stalin's Secret W(If (London, 1983),287-8,338; S. de Mowbray,
'Soviet Deception &: the Onset of the Cold War. British Documents for
1943 - A lesson in Manipulation', EIICQllllter, 63 (1984), 16; J. ChaTlnley,
ClllIrchi/J. Thr End o{Glory (Lo ndon, 1993),455,467,612; A. G lees, Tile
Secrets o{ Ihe Service: British Intellig('llce fwd COlIIlIIUllisl SUhlWsiQII 1939-5 1
(Lo ndon, 1987), 51.
6 L Kettenacker, 'The Anglo·Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germa ny,
1941 - 45 ' , luumal o{ Contemporary History, 17 (1982), 446; J,M. Lewis,
C/wllgillg Dirrclioll. iMlisl1 Military Plallllillg {or l'osHvar Strategic /Je{eIlCt',
1942--47 (l o ndon, 1988), 337; D. Fraser, A/(lIIhrooke (London, 1982),
450.
7 E. Barker, Clw rc/lill ami Edell at War (London, 1978), 221, 287, 291;
W.M. McNeill, Amerim, Britaill a//(I Russia. Tllf'ir Cooperat iun (///(I Conflict
1941--46 (london, 1953), 536; M. Kitch en, Britisll Po/icy Towards I/Ie
Soviet Union durillglhe SecolUl World War (London, 1986),27 1; V. Rothwell,
Brilllill ami tlte Cold War, 1941-47 (London, 1982),4.
8 R. Cecil, review of Glees, Searls, in Intelligence (lnd Natioll(l/ Security, 3
( 1988),342; T.H. Anderson, Tile United Stllles, Great Bri/llin (lnd Ille Cold
War, 1944-47 (Columbia, MO, 1981 ), 182.
9 Lewis, C/wnging Direction, 139 note 95; Ross, 'Foreign Office', 528; Rothwell,
Brilllill, 14 .
10 M. Kit chen, 'Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Sec-
o nd World War', Hislor;m/loufl/al, 30 (1 987), 424-5; L. Aronsen and

172
 Noles (/lid Referellces 173

M. Kitchen, Tile Origins o{/he Cold War ill COmp(If(l/iI'e Persp«liI't' (London,
1988), 86; Charm ley, Clwrcilill, 507-8; Rothwe ll, Brilaill, 104.
11 Wa rner minutes 17 February 1942 F0371 /32876/N927, 30 August 1943
F0954/26A.
12 J.M. Lee, T/l1' C/lll rc/lill Coalitioll (London, 1980), 169.
13 The Government was anxious to prevent the left reaping a ny benefit
from havi ng been correct about the resilience of the USSR, but the
'stealing the thunde r' campaign. which involved taking over the or-
ganisation of pro-Soviet events, also se rved the purpose of making the
Gove rn ment (especially its Conservative members) appear supportive
of the USSR and thereby quieten criticism. The fO often regretted the
uncritical pro-Soviet fervour, but there was no doubt that it was or-
chestrated by the Ministry of Information, MIS and Special Branch,
who checked the credentia ls of all pro-Soviet organisations and ensured
the non-Co mmunist ones were favo ured, Parker to Mo nckto n IS Jul y
1941, Home I'olicy Committee (HPC) meeting 4 September 1941 , INFI /
676; P.M. H. Bell, la/III Bli/l a/1(/ 1/11' BI'(I(. Brillsll Pllvlic Opillioll, ForriSII
Policy a/1(/ tlw Sovil't Ullioll, /941-45 (London. 1990), 42-5 .56-66; M.
Balfour. Prop"S(IIIt/a ill War 1939-45: Orgallist/tioIlS, Policies alld Polilics
ill Britaill Will Germally (London, 19 79), 228-30.
14 D. Yergin, Siml/erni I'eace. Tile Or;sillS o{ tile CQ/d War (/lid til e NatiOllal
SeCII,;t}' Stale (lloston, 1977), Chapters I and 2.

Chapter 2
f .S . Northedge and A. Wells, Brilaill a/1(/ Soviet Commullism . Tile Impact
of a Revolutioll (London, 1982), 50-3. 62-73; R. Manne, 'The f-oreign
Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapproche ment', lOI/(/Ial o{COI/-
lempvmry History, 16 (1981 ),736-7.
2 D. Lammers. 'Fascism, Communism a nd the Foreign Office 1937-39',
lOllmal O{Colltl'lIJporary History, 6/3 (1971), 68; F. McLynn, Fitzroy M(ICleoll
(London, 1992),26, 41 -3,5 1.
3 Neither of these important officia ls has been subject to biographical
st udy. Th ey were both born in 1884 , and had been in the FO since
before the !=i rst World War. Charles Webster desc ribed Sargent as hav-
ing the views of the ro of around 1910, Webster diary 3 February
1946, BI.PES. Roderick Barclay found him 'cy nical. pessimistic and
unconstructive, though very likeable'. Jebb thought him brilliant, bu t
pessimistic and inclined to debunk theorisations. He had no t served
overseas since 1919. Cadogan was, again according to Jebb, cautious,
conventional, 'clearly shy and repressed emotionally', and a methodi·
cal worker not given to the more passionate viewpoints of his predecessor,
Vansiltart. R. Barclay, Ernest Bevin mulille Foreign Office (London, 1975),
83; Lord Gladwyn, Tile MellJoirs of Lord Gladwyn (Londo n, 1972), 70,
73; Bruce Lockhart diary \3 April 1943, in K. Yo ung, ed. , Tile Diaries
of Sir Robert Bmce Lockhart, 1939-65 (London, 1980) .
4 K. feiling, Tile Li{e of Nevi lle C/Ulmbl'flaill (London, 1970), 425; Halifax
comments to Dominions Ministers 1 November 1939 CAB 99/1; War
174 Notes ami Referellces

Cabinet Minutes (hereafter cited as WM with the year, meeting number

and date) WM(39)43rd 9 October 1939 CA B 65/2.
5 Collier memorandum 31 January 1940 F0371/24845/NI360; Sargent
minute 24 March 1940 F0371/24843/N3363; Maclean pa per, 'I'ossi-
bilities of Allied Action Against the Caucasus' (draft) ud(undated) March
1940 F0371/24846/N3698; Kirkman and Hammond minutes 6 March
1940 W0208/1754; WM(40)66th 12 March 1940 CAB65/6.
6 Sargent memorandum 'The future direction of Soviet policy' 14 March
1940 F0371/24843/N3S38; M. Gilbert, Fillest HOllr. WillStOIl Chllrcllill
1939-41 (London, 1983), 49, 98, 100-1; Churchill conversation with
Welles 12 March 1940 FRUSI940:I, 84.
7 Seeds to Halifax 21 March 1939 F0371/23061/C3968; J. Haslam, Tile
Suy;et UII;OIl alld IIII' Struss/e for Col/ect;\'/' Security ;11 Europe 19.13-39
(London, 1984), 230. Gottfried Niedhart makes the important point
that for the British the USSR occupied a peripheral position; there was
underlying anti-Bolshevism, but no policy-makers built t heir policy
around it; indeed the USSR was usually ignored, at least until 1939,
'British Atti tudes and Policies towards the Soviet Union and International
Communism, 1933-9', in W. Mommsen and 1.. Kettenacker, eds,
The F(lscist C/w//ellge 1/1111 tilt' Policy of Appel/semelll (London, 1983),
291; C. Keeble, Britain (1/1(/ IIII' Soyiet Ullioll, 1917-/989 (London, 1990),
Chapler 6.
8 Collier to lIutler 18 March 1940 F0371/24846/N3313; Halifax, Full1ess
of Duys (l.ondon, 1957), 207; d. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, 96.
9 Sargent memorandum 14 March 1940 F0371/24843/N3538.
10 Sargent memorandum 'Possibilities of further Soviet-German collabo-
ration' 17 July 1940 F0371/24852/N6029; circular to HM Representatives
(HMRR), Sout h-Eas tern Europe 5 September 1940 F0371/24902lR7463;
Sargent minute 28June 1940 F0371/24844/N5853. Lothian, Ambassador
to the US, told Welles that the IIritish Government supported Cripps'
view that the Soviets were increasingly apprehenSive regarding Ge rman
victories, 18 June 1940 State Department rapers, US National Archives,
College rark, Maryland, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG59) 711.61/739.
II Maclean minute 25 May 1940, NID report 'Soviet Intentions in Nor t h
East Europe' 20 June 1940, FO to Cripps 14 June 1940 F0371/24844/
N570!, N5808; Halifax conversation with Ambassador Kennedy 21 J une
1940 1'0371/24761/NS862; Rose minute 26 July 1940 F0371/24968/
R675 I.
12 FO to Cripps 14 June 1940 F0371/24844/N5808.
13 Clutton minute 22 February 1941 F0371/29778/RI452; 1'0 to HMRR
S. E.. Europe 28 February 194 1 F0371/297791R211O.
14 Dominions Office to Smuts I November 1940 F0371/24845/N7046.
IS FO to Cripps 2 December 1940 F0371/24848/N7348; Maclean sum-
mary 24 November 1940 F0371/24853/N7Z79; 2 Collier minutes 31
January 1941 F0371/29463/N373; comments on Cripps despatch 26
January 1941 F0371/29S00/N947; WM(41)20th Confidential Annexe
(CA) 24 February 1941 CAB65/21.
16 The belief t hat Germany would not attack the USSR was built more
on estimates of German aims and interests, and the Soviet desire to
 NQles llIul Re{crt'l/ces 175

avoid war, than on concepts of the natural affinity of Germany and

the USSR: see Cavendish-Bentinck minute 27 March 1941 F0371 /26518/
C2919, cf. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, 112- 14, and idem, 'Churchill's
Warning',981.
17 Maclean minute 12 October 1940 F0371/24852/N6922: Halifax to Cripps
27 November 1940 1:0371/24848/N7323; Burgin memorandum 5 March
1941 1'0371/29498/N951.
18 Report by Wavell AIR2/l911; Martel conversation with Liddell Hart 6
October 1936 Liddell Hart papers, Liddell Hart Centre (LHC) LHII/l936;
J. Herndon, 'British Perceptions of Soviet Military Capability, 1935-9'
in Kettenacke r and Mommsen, eds, Fascist C/r(ll/mse, 301-2; K. Neilson,
,uPursued By A Bear British Estimates of Soviet Military Strength and
N
;

Anglo.Soviet Relations, 1922-1939', C(llladian JOIln/al o{ History, 28 (I 993j,

209-11.
19 COS283rd meeting 18 March 1939 CAB53/10; FP(36)82 'Report on the
Military Value of Russia' 24 April 1939 CAB27/627; Neilson, 'Pursued
By A Bear', 203.
20 Weekly Resume 5 October 1939 CAS80/!; WP(39)101 28 October 1939
CAB66/3. Soviet performance against the Japanese in 1938 had been
noted as poor, Herndon, 'British Perceptions', 347; WM(40jIOthCA
12 January 1940 CA B65/l1; WI'(39j 179 31 December 1939 CAB66/4.
21 MI2 paper, 'The Foreign Relations of the USSR' 2 November 1940 F0371/
24845/N7310.
22 Gree r to DMI6January 1941, Sillem minute 8 January 1941 W0208/
1758.
23 Tamplin minute 8 January 1941, Mackenzie paper 'Will Stalin
Fight?' 8January 1941, Tamplin minute 17 January 1941 , MI2b paper
'Strategy of the !led Army in a War against Germany' 27 January 1941
W0208/1758.
24 JIC(41)218(F) 23 May 1941 'German Intentions Against the USSR', MI2
comments 22 May 1941, JIC(41 )234 'The I'ossible Outcome of German-
Soviet !lelations' 31 May 1941, Barclay (MII4) comments 1 June 1941
W0208/1761.
25 Cadogan minute 21 June 1940 F0371 /248 49/N5788.
26 WM(40)123rd 15 May 1940, 127th 18 May 1940, 149t h 31 May 1940
CAB65/7; Lockhart diary 4 May 1940, 21 May 1940; Dalton diary 17
May 1940 in B. I'imiott, ed., Th,' Secoml World Wilr Diary o{ Hllg/I Oil/tOil
/940-45 (London, 1986); Cripps conversation wi t h HaBrax 20 May
1940 1:03 71!24847/N5648; H. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps as British Am·
bassador in Moscow, May 1940-June 1941', Euglish Historical Review,
94 (\979), 56.
27 C. Cooke, The Life of Ric/wrd Stafford Cripps (London, 1957), 242-3, W.
Jones, The Russia Complex (Manchester, 1977),46, Tribune 1 December
1939, T.D. Burridge, British Labour 11m/ Hitler's Wllf (London, 1976),38.
28 E. Estorick, Stllffo(f/ Cripps. A Biograp/Jy (London, 1949), 243.
29 Cripps to 1:0 27 July 1940 F0371/24844/N6072 .
30 C ripps to Halifax 10 October 1940 F0371/24848/N7323.
31 Cripps to FO 2 August 1940 F0371 / 24845/ N62 43; Earle to Hull
10 June 1940 FRUS1940:1, 606.
176 Noles al1(/ ReferellCes

32 Cripps to 1'0 20 November 1940 F0371/24848/N7238.

33 Cripps to 1'011 October 1940, 13 October 1941 F0371/24845/N6881,
N6875.
34 Cripps to 1'0 11 October 1940 F0371/24848/N6838, to Monckton 31
August 1940 and Halifax 2 5eptember 1940 1'0800/322.
35 Cripps to 1'0 8 August 1940 F0371/24847/N6105, 2 j uly 1940 1'0371/
24844/N5937; Steinhardt to Hull 22 September 1940 RG59 741.61/
899.
36 Maclean minute 9 August 1940 F0371/24847/N6105.
37 Maclean minutes 3 j uly 1940, 10july 1940 F0371/24844/NS937; Hali·
fax 10 Alexander 19 August 1940 F0371/24847/N6105 .
38 Daily Hewltl I December 1939; Burridge, Bri/isll Labour, 21, 38; B.
Donogh ue and W.jones, Herberl Morrisoll. Purlmil of II Politician (London,
1973), 255.
39 n. Pimlott, HIISh DaIIO// (London, 1985), 284- 6, 294; HaJJ to Dalton 19
August 1940, Wa rd and Lucas minutes 3 September 1940 1'0837/1082.
40 Dalton minute 18 May 1940, Palairet to MEW 5 j une 1940, Gaitskell
to Herbertson 26 June 1940 1'0837/1127.
41 Postan note on 1'0 to Athens 2 April 1941 1'0837/1098.
42 Hal! to Baxter 23 July 1940, and to Sargent 23 j uly 1940, Trench minute
27 july 1940, Baxter minute I August 1940, Postan minute 20 August
19401'083711130.
43 I'ostan no te 6 September 1940 1'0837/1082; Maclean minute 26 August
1940, Collier conversation with Postan 6 September 1940 F0371/248521
N6359.
44 Halifax letter to KnatchbuU. Hugessen (Ankara) 21 February 1940 1'08001
323; Baggallay minute 9 February 1940 1'0371/24581/ E573; HMRR
mtg 8 April 1940 1'0371/24902/R4832; Ml2b note o n Sout h Caucasus
31 january 1940 W0208/1753.
45 Cadogan minute 2 june 1940 F0371/24847/N5689.
46 Sargent draft of Halifax to Cripps 13 August 1940 F037l/24847/N6105.
47 Cadogan minute 12 November 1940 F0371/24852/N7163.
48 Maclean minute 9 August 1940 F0371/24847/N6105.
49 Ede n to Cripps 17 Ja n uary 1941 F0954/24B.
50 Butl er minutes 16 Ap ril 1940 r0371/24843/N3363, 12 March 1940,
29 March 1940 F0371/24846/N2779. N3313.
51 Cripps to Eden 9 March 1941 1'0954/24B.
52 Postan note on Sargent paper 20 August 19401'0837/1130.
53 WM(40)185th 28 june 1940 CAB65/7; Collier minute 10 November
1940 F0371/24845/N7148.
54 Cripps to 1'0 8 December 1940 r0371/24849/N7387.
55 Cripps to 1'0 I I November 1940, 20 November 1940, Maclean minute
5 December 1940 F0371/24848/N7173, N7238, N7366.
56 Sargent minutes II December 1940,3 j anuary 1941 F0371/24849/N7387,
N7548.
57 Cripps to 1'0 29 December 1940 F0371/24849/N7548, 31 December
1940 f037 1/29463/N29; Steinhardt to Hull 8 February 1941 RG59 741.6 11
920; Cripps to Eden 9 March 1941 1'0954/24B.
58 Sargent minutes 6 February 1941 F0371/28563/N502, 28 March 1941
 Noles (md Re{ert'l/ces 177

F0371/29464/NI229; Maclean minute 15 March 1941, Collier minute

27 March 1941 F0371/29500/N947, N1 164.
59 Churchill, SI'COI1(/ World War vol. 2, 118; 1'0 to Cripps 13 J une 1940
F0371 /24 844 /N5808; Hanak, 'Cripps', 61; Dalton to Halifax 24 June
1940 F083 7/1127.
60 Cr. Hanak, 'Cripps', 54.
61 WM(40)27Ist 15 October 1940 CAB65/9; 1'0 to Cripps 15 October 1940
F0371 /24845jN6875, Halifax to Cripps 27 Novembe r 1940 F0371/24848/
N7323; Atherton to Welles 26 November 1940 RG59 711.61/768.
62 Cripps to 1'0 2 tels II Novem ber 1940 F0371 /2 4848 /N7165, N7163.
63 Cripps to Eden 9 March 1941 F0371 /29500/N1l64; Cripps to F..den 28
March 1941 Eden to Cadogan 29 March 1941 1'0371/29464/N I289, NI360.
64 Eden had told Cripps, '[ share with you a keen desire to improve our
relations with the Soviet Government and [ have also had my share
o f disappointment in these endeavours. . it is. . an advantage
that the Russians profess to regard me as one who has no prejudices
against them . .', letter 17 January 1941 1'0954/2 4B.
65 ['0 to Eden 2 April 1941 1'0371 /2927 1/N I323; Cadogan to Eden 2 April
1941 1'0371 /29 464 /N I360.
66 Sargent minute 9 April 1941. Eden minu te 15 April 1941, Sargent draft
of Eden to Cripps 16 April 1941 d. Sargent's 28 March 1941 minute
F0371 /29464/N1386, N1229; Sargent nOle on Halifax to Collier 26 April
1941 , Eden conversation with Maisky 16 April 1941, Sargent 10 N.
Dept 18 April 1941,1'0 to Halifax 19 April 1941 F0371 /29465/NI806,
N1658, N1667.
67 Churchill to Cadogan 3 April 1941,5 April 1941 F0371/2927 1/N 1323;
Defence Com mittee meeting 00(40)39Ih 31 October 1940 CAB69/1,
WM(41)20thCA 24 I'ebruary 1941 CAB65/21, F. H. Hinsley, lJrilisll 11/-
telligellce in tile Second Warld War: /Is In{lut'l/ce on Slm/t'SY (Jml 0PI'f(J/iOI/S
(London , 1979) vol. 1,432, 437,440.
68 Churchill to Stalin 3 April 1941 F0371/29479/NI366.
69 FO to Cripps 4 April 1941 F0371/29479/NI366.
70 Cripps to FO 2 leis 19 April 1941 F0371 /29 465 /NI725; Cripps to FO
23 April 1941 F0371 /29480/NI761, N1762.
71 Cadogan minute 19 April 1941, Collier minute 22 April 1941 1'0371 1
29465/NI667, NI725; Sargent minute 26 April 1941 1'0800/279.
72 Churchill to Eden 22 April 1941 PREM3/395/16.
73 Warner memorandum 14 May 1941 F03 71/29465/N2233; Cripps to
1'09 Ma y 1941 F0371129500/N2102; Eden minute 9 May 1941 1'0371/
29498/N2050; J [C(41)234 ' The Possible Outcome of German-Soviet Re-
lations' 31 May 1941 W0208/l761.
74 Butler minute 26 May 1941, 1'0 meeting 28 May 1941 1'0371129465/
N2565, N2566; 1'0 to Halifax 17 June 1941 F037 1/29501 /N2840.
75 Butler minute 30 April 1941 F0371/29465/NI801; Sargent minute
I June 1941 1'0954124B; 17 June 1941 meeting on propaganda should
Germany attack the USS R F0371 /29483/N2904 .
76 Johnson to Hull 13 J une 1941 f"/WSI94J:I, 170-2; Avon, The Reck.oning
(l ondon, 1965),269; WM(41)61st 19 June 1941 CAB651l8; HPC meeting
18 JUl1e 1941 INI'1/913.
178 Noles ami ReferellCes

77 WM(41)58thCA 9 june 1941, 59thCA 12 June 1941 CAB65/22; Warner

minute 8 ju ne 1941 F0371/29466/N2889.
78 J. Kennedy, The Bllsiness of War (London, 1957), 147; B. Bond, ed.,
Cilief of StaR: Tile Viaries of Liertlel/al/I~(;eneral Sir Hl!llry I'owl/all (London,
1974) vol. 2 1940-44, diary 29 June 1941.
79 jI C(41)234(F) 9 June 1941 F0371/29483/N2906; J IC(41)247 10 June
1941 CAB79/12; Nicolson diary 24 j une 1941 in N. Nicolson, ed., Hnrold
NkoisOlr. Diaries ami Letters (London, 1967) vol. 2 1939-45; Kennedy,
Husiness, 147, 149; Ismay, Memoirs of Gel/eml Ore Lortl/smay (\.ondon,
1960), 225; T. Barman, Diplomatk Correspondent (London, 1968), 99.
80 Ch ur chi ll to Roosevelt 14 june 1941 (sent on 15 June 1941) PREM3/
230/1.
81 Colvi!!e diary 22 June 1941 in J. Colvi!!e, Tile Fringes of Power. Down-
ing Street Diaries (London, 1985) vol. I 1939-0ctober 1941.
82 Colville diary 21 June 1941; Duff Cooper to Eden 28 June 1941 INrI /
913; WM(41)64th 30 June 1941 CA B65/l8.
83 S. Lawlor, 'Britain and the Russian entry into the war' in It Langhorne,
ed., Diplomucy and Intelligence during lI,e Second World War (Cambridge,
1985), 17 1-2.
84 WM(41)62nd 23 June 1941 CA B65/ 18; Morton to Churchill 31 August
1941 rREM4 /64/5 and 12 November 1941 [NFI/913.
85 Colville diary 21 June 194 1, d. his account in J. Wheeler·Bennett ed .,
Action Tllis D(IY. Workillg willI Clwrdlill (London, 1968), 89.
86 Gilbert, Fi ues/ Hour, 1123; COS to Macfarlane 14 Jul y 1941 F0371 /
29486/N3729.
87 Macfarlane article on service in t he USS R, Macfarlane papers 3 1, 1m·
perial War Museum (IWM); Instructions to Naval Mission AOM223/
506; Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. I, 483.
88 Nicolson note for HI'C 17 June 1941 INFI /913 cf. FO/lnformation meet·
ing 17 June 1941 F0371/29483/N2904, where it was agreed, 'There
would probably be strong pressure in some circles to neat Russ ia as
an ally. This should be resisted. Our attitude would however d epend
on tha t of the Russians, who would probably not wish to regard the m·
se lves as our allies.' Eden conversations with Maisky 26 June 1941, 30
June 1941, Cri pps 10 1'0 27 Ju ne 1941 F0371/29466/N3226, N3304,
N3231.
89 Sargent minute 9 July 1941, Eden talk with Winant 9 July 1941 and
to Cripps F0371/29467/N356 1, N3603; WM(41 )64th 30 June 1941
CAB65/l9; Steinhardt to Hull 9 Jul y 1941 FRUSI94/: I, 179-81.
90 Harvey diary 21 Ma rch 1942, J. Harvey, ed., Tile War Diaries of Sir
QliI'a Harvey (Lo ndon, 1978).
91 A.Jr. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972), 165; A. Foster, 'The Beaverbrook
Press and Appeasement: The Second Phase', European History Quarterly,
2 1 (1991), 7, 10-11.
92 A. Chisholm and M. Davie, Bem'erbTook. A Life (London, 1992), 282,
322, 326. On Beaverbrook's isolationism, see Beaverbrook to Uddell
Hart 3 September 1939 LHI /52; 8eaverbrook to Churchill 30 Septem ber
1940 Beaverbrook papers, House of Lords (B BK), 0/425; Foster,
' IJeaverbrook Press', 8-9.
 Notes (/lui Re{erellces 179

93 'Apologia for Evellil18 SI(III(/(lr(/', fiSK 0/494. Generally, the Ileaverbrook

press was isolationist on eastern Europe, friendly and indulgent to th e
USSR, guided by Stalin's foreign policy not his domestic activities, Foster,
'Beaverbrook Press', 21.
94 Gorodetsky, StaffoTf/ Cripps, 200--4.
95 00(41)22 19 October 1941 CAB69/3, 00(41)67th 20 October 1941
CAB69/2 .
96 Poster for 'Tanks for Russia', INFI3/123.
97 00(41)62nd 19 September 1941 CAB69/2 .
98 Churchill to Beaverbrook 30 August 1941 BBK 0 /94, H. Balfour diary
26 September 1941, lnchrye papers, House of Lords.
99 C ripps despatch IS September 1941 F0371/29490/NS447; Cripps to
Eden 20 September 1941 F09S4/24B.
100 Beaverbrook to Eden IS September 1941 BBK 0/338; Hi s secretary'S
notes on Cripps' despatches show the genesis of Beaverbrook's tactics;
to counter the Soviet 'inferiority complex' as to their status as an ally by
building up Soviet prestige in private and public. Beaverbrook's personal
relationship with Stalin was to be the key to the success of the mission,
I'arrer notes BBK 0 /90; Balfour diary 21 September 1941; Beaverbrook,
'Russian Narrative' 2S June 1945 BilK 0/100; A. Harriman and E. Abel,
Special ElIl'oy 10 CllIIrc/liII alld Slalill (Lo ndon, 1976), Chapter 4; D. I:arrer,
G For God Alm(gllly (Lo ndon, 1969), 75; J.D. Langer, 'The Harriman-
Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the
Soviet Union, 1941 ', loumlll o{ Collfempomry History, 14 (1979), 469.
10 1 Balfour diary 30 September 1941, 9 October 1941; WP(41}238 8 October
1941 CAB66/l9.
102 00(41)64Ih IS October 1941 CAB69/2; DO(41}22 'Assistance 10 Rus-
sia' 19 October 1941 CAB69/3_
103 DO(41)71st 3 December 1941 CA B69 /2 d. Beaverbrook at 00(41)67tI1SS
20 October 1941 CA B69/8; J E. Beaumont, COli/wiles ill Arms (London ,
19S0), 76-9.
104 Sinclair to Beaverbrook 20 October 1941 , Air Staff paper 27 November
1941 BBK 0/327; WM(41 )1 I IIhCA II November 1941 CAB6S/24;
Beaumont, Camm ill'S, 67-9.
105 JP(4 1)104th 15 August 1941 CAB84/3; COS(41)155(O) 31 July 1941
CAB80/59; Brooke diary 14 July 1941, 28 October 1941 Alanbrooke
papers 2/4, LHC; DO(41)62nd 19 September 1941 CAB69/2.
\06 00(4 1)7Ist 3 December 1941 CA B69/2; Brooke diary 4 December 1941,
25 February 1942 Alanbrooke 2/S; COS(41)4 1st(O) 2 December 1941
CAB79/55; JP(41)1038 15 December 1941 CAB84/38.
\07 Warner minute 3 December 1941, Cavendish-Ben t inck minute
4 December 1941. F0371/29501/N7081; Whitefoord (D OMI(!)) to VCIGS
12 August 1941, Tamplin m inute I October 1941 W0208/1776; Sillem
minute 19 September 1941 W020S/1777; M13c appreciation 13 Sep·
tember 1941 Martel papers, [WM, GQM 4/3.
\08 Kennedy, Bllsiness, 149; ])alton diary 18 November 1941. For Russian-
speaking officers, see n otes on Theakstone and Martin F0371/295741
N5882, A. Birse, Memoirs o{ all IlIlerpreter (London, 1967), 80.
\09 Cadogan diary 22 May 1942 in D. Dilks, ed., Tile Dillfies o{Sir AlexlIIJller
180 Noles ami Re{erellCes

CtulogulI, 1938-46 (London, 1971); Charmley, CllI/rellill, 456-7; D. Carlton,

Alit/WilY Eden (London, 1982), 183-4.
110 McLynn, Mac/eml, 63.
III 1-"0 to Cripps 21 October 1941 F0371/29470/N6267; Eden to Cripps
10 November 1941 F0371/29493/N6544. In a draft telegram to Cripps,
Cadogan wrote, 'our prime need of cooperation with the Soviet must
overrid e all other considerations' 2 October 1941 F0371/29491/N5679.
112 Dew minute 15 November 1941, Maisky conversation with Eden 12
November 1941 I'0371/29470/N6288. Soviet sympat hisers in Britain made
great play of speeches by Halifax, Page Croft and Moore Brabazon as
indica t ions of such feelings among the British ruling class, Brabazon
to Blackburn 7 August 1941 and Churchi ll 3 September 1941, Brabazon
papers, RAI' Museum, Croft to Mllisky 25 October 1941 Croft papers,
Churchill College, 1/16.
113 Cripps to Eden 29 July 1941 F09S4/24B.
114 WI'(41)238 8 October 1941 CA B66/19; Peirson to Harvey 29 October
1941 F0371/29470/N6312.
liS WM(4 1)l02nd 13 October 1941 CAB6S/19.
116 Maisky conversations with Eden 17 October 1941, 27 October 1941
F0371/29469/N60S9, N6228.
117 WM(41)104th 20 October 1941 CAB6S/19, 123rdCA 3 December 1941
CAB6S/ 24; Churchill to Cripps 28 October 1941 F0371/29471/N6S83.
11 8 Cripps to 1'0 2S October 1941 1'0371/29492/N6169; Cripps warned of
the danger of a growth of a feeling of isolation in Moscow, and an
obsession there that 'we were sitti ng back and watching'.
119 Cripps to Churchill 29 October 1941 F0371/29471/N6584. C hurchill
was of the opinIon that the Soviets were more dependent on Britain
than vice verStI and reacted strongly to assertions of this kind by Cripps,
Churchill draft to Cripps 3 October \941 F0371/29491/NS679.
120 Stalin to Churchill 8 November 1941 F09S4/24B. Church ill was dis-
gruntled by Stalin's tone. It took a mollification by Maisky, prearranged
with Eden, to bring him round; he then wrote to Stalin that he wished
for a personal correspondence with him, as with Roosevelt, and stated
Britain's desire for postwar collaboration with the USSR, WM(41)1 IlthCA
I I November 1941 CAB6S/24, Eden conversation with Maisky 20
November 1941 1'0371/2947 1/N6704, Harvey diary 21 Nove mber 1941;
Churchill to Stalin 21 November 1941 F0371/29472/N67S0.
121 Skaife minutes 2 November 1941 F0371/29493/N6364, 9 November
1941 F0371/29470/N6490; Maisky to Leith-Ross IS October 1941 , Leith-
Ross to Greenwood 29 October 1941 T188/2S3.
122 Warner minute 23 November 1941 F0371/294221N7S03.
123 Churchill minute 1 November 1941 F09S4/24B; Sargent minute
18 Novembe r 1941 r0371/29470/N6288.
124 Sargent minute 26 October 1941 F0371/29493/N6S14.
12S Dew and Cadogan minutes 17 November 1941 r 0371/29494/N6801.
126 Harvey diary 14 November 1941.
127 The phrase was Sargent 's, minute on Stalin's speech 12 November 1941
1'0371/29494/N6631; Maisky conversation with Eden 26 Augus t 1941
1'0371/29489/N4840.
 No/es (lIId Referellces 181

128 Warne r minute 17 November 1941 F0371/29470/N6288, minute on

Stalin's message 12 November 1941 F0371/29471/N6540, minute
23 November 1941 F0371/29422/N7503.
129 Harvey diary 14 November 1941; Eden minute 13 Novembe r 1941 F0371/
29494/N6631.
130 Dew minute of 1'0 meeting 18 November 1941 F0371/29472/N5839;
C ripps to Eden 5 November 1941 F0371/29493/N65 44. Harvey noted,
'We felt the im portant thin g is to convince Stalin t hat we mean to
work with him during and after the peace. If we can convince him of
this, then the facl that our ideas for post-war are slill nebulous needn' t
matter - all thaI should be sludied properly later', diary 18 November
1941.
131 1'0 meeting 19 November 1941 F0371/29015/W13829.
132 Dew minute 3 November 1941 F0371/29470/N6312.
133 Eden to Cripps 10 November 1941 F0371/29493/N6544.
134 Eden Memorandum 'Forthcoming Discussions with Ihe Soviet
Governmcnt' 26 November 1941 WP(4 1)288 F0371 /29 472/N6835;
WM(41 ) 120IhCA 27 No vember 1941, I 24thCA 4 December 1941 CAB65/
24; Eden conversations with Maisky I December 1941, and Winant
4 December 1941 F0371/29472/N6893, N7013; Winant to Hull
4 December 1941 RG59 740.0011/17085.

Chap ter 3
Tille of account of conversations between Majo r Magnus and Major-
General 50lovodnik 20 May 1944 F0371 / 43315/N3353.
2 C h urchill to Eden 16 January 1944 PHEM3/399/6.
3 Rothwell, Bril aill , 90-2; Kitchen, Uri/isll Policy, \57-8, 177-8.
4 Clark Kerr to Fe 17 April 1943, to Sargent 12July 1943 1'0371/37001/
N2366, N4002; I). Gill ies, Radicol DipiOI/IlI!. Tile Life Of Arc/ribald Clark
Kerr, Lord lm'erc/wpel, 1882- 1951 {London, 1999),23,81,167; Barman,
Correspol1de"l, 170-1.
5 Clark Kerr despatch 30 September 19421'0181/964/4; Balfour to Warner
17 March 1944 ':0371/43304/N2068; Clark Kerr to Warner 24 May
1944 1:0800/302 ; Barman , Correspo/lde/lt, 149-51.
6 Churchill to Eden 14 July 1944, Cadogan minute 17 July 1944 1'0954/26B.
7 Blund en to MacNulty 6 Augus l 1942 F0371/32922/N5000; Warner
mi nute 10 November 1942 F03 71/32923/N5832; A. I:oste r, 'TIre Times
and Appeasement: the Second Phase', 10urlUII of COl1temporary Histl)ry,
16 (1981), 460-1.
8 Kitchen, British Policy, 61; Hill paper IS April 1943 F0371 /36948/N2364;
S..l.Tman, CorresfXJ"del//, 151-4; Ismay diary 25 October 1943, Ismay papers!
111/5/la, LHC.
9 The FO came to conclude when Polish pessimism proved unfounded
that the Poles were jealous of the Soviets and of losing t heir position
as Britain's major aily: Clarke minule 7 October 1941 1'0371/29491/
NS751; Dew minule II May 1942, Sargent minute 12 May 1942 1:0371/
32921/N2405, N2488. As the Poles' reputation fe ll, so Pika's rose, Pika
182 Notes ami Re{erellCes

report 20 October 1941 F0371/29492/N6068, Lockhart minu t e

8 December 194 J F0371/29494/N6891.
10 Macfarlane to OM! 2 Augus t 1941 F0371/29488/N4281: Exham to OMI
23 September 1942 AIR40/2344; Turner to DDMI (I) (Kirkman) 3 August
1943 W0208/l833; Fawkes report 7 October 1941 AOM223/248; B.F. Smith,
S/wrins Secrets witl! Stalin. How tlJe Allies Tmried Intelligence, 1941- 1945
(Kansas, 1996), lSI, 171.
II Ismay to Hollis 14 January 1944 PREM3/396/JO: NIO report 17 Nov.
ember 1943 ADMZ23/506; Hinsley, British /lltt'iligCIICI', vol. 2, 41, 618.
IZ e.g. jlC(44)ZI(I:) ZO january 1944 'The Situation on the Russian I:ront'
A!R40/2344.
13 'Report by a British Officer of a visit to Leningrad' 29 january 1944-5
February 1944 F0371/43312/NI122; report of tour of White Russia,
2-10 August 1944 F0371/43316/N5774; SBNO Black Sea diary Septembe r
194 1 AOM223/506.
14 Haigh minute 24 September 1944 I:0371/43336/NSS98; 0 Malley des-
patch 30 April 1943 F0371/35261/U2011; M. Gilber t, Roml /0 Victory
(London, 1986) 239; Lockhart minute II April 1945 1'0371/47860/
N4IOZ; Martel drafts for The RIIS$illll DIII/ook, 1947, GQM6/1; Miles to
ONI 26 November 1942 AOM223/248; Rear·Admiral Archer described
'this suspicious and semi·civilized a ll y', Naval Mission report, 1943-45
AOM223/506; SOE 0/1'.1 to D/HV 30 May 1942 HS4 /327.
15 C lark Kerr to I;den 8 jUl1e 1943, 24 June 1943 F0371/36949/N3673,
N3934; Ska ife minute 7 December 1943 F0371/369521N6777; Baggallay
to Eden 25 February 1942 F0371/32906/NI585.
16 SBND Murmansk to ONI 20 September 1941, 29 j anuary 1942 ADM223/
249; Cripps to FO 20 September 1941 F0371/29469/N5585 .
17 Dew minute 19 July 1941 F0371/Z9487/ N3826; Lockhart memoranda
20 February 1942 F0371/32876/N927, 23 February 1942 BilK 0/96.
18 Dew minute 27 December 1941 1:0371/29499/N7355; SOZ pape r
25 jun e 1941 HS4 /327.
19 naggallay to Sargent 18 january 1943 F0371/36944/N583.
20 Preston minute II February 1941, Collier minute 10 March 1941 1'037 1/
29498/N841; LambNt memorandum S August 19421'0181/966/13.
ZI Balfour paper 19 March 194Z, Inchrye papers; Strang minute Z November
1941 F0371/29471/N6774.
22 Collier to Butler 7 September 1940 F0371/24841/N6488; Lambert memo-
randum 5 August 19421'0181/966/13.
23 Haigh minute 24 September 1944 F0371/43336/N5598.
24 Cripps to FO 24 july 1941,3 August 1941 rD371/29488/N4043, N4Z60;
Dew minutes 24 july 1941 F0371/29488/N4004, ZO September 1941
F0371/Z9499/NS448. Sumner (FRPS) predicted a 'Suvorov spirit' that
the regime had been cult ivating for five years, and that a 'Chungking'
was more likely than a 'Brest·Litovsk' minutes I july 1941, ZO July
1941 rD371/29499/N3476, N470Z.
25 WO to Macfarlane 5 july 1941 ADM223/506j M!3b appreciation of
the Romanian situation 13 August 1941 WOZ08/4616; jl C(41)376(1')
23 September 1941 F0371/29491/N5649; Political Review 9 March 1942
F0371/33026/N3996.
 Noles (//u/ Re{erellas IS3

26 Baggallay to Eden 2S February 1942 F0371/32906/NIS8S.

27 Stalin Order of the Day 1 May 1942 F0371/37032/N3670; Clark Kerr
despatch 10 October 1942 1:0ISI /964/S.
2S JIC(42)200(F) I June 1942 AIR4Q/2344; COS(42)169th 4 June 1942 CAB791
21; Exham to Reed 4 September 1942 FOISI/964/8; MI3c notes on
Hungarian reports I September 1942 W020S / 180S; Davidson minute
II September 1942 W020S/ISIS; MI3c summary 4 November 1942
W020S/1820; Baggallay to FO 13 J an u ary 1943 F0371 /36944/NS82.
In fact, Stal in went to the fron t only once, after the battle of Kursk,
R. Overy, Rllssitl's War. Blood UpOll lilt' SIIOII' (New York, 1997), 2S4.
29 Skaife memorandum 19 December 1942 1'0371/32924/N6633.
30 I'ood and transport went to maintaining the Red Army and industrial
workers, together with Government officials, the NKVD and party func-
tionaries. Those classified as ' useless mouths' - dependants, especially
th e elderly, and those in non-essential occupa tions, had to fen d as
best they could , J IC(42)459(F) 2 December 1942 AIR40/2344; MEW
report on Soviet rations 31 March 1944 F0371 /43329/N2032.
31 2 Clark Kerr despatches 10 October 1942 FOISI/964/S.
32 jlC(41 )290 31 july 1941 W020S/ I 777.
33 Sillem note 19 September 1941 W020S/1777; MI3c commen ts I Sep-
tember 1942 W020S/ISOS; Berthoud to Wa rne r 4 February 1942 F03711
32920/NI23S; lIaggaliay to Sargent IS January 1943 F0371 /36944 /NSS3.
34 Skaife memorandum 24 February 1944 ['0371 /433\3/N 1S47.
35 Warner comment on Stalin speech 7 November 1942, minute 1 December
1942 1'0371 /3 2923/N578 2, N6068; Cheshire to ACAS(I) 6 October 1942
AIR40/2344; Thornton minute 24 Jul y 1943 W0208 / 1833; Ede n con-
versation with Ma isky 8 August 1943 PREM3/396/l3; M. Harrison, 'The
Soviet Economy and Relations wit h Ihe United States and Britain,
1941 - 4S' , in A. Lane and H. Temperley, eds, Tile Rise and Fal/ of /III!
Gr(l/u/ AI/hlllee (Basingstoke, 1995), 7S, 77-S, 86.
36 Wilso n minute 12 August 1943 F0371/37033/N4506; Dew m inu te 13
August 1943 r0371 /369S0/N4S93; Balfour to 1:0 10 September 1943
r0371 /370S7/N5805.
37 Whilefoord to Dew 2 October 1941 r 0371/29491/N5751; Warner minute
28 September 1944 F03 71/43336/NSS98 .
38 Firebrace note, 'British Military Relations with the USSR' 24 November
1943 F0371/36970/ N72 41; Clark Kerr to Warner 3 August 1944 1'08001
302.
39 MI3b appreciatio n 13 August 1941 W020S/4616; MI3c n otes I Sep-
tembe r 1942 W0208/l8S0; jI C(42)200(F) I June 1942 AIR40/2344;
Baggallay despatch 25 February 1942 F0371/32906/NI585.
40 Tamplin to MI3 Co lonel 15 j uly 1942 W0208/l777;jlC(42)459( I')
2 December 1942 ' Russian Strength during the Winter 1942-43' AIR401
2344.
41 Aircraftman C lague note 19 March 1942 AIR46/21; COS(42)l78th 13
June 1942 CAB79/21; Hoseley repor t 11 May 1942 r 0371 j32921 /N2547.
42 Ignatieff note 4 Septe mber 1942 W0208/1815; Fawkes report 10
November 1941 F0371/29499/N6539.
4 3 Clark Kerr 10 Eden 13 October 1942 F0371/32922/N5267; Exham
184 Noles ami Referellces

to Cla rk Kerr 12 October 1942 1'0181 /964/4; SBNO Blac k Sea report
4 March 1943 W020S/17S0.
44 Dew minute 13 October 1942 F0371/32922{NS267; Exham to DMI
14 Oc.tober 1943 1'0181/964/ 4.
45 Clark Kerr despatch 3 November 1943 F0371 /36952/N7539; SBNO North
Russia report , 15 December 1942 F0371/32924/N6354; renn report
22-31 October 1943 f0371 /43310/N295; Babington me morandum 12
August 1943 F0371/36960/N6227; SBNO Black Sea note 26 October
1943 W0208/1761.
46 Dew minute 18 April 1943, MEW note 1 May 1943 F0371/36948/N2337,
N2637.
47 JI C(42)459(F) 2 December 1942 AIR40/2344; Tamplin note 24 October
1942 W020SI1S05; Noble note 22 May 1943 F0371 j36959/N3026.
48 JIC(42)200(F) 1 June 1942, JIC(42)4S9(1) 2 December 1942, J IC(43)409(O)
2 October 1943, J[C(42)298(O ) 2 August 1942 A[R40/23 44; Nava[ Mis-
sion Diary 5 May 1942 ADM[99/1 102; Ambrose report ud. December
1941 ADM223/248.
49 e.g. PHP(44)17(O) Revise IS September 1944 'Security of Weste rn Euro pe
and t he North AtlantiC' F03 71/4074 1A/U76IS.
50 Dew minute 21 November 1942 F0371/32923/N5858.
51 Baggallay despatch 25 November 1942 F0371 /36944/N55; Dew minute
20 April 1943 1'0371 /36948/N2335; Hill report 29 January 1944-5
February 1944 F0371/433 16/N I 122.
52 lambert to 1'0 3 December 1942 F0371/36944/N275; Kf(/SI/(l },a Zvezlla
7 January 1943, Lambert despatc h 14 January 1943 1'0371/36945/N I243,
N125!.
53 The press advocated dancing and other 'social graces' for officers, Clar k
Kerr despatch 3 November 1943 F0371/36952/N7539.
54 Lambe rt despatch 14 January 1943 F0371/36945/N I251; NIl)16 view
8 March 1943 F0371/36946/N 1464.
55 Balfour to 1'0 21 December 1943 l'03 71j36952/N7626_ Stalin hoped
Churchl!1 'would set about learning the new tune and whistling it
to the members of the Conservative party', Clar k Kerr to Chu rchill
3 February 1944 F0800/302.
S6 Baggallay despatch 2S I'ebruary 1942 1'03 71/32906/N IS8S .
57 Skaife memorandum, 'The Future of the USSR in the Post·War Yea rs'
19 Decem ber 1942 F0371/32924/N6633; Clark Kerr despatches 30 Sep-
tember 1942 1'0181/964/4, 2 Augus t 1943 1'0371 /36950/N 4533. He
commented on the lise of the word RlIsski ra t her than Sovietski, and
I.ambert speculated how long it would be before Rossiiski (Great Rus·
sian ) came back into use, Lambert minute 15 April 19431'0371/369471
N2234 .
58 Dew minutes 30 July 1943 F0371 /3695 0/N4 309, 6 May 1943 1'0371 /
37001/N2896.
59 Kuibyshev Embassy to 1'0 28 July 1942 F0371 /32949/N4525 .
60 Balfour to Warner IS August 1944 I'0371/43316/N5186.
61 Skaife minute 5 October 1943, Dew minute 5 October 1943 F0371j
37052/N5523.
62 Dew minute 15 September 1943 F0371/36951/N5175.
 Noles (//u/ Re{erellas 185

63 Skaife minute 13 September 1943 F0371/36951/N5715; Sargent minute

5 July 1944 F0371/43315/N3816.
64 Cla rk Kerr to Fa 27 July 1944 1'0371/43316/N5009.
65 Clark Kerr to 1'0 16 September 1943 F0371/36951 /N5 807; NID no te
on Soviet Naval Officers 23 August 1942 ADM223/506 .
66 Skaife memorandum 19 December 1942 l'0371/32924/N6633.
67 Wilson minute 14 May 1944 f0371 /43335/N2833.
68 Dew minute IS August 1943 F0371 /369S0/N4893 ; Wilson minute
26 December 1943 F0371 /36 952/N7539.
69 Balfour to Warner 17 July 1944 F0371/43336/NS415.
70 Clark Kerr despatch 3 November 1943 l'0371/36952/N7539.
7 1 Lockhart memorandum II April 1945 F0371 /47860/N4 102.
72 rolitical Review 4 December 1944 F0371/43449/N7946; Ministry of
Info rmation paper ud. October 1943 F0371 /3695 1/N6150; Wheeler-
Bennett memorandum 10 April 1944 F0371 /40691/U3704; Hill report
2-10 August 1944 F0371/43316/N5774, Magnus report 20 May 1944
1'0371 /43315/N3353 .
73 l'enn reJXlTt of visit to Destroyer Bakll 31 October 1943 F0371/43310/N295.
74 Dew minute 16 January 1942 \'0371/36920/N302 .
75 Maisky statement 23 September 1941 F0371 /29490/NS565 ; Randall note
18 December 1941 \'037 1/29549/N7356; Waddams to Warner 18 Nov-
ember 1942, ci ting a survey of the 'more intelligent' members of the
populace, 72 per cent of those feeling there were obstacles to proper
understanding between Britain and t he USSR named t he Soviet treat-
ment of religion as the chief difficulty, F0371 /3 2950/NS9 12.
76 Dew minute 23 Jul y \941 F0371 /29 486/N3462; Wilson minute 8 April
1942 1'0371 /329 49/NI800.
77 Cripps to 1'0 II October 194 1 F0371/29470/N6317; Dew minutes IS
January 1942, IS June 1942 F0371/32949/N284, N3366; Nava l Mis-
sion diary 4 October 1941, 'God appears quite popular here a t present,
Stalin having referred to Him favourably in his speeCh', ADMI99/l102.
78 Clark Kerr despatch 13 May 1942 r0371/32949/N3S38; additional rations
were provided fo r making t raditional Easter cakes, Naval Mission Diary
5 April 1942 ADMI99/1102.
79 Cla rk Kerr despatch 20 September 1942 F0371 /32 950/NS328 .
80 Minutes by Wilson 21 September 1942, Dew 25 September 1942, Warner
2S September 1942, Sargent 25 September 1942, Cadogan 28 September
1942 1'0371/32949/N4838; Eden minute 7 February 1943 1'0371 /36961 /
N508; Wilcox to Warner 10 August 1943 1:0371/36962/N4560.
81 Cla rk Kerr repo rt of Pan-Slavonic meeting 9 May 1943 1'03711369611
N43S6; Dew minute 7 October 1943 F0371/36962/NS604.
82 Warne r minute 19 May 1943 F0371/36961/N3047.
83 Clark Kerr despatch 1 October 1943 1'0371/36963/N67 10.
84 Clark Kerr noted that the CI'SU had been told religion 'corresponds
with the moral needs of the people: to FO 10 September 1943, Skaife
minute IS September 1943 F0371 /36962/N5264, N5253. There was some
truth in Skaife's view, W.e. Fletcher, 'The Soviet lIible lIelt: World
War II 's Effects on Religion', in S.J. Lim:, ed., Tile Impact or World War
f} 011 (lie Soviet Ullioll (New Jersey, 1985),91.
186 Noles ami Re{erellCes

85 Bell, JOItIl Bull, 70.

86 Winant to Hull 24 May 1943 FRUSI943: 1II, 532-3; Lambert to Sargent
23 May 1943, Clark Kerr to FO 24 May 1943 F0371/37019/N3086,
N3U82; Political Review 4 December 1944 F0371/43449/N7946.
87 Warner letter to Clark Kerr 28 May 1943 1'0800/301.
88 Dew minutes 4 June 1943 F0371/37019/N3082, 4 May 1943 1'0371/
36948/N26S8; Warner minute S May 1944 F0371/4333S/N2652. NID
stressed the danger from the Communist Party, and its eagerness to
gather secrets for the Soviet Union, probably with the Springhall/Uren
case in mind, Rushbrooke to VCNS 13 June 1943 ADM223/506.
89 Warne r minu te 29 October 1941 F0371/29471/N6215; Cripps to 1'0
6 October 1941, F0371/29491/N5813; Skaife min ute 2 Nove mber 1941
1'0371/29493/N6364.
90 MEW papers 'The Economic Effects of the Russian Adva nce during the
I'eriod July-Oc tober 1943' 20 October 1943 r0371/36951/N6487, 'Re-
port on Economic Resources of Eastern Russia' 28 July 1944 1'0371/
43329/N4864.
91 llaggal1ay despatch 26 February 1942 1'0371/3292I/NI598, to Sargent
18 January 1943 1'0371/36944/N583.
92 Warne r minute 21 November 1942 F0371/32923/N5858; Sargent minute
23 April 1943 F0371/36948/N2364; Sargent wanted 'a small Standing
Inter-departmental Committee to deal with Russian questions, so as
to make certain that they are all being handled on the lines laid dow n
by t he Foreign Office'.
93 MEW paper 'Conditions in Russia' 12 October 1943 1'0371/36951/N6382;
Skaife to Wilson 28 July 1944, Radice (Head, Enemy Branch) to Warner
28 July 1944 F0371/43329/N4286, N4864.
94 Cripps to 1'0 25 October 1941 F0371/29492/N6169; Bert houd re port
9 March 1942, Macfarla ne to DM I 26 March 1942, Clark Kerr to 1'0
3 July 1942 F0371/3292I/NI911, N 1690, N3485; Overy, Russia's WlIr,
273 .
95 Cadogan and Eden minu tes 29 Ju ly 1942 F0371/32989/N4140; Clark
Kerr to 1'0 I October 1942 F0371/32990/N5066.
96 MEW repo rts 23 March 1942, II April 1942 F0371/32988/NI901,
WI'(42)309 21 July 1942 CAB66/26.
97 Enemy Branch Report 5 September 1942, Minister's Conference 8 Cktober
19421'0837/32; MEW report 22 October 1942, J IC(42)58t h 1 December
1942 1'037 1/32990/N4561, N6195; Baggallay to Sargent 18 Jan uary 1943
F0371/36944/N583; MEW paper 20 October 1943 F0371/36951/N6487;
COS(43)346th 15 December 1943 CAB79/87; Dalton diary 8 February
1944.
98 M1I4 had concluded that in wartime, Soviet railways were incapable
of additiona l efforts and the rail system was the weakest link in the
conduct of military operations, MI1 4 Report on Soviet railways 9 May
1940; MI6 report from French source 'Beaune' 30 Aug ust 1941 W020S/
1750. While oil and manpower shortages reduced agricultural produc-
tivi ty, the real problem was seen to be getting what was produced to
where it was needed, JIC(4 1)376(1') 23 September 1941 F0371/29491/
N5649; MEW paper 'I:ood Position in Russia' 23 March 19421'0371/
 Noles (lIId Re{erellc(:s 187

32988/N1901. The situation was actually better than the British assumed,
H. Hu nter, 'Successful Spatial Management', in Unz, ed., Impact, 5l.
99 M l3c report 5 March 1943 F0371/36958/NI539; j lC(42)459(F)
2 December 1942 A1R40/23 44; Wilson visi t to Chelyabinsk 30 April
1943 F0371/36948/N3268.
\00 Gifford note 12 March 1943 F0371/36948/N2658.
101 Enemy Branch note I May 1943, ME.W paper 'The E.conomic Effects of
the Russian Advance, November 1942-March 1943' 29 April 1943 F0371/
36948/N2637, N2887; Balfour to FO 4 Nove m ber 1943 F0371/36952/
N7542.
102 MEW paper 20 October 1943 Fa371/36951/N6487.
103 J lC(43)409(0) 2 October 1943 AIR40/2344; Clark Kerr to 1'0
14 Oct obe r 1943 F0371/36960/N6687.
104 MEW paper 20 October 1943 F0371/36951/N6487; C lark Kerr to Fa
25 Augus t 1943 F0371/37052/N5508; Balfour to FO 4 Novembe r 1943
F0371/36952/N7542.
105 Baggallay despatch 25 November 1942, Warner mi n ute 18 March 1943:
' I don't believe the Soviet Govt. will lightly abandon their idea of
being self.sufficing. I hope I'm wrong.' F0371/35338/U67, UI725; Nichols
paper, 'Russian Shipping I'osition after the War' 15 Ma rch 1943 ADM223/
506; Churchill to Attlee 1 February 1943 F0954/22A.
106 MEW paper 20 October 1943 F0371/369SI/N6487.
107 Wilgress despatc h 23 june 1944 (suggesting the standard of living could
be re t urned 10 the 1938-40 level in three years, with German help)
an d Enemy Branch comments (replacement o f livestock and repair of
capital de preciation would take much longer) 21 September 1944 F0371/
43329/N5080.
\08 PHP(44)13(0)(F) 6 j une 1944 CA B81/45.
\09 j IC(44)366(0)(I') 22 August 1944 'Russian Capabilities in Relation to
the Strategic Interests of the British Commonwealth' CAB81/124.
110 Wilso n to Fa 28 February 1943 F0371/36946/NI5 14; SII NO Black Sea
report 4 ja n uary 1943 W0208/17S0; J. Barber and M. Harrison, The
Soviet Home Front 1941-1945 (London, 1991), 172-3.
111 Lambert minute 3 I'ebruary 1943, Wilson to Dew 22 February 1943
F037l/36946/NI418, N1516; Hubba rd (Sank of England) to Skaife
19 j anua ry 1943 F0371/36944/N504.
112 Ska ife minute 12 August 1942 1'0371/32989/N3820; Clanchy (NID16),
by cont rast saw the SOviet Gove rn ment to be skilful in keeping t he
people ignorant of hig h standards of living and freedom in the out-
side world, b rief for Waldock c20 Febru ary 1943 ADM!99/604.
113 Ska ife paper 5July 1942 F0371/32989/N3515; Loc khart memorand u m
' Russia and the Allied Governments' 9 August 1943 1'0371136992/N4531:
Stalin's aim was 'to give every Russian a di n ner iacket and a white shirt'.
114 Ska ife minute 12 August 1942 I'0371/32989/N3820.
liS Warner to Vickers 10 j uly 1942, Vickers to Warner 20 July 1942 1'0371/
32989/N3515, N3820.
\16 Wilso n minute that the USSR would try to get what it wa n ted from
Germany, free of charge 27 july 1942, Jebb minute 31 July 1942 F0371/
32989/N3820.
188 Noles allfl ReferellCes

117 Wilson draft telegra m 27 August 1942, Warner to Dew 10 September

1942 F037l/32989/N3820. Warne r fou nd the discussion 'interesting',
but allowed it to lapse.
118 Committee on 1'0st·War Trade With Russia, 1st meeting 15 September
1943 F0371/36983/NS470; Ismay to Casey 14 Ma rch 1944 Ismay/IV/Cas.
119 Wilgress despa tches 9 March 1944 F0371/43413/N398, 23 J une 1944,
Warner min utes 10 September 1944 F0371/43329/N5080 and 29 july
1944 F0371/40741 A/U6792; K.G. Ross, Tile Foreign Office (Iud tllr Kremlill
(Cambridge, 1984), 43.
120 WP(44)436 (CAB66/53) described an 'ardent desire to resume rapidly
their interrupted programme of internal developmen t'. Rehabili tationl
development wO\lld take at least five years.
121 Hil1 repor t \3 I'ebruary 1944 F0371 / 43314/NI91O; Political Review
4 December 1944 F0371 /43449/N 7946; British personnel 's ex periences
with the NKVD reinforced the impression given from occasional glimpses
of the Soviet penal system, Reed to Dew 17 March 1943 1'0371/36945/
N1840; Dew min ute 12 April 1943 F0371/36946/ N2172. Berthoud es-
ti mate<l there were between 7 and 15 million in labour camps, to Wamer
4 February 1942 F0371/32920/N I235.

Ch apter 4
'We live in a world of wolves - and bears', C h urchill said, Colville
diary 4 March 1944; Clark Kerr despatch 27 March 1945 F0371 /47941 1
N3934.
2 Archer diary 23 j anuary 1945, Archer papers, IWM; Cadogan diary II
I'ebruary 1945; Eden to Cadogan 5 Ja n uary 1945 F09S4/22B.
3 Wamer minute 12 November 1941 1'0371/29471/N6S40; jebb minute
5 February 1943 l'037 1/35396/U2329; Eden to Halifax 2 tels 10 February
1942 F0371/32875/N798.
4 Uirse, Memoirs, 103; Q. neynolds, Ollly tile SIMS Are Nelltral (London,
1943), 76; Kitchen, British Policy, 77, 235; Harriman and Abel, Special
EIIVOY, 266.
5 Churchi ll statement, 8 September 1942 Hansard, HOl/se of Com mollS
Debt/US vol. 383 col. 95; jones, Russia Complex, 68; ~f acfar1ane recol-
lected 'my admiration for his amazing and unusual qualities grew with
every month 1 spent in the Soviet Union', paper 'Russian Artillery
1941-45', Macfarlane/I,22; Brooke 'Notes On My Life' on diary, 28
November 1943.
6 Baggallay to Fa 28 February 1942 1'037l/32876/NIISS; Clark Kerr to
1'0 14 june 1943 I'0954/26A; Balfour to Warner 16 January 1945 1'037 1/
47860/N3013.
7 Eden to Churchill 8 November 1943 Ismay/lV/Avo; J. Haslam, 'Stalin's
I'ears of a Separate Peace, 1942', Illtelligence ali(I Nation(ll Secllrity, 8
(1993), 98-9; C. Andrew and O. Go rdievsky, KGB. The {mide Story of
its Fore/gil OP('flIliollS from Lellill 10 Gorbtl(/I('Y (London, 1990), 239.
8 Eden to Halifax 22 Jan uary 1942 F0954/29; Lockhart Illemorandum
23 February 1942 BBK 0 /96; Cripps speech, Grand Hotel, Bristol in
 Notes (lIId Re{erl'IIcrs 189

Tllr Timrs 10 February 1942. Eden wrote in 1941 that Stalin was 'the
true lineal descendant of Chenghiz. [sic) Khan and the early Tsars',
mi nu te 24 January 1941 F0371/29500/N367.
9 Churchill to Eden 16 January 1944 PREM3/399/6; Clark Kerr to Warner
14 August 1943 F0800/30 I.
10 Warner minute 2 December 1944 F0371/43336/N7650; Eden to Churchill
29 October 1943, Clark Kerr to 1'0 8 November 1943 F0371/36957/
N6353, N6646.
11 Stalin remarks to Eden on propaganda role of Free German Commit-
tee 2 1 October 1943 F0371/37030/N6262; Clar k Kerr to FO II Augus t
1944 P I~EM3/355; Warner minute 31 May 1944 F0371/43305/N3246.
12 Dalton diary 13 Janua ry 1942 . O'Malley tried to link the domestic
tyranny with foreign policy, but received short shrift in the 1'0, des·
patCh 30 April 1943 and minutes thereon F0371/35261/U2011.
13 Churchill statement, 8 September 1942 Hansard, De/wles 383/95. Att lee
wrote, 'Molotov's smile never seemed to go beyond his lips, but Stalin
had a lively sense of humour', Attlee, As /I Happel/eli (London, 1964),
147; Dalton diary 13 January 1942; Ismay d iary 27 Octobe.r 1943 Ismay/
11 1/5; Clark Kerr to Cripps 26 April 1942 1'0800/300; W. Strang, HOllie
mul Abroad (London, 1956), 159, 165.
]4 Rende! to Warner 17 October ]944 1'0371/433 I 7/N6589; Clark Kerr to
Cadogan 2 1 August 1942 PREM3/76A/IO; Eden to Churchill 31 Janu·
ary 1944 PREM3/396/l1.
15 Clark Kerr 10 1'0 29 February 1942 1;0181/964/10; Clark Kerr 'Bracelet'
diary 16 August 1942 F0800/300.
]6 T, Pat erson, 0 " El'rry FrOllt (New York, 1979), 162-8.
17 Coll ie r minute 6 February 1941 F0371/29498/N426; Cripps to 1'0 26
January 1941 1'0954/24B.
18 Church ill to Roosevelt 5 November 1944 F0954/26B; Macfarlane 10
OMI 22 September 1941 BBK 0/90; Clark Kerr to 1'0 29 June 1942
1'0371/32883/N3403; Cadogan minute 6 January 19421'0371/32920/
N80.
19 Clark Kerr to 1'0 13 Sept ember 1943 F0954/26A; H. Macmillan. War
Diaries. Tile Mer/ilerrmlewl 1943- 1945 (London, 1984), d iary 29 November
1943,26 Ma rch 1944.
20 Dew minute IS May 1943 F0371/36948/N2791; Baggallay to 1'0 13
February 1942 F0371/32920/N899.
21 Warner minute 31 January 1942 F0371/32920/N500; Skaife to Embassy
261anuary 1944 F0371/4331O/N575; J. Balfour, Not Too COfrect (//1 A'lfrole
(Salisbury, 1983), 93- 4.
22 Postan to Cavemlish-Ben ti nck 4 November 1941 F0371/29493/N646S;
Naval Mission diary 8 December 1941 AOM199/1102; Baggallay to 1'0
\3 February 1942 r0371/32920/N899, N900.
23 Nic hols to Warner 8 March 1943, Clark Kerr despatch 16 March 1943
]'0371/36946/NI464, N1862; Warner minute 2 December 1944 1'0371/
43336/N76S0.
24 C rip ps to 1'0 30 June IY41, FO to Cripps I July 1941 r0371/2Y48S/
N3279, N3301.
25 Stalin said to Cripps on the completion of the mutual assistance
190 Noles ami Re{erellCes

agreement that 'some Communist speakers in this country were speaking

in a pro-German sense and this would enable him to put a stop to it ',
Cripps to FO 10 July 1941 P0371/29467/N3S6S.
26 Macfarlane to D!II22 November 1941 F0371/29471/N6749; Macfarlane
to Brooke 22 December 1941 W02161124.
27 Cripps to 1'0 23 September 1941 F0371 /29490/NSS42.
28 Eden to 1'0 18 December 1941 F0371 /29 472/N7013.
29 Clark Kerr 'Bracelet' diary 14 August 1942 F0800/300.
30 Churchill to Attlee 14 August 1942 1'0800/300; Colville diary 11 Sep-
tember 1941; Jacob diary 13 August 1942 in C. Richardson, From
CJwrcl1ill's Sl'crel Circle 10 IIl l' BBC (l.ondon, 1991).
31 Churchi ll to Roosevel t 24 October 1942 F0954/25B, wondering if a ny-
thing had occurred 'inside the Soviet animal to make it impossible for
Stalin to give an effective reply', and whether the ned Army had gained
a more powerful position in t he Soviet machine.
32 Original Warner minute (pasted over) I December 19421'0371/32923/
N6068; Dew minute I I November 1942 F0371 /32918/N5882.
33 1'0 memorandum 29 December 1942 F0371/36954/N66.
34 Wilson conversation with Maisky 4 February 1943, Dew minute 4 Feb-
ruary 1943, Clark Kerr to 1'0 12 April 1943 and 16 April 19431'0371 /
36954/N872, N2227.
35 JIC(42)58th I December 1942 1'0371/32990/N6195. Clark Kerr said,
'Stal in was our friend, Molotov our enemy.' COS(42)346t h 15 December
1942 CA1l79/87.
36 Ch urchill to !'.den 18 March 1943 F0954/26A. 1.ater in the year, Churchlll
wrote to Roosevelt regarding an insulting telegram from Stalin; ' I think,
or at least hope, that this message came from the machine rather than
Stali n as it took twelve day5 to prepare. The Soviet machine is quite
convinced it can get everything by bullying.' Clark Kerr had suggested
this: ' I fancy [ see more of Molotov's hand than of his in the reo
ply .. .' Clark Kerr to ['0 14 October 1943, Churchi ll to Rooseve[t 16
October 1943 F0954/26A.
37 Reed to Dew 2 April 1943 F0371 /3695 4/N2 135.
38 C[anchy to Wa[dock c20 February [943, Rushbrooke minute 15 Sep-
tember 1943 ADMI99/604.
39 Wilson memorandum (revise) 26 May [944 F0371/43305/N3SS4.
40 Churchill to Attlee 17 October 1944 PREM3/355/13.
41 S.R. Lieberman, 'Crisis Management In the USSR: the Wartime System
of Administration and Control', in 1.inz, ed., Impacl, 62-3, M. Djilas,
COIJl'erslltiolls willi Sir/lin (London, 1962), 69; A. nlitov, 'The Soviet
Union and the Grand Alliance: the Internal Dimension of foreign Policy',
in G. Gorodetsky, ed., Soviel Foreigll Policy, / 917-/99/. A Relrospeclil'f
(1.ondon, 1994), 99.
42 WP(42)48 28 January 1942 'Pol icy Towards Russia' F0371/32875/N563;
FO aide memoire for Winant 25 February 1942 CABI27/75; 1'0 paper
'The Four Power [>lan' 8 November 1942 F0371/31525/U742.
43 MSC memo 'The United Nations l'lan' iO March 1943 1'0371/353961
U1158; Wilson minute 29 May 1944 F0371/43305 /N3 246; 1.ockhart
memo 9 August 1943 f0371/36992/N4531.
 Noles llIul Re(crt'l/ces 191

44 Dew minute 30 April 1942 F0371/32880/N2221; British plans centred

on the self-denying ordinance first suggested by Eden to Molotov, 7th
meeting with Soviet delegation 9 June 1942 F0371/32882/N3000. For
a summary of developments on this subject, see Eden to Clark Kerr 11
July 1943. m371/369SS/N4006.
4S Eden to Clark Kerr 4 February 1943, Clark Kerr to FO 2S February
1943, Churchill to Eden 26 February 1943, Eden to Churchill I March
1943 m371/3S338/U321, U888.
46 Jebb minute 10 May 1943 F0371/35261/U2011; Warner minute 24 Sep-
tember 1943 F0371/36992/N6007; Dew minute IS October 1943 1'0371/
37031/N6851.
47 Dixon memo randum 30 March 1942 1'0371/32879/NI946; minutes in
F0371/35261/U2011; Rothwell, Britaill, 194.
48 Eden note 10 February 1944 F0371/35396/U867, minute 3 April 1944
r:D371/43304/NI908; Cadogan minute 20 October 19431'0371/37031/
N685 I.
49 Baggallay to Warner 25 November 1942 1'0181/966/21; Warner minute
5 April 1944 1'0371/43335/N2652; Sumner paper 'The USSR and the
Principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms' 3 Febru-
ary 1944 F0371/433J2/N744.
50 Political Review 9 March t942 l'OJ71/JJ026/N3996; FRPS paper 'The
USSR and the European Powers' 10 May 1943 F0371/37017/N2979;
WP(42)516 8 November 1942 F0371/31525/U742; Eden to Churchill
19 August 1943 F0371/36992/N5060.
51 Harvey diary II November 1941; Baggallay despatch II February 1942;
1'0490/1; Memorandum on Soviet Frontiers 23 August 1943 1'0371/
36992/N5060; Eden conversation with Stalin 21 October 1943, Eden
to Churchill 22 October 1944 F0371/37030/N6262; Sargent minute 19
October 1943 F0371/37031/N6851.
52 Cripps to FO 15 November 1941 F0371/29471/N6605; l.ockhart memo-
randum 16 March 1942 BUK D/96; Lambert memorandum 5 August
19421'0181/966/13; Baggallay to Cadogan 14 December 19421'0954/
258; Cadogan minute 19 January 1943 1'0371/36958/N250.
53 Sargent minute 14 November 1941, Warner minute 23 November 1941
r:D371/29422/N65IO, N7503.
54 SOl'. AD/3 to AD 10 May 1942 H54/327; Warner to Clark Kerr 5 February
1943 F0371/36954/N872; Maisky conversation with Eden 31 August
1943 f0371/36956/N4977. The left -wing press gave support to such
views, e.g. Tribu/le's open letter to Stalin 23 October 1942.
55 WM(42)lstCA I Janua ry 1942 CAB65/29; Dalton diary 13 January 1942;
Eden to Churchill 6 March 1942 F0371/32877/NI174; Winan t to Hull
10 January 1942 FRUSI942, []] , 492.
56 Churchill to Eden 8 January 1942 F0371132874/NI08; Halifax conver-
sation with Welles 18 February 1942 RG59 741.6111/5 1/7.
57 Heaverbrook papers 'Controversy Over Russia' 3 March 1942 F0954/
25A and WP(42)71 'Russia' 18 February 1942 CABl27/329; WM(42)17thCA
6 February 1942 CAH65129, WM(42)18th 9 February 11)42 CAII65/25.
58 Urooke diary 12 October 1941.
59 Attlee at the 6 February 1942 Cabinet meeting described recognition
192 Noles ami Re{erellCes

as 'wrong and inexpedient' WM(42)17thCA CAB65/29. Biddle memo-

randum of Bevin views 20 i=ebrua ry 1942 RG59 740.00119/1047; K.
Harris, Allire (London, 1982), 197.
60 Cadogan dia ry 24 February 1942, minut(' 7 ~'ebruary 1942 1:0371/329051
N885; Cavendish-Hentinck minute 6 Ma y 1942 F0371/32881/N2524.
61 Dew minute 14 March 1942 F0371/32877/N1364; WM(42)24 thC A 25
February 1942 CAB65/29: 'there was no doubt that Russia regarded
the United Kingdom as of greatest importance from the poi nt of view
of the post-war settlement in Eu rope and wanted to work with us
after the war'.
62 Harvey diary 18 December 1941; Wilson minute 14 January 1943 1'03711
36958/N250.
63 Eden minute 11 November 1942 F0371/32884/N5608. Emphasis in o rigi-
nal.
64 Sargent minute 4 March 1942 1:0371/32876/NIISS; Warner minute
28 February 1942 F0371/32877/NI226; Harvey diary 16 May 1942.
65 Wilson to Clark Kerr IS May 1944 1'0800/302; Standley account of
C lark Kerr vi('wS 8 August 1943 FRUSI943: l l , 347; Birse, Memoirs, 138;
d. Rothwell, /Jri/(l ill , 104.
66 1'0 meeting 19 November 1941 F0371/29015/WI3829; Eden to Churchill
12 July 1942 1'0954/25 8; Eden to Churchill 2 November 1943 1'0954/
26A; Cavendish-Hentinck minute 16 December 1943 1'0371/36970/N7241;
Kitche n, IlririsJr Policy, 163.
67 Cripps to Fa 19 April 1941 F0371/29465/NI72S.
68 WI'(42)48 28 January 1942 F0371/32875/NS63; Warner minute 16 Feb-
ruary 1942 F0371/32876/N827.
69 l.ockhart memorandum 23 February 1942 BHK 0/96, diary 10 March
1942, 4 April 1942. Sim ilarl y, SOE's Soviet section noted the Soviet
desire for acceptance as a civilised country, 0/1'.1 to D/HV 26 May
1942 HS4/327.
70 1'0 to Halifax 26 March 1942 1'0371/32878/NI653.
71 Clark Kerr to Warner 10 August 1943 1'0800/301; Clark Kerr to Warner
28 August 1943 F0371/36956/N4929.
72 Eden conversation with Maisky 31 August 1943 F0371/36956/N4977.
73 Dew minute 30 August 1943, Wa rner minute 30 August 1943 1'0371/
369S6/N4929.
74 Clark Kerr to Warne r 10 August 1943 1'0800/301; Clark Kerr to 1'0
5 November 1943 F0371/37031/N6575.
75 Dew minute 15 October 1943 F0371/37031/N6851.
76 C lark Kerr 10 Fa S November 1943 F0371/3703 1/N6S75; Eden to
Churchill 2 November 1943 F0954/26A.
77 Wilson letter to Clark Kerr 19 March 1944 1:0800/302. Earlier, Pownall
had noted the importance of remembering the Soviets were 'Orien tal
not old Etonians', d iary 17 August 1941: the phrase was a useful short-
ha nd to distingu ish the two cu ltures.
78 Wilson paper 24 April 1944, to Clark Kerr IS May 1944 F0800/302.
79 Sargent minute 1 Ap ril 1944, Eden minute 3 April 1944 1'0371/43304/
N1908; Eden 10 Churchill 9 May 1944 F0371/43636/R7380.
80 Clark Ke rr desp~tch 3 1 August 1944 F0371/43336/N5598.
 Noles (//u/ Re{erellas 193

81 Clark Kerr to FO IS September 1944 F0371/44713/U7393.

82 Clark Kerr to Eden 2S September 1944 F0800/302.
83 Sargent to Eden 30 August 1944,26 September 1944 F0371/433061
NS126, N6124; Political Review 4 December 1944 F0371/43449/N7946.
84 Dew minute 9 November 1942 F0371/32884/NS608.
85 Lockhart memorandum 23 february \942 BBK 0/96, Stalin Order 23
I'ebruary 1942 F0371/32920/N I 121.
86 Baggallay to FO 28 February 1942 F0371/32876/Nl1SS.
87 Sargent minute 4 March 1942 F0371/32876/NI155, memorandum
5 February 1942 F0371/32905/N88S.
88 FO to Halifax 10 February 1942 1:0371/32875/N798; FO to Halifax
7 March 1942 F0371/32877/NI174.
89 Sargent minute 9 March 1942 F0371/32877/N I 279; Rober ts minute
28 March 1942 F0371/32879/NI91O; Harvey diary 26 May 1942.
90 Sargent minute 14 May 1942 F0371/32881/N2IS2; WM(42)134th
6 October 1942 CAB65/28; JIC(42)58th 1 December 1942 F0371/329201
N6195; Lockhart diary 10 December 1942; Dew minute 14 August 1943
F0371/36955/N4591; Cripps to Eden 10 August 1943 F0371/36992/N4717.
91 Jebb minute 13 June 1943 F0371/36983/N3547; Warner 10 Clark Kerr
28 September 1943 1:0800/301; Dew minute 15 October 1943 1'0371/
37031/N6S51.
92 Roberts minute 20 May 1944, Jebb minute 28 May 1944 F0371/406911
U3704.
93 Sargent minute I April 1944 F0371/43304/NI908; Hull to Harriman
15 January 1944, 22 January 1944 FRUS1944;][J, 1229, 1234.
94 Warner minute 24 May 1943, Strang minu te 29 May 1943 1'03711
35261/U2011; Eden memorandum 23 August 1943 F037l/36992/N5060;
FO-MSC meeting 23 June 1943 1'0371/35407/N2937.
95 J P(42)354 3 April 1942 CA B84/44 considered North Atlantic security
in terms only of a German threat, because of the imminent treaty;
the N. Dept requested that they consider a Soviet threat too, Somers
Cocks minute 7 April 1942, to Howkins 14 April 19421'0371/32832/
N1806. Howkins to Scott 13 May 1942 CAlli 19/65.
96 Ronald minute 23 April 1942 1'0371/32482/W5996; Payne to Ronald
19 February 1942 F0371/32423/W3003; Howkins to Ismay 4 June 1942
CABI19/64. The MSC comprised Brigadier van Cutsem. Rear-Admiral
Bellairs and Spaight (Air Ministry official).
97 The three from the MSC were joined by Air Vice-Ma rshal Longmore,
Major-General Grove-White and Waldock (Naval Secretary, Admiralty)
to form the PH PS/c. Jebb was Chairman, partly because none of the
services would accept a member of another as Chairman, and partly
because the FO were anxious to influence proceedings: Le Mesurier
note 25 June 1943 CAB 119/64; C05(43) 199(F) 25 July 1943, Dol' meeting
9 April 1943, Jebb to Cadogan 12 May 1943 F0371/3S449/U31S1, U2232,
U2235.
98 Hollis to Sargent 23 September 1943 F0371/36992/N6007.
99 COS(43)364(O) 5 July 1943 CARSO/71; COS(43)569(O) 22 September
1943 CAB80/75; Lambert note of I'HI'(43)4th 16 August 1943 F0371/
35449/U3151; JP(43)283(F) 24 August 1943 CAB84/55.
194 Noles ami ReferellCes

100 I'O-MSC meeting 23 June 1943 1'0371/35407/U2937.

101 Sargent minute 31 January 1944 F0371/4333S/NI008; JIC(44)i05(0)
20 March 1944 CAB81/121.
102 Ward minute 25 February 1944, I.e Mesurier to Ward 5 April 1944
F0371/43384/N2292, N2293.
103 WP(42)48 28 January 1942 F0371/32874/N563; Dew minu te 22 I'ebru-
ary 1942, Warner minu te 2 March 1942 F0371/32876/N1023, N1l56;
Eden to Churchill 6 March 1942. Sargent minute 9 March 1942 1'0371/
32877/NI174; WM(42)lstCA 1 Janua ry 1942, 24thCA 25 I'ebruary 1942
CAB65/29; Eden minute 8 I'ebruary 1942 1'0371/32905/N88S.
104 Bagga!!ay to 1'0 (3 telegrams) II February 1942. 20 February 1942 1'0371/
32876/N927, Ni023; D. Glantz and J. House, When Titans Clashed.
Hull' /Ill' Rrc! Army Stopped Hitler (Ka nsas. 1995).97, 106.
105 Warner minute 16 February 1942 1'0371f]2876/N927.
106 Lockhart memora ndum 23 February 1942 BBK 0/96; Lockhart diary
10 March 1942,4 April 1942. I--ew of the secondary sources recognise
Lockhart's influence: an exception (for 1945) is J. Zametica, 'Three
Letters to Bevin: Frank noberts at the Moscow Embassy, 1945-46', in
idem, ed., Ilrilisll Officials (/Ju/ Britisll Foreign !'olicy, 1945-50 (Leicester,
1990). 45.
107 Sargent memorandum 'A Possible Development of the Russo-German
War' 5 I'ebruary 1942 F0371/32905/N88S.
108 Lockhart min ute 20 February 1942 F0371/32876/N927; Lockhart minu te
to Sargent 8 March 1942 F0371/32877/NI439; Lockhart paper 16 March
1942 BBK 0/96. Differences between Sargent (who followed l ockhar t)
and Cadogan were shown in Cadogan's modifications of Sargent's draft
telegrams to Halifax, Cadogan diary 23, 24, 25 March 1942. For Lockhart's
view of the split in the 1'0 between the Cadogan a nd Sargent ap·
proaches, see diary 13 April 1943.
109 The concession was described to Halifax as a timely gesture showing
British sympathy. WM(42)37th 25 March 1942, 1.0 to Halifax 26 March
1942 CAB65/29; Churchill to noosevelt 7 March 1942 1'0371/32877/
N1174.
110 Warner minute ud. March 1942 F0371/32876/N927.
III Winant to Hull 23 June 1942 RGS9 741.6111/29; Beaverbrook to Liddell
Ha rt 11 June 1942 LH 1I11942; FO to Halifax 29 May 1942 1-0371 /3 2881 /
N2746; WM(42)68thCA 26 May 1942 CAB65/30. The Treaty was a shock
to Molotov too. He told Stalin the British draft (which omitted any
men tion of front iers) was ' unacceptable, as it is an empty declaration
which the USSR does not need.' Stalin replied, 'We do not consider it
an empty declaration but rega rd it as an important documen t. It lacks
the question of the security of frontiers, but this is not bad perh aps,
for it gives us a free hand. The question of fron tiers, or to be more
exact, of guarantees for the security of our frontiers ... will be de-
cided by force.' Molotov to Moscow 24 May 1942, Stalin to Molotov
24 May 1942 in O.A. Rzheshevsky, War OIId Diplomacy. The Makillg of
I/le Grand AI/kmee. Prom Slfllill's Arc/lil'es (trans. T. Sorokina, Amste r-
dam, 1996).
112 Harvey diary 26 October 1942; WM(42) 145thCA 26 October 1942 CAIl6S /
 Noles lllld Re{cr('llces 195

32; Eden minute II November 1942 F0371/32884/N5608. The sus-

pension of convoys to northern Russia was extended so that shipping
could be diverted to the landings in North Africa in November 1942.
113 Dew minute 'New Soviet Party Line on Foreign Policy to Allies' II
November 1942 F03 71/32918/N5882.
114 1'0 circular, by Warner, 29 December 1942: even Ca dogan saw this as
an important moment, enjoining frankN and closer cooperation by
British representatives with Soviet colleagues, minute 23 December 1942
F0371 /3695 4/N66.
115 1'0 paper 20 October 1942 F0371 /31525/U7 42; WM(42)16Ist
27 November 1942 CA B65/28.
116 Gladwyn, MmlOirs, 115.
11 7 Warne r minute 9 May 1942 F03 71/32880/N2221, paper ' Russian Par-
ticipation in Allied Economic Machinery' 19 May 1942 F0371/32881/
N2638, draft for interview with [\lis Smith Mr, 8 November 1942 1'037 1/
32885/N6539.
118 Cavendish-Bentinck minute 16 October 1943, Sargent minute 19 Oc-
tober 1943, Cadogan minute 20 October 1943 F0371 /37031 /N6851 ,
Eden 10 Churchill 19 August 1943 F0371 /36992/N5060. Eden told Hull
the Soviets had on ly two policy choices, one based o n three-po wer
cooperation, one on isolation, no te 23 August 1943 F0371 /36992/N5060.
119 Clark Kerr to 1'014 JUlle 1943, Eden lunch with Winant and Maisky
2 September 1943 F0954/26A; Sargent minute 5 July 1943 1'037 1/37045/
N4905; 1'0 to Moscow 18 September 1943 F03 71/37028/N5413; Lockhart
diary 12 August 1943; Harvey diary 24, 30 August 1943.
120 Eden to Churchill 24 October 1943, Cad ogan to Halifax 4 November
1943 F0371/37030/N6263, N6447; 5th Moscow meeting 23 October
19431'0371 /37 031 /N692 1.
121 Churchill to Attlee 14 August 1942, Churchill to Stalin 24 November
1942 F0954/25 B; Gllbert, Rom/to Victory, 639; Churchill to Clark Kerr
2 May 1943, Churchill to Eden 31 Jul y 1943 F0954/26A; ChurchHl to
Eden 15 February 1944 and meeting with Mikolajczyk 16 February 1944
r0954!20.
122 1'0 meeting 23 June 1943 F0371 /35407/U2837 .
123 Ronald minute 8 June 1942 F0371/32429/W8466; Bevin at Jowitt Com-
mittee 1st meeting 31 March 1942 CAB87/2; Wilson minute 13 J une
1943 F0371/36983/N3547.
124 Warner to Clark Kerr 8 July 1943, 29 September 1943 1'0800/301;
Church ill to Clark Kerr 16 June 1943 1'0954/26Ai Warner to Balfour
25 January 1944 1'08001302.
125 Warne r to Clark Kerr 9 April 1943: the choice was 'appeasement' or
the 'frank eXChange of views as between allies' 1'0800/301; Clark Kerr
to FO 30 July 1943 F0954!26A.
126 Warne r to Clark Kerr 12 May 1943 1'0800/301.
127 Warne r minute 16 December 1943, Eden minute ud. September 1943,
Martel to COS 26 September 1943 F0371 /36970/N7241, N5349, N5680.
128 WM (43)32nd Hi February 1943 CA B6 5/33; NlI)16 re port o n Soviet Na-
val Mi5sion I Ma y 1943 F0371 /36969/N2782; Martel to Brooke 9 October
1943, COS(43)729(0) 24 Novem ber 1943 F0371 /36970/N5930, N72 41;
196 Notes (//1(1 ReferellCes

Brooke diary 13 August 1942, 17 February 1943; Beaumont, Comrades,

114; idem, 'A Question of Diplomacy: Military MisSions to the USSR,
1941--45', louma/ of tile Royal Ullited Services {mtitl/le for Defetlce Studies,
118/3, (1973), 76-7; Nelson to Sargent 6 June 1942 HS4/327; Gillies,
Rrllilcal DIplOTllal, 145.
129 Wilson minute II July 1943 1:037 1/36969/N3968; Lockhart diary 11
February 1943,4 December 1943; Warner to Clark Kerr 12 May 1943,
Clark Kerr to Warner 31 July 1943 1=08001301.
130 I.ockhart diary 12 August 1943; Cadogan diary 18 October 1943.
131 Churchill to Eden 13 August 1942 F0954/25A, 29 June 1943 CA BI20/
683; Churchi ll to Drummond 1 December 1942 F0954/25B;
WM(43)42ndCA 18 March 1943 CAB6S/36.
132 WM(43)\35thCA 5 October 1943 CAB65/40; I.ambert minute 27 July
1943 F037 1/36991/N4514; Harvey diary 24 August 1943; K. Sainsbury,
'British rolicy and German Unity at the End of the Second World
War', ElIgtiS/1 Historimi Review, 94 (19 79), 797, 801.
133 WM(43)S9th 27 April 1943, 63rd 3 May 1943 CAB65/34; Warner to
C lark Kerr 28 May 1943 1'0800/301; Gilbert, Road 10 Victory, 390, 664.
134 Balfour to FO 2 January 1944 F0371/4331O/N62; Harvey diary 2S Oct-
ober 1943; WM(43)169thCA 13 December 1943 CAB6S/40; Eden to
Churchill 29 October 1943 F037 1/36957/N6353; Cadogan to Ha lifax
4 November 1943 F037l/37030/N6447.
13S Warner memorandum on Moscow Conference 29 October 1943 1'0371/
37035/N6789.
136 WM(44)llthCA 2S January 1944 CAB65/4S; Churchill to Eden 161anuary
1944 PREM3/399/6. For the Pravdll story, Beaverbrook to Churchill
24 January 1944, Eden minute 28 January 1944, Churchill to Stal in
24 January 1944 I'REM3/396/l1; d. Hull to Harriman IS January 1944
FRUS 1944:1lI, 1229.
137 C. Kennedy-Pipe, SWIll/'S Cold War. Soviet Slmlegics III Europe, 1943 /0
1956 (Manchester 1995), 27-9, 35-6, 39, 42; W_ Kimball, 'Stalingrad:
A Chance for Choices', IOllmal of Military History, 60 (1996), 109;
J. Erickson , 'Sta lin, Soviet Strategy and the Grand Alliance', in Lane
and Temperley, eds, Grand AIliIl/lC!~, 150; information supplied by
V. Batyuk, Russian Academy of US and Ca nadian Studies.

Chapter 5
Sargen t minute 31 April 1944 F0371/4333S/N2832_
2 1'0 paper 'Probable Post-War Tendencies in Soviet Foreign Policy as Affect-
ing British Interests' 29 Apri l 1944 F0371 / 43335/Nl008.
3 Wilson memorandum (revise) 26 May 1944 l'0371 / 4330S/N3S54.
4 Comments on Wilgress despatch 9 March 1944 F0371 / 43335/N2652.
5 Warner minute 16 June 1944 1'0371/43335/N3742; Warner to Wa rd II
Aug ust 1944 F0371/40741A/U687S_
6 Duff Cooper despatch 30 May 1944 F0371/40696/ US407, Eden to Duff
Cooper 2S July 1944 F0371/40701/U6S43.
7 Jebb minute 18 June 1944, Harvey minute 25 June 1944 1'0371 /40696/
U5407 .
 No/I's (/lui References 197

8 Sargent minute 30Ju n e 1944, Eden minute 2July 1944 1'0371/406961

U5407.
9 1'0 paper 'Western Europe' 9 May 1944 F0371/40698/U6139; jebb to
Ron ald 7 April 1944 FOJ71 / 43384/N2293.
10 1'0 paper 'British Policy Towards Europe' 22 May 1944 CAB2111614.
II 1'0 to COS 14 june 1944 F0371/40740/U5908; Warner to Squire 9 June
1944, Warner to Peel 9 june 1944 1'0371/43335/N2833, N3091; cf.
Kitchen, British Policy, 216.
12 WM( 44)43rd 3 April 1944 CAB65/46; Eden minute J April 1944 1'03711
43304/NI908; Churchill to Eden 4 May 1944, Eden to Churchill 9 May
1944 F0371143636/R7380: Gilbert, Road to Victory, 648, 651-2; Churchill
to Eden 8 May 1944 1'0954/20.
13 WP(44)304 7 june 1944 CA B66/51.
14 Cranborne to Eden 12 J une 1944, Cadogan minute 19 June 1944, Eden
minute 20 June 1944 F0371 / 43335/N4956.
15 WP(44)4369 August 1944 CAB66/53.
16 I'HP(43)1 (0 ) 8 March 1944 F0371 / 43384/NI120, revised as
PH P(44) 13(0)(I:) 'Effect of Soviet Policy on British Strategic Interests' 6
June 1944 CA B81 / 45; J IC(44)\05(0 )(F) 'Soviet Policy after the War' 20
M,lTch \944 CAII81f121.
17 ]'H1'(44) 12(0) 'Draft Assumptions for PHI'S Strategic Studies' 26 May
]944 F0371 / 40740/U4379.
18 I'HP(44)20 ' Air Defence of Great Britain' 2 May 1944 - subsequent drafts
were even less certain of a ten·year threat·free period, I'HI'(44)20(f) 19
May 1944 F0371/40791 /U3978, U4584 .
19 Separation from other parts of the planning machinery meant the PHI'S
could make no assessment of British ca pabilities, A. Gors t, 'British Military
Planning for Postwar Defence, 1943-45', in A. Deighton, ed., BritailJ
mJd the First Co/t/ WtJr (London , 1990),92. The new PHI'S we re Captain
Allen RN, Brigadier Curtis and Air·Commodore Warburton, each in his
early forties. They lacked the broader experience in armiStice and con-
trol matters, and the internationalist tendencies of their predecessors.
Jebb note 2 May 1944, Ismay to Cadogan 2 August 1944,1'0371 /4073 61
U3498, U6770; COS(44)249th(O) 27 July 1944 CAII79/78.
20 PHI'(44)l7(0)3rd Rev 20 October 1944 F0371 /407418/U7975.
21 5terndale-Bennett'S criticism of the south-east Asia paper I'HP(44)6(0)
I October 1944 could have applied to many of them: it gave the im-
pression of being thrown together merely from the st udy of a map,
without regard to political difficulties and realities, minute 10 October
1944 F0371/40741A/U7658.
22 Sloan minute 18 September 1944 F0371/40741AjU6875.
23 j lC(44)366(O)(F) 22 August 1944 ' Russian Capabil ities in Relation to
the Strategic In terests of the British Commonwealth' CAB811124.
24 rHI'(44)16(O) 'Strategic Interests in the Middle East' 14 December 1944
1'0371/4074111/U8672.
25 j lC(43)409(0) 2 October 1943 AIR40/2344, Portal at CCSI13t h mtg,
20 August 1943 FR W(/shillg/Oll 0. QIII.'lJec 1943,911.
26 COS(44)248th(0 )CA 26 July 1944 CA879/78; Jebb minute 7 June 1944,
Warner minute 23 May 1944 F0371/40740/U6253, U4379; Cavendish-
198 Noles al1(/ ReferellCes

Bentinck minute 18 Jul y 1944, Jebb minute 25 July 1944 I'0371/4074 1A/
U679 1, U6792.
27 Warner minute 12 July 1944, Jebb to Cadoga n 18 July 1944,
I'Hl'(44)17(O)(f) 20 J uly 1944 F0371/4074 IA/U6283, U6791, U6792.
28 Hollis toJebb 27 July 1944 F0371/40703/U6772; jebb note of COS views
28 july 1944 F0371 /4074IA/U6793; Sargent to Eden 18 August 1944
F0371/43306/N5126.
29 Warburton to PHPS 31 July 1944, I'HI'(44)17(0)Revise IS September
19 44 F0371 /407 41A/U6 793, U7618; Davison to Redman (8JSM) 27 J uly
1944 CABI22/ 1566; PHI'(44)20(0) 'USSR - Questionnaire to JIC' II August
1944 CA B81/45.
30 l'Hl'(44) IS(0) 'The Dismemberment of Ge rmany' 25 August 1944, Jebb
minute 27 October 1944 F0371/39080/C11955, C14995.
31 AI'W( 44)90 'The Dismemberment of Ger many' 20 Septembe r 1944,
Trou tbeck minute 6 September 1944 F0371/39080/CI3517, CI1 631.
32 Sargent minutes 30 August 1944,26 September 1944 F0371/43306/N5126,
N6124; Sargent memora ndum 4 October 1944 F0371/39080/C13518;
Lew is, Clwnging /)in'CliOlJ, 131 -2 .
33 Sargent note following COS-Eden meeting 4 October 1944 1'0371 /39080/
C13518.
34 Portal at 4 October 1944 meeting l'0371 /43336/N6 177; COS letter
2 October 1944 F0371/39080/C135 17.
35 Wa rd minute 13 December 1944 F0371 / 40397/U8S 20.
36 COS(44)5 Ist 17 February 1944, Jebb minute 19 February 1944 1'037 1/
40740/U I 751.
37 COS-Eden meeting 4 October 1944 F0371 / 43336/N6177; COS(44)346th
(O)CA 24 October 1944 CAB79/82 .
38 Warner minute 2 December 1944 F0371 / 43336/N76S0; Warner minute
13 Nove mber 1944, Ede n minute 16 Nove mber 1944 F0371/43317/N7046;
Balfour to Warne r 16 Janua ry 1945 F0371/47860/N3013.
39 Clark Kerr despatch 31 August 1944 1'0371 /43336/N5598 .
40 Lockhart diary 7 October 1944.
41 Sargen t memorandum 2 April 1945 F0371/47881/N4281.
42 Wilson 10 Clark Kerr 3 October 1944 1'0800/302.
43 Sargen t minu te I Ap ril 1944 F037 1/43304/N I908; Sargent minute 2
September 1944 F0371/39410/C11277.
44 jebb notes for political background for PHI'S world surlley 18 December
1944 F037 1/40741B/U8523.
45 Cavendish-Bentinck, Warner notes on j IC(4 4)467(0) 18 December 1944
1'0371/47860/N678.
46 JIC(44)467(O) 18 December 1944 F0371/47860/N678. The COS found
t h is paper sound though designated H as a 'staff study', not a definitive
COS statement of opinio n, COS(44)411 th (0 ) 27 December 1944 CAB79/
84; COS(45)29th 26 January 1945 CAB79/29; J 1'(44)278(1'), COS(45)6th
4 January 1945 CAB79/28.
47 D. Ri chards, Lo((/ (>orla/ of HUllgerford (Lo ndon, 1977),289, 297; Dalton
diary 2 February 1945; Martel, whose spell in Moscow had not been a
hap py one, wrote, 'I quite agree that there may be danger, but m y
who le feeling from close contact with them is that they will be con-
 Noles fllld Re{erellces 199

tent with being a bally nuisance in European affairs and no thing more
than certain demands for warm water access which is reasonable enough',
to Liddell Ha rt 3 September 1944 LHI /492.
48 WM( 44) 11 thCA 25 January 1944 CAB6S/45; Churchill to Clark Kerr 10
March 1944 F0954/20; Jones, Rllssia COII/plex, 78, 85, 95; Lee, Glmrellill
Coalitioll, 160. There is no recorded discussion of WI'(44)436.
49 Gilbert, Rood to Victory, SOl, 723, Churchi ll to Eden 10 July 1944 F0371/
43636/ R7903; Colville diary 8 October 1944.
SO Churchill to Roosevelt I April 1944 F0954/26B; Churchill t o Eden
I April 1944 F03 71/43304/NI908; Gilbert, Road /0 Victory, 859, 988;
Charm ley, CllIIrellill, 543.
51 WM (45)22 nd 19 February 1945 CA B65/51; Harriman and Abel, Speda/
EIIVOY, 161.
52 Mo ran diary 14 October 1944 , in Moran, CIIII(ellill. Tile Stfrlgg/e {or SlIr-
viva/, 1940-65 (London, 1966); Jacob to Hollis 17 October 1944 CABI27/
34; Churchill to Attlee 18 October 1944 CA B120/l65; WM(44)157thCA
27 November 1944, WM(44)164thCA II December 1944 CAB65/48.
53 Churchill to Attlee 18 October 1944 CA BI20/165; Laskey (So uthern
Department) noted the percentages assumed Britain would have some
influence in all the cou ntries, for these were not sepa rate zones, minute
23 October 1944 F037J/43636/RI 7490; R. Ga rson, 'Churchill's "Spheres
of Influence Rumania a nd lIulgaria', SlIrvey, 24 (\979), 15 1, 157. Kimball
ff
:

and Mark have suggested Roosevelt was amenable to 'open spheres':

Soviet control but not exclusion of the Allies, with coalition govern-
ments of 'anti-fascist' elements, and this seems equally to apply to
Churchill between Moscow and Yalta, E. Mark, 'American I'olicy Towa rd
Eastern Eu rope and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-46: An Alter-
native In te rpretation' /Ollfl/II/ o{ Ameriam History, 68 (1981), 3 13-16,
W. Kimball, Tile IlIggler. Fml1klil1 Roosevelt as Warlime SlfIteslllal1 (Princeton,
199 1), 169 .
54 Gilbert, Road to Victory, 992-3, 1055, 1065, 1095; K. G. Ross, 'The Mos-
cow Conference of October 1944 (Tolstoy)', in W. Deakin, E. Harker,
and J. Chadwick, eds, British Pulitical allli Military Strategy in Celltm/,
Eastern ami SOlllilem Europe ill 1944 (London, 1988),73- 6; J.M. Siracusa,
'The Meaning of Tolstoy: Churchill, Stalin and the Balkans, Moscow,
October 1944', Diplomatic History, 3 (1979), 444; P. Ho!dich, 'A Policy
of Percentages? British Policy and the Balkans after the Moscow Con-
ference of October 1944', Il1tema/lol1a/ History Review, 9 (1987), 33, 37,
42. As with the 'arrangement ' regarding Greece and Romania in May,
no agreement was actually finalised, nor defini tions of 'influence' agreed,
though the part ies in many ways acted as if there was. On the o ther
hand, it has been suggested that Stalin's famous blue ti ck was a sign o f
disagreemellt, for red was the colour he used to mark proposals from his
subord inates that he agreed with, while he used blue to show that he
did not: A.E. Titkov, 'Soyuzniki-sopemiki (k istorii antigermanskovo soyuza
SSSR's SShA i velikobritaniye v 1941 -1945 g.), in L.N. Nezhinski, ed.,
Sovelska"a Vnesllll,,(lia Po/itik" 191 7-1945 g. /'Qiski Novikll I'odkhoilov
(Moscow, 1992),298-9. Certain)y, the percentages were never discussed
oflkially again. Similiarly, Tsa kaloyannis suggests the re is no evidence
200 Notes am/ Re{erellCes

that Soviet officers in Greece delivered any restraining orders to lOAM,

r . Tsakaloyannis, 'The Moscow Puzzle', jOllrtl(l/ o(Colltempomry History,
21 (1986), 45-52.
SS WM(43) I72ndCA 20 December 1943 CAB6S/ 40: Churchill conversation
with Stalin 1 December 1943 CA BI20/113; Lockhart diary 6 January
1944; Eden note to Hull 23 August 1943 F0371 /36992/N5060.
56 Cadogan to Churchill 31 March 1943 rREM3/354/8; Stalin's views, it
was said in Cabinet, 'might well be different from those of the Russian
FO' WM(44)llthCA 2S January 1944 CAH65/45.
S7 C hurchill to Eden 7 January 1944 I'REM3/355!7; Gilbert, Rom/to Vic·
tory, 648; WM (44 j I5thCA 4 February 1944 CAB65/45.
58 WM(44)28thCA 6 March 1944 CAB65/45; Colville diary 18 March 1944;
Churchill to Eden 10 July 1944 F0371/43636/ R7903; Barker, Clwrcilill
(//1(1 Edell, 278-81.
S9 WM{44) IOSth CA 18 August 1944, 111thCA 28 Augus t 1944 CAH65/47.
The CAS reported the military opinion that the Soviets were overextended
and genuinely unable to relieve the Poles in Warsaw.
60 Charm ley, C/Ulrc/lill, 579; Jones, Russia Complex, 92; Dalton diary 30
August 1944, 6 September 1944; Burridge, IJrilis/r La/Jour, 144- 9; Nicolson
dia ry 4 October 1944; Harvey diary 15 August 1944; Kitchen, Britisll
Policy, 228, 231, cf. R. Edmonds, Tile Big Tilree (London, 199 1),384.
61 WM (44) 123rdCA 18 September 1944 CAB65/47.
62 Eden to FO 14 October 1944 CAIl120/l65; Churchill, St'(Q1Il1 WI)fld War
vol. 6, 205; Churchill conversation with Mikolajczyk \4 October 1944,
Dl)(lIlIIellls 011 Polisll-Soviel Rr/atiOIl$ vol. 2 (London, 1967),417.
63 WM(44) 157thCA 27 November 1944 CAB65/48; N.A. Graebner. 'Yalta,
rotsdam and Beyond: the British and American Perspectives', in Lane
and Temperley, eds, Gralld AI/iallce, 227.
64 Chu rchill to Eden 10 July 1944 F0371/43636/R7903; Churchill to Clark
Kerr 13 March 1944, Churchill to Roosevelt 19 May 1944 F0954/26B;
Ch urchHl to Eden 28 May 1944 ]'0371/4400I/R907S. On repatriation
of Soviet personnel captured with the Germans, a prime opportunity
for a fi rm stance, Churchill noted, 'I thought we had ar ranged to send
all the RUSSians back to Russia', Chu rchill to FO 28 October 1944 F0371/
40396/U8063.
65 Moran diary 30 October 1944 , d. Normanbrook and Colville comments
in Wheeler-Bennett, Action Tl1is DIIY, 28-37, 110; Charm ley, CllIIfcilill,
577-8; Edmonds, /Jig Tl1ree, 363-6.
66 Churchill found the Soviets in practice to be more accommodating than
they wanted thei r allies to expect, in the hopes of gaining concessions,
WM(44)47thCA 11 April 1944 CAB65/46, and suggested to Roosevelt
that the 'Soviet bark may be worse tha n its bite', I April 1944 F0954/26B;
WM(44)63rdCA II May 1944 CAB65/46; Gilbert, Rom/to Victory, 754.
67 Eden found Churchi ll 's interventions in foreign policy to be 'romantic
improvisa t ions', and blamed Beaverbrook and Cherwell, Charmley,
Churcllill, 605; Lockhart diary 10 November 1944; Eden to Cadogan
5 January 1945 F0954/22B; Churchill to Eden S February 1945 F0371/
50826/U 1900.
68 Warner to llalfour 25 January 1944 F0800/302; for Churchill's mood
 Notes (/lid References 20 I

swings, see for instance his comments at WM(44)63rdCA I J May 1944

compared to those at WM(44)47thCA II April 1944 CAB65/46. Church ill
noted the Soviet leaders' own swings; after a rude message they often
did what had been asked, to Roosevelt 19 May 1944 F0954/26B.
69 For an example of how historians have had to resort to speculation on
this, see 1'.0. Burridge, Clemi'll/ Attire: A Political Biosraphy (London,
1985), 172~3.
70 Lee, Cllurcilill Coa/ition, 142-3; Sa insbu ry, 'British', 788; Dalton diary
19 july 1944.
71 Dalton diary 1 November 1943. Attlee did give some support to the
two schools argument, Attlee to Churchill 25 August 1943 CABI20/
113. Dalton had in 1939 seen the Soviets to have passed from being
Communists to Nationalists then Imperialists, diary 18 October 1939.
72 'Notes on Post-War Problems' ud 1944- 45 Attlee papers, Church ill Col-
lege ATLEl /24; [ de diary 10 April 1945, in K. jeffreys, ed ., Labour and
lilt' Wartime Coa/i/iml . From IIII' Diaries o( /til/II'S Cllula Etll', 194 1-45
(London, 1987).
73 Dalton diary 5 january 1943.
74 Harris, AttieI', 213, Burridge, British LahaM, 169.
75 Attlee minute 26 January 1944 PREM3/197/2; Harris, Alllee, 210, 213;
Bevin to Cranborne I February 1945 Bevin papers, Churchill College
BEV3/l; Rothwell, Britain, 225-6, 228; Bevin at WM(45)7thCA 22 Janu·
ary 1945 CA B65/51 , for a bizarre 'therapeutic trust' suggestion about
Lvov.
76 Dalton diary 5 january 1943, 5 May 1944; Pimiott, D(l/lolI, 389; j.T.
Gra ntham, ' Hugh Dalton and the International Postwar Settlement: Labour
Party Foreign Policy ]:ormulation, 1943-44' IOl/fII111 of COlilelllpOf(lry His-
tory, 14 (1979), 715.
77 WM (45)10thCA 26 january 1945 CAB65/51; F. Harbutt, Till' lroll Cllr-
lIIill. CIII/rcilil/. Amer;m alllltlll' Or;g;/Is of tile Cold Wllr (New York, 1986),
122-3; Dalton diary 13 july 1944; Burridge, Uri/isll Labour, 149.
78 jones, Rllssia Complex, 89: Burridge, Alllee, 168.
79 CM(47)15th 3 1:ebruary 1947 CABI28/9; Altlee to Bevin 5 January 1947
F0800/502; Bevin minute 5 March 1948 F0800/452; R. Smit h, 'A Climate
of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy,
1945- 7', 1,lIema/iol/a/ Affairs, 64 (1988), 646- 7; Zametica, 'Three 1.etters',
90. Even in the changed atmos phere of 1947, in a paper wherein he
described the objective of the Soviet leaders as the organisation of World
Revolution, Jebb saw them having earlier been groping for a policy of
cooperation, which was then impeded by the Atomic Bomb, jebb paper
'Stocktaking II ' 19 March 1947 F0371/67587C/UN2622.
80 R. Smith and J. Zametica, 'The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsid-
ered', flltematiOlwi Affairs, 61 (1985), 248-9.

Chapter 6
I Gi lbert, Rom/lo Victory, 1350.
2 Cadogan to Mrs Cadogan 20 February 1945 in Dilks, ed., Diaries; Dalton
202 Notes ami ReferellCes

diary 23 February 1945, 12 Ma rch 1945; British Yalta Conference Records

9 February 1945 CAB99/31; Dixo n diary 6 February 1945, 13 February
1945, in 1'. Dixon. ed., DOl/ble Diplollla. Tile Life of Sir Pirrsoll Dixon
(London, 1968); Ha rvey diary 14 l:ebruary 1945. Portal wrote, 'U.j . is
the goods - s incere, simple and big .. .', Richards, Portal, 289.
3 Dalton diary 23 Feb ru a ry 1945; Colvil le diary 23 Februa ry 1945; Mo ran
diary 6 February 1945, 9 February 1945, 19 july 1945, 6 September
1945; WM(45)22ndCA 19 February 1945 CA B65/5 1; Kitchen, British I'olicy,
243,248,250-1 , 267; Gilbert, Road 10 Viclory, 1231, 1254, 1261.
4 Balfour to Warner 16 January 1945 , JIC(44)467(O) 18 December 1944
F0371/47860/N3013, N678.
5 Balfo ur to Warner 30 May 1945 I'037l/47862/N6417; Macmillan to FO
2 1 March 1945 1'0371/4 7941/N3097; I'.K. Roberts, Deuling willI Dicla-
lors (London, 199 1),90 .
6 Clark Kerr to Wa rne r 21 June 1945 F0371/47862/N6417.
7 Sargent to Churchill 2 Ma y 1945 PREM3/396/12.
8 Roberts to Wa rn e r 25 Ap ril 1945 1'0 37 1/47854/N8096,
9 Kenn an paper, ' Russia Seve n Years t at er' ud September 1944 1'0800/
302; Yergin, Sll(IlIered J>('(la, 78; Russell not e 19 June 19451'0371 / 47883/
N79Q9.
10 Roberts to Warner 25 April 1945 F0371{47882/N4919.
II Galsworthy minute 4 july 1945, Brimelow minute 5 july 1945 1'037 1/
47883/N7909; V. Mastny, RI/SSitl'S Rr1{l1l to liI(' Cold War. Dip/rJ//wcy, Warrlre
(!Iul/iI (' J>olilics of Co11111 11m ism, 194 1- 45 (New York, 1979),260 .
12 Sargent paper, 'Stocktaki ng after VE [)<lY' II Ju ly 1945 1'0371/50912/
U5 4 71; Churchill speech 16 August 194 5, Hansard, Debales, 4 13/84 .
\3 Roberts to Warner 30 April 1945 1'0 371/47854/N8096; Roberts despatc h
24 Ma y 1945 F0371 /47923/N6582.
14 Ro berts to Wa rn e r 25 Ap ril 1945 F037 1/47882/N 4919,
IS Ward minut e II June 1945 F0371/50826/U4283.
16 Comm ents on political forecast 5 Februa ry 1945 F0371/50774/UI080.
17 I'HP(45)29(0) 'Security o f th e British Empire' 29 june 1945 CAB81/46.
18 Sargent paper II Jul y 1945 F0371/50912/U5471.
19 Lock ha rt memo ra ndum II Ap ri l 1945 F0371 / 4 7860/N4102.
20 N. Dept draft of section 7 of Harvey to Peterson 4 Jul y 1945 1'03 711
50826/U4283; Dixon draft of paper 'Questions at issue with the Soviet
Govern ment ' 17 May 1945 1'0371/48 192/ R9256.
21 Roberts to Harvey 24 july 1945 1'0371/50826/U5786.
22 Cadogan minute II Jul y 1945 F0371/50912/U5471; see Overy, R" ss il, 's
War, 237-40.
23 jl C(44) 4 67(0) 18 Decembe r 194 4 F0 371/47860/N678, and see
COS(45) 175 th 12 ju ly 1945, j l'(45) 170(1:) II july 1945 CA B79/36.
24 Ch urchill min ute 5 March 1945 1'0954/23; C hurchill to Rooseve lt
8 Marc h 1945, W. Kimball, ed., Churchill (///(I Roosevelt. Tlleir Complete
Co rrf'spondencr, vol. 3 (Princeto n, 1984) 547; N icolson diary 27 I'ebru-
ary 1945; 1'0 to Halifa x 28 May 1945 1:0 371/48 192/R9256; Kit chen,
8rilisll Policy, 254-5.
25 Stewart minute 23 Ap ril 1945 F0371/48192/ R7333.
26 1'0 paper 20 Jul y 1945 F0371 /47964/NlOO36; Eden to Churchill 24 March
 Notes (/lid References 203

]945 F0954/26C; Sargent minute 2 June 1945 F0371/47882/N6141.

27 Williams minute 28 Apr il 1945 F0371/48192/R7333; Boswal\ to FO 29
J une 1945 F0371/48219/RII159; Kitchen, Brilisll PIJlicy, 255-7; Mclynn,
Mlle/eml, 203; Churchill told the Commons on 18 Jan ua ry 1945 tha t an
understanding had been reached with Stalin on joint wartime policy,
Hansard, Df'bales, 407/398-9.
28 Warner note on Lockhart memorandum II April 1945 1=0371/47860/
N4 \02; Sa rgent memorandum 'Policy Towards the Soviet Union' 2 April
1945 F0371/47881/N4281.
29 Ga lsworthy minute 4 July 1945, Stewa rt minute 12 July 1945 1'0371/
47883/N7909.
30 Sargent paper, 'Stocktaking' revise 31 July 1945 1'0371/50912/U5471.
31 Sargent memorandum 13 March 1945 F0371/48192/R7333.
32 Roberts to Harvey 24 July 1945 F0371/50826/U5786; Roberts despatch
24 May 1945 F0371/47923/N6582.
33 Clark Kerr to FO 7 June 1945, Stewart minute 9 June 1945 F0371/
48192/R9818.
34 Sargent paper, 'Stocktaking' revise 31 July 1945 1'037I/509 12/U5471.
35 Cranborne to Eden 26 March 1945, Eden to Cranborne 28 March 1945
1'0954/2211; [den to Churchill 24 March 1945 ]:Q954/26C.
36 W. Miscarnble, 'Anthony Eden and the Truman-Molotov Conversation s,
April 1945' Diplomat ic His/ory 2 (1978), 169-76,
37 Eden to Churchill 17 July 1945 F0954/26C.
38 Clark Kerr to 1'0 6 April 1945 \'0371/47881/N3745 .
39 1'0 to Clark Kerr 8 April 1945 F0371/47881/N3745.
40 Roberts to Warner 30 June t945, Warner minute 17 Jul y 1945 1'0371/
47855/N94 16.
41 Clark Kerr despatch 27 March 1945 F0371147941/N3934.
42 Clark Kerr despatch \0 J uly 1945 F03 7 I /47883/N8674.
43 Clark Kerr despatch 27 March 1945 F0371/47941/N3934.
44 Roberts to 1'0 21 April 1945 F0371/48928/R7704; Lockhart memoran-
dum J J April 1945 F0371/47860/N4102.
45 Clark Kerr despatch 27 March 1945 F0371/47941/N3934.
46 Roberts to Warner 25 April 1945 F0371/47882/N4919, 24 May 1945
F0371/47923/N6582.
47 Sargent memorandum 13 March 1945 F03 71/48192/R7333.
48 Lockhart diary 1 April 1945.
49 Lockhart diary 18 March 1945,31 March 1945; lockhart's views reflected
those of the Czechs; Benes was at this time also advocating plain and
honest speaking, Lockhart diary 17 February 1945, 6 April 1945.
50 Lockhart diary 1 April 1945, memorandum 11 April 1945 1'0371/47860/
N4102.
51 Sargent papers 2 April 1945 F0371/47881/N4281, 17 April 1945 1'03711
48192/R2956.
52 O'Malley to Sargent 22 May 1945, Sargent minute 31 May 1945 1'03711
47882/N6645_
53 Sargent paper 11 July 1945: Jebb thought 'crude bargains' could not be
avoided - and Britain after all wa!lted to keep the Soviets fro m meddling
in \'rance, Belgium and Holland, minute 20 Jul y 1945 F0371/50912/U5471.
204 Noles ami ReferellCes

54 Wilson minute 18 April 1945 F0371/47853/N4044 .

55 Howard minute 30 April 1945 F0371/48192/R7333.
56 Churchill to Roosevelt 5 April 1945 ]'" 0954/26C.
57 Churchill to Roosevelt 8 April 1945, Churchill to Truman 12 May 1945
F0954/26C.
58 Churchill conversation with TUC delegation 16 March 1945 F0371/
47881/N3039.
59 Churchill to Truman 12 May 1945 F0954/26C.
60 Gilbert, Road 10 Victory, 1306, 1330.
61 Gilbert, Road 10 Victory, 1329, 1332, 1350.
62 Gilbert, Roml 10 Victory, 1276, 1280, 1303; Churchill to Roosevelt 5
April 1945 F0954 / 26C; Churchill to Eden 4 May 1945 F0954/20; Ad-
miral Cunningham noted that Churchill was now optimistically placing
great faith in the bomb, and that he thought Soviet knowledge of the
bomb's existence would make them more humble, M. Gilbert. Never
Despair (London, 1988), 90; also Brooke dia ry 23 July 1945.
63 Gilbert, Neva Despair, 75.
64 Gilbert, Road 10 Vicillry, 1350.
65 Churchill conversation with Gusev 18 May 1945 I'REM3/396/l2.
66 Eden diary 17 july 1945, R. Rhodes james, AliI/lOllY Eilell (London, 1987),
307; Gilbert, Never Despnir, 75.
67 Gilbert, Rond 10 Victory, 1349; W. Kimball, Forgcd ill War. Roosewlf,
C/llIrchill, (/lid the Second World War (New York, 1997), 322.
68 Kitchen, Brilish Policy, 262.
69 PHP(45)29(O) 29 June 1945 CAB81/46.
70 COS(45)116th 3 May 1945, j lC(45)163(O) ' Relations with the Russians'
23 May 1945, COS(45)134th 23 May 1945 CAB79/33; Sargent minute
17 May 1945, Eden to Churchill I June 1945 F0371 /48192/R9256, R9257;
d. Kimba!l, lllgsler, 173- 6, 181 -2.
71 Lockhart diary 6 April 1945.
72 D. Cameron Watt points out the difference between seeing the Soviets
as difficult and seeing them as impossible, an important distinction
tha t those who see any sign of disagreement as a p roto-Cold War atti-
tude tend to miss, 'Britain, the United States and the Opening of the
Cold War', in R. Oven dale, ed., Tllc Foreigll Policy of Ihc British La/JOllr
Govcmmellts 1945-51 (Leicester, 1984), SO.

Chapter 7
Overy, RIISsi(I 's W(/(, 202-5, 272, 348, 389-91; B.F. Smith, Till' Wtlr's
Lons Slim/ow. The Second World War miff ils A(/emwllI. Cllilla, RIfSSifl,
Brill/ill, A II/(~ri({/ (New York, 1986), 93, 95-6.
2 Thurston (Mo.scow) to Hull 20 March 1942, Atherton memo 9 Decem-
ber 1942 FRUSI942:11 I, 421, 205; Harrima n to Roosevelt 5 July 1943
FRU51943: 1ll, 581n; memo by Division of Far Eastern Affairs 17 Aug ust
1943 FR WaS/lillSloll & Quebec, 627; Harriman to Hull 29 September
1944 RG59 71\.61/9-2444.
3 Berle to Welles 3 April 1942, Welles to Berle 4 April 1942 RGS9 741.611
 Noles (lIId References 205

98 1-2; Standley to Hull 10 March 1943 FRUSI943:1lI, 510; Durbrow

memo 3 February 1944, Stettinius memo 8 November 1944 FRUSI944:IV,
816, \025; Hull to Roosevelt 17 J une 1944, Roosevelt to Ch urchill
22 June 1944 FRUSI944:V, 124-5.
4 Welles memo 16 March 1943 FRUS1943:1J[, 22. and comments 25 J une
1942 RG59 733.6 1/57; Hamilton to Hull 8 August 1944 FRUSI944:I1,
347; Kekich memo 27 November 1944 RG59 741.6011/1 1-2744.
5 j. Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49',
in Deighton , ed., Bri/(Iill, 166-7.
6 WP(42)5 16 8 November 1942 CAB66/30; Duff Cooper to Eden 30 May
1944 F0371/40696/U5407; Achilles memo of British attitudes to the
USA and USSR 3 April 1943 RG59 740.00 11 /29067; Ross, 'Foreign Of·
fice Attitudes', 532, 538; A. Resis, review of Kitc hen , BritisJJ Policy in
Slllvic Review 47 (1988), 743.
7 A. Bullock, introduction to Rzheshevsky, Wllr ami Diplomacy, xix.
8 R. Overy, Wily till' Allies Wall (London, 1995), 3, 254.
9 The wartime, as opposed to Cold War, mindset is illustrated in Strang's
minute: ' It is better that Russia should dominate Eastern Europe than
that Germany should dominate Western Europe. Nor would the domi-
nation of Eastern Europe by Russ ia be as easy as all that. And however
strong Russia may become she is unlikely ever to be so grim a menace
to us as Germany could be again within a few years .. .' 29 May 1943
1'0371 /3526 1/UZO II.
\0 D. Dilks, 'British Political Aims in Central, Eastern and Southern Eu-
rope, 1944', in Deakin, Barker and Chadwick, eds, Brilisll l'oliliCiJI, 23-5.
II Eden to Churchill 5 January 1942 F0371 /3287 4/N\08; Eden conversa-
tion with Roosevelt, Welles memorandum 16 March 1943 FRUSI943:1II,
22. Kimball ascribes a similar sentiment to Roosevelt, Jllsskr, 183.
12 Clark Kerr despatch 31 August 1944 1'037 1/43336/N5598 .
13 On 21 September 1943 Churchill said in the House of Commo ns: 'without
the close, cord ial and laS\lng association between Soviet Russia and the
other great Allies, we might find ourselves at the end of the war only
10 have entered upon a period of deepening confusion', Hansard,
Debates, 392/100.
14 Titkov, 'Soyuzniki-sopern iki', 310-11. Titkov suggests the PHPS papers sent
on by Maclean had the effect of a bombshell in Moscow at the end of
1944. I' hilby also fed such suspicions, Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 239.
IS Roberts to Warner 30 June 1945 F0371/478S5/N9416.
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E. Barker, TIlt' Britis/! hetween Ih e Superpowers (London, 1983)
E. Barker, Britisll Policy in SQutll-Ellsl EUrilpe ill the Se(()n(/ World W(lr (Lon-
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E. Barker, Cllnrcllillaml Eti!'ll III Wllr (London, 1978)
J. E. Beaumont, Comr(l(les ill Arms (London, 1980)
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C. G. Bold', The Sovif'l Question in Britisll Politics (New York, 1989)
A. Boyle, Climate of Trm SO/1 (revised edition. London, 1980)
T.D. Burridge, British Labollr al1(l Hitler's War (London, 1976)
D. Caute, Tile Fellow-Travellers (London, 1973)
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W. and Z. Coates, Tile History of Allglo-Soviet RelatiOI1S, 1917- 1950, 2 vo ls
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R. Deacon, Th e Brifisil CO/lllec/ io/1 (London, 1979)
W. Deakin, E. Barker and J. C hadwick, eds, British Political (IIul Military S/m/egy
i/1 Cemral, Eastem alld SOli/hem Europe i/1 1944 (London, 1988)
A. Deighton, ed., Britaill fill/II/,e First Co ld W(/f (Lo ndon, 1990)
D. Dilks, ed., RI'trellt from Power: S/m/ies ill Britaill'S Foreign Policy ill tile TWl'lJIieti1
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H. Feis, Cll1Ircilill, Roosevell, Stali,, : The Wllr Tiley Wtlged (IIulllll' Pellce Til ey
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A. Glees, Till' Seaels of IIII' S!'fvice; British Illtelligi'llce (/1/(1 COll1l11l1l/isl Subver-
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J. Golley, HlIrri((IIII'S over MlIfllulllsk (Lo ndo n , 1987)
M.R. Gordon, COl/flict allil COl/sel/slIs ill L(/bollr's Foreigll Policy, 1914-65
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G. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps Missioll 10 " 'foscow 1940-42 (Cambridge, 1984)
L Grigg, British Foreign I'olicy (London. 1944)
F. Harbutt. Tilt' Iro/1 Cllrtain; C/lJlrciljl/, America (1m/ IIII' Ori:siJ1s of IIII' Cold
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F.H. Hinsley et al.. Till' History of British Intelligence ill World War Two. 5 vol s
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M. Howard, TI,e Meditermlleall Stmlrgy ill Ihe Secoll d World War (London ,
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W. Jones, Tile Russ ia COl/lpkx (Manchester, 1977)
G. Kacewicz, Great Bril(lill, The Sovirt Union alld IIII' Polish Gowmlllwi ill
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C. Keeble, Britaill alld 1/11' Savil.'l Unioll, 1917-1989 (London. 1990)
C. Kennedy- Pipe, Sialin's Cold War. Soviet Stratl'gies ill Ellrope, 1943- 1956
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L. Kettenacker a nd W. Mommsen, eds, The F(lscis/ C/Jalltmge (1/11/ III I.' Policy
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M. Kitchen, Brilisll Policy Towards IIII' Sovirt Union During tile Secollli World
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j.M. Lee, Tile CIII/rellill CoaliliOl1 (London, 1980)
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1. McLaine, Ministry of Moraie: HOllie Fro/JI Morale oml the Ministry of Illfor.
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W. H . McNeill, Alll eriw, Britaill allil Rllss ia: Tlleir Coopewtioll mul C(mlliet,
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V. Mastny, Russia's RO(J(I to tht' Cold War. Diploll/acy, Warfare ami tile Polilics
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S.M. Miner, Betwee" CIII/rellill ami Stal;" (Chapel Hill, 1988)
F.S. North edge and A. Wells, Brilaill IlIId SOI'iel COllllll llllislll. The IlIIpa cl of A
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V. Rothwell, Brilaill (///(1 Ihe Cold War, 1941-47 (Londo n , 1982)
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V.A. Sipols, Tile Road 10 Greal Victory, /941-45 (M oscow, 1985)
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D. Cameron Watt, PasO/wlilies amI Policies (Lo ndo n , 1965)
A. Werth, Russia al Wllr 194/-45 (New Yo rk, 1964)
P. Winterton, Reporl a / I Russia (I.ondon, 194 5)
N. Wood, COlllllllm ism al1d British Imelleell/als (London , 1959)
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 8ihllagmphy 213

3. Articles a nd essays
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j.E. Beaumont, 'A Question of Diplomacy: Military Missions to the U55R
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P.G. Boyle, 'The British roreign Office View of 50viet·American Relations,
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T.O. Burridge, 'Barnacles and Troublemakers: Labour's Left Wing and Brit·
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T,O. Burridge, 'Great Britain and the Dismemberment of Germany at
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F.M. Carroll, 'A nglo.American Relations and the Origins of the Cold War:
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D, Childs, 'The British Communist rarty and the War, 1939-4 1: Old Slo·
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A.M. Cienciala, 'The Activities of Polish Communists as a Source for Stalin's
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R. Edmonds, 'Churchill and Stalin', in R. Blake and W. R. t au is, eds, CllljT(l,ill
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R. Edmonds, 'Yalta and Potsdam: I:orty Years Afterwards', II/Iemaliollnl Af-
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A.J. roster, 'Thr Times and Appeasement: The Second Phase', Immllli of COli"
/empomry His/ory, 16 ( 1981), 441-65
A.j. Foster, 'The Politicians, Public Opinion and the Press. The Storm over
Brit ish Military Intervention in Greece in December 1944', Journal of
Cmrtell1powry His/ory, 19 (1984), 453- 94
A.j. Foster, 'The Beaverbrook Press and Appeasement: The Second Phase',
Erjroprnll History Quar/aly, 21 (1991), 5-38
R. Garson, 'The Atlantic Alliance, Eastern Europe and the Origins of the
Cold War: From Pearl Harbor to Yalta ', in H. C. Allen and R. Thompson,
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(Lo ndon, 1976), 296-320
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June 1987), 44-50
214 BibliograpllY

M. Gat, 'The Soviet Factor in British Policy Towards Italy, 1943-1945', Tile
His/oriall, 50 (1987), 535-5 7
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June 1941', Englisl1 His/orical Review, 94 ( 1979), 48- 70
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His/ory, 13 ( 1989), 123-33
T. Harrisson, 'Public Opinion and Russia', Political QUlIrterly, 12 (1941), 353-66
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S. Kerr, 'Roger Hollis and the Dangers of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of \942',
[II/l'ilig('/JC(' IImi NaIiO/Jili SeCliri/y, 5 ( 1990), 148-57
L. Kettenacker, 'The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany,
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R.H. Keyserlingk, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service and
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Peace Feelers, 1942-44', loumal OrCm1telllPOrary History, 10 (1975), 531-49
A.J . Kochavi, 'Anglo-Soviet Differences over a Policy towards War Crimi-
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lormllll or Britislr Studies, 6/2 ( 1966-67), 99- 123
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/lal or COlltemporary Hi5tory, 6/3 ( 1971 ), 66--86
J.D. tanger, 'The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Un-
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R. Manne, 'The British Decision for Alliance with Russia', IOllmal of COI1-
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R. Manne, 'Some Ilritish Light on the Naz i-Soviet Pact ', Ellropean Studies
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R. Manne, 'The r oreign Office and the r ailure of Anglo-Soviet Rapproc he.
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R. Smith and J. Zametica, 'The Cold Warrior: Clement AttIeI' Reconsidered
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Index
Adriatic Sea, Soviet designs in, 88
Afghanistan, 17,36
aid, British to Soviet Union; forces ,
33,34,35,90; supplies, 31,
50,52,91, 127, ISO
Air Force, German, 127
Air Force, Royal, 127
Air Force, Soviet, set' Red Air Force
aircraft , Soviet, 12, 127
Albania, 121
Allen, Captain C.C.A., 197 n19
Andreyev, A.A., 145
Anglo-American relations, 34, 76, 90,
107, 114, 130, 132, 134, \70
Anglo-Soviet alliance, 33, 38, 94,
97, 118, 119, 129, 148, 156,
158, 170, srI' (I/so Anglo-Soviet
Treaty
Anglo-Soviet-American relations,
37, 84, 109-10, 130, 140,
]60-2, srI' (ilso Grand Alliance
Anglo-Soviet cooperation, 37-8, 72,
74-5, 77, 82, 85, \04-5, 107,
109, 110-15, 117, 131, 137,
140, 159, 163-6, 168- 70
expected to have difficulties, but
not be impossible, 131 , 140,
142, 147, 156, 158, 161, 167,
170
nature of, 110-12, liS, 165
Anglo-Soviet re lations, 61, 67, 71,
92, \09, 151 , 154
historiography of, 2-3, 170
Anglo-Soviet Treaty, I. 87, 101,
103,108-9,114,120,194
nl11
Anti-God Society, 62
appeasement. 2, 107
Ardennes, 142
Armenians, srI' Soviet Union,
et hnicity
Armistice and Postwar Committee
(AI' WCj, 139
217
Army, British, see mili tary, British
Army, German, srI' ~Vel"'lIaclll
Army, Soviet, see Red Army
Atlantic Charter, 35, ! 13
atomic bomb, 115, 163,201 n79,
204 n62
attaches, British Military and Naval
in Soviet Un ion, 10, II, 35
Attlee, Clemen t, 16,24, 135 138-40,
141, 189 nl3
and Soviet frontiers, 91, 191 - 2
n59
and 'two schools' theory, 201
nn
as Prime Minister, 140, 160
on Soviet imperialism, 139
on Soviet sensitivities, 108
Archer, Rear-Admiral Ernest, 182
nl4
Asia, 26
Austria, 151, 160, 163
Axis satellites, 15\-4, 164
Azeris, s('e Soviet Union, ethnicily
Babington, Air Marshal Sir john, 53
Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 98
Baedeker Guide /0 Russia (1914), 47
Baggallay, Lacy, 41, 45, 46, 51, 57,
70, 78, 101, 106, 108
Balfour, john ('jock'), 41, 58, 60,
74, 144
Balkans, 37
crisis in (March-April 1941), 19-21
SOviet influence in, 120-1, 153
War Cabinet paper on
(WI'(44)304), 120- I
Baltic Sea, 36, 133, 163
Baltic states, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18,20,
21,30,36,37,62,94
BARBAR055A, Operation, 4, 12, 19,
23,31,46,53,62,67,79,81,
82, 90, 103, \06, see (Ilso
Soviet-German War
218 IIJI/ex
Barclay, Roderick, 173 n3
Barman, Thomas, 41
Beaverbrook, Lord, 2, 26-31, 32,
33, 78, 92, lOS, 200 n67
and supply to USSR, 27, 29
attitude to USSR, 26-7, 28
criticisms of military, 30-1
favours political concessions, 30,
91, 106
imperialist isolationism of, 26,
178 nn, n93
influences on, 26-7
mission to USSR, 1941,28-30,
33, 83, 9 1, 112
on Soviet morale, 2 7-9, 34
on Soviet sensitivity, 27, 30, 91,
107
political ambitions of, 26, 28
pre-war views, 26
relations with Churchill, 28
resignation from War Cabinet,
1942, 91
response to RARRARQSSA, 27-8
tactics of handling Soviets, 29,
83, 179 nlOO
views on Soviet frontiers, 30, 91
Belgium, see Low Countries
Belgrade, anti-Nazi coup in, 19, 20
Bellairs, Rear-Admiral Roger, 193
n96
Bend, Eduard, 203 n49
Beria, l.avrenti, 81, 83, 14S
Berlin, 37, 163
Molotov trip to, 1940, 9
Berthoud, Eric, 49
Bessarabia, 13, 37
Bevin, Ernest, 16, 138-40, 141,201
n7S
Be:t.bozI1l1ik, 62
Black Sea, 36, S4, 163
Blitzkrieg, 4 7
blockade, 18, 20, 31
Bohlen, Charles, 146
Bolshevik Revolution, see Revolution,
Russian
Bolshevism (and Bolsheviks), 46,
57, 58, 61, 65, 74, 90, 138,
143
' Bolshevik bogey', lIS
Bolsover, George, 41
Bomber Command, 143
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 58, lIS
Brabazon, J,T.C. Moore, 180 nl12
' Bracelet', see Conference, Moscow,
1942
Brimelow, Thomas, 41, 146
BrUal/ski Soyuz/!ik ('British Ally'), 72
British Naval Liaison Officers
(BN LOs), 127
Brooke, General (later Field
Marshal) Sir Alan, 31, 112
Bruce Lockhart, Robert, 5, 42, 60,
87,92,94, 100-I, 148, 149-50,
159-60,166, 194 nl06, n108,
203 n49
advocates 'frankness', 107-8, 113
as expert on USS R, 5
'dinner jacket' argument, 78, 187
n 113
influence on Beaverbrook, 26-7
influence on Sargent, 160
on ethnicity, 45, 94
on Soviet sensitivity, 27, 94, 107,
113
on Soviet xenophobia, 107
on 'therapeutic trus t', 107
sees Soviets as over-confident,
131, 159
Rukovina, Northern, 13
Bulgaria, 9, 132, 135, 151, 154,
15S-9, 160
Bullock, Lord, 170
Burrows, Major-General Montague
Brocas, 51, 99
Butler, Richard A., 18, 21-2, 46-7
Byelorussia (Belarus), 43
Cabinet, see War Cabinet
Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 7, 13, 17,
32,35,63,66,78,81,84,88,
92, 105, 110, 121, 143, 149-50,
173 n3, 180 nIII , 194 n108,
195 nl14
Carpathian Mountains, 153
Cat herine the Great, Tsar, 146
Caucasian peoples, 46-7
Caucasus region, 18,33,35,81 ,
109, 126

Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor, 31-2,
92, 110, 128
Ceci l, Robert, 3
Central Department, FO, 88, 101
cen tral Europe, 129, 134, 149, 153
Chambe rlain, Neville, 144
Che rwell, Lord (I'rederick
Li ndemann), 200 n67
Chief of the Air Staff, see Portal
C hief of the Imperial General Staff
(C IGS), 34; s('e a/so Broo ke, Dill
Chiefs of Staff, British (COS), 5,
22,27,30,69,85, 133, 141,
169
and I'our Power Plan, 130
and Beaverbrook, 30-1
and informati on exchange, 35
and PH PS, 104- 5, 128, 124
and Soviet sensiti vity, 123, 128,
129-30
and suppl y to USS R, 3 1
and 30 Missio n, 22, 112
and USS R as potential e nem y,
103-5 , 123, 129-30
and wartime cooperat ion with
USSR, 103, 112, 128
assessments of Red Army, I 1,51
dispute with Fa, 118, 123, 128-30,
132, 154
meeting with Eden, October
1944 , 129-30
on Warsaw risi ng (1944), 200
n59
pessimism about Soviet resistance,
25
place of USSR in strategy of, 31 -2
see (1/50 Brooke, Dill, Ismay,
Portal
China, 40, 130, 132
cil;11Y (rank ), 58-9
Cholert o n, A.T., 41
churc hes in the USSR, 62, see also
Orthodox Church, Russia n
Church of England, 63
Church ill Coalition, 4-5, 39, 103,
146,1 48, 165, 167,171
Churchill, Winston, 5, 9, 17,30,
33, 41 ,50,98, 112, 141 , 142,
166, 180 n119, n120, 188 nl
1m/ex 219
acid tests of Soviet policy, 138
against discussions of postwar
issues, In, 134
ambivalence of, 163- 4
and a tom ic bomb, 163, 204 n62
and Poland, 135-7
appOintment of C ripps, 13
at Po tsdam, 163- 4
becomes Prime Minister, 4
broadcast 22 June 1941 ,4 8
correspondence with Stali n, 19,
20, 34,97, 131, \37-8, 180
n20
ex pects Soviet- German interests
to c lash , 7, 8, 20
com pla int to Gusev, 164
geopolitical approach of, 138,
143
in Commons, 203 n27, 205 nl 3
inconsistency of, 138, 201 n68
memoi rs, 2
Moscow Conference ('Bracelet ')
(1942), 83
Moscow Conference ('Tolstoy')
(1944), 8 6, 134, 13 7
not yet a Cold Warrior, 163
o n Allied stre ngth, 1945, 16J
on Anglo- US united action, 134,
161 - 2
o n Rea ve rbrook mission, 28
o n behaviour as guide to Soviet
aims, 114, 162, 200 n66, 201
n68
on hold ing position in w nes,
162-3
0 11 Mol otov, 81
o n nature of cooperation, 111,
11 3, 115
on reconstruction, 70
on repatriatio n of Soviet
prisoners-of-war, 220 n64
o n reserve policy, 2 1
o n Soviet Union : aims and
ambitio ns. 24 , 120; bulli es,
162; capabilities, 24-5;
freedom of action, 134, 143,
162; fro nti ers, 91 -2, lOti;
internal affairs, 39, 44, 55,
M - 5, 75; morale, 48;
ZZO Inllex.
Churchill, Winston - con/hwell
'oriental '; 45, realism, 134;
sensitivity, 94, 134; 'two
schools' theory, 83, 85, 86,
135, 138, 145
on US attitudes, 16Z-3
percentages agreement with
Stalin, 1944, 134-7, lSI, 199
n53
pessimism of, 162, 171
qualified optimism of, 137
reaction to BARBA ROSSA, Z3-5, Z7
view in May 1940, 13
view of Stalin, ZO, 78-80, 82, 95,
86, 134-8, 143-4, 146, 162,
164, 180 nIZO, 190 n30, 190
n36, 203 n 27, 205 n13
views on handling Soviets:
bargaining, 163; conceSSions,
91; firmness, 137, 161-4;
need for firm agreements,
134-5; showdown, 157, lS9,
163; trust, 138, 144
Clanchy, Captain Henry, 187 nl12
Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald, 40-1, 42,
44, 65, 66, 79, 80, 83, 144,
146, 147, 154, 159, 166
down plays Soviet bad behaviour,
155-6
on Army-I'arty relations, 5Z-3
on cooperation with Soviets 76,
131, 155- 6, 158, 170
on 'frankness', 113, 157- 8
on Molotov, 190 n36
on religion, 62, 64
response to W I'(44)436, 130-1
views of Soviets: as immature,
ISS, 157; as over-confiden t,
155; desire to be in 'club',
93, 95; ethnicity, 4S;
inferiority complex and
sensitivity, 96, 98-9, 154-5;
on 'two schools' theory, 85,
190 n35
talks with Sta lin, February 1943,
84-5, 88, 111 , 113
'Cliveden set', 90
Cold War, I, 4, 77, 80, 86, 148,
158, 160, 164-5, 166, 171
Collier, Sir Laurence, 7-10, 17, 18,
46-7, 94
Colville, John (,Jock'), 24-S, 134,
144, 162
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS),
130
Com intern, 24, 65-7, 139
commissars, military, see polilruki
Commissars, Soviet People's, 83, 98
Commons, House of, 6, 24, 154,
203 n27, 205 n13
Commonwea lth, British 126-7, see
illso Domini ons
Communism, in Eu rope, 67, 88,
15Z, 161
Communism, in Britain, 6, 24, 65,
66, 139, 162
Spri nghall and Ure n espionage
case (1943), 186 n88
Communism in USSIl, 10, 1Z, 47,
55, 60-1, 66
Communist Party (CPSU), 80,
130, 147: relations with
Army, 48, 52-3, 56, 190 n30;
and the Comi ntern, 66, 67
confederations, in eastern and
south-eastern Europe, 37
Conferences
Moscow Supply (October 1941),
28-30, 83, 91
Moscow ('Bracelet') (August
1942), 83
Moscow Foreign Ministers
(October 1943), 96, 99, 104,
II, 114, 135
Moscow (,Tolstoy') (October
1944), 96, 134, 137, 153
Potsdam UUly- August 1945), 154,
163-4
5an I:rancisco (May 1945), 139
Teheran (November 1943),97,
104, 114, 118, 134, 135
Yalta (February 1945), 78, 133,
134, 137, 14Z-3 , 144-5, lSI,
152, 153, 160, 163, 166
Conservati ve Party, 184 n55
COJlvoys, Arctic, 109, 112, 195 nl12
Cooper, Alfred Duff, see Duff
Cooper

'cordOll s(mi/(lire', 90, 100, 117, 153
Cossacks, 56
Cranborne, Viscount, 24, 121
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 16-17, 30, 40,
44, 45, 79, 82-3, 85
advoca tes Balti c states concession,
18-19
and Balkans crisis (March-April
1941), 19-20
and Beaverbrook mission, 29
and Churchill message to Stalin
(A pril 1941),20
appointment as Ambassador to
USS R, 4, 13
approach to Soviets (October
1940), 19
criticism of British policy, 13-15,
18, 90, 92
Crippsians in 1'0, 33, 44, 92
expelled from labour I'arty, 13
interview with Sta lin (1 July
1940), 15
negotiates mutual assistance
agreement, 25
on Molotov, 14, 19, 82
o n need to treat Soviets as
equals, 34, 94, 106, 180
n118
on Soviet policy: commitment to
collective security, 13- 14;
realis m, 14; sensitivity, 14-15,
29, 33
on Soviet- German reJa tions, II ,
14,21, 174 nlO
on postwar cooperat ion, 14, 29,
34
reaction to Nazi-Soviet r act,
13-14
recommends bargaining, 29
recomme nds rese rve policy,
18- 19
tactics of handling Soviets, 15,
29, 34, 36, 105-6
Cromwell , Oliver, ISS
C unn ingham , Admi ral Sir Andrew,
204 n62
Curtis, Brigadier EC., \9 7 nl 9
C urzo n line, 136, see also Poland,
frontie rs
Imlex 221
Czechoslovakia, 18, J19, 132, 153,
160
Czechs as sources of information,
42, 51
D(lily Herald, 16
D(lily Te/esrapll, 41
Dalton, Hugh, 16, 79, 91, 140,
143, 201 n71
Dardanelles Straits, 36, 88, 132
Decla ratio n on liberated Emope,
152-3, 164
Defence Committee, 32, 91
'deputy captain' (polit ical o ffi cers
on warships), 53
Dew, Arm ine,S, 32-3, 37, 43, 45,
55, 66, 84, 95, 96, 100, 120,
146
on changes in USSR, 57-8, 60,
61, 147
on religion, 62, 63
Dill, Ge neral Sir Joh n, 23
diplomatic commun ity, in USSR,
42
dismemberment of Germany, 128-9,
see (1150 Ge rmany, postwar
treatment of
Dneprope tro vsk dam, 126
Dominions, British, 26, 28
Donbas, 69, 126
Donetz, 69
Driberg, Tom, 27
Duff Cooper, Alfred, 24, 118-19, 121
EAM (ElI1I1ikul1 Apele(JllerolikQI1
Me/o{JfJ11 - Greek Communist· led
reSistance), 135, 151 , 199 n54
Easte rn Department, ro, 41
eastern f.mo pe, 26, 30, 45, 63, 76,
79,87,10 1, III , 11 7, 119,
133, 134, 140, 148-9, 150,
159, 161
Easte rn Front, 32, 34, 42-3, see
(1/50 Soviet- Ge rman War
Economic and Reconstruction
Depa rtment, FO, 73, 92, 109
Economic Warfare, Mi nistr y of
(MEW), 41-3, 48, 54, 67, 91,
12S
222 Index
Economic Warfare - collli/wed
advocate concessio!l5, 17
and Cripps mission, 13
on intern al developments in
USSR, 57
on reconstruction, 70-2
supports Cripps' views, 16-17, 18
USSR section (German Europe
and Russia Department,
Enemy Branch), 4, 43, 68-9,
187 n107
Eden, Anthony, 2, 36, 38, 75, 95,
110,116,121 , 134, 141 , 149- 50,
169
and Balkans crisis (March-April
1941), 19-21
and Soviet frontier question,
90- 1, 92, 105
believes Soviets think he wants
good rela tions 19,32, 177
n64
cooperation as cornerstone of
British policy, I, 119
criticism of C hurchill, 200 n67
in Moscow (October 1943), 96
meeting with COS (4 October
1944), 129-30
meetings with Stalin (December
1941 ),30,37,83,90, 105,
119
on Italy, 98, 120
011 Molotov, 83
on religion in USSR, 63
on Soviet aims and ambitions,
98, 118, 120
on Soviets feeling excluded, 96
011 Soviet options, 195 n118
on Soviet suspicion, 32, 34, 91,
92-3 , 106, 107
on Stalin, 79, 189 n8
on 'two schools' theory, 82
pessimism in 1945, 151 , 154,
163-4
probability of sovietisation
policy, 88
reaction to BARBAliOSSA, 24-5
sees British policy as drifting, 34
sees Soviets as cooperative, 98,
115
tactics of handling Soviets:
bargaining, 112; 'belling the
cat' 113; concessions, 32,
I U5-6; no concessions, 21;
reserve, 18; s howdowns, 157,
159; Treaty as basis for
policy, 138
takes up idea of alliance in
Cabinet, 33
Egypt, British position in, 133
Ekaterinberg, 46
Embassies
Australian, in Moscow, 42
British, in Moscow and
Kuibyshev, 4, 38, 40, 49, 5 1,
58, 59, 60-1, 65, 69, 72, 85,
86, 88, 99, 106, 113, 146,
153, 157-8, 168, 171:
press-reading bureau in, 41,
68
Canadian, in Moscow, 42
Soviet, in London, 15
United States, in Moscow, 42,
144, 168
Empire, British, 26, 124, 165, 169
Engels, Friedrich, 79
Estonia, see Baltic states
Eton, 97
Europe, 37,101,107,110,117,
122, 139
Axis, 69
postwar division of, 95, 115,
119, l S I , 158, 165, see also
spheres of influence, western
European bloc
reconstruction of, 66, 101, 161
Soviet influence in, 65, 67, 118,
121- 3, 132, 135, 139, 161
US withdrawal from, 157
victory in, 157
European Advisory Commission
(EAC), III
Evening Sial/dard, 27
Far East, 132
Fierlinger, Zdenek, 42
Finland, 36, 160
declaration of war on, 30, 33, \08
Soviet invaSion (1939), 7, 14, 16

First World War, 35, 109
Foot, Mi chael, 27
Fo reign Office (FO), 3, 5, 7, 12, 13,
15, 16, 17,4 1,42,44, 48,51,
54, 67, 69, 80, 139, 150
advocate rese rve, 19, 33, 36
against concessions, 18
and C ripps mission, 13
cooperation with PH PS/c, 116
dispute with COS, 123-30 , 132,
154
d ivisions in, 92
directions on Churchi ll message
(April 1941),20
junio r officials, 4-5
meetings o n USS R (November
1941 ),35-8
on dismemberment of Germany,
129
o n 'ganging up', 134
o n PHI'S papers, 125-6, 128-9,
197 11 21
o n Poland, 136
on postwar cooperation, 34, 37,
111 , 11 5,181 n130
o n Soviet influence in Eu rope,
118- 19, 205 n9
on Soviets as po te ntial e nemy,
103-4, 117, 123
o n USS R: internal changes, 57,
60, 61, 65, 147; religion,
62-5; reconstruction, 117,
122, 127
o n western European gro up,
118- 9 , 129
papers; APW(44)90, 129;
WP(44)304, 120, 133:
WP(44)436, 120, 121-3, 128,
129, 130, 133, 140, 149
qualified opt im ism in, 121 -2,
130-1, 137
reac tio ns to BARBAROSSA, 22-6,
178 n88
sh ift in attitudes, end of 1941 ,
32-4
tactics of handling Soviets, 63,
92, 105-8, 112-3, 11 8, 122,
138, 158- 9, 161, 169
views of Sov iet policy: as
/m/ex 223
undecided, 96, 114, 11 8,
130; behavio ur as guide to,
114; cooperativeness, 74, 92,
105,110-11,114- 15,117,
122-3, 128, 130, 140-1, 164;
expansio nism, 11 7, 122;
inferiority complex, 11 7;
isolationism, 109, 117, 120;
lim ited ob jecti ves, ISO, 161 ;
'probable tendencies', 116,
121. 126; realis m, 11 7- 18,
120, 123; securit y, 36, I 17,
120, 121, 122, 161 ;
sensiti v ity, 103, 11 7, 123,
158; suspicio n, 33 , 35, 90,
92,99, 11 7-18, 138; ' two
schools' theory, 83- 4, 86,
120, 145; war aims, 88
want agree ments with USS R, 37,
113, 120, 11 8
srI' also I/m!rr sepamtr departments
am/ O{fici(I/S
Foreig n Office Research Departmen t
(FORD), 35, 44
Foreign Resea rch and Press Service
(FRI'S - part of IUJA), 44
Foreign Secretary, British, 34, 136,
see a/so Eden, Halifax
France (a nd French), 14, 47, 82,
11 9, 170
fall of, 9, 13
French National Committee, 11 8
Free Ge rman Committee, 189 nIl
fr o ntiers, Soviet, 30, 36, 37, 90, 94,
96, 101, 117, 122, 138- 9, 194
n111
Four Power Plan, 109-10
Ga lsworth y, Jo hn, 146, 152
Geo rgians, Sl't' Soviet Unio n,
ethnicity
Ge rman y, 1, 3, 8- 9, 11 , 14, 24, 34,
36, 55, 62, 66, 74, 81-2, 84,
85, 87, 90, 91, 96, 101-2, 103,
11 7, 119, 120, 123, 126, 12 7,
128, 153- 4
bombing o f, 159
ethni c stereot ypes o f Germans,
45
224 /IJI/ex.
Germany - conlinued
Ge rman-Soviet separate peace
possibilities, 100-1
' Hitle rite' regime in, 102
occupation zo nes in, 157
postwar control of, 119, 133
postwar resurgence of, 76, 88-9,
102,110,1 17,123,170
postwar treatment of, 98,
99-100,110,117,119,
122, 124, 139-40, 165
pressure on Soviets (1941 ), 21
proposed dismemberment of, 128-9
prospect of Communist Germany,
88-9, 119, 161
prospect of postwar Soviet-German
rapprochement, 123, 131
reasons for Soviet success
against, 49, 51, 5Z, 54
relations with USSR (1940), 7-8
reparations (including labour),
36,70- 1, 73, 133, 187 nl16
Soviets no m,Ltch ror, 47
Giffo rd, Charles, 41
G ilbert , Martin, 142, 162
GKO (Soviet State Defence
Council), 81, 84
Gorode tsky, Gabriel, Z
GI'U, 85, see also NKVD
Gra nd Alliance (UK-USA-USSR), I,
2,37, 100, III , 170
Great Britain, 1, 63, 82, 84, 85, 96,
100, 118, 127, 135
defence of, 103, lZ0, IZ4-5,
IZ 7-8, lZ9
domestic dimensions of relations
with USSR, 50, 173 n 13
left-wing opinion in, 13, 16, 27,
28, 92, 191 nS4
military strength of (194S), 157,
159, 160
public opinion on USSR, 5-6, 24,
36, 62-3, 65, 109, ISS, 157,
158, 173 n13, 185 n75
Great Britain, Government of, 4, 6,
7, 47,61,6 7,79, 87,92, 108,
116,135,140,142, 144,148,
ISS, 163, 165, 171, see (1150
Whitehall
aid for Soviet reconstruc tion
considered, 73-4
contacts in USSR, 40, 41 , 95, 98,
III
ethnic stereotypes of Soviets, 16,
44-7, 75
fea rs of Soviet influence in
E.urope, 118-Z0, IZI-3, 135,
139, 161
inter-departmental committee o n
postwar trade, 73
perceptions of Soviet foreign
policy: acid tests of Soviet
policy, SO, 150, 15Z, I 71;
aims 36, 100, 10Z, 104, 113,
12Z, IZ4; annexation of
Balt ic states, 9, 14;
appeasement of Germany,
9- 11; arrogance, 158-60; as
anti-British, 17; coope ration
as favoured option, 1, 3,
16-17,40,66,74,76,80,
84-5,87,89, 90, 9Z, 96-7,
IOO-Z, 104, 105- 6, 109- 11,
114, 116-18, 122-3, 124,
128, 129-30, 131 , 135, 137- 8,
140-1 , 148, 150- 2, 155-7,
167- 71; desire to be treated
as equals, 93-9, 100- 1, 140,
168; expansionism, 87, 89,
102,117, 119,122,124, 132,
152-3; fear of Germany, 9-10,
12, 17, 19,21, 103, 110,
IZZ, 130, 152, 153-4, 156;
freedom of action, \68;
inexperience in wo rld affairs,
93, 95, 97-8, 133; influence
of Soviet perceptions of
British public opinion, 6,
106; inferiority com plex in ,
95,9 7, 98,99,117,154,179
nI OO; ideology, role of, 8,
16,17, 111 , 117, 146, 147-8;
influence of Soviet public
o pinio n, 48-50, 71;
isolationism in, 76, 82, 85,
100,101,103,109,110, 11 7,
119,131 , 133,148, sl'e also
' lone wolf'; limited

objectives, 79, 89, 102, 123,
133,143, ISO, 161, 168;
methods as guide to aims,
77,92,97,102,114,117,
122, 130-1 , 140--1, 142, 146,
147, IS2, ISS-6, 16S-6;
motivations, 87, 117, IS2;
mutual exhaustion theory, 8,
11,14,102; options in, I,
100, 102- 3, 110, 134, 19S
n118: opportunism, 8, 16,
17; postwar policy, I, 3S,
36-7; as potential enemy, 76,
102- S, 118- 19, 123- 30, 16S,
193 n9S; qualified optimism,
76, 121 - 2, 130--2, 134;
realism , 14, 17,89,92,94,
112, liS, 117, 120, 137, 139,
147, IS7, IS8, 166;
reconstruction and Soviet
foreign policy, 35, 70-5, 116,
122, 124, 126, 133, 140-1,
148- 50, 156, 168- 9;
reinsurance policy, 79, 88,
100, 102, 138, 142, 152;
relatiOn to British interests,
121, 147, 150, 156, 168;
relations with Germany, I, 7,
9, 14, 16-17, 18, 19,26,77,
89,91 - 2,99, 118, 174- 5
n16; respect for strength,
106; response to external
stimuli, 17, 18,26,77,89,
91 - 2, 99, 118; security
obsession, 8, 9, 36, 74 , 76,
87- 9, 92, 99, 100, 101 - 2,
110,115,117,119, 120,
122, 133, 135, 140--1, 147,
150, 152, 163-4, 159, 161 ,
169; sense of exclusion,
93- 6, 106, 107, III;
sensitivities, 14- 15, 29, 76,
89-95, 98-9, 102, 103, 106,
107, 108, 112, 113-14,117,
123,129,130-1, 139, 141,
154, 158, 166, 168-9, 192
n69; Soviet acid tests of
British policy, 92, 171 ;
sovietisation in, 159, 161,
/m/ex 225
Soviets building a bloc,
15 1- 2, 153, 154; Soviets
difficult, but not impossible,
167; Soviet sense of strength,
ISS, 161, 163; suspicion in,
30,33, 36,84-5,88, 90,91,
93,96,98-101, 107-8,
112- 13,117- 18,129, 131,
134, 139, 155; u ndiplomatic
methods, 8, 170; unilateralism,
96,97-8, 101-2, 103, 141,
159-60, 169; use of
subversion in Britain, 2-3,
65; use of Communism, 89,
130, 141 , 161
perceptions of Soviet internal
affairs, general, 39- 75, 98,
139, 144- 6
perceptions of Soviet internal
affairs, specific features o f:
aims of regime, 49; abolition
of po/ilmki, 52- 3; class
system, 57- 61, 64, 168;
ineflkiency in, 45- 8;
liberalisation, 49, 55, 57,
59- 60, 61, 62, 64, 75, 147;
military capabilities, 10-12,
21, 22, 124-7; politics, 85- 6,
109; postwar reconstruction,
35,67- 75, 117, 123- 4, 128,
133, 166, 168, 187 n107,
188 n120; reaction to
dissolution of the
Comintem, 65- 7; regime
undogmatic, 55- 6, 64, 102;
religion, 61 - 5, 168; revival
of Tsarist practices and
tradition, 54-7, 58, 61; role
of ideology, 55, 57-8, 61,
117; sources of information
on, 40-4, 68; strength of
USSR, 116-17; transport, 68,
69; 'two schoolS' theory, 66,
81-6, 146; weaknesses, 8,
10-13, 21, 22, 27-8, 45-8, 67
perceptions of Soviet leaders,
80- 6,117
perceptions of Soviet military,
10- 12, 21 , 22, 50, 125- 7
226 Illdex
Great Britain, Gove rnment - cOlltilllled
perceptions of Stalin, 9-10, 12,
77- 81, 83- 6, 134-7, 143-5,
see also Stalin
policy formation in, 4-5
policy to Europe, 12 1
postwar aims, 11 3
post·Yalta disillusionment , 14 2
pre-war views of USSR as
peripheral, 7-8, 17-18,26,
174 n7
reactions to BARBAROSSA, 22-5,
\08
representatives in south·east
Emope, 152
Soviet sym pat hisers in, 2
tactics of handling Soviets; avoid
'ga nging up', 100, 107, 110,
114, 134, 169; behaviour
modification, 159, 162, 165,
166, 169-70; concessions, 15,
17- 18, 19,20,27,29, 34,
91 -2 , 10 1, 105-8, 164;
debate, 77, 111 -14, 158-7;
firm and frank, 35, 106-8,
112- 14,122,129,131,136,
138, 157-65, 169; 1'0-
militar y dispute o n, 123-30;
ha rd bargaining, 29, 63, 107,
112; passive hostilit y, 17;
possibility of goodwill, 15,
18,169; reciprocit y, 112,
156, 157; reserve, 17-1 9,21,
22, 25, 32-3; showdowns,
157, 159; therapeutic trust,
107, 138,201 n7; toug h but
friendly, 158, 165; use of
force, 8, 18; 'Volga Charter'
idea, 36-7
ten·year threat-free peri od
expected by, 197 nl8
wartime policy towards USSR: lid
IIOC nature of, 106, 109,
111 - 12, 11 3-1 4; Anglo -Soviet
alliance as overarching link,
119-20; as pragmatic, 2,
169-70; criticised for excluding
Soviets, 94- 5, 106; debate
o n, 5('(' tactics of handling
Soviets; mentioned, 17, 94,
100, 104, 165, 167; nature o f
cooperat io n with Sov iet s,
11 1-12, 115, 165; reluctance
to form alliance, 22-5
Greece (a nd Greeks), 34,121,135,
136, 137, 158, 161, 164, 199 n54
Gree nwood, Arthu r, 16
Greer, Colonel Eri c, II
Grigg, Sir Edward. 23
Grove-White, Major-Gene ral
Maurice, 193 n97
Gulf, Persia n, 36
Gusev, Fyodor, 164
Haigh, Anthony, 44
Halifax, Viscoun t, 7, 16, 18, 20,
21 -2, 94 , 101, 180 nl1 2
Harriman, W, Ave rell , 83, 107, 134,
144, 145
Harrow, 9 7
Harvey, Oliver, 26, 32, 119, 181
n 130
Harris, Air Marshal Si r Arthur, 143
Hess, Rud o lf, 78
Hill, Brigadier George, 42, 43, 55,
61, 74
Hitler, Adolf, 8-9, 22, 23, 24, 34,
78, 101 , 113, 118, 144, 170
Hoa re, Sir Samuel, 13
Hopkins, Harry L. , 27
Ho ustoun-Boswall, William, 152
Hull , Cord ell, 96, 135
Hungary, 132, 135, 151, 153, 154,
160
declaration of war on, 30, 33
India, 11, 26, 65, 78
inferiority complex, in Soviet
policy, 45-6, 95, 97-9, 11 7,
154, 179 nloo, see (1/50 Sov iet
Union, foreign policy (ll1d
Great Britain, perceptio ns o f
Soviet foreign policy
Information, Ministry of, 43, 57,
173 n13, 178 n88
In telligence, British Mil itary, 4, 57,
86, 124
Director o f (OM I), 4, 11

material for Soviets, 82
sections: M12b, 11 - 12,31; M13c,
31-2,42,43,51,53,66; MIS,
173 n13; MI14, 186 n98
Intelligence, British Naval . 85, 186
n88
Director of, (ON I), 85
N1D 16, 43, 53, 187 nl12
intelligence, signals, see signals
intelligence
tll/emotiollllle, the, 56
Intervention, Brit ish, against
Bolshevik Revolution, II , 26,
42
han (Persia), 17,36, 132, 136, 161
Ireland, western ports in, 30
Ismay, Major-General Sir Hastings,
29, 34, 35
Italy, 54, 95, 98, 120. 122- 3, 132,
136, 161
Ivan the Terrible, Tsar, 146
jacob, Lieutenant-Colonel lan, 83
japan, II, 14,36,103. 11 7,122,
124, 126, 133
Jebb, Gladwyn, 3, 73, 88, 92, 102,
104, 119, 124, 128, 130, 132,
161, 173 n3, 193 n97, 201
n79, 203 n53
joint Intelligence Committee OIC),
12,23,3 1,43,49,51 - 2,71,
85, 104, 123-4, 125, 141 , ISO
papers: jI C(44)366(O), 125-7,
150; JI C(44)467(O), 132-3 ,
198 n46
jo int Planning Staff (11'5), 12, 22,
23, 124
journalists, British, in USS R, 41
Ka ganovich, Lazar, 81
Kalinin, President Mikhail, 63
Katyn Forest massacre, 114
Kennan, George E, 145
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, sel! Cla rk
Kerr
Khan, Genghiz, 79, 189 n8
Khar'kov, second battle of, 109
Ki ev, Metropolitan of, 62- 3
Kimball, Warren F., 199 n53
tilt/ex 227
Kitchen, Martin, 39
Kolklwli (collective farms), 68, 72
Kollontai, Alexandra, 82, 155
Korea, 132
Kovno, 46
Kremlin, 13, 18, 62, 68, 79, 8 1-3,
96, 110, 129, 144, 170, see also
Soviet Governmen t
Kuibyshev, 42, 58
Kutusov, Marshal, 55, 79
Labour Party, 16
leaders' views of USSR, 16, 139-40
leaders' views on Poland, 135- 7
ministers, 33, 66, 91 - 2, 138- 40
see II/SO AttIeI', Bevin, Dalton,
Greenwood, Morrison
Lambert, jim, 41, 46, 47, 184 n57
Laskey, Den is, 199 n53
Latvia, Sfe Baltic states
lebmsfI/!IIIJ, 153
Leningrad, 33, 43, 55, 81
Lermontov, Mikhail, 47
Lewis, julien, 129
Li thuania, see Baltic states
Utvinov, Maxim, 82, 155
Lockhart, Sir Robert Bruce, see
Bruce Lockhart
' lone wolf', as tendency in Soviet
foreign policy, 100-2, \03, 109,
I 10, 117, 120, Sfe (liso Soviet
Union, foreign policy
Longmore, Air Vice-Marshal Sir
Arthur, 193 n97
l.othian, Marquis of, 174 n 10
Low Countries, 119
l.Obeck, 163
LII(IIV(ltre (German Air Force), 127
J.vov, 201 n7S
Maclean, Donald, 171,205 nl4
Maclean, Fitzroy, S, 7-8, 10, 16,
17,32, 102, 152, 165
Macmillan, Haro!d, 81
Madrid, 13
Maisky, Ivan, 16, 20, 25, 27- 8, 33,
61, 82, 94, 86, 90
asserts Soviet sensitivity, 27, 93,
95- 6, 154-5
228 IIJI/ex
Malenkov, Georgi, 81, 83, 145
Manchester Unive rsity, 41
Manchuria, 132
Mark, Eduard, 199 n53
Martel, Lieutenant- General Giffard
Le Q., 10, 45, 112, 198-9 n47
Marx, Karl, 79
Marxism, in Soviet Union, 78,
144, 146, 148
Mason-Macfarlane, lieutenant-
General Noel, 25, 81 - 3, 188 n5
Middle East, 9, 31, 104, 127, 132
Mikoyan, Anastas, 46
Military MisSion, British, in
Moscow (30 Mission), 25, 43,
51, 82, 112
Air Section, 53
military, British (all services), 13,
54, 68, 74, 166
dispute with 1'0, 123-30
distaste towards USSR, 3, 11 , 22,
32
ethn iC stereotypes of Soviets of,
51, 112
favour reciprocity, 112
personnel in USSR, 41 - 2, see (1/50
Military Mission
reJect sensitivity theory, 112
Soviet strength in numbers, 125
Soviet Union as potential enemy,
103-5, 164
views of Soviet capabili ti es
pre-war, 10-11 , 175 n20
views of Soviet capabilities,
wartime, 12, 23, 50-4, 124-7
see also Intelligence, British
Military, post-hostilities
planning, C hiefs of Staff
military, Soviet (all services)
defensive strength, 10, 11, 12,
51,54, 133
equipment: aircraft , 52, 12 7;
motor transport, 126-7, 150;
tanks, 12; warships, 52, 127;
winte r clothing, 52
organ isational weakness of, 10-12,
51
poor technology of, 51 - 2, 54,
127, 133
postwar development o f, 124,
126-7, 149
tactics of, 54
weak staffwork of, 51
see also Red Army, Red Air Force,
Red Navy
Mil itary Sub-Committee (MSC),
103
membership, 193 n96
Minsk, 10
Miscamble, Wilson, 154
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich,
14, 19,81,82-3,96,97, 130,
136, 143, 145, 154, 155, 189
n13, 190 n36
as anti-Britis h, 82-3, 190 n35
dichtomy with Stalln, 146
in Berlin (1940), 9
Moran, Lord, 83, 138
Morrison, Herben, 24, 139, 140
Monon, Desmond, 83
Moscow, 13, 20, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36,
40,41,42, 47,61 ,65,83 ,95,
96, 97, 99, 105- 6, 123, 134,
135, 136, 137
defence of, 48
University of, faculty of
International Relations, 59
see also Embassies, Conferences
Munich, 15
Mussolini, Benito, 78
Navy, Soviet, see Red Navy
Navy, Royal: Intelligence, 43, 53,
85; personnel in USS R, 43, 54
Nazism, 14, 69
Nazi- Soviet l'act (1939), 7, 13, 82
Near East (so uth-east Euro pe), 9
Ne therlands, see Low Countries
Nevski, AleksandeT, 55
Nicolson, Harold, 23, 25
Niedhardt , Gottfried, [74 n 7
NKVD (Soviet Commissa riat for
Internal Affairs), 41, 42, 66, 80,
81, 85, 188 n121
Noble, Sir Arthur, 132
Normandy, Allied landings in Qune
1944), 136
Nor th Atlantic security, 36

North Russia, 53, 54
No rthern Department, FO, 5, 7-8,
13,21,32,38,41,43, 49,53,
59, 60-1, 62, 66, 70, 84, 85,
88, 92, 105, 110, 1l3, 123,
131, 146, 14 7, 149, 152, 193
n95
No rwa y, 36, 119
October Revolution, see Revolution,
Russian
oil, 18, 126
O'Malley, Owen, 44-5, 118, 121,
160, 189 n12
Order of Lenin, 55
Order of the Red Banner, 55
'Orien tals', Soviets viewed as, 16,
44-5, 112, 139, 192 n77
O rthodox C hurch, Russian, 61, 63,
64
Patria rchate of Moscow, 64
Sobor' (Holy Synod), 64
supports Soviet war effort, 62, 64
!'raining of priests, 63, 64
see also Religion
Page Croft, Henry, (Lord Croft),
180 nl12
Pam ir Mountains 25
pan-Slavism, 63
Paris, 32
Parker, Ralph, 41
Parliament, see Com mons, House
of
part isans, 62
Patriarchate of Moscow, 64, set' also
Orthodox Church , Russian
percentages agreement, Churchill-
Stalin (1944), 134- 6, lSI, 152,
164, 199 n53, n5 4
Persia, st'e Iran
Peter the Great, Tsar, 79, 146
Philby, HAR. 'Kim', 205 nl4
Pika, Colonel M., 42, 181 n9
pogO/Ii (e paulettes), 56, see a/so
Soviet Un ion, revival of Tsarist
practices
Po land, II, 12, 18,37,114,119,
122, 130, 142, 151, 160, 162
1m/ex 229
and Anglo-Soviet re latio ns, 137
as test-case, 135, 159
Brit ish wan t concession from,
135-6
frontie rs, 88, 135-7, 164
Government of, 136
pessimism regarding SOviet
resistance, 32, 42, 181 n9
Polish views on scorched earth, 67
relations with USSR, 132, 135,
156, 163
Union of I'olish Patriots, 137
Yalta agreement on, 13 7
Politburo, 81 , 84, 85, 130, 144-6,
200 n56
Politica l Warfare Execut ive (PWE),
41, 43
politmki (Soviet political
commissars in military units),
11 ,52-4, 56
Polyarnoe, 53
Portal, Ai r Mars hal Sir Cha rles, 22,
12 7, 128, 133, 143, 201 n2
post-hostilities planning
by Fe, 109
regional surveys fo r, 125
Soviet Union in , 103, 123-30
Staff (PHI'S), 71, 120, 124-6, 133,
148, 171 , 197 n19, 205 n14
Sub-Committee (PHPS/c), 103- 4,
116, 123- 4, 193 n97
see a/so Military Sub-Committee
Postan, Michael , 16-17
Potsdam Conferen ce (July-August
1945), 154, 163-4
Pownall, Lieutenant-General Henry
(VClGS), 23, 192 n77
PQI7 (co nvoy ), 109
Prague, 163
Pwwfa, 56-7, 114
press, British, 15,4 1,53,55,61,
65, 90
ad miration of Red Arm y, 50, 51,
155, 158
suggests that USSR no lo nger
Comm unist, 55, 61, 147
Sl't (liso V(lily Herald, Vaily
TdegmpJJ, journa lists, The
Times, Tribllll1'
230 IIJI/ex
press Soviet, 41 , 52, 48, 68, 86, 90,
96, see ( I/SO Pravda
Preston, Thomas, 46
priests, in Soviet Union, 62, 63
prisoners of war, repa triation of,
200 n64
public o pinion, British, 5-6, 24,
36, 65
excessive adulation of USS R by,
109, ISS, 157, 158
on religion in USS R, 62-3,185 n75
'steal ing the thunder' (from
British Comm un ists)
ca mpaign, 173 nl3
public o pinion, Soviet, 48-50,
71-2,73,80, 130, 187 n112
Pu blic Record Office, British, 43
ra ilways, Soviet, 69, 73, 186 n98
Rapa1!o, Soviet-Germa n Treaty of
(1922), 82, 101 , 110
Red Air Fo rce, 12, 51, 54, 127
bomber fo rce in, 124, 127
Red Army, 50, 62, 63, 66, 69, 78,
80,81, 101
adva nces of, 70, 134, 135, 142,
161
as an unc\!rtain fo rce, II
attitude to Ger ma ny, II, 100
defe nsive abilities of, 51-2, 54
efficiency of, 56
equipment of, 12
lack of sophist icat ion of, 125,
127
marshals, 144-5
morale in, 48, 51, 52, 53, 58
political inte rference in, 52-3
relations with CI'SU, 48, 52-3,
56, 190 n30
reforms in, after Russo·Finnish
war, ! I , 12
revival of officer corps 56, 58
suspicion of West in, 84, 144-5
tactics, 54
see also military, Soviet
Red Navy, 43, 52, 53, 54, 124,
126-7
club (at !'olyarnoe), 53
warships of, 127
religion , in Soviet Unio n, 6 1-5, 75,
168, 185 n 75, n 77, n78, n84
reparations, 36, 71 , 73, 133
Revolution, Russian (1917), 56- 7,
62
ideology of, 56,58,59,61,63,
65
Roberts, Frank, 41 , 101 , 128, 144,
145-6, 14 7-8, 149, 153, 17 1
on division of Europe, 158, 161
on Soviet 'dog· in.the.ma nge r'
attitude, 156
sees Soviet defensive motives,
148, 154
rodilla ('motherland'), 49
see a/so Soviet Union : patriotism
Romania, 9, 88, 136, 142, l SI,
153, 154, 158-9, 160, 199 nS4
declara tion of war o n, 30, 33
Ronald, Nigel, 92, III
Roosevelt, !'reslde nt Franklin D.,
23, 78, 161, 162
Rostov·on·Don, 52, 70
Rothwell, Victor, 39, 139
Royal Ai r Fo rce (RA I:), 127
Bo mber Command, 143
Royal In stitute of International
Affairs (RIl A), 35
Rushbrooke, Commodo re Edmund
(DN]), 85
Russell, John, 41
Russia, 32, 46
Arm y (Tsarist), 56
Briti sh intervention in, (19 19),
II, 26, 32, 90
No rth Russia, 53, 54
pre· Revolutionary practices in,
56, 58, 64, 72
revolutions in (1917), 56-7, 62
set' also Soviet Unio n
Russia Committee ( 1946), 68
Russo·r:innish War (1939-40), 7,8,
11, 17,27,52
San Fran cisco Conference (l945),
139
Sargent, Sir O rme, 7, 38, 44, 75,
92, 106, 117, 131, lSI , 173 n3
and Bal ka ns crisis (A pril 1941 ),20

and reserve policy, 18-19
briefs Eden on COS dispute, 129
changing views on eastern
Europe, 159, 161
comparison with Cadogan, 194
n108
on German-Soviet relations
(1940), 8-9
on religion in USSR, 63
on sepa rate peace, 101
on Soviet expansionism, 153-4
on Soviet marshalS, 145
on Soviet security, 159-60
on Soviet sensit ivity, 99, 129
on western bloc, 119, 129, 161
prefers to avoid contention, 18,
131, 153, 159
recommends showdown, 159,
160-1
relations with Bruce Lockhart,
160
sees cooperation possible, 98,
105, 110, 161
sees Stalin as realist, 35
'Stocktaking' paper (1945), 146,
148
wants clearing committee, 186
n92
School of Slavonic and East
Eu ropean Studies, London, 41
schools, Suvrorov, 58, ami see
Soviet Union, education
scientifiC materialism, 64
scorched earth, effects of, 48, 67,
69- 70
second front, 33, :H, 48, 111 - 12
Second World War, 7, 167, 170
self-denyi ng ordinance, III, 191
n44
separate peace, S0, 100-1
Services Liaison Department, FO,
31, 125, 132
Shcherbakov, A.S., 81
5hv('rnik, Nikolai, 145
Siberia, 2S
signals intelligence, 20, 42-3, 68
Sillem, Captai n ItO., 31
Skaife, Brigadier Edward, 44, 45,
49-50, 55, 58, 60, 64, 87, 165
Illdex 231
o n reconstruction, 34-5, 67,
72- 4
Sloan, R.K.W., 125-6
Smolensk, 70
Socialism, 55, 168, 171
'Socialism in one country', 60, 66,
78, 100, 147
Sofia, 152
south-eastern Europe, 45, 88, 121,
149, 153
Southern Department , FO, 9, 88,
120, 151, 152, 153
Southern r ront, Soviet, 48
Soviet-German war (1941-45), 24- 5,
28, 33, 42-3, 47-8, 49, 52, 55,
62,68,92, 101 , 108, 168
Soviet Un ion
agriculture in, 67, 70- 1, 133
Allied aid to: demands for, 33,
offers of (June 1941 ), 22, of
material, 3 1, 50, 52, 91, 127,
150; of troops, 33, 34, 35,
90; postwar, 70, 160; Supply
Protocol (1941), 30, 31
Army, see Red Army and military,
Soviet
atrocities by Germans in, 39
attitudes to foreigners, 46, 85,
89, sa a/sQ xenophobia
bureaucracy, obst ructiveness of,
86, 93, 97
casualties in, 69
class system in, 57-61, 64
coercion in , 60, 69, 74, 149
comm unications in, II, 126
Comm un ism in, 10, 12, 47, 55,
60-1, 66
Communist Party (CrS U), 48,
52-3, 56, 66, 67, 80, 130,
147, 190 n30
confiden t mood in, 48, 106
conservative values in, 59, 63, 74
Constitution (,S talin
Constitution', 1936), 50, 62,
74
economy of: cash economy, 72;
consumer demand in, 7\-3,
\49; data o n, 68; focus on
arms production in, 71, 87,
232 IIJI/ex.
Soviet Union - conlilllleil
126; fragility of, 8, 10, II,
67; fully mobilised, 54;
postwar recovery of, 71, 14U;
problems of conquered
territories and, 148-9;
productivity in, ISO; self-
sufficiency policy, 187 n105;
standard of living in, 71-3,
148; wartime destruction of,
68-70; 51'1' nlso reconstruction
economic aid to Germany ( \ 940-
41 ), 8- 10, 18, 19
education in, 58, 59, 127, 146
efficiency in, 53-4, 56, 57-8, 59,
122
ethnicity in: AzeriS, 46;
Armenians, 46-7; Georgians,
16,46-7; general, 44-7, 51,
75, 89, 94, 98, 127; Jews, 16;
Slavs, 45-6, 49, 131;
stereotype as 'Orientals', 16,
44-5 , 112, 139, 192 n77
food supply, 47, 67, 68-70, 126,
ISO, 183 n30, 186 n98
foreign policy of; Com intern in,
65-6, 89; concern about
Anglo-Ame rican postwar
aims, 35-7, 86, 90, 98,
99- 100, 114, 128, 140; desire
for friend ly governments in
eastern Eu rope, 88, 117, 133,
141, 151, 161; desire to be
treated as equals, IS, 37, 93,
78, 91, 93-9, 100-1, 140,
168; eastern bloc in, 133,
139, lSI, 153, 154;
expansionism, 8-9, 36, 87,
89, 102, 117, 119, 122, 124,
132, 152-3; fear of Germany,
6, 55, 88-9, 103, 110, 122,
130, 152, 153-4, 156; fear of
vacu u m in Europe, 119, 132,
134, 139; fears of western
bloc, 154; feeling of
exclusion, 93-6, 100, 106,
107, 110, 111, 114, 134, 169;
freedom of action, 168;
ideology in, 8,16,17, Ill,
117,146; immaturity in, 139;
imperialism in, 139-40;
inferiority complex in, 45-6,
95,97-9, 117, 154, 179
n 100; isolationism ('lone
wolf'), 37, 82, 85, 100-2,
103,109,110,117,119,120,
131, 133, 148; limited
objectives in, 79, 89, 100,
102, 123, 133, 143, 150, 161,
168; minimum aims of, 100;
mutual exhaustion policy, 8,
102; over-confidence in, 156,
166; pan-5lavism in, 63;
postwar aims, 35-7, 87, 113,
117,121,133; postwar policy
to Germany, 6, 88-9, 123;
potential cooperation with
B rit~in, 9, 73, 75, 89, 90, 92,
96-7, 100-2, 104, 105-6,
109- 11 , 114, 116-18, 122-3,
124, 128, 129-3U, 131 , 135,
137- 8, 140- 1, 148, 150-2,
155-7, 167-71; pre-war
debate on, 81-2; ' puppet'
governments in liberated
Europe, 152-3; reactions to
1l ~lkans crisis (March-April
1941), 19; realism in, 15-17,
88, 89, 92, 94, l12, 115,
117,120,137,139,147,157,
158, 166; reconstruction and,
35,70-5,116,122,124,126,
133, 140-1, 148-50, 156,
168-9; reinsurance policy in,
79, 85, 88, 100, 171; 'robust
methods' in, 97; security
motivation in, 6, 9, 36, 87-9,
92,99, 100, 101 - 2, 110, liS,
117, 119, 120,122,133, 135,
140-1, 147, 150, 152, 163-4,
159, 161 , 169; sensitivi t ies,
15, 45, 89-95, 98-9, 102,
103, 106, 107, 108, 112,
113- 14,117,123,129, 130-
I, 139, 141, 154, 158, 166,
168-9; separate peace with
Germany, 50, 100-1;
sovietisa!ion in, 37, 87, 88,

122, 132, ]4] , 152-3, ]59,
161; suspicion in, 6, 35, 88,
90,91,93,96,98-101,
107-8, 112-13, 117-18, 129,
131, 134, 139, 155; towards
Germany: in 1939-41. 7-11,
14-15; unilateralism in, 96,
97-8, 101-2, 103, 141,
159-60, 169; see also Great
Britain: perceptions of Soviet
foreign policy
frontiers, 30, 36, 37, 90, 94, 96,
101, 117, 122, 138--9, 194
nil I
Government of, 46, 48, 57, 59,
62, 63, 64, 71, 72, 73, 80,
84, 94, 98, 107, liS, 122,
129, ISS, 159, see also
Kremlin
housing, 70, 73
improvisation in, 45, 46, 69-70
industry, 70-2, 126, 133
inefficiency of, 45-7, 48, 75
in Grand Alliance, I
intelligentsia, 67
General Staff (Stal'ka ), 12, 52-3
labour camps, 74, 188 n121
livestock losses, 67, 70
manpower reserves, 54, 125-6,
148
militarisation of Soviet society,
58, 60, 61
military capabilities, Bri tish
perceptions of, 10-12, 50-4
morale in, 10, 26, 27, 34, 47-50,
51, 52, 53, 75
national anthem, change of.
56-7, 184 n55
nationalism in, 24, 49, 55, 56-7,
74,117-18,147,168
oil, 18, 126
patriot ism in, 12, 45-6, 47-50,
52, 55, 59, 61
peasantry, 72, 73
penal system, 49, 74, 188 n121
perceptions of British policy: acid
tests, 92, 105, 115, 117, 118,
171; concern about policy to
Germany, 99-100, 122;
Illdex 233
perception of British strength
(1940), 8; perception of
British strength (1945), 156,
159, 160, 166; superiority
complex, 95; suspicions, 15 ,
30, 33, 35, 85, 88, 90, 95,
129, 131 , 171; two schools
in Britain, 90, 95, 180 n 112,
205 n14; views of British
interests, 158
polities in: British 'two schools'
theory of, 66, 81 - 6, J09,
114,118,120,122,144,146;
flexibility of regime, 53-4,
55, 62, 64; 'Georgian-
Armenian' ruling clique, 47,
81; 'Kremlin gang', 82;
manage rs, not
revo lutionaries, 117, 168;
maturity of regime, 61, 95,
155; nature of autocracy,
46-7, 74, 80-2, 84, 86, 145;
Party-Army relations, 48,
52-3, 82; popularit y of
regime, 10, 48, 58, 59, 117,
147; pragmatism of regime,
49, 55, 62; pro-German
faction in, 81 ; purges, 49,
52, 77,85; role of Politburo
and epsu, 81 -2, 84, 86, 145;
status of indi vidual leaders,
81, 83
private property in, 57, 60
popu la ti on losses, 69, 126
postwar rearmament of, 124-5,
126-7
propaganda in: absence of
Socialism in, 55, 57; anti-
German, 101; anti-religious,
62-3; use of history in, SS
public opinion, 48-50, 71-2, 73,
80,130,187 nl12
railways, 69, 73
rationing, 49, 69, 183 n30
reconstruction, postwar, 6, 34,
3S, 37, 40, 46, 60, 67-72,
123-4, 12K, 133, 166, 18 7
n107, 188 nI20, see also
scorched earth
234 IIJI/ex
Soviet Unio n - colllillller!
religion in, 61-5, 75, 168, 185
n75, n77, n78, n84, see (1/50
Orthodox Chu rch, Hussia n
relocation of industr y, 46, 48,
69, 126
resistance, against Ge rmans, 23,
25, 28, 3 1, 34, 52, 67, 182
n24
revival of Tsarist practices, 54-7,
58, 184 n53, 184 n57
secrecy in, 46, 68
secret police system, 60, 74, 189
n12, see (1/50 NKVD
se nse of strength (1945); 155,
161, 163
separate peace possibilities, 34
show-tri als (19305), 7, 85
soldiers, abilities of, 5 1- 2, 53-4
subversion in Britain, 2-3, 65
supply of war material to
Ge rmany (1939-41),7-9, 18
traditio ns in, 61, 63, 64, 74,1 17
transport, 47, 68, 69, 125, 126,
183 n30
war with !'inland, see Russo-Finnish
War
war with Ge rman y, see Soviet-
Ge rman War
wartime reforms in, 59-61, 64,
147
weaponry, 12, sei' also military,
Soviet
xenop hobia in, 45, 94, 107, 146
see a/so Stalin
Spaight, Jam es, 193 n96
SpecIal Branch, Scotla nd Yard, 173
n13
Specia l Operati o ns Exec uti ve (SO E),
42, 46, 90, 112, In n69
'special relationship' (Anglo-
Ameri ca n), 162
sphe res of influence, 95, 132, 148,
15 1, 163, 199 n53, 203 n53
Spitfire, Su perma rine, 78
Stali n, Marshal Josef Vissarionov ic h,
2, 23, 28, 35, 45, 55, 77-86, 93,
97, ISS, 159, 169
acid tests of, 92, 105, 109, l IS, In
and a Communist Ge rman y,
88-9,189 nIl
and Churchill, 83, 113, 134-5,
143-4, 164
and internal developmen t of
USS R, 58, 59, 72, 75, 78, 79,
87, 168
and percentages agree ment ,
134-5, lSI, 164, 199 n53,
n54
and prO-German schoo l, 82,
189-90 n25
and separat e peace, 100- 1
and 'Socialism in one country',
66, 78
and the Comin lern, 65-6
and western bloc, I 19
Anglophobia of, 8, 79, 102-3
appeal s for second front , 48
appeasement of Hiller, 8- 10, 20,
21
as Grea t Russian na tio nalist, 16
as a negotiato r, 143, 146
as a peasanl, 78, 80
aspirations of, 72, 78
assumption of PresIde ncy of
Council of People's
Commissa rs, 21
awa re of Allied strengt h, 160
correspondence with Churchil l,
19, 20, 34, 37, 136, 180
n1 20
c harm of, 79
Cold War images of, 3, 86
cult of, 79, 146
desi re for cooperation with
Britain, 14, 33, 36, 79, 82,
83-5,86, 92, lOS, 109, 110,
liS, 122-3, 130, 135, 140-1,
143-4, 145, 155-6, 166, 168,
190 1135
egotism of, 78
fea r of Germany, 8, 12, 17,79,
88-9, 103
fron tier demands of, 30, 37, 90,
105,109,194 nlll
interview with Cripps Uuly
1940), IS
Labour leaders' views of, 139

Marxism of, 78, 144
meeting with Beaverbrook
(October 1941 ), 33, 78
military prowess, 78, 146, 171,
188 n5
nationalistic policy of, 66
not a world revolutionary, 79,
117, 168
o n Free Germa n Committee 189
n1l
on roland, 135-7, 143
opportunism of, 160
Order of the Day, February 1942
(Red Army Day), 48, 100-1
Order 227 'Not A Step Back', 48
plans for eastern Europe, 88, 102
popularity of, \0, 48
rationality and intelligence of, 6,
77, 78, 80, 83, 86, 143- 4,
146, 168
realism of ('realpolitik'), 38, 65,
78, SO, 105, 122, \34, 13S,
164 , 166
refusal to aid Warsaw, 136
reinsurance policy of, \02, 163
relations with Politburo, 85,
144-6, 200 n56
rudeness of, SO, 145
security obsession, 12, 86, S7,
110, 144, 168
seen as man-monster, 77, 79
seen as st atesmanlike, 4S, 143,
146, 202 n2
sense of humour, 79, 80, 189
n13
sensitivity of status, 78,91, 98,
140
speeches, 35, 79-80, 84, 109
suggests postwar alliance, 33
support for leftist regimes, 67, 88
suspicion of, 36, 78, 88, 91, 160
trucu lence of, 162
visits to front-line, 183 n28
wants concrete agreements, III
Stalingrad, battle of, 48, 88, 109
Stalinism, 148
State Department , US, 102, 145
S/ilvk(l (Soviet High Command), 12,
52-3
1m/ex 235
'stealing the thunder', 173 n13,
see (l/SO public opinion,
British
SterndaJe-Bennett, J.C., 197 n21
Stewart, Duggald, 151-2
Slormo vik , Ilyushin 11 -2, 52
Strang, William , 205 n9
strategiC bombing, 54, 124, 126,
127, 143, 159
Sumner, Humphrey, 35, 182 n24
supply, Allied to the Soviet Union,
31, SO, 52, 91, 12 7, 150
Supply Protocol (1941 ) 30, 31
Supreme Soviet, 145
Suvorov, Marshal, 55, 79
'Suvorov spirit', 182 n24
Suvorov schools, 58
Tamplin, Major C.H., II, 31
Tanks
'Tanks for Russia' (publicity
campaign), 28
Soviet, 12
supply of, to USSR, 31
30 Mission, see Military Missioll,
British
Teheran Conference (Novembe r
1943),97, 104, 114, 118, 134,
m
10 Downing Street, 5
Teutons, 45, 55
Tillles, Thl', 41
Timoshenko, Marshal Semyon,12
Titkov, A.E., 205 nl4
'Tolstoy', see Conference, Moscow,
1944
Trade, Anglo-Soviet, 73
Trades Union Congress (TUC), 66
Treasury, British, 63
Tribune, 13, 191 n54
Trots ky, Leon, 55, 81
Trotskyites, 6S
Truman, President Harry S., 154,
161 , 162
Tsakaloyannis, Peter, 199 n54
Turkey, 34, IS8, 161
Ukraine, II, 67, 69-70
United Nations, 99
Z36 /1U!e:<.
United Sta tes, Z6, 34, 35, 37, 61 ,
63, 90, 96, 101 , 10Z, 104, 109,
110, III, 113, 114, 127, 132,
134, 138, 139, 149, 154, 157,
159-60
avo id 'ganging up', 134
Church ill view of US policy,
161-2, 170
in British post·!lOstilities
planning, 124, 128
relations with Britain, 34, 76, 90,
107, 114, 130, 13Z, 134, 170
relations within Grand Alliance,
I, 84, 109-10, 130, 140,
160-2
State Department, 102, 14S
views of British policy, 19, 21
views of Soviet policy
views of Stal in, 80
and see Harriman, Hull, Roosevelt ,
Truman
Ural Mountains, 23
USSR, see Soviet Unio n
van Culsem, Brigadier W.E., 193
n96
Vansittart, Sir Robert, 173 n3
Vickers, Colonel Geoffrey, 72
'Volga Charter', 36-7
Vys hinsky, Andrei, 19,81
Warburton, Air-Commodore P., 197
n19
Waldock, C.H.M., 193 n97
War C<lbinet, British, 13, 16, 17,
19, 20, 26, 32, 33, 44, 69,
90-1,94,105, 114- 15,134,
138, 140, 192 n61
agrees 10 accept Soviet frontier
demands, 108, 194 nlO9
papers; WP(44)304, 120;
Wr(44)436, 1, 120, 121
Ward, John ('Jack'), 92, 125-6, 130,
148
warm wale r port, 36, 164
Warner, Christopher,S, 21, 31,
35-6, 61, 63-4, 66, 68, 73, 75,
84, 92, 94, 95-6, 118, 121 ,
130, 131. \49, 188 nl17
and post-hostilities planning,
104, 127
favours frankness, 36, 106, 108,
112-13, 195 nl25
on Soviet potential for mischief-
making, 110
sees cooperation 'on test', 104,
lIS
War Office, British, 4, 10,23,3 1,
37, 51
Russian-speaking officers In, 32,
179 n108
Warsaw, 135
Rising (1944), \36, ZOO n59
Watt, D. Cameron, 204 n72
Wave II, General Archibald, 10
Webster, C harles, 173 n3
Weekly Political Intelligence
Su mma ries (WI'IS) (FO), \47
Wellrmllcllt (Ge rman military forces
(land)), 12, 75
'West', the, 71, 72, 79, 86, 89, 94,
98,99, 101, 133, 137, 140,
145, 158
western European bloc, 118-20,
123, 128, 129, 139, 151 , 154,
161
Western Front, 142
Allied advances on, 157, 163
Wheeler-Bennett, John, 61
Whitehall, 2, 13, IS, 21, 4Z, 43,
48, SO, 53, 54, 57, 61, 68, 96,
99, 107, 110, 144, 152
WilgTlm, Dan<l, 42, 187 nl07
Wilhelm II , Kaiser, 118
Wilson, Sir Charles, see Moran,
Lord
Wilson, Geoffrey,S, 13, 43-4, 60,
63, 73-4, 84, 87, 92, 93, 97,
III, 113, 130, 131, 13Z, 147,
148, 156, 161, 165, 166
world organisation, IZO, 124, 128,
140, sec also Four Power Pla n,
United Nations
' Volga Charter', 36-7
Yalta Conference (I'ebruary 1945J,
3, 78, 133, 134, 142-3, 163,
166
 Illdex 237

agreement o n r o land, 13 7, 143 Yugoslavia, 121, \32, 135, 137,

Declaratio n on Li berated Europe, l SI , 152, 160
I.S2-3, 164
' Yalta axioms', 6 Zhdanov, Andrei, 81 , 145
Yergin, Daniel. 6 lones, occupat ion , in Germany:
York. Archbis hop of. 64 withdrawal to at end of war,
162-3