Hybrid - ENG - FOR WEB 02

Yevhen MAHDA
A G G R E S S I O N:
LESSONS FOR THE WORLD
Translated from the Ukrainian by Irene Zabytko
KYIV 2018
УДК 327.8(470+571)=111
М 12
Co-funding for the publication of this book was provided by The Institute of World Politics
Автор / Author • Євген Магда / Yevhen Mahda

Головний редактор / Editor • Надія Фіголь / Nadia Figol
Переклад / Translator • Ірен Забитко / Irene Zabytko
Фотографії / Photography • Олександра Ратушняка / Oleksandr Ratushniak
Обкладинка / Cover design • Грасі Олійко / Grasya Oliyko
Дизайн, верстка / Book design/lay-out • Андрія Терехова / Andriy Terekhov
Photos were taken at the anti-terrorist war operations in Donbas.
The views and opinions are solely the work of the author and not necessarily
those of Kalamar Publishing House.
Євген Магда.
М 12 Гібридна агресія Росії: уроки для світу—Київ: КАЛАМАР, 2018.—284 с.
ISBN 978-966-97478-6-0
In his new book, Yevhen Mahda identifies the causes of Russia’s hybrid aggression
against Europe, focusing on conflict in Ukraine. He not only conducts historical
analogies and informs the inhabitants of Europe about the dangers that the Kremlin
carries, but also offers options for counteraction.
The book is intended for policy-makers, specialists in the field of international
relations, political scientists, and all who are not indifferent to changes in the modern
world and the fate of Ukraine.
УДК 327.8(470+571)=111
ISBN 978-966-97478-6-0
© “KALAMAR”, 2018
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Reviewers may quote brief passages.
Requests for permission to make copies of any part of this work should be mailed to:
KALAMAR Publishing House,
P. O. Box 340, Kyiv 03150, Ukraine
email: info@kalamar.ua
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Section 1
Introduction to Hybridityy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Section 2
Hybrid Warfare through the Ages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Section 3
The Ukrainian Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Section 4
Information—a Key Factor in Hybrid Aggression . . . . . . . . 107
Section 5
Cultural-Ideological Components of Hybrid Aggression . . 145
Section 6
In Search of an Effective Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Yevhen Mahda • RUSSIA’S HYBRID AGGRESSION: LESSONS FOR THE WORLD
Section 7
The European Vector of Hybrid Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Section 8
One for All Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Glossaryy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6
INTRODUCTION
The nightmare of the First World War which was the first war
that publicly revealed in newsreels the horrors that accompanied
the fight against totalitarian regimes in Europe, followed by
the struggles for freedom during the Second World War—all
should have been reliable guarantees against the recurrence of
militaristic madness.
But this did not happen; within the European continent there
was a nation prone to flex its muscles as a tool of foreign policy.
W
While Eur
Whi Europe slowly discusses the consequences of aggression,
territoria expanses of bloodshed continue. Yesterday, a lot of
territorial
people iin our country of Ukraine assumed this situation would
be impo
impossible, but today we are faced with these issues up-close.
The nightmare
Th i of the First World War which was the first war
that publicly revealed in newsreels the horrors that accompanied
the fight against totalitarian regimes in Europe, followed by the
struggles for freedom during the Second World War—all should
have been reliable guarantees against the recurrence of milita-
ristic madness. But this did not happen; within the European
continent there was a nation prone to flex its muscles as a tool
of foreign policy. Unfortunately, not all representatives of the
European elite understand this—many prefer to bet on mutually
beneficial cooperation in economic policies and a tolerant silence
still remains as the possible format of relations with Russia.
The tragedy of this situation lies in the fact that this violator
of international law in the 21st century was a country that was
once part of the Soviet Union, and had made a significant con-
tribution to the victory of defeating Nazism.
It would seem that the Kremlin would have remembered the
price of war, but today Moscow is the aggressor, and the Western
world continues to oscillate between the need to strengthen sanc-
tions against Russia, and the desire to appease it. Unfortunately,
the price of the Second World for the USSR in the tens of mil-
lions of lives, and the impunity of partitions and annexations in
Eastern Europe during the period from September 1, 1939 to
June 22, 1941 has been forgotten. Fighting deadly Nazism was
initially a convenient force for forming an alliance with Russia.
Naturally the hesitation of the Europeans in upsetting Russia is
understandable in wanting to communicate with a government
that boasts not only of being the world's largest territory, but also
having the second-largest nuclear capability. But the principles of
European democracy, by definition, should be more important
than short-term profit.
It is now understood that Ukraine was bound to be in con-
flict with the Russian Federation. The hidden characteristics
13
of confrontation between the two largest countries of the for-

mer Soviet Union began long before the annexation of Crimea.
Officially, Kyiv preferred to adhere to the letter and spirit of the
“Big Treaty” 1 with Russia, signed by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid
Kuchma on May 31, 1997, while Moscow was in full swing pre-
paring to face down the Ukrainian “upstarts.” Our country is
perceived by the Kremlin as a competitor for influence within
the former Soviet Union, although Ukraine is not too success-
ful in the issue of building a successful nation. By punishing
Ukraine, Vladimir Putin seeks to resolve a number of internal
problems, demonstrating the recovery of Russia’s thirsty imperial
power that will stifle the Russian people’s ability to embrace their
“younger brother.” This “small victorious war” that started at the
beginning of the 21st century is still a relevant tool for solving
problems at the center of Europe.
For almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Moscow brilliantly studied the behavior of its Western
partners. Over the years, the Russians were able to perceive
habits within the post-Soviet space mainly through the prism
of Russian foreign policy interests.
The European Union, and to a lesser extent the United States,

has long had a “business as usual” relationship with the Kremlin,
and purposefully exchanged resources from Russian deposits
(mainly energy) for products with high added value. Over the
years, the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions which were gener-
ously energized in petrodollars thanks to a surge in their value
at the beginning of the 21st century, has repeatedly tried to find
1
The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and
the Russian Federation is an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
which consolidates the principle of strategic partnership, recognizes the inviolability
of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity and mutual obligations, and not
to use their territory to the detriment of each other's security. Signed on May 31,
1997 in Kyiv by then Presidents Boris Yeltsin (RF) and Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine).
The contract is still valid (at the time of this writing).
14
INTRODUCTION
unlimited markets. For a while it seemed that they understood

“how far to go” (i.e., crossing the “red” line) with respect to the
punitive operations in Chechnya, 2 and from there it turned out
that the civilized world was quite able to swallow without chok-
ing the Russian aggression against Georgia in early August 2008. 3
Currently, the biggest challenge over the past 20 years of conflict
in Europe is one in which the Kremlin prefers to initiate violent
activity while staying detached by exhibiting a feigned misun-
derstanding of their status and culpability as the real aggressor.
Alas, Ukraine in many respects has unwittingly provoked
Russian aggression. It is not only about the reign of Victor
Yanukovych, 4 during which time the influence of the Kremlin
agents had deliberately destroyed the army and security forc-
es, along with the political class who often “broke the spear” in
the fight for flimsy values by losing sight of the real threats to
2
This is the second Chechen war in 1999–2000.
3
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was an armed conflict between Georgia on
the one hand and Russia and the separatist groups of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
on the other. The war began around an armed confrontation in South Ossetia in
August 2008. In military operations against Georgia, in addition to the regular
armed forces of South Ossetia and Russia, the militia from Russia and Abkhazia
took part. On the night of August 8 after the bombing of Georgian villages, the
Georgian armed forces announced their intention to "restore constitutional order"
in the territory of an unrecognized republic, and as a result of the battles took most
of Tskhinvali. On the same day, Russia intervened in a conflict on the side of the
South Ossetian separatists and introduced troops, including the tank brigades, into
Georgian territory, and subjected the bombardment of Georgian cities, ports, and
military facilities. After the occupation of Georgia by Russian troops and ethnic
cleansing of Georgian villages around South Ossetia, a ceasefire was achieved with
the participation of international mediators. According to the agreements reached,
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory was due to end by October
1, 2008. Military losses of Georgia: 170 killed, and about 1100 wounded. Losses from
the RF and allies: 155 dead, 354 wounded. Non-military losses: 192,000 refugees,
and about 600 dead and 800 injured on both sides.
4
Viktor Yanukovych—Ukrainian politician. Prime Minister of Ukraine (November
21, 2002–January 5, 2005 and August 4, 2006-December 18, 2007). Former (4th)
President of Ukraine (from February 25, 2010 to February 22, 2014). Accepted by
the Verkhovna Rada as self-abandoned from the exercise of its constitutional pow-
ers, and subsequently deprived of the title of the President of Ukraine by special law.
15
sovereignty. Yanukovych’s part of the blame for Ukraine’s lack of

preparedness for a possible Russian aggression carries with it vir-
tually every cohort of all the Ukrainian rulers for a quarter cen-
tury since its developing independence. Their inaction, coupled
with the lack of a clear position of Ukraine in the international
arena, has provoked Russian aggression, and created a picture
of a weak Ukraine with a puppet “people’s republic” which will
easily crumble into dust if pushed too far. The current resistance
to Russia's desire to subordinate Ukraine in its interest is largely
in spite of, rather than because of the actions of those who call
themselves the Ukrainian political elite.
The current aggression in Europe bears little resemblance to

classical warfare, when fighting is regulated by international
law, along with the celebratory announcement of the end of war.
Although bursting shells and exploding mines occurred in

Donbas, the surprise attack on Ukraine caused an indirect nega-
tive consequence of Russian aggression that was felt by the inhab-
itants of almost every European country. One can only imagine
what the average European was thinking while watching at home
the TV news reports during the height of the conflict in Eastern
Ukraine. But even more importantly, the Russian propaganda
machine strives to manipulate the Old World with a tsunami
of lies. In this, the Kremlin is sparing no expense and effort in
advancing and integrating its Russia Today TV channel broad-
cast networks into Western countries as an alternative media
perspective. Europe is known for its respect of pluralism and
freedom of speech, and Russia exploits those precedents with
its special brand of cynicism.
In 21st century Europe, this aggression is not manifested only
by warfare alone. The main task of the Kremlin is not to kill
millions of people as was done by the bloody dictators of the
20th century, but rather its aim is to destroy Western European
values and redraw the political map of the continent. Establishing
control over Ukraine is only an intermediate stage. Russia has
16
INTRODUCTION
set-up a much more serious problem. Vladimir Putin seeks to

appropriate the Moscow-driven format of international relations
towards the usual bipolar world approach, although so far has
only succeeded in having Russia turn into a besieged fortress.
But Russia's activity is manifested not only in building a uni-
versal society of Vladimir adoration. It is actively operating an of-
fensive in the information sphere in Europe, and this aggression,
perhaps, is not only a key feature of a hybrid war, but also the
greatest danger to the not as yet fully conscious Europeans. To
illustrate my opinion, here is an example: the Russian president
even after the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas aggres-
sion—acts that were not recognized by the international commu-
nity—still called Ukrainians Russia’s “brotherly people.” Leaving
out the cynicism between the lines, let us ask another question:
if Russia is so effective against its own so called “brothers,” what
will keep Russia from aggressive manifestations against other
countries and peoples that Moscow feels less sentimental about?
The Russian information machine is based on a public-pri-
vate partnership which acts harmoniously and in concert. The
national media’s dirty hands will direct the course of private
newspapers and TV channels. In the most critical moments of
confrontation that is verifiable, the national news agencies will
shamelessly spread misinformation. In Moscow, “soft power”
methods are used to keep alive the myth of the “American fi-
nanced Maidan” fitting perfectly into the coordinate system of
Putin and the Russian political elites, which then lead to the
aggressive actions of Russia in Ukraine. Indicative flogging of
the former brotherly country with which Russian citizens con-
nect to with their millions of links, the Russian government is
committed not only to remove a competitor in the post-Soviet
space, but also gives a clear signal to the rest of Europe. And
so it will be with anyone who dares to resist the grace of the so
called “Russian world.”
Russia’s cultural-ideological intervention in Ukraine, by and
large, did not stop after the Soviet collapse. Over a long period,
Russian books and the media have always had a privileged status.
17
Russian TV channels covered a significant part of Ukrainian

territory. In different parts of Ukraine, from Transcarpathia to
Odesa, pro-Russian non-governmental organizations were cre-
ated that were capable of gauging the required temperature of
society. Looking back, we can divide the history of Russian policy
towards Ukraine into several parts. The first began with the proc-
lamation of Ukraine’s Independence from the Soviet Union in
1991, followed by the Orange Revolution 5 when attitudes shifted
against the Russian elite and their territorial privilege was tempo-
rarily lost amid timid attempts by Kyiv to slip out from under the
tutelage of Moscow because Russia lacked a systematic approach
for the “domestication of Ukraine.” However, the events at the
end of 2004 in Kyiv noticeably scared Putin enough to “punch
the Orange Revolution right in the face,” as proposed by political
analyst Gleb Pavlovsky. 6 By then, Russia was experiencing rap-
id increases in the price of energy resources to world markets.
Therefore, the second period associated with the presidency of
Viktor Yushchenko 7 may be called the time of trial and error
due to the pressures on Ukraine (tentative attacks in the cul-
tural-ideological sphere, “gas wars,” 8 discrediting Western part-
ners). The elections of 2010 brought to power a Kremlin loyalist,
Viktor Yanukovych. Behind him (and even with his knowledge)
the Russians boldly and consistently dismantled the Ukrainian
5
The Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was held on August 24, 1991 on
the Orange Maidan (Plaza) after protests against falsifications in the presidential
elections of 2000 which elected Yanukovych. The protests lasted from November
to December 2004 ending with Yanukovych’s abandonment of office.
6
Gleb Pavlovsky, a Russian publicist and political scientist, former Soviet dissident,
and spokesman for Ukrainophobic views.
7
Victor Yushchenko—Ukrainian politician and statesman, third President of
Ukraine (2005–2010), Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine (1993–2000),
Prime Minister of Ukraine (1999–2001), Leader of the Orange Revolution.
8
"Gas Wars"—a series of conflicts in the winters of 2005–2006, 2008–2009, and
2013–2014. The conflicts centered around the supply of gas from Russia through
Ukraine to European countries. Disputes were formally between the corporate levels
of the companies Naftogaz in Ukraine, and Russia’s Gazprom.
18
INTRODUCTION
nation-building elements. Actually, the Euromaidan events 9 were

much more dramatic and bloody—the Kremlin was confident
that Ukraine was not going anywhere, but massive Euromaidan
protests forced the Ukrainian elite to change the ship’s course.
Russia for the last half dozen years, not only restored its
agents of influence in Western and Central Europe, but also
significantly expanded its arsenal of influence on the political
situation in the Old World.
The Kremlin unceremoniously flirted with politicians from

opposing camps. It was supported and financed by those who
ignored the fashionable European political circles and with a
finely tuned string of radical right (and left) political forces, so
that they were quite in harmony with the Russian concert. The
time when Moscow shouted the promise on the mountain-top
that the entire bourgeois world would burn in a flash of fire has
long since passed. Now the trend is for Russia to focus on subtly
manipulating Europe’s problems. If energy blackmail was possi-
ble in Ukraine and Belarus (with different, but equally impressive
results), then the current chaos of refugees into the rest of Europe
would provide Russian know-how in finding an accented influ-
ence on the public mood invented specifically for the old Europe.
But on July 17, 2014, during an intensive phase of fighting in
Donbas, a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 passenger plane that was
en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was brought down
from the sky over the warring region with the aid of a “Buk”
missile. On board were 298 passengers and crew members. All
were killed and their belongings were looted by the armed sep-
aratists. Russia's desire to distance itself from the destruction of
9
Euromaidan—Also called “The Revolution of Dignity.” Mass political protests in
Ukraine supporting Ukraine’s European orientation, as well as against corruption
and the regime of President Yanukovych. The protests continued from November
21, 2013 to February 22, 2014. As a result of attempts to suppress the massive
protests, more than 100 people were killed, about 2,000 wounded, and among law
enforcement agencies: 16 dead and about 300 wounded.
19
a passenger plane was doomed to failure, but that did not stop
the “machine laundering” by the Kremlin. The tragedy for thou-
sands of people was a turning point in the conflict in Donbas,
especially after massive Russian propaganda lost the opportuni-
ty to spread the myth of blaming the local “miners and tractor
drivers” for seizing weapons from the Ukrainian military. The
shock caused many in Europe to look closely at developments
in Eastern Ukraine. The results of the investigation, which con-
firmed that the plane was shot down by a Russian “Buk” missile,
still affects the world's attitude to what is happening in Donbas.
Russian aggression poses a threat beyond Ukraine’s sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity. The confrontation between the two
leading post-Soviet nations cannot remain without the atten-
tion of the entire world. It is an expensive price, but thankfully,
Ukraine has finally emerged from Russia’s shadow. It managed to
survive the summer of 2014 of which the consequences have yet
to be fully comprehended. Ukraine has turned into a ground of
hybrid aggression on which the Kremlin runs the test of Europe's
intimidating technologies. Therefore, the resistance of our coun-
try to counter Russian pressure on all fronts is critical to the se-
curity of the Old World. The decisions of the Warsaw Summit of
NATO 10 was to provide Ukraine with a comprehensive assistance
package—another proof of its importance.
Ukraine has managed to survive under the most terrible blows
both insidious and accentuated in 2014, but continues to fight for
its sovereignty to this day. It is necessary not only to learn from
the mistakes, but also to find channels to promote this country’s
unique experience of opposing Russian hybrid aggression for
other interested nations.
10
NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland (July 2016) in which European Heads of
State and Heads of Government also called for NATO and EU security cooperation
for monitoring Russia’s hybrid actions.
20
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
TO HYBRIDITY
Approaches to the modern essence of war. Options for de-

termining a hybrid aggression. The technologies war of the
modern world. The consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian
confrontation.
I In any human society, it isn’t possible to imagine any military
action without aggressive fighting. War and the threat of the use
of force have long been great policy elements. Military spend-
ing and expenses have consistently increased throughout history
therefore turning it into a sacred cow. Even the tragic outcome
of the testing of the hydrogen bomb during World War II did
not stop the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons or the
arms race. Rather, it forced the recognized centers of power on
the planet and the countries who aspired to become like them,
to act with more subtlety.
But nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction were not
the only factors that affected the behavior of the leading countries
in the world. After the Second World War, nations had almost
lost their monopoly regarding the conduct of war.
In third world countries, the military-political contradic-
tions are often turned around the conduct of non-conventional
wars. Unusual and unexpected hostilities that were traditionally
“against the rules” were the only available means for the people
of yesterday's colonies to challenge the monopolies that objec-
tively weakened them following the after-effects of the Second
World War.
For instance, the Soviet partisans and the Yugoslav partisans
in theory and practice of the so called post-World War II “pop-
ular wars,” and Mao Zedong in China all proved serious chal-
lenges. Those who previously wanted to rekindle the flames of
the proletarian revolution throughout the world in the middle
of the 20th century by jousting on a large chessboard preferred
fighting without rules. This new military reality was referred to
as the “war among the people,” and had a significant impact on
the course of international relations.
An undeclared war can be featured as a hallmark of the 20th
century and with it, the demonstration of changes in the system
of international relations. Recall that Soviet Russia first rehearsed
a 20–30 year “hybrid war” against its neighbors—Poland, China
27
and the Central Asian countries. 11 Similar methods were armed

with Nazi Germany, which appeared first during the Anschluss
of Austria and a number of activities in the Sudetenland, and
under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles which later became
the Czechoslovak Republic.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union acted in a number of
countries through the mechanism of support for the left, or the
national liberation movements, providing them not only with
arms and money, but also directing advisers and special forces
for military action disguised as “the people's struggle against
the puppet regime that was supported by the West.” Soviet mil-
itary personnel worked in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central
America while trying to minimize the information about their
presence there. Fulfilling their “international duty,” the Soviet
military specialists received high salaries, and sometimes wounds
and tropical diseases, but often were able to qualify for special
benefits due to the high degree of the value and secrecy of their
operations. In fairness, we note that the United States often used
similar methods during the Cold War confrontation. From our
modern-day hybrid war, the situation was different except the
information was locked up for 50–80 years in the 20th century,
and so it was much easier to conceal the tactics from a society’s
awareness than at the present.
The clashes between the US in Indochina in the 1960s had a
key character that changed the approaches to the interpretation
of war. This occurred after the fierce battles in the jungles of the
Vietnam War in which classic warfare was increasingly beginning
to leave the past. It was then replaced by a high-tech war—an
asymmetric answer to what became known as “guerrilla-terror-
ism.” This term was mentioned as early as the 1930s in refer-
ence to a military theory by then immigrant Evgeny Messner, an
11
These are the methods used in information warfare (against Poland), which
is support for the political forces with pro-Soviet orientation, as well as attempts
to disassociate the internal political situation in these countries in the interests of
the Soviet Union.
28
SECTION 1 • INTRODUCTION TO HYBRIDITY
officer of the White movement. 12 The strategy has since gained

momentum in media wars, sometimes completely replacing an
actual war. 13
During the 1950s to the 1980s, the Soviet Union and the
United States continued honing the skills of conducting local
conflicts with each other without a declaration of another world
war. They were trying to increase the ranks of their supporters
or followers in Third World countries without sparing them fi-
nancial and military hardware.
Principles of “war without rules.” How hybrids became

methods of aggression and were formed precisely at the
time of the bipolar confrontation. The 21st century has added
informational content, thereby impacting the war experience
for billions of people.
Unfortunately, this is not an exaggeration. For inhabitants

of the civilized word, a war has evolved from a typical “last ar-
gument of kings” into a showdown between old adversaries or
those who were once “fraternal peoples.”
Frank Hoffmann, one of the authors who defined the concepts
of a hybrid war while analyzing the 21st century wars, reasonably
noticed and stated that “a war was not just military action and
conducting battles. War is an evolving reality and our under-
standing and vocabulary also need to evolve to be able to grasp
this evolution—the new terms for its description and solutions
require new types of weapons for the most effective responses
and for new creative methods and concepts.” 14
12
Evgeny Messner (1891–1974)—Russian-German Officer of the Russian
Imperial Army. Fought in the White Army against the Bolsheviks in the Russian
Civil War, afterward escaped to Belgrade where he was Professor at the Higher
Military Courses.
13
A.V. Kuzmovich, “Evolution of views on the theory of modern war,” http://cyber-
leninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-na-teoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny.
14
Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ),
Issue 52, Fourth Quarter, (2009): 34–39.
29
An analysis of the main military components of modern war-

fare is the key to understanding the logic of the participants’
actions in collisions virtually anywhere in the world. This arsenal
implies not only significant material costs, but also the presence
of the political weight of the nations that had decided to apply
it. Recent trends in the preparation and conduct of war to date
are as follows:
– Reliance on the equipment of the armed forces for the
means of non-contact fighting. There is no longer any need
to attack with “a raised visor” because of the now obvious
indications that high-precision weapons, electronic intelli-
gence and other means of electronic warfare are in evidence.
– Intensive capacity of rapid reaction forces, airborne troops,
and special forces. A readiness to win due to numerical su-
periority and skills are not the only factors, but a necessity
in difficult circumstances when surrounded by a civilian
population. Fighting is no longer found in the quantity of
numbers and skill levels of the army, but also by the sur-
rounding civilian population in utilizing their widely useful
skills.
– Striving to show “little blood, in a single blow.” Using the
element of surprise, often from behind, so as to better defeat
and demoralize the enemy.
– Highlighting the confrontation from the dominant sec-
tor’s information sphere. Emphasis is placed away from the
transition of the actual desires and intentions of the nation
in capturing a territory while purposefully influencing the
thoughts and emotions of its citizens to better manage them.
– The distribution of humanitarian intervention and services
that are more influential for world ranking nations to “care”
for the population of another country, but are solely in the
interests of the “patron.”
The theory surrounding the devastating network-centric
wars which appeared on the verge of the second and third
millennia, claims that the armed forces implemented networks
(horizontal and parallel) within all networked organizational
30
forms and processes which are stronger and have a superior

advantage over traditional networks. The overall informing and
intellectualization of these control system forces qualitatively
changed the nature of military operations, turning them into
sentient wars. This is not a matter of humanizing war, on the
contrary, it is conducted continuously and in all areas of the
functioning parts of society.
For the first time, we find an article which has a clear defi-
nition of network-centric warfare. “Network-centric Warfare:
Its Origins and the Future” was published in 1998 in one of the
main US military theory journals, US Naval Institute Proceedings,
in which the authors, Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John
J. Garstka compared the potential impact of NCW theory with
the French concept of the general mobilization (levee en masse)
during the Napoleonic period. 15
Network-centric war is the cornerstone of information war-
fare. The term “information struggle” over time developed into
the concept of “information warfare” and has several formulas.
One is formulated by the US Department of Defense in its docu-
ment The Joint Doctrine of Information Operations. 16 Information
warfare is a complex action (using aggregate information op-
erations) on the systems of the government and military man-
agement of the opposing sides, and its military-political leader-
ship, which in peacetime may lead to the adoption of decisions
favorable to the initiating party of information influence, while
during the conflict, the functioning of the enemy's infrastruc-
ture is completely paralyzed. 17 In other words, the aim of a 21st
century war is not so much the destruction of the enemy, but the
demoralization and deprivation of the ability to resist.
15
M.M. Khamzat, “The Influence of the Concept of Seticentric War on the Nature
of Modern Operations,” Military Thought, No. 7, (2006): 13–17.
16
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf and http://www.c4i.org/
jp3_13.pdf.
17
7
A.V. Kuzmovich, “Evolution of views on the theory of modern war,” http://cyber-
leninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-na-teoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny.
31
We shall return to information warfare in the following sec-

tions. The concept of network-centric warfare had an obvious
influence on the theory and practice of hybrid aggression as
adopted by Russia. It stemmed from the Russian leadership's
desire to compensate for its own complexes associated with the
use of the United States’ “soft power” against Russia.
The concept of a “hybrid war” is a relatively new concept
for analysts and journalists. In the field of military science, the
term began to be used in 2006. The Israeli Defense Forces were
unable to break the resistance movement groups of Hezbollah
in southern Lebanon, despite the overwhelming military and
technological superiority over the insurgents.
Events in the Middle East confirmed the predictions of Israeli
military theorist Martin van Creveld in the 1990s when it was
expected to increase the role of paramilitary groups and warlords
instigating hostilities. In modern conditions, it is often difficult
to understand who the real enemies are and how to deal with
them that makes the arsenal of these tools of aggression for
mitigating the victims almost inexhaustible. Another change
was the balance of participation in the fighting between govern-
mental and non-governmental actors in favor of the latter. It is
becoming increasingly apparent (in the light of recent events in
Ukraine) that this transformation has been made possible thanks
to the support of concerned nations.
Today, compliance with laws and rules of war has become
the prerogative of a nation while the new actors of war (terrorist
organizations, militias, mercenaries, and so on) apply without
any regard to the rule of law. They seem to live by the rule of
the “fog of war.” The end justifies the means, and woe to the
vanquished enemy who is always waiting around, and even the
enemy who is not always expected—and from that summary,
one can formulate the basic rules of hybrid aggression.
Frank Hoffman, a military consultant and analyst, was one of
the first to propose the concept of a hybrid war, which though
not purely military, yet allows one to quickly capture the es-
sence of changes in the nature of modern warfare. Since 2005,
32
his many publications made him a key expert in this matter.

According to Hoffman, the hybrid war aggressor often uses a
unique combination of threats aimed at the most vulnerable
places of the victims of its aggression. Hybrid aggression often
uses unique threats of interstate conflict with the ragged nature
of irregular warfare, along with the high-tech capabilities com-
bined with irregular tactics. Frank Hoffman predicted that this
type of opponent will be made up of both hybrid guerrillas and
regular army, and one who will be faced more and more often.
His publications allowed the opportunity to examine the war
both in Kosovo and the Russian intervention in the Ossetian
conflict from a new angle, which obviously had a hybrid charac-
ter. 18 However, we must emphasize the important thing: hybrid
aggression in each case is not only the common feature, but also
is uniquely inherent in each particular concrete situation. The
hybrid nature of aggression can manifest itself not only in the
mixed character of the troops (regular troops plus guerrilla and/
or terrorist formations in various proportions), but also in the
non-standard connected elements of war which is dependent on
the aggressor's goals and weaknesses of the victims—the eco-
nomic, international, diplomatic, informational, psychological,
and the military pressures against them.
Here’s an interesting fact: in January 2009, US Defense
Secretary Robert Gates first publicly used the term “hybrid com-
plex war” in this statement: "We need to look at other elements
of the [future in the armed forces], and determine what will be
most suitable for the protection from the conflict, which I would
call a hybrid complex war.” 19
It should be stressed that until 2014 the concept of “hybrid
warfare” was used primarily in highly specialized analytical texts.
18
J.N. Mattis and F. Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” http://mil-
newstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf and Frankk Hoffman,
“On not-so-new warfare: Political warfare vs hybrid threats,” https://warontherocks.
com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.
19
Robert Wilkie Robert, “Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not Something New,”
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/win09/wilkie.html.
33
The case of Ukraine changed everything. The interest in the

theory of “hybrid war” spilled out beyond the circle of analysts.
The term is more often glimpsed in the public speeches of politi-
cians and the military. It operates not only on the most critically
strategic military texts (for example, we are talking here about
the US doctrines of its Navy, the Air Force, and Army), 20 but
also in civic official documents—applications, press releases,
comments.
The debate continues about the nature of hybrid wars.
Actually, the adjective “hybrid” applies both to war and to con-
flict, (and to the techniques and methods of warfare), and its
threat. These are all the components of a whole, although the
term “hybrid warfare” reflects the strategic, the tactical, and op-
erational levels respectively.
Some of the definitions are close to what would become a
“total war,” but a modernized understanding of war would be
one that permeates all spheres of public and social life, and in
addition refers to the use of all resources for a war (as implied
in the concepts of 19th -20th centuries). Also, hybrid warfare is:
– Military strategy, which combines a conventional war, cyber
war, and a small war;
– Sophisticated, flexible, and dynamic battle spaces which
provide rapid responses and adaptation of the opposition
parties;
– A modern version of a guerrilla war which combines the
latest technology and methods of mobilization (via the
statement of US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Bill
Nemeth). 21
David Kilcullen, author of the book The Accidental Guerrilla,
claims that hybrid warfare is the best definition for contemporary
20
Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid
War,’” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-
ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf.
21
William J. Nemeth, “Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare,”
http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5865.
34
conflicts that include combinations of partisan and civil wars,

rebellion, and terrorism.
Frank Hoffman defines a hybrid war in the form of any enemy
action which quickly and flexibly uses a variety of combinations
of permitted weapons, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and battle-
field crimes for political purposes. 22
The continuous hybrid warfare in Ukraine affects the Western
world’s perception of the problems. Political leaders and ordinary
citizens of the West are afraid of what is happening in Eastern
Ukraine because these events do not fit into the logical scheme
of world development after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the Cold War. I believe that the West is not always ready to admit
that in their desire to integrate Russia, the largest country in the
world, into favorable conditions for the global economic process-
es, they had underestimated the revanchist tendencies of Russia.
Therefore, for Western politicians, media representatives, and

ordinary citizens who are interested in international relations,
it is necessary to have an introductory course called “Hybridity
for Dummies.” This title seems to be an objective one, since
it reflects the situation in the modern world.
A hybrid threat will involve the use of various combinations

from the enemy: 1) the political, military, economic, social, in-
formational resources; and 2) conventional, irregular, terrorist,
and subversive means. It can also be used in a combination of
action, utilizing both public and non-national actors. 23 It erases
the traditional concepts and practices of war and complicates
the identification and definition of the enemy when he is judged
through the prism of the laws of war and international law.
22
R. Arzumanyan and A. Baghdasaryan, ““Theory of War in the 21st Century.”
Review of the XXI Annual Conference on the Strategy of the Institute for Strategic
Studies at the Army Military College, XXI Century, No. 3, (2011): 20–42.
23
Russell W. Glenn, Evolution and Conflict: Summary of the 2008 Israel Defense
Forces-U.S. Joint Forces Command “Hybrid Threat Seminar War Game,” (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND).
35
Hybrid aggression is a kind of transformer and similar to a

classic war which includes a military component, but is hidden
deep inside beneath layers of other, implicit forms of aggres-
sion. This fact is important for the understanding of a hybrid
war. On the outside, other shells are constantly seen (informa-
tion attacks, economic pressures, trade wars, terrorist attacks,
and muscle-flexing at the borders, and the non-recognition
of participation in the conflict), which does not allow identi-
fication of a hybrid war as a classic war. Therefore, the key to
this definition is the concept of “aggression,” despite the fact
that its non-military components do not appear to look like a
traditional war.
Modern hybrid aggression is impossible to imagine without
the following components:
– Informational-propagandistic;
– Politics and diplomacy;
– Economic and trade with lobbying-corruption elements;
– Energy and infrastructure;
– Reconnaissance, both sabotage and guerrilla;
– Regular combat operations;
– The possibility of a limited use of tactical nuclear weap-
ons.
Hybrid warfare can be broadly defined as a set of prepared
and promptly implemented actions of the military, diplomat-
ic, economy-based, and informational that are aimed for the
achievement of strategic objectives. Its key goals are the sub-
ordination of the interests by one nation to another in terms
of the formal preservation of the political system of the sacri-
ficial country. The basic components of a hybrid war include
conventional and unconventional threats, terrorism, subversive
activities, and new or unconventional technology to counter
the enemy's superiority in military power.
Russian specialists and their followers tend not to recog-
nize the participation of the Russian Federation in the hybrid
aggression anywhere in the post-Soviet space. They prefer to
divert the discussion with underhandedness and behind the
36
most specious, pseudo-scientific motives. If we analyze the

arguments for the voiced criticisms of the terms and concepts
of a hybrid war, it comes down to four main arguments:
1. The term is not new and is already far away from its orig-
inal meaning, and requires the description of the types of
threats that cannot be eliminated with the help of the army.
2. The concept of a hybrid war does not correspond to the
Russian concept of war, and those who think this way are
probably using insufficient Russian-language sources.
3. The views of Valery Gerasimovv 24 are based on the intellec-
tual heritage of its predecessor team, headed by the Chief
of the Russian General Staff Nikolai Makarov (2008–2012).
Moreover, it is just a reaction to the achievements of
Western military thought.
4. The non-military components of pressure are still on mili-
tary power. And it is very well demonstrated by the intense,
albeit relatively short-lived fighting in Debal′cevomu, the
Donetsk airport, and Ìlovaisk with the use of artillery,
drones and electronics.
In Ukraine, the Russian implemented hybrid war caused the
loss of many lives and health. According to UN estimates, at
least 10,000 people 25 have been affected. The victim can also
mean to include the entire Ukrainian people who are assaulted
with daily streams of fake news and misinformation. Meanwhile
in the rest of the world, the Kremlin is using a strategy of hy-
brid aggression which is the indirect impact on the situation in
nations and international alliances. It would be naive to believe
that Putin and his entourage aim to only achieve the subordina-
tion of Ukraine. Its foreign policy goals are much bigger.
24
Valery Vasilievich Gerasimov (born September 8, 1955, Kazan, the RSFSR,
USSR)—Soviet and Russian military commander, Chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, First Deputy Minister of Defense
(from November 9, 2012), Army General (2013), granted hero status in the Russian
Federation (2016).
25
http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/oon-obnarodovala-obnovlennye-strashnye-dan-
nye-zhertv-voyny-na-donbasse-602225.html.
37
By analyzing the performance of Vladimir Putin, Western an-

alysts have concluded that Russia has invented a way to achieve
its objectives while at the same time avoiding an open armed con-
frontation with the West. The Kremlin was able to show itself as
a good student, capable to “creatively modify” its approach using
“soft power,” as described by Joseph Nye. 26
Had Western observers focused on hybrid warfare during 2014–
2015, today’s focus might have shifted towards an actual military
action. A need to change this approach was shown following the
events in Syria. Hybrid conflicts are under the Kremlin's leadership
and have not disappeared. But it seems that hybridity has become
a form of classic militarism. While trying to resist the aggressor on
the information front, we should not forget about the battlefields.
The RF [Russian Federation] is rearming and increasing its
military budgets, while the general trend in other countries is in
reducing theirs. 27 For the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the
Kremlin did not cope with only a political cover, rather it forced
NATO to stop its own reduction of military budgets, and the
strengthening of military components began with the eastern flank
of the Alliance.
The Russian methods in Ukraine and in Syria came as a sur-
prise to the West, even though the Russians’ intentions were not
kept secret and were openly defiant. The annexation of Crimea
and the incitement of conflict in Donbas which has become the
biggest aggression in Europe over the last 20 years, have led many
in the West to talk about hybridity as a new word in aggression
technologies. But in fact, the Russians have not invented the wheel.
Rather, they upgraded old ideologies of hybrid aggression practiced
against Ukraine during Soviet times.
But generally, there is a double-edged sword here.
26
Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (Public
Affairs, 2004).
27
Andrew Monaghan,“Putin’s Way of War. The ‘War’ in Russia’s HybridWarfare,”
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2015–16/9_
Monaghan.pdf.
38
The intensity of the use of RF hybrid vehicles and methods

against Ukraine has increased international interest and
awakened NATO's desire to understand the peculiarities of
this form of aggressive action. As a result and dependent on
their goals, the Alliance has focused on the study of methods
of combining covert and overt military presence, information
warfare, cyber warfare, and economic warfare. Paradoxically,
it was the actions of Russia in Ukraine which revived the
status of NATO as a military-political bloc, designed to play
a stabilizing role in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the global
system as a whole.
Chief of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces General Staff

Valery Gerasimov has set the trend. He published an article in
February 2013 (!) with the significant title, “Value of Science in
Foresight.” In the publication of the weekly newspaper Military-
Industrial Courier, 28 Gerasimov gave a speech at the Academy
of Military Sciences. Recall that in early 2013 there were no
signs yet of the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych, a
former leader. The Verkhovna Rada [the Ukrainian Parliament]
prevailed towards a pro-presidential majority with the Party of
Regions [Yanukovych’s political party] in their own interests
which easily broke through the knee-jerk legislative process.
Ukraine appeared to be completely controlled and obedient,
and there were no signs of large-scale social unrest, and espe-
cially military aggression.
But the Russian Army General Gerasimov already in antici-
pation of future actions by the Russian leadership had indicated:
“The emphasis of confrontational methods is used by shifting
towards widespread use of political, economic, informational,
cultural-ideological, and other non-military measures imple-
mented by exploiting the potential of a population’s protest in
28
V. Gerasimov, “The value of science in prediction,” http://vpk-news.ru/
articles/14632.
39
response. This is complemented by hidden military means, in-

cluding the implementation of measures of information warfare
actions and special operations forces. To open the use of force
is often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management
and should only move at some stage, mainly in order to achieve
the ultimate success of the conflict.” 29
Reactions to such an eloquent statement by the Ukrainian
authorities were not followed up. This is not surprising: there
was no request for an objective response to such a clear and
present danger. And the West quite comfortably pursued eco-
nomic relations with Russia whose behavior did not give any
cause for alarm for the “peacemaker” Barack Obama, or for
the leaders of the European Union of which many wanted to
build mutually beneficial economic relations with the Russian
Federation.
It is interesting that Gerasimov did not mention (probably
deliberately) the main feature of a new war: that it will not
happen at the culmination of field battles or in the streets, but
first and foremost in the minds of the people. The events in
Ukraine since the end of 2013 show in two and a half years,
the aggressor was not seeking so much to seize the territory
as to establish control over the outlook of the millions of our
nation’s citizens into becoming the victims of aggression. The
purpose of such a war will lead to a situation where the use of
military force will be a plus, as it was in Crimea. It is necessary
that the people themselves betray their own nation and support
the aggressor. 30
General Gerasimov made the assertion that the aggres-
sive plans of the Kremlin are not accidental. And to consider
Ukraine as a potential object of Russian aggression at that time
was not easy. Energy prices that provided the economic pow-
er of Russia soared in the beginning of the third millennium,
and were fixated on financing for military necessities. During
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
40
the first decade of the 2000s, even during the global economic
crisis, Russia had received astronomical incomes fueling Putin's
imperial ambitions. With the formation of the regime of per-
sonal power, limited only nominally, the Russian president had
the tools to implement his own nostalgia for the Soviet Union.
Therefore, Russian political discourse increasingly sounded
out the notes and desire to compete with the United States for
leadership in the modern world. The ideological superstructure
of a “sovereign democracy” demanded the practical implemen-
tation in the form of aggression against the nation of Ukraine,
which not only considered itself to be protected by the Budapest
Memorandum, 31 but also in building relations with Russia on
the basis of the Grand Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of
the Kharkiv agreements, 32 along with the extended-stay of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian ports until 2042. Revenues
from energy exports sat on a gas “needle” which enabled the
most extravagant ideas vital to Russian society to spread over
to the EU and Ukraine since the early 1990s.
Derived from energy export windfalls, the Kremlin formed a
modern system of propaganda known as the TV channel Russia
Today. As only part of the brainwashing system, the export seg-
ment called Russian Lifestyle is translated and inscribed in the
West for news channels as an alternative and generally accepted
31
The Budapest Memorandum is an interstate document that ensures compliance
with the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, the UN Charter, and the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with regard to Ukraine as a non-nuclear-weapon
state party to the NPT. Signed on December 5, 1994 by the leaders of Ukraine, the
United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.
32
The agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, signed on April
21, 2010 in Kharkiv, Ukraine by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, and
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, regarding the terms of stay for the Black Sea
Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol extended from 2017 to 2042 with an
automatic continuation of 5 years, with a set rental providing none of the parties
objected. Agreement was unilaterally denounced by the State Duma of the Russian
Federation on March 31, 2014.
41
point of view. According to journalist Alexander Dugin, 33 and

publicist Alexander Prokhanov, 34 this mobilization of the me-
dia’s intersection with Russia’s ideology of Euroasianism ap-
pears significant.
Using unbound hybrid aggression, Vladimir Putin conducts

his own “war” with Western leaders in Ukraine. By maintaining
a hybrid war, Russia is trying to overcome its own inferiority
complex in relation to the United States. The defeat in the
Cold War left a mark on the modus operandi of the Russian
political elite which is trying to prove that Russia is able to
compete with the United States on an equal footing.
The objective evidence of this thesis therefore finds an in-

crease in the belief that the words of Russia’s ideological machine
are carefully honed for promoting Russian interests in the former
Soviet Union.
Hybrid aggression is aimed for the return of Ukraine within
Russia’s sphere of influence and the unconditional legitimation
of this state of affairs in the eyes of world public opinion.
I suppose that the main goal of Russia in the confrontation
with Ukraine is for Ukraine’s complete subordination to Russia’s
control and destroying the formal preservation of our coun-
try's independence. The collapse of “project Novorossiia” [New
Russia] forced the Kremlin to try to return the Donbas to Kyiv's
jurisdiction, but of course on Russia’s own terms. The value of
33
Alexander Dugin—Russian philosopher, translator, political scientist, journalist
for fascist publications; founder of the ideological movement "Neo-Eurasianism."
Dugin's "philosophical" views are a modern eclectic compilation of the old Russian
"Eurasians" and from such well-known European "neoconservatives" and "tradition-
alists" as Carl Schmitt, René Genon and Julius Evola. Also is a figurant in the US
financial sanctions for aggression against Ukraine.
34
Alexander Prokhanov—Soviet and Russian writer, screenwriter, journalist, po-
litical and social activist, and Russian Orthodox nationalist chauvinist. In August
1991, he supported the actions of the GKChP. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, he
maintained close ties with the terrorists of the DPR and LNR.
42
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of the Ukrainian economy has

decreased significantly (Ukraine has lost about a quarter of its
industrial capacity), and yesterday’s political groups which in-
cluded the all-powerful “Donetsk” clans 35 today are scattered and
demoralized. There is no doubt that the Kremlin is interested in
the transformation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as “areas
with special rights,” possibly in the course of Ukraine’s forced
federalization. I believe that the Kremlin is actively exploring
the Dayton Agreement 36 in order to carry out the procedure of
“Bosniaization” which is to minimize the subject of Ukraine in
international relations.
It should be understood that the present confrontation be-
tween Russia and Ukraine is not only here to stay, but will change
the nature of its bilateral relationship (as is happening today). It
will also affect the development of international relations.
The collision of the largest state in the world with one of

Europe's largest countries will have far-reaching consequences
not only for the continent. It creates trends in the development
of a new world order that will allow for the simulation of both
new challenges and the responses to them.
The Russian leadership has preferred to forget that it was the

successor of the Soviet Union, and victorious over Nazism; but
in post-war Europe and contrary to international law, Russia
went on an unprecedented revision of the boundaries of pow-
er. Aggression against Ukraine reflects not only the exhaus-
tion of the arsenal of means to influence the situation in our
country, but also highlights the far-reaching nature of Russian
aggression. The development of events shows that the Kremlin
35
Donetsk region locals who obtained important political or public positions and
economic power through ties with other clan members.
36
Dayton Accords—peace agreements signed between England and the United
States and the civil war participants in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1995
in Dayton, Ohio. Provisions were made for conflict settlements in those regions.
43
is trying to recreate a bipolar world, which is also to create

comfortable living conditions for the political leadership of the
RF. And the goal for the Kremlin in this case fully justifies the
means.
Only a few days prior to the annexation of Crimea, the
journal Russian Pioneerr published a story by a certain Natan
Dubovitsky about nonlinear war. 37 It was quickly revealed that
its true author was Vladislav Surkov who said: “This will be
a war of all against all. But because the high intensity of this
kind of conflict cannot be kept indefinitely, sooner or later it
will be reborn into a creeping and permanent conflict. This is
ideal for countries such as Russia, for an authoritarian regime
is in constant mobilization in working the population into their
hands of power. In this never-ending war, it cannot be too in-
tense but still deadly for democracy because it corrodes all of
its core values that initially led to its freedom.” 38
Vladislav Surkov (the author of the concept of “sovereign
democracy” and curator of the conflict in the Donbas region
in Putin's entourage) is frank. He skillfully identified the pain
points of Ukraine which during the whole period of indepen-
dent development (up until February 2014) can rightly be at-
tributed to the benefits of its exclusively peaceful character de-
spite the political conflicts. The Ukrainian ability to peacefully
resolve its internal problems, it seems, has become a serious
irritant to the representatives of the neighboring country.
I am sure that the Orange Maidan Revolution in 2004 seri-
ously startled the Russian leadership, and provoked its intensive
preparations for the hybrid war against Ukraine. Already in
2005, the Russian political rhetoric appeared in much stronger
phrases such as “Ukraine is a failed state” (as in defective and
a not established state). As an alternative to the independent
37
V. Abarinov, “Terrible fairy tale,” http://www.svoboda.org/content/arti-
cle/25321516.html.
38
L. Vuichik, “Ukrainian hybrid war,” http://inosmi.ru /sngbal-
tia/20140515/220303215.html#ixzz3IrQRtksR.
44
development of Ukraine, the Russian suggestion is filled with

threats and challenges, and to persevere, would act as a “haven”
for the “Russian world” whose existence without Ukraine would
appear inferior.
Hence the desire of the Kremlin is for the “protection of
compatriots” or the known principle called the "fog of war.”
According to Vladimir Putin, "the Russian world” can and
should unite all who cherish the Russian word and the Russian
culture, wherever they live, in Russia or abroad. Often the re-
gionalists will eat up this "Russian world” phrase. 39
In order to deprive Ukrainian society any alternatives to the
“Russian world,” Russia carries out the cleaning and restruc-
turing of its historical past through popular culture and main-
stream science. In Moscow today, the specific archives from
not only the times of the USSR, but further back to the Russian
Empire, allows for Russia to possess and aggressively promote
its own historical versions from ancient and recent pasts. The
result becomes a fierce struggle for the Russian propaganda ma-
chine when special places in history truly belongs to Ukrainian
historical figures such as Ivan Mazepa 40 and Stepan Bandera. 41 If
these figures are consistently vilified, then many other historical
39
L. Sycheva, “Russian language, Russian culture, Russian world,” Russian
Federation Today, No. 4, (2007).
40
Ivan Mazepa, (March 20, 1639–September 21, 1709)—Ukrainian military, po-
litical and state figure. Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, the head of the Cossack
state on the Left Bank (1687–1704) and the entire Dnieper Ukraine (1704–1709).
Tried to restore the authority of Hetman in Ukraine with elections. Has made a
great contribution to the economic and cultural development of the Left Bank. For
a long time formally supported the Moscow kingdom in the Northern War with
the Swedish Empire, but in 1708 supported the side of the Swedes. After defeat
near Poltava, he was forced to leave Ukraine. At the order of the king, the Russian
Orthodox Church declared Mazepa as an “anathema.” Russians consider Mazepa
and others as traitors for going over to the Swedish side.
41
Stepan Bandera (January 1, 1909-October 15, 1959). Ukrainian politician.
One of the most prominent ideologues and theorists of the Ukrainian nationalist
movement of the 20th century. After the split of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists, became the head of the OUN-B Providence. Stepan Bandera and
Yaroslav Stetsko were authors of the Ukrainian State Recovery Act of June 30, 1941.
45
personages that are coopted by the Russian agitprop will try and
win over to their side their way of thinking while adjusting their
actions under the current political situation.
In the Ukrainian case, it is necessary to view the events on
the Euromaidan as an important part of a hybrid war against
Ukraine, a kind of reconnaissance, which was not carried out
by “green men” 42 but by representatives of Ukrainian law en-
forcement agencies who have been under external control. And
the acceleration of student protests on the nights of November
29–30, 2013, and subsequent clashes on Bankova Street in Kyiv
on December 1 of the same year, followed by the deaths of “The
Heavenly Hundred” 43 establishes in the current environment
the components of a hybrid war.
Hybrid aggression differs constantly by changing the meth-
ods of exposure. Therefore, in today’s Donbas region, Russia
uses army troops against the Ukrainians under the guise of
representatives made up of local criminals or the “patriots from
their native land.” The Kremlin deliberately relies on the tactic
of “ignoring the obvious” while trying to overtake the West’s
speed of decision making. Let us not ignore the factor of nu-
clear weapons, the mention of which is increasingly coming
forth from the lips of the Russian diplomats in the non-public
consultations on the issue of settling the Donbas conflict.
The Orange Maidan, as well as the various colors of the revo-
lutions 44 in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, scared Russia, forcing it to
seek new instruments of influence in the post-Soviet space. An
important element of testing military plans manifested during
the swift war of August 2008 in Georgia, which ended in a loss
42
Euphemism for Russian soldiers dressed in green camouflage whose presence
on the peninsula is officially denied by the Russian Federation.
43
“Heavenly Hundred” is the collective name given for the dead protesters on the
Euromaidan in January-February 2014.
44
The "Color Revolution" is a term referring to so-called "non-violent revolu-
tions," also some well-known mass non-violent protests. As a result of the color
revolutions, a change of political regimes in a number of post-socialist European
countries and countries of the Arab world took place.
46
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for that Caucasian republic. Both

have since become puppet states. At the same time, the Kremlin
took care of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR)
and “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LNR) with the creation of
the Spring 2014 “referendums” and which allegedly favored the
vast majority of the locals (89% and 96%, respectively) whose
residence is seen as an international “gray zone.” They are not
recognized even in Russia. This suspended state is also an ele-
ment of a hybrid war.
Objectively speaking, the current confrontation between
Russia and Ukraine include factors indicative of a war of emo-
tions, and the manipulation of trust and confidence. Russians
in Ukraine will work out a new kind of conflict. The main role
played here is not by rocket fighters, but with emotions and
feelings. The Kremlin knows very well how painful it was for
our people during the First and Second World Wars, and the
between-the-wars experience of the Holodomor genocide. 45
The indecisive hesitancy of the Ukrainian political leadership

for almost the entire period of independence and the massive
amounts of missed chances and opportunities for reform have
turned Ukraine into a convenient object for hybrid aggression.
The Russian leadership after the Euromaidan decided not

to wait until the new leadership of Ukraine was fully engaged
into the swing of things, but struck Ukraine in its soft under-
belly when many of its residents were skeptical with respect to
their own country. The lack of a nation-building strategy in
Crimea and the chaos inflicted by local warlords (during the
reign of Viktor Yanukovych who called those Donetsk locals
45
The Holodomor of 1932–1933 was the genocide of the Ukrainian people, or-
ganized by the Soviet authorities by creating an artificial mass famine, which led
to multimillion human losses in the countryside on the territory of the Ukrainian-
Ruthenian Socialist Republic, and the Kuban, the vast majority of which were
Ukrainians.
47
“Macedonians”) resulted in a rapid loss of control over Ukraine’s

Crimean peninsula.
Given the degree of the lack of reforms in our country and
the level of integration of the Russian agents of influence inside
the power echelons, the fact that Ukraine has withstood the first
blow of a hybrid war can only be explained as a miracle. The
secret: a high level of civil organization and genuine patriotism,
however pathetic it may sound today.
48
RESULTS
A nonlinear (hybrid) war is not an invention of modern times.
At the beginning of the 21st century, a combination of factors
caused the actualization of indirect and non-military actions
during war itself. Recall that its framework and conditional
“rules” were erased, and the war in fact ceased to be a prerogative
of the nation. In addition, the growing informational environ-
ment has made the quality of control factors and network coor-
dination the real armies of a dominant battlefield. The Russian
general’s staff understood the trends of the time, and has adopted
the concept of a hybrid war in which the emphasis is placed on
non-military methods of confrontation.
In recent years, largely due to the conflict between Russia and
Ukraine, the term “hybrid warfare” has gone from marginal to
dominant not only in the public space, but in the program doc-
uments of the strongest army in the world—the US.
A hybrid threat involves the use of various combinations of
the enemy, both military and non-military means of pressure on
the government impacting the national and non-national actors.
49
SECTION 2
HYBRID WARFARE
THROUGH THE AGES
Evolution and features of a hybrid confrontation. Causes of dis-

placement, the hybrid component, and the laws and rules of war.
M
Militaryy history is rich with examples of asymmetric wars that
use nonllinear tactics as well as the irregulars found in armed
groups. F Finding similar examples in history, some military the-
orists arggue that in fact, there is nothing new in this particular
type off war.
The well-known study by Williamson Murray and Peter
Mansoor, editors of Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents
from the Ancient World to the Present, (NewYork, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) was issued before the start of the hybrid
Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, by that time, the con-
cept of a hybrid war was already quite popular. The basic idea
is that the hybrid war brings nothing new to the understanding
of the war itself, since the elements of hybridity were already
available in many wars before.
The collection of articles that analyzed hybridity in wars were
about: the Roman Empire’s attacks against the Germanic tribes,
the British strategy in Ireland at the turn of the 16th to 18 th centu-
ries, the American War of Independence and the American Civil
War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the wars of the British
Empire from 1700 to 1970, and of course, the war in Vietnam. It
makes sense that such deep and comprehensive military-histor-
ical analyses show that the elements of hybridity can be found
in many wars of the past.
If one proceeds from pure pragmatism, then hybrid warfare
is often the way for the strongest to beat the weakest. By concen-
trating the resources needed to win in the here and now, success
will come at the right time and in the right place. In addition,
hybridity is a way to fight without fighting openly, thus mini-
mizing its losses.
The history of humankind is impossible to imagine without
war. The existence of war between homo sapiens was not less
than 10,000 wars of all sizes, including two World Wars. But
war is not only a clash on the battlefield. It is also a psychologi-
cal, economic, and ideological confrontation, activated with the
use of intelligence, funds, volunteers, and defectors. The value
and measure of the impact of these components on the general
55
course of a war’s role and place and its outcome in each case is
determined by the level of aggression based on a society’s level
of development, and the spirit of the era.
The idea of locating an enemy’s weak spot and to fight not
only against his army, but also to destroy the battle formations
from within while undermining communications from the rear
does not appear to be new. Even tribes who had no written lan-
guages used primitive methods to intimidate the enemy and its
impact on morale (via screams, ritual dances, war paint). What
more can one say about the modern world where the rewards
for winning the conflict is a far more serious prize?
The first, albeit mythologized cases of non-standard military
action was the Trojan War. When the traditional method at the
time of military action—the siege and direct collision—came to
no avail, cunning Odysseus suggested a far more creative move.
His army hid inside a huge wooden horse where, in modern
parlance, they took refuge as saboteurs and as a reconnaissance
group. The art of The Odyssey was to convince the exhausted
Trojans that their 10 year old war was over, but it was before the
gates of Troy and in the safety of the horse that the miracle oc-
curred. The military cunning of Odysseus can serve almost as an
encyclopedia of ideas for those who plan to start a hybrid action.
With regard to the territory of modern Ukraine, it is pos-
sible to give an example of the Scythian tribes’ war against the
Persian king Darius in the late 6th century BC. Their tactics of
scorching land and wearing down the enemy was by then very
popular among the military leaders who chose non-conventional
methods of war. It is still emulated by the partisans of all groups.
Another early example of the use of non-standard military
practices was discovered by the Athenians in the Peloponnesian
War 46 with Sparta. They won over the Messenians (inhabitants
of the Messenia region), whose ancestors the Spartans had
46
Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC)—a military conflict in ancient Greece, in
which the Democratic Alliance headed by Athens versus the Peloponnese Union
led by Sparta participated.
56
SECTION 2 • HYBRID WARFARE THROUGH THE AGES
expelled from the habitable lands. The Athenians approached

the Messenians in the rear, and began forays into Spartan terri-
tory while strengthening Pylos, the capital. They brought in the
helots of the desert who knew the local dialect and began to work
for them. The Spartans found themselves in a difficult situation,
because the helots provided the livelihoods that Sparta depended
on. Although one can note that this trick had a tactical success,
it did not help Athens win the Peloponnesian War. 47
Attempts by the Roman army to destroy the Germanic tribes
can also be attributed to variations on the theme of hybrid tactics.
Confronting the war machine of Rome and the Union Army of
the Germanic tribes may well serve as an analogue to Russia’s
actions in Chechnya at the turn of the second and third millen-
nia. The Germans during the second to fourth centuries, like the
Chechens at the end of the 20th century, confronted a powerful
enemy, albeit on a lower level of social and political development.
But the German tribes were able to adapt the advanced (for its
time of course) tactical and technological methods of fighting.
This helped them not only to survive but to remain alive beyond
the battle.
No less significant is the struggle of the Carthaginian com-
mander Hannibal against Rome. His campaign in the year 218
B.C. sweeping through Spain across the Alps to Italy was among
other things, a supposed uprising attempt against Rome by the
Celts of northern Italy (which did not actually happen). 48
In response, Scipio Africanus took the offensive on the strate-
gic rear of Hannibal’s hometown of Carthage. It should be noted
that not everyone in Rome had supported the bold idea of the
then famous commander. Scipio had received permission from
the senate for the expedition, but he was denied an additional
set of troops. As a result, in the spring of 204 BC, he went on
47
7
Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor, eds., Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex
Opponents from the Ancient World to the Presentt (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 3–4.
48
Ibid., 45–48.
57
the expedition with only 7,000 volunteers and two legions (ap-
proximately 10–11,000 people). However, the results exceeded all
expectations with Hannibal imposing a disadvantageous battle
causing a small tactical victory over his cavalry, and with Scipio
forcing Carthage to surrender without a fight. 49
A very successful example of the fight against occupation-
al forces was demonstrated in the 14th century by the French
Commander and warlord Bertrand du Guesclin. 50 Weakened by
the French defeat, he could hardly hope for success in the battle,
so du Guesclin’s strategy consisted of evading the battle with the
British and the parallel creation of all sorts of interference against
the enemy on the occupied territories, and leading them into exile.
Du Guesclin achieved such artistry in the use of mobility and
surprise, that in less than five years he had reduced the huge
British possessions in France to a small strip of land on the
southern coast of the Bay of Biscay. He captured the carriag-
es, trampled individual detachments of the British, inflated the
flames of local unrest to distract the enemy, and secured the
support of the local population 51
An example of the use of not only military measures for the
country’s subordination was the Golden Horde policy in relation
to Kyivan Rus’. The Mongols used the disunity of the princes and
their inability to agree, together with the brutal attacks against
the conquered cities. The Mongols interfered little in the internal
affairs of the conquered kingdoms. In fact they limited their yoke
of dependence by keeping it all under the control of the princes.
49
Ibid., 52–53.
50
Bertrand du Guesclin (1320–1380)—French commander during the Hundred
Years War. Du Guesclin entered history not only as a great military leader, but also as
a model of chivalry. He preferred to fight the forces of mercenaries and not knightly
militia. Introduced rigorous discipline in his units; disliked the great battles, pre-
ferring small clashes and methods of guerrilla warfare, thereby improving France’s
position in the Hundred Years War until the end of the 14th century.
51
Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 51.
58
This Horde tactic was later adopted by the Russian Federation

in relation to Ukraine.
The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) presented to humanity a
vivid example of how a weak army can successfully withstand a
much stronger one. The army of the Swedish king Gustav Adolf II
was considered at the time to be invincible. It was able to resist the
troops of Albrecht of Wallenstein and the Elector of Bavaria. The
latter did not engage in a war with the battle-hardened Swedes.
Instead, they dug into position, and by relying on the help of the
Light Brigade, controlled the supply lines of the Swedish army.
Wallenstein adhered to this tactic and tried to fight until the
Swedes were sufficiently and simultaneously weakened in addition
to being frightened at the possibility of famine. Their attempt to
attack Wallenstein turned futile. Of course, the victory was not
decisive, but enough to destroy the myth of the invincibility of the
Swedes. This naturally led to a weakening of the Swedish influence
and corresponding psychological effects for their opponents. 52
Let us draw an analogy with the present situation: the first
humanitarian convoy sent by the Russians to Donbas had a pow-
erful psychological effect. The whole country watched the news
reports on where the convoys went and where they stayed with
how many machines. The analysts speculated on the cargo and
destination columns of these white trucks. This method of indi-
rect action is analogous to the tactics of the Duke of Marlborough
in the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1704, Marlboro decided
to redeploy British troops from the Meuse to the Danube, and
accomplished much of it covertly. The march his troops were on
only lasted about six weeks, and during that time Marlborough
changed course several times. 53
Let me remind you that the strategy of an indirect approach is
to combine flexibility with mobility and suddenness. These three
components make this complex action truly effective and achiev-
able in its goals.
52
Ibid., 89.
53
Ibid., 103.
59
The revolutionary spirit of France’s National Army in the late

th
18 century made it invincible by eliminating drills and develop-
ing the marching abilities of individuals. As a result, the French
conducted a march with 120 steps per minute, when the gen-
erally accepted norm was 70 steps. This elementary difference
in the pre-industrial era of wars has provided greater mobility
for the French army. This change also made it possible, in the
words of Napoleon, to “multiply the mass by the speed.” 54 Moral
motivation can also be capable of causing a change in military
decisiveness. This analogy is quite applicable to the Ukrainian
Army although it is unlikely the results will be similar to that
of the French. And it’s not because we do not have a Napoleon
(at least not yet). Whatever the troubles, it was in times of “the
old regime” such as occurred on the eve of the Revolution in
1787 that innovators such as de Broglie and Guibert conducted
military reforms. In order to protect the Ukrainian Army and
its society from having vertigo from such successes, here is an-
other example from the era of the Napoleonic wars. “The Sun of
Austerlitz” 55 was preceded by indirect actions of a psychological
nature taken by Napoleon. He tried to force a sign of weakness
when attacking the Russian army. Before battle, he concentrated
all his 50,000 men against 80,000 Russians. The demonstration
of weakness was complemented by sending “doves of peace” to
the Austrian and Russian emperors. Then, Napoleon’s troops
took a position at Austerlitz, forcing the enemy that attacked
the retreating French troops to stretch their left flank. By rear-
ranging the troops in the center, Napoleon dealt a blow to the
weakened junction of the allied troops. As a result, a decisive
54
Ibid.,123–125
55
Napoleon’s victory under Austerlitz (November 20 (December 2), 1805) is il-
lustrated by the forces of the third anti-Napoleonic coalition. In the history of mil-
itary affairs, the battle entered as a brilliant example of victory over a quantifiably
prevailing opponent. The expression itself is part of Napoleon’s phrase, which he
exclaimed at dawn before the Battle of Borodino, trying to recall a glorious victory.
On September 7, 1812, when he saw the rising sun, Napoleon exclaimed: “Here it
is, the sun of Austerlitz!”
60
and momentous victory was won and the Austrian Emperor was
forced to beg for peace. 56
The history of the American Revolution and America’s War of
Independence against Britain became almost a textbook example
of a hybrid war. As Williamson Murray notes in Warfare: Fighting
Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, the
United States was literally born inside the crucible of a hybrid
war, with American irregulars using guerrilla warfare against
the linear tactics of the British Army. The British Empire, once
the largest conglomeration, was unable to face the challenges of
hybridity in the people’s struggle against colonial rule. This, of
course applied not only in the American War for Independence,
but also in the Anglo-Boer War, and the struggle for indepen-
dence in India and Ireland.
A hybrid war is seen by many as a modern version of the com-
pounding of the war, which started whenever the regular forces
intensified their operations through irregular means. During the
Peninsular War 57 for example, the Duke of Wellington ousted
the French out of Spain while fighting against the Napoleonic
marshals’ conventional war, and at the same time releasing them
in the rear of the Spanish partisans. 58
Not being able to resist Napoleon in the Central European war
theater, the anti-French coalition was able to find a weak spot on
the Iberian Peninsula. The French have always won with regular
Spanish troops, but were powerless against guerrilla warfare. The
elusive network of guerrilla groups replaced the less flexible and
movable regular army. Vigorous guerrilla commanders were vic-
torious over the limited movement commandeered by generals.
56
Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present ((New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 137–138.
57
The Peninsular or Iberian War—military conflict on the Iberian Peninsula
during the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century in which the Napoleonic
Empire opposed the alliance of Spain, Portugal and England.
58
Hon. Robert Wilkie, “Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not Something New,”
http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/apj/apj09/win09/wilkie.html.
61
England and the Duke of Wellington made every effort to guar-

antee that guerrilla war would be a success, and the French army
faced the most problems. For example, the basic loss of French
troops were not caused by armed clashes, but were burdened
by diseases because the army had to stay inside the countryside
which became unbearable for the invaders. The old genius of
Scythian thought and tactics had defeated this enemy. 59
The First World War was not only a war that was fought as
a positional confrontation on the Western Front. Outside the
European theater of fighting, the tactics were varied and more
interesting, for example, as occurred in North Africa.
Even then, the military and political successes were reflected
in popular culture. And so Lawrence of Arabia was not only a
masterpiece of cinema, but also as we would say today, a vivid
example of hybrid war methods. Britain was interested in weak-
ening the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Captain
Thomas Edward Lawrence assisted the Arab tribes in the prepa-
ration and implementation of the uprisings of 1916–1918. He
organized guerrilla warfare against the Turks and became a mili-
tary hero in Britain, and among the Arabs. An award in honor of
T.E. Lawrence was named after him called the Commemorative
Medal of Lawrence of Arabia which has been awarded since 1935
by the British Royal Society for Asian Affairs in recognition of
outstanding achievements in the field of exploration, research,
and literature.
The Eastern Front was directly concerned with Ukraine and
therefore of particular interest. The countries that formed the
Quadruple Alliance were involved in warming up the situation
in the Russian Empire. Its withdrawal from the war would sig-
nificantly improve the chances for the Austro-Hungary and the
Ottoman Empires, Germany, and Bulgaria to victory. Their con-
centrated efforts were crowned with success, but however did
not bring victory. Even so, the process can serve as an illustrative
case of hybrid tactics in the broad sense, and not in the context of
59
B. Liddell-Hart, Strategy of Indirect Actions (Moscow: AST, 1999), 140–143.
62
formations of irregular forces. Generous funding by the Russian

Bolsheviks and the Germans for the arrival of Vladimir Lenin
in Petrograd in a sealed train became known facts, and the con-
sequences of the support of the RSDLP(b) (Bolshevik Party) by
the German General Staff was a dramatic turn for Tsarist Russia.
Documents about the participation of German money in the
Bolshevik movement gained publicity after the Second World
War. The documents hit London from Germany’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Archives. The Soviet government fiercely denied
the authenticity of this information, calling it a provocation. Even
after the collapse of the Soviet Union there emerged the names
of many Russian citizens who were actively engaged in espionage
in favor of Germany with a goal set on destroying the political
system of the empire. According to some estimates, Berlin paid
the Bolsheviks at least 100 million Deutsche Marks. The chief
financial steward was Israel Gelfand, but was better known by
his alias—Alexander Parvus. Historians believe that he found
Lenin in Switzerland, then the leader of the most radical party
in Russia, and helped him with money and provided his transit
through Germany into the arms of Russia’s unrest.
For Bolshevik Number 1, the Russian Revolutionary leader did
not disdain German help which helped him forge a revolution
and brought much worry to Germany as the “eastern colossus” of
war. The 1917 Bolshevik uprising of October 25–26 (November
7–8 New Style), was a success, and Lenin and his comrades were
able to gain a foothold in power. And almost immediately after-
wards (March 3, 1918), he concluded with Germany a separate
peace agreement in Brest. Lenin had met Berlin’s expectations. 60
Paradoxically, Vladimir Lenin, himself a tool of hybrid war-
fare, formulated one of their principles: “The most sensible strat-
egy in any campaign is to delay the battle, and the most rea-
sonable strategy is to delay the beginning of the offensive until
60
O. Shama, “Hybrid Kaiser War. How Germany, with the help of the Bolsheviks,
organized a revolution in Russia.” http://nv.ua/publications/gibridnaya-voyna-kayz-
era-kak-germaniya-s-pomoshchyu-bolshevikov-organizovala-revolyuciyu-v-rossii
34213.html.
63
it undermines the morale of the enemy and creates favorable

conditions to deliver a decisive blow.” 61
The theoretical and practical legacies of the First World
developed and continued during the 1920s and 1930s. For ex-
ample, on February 25, 1925, the Russian tactics of hybrid war
aggression were based by the decisions of the Commission of
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the question of active ex-
ploration. During this period, Soviet Russia first rehearsed
a hybrid war against the neighboring countries of Poland,
China, and Central Asia. Instead of calling it a hybrid war,
the Stalinists preferred the terms “active intelligence” and “mil-
itary subversion.”
The Second Rzeczpospolita (The Republic of Poland be-
tween the World Wars) became the target of phishing attacks
(within the meaning of that era, of course) by their totalitarian
neighbors. This first started with the USSR in the mid-1920s
which hung the familiar shortcut defamatory labels on the
Poles and Polish authorities as: “fascists,” “imperialists,” “na-
tionalists.” After 1934, the Soviets joined Nazi Germany and
grabbed Poland in its tongs.
The aggression of the USSR became especially active fol-
lowing the establishment of the Polish political circle con-
glomerates of pro-Soviet organizations and parties. It is likely
that it was at that time when the practice of using Communist
parties as a fifth column was perfected. Members of the Polish
Communist Party and the Communist Party of Western
Ukraine accused the politicians and the government of fascism
by actively using manipulation and misinformation.
Meanwhile, a special group of Soviet spies operated in the
east of the country. They were dressed in Polish military or
police uniforms, and looted and burned government build-
ings, private homes, and even seized a train. By discrediting
the central government, they tried to cause a revolt in regions
61
B. Liddell-Hart, Strategy of Indirect Actions (Moscow: AST, 1999), 180.
64
with non-Polish populations. But popular uprisings did not

work despite the best efforts of saboteurs and active scouts.
Among other tactical characteristics worth mentioning in
the undeclared Soviet aggression against Poland were incrim-
inating statements by Soviet diplomats, public accusations of
the Polish authorities regarding the repression of ethnic mi-
norities, and promoting the idea of salvation and liberation
of Western Ukraine to the masses. The Communists inside
and outside the Soviet Union manipulated public opinion in
Poland with threats of future fiery rebellions and civil war.
Warsaw tried to find adequate answers to these dangerous
challenges. Poland’s Special Forces units firmly opposed the
pro-Soviet parties and organizations. Their members were im-
prisoned in concentration camps, and their activities forbid-
den and restricted. It is worth noting that in “Poland B” (on
the lands of Western Ukraine and Belarus), a rigid internal
policy was conducted causing its population to almost being
caught between a rock and a hard place. Polish diplomats had
actively and verbally defended the interests of the country
by looking for allies. The first and most important, though
not the most effective was the United Kingdom. Allied rela-
tions were made in the Anglo-Polish military alliance in 1939,
which was to ensure the protection of Poland in the case of a
German attack.
In its reasoning in the 1930s, the representatives of Germany
and the Soviet Union were similar in catching Poland through
“random formation,” which has no place on the political map
of Europe. Today, Ukraine is perceived by the Russian political
elite as “temporarily lost territory.” Aggressive strategy and
hybrid tactics have not changed.
An apogee hybrid aggression against Poland on September
1, 1939 can be regarded as an invasion by both the USSR and
Germany. The significant statement of Vladimir Potemkin,
(the USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) was this:
“Poland is not a nation. It is a bankrupt state and residents of
Western Ukraine and Western White Russian lands need to
65
be protected by the Workers and Peasants Red Army, which is

here, and provides them with all possible assistance.” 62
The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were outcasts in inter-
war Europe, and especially disdained the methods that did not
strengthen their own positions. The cynical desire to increase
its influence at any cost while ignoring the position of civilized
Europe—where politicians were scared to death since the events
of the First World War—did motivate Moscow and Berlin. Poland
was not the only victim of aggressive intentions and implementa-
tion by totalitarian regimes. During the Anschluss of Austria and
the loosening of the situation in the Sudetenland, under the terms
of the Treaty of Versailles which became part of the Czechoslovak
Republic, the German secret services, too, did not pay attention
to the rules of political decency.
The Sudeto-German Party leader Konrad Henlein 63 in many
ways largely referenced the military and political forces that did
much damage when signing the Munich Agreement in September
1938, which was later described as “the Munich conspiracy.”
He stated: “They were instructed to place the Czechoslovak
Government into a void with impossible conditions and aggra-
vate the situation to such an extent that the government refused
to comply with their demands. And that was what came to be the
beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia—both militarily and
politically.” 64
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union acted in a number of
countries through the mechanism of support for the left or the na-
tional liberation movements, providing them not only with arms
and money, but also directing advisers and special forces groups
62
“Hybrid War: Lessons from Pre-war Poland,” http://vgolos.com.ua/blogs/gi-
brydna_viyna_uroky_dovoiennoi_polshchi_158663.html.
63
Konrad Henlein—(May 1898-May 1945). German Nazi politician in the
Sudeten Region. The leader of the Czechoslovak Germans, founder of the Sudeto-
German party in Czechoslovakia who acted in the interests of Nazi Germany. Also
the Reichskommissar of German occupied Sudeten region.
64
A. Chekanova, “Prelude of Heinlen,” http://www.radio.cz/en/rubrika/progulki/
prelyudiya-genlejna.
66
for military action disguised as a “struggle of the people with a

puppet regime supported by the West.” Thus, we can say that the
Russian variety of technologies in a hybrid war is an updated
version of militaristic-subversion tactics that were developed and
tested during the Stalinist period in the USSR.
In fairness, we note that the United States often used sim-
ilar methods during the Cold War. Regarding our modern
hybrid war, the situation was different except that the infor-
mation was held under lock and key from the 1950s-1980s of
the 20th century, and was much easier to do so than at the present
time. 65
Without exaggeration, a turning point for the formulation
of approaches to understanding warfare happened during the
Vietnam War. Without going into the vicissitudes of the French
opposition, and then the American military machine and
Vietnamese guerrillas, we can denote the following key points.
The Vietnam War marked the transition from a classical scale
war to a completely new type. It combines four wars: the first is
the history of high-tech warfare (the air defense of North Vietnam
against the United States Air Force), the guerrilla-terrorists (the
partisans of the local Communists in South Vietnam against
government forces and allied Americans), the classical war (the
North Vietnamese regular army against the American and South
Vietnamese troops), as well as a full-scale information war.
The defeat of the French army in Indochina was due not only
to the support of the Vietnamese Communists and their associates
from China and the Soviet Union. French society at that time
did not fully recover from the effects of World War II, so its con-
tinued presence in Indochina was not in Paris’ focus along with
any strategic objective. After the French left, the colonial troops
were placed in a difficult situation in Southeast Asia with the US
military who possessed a different motivation.
65
“Hybrid War in Eastern Europe. Non-military dimension. Energy com-
ponent.” http:// geostrategy . org . ua / ua / analitika / item / 619 - gibridna -viy-
na - v - shidniy -evropi - energetichniy - component.
67
Contrary to popular belief, the guerrilla war supporters of Ho

Chi Minh lost, but the information war in North Vietnam was
won brilliantly and fit perfectly into the ideological leftist main-
stream thought in the West at the end of the 1960s and early
1970s. This ensured Hanoi’s victory in the war as a whole.
Here is an illustration that began in 1968—a turning point for
many countries. For the first time it was discovered that the TV
picture is much more important than the war itself. On January
30, 1968, the first 84,000 South Vietnamese guerrillas and North
Vietnamese soldiers began an attack on their New Year day called
Tett in 36 of the 43 centers of Vietnam’s southern provinces. The
Communists took over the old Vietnam capital, Hue, when fight-
ing broke out on the Saigon streets. All America saw it on their TV
screens, and the Americans were convinced that the war was lost.
Recall that in early 1968, American, South Vietnamese,
Australian, and South Korean troops in South Vietnam had
1.4 million people (including 550,000 Americans), 500 tanks,
4,500 guns, 4,100 planes and helicopters. 66 As a result, during
this month of intense fighting, the Communists were driven out
from all the cities they attacked based on different data losses that
ranged from 32–45,000 people, while the enemy lost only 3,000
people. This defeat greatly undermined the combat potential of
the Communists. But it remained behind the scenes due to the
fact of such a large-scale offensive that at least greatly sabotaged
the moral and psychological outlook of the Americans.
The situation was aggravated by war crimes: the operative
group of the 23rd Infantry Division under the US command of
Lieutenant William Calley Jr. on March 16, 1968 carved the vil-
lage of My Lai (this event gained worldwide fame as “the My Lai
Massacre”). The US soldiers killed about 500 civilians there be-
cause they viewed them as guerrillas. Although developments in
the My Lai Massacre led to major changes in the US Army after
the Pentagon issued a directive requiring the personnel to adhere
to strict observance of the norms of military law, the negative
66
F. B. Davidson, Vietnam at War (Moscow: Isografus Exmo, 2002), 98.
68
effect was achieved: the prestige of the US Army collapsed in the

eyes of the world and its own people.
Although in the following year, 1969, the Americans actually
won a counterinsurgency war in South Vietnam. This victory
was a Pyrrhic one because the US Army in Southeast Asia was
beginning to decay from within. During the same year of 1969,
37 officers and sergeants of the US military were killed by their
subordinates. Nothing like that had ever happened before. In the
US itself, desertions of conscripts and anti-war speeches took on
a massive character to their population and changing the situa-
tion was not possible. Because the information warfare had been
completely lost, the military successes had no practical value.
The US officials found out for themselves that by positioning
America as “democracy number one,” it was impossible to wage a
war when public opinion on universal conscription and military
duties was not even acceptable within its own armed forces. The
high degree of scrutiny via televisions in American families had
played a cruel joke with the US authorities who were unable to
find adequate answers to the challenges of the information gen-
erated by the Vietnam War.
There was only one possible way to effectively work on the
mistakes. Immediately after the end of the Vietnam War, a tran-
sition to contracting (rather than drafting) recruitments into the
US forces allowed Washington to successfully solve the military
and political objectives before the start of the third millennium.
On January 27, 1973 the Paris Agreements were signed and
concluded the war in Vietnam. The American troops left Vietnam
in a state of psychological shock. They focused on the evacuation
of manpower, leaving behind for their allies a huge number of
weapons. But even though they were armed to the teeth, the South
Vietnamese army was prominently demoralized and on April 30,
1975 after the rapid onset of the Viet Cong, a red flag with a gold
star was raised over the presidential palace in Saigon.
If we analyze the geopolitical consequences of a local con-
flict, the Vietnam War claims to be the third most important
in the twentieth century after the two World Wars. The direct
69
participation of US troops was turned back onto the United States

with considerable image losses. They were extremely sensitive to
what was then the format of a bipolar confrontation. It was after
the Vietnam War that a classic war increasingly became a thing
of the past, and instead became a marginalized type of war. It is
now replaced by a high-tech war which is an asymmetric answer
to one fighting a guerrilla-terrorist. In addition, the increasing
importance of an information war sometimes completely replaces
an actual war.
The collapse of the bipolar system of international relations
reduced the demand for hybrid war technology when the Soviet
Union was demolished, and the United States could ensure its
dominance in the world. However, the terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001
marked the transition to a multipolar world in which technology
was featured. The fact that they are used in the Middle East, in
the region, which traditionally is a place of conflict between the
interests of both world centers of influence and local players, is
indicative.
The events of July-August 2006 (the Second Lebanon War)
showed that a hybrid approach was able to neutralize the threat
against any army’s technological advantage. Hezbollah gained
a psychological victory. Here, the focus of the decision-making
process was shifted over from the military plane with ethical and
moral choices, and instead provided another choice between the
articles of association, rights, morality, and finally a way to dis-
credit the enemy after whatever decision was made—these were
the key points that provided the benefits for Hezbollah. 67
By mixing political actions with autonomous military units,
Hezbollah showed that it was able to withstand a recognized re-
gional force—the Israel Defense Forces. Well trained and disci-
plined militias have relied on guerrilla warfare in densely pop-
ulated areas of cities. The surprise also was Hezbollah’s use of
67
J.R. Davis, “Defending Future Hybrid Threats,” Military Review, Fort
Leavenworth, September-October, No. 5, (2013): 21–29.
70
modern weapons in connection with the tactics of dispersal, for

example, in anti-tank missiles.
The aforementioned Frank Hoffman called the new Lebanon
“terrible.” 68 The fact is that the power of traditional societies in
military science is defined by the concept of a “military horizon.” 69
It can be achieved not by quality weapons, but by the quality of
the teamwork, organization, and management according to a set
of principles. In this concept, many experts often underestimated
the opportunities and potential effectiveness of the hybrid forces.
Some people believe that traditional societies are not able to
master the highest level of military technology. However, the days
when the British troops shot armies of African tribes with the
advantage of guns, are gone forever. Today’s high-tech weapons
can easily be mastered effectively against modern armies even by a
person without a doctoral degree. This is shown from the fighting
during the last 30 years in Afghanistan, Somalia, and the emer-
gence of the military successes of the terrorist army, Islamic State.
But in the case of the RF’s hybrid war, they are not a stateless,
warlike people, however, its government is one with a nuclear ar-
senal and military equipment is used to mask their intentions for
use against traditional societies. Therefore, the adjective “hybrid”
can have a different quality of meaning, and a different essence
of war while denoting a common point which is utilizing the
connective diversity of strategies and tactics that vary in effect
and are even compounded to absurdity. What will it likely do?
The goals are to disorient, to inflict maximum damage but not of
the military or in manpower, rather the aim is in infrastructure
and reputation.
For example, a Russian leader appeals to history, drawing les-
sons from it to the best of his own understanding. There is an
opinion that the experience of the second Chechen war years of
68
Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” http://ndupress.ndu.edu/
portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-52.pdf.
69
Harry Holbert Turney-High, Primitive Warfare: Its Practice and Concepts,
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949).
71
1999–2009 led to the soldiers who were without a state, and so

were not burdened by law and morality. Hybrid power! This is
where terrorists, or mercenaries without a clear command and
clear objectives emerge. There is no one with whom to negotiate,
and there is nobody to blame for war crimes.
Summarizing the use of hybrid methods of waging war, it is
necessary to emphasize the following:
— A desire to violate the rules of war has deep historical roots
and is based on the principle that “the winners are not judged.”
— Technological progress on the one hand, can be balanced
by cunning and dexterity on the other.
— Hybrid displays in military operations can be called a nor-
mal practice in military history, with another thing being that
such innovations quickly become not only publicized but subject
to correction of the rules and the laws of war.
— In the 20th century the use of hybrid technology warfare has
been gaining a stable character, affecting the balance of forces in
the world.
— Hybrid instruments against the leaders of the bipolar
world—the USSR and the United States—were one of the attri-
butes of competition in the military sphere.
— In the multipolar world, betting on hybrid methods of war
indicates the maximum desire of hiding foreign policy plans
thereby achieving greater successes with less effort.
72
RESULTS
Conventional wisdom has it that whatever is new—it is good,
and the old approach should be forgotten. A number of princi-
ples and methods of modern hybrid wars have analogies in the
history of warfare. Hybrid war for a long time was seen as a way
to defeat the weakest by the strongest, to beat them from the
concentration of resources needed to win “here and now,” at the
right time in the right place. By and large, hybridity was a way
to fight without fighting openly, thus to succeed with minimal
losses. Therefore, the Achaeans, and the Gauls and Spaniards
in opposition to Napoleon, and the future Americans in the
Revolutionary War, and Germany in World War II, the Soviet
Union, and Vietnamese guerrillas, and Islamic militants have all
used such opposition elements such as irregular armed groups,
information and psychological warfare, communications break-
through, and indirect hostilities.
With multiple analogies, the old effects are well forgotten but
does not deny the very concept of a hybrid aggression. Modern
warfare conditions bring new elements and principles of their
relationship. In the 21st century, the use of hybrid technology
fighting acquires a stable character, affecting the balance of pow-
er in the world. In a multipolar world, one can bet that hybrid
warfare is the desire to maximize and hide a nation’s foreign
policy plans to achieve more with less effort.
73
SECTION 3
THE UKRAINIAN
CHALLENGE
Reasons behind Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine.

The strategic mistakes of the domestic elite. The Russian vision
of its role regarding Ukraine at the present stage.
R
Russia’s
sia’ss hybrid aggression against Ukraine was not random. It be-
came a logical continuation of the Russian policy in the post-So-
viet
et spa
space. The Kremlin’s efforts to claim and subdue the interests
of Ukraaine had occurred since the beginning of the 2000s, after
the government of Vladimir Putin came to power.
To confirm this thesis, I propose to analyze the Ukrainian-
Russian relations since 1991. During this time, the sine wave of
inter-governmental contacts kept returning to a zero-sum game
between the involved partners whenever the important prob-
lems (e.g., the duration of the Black Sea Fleet housed in Crimea,
the status of the Russian language in Ukraine) were discussed,
but often did not find resolutions. At the same time, Russia re-
mained the key to Ukraine’s economic and political partnership.
Thousands of threads connect Ukraine with Russia. Now these
links appear to be a web, which has entangled and lulled the
Ukrainian elite, and millions of its citizens.
With regard to the use of hybrid methods and means of war-
fare and aggression symptoms, I suggest the following period-
izations of Russian-Ukrainian relations after Ukraine gained
independence:
The first period—1991–1997—Beginning with Ukraine’s
Independence to the signing of a major Russian-Ukrainian agree-
ment on friendship and cooperation. This was a leftover policy
regarding the ties and relations with the Soviet Union accom-
panied by latent manifestations of intense power on the part of
Russia. Both countries were predominantly occupied by internal
problems, and hard-won interstate agreements laid the founda-
tion for further cooperation.
The second period—1997–2003—This was the time of
Ukraine’s borrowing political technology from Russia (during the
second presidential campaign of 1999, between the then current
President Leonid Kuchma and Communist Party leader Petro
Symonenko as a convenient sparring partner) and finding its own
foreign policy identity. Without the participation of any Russian
organization of the post-Soviet republics, GUAM created and
signed the “Distinctive Partnership Charter” of Ukraine–NATO
79
in 1997. The “cassette scandal” of 2000, 70 and the subsequent re-

traction of Leonid Kuchma, is not so much about the importance
of Ukraine being called back into the Kremlin’s orbit of influence
for Russia, as was the change of the Kremlin’s owner—the decrep-
it Democrat, Boris Yeltsin who virtually handed over the reins
of inheritance to the “gray lieutenant colonel” Vladimir Putin. 71
The third period—2003–2006—This was the period of ex-
acerbation of bilateral relations in which Russia allowed itself to
“prank” the conflict over the island of Tuzla in autumn 2003 72
before the first “gas war” at the turn of 2005–2006. This period
of gradual increase of the Kremlin’s pressure on Ukraine caused
rising tensions, while also increasing the number of pain points
in bilateral relations. Russia focused on testing Kyiv’s official
response to its aggressive manifestations, while scanning the
Ukrainian political elite in search for collaborators in its midst.
The fourth period—2006–February 2014—During this time,
Russia had done a lot to establish full control over Ukraine, its
elites, and resources. The Kremlin was trying to build a rela-
tionship with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, playing on her
conflict with then President Viktor Yushchenko and in 2010,
made Viktor Yanukovych the head of state. The sharp improve-
ment in the Russian financial and economic situations due to
the increase in energy prices in the early 2000s allowed valuable
contributions when searching for allies and partners in Western
70
The cassette scandal is a political scandal that exploded in November-December
2000. Linked to the publication of talks in the office of President L. Kuchma, re-
corded by Major General Mykola Melnychenko, the tapes testified to Kuchma’s
involvement in the disappearance and murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze.
71
Vladimir V. Putin (born October 7, 1952, Leningrad) is a Russian state and
political figure, the second (2000–2008) and the fourth (from May 7, 2012) presi-
dent of the Russian Federation. He worked at the Committee on State Security of
the USSR. In early 1992, he was transferred to the KGB’s “operating reserve” in the
rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
72
The conflict around the island of Kos Tuzla is a Ukrainian-Russian territorial
dispute over the identity of the island and the Russia imposed construction of the
Kerch Strait dam to the island of Kos Tuzla.
80
SECTION 3 • THE UKRAINIAN CHALLENGE
Europe and ensuring the dominance of the Russian post-Sovi-

et space. This period witnessed the refusal of NATO to allow
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Action Plans to achieve membership in
the NATO (MAP) at the Bucharest summit. 73 The decision was
probably made not without the influence of the Kremlin. The
European aspirations of Ukraine regarding the signing of the
Association Agreement with the EU were disrupted by the direct
participation of Russia, but the Kremlin’s victory was pyrrhic:
the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity not only caused the fall
of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime, but also ignited Russia’s direct
hostile actions against Ukraine.
These periods for Ukraine and Russia were a joint process in
a state of confrontational, yet conventional hybridization. This
is due to the nature of a confrontational character—the enemy
does not bother with the declaration of war, the army is often
indistinguishable from the locals, and if the enemy shows up, it
is impossible to understand who is in front of you—a terrorist,
mercenary, professional soldier, conscript, Russian or Ukrainian,
and maybe a foreigner in search of adventure.
Which of the several instances of Russian interference within
the episodes of Ukrainian affairs became a point of bifurcation?
Which of the Russian interventions is really interference, and was
or wasn’t a coincidence? Where was the “Russian trace,” and was
it the only hint on the trail? If Russian snipers 74 participated in
the acts of the Euromaidan, it still needs to be proven. Perhaps it
started with the first death on January 22, 2014 on Hrushevsky
Street in Kyiv 75 for it to be considered as a reference point? Or
73
The Bucharest Summit of NATO, April 2–4, 2008 in Bucharest, Romania. The
agenda was the recognition of Kosovo, hostilities in Afghanistan, the expansion
of the Alliance with the accession of Croatia, Albania and Macedonia, as well as
accession to the MAP for Ukraine and Georgia.
74
There is a version that Russian special forces, in particular snipers, participated
in the Maidan events during December 2013–January 2014.
75
On January 22, 2014, five protesters were killed in Kyiv as a result of the con-
frontation between the “Berkut” squads and the participants of the Euromaidan
on Hrushevsky Street.
81
was it the appearance of the first “green men” 76 in the Crimea

and the capture of their administrative buildings on February
27, 2014? 77 By the way, on March 12, 2014, NATO acknowl-
edged those “polite people” who were actually the soldiers of the
Russian army. The full participation of the Russian army in the
battle for Ilovaisk that started from August 22, 2014, can also
become a kind of landmark. 78 Or it is necessary to look beyond
all of it (as does Mychailo Gonchar and his colleagues at the
Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” 79) and start a reference
point of the trade wars during the summer of 2013? 80 Ukraine
needs clear answers to these questions. They are worthwhile and
still necessary for Ukraine and Europe because the responses are
dependent on the prospect of the development of relations on
the continent and the fate of the European Union.
76
“Green men” (also in the Russian media space known as the “polite people”)—a
humorous and ironic name of the Russian military sans distinctive uniforms and
technology, whose operations were secretly carried out in these special units at the
first stage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, often using often non-military
operations to capture and block the opposition.
77
On the night of February 27, the government buildings of the Verkhovna Rada
of Crimea were captured by armed Russian special forces who installed Russian flags.
According to media reports, the center of Simferopol was blocked by law enforcers
raising anxiety levels, and restricting public transport. Unknown representatives of
the Crimean Council of Ministers said that they were the “defenders of Russian-
speaking citizens,” and the Russian media reported that militants were actually
soldiers of the Sevastopol squad “Berkut” which disbanded on February 25, 2014.
78
The Battle of Ilovaisk, also known as the Ilovaisky Boiler, was deployed from
the city of Ilovaisk in the Donetsk region during the war in eastern Ukraine on
August 2014. On August 18, during the fierce battles, Ukrainian security forces, a
large part of which consisted of volunteer battalions, entered Ilovaisk. They were
able to take control of a portion of the city, but after the arrival on August 23–24 of
significant forces by the regular Russian troops from the Russian Federation, the
Ukrainian forces were surrounded.
79
Mychailo Gonchar is an expert on energy issues, the President of the Center
for Global Studies, and “Strategy XXI” which are “think tanks” located in Kyiv.
80
Mychailo Gonchar, Andriy Chubik, and Oksana Ishchuk, “Kremlin hybrid war
against Ukraine and the EU: Energy Component,” https://dt.ua/energy_market/
gibridna-viyna-kremlya-proti-ukrayini-iyes-energetichniy-komponent-_.html.
82
Hybrid aggression is still not a war in the traditional sense.

In addition, the “soft entry” towards a state of war also played
a role in which victims of aggression are not fully aware of the
danger, not to mention having the appropriate responses and
taking precautions. And yet, there is a point of no return that can
be defined. For all its cynicism and aggressive nature in respect
to Ukrainian sovereignty, neither the trade wars nor the murders
on the Euromaidan lead to irreversible consequences or such
that would violate Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity
thereby jeopardizing the very existence of the Ukrainian nation.
Such were the after-effects of February 20, 2014 (incidentally,
this is the date printed on Russian medals along with the logo:
“For the return of Crimea”) and following the appearance of
the “green men” in Crimea. It is also about seizing the build-
ings of the Verkhovna Rada and the Council of Ministers of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, blocking Belbek’s military air-
port on the night of February 27, 2014, also blocking the airport
in Simferopol, capturing the TV and radio company “Crimea,”
and blocking sections of the Ukrainian army. 81 The Federation
Council Decision of March 1, 2014 ratified by both houses of the
Russian Parliament regarding the possibility of using its armed
forces on the territory of Ukraine gave this accomplished aggres-
sion a patina of legitimacy. The first spring evening in 2014 was
for Ukraine a truly dramatic one.
The Russian Referendum of March 16, 2014 on the status of
Crimea with the predictable result was the logical conclusion of
the first act of aggression. There was no doubt in Ukraine that
the Ukrainians were now the direct participants in a military
drama with an open ending.
Whatever the date of the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian
war, one thing is clear: the strategic goal was determined long
ago, long before 2013. For example, a plot by Russia against
Ukraine began before the first “gas war” was organized in 2005
when Ukraine was designated as a failed state. The tactics were
81
“Chronology of the Crimean Crisis (2014),” https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki.
83
the realization of the Kremlin’s strategic plans that were adjust-

ed and dependent on the internal political situation in Ukraine
during the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014.
Reasons for the hybrid aggression against Ukraine:

1. Explosive and critical views of the incompatibility of the
Ukrainians and the Russian political elite regarding the
future of Ukraine.
2. The foreign policy ambitions of the Russian leadership,
supported by the historical tradition of empire building
and significant savings from the sale of energy. The
Russian elite felt that the perfect moment had arrived—
the desire coincided with the possibilities.
3. The attractiveness of Ukraine as a victim and a trophy—
an unreformed state with a weak army, an inefficient
economy, and dubious corrupt elites at the helm but
exhibited significant potential (natural, economic,
geopolitical).
4. The need for Russia’s “small victorious war” that could
unite Russian society around the political leadership of
the country, the desire for unchanging leadership, the
need for the war to be permanent and prolonged touting
it as a war against its nation which is emblematic for the
millions of Russian citizens.
A retrospective of Russian-Ukrainian relations can be viewed

through the prism of the past Ukrainian presidents who were tradi-
tionally the leading political figures, regardless of the scope of their
authority.
Russian-Ukrainian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union
were formally friendly, but Moscow could not get rid of its imperialistic
complex. On November 19, 1990, the Chairman of the Verkhovna
Rada Leonid Kravchuk, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a
84
basic framework agreement on the principles of relations between the

Russian SFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, for “the recognition and respect
of the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”82
The signatories supposedly legitimized themselves as future leaders of
independent states while ensuring the support within the Soviet re-
publics. The situational interests of Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk
were matched and allowed the two largest former Soviet republics to
form, if not always easy, but in general, an effective dialogue.
But even before the overtures began for an independent Ukraine,
the Russian political elite did not really mean to accept this fact. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was perceived as “temporar-
ily a lost territory.” Perhaps only the internal clashes between members
of the Russian elite did not allow them then to present a united front
against an independent Ukraine.
The division of property, the status of the Black Sea Fleet and the
Crimea, and Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament were the main issues of
Russian-Ukrainian relations immediately following the collapse of the
USSR. The “older brother” complex Moscow had manifested for itself
was evident, while Ukraine did not dare to be too active. In truth, Kyiv’s
officials had neither the political will nor the resources to impose their
game against Moscow in the early 1990s.
An unpleasant surprise occurred for the Russians following the
results of voting in the referendum in the Crimea on December 1,
1991: 54% of the Crimean people voted for Ukraine’s independence.83
Although these results were lower than in the entire country, they were
indicative. This solution seemed to be a logical continuation of the
previous plebiscite: in January 1991 a referendum was held in which
the status of Crimea was promoted as an Autonomous Soviet Republic,
and the results of the Crimean votes were recognized by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine. Russia reacted to this decision by the Decree of the
82
“How Ukraine turned into a country with market economy and democracy,”
http://www.ukrainereforms.info/?cat=3.
83
“Documents of the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine on the Anniversary
of the All-Ukrainian Referendum on December 1, 1991,” http://tsdavo.gov.ua/4/
webpages/63470077.html.
85
Supreme Council of January 23, 1992 based on the unconstitutionality

of the decisions made in 1954 regarding the transfer of the Crimean
oblast (region) of the RSFSR to becoming part of the Ukrainian RSR.84
In Russia, the Black Sea fleet remained in reserve. The global mar-
itime importance was negligible because of the possibility of being
locked in the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles. But to have an im-
pact regarding the mood on the peninsula with an already obviously
outdated fleet proved to be sufficient. Crimea became a “fatal penin-
sula” for Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the major stumbling block
between the former Soviet republics.
The Russian and Ukrainian Parliaments in the early 1990s ex-
changed decisions like boxers for the determination of the status of
Crimea and Sevastopol. They were used mostly for propaganda ef-
fects and were unsuitable for implementation. The opposition between
Russia and Ukraine over Crimea’s new colors began after January 30,
1994 when the Crimea’s President Yuri Meshkov appeared—a pol-
itician with pronounced pro-Russian orientation whose intentions
were to implement calls for a rapprochement with Russia. But due to
stiff opposition from the Ukrainian authorities and the intra-Crimean
opposition, Russia realized that the transition to Moscow would only
come in time (also known as Decree Number 1).85
Ukraine won the first round of the battle for the Crimea due to
the following factors:
– The confrontation of different branches within the Russian
Federation was prevented by Moscow in developing a consolidat-
ed common position on the decision surrounding the “Crimean
issue.”
– Officials in Kyiv managed to apply the traditional practice of
“divide and conquer” thereby minimizing separatist sentiment
in the peninsula. The Crimean elites were disunited and disor-
ganized.
– Crimea’s status was not a major issue on the agenda of bilateral
. Fedorov, “Legal status of the Crimea. Legal Status of Sevastopol,”

krstor.com/ukrstor/fedorov-pravstatus.html.
85
“Chronicles of Crimea. Annexation of the Peninsula,” http://journal.112.ua/krym.
86
relations. The relations between Kyiv and Moscow were aggra-

vated in 1992–1993 in parallel with the intensive talks about
Ukraine’s nuclear status.
– In the first half of 1990, the Russian and Ukrainian armies were
still fragments of the former Soviet Army, and not the armed
forces of independent nations. Serious discussions about using
the armies during a confrontation would not have been of great
risk for either Kyiv or Moscow.
– Russia was mired in the first Chechen war and was busy ensuring
its territorial integrity.
The nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was the result of coordi-
nated pressure on our country by the United States and Russia who
were interested in the preservation for having limited numbers of
members in the nuclear club. I believe that Kyiv had no opportunity
to defend its nuclear arsenal. The other consideration was that the
payment for parting with it was far more impressive. The Budapest
Memorandum86 can be viewed as the greatest geopolitical illusion of
Ukrainian independence.
The early ‘90s for Ukraine was not easy due to a combination of po-
litical and economic problems, but the representatives of the national
elite have tried to find a democratic way out. The result, in particular,
turned out to be the early parliamentary and presidential elections of
1994. The new leader of Ukraine—with indirect support from Russia
(it is believed that the former head of Pivdenmash877 was able to co-opt
for his own purposes) was the “red director,” Leonid Kuchma.88
86
Memorandum on security guarantees in connection with the accession of Ukraine
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an international agree-
ment concluded on December 5, 1994 between Ukraine, the USA, Russia, and the
United Kingdom on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. The agreement contains claus-
es providing guarantees of sovereignty and security of Ukraine.
87
7
Pivdenmash is a state-controlled enterprise also called the Production Association
Southern Machine-Building Plant named after O. M. Makarova, and the leading
Ukrainian company for rocket and space technology production, defense, scientific,
and national economic technologies in the city of Dnipro. Produces the most envi-
ronmentally friendly carrier rockets in the world.
88
The “red directors” were the influential leaders of Soviet industrial enterprises.
87
His victory in the presidential campaign and his coming to power

in the 10 years had been crucial for the development of the country.
Kuchma laid the oligarchical model of the economy that led to a grow-
ing gap between our country and our neighbors in Central Europe.
The multi-vector foreign policy had played a cruel joke with Kyiv by
escalating the threat of Ukraine becoming a “gray zone” in the center
of Europe. But then, this threat seemed ephemeral and unrealistic
considering this sort of narcissistic agenda, and of Ukraine’s unique
potential.
A new page was turned in the relations between Ukraine
and Russia acting as independent states through the signing of
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and
Ukraine (the Big Treaty) on May 31, 1997 in Kyiv, during the
first official visit of Boris Yeltsin to Ukraine. The most import-
ant provision of the Big Treaty was the legal recognition of the
territorial integrity of the parties towards each other and the
inviolability of national borders. Out of these, without doubt,
the real key provision of the document was never to forget those
Russian politicians who continued to cry out that “Crimea is
ours.”
In this revealing look of the ratification process of the trea-
ty, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the procedures of
January 14, 1998. The lower house of the Russian Parliament,
the State Duma, ratified the treaty on December 25, 1998, and
the upper house, the Federation Council, on February 17, 1999.
Russia delayed the ratification of this fundamental document
of bilateral relations as long as the Ukrainian Parliament was
not willing to ratify the agreements regarding the military base
of the Russian Federation’s Black Sea Fleet in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea. Let me remind you that it was the Russian
Black Sea Fleet division that became one of the forces that direct-
ly carried out the annexation of Crimea, and the Federal Security
Service (FSB) provided the counterintelligence measures against
the fleets that were active on Ukrainian territory.
Paradoxically, the fact is that after Leonid Kuchma came to
power, the Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov began to feel much
88
less at ease, and the experienced Crimean security officers under

Yevhen Marchukk 89 were able to quickly root out the germs of
separatism, forcing Meshkov to go to Moscow while his sup-
porters hid.
Leonid Kuchma, in the second half of the 1990s, tried to build
a multi-vector foreign policy. To some extent, it succeeded.
On July 9, 1997, he signed in Madrid the Charter of a
Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, which
laid the foundation of our country’s unique relationship with
the Alliance.
Ukraine, together with a number of former Soviet repub-
lics—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Uzbekistan joined the
informal association at that time but it took a separate posi-
tion)—comprised the organization GUAM 90 in October 1997.
Its political association with the United States could be called
its patron, and helped to establish it at the Council of Europe
in Strasbourg. The economic basis for the organization was
Caspian oil, and a form of activity for the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline which was the first post-Soviet
space to bypass Russia.
Kuchma’s second presidential term was not so successful. A
number of internal steps (the premiership of Viktor Yushchenko,
the creation of a coalition in the Ukrainian Parliament loyal
to the president’s centrists and national democrats) in the first
years following his re-election showed a drifting of Ukraine to-
wards the West. Perhaps it was then that the Russian Federation
decided to try to intervene in the situation with non-standard
methods.
89
Yevhen Kyrylovych Marchuk (born 1941) is a Ukrainian politician, an em-
ployee of the Soviet and Ukrainian special services, the first head of the Security
Service of Ukraine (1991–1994), the Prime Minister of Ukraine (1995–1996), and
the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. After leaving politics,
acts as a consultant.
90
The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) is a
regional organization created by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (the
organization also included Uzbekistan from 1999 to 2005).
89
In autumn 2000, the Ukrainian President was accused of

being involved in the kidnapping and murder of opposition
journalist Georgiy Gongadze. 91 The charges were based on
conversations in the office which Kuchma allegedly made that
were recorded by State Security Service Officer, Major Mykola
Melnychenko.
I do not rule out that the scandal was the first testing methods
of the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine. Accusations of
Kuchma’s address (an attack on freedom of speech, the use
of “death squads”) have focused on the West’s perception and
closed the opportunity for him to build relations with the US
and EU. The “control shots” were the information regarding
the supply of Ukrainian electronic intelligence stations
known as “Chainmail Iraq,” an active phase of a planned
military operation by the United States that was published in
September 2002. 92
Russia wasted no time in reducing the amount of space the

officials in Kyiv had for maneuvering. Vladimir Putin had by
then settled into the Kremlin, and unleashed a variety of pro-
posals on Ukraine. In February 2003, Moscow announced the
creation of the Common Economic Space (CES), a prototype of a
91
Georgy Ruslanovych Gongadze (1969–2000) was a Ukrainian journalist, found-
er and first editor-in-chief of the Internet publication Ukrainska Pravda. Gongadze
disappeared and murdered in 2000. The circumstances of his death were a national
scandal and a reason for protests against President Leonid Kuchma.
92
In April 2002, the former Major of the State Security Center, Mykola
Melnychenko, testified to the Grand Jury of San Francisco that his recordings in-
dicate a two-year-old presumption: Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the
head of Ukrspetsectport, a Ukrainian state-owned company, own a monopoly with
rights to export and import products, military, and dual-use services. Maliev sup-
posedly discussed details of a “special operation” regarding possible sales to Iraq
of four “chainmail” stations. On September 24, the United States stated that they
considered Melnychenko’s records to be authentic. Regarding “Kolchug,” –another
name for the “chainmail” stations, Americans did not find evidence of this scandal
in Iraq, but, they say, the aftertaste of scandal remains.
90
customs and monetary union with four of the most powerful—in

economic terms—post-Soviet states. 93
In the fall of 2003, the territory of the Kuban with the direct
assistance of the local governor Aleksander Tkachyov who was
elected on September 29, began construction of an artificial dam
in the direction of the island of Tuzla in the Azov Sea. With
this provocation, the Kremlin sought to ensure the passage by
the State Duma of the Homeland Party which was the bearer of
chauvinism and nationalism. Its ideologists were Sergei Glazyev 94
and Dmitry Rogozin, 95 who today claim to be the “tamers of
Ukraine.” Even then, the intensive “small victorious war” report-
ed by the accompanying media was supposed to bring visible
tangible benefits for the Kremlin’s political allies, and to test
the reaction of the Ukrainian leadership towards unexpected
developments.
Leonid Kuchma was forced to cut short a visit to Brazil. On
the island of Kosa Tuzla, a border outpost was quickly built and
appeared near Ukrainian warships and aircraft. The Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine adopted a resolution with 369 votes out of 450
which condemned Russia’s actions as “unfriendly acts, forcing
Ukraine to reconsider its current relations with the Russian
Federation.” 96
The conflict over the island of Kosa Tuzla demonstrated
Moscow’s desire to return Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of
monopoly power. It is not episodic, or accidental. Vladimir Putin
93
L. Kosikova, “CES. To be or not to be?” http://censor.net.ua/resonance/2636/
eep_byt_ili_ne_byt_ng.
94
Sergey Glazyev (b.1961)—Russian economist, politician, advisor to the
President of the Russian Federation on regional economic integration. Known for
his ultra-nationalistic views.
95
Dmitry Olegovich Rogozin (b.1963)—Russian politician, diplomat, deputy
chairman of the Russian Federation. Known for his ultra-nationalistic views.
96
T. Gunchak, “Empire is difficult at being an equal neighbor,” https://day.kyiv.
ua/uk/article/podrobici/imperiyi-tyazhko-buti-rivnopravnim-susidom.
91
launched an offensive on the Ukrainian position, armed with

a strategy of indirect actions. Among analysts and experts a
lot of recommendations were formulated after the situation
with Tuzla. 97 We will not go into the alternative-historical
genre, and yet we dare to suggest: if the threat from that
“great neighbor” was then perceived objectively and reacted
aggressively in response, the Ukrainian-Russian relations
today would have been different.
Despite shaking hands mostly with the West, President

Kuchma preferred to work closely with his Russian counter-
part. Viktor Medvedchuk became manager of this strategy and
the head of the presidential administration, (we will return to
his policymaking). The culmination of Kuchma’s cooperation
with Russia was the presidential election in Ukraine, which
took place in late 2004, and throughout the election campaigns
Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin met almost monthly.
Russian political technologists not only took an active part
in ensuring the election campaign of Viktor Yanukovych, but
also spearheaded the mission of “ideological sharpening” for
keeping Ukraine within Russia’s interests. On August 31, 2004,
one of Putin’s inner court members and political strategists,
former Odesa dissident Gleb Pavlovsky, opened a Russian club
hotel called The Premier Palace in Kyiv which became one of
the informal centers of agitation for the Yanukovych campaign.
His regular members descended on the screens of Ukrainian
and Russian TV channels, spraying mud on Viktor Yushchenko
and praising Viktor Yanukovych without empty measure. It is
due to the unbridled “merits” of these Russian image makers
that created the tarnished image of Victor Yushchenko as an
agent of the United States.
The Orange Revolution dealt a serious blow to Vladimir
Putin’s geopolitical vanity. In Ukraine, millions of people not
97
For example see http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/pravo_na_silu.html.
92
only took to the streets but seriously affected the develop-

ment of a logical sequence of events for power policies, against
which Russia actively fought. In the Kremlin, they were sur-
prised by the refusal of Leonid Kuchma to use force against
the protesters. The participation of the State Duma Speaker
Boris Gryzlov, together with representatives of the EU and
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Javier Solana and Miroslav Lajčák in negotiations on
the settlement of the political crisis in Ukraine in late 2004
appeared more like a good match for a bad game. And at the
same time it was an attempt to show that Russia had interests
and influence in Ukraine.
Leonid Kuchma spent two full presidential terms in office,
which had the following features:
– Inconsistent foreign policies and the desire to concentrate
power in the hands of the president.
– Trying to carry out foreign policy on the principle of equi-
distant-turned multidirectional while being drawn into
the orbit of Russian influence.
– The oligarchization of the economy, and the establish-
ment of control over the media led to ineffective com-
munication authorities thereby allowing both society and
the government to weaken under the control of outside
influences.
Thanks to the victory of the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko
came to power. At the beginning of his presidential term he
tried to improve relations with the Kremlin, and even made
an unofficial visit to Moscow on January 24, 2005. However,
it did not help to remedy the situation because in Russia,
Yushchenko’s victory was perceived as his own strategic de-
feat. Moreover, Yushchenko was not ready for the oppositional
behavior for a number of objective and subjective reasons.
The Kremlin had begun preparations to counter the color
revolution by implementing the emergence of movements such
93
as Our 98 cals, 99 and hosting ideological seminars on Lake

Seliger 100 to establish total control over Russia’s information
space and depriving the opposition of any potential leader-
ship and funding sources (example: the Khodorkovsky case, 101
which started in 2003). This is only a short list of countermea-
sures by Putin’s domestic policy administration.
With respect to Ukraine, the tactics used were the levers of
“energy pressures” against Ukrainian consumers and Ukraine’s
status as a strategic partner for the transit of gas. Russia led
its retaliation against its important partner and went back on
its word with an asymmetric policy: in early June 2005, its
representatives demanded that from January 1, 2006 onward,
it was going to triple the price from the current $50 per 1,000
cubic meters to $160, and then, when the negotiations did not
lead to concrete results, up to $230. 102 Russia had increasingly
raised the stakes, while having at its disposal comprehensive
information on the vulnerabilities of its negotiating partners.
By providing powerful pressures on Ukraine in the gas sphere,

Russia had been trying to solve several problems:
– Undermining the credibility of Ukraine as a transit country
to the leading Russian energy resources of Europe.
98
A youth movement, created in 2005 by the Russian President’s Administration,
was reorganized as the youth organization Together. It is considered to be a
pro-Kremlin group that executes any orders by the Kremlin.
99
A Moscow region political and ecological movement for youths.
100
Since 2005, Our (Nashi) holds an annual summer camp at Lake Seliger in the
Tver region, with prominent political figures, analysts, and representatives of Russia’s
executive and legislative powers.
101
Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky (b.1963)—Russian businessman, public fig-
ure, publicist. In October 2003, was the chairman of the board and largest co-owner
of YUKOS; arrested and charged with stealing property and tax evasion. Quoted
as saying he paid for his public criticism of Putin with his freedom and property.
102
Michael Krasnov and Peter Kanaev, “Ukraine will estimate losses and revise
the agreement,” http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/01/06/oa_183871.shtml.
94
– Questioning the effectiveness of the Ukrainian gas

transport system in order to establish control over it later.
– Affecting the 2006 parliamentary election campaign, the
outcome being extremely important in light of Ukraine’s
transition to a parliamentary-presidential republic from
January 1, 2006, so as to influence votes in the Ukrainian
parliament majority and determining who would be loyal
to the Kremlin.
– Working out a mechanism to discredit the government
in the European information space, while weakening the
position of Ukraine in the international arena.
Unfortunately, the background reasons for the defeat in the “gas

wars” were laid out by the actions of the Ukrainian government in
its inability to rise above the internecine contradictions in order
to protect national interests. Moreover, it soon became clear that
the information space of the country resembled a thoroughfare,
and there was almost no one in the information sphere who could
resist the pressure. The objective of the manipulative transforma-
tion of Ukraine did not cause an adequate reaction on the part of
the national elite and government representatives.
A parallel, but no less effective process of external influence,
was the intensification of the pro-Russian organizations. The
Kremlin used the democratization of Ukraine to create a network
of agents of influence in the private sector. Yuschenko’s “Naive
Ukrainianization” that sought to create a “my nation” type of cul-
tural basis, had Russia creating a network of agents of influence
in the destructive ideas aimed at dividing Ukraine’s non-govern-
mental sector. It was in the information space that was used at the
time to actively revive the theme of a “New Russia” in the south of
Ukraine, since Donbas was controlled by the Party of Regions and
was seen as an electoral reserve for Viktor Yanukovych.
Southern Ukraine was consistently becoming more pro-Rus-
sian. The proximity to Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea fleet
was stationed, was composed of a motley ethnic composition of
95
the population (the Odesa region could be called the most demon-
strative of this aspect), and the weak position of the central govern-
ment were decisive factors in enhancing the pro-Russian organiza-
tions. Among those that should be emphasized are the Ukrainian
Party Union, the political parties Country, the Progressive Socialist
Party of Ukraine, the Slavic Party (centered in Donetsk), and the
Russian Block (which contains within it the following parties: For a
One Russia, the Russian-Ukrainian Union, the Russian Movement
of Ukraine), and the Slavic People’s Patriotic Union.
The ideology of the organizations mentioned above is an up-
dated version of the Russian Black Hundreds 103 of the early 20th
century. The ideological foundation is the propaganda thesis of:
“we are the only real defenders of Orthodoxy” as the idea behind
Slavic unity along with Russian Slavophilic conservatism and a
sharp denial of any alternatives, and which actually embodies
Ukrainophobia and anti-Semitism. These hysterical attitudes
were observed by the alternative Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Christian denominations: the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, and the
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. 104
The culmination of the activity of pro-Russian organizations
in southern Ukraine was the restoration in October 2007 of a
103
The Black Hundreds (1905–1914)—collective name for several of Russian
monarchist and ultranationalist organizations that arose in the Russian Empire after
the 1905 revolution. The name was taken from the grassroots Nizhny Novgorod
Militia of Troubles, under the leadership of Kuzma Minin. They favored the pres-
ervation of autocracy on the basis of the Vavrov principles: “Orthodoxy, Self-
determination, Nationalism.”
104
Historically, there were several Christian churches in Ukraine. The Ukrainian
Greek Catholic Church was formed as a result of the conclusion of the Brest Union in
1596, is in communion with the Bishop of Rome and preserves the Constantinople
(Byzantine) liturgical tradition. Another is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv
Patriarchate Orthodox Church in Ukraine with the residence of the Patriarch in
Kyiv. The UOC-KP was created in June 1992 as a result of the unification of two
church groups advocating independence from the Russian Orthodox Church: some
of the faithful and the UOC-MP bishopric, headed by Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko),
the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church.
96
monument in Odesa to the Empress Catherine of which a remark-

ably low performance of activism was exhibited by the central gov-
ernment and pro-Ukrainian activists. 105 By undertaking a secret
sauce type of idea for restoring historical justice, there was a desire
by Russia to stake a territory which is one of the key manifestations
of a hybrid war, and by which approach only one might guess.
Along with the strengthening of the pro-Russian organizations
in Ukraine, the Russian Federation’s articulation of new foreign pol-
icy intentions were carried out and acted with remarkable ease. The
Munich speech was the starting point of Putin’s 106 growing geopo-
litical game muscles. The Kremlin felt that its nation had a chance
to restore its influence on world politics in quantities greater than
was inherent in the Soviet Union, even greater than Yeltsin’s Russia,
and at the same time could challenge the United States as a nation
that was intent on demonstrating its right to leadership in today’s
world. However, without the restoration of control over Ukraine,
the talk about the realization of this ambition was impossible.
Moscow was preparing to launch a situational counter-offensive
move on the international front for an adequate search for allies
and partners. In many ways, it formed the pool of “Russian friends.”
Among them were such giants of European policy as Gerhard
Schröder and Silvio Berlusconi. The effort paid off—for example,
Germany, together with France, torpedoed the granting of the MAP
to Ukraine and Georgia at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.
The Russian President Vladimir Putin, during these circumstances,
acted most harshly by quickly going on the offensive. In a closed
session of the NATO-Russia Council, Putin threatened that in the
case of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, Ukraine would cease to exist
as a unified state. In particular, Russia would annex Crimea and
the East of the country. To prevent NATO from overtaking the
105
“In Odessa, they want to demolish the monument to Catherine II,” http://
glavred.info/zhizn/v-odesse-hotyat-snesti-pamyatnik-ekaterine-ii-246791.html.
106
President Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech at the Munich Conference
on Security Policy was delivered on February 10, 2007. http://archive.
kremlin.ru/appears/2007/02/10/1737_type63374type63376type63377type-
63381type82634_118097.shtml.
97
borders of Russia, Putin “promised to take adequate measures.”

Referring to US President George W. Bush, Putin allowed himself
to say that “Ukraine—is not even a nation! What is Ukraine? Part of
its territory is Eastern Europe, and a large part was gifted by us.” 107
The year 2008 was filled with disturbing signals for Ukraine. The
loudest of the alarms sounded at the beginning of August during
the Georgian-Russian war. Ukraine in the course of this local con-
flict was in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the Georgian
air defenses were equipped with Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile
systems and represented a real problem for Russian aviation. Victor
Yushchenko took a clear position in support of Georgia. On the
other hand, a detachment of ships from the Black Sea Fleet, based
in the Ukrainian port, participated in hostilities against Georgia.
It is interesting to note that in October 2008, Jeffrey Kuhner,
a columnist for the publication The Washington Times, gave an
analysis of the current military conflict in the Caucasus and the sit-
uation in Europe, which proved to be prophetic: “The main aim of
Moscow is to snatch and take control of the Kyivan Crimean penin-
sula. Russia was distributing Russian passports to thousands of its
supporters in Crimea. The plan is to repeat what has already hap-
pened in South Ossetia and Abkhazia which is to create a pretext
for sending in the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Crimea to protect the
supposedly in distress Russian ‘citizens.’ But Ukraine is not Georgia.
This is a big and strong country militarily, and very much mindful
of Russian domination. Any attempt of Moscow to split Ukraine
will come up against fierce resistance. This may cause a bloody war
between Russia and Ukraine. It will inevitably be drawn into Poland
and the Baltic countries—and they are all NATO members. Putin’s
bellicose nationalism threatens the pan-European fire.
“The battle for Ukraine is not only a test of willpower on a
regional scale. This clash is over the future of Europe and Russia’s
role in the future.” 108
107
Kommersant, April 2008–7.
108
J. Kuhner, “The next war in Europe—between Russia and Ukraine?” http://
inosmi.ru/world/20081013/244608.html#ixzz3Rn4zaCiU.
98
Unfortunately, the internal contradictions in the Ukrainian

leadership led to a failure to mobilize against Russian pressure.
Moreover, the “gas war” in 2009 dealt a serious blow to the
international prestige of Ukraine and finally a wedge was driv-
en between Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Under
these conditions, the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych
was only a matter of time.
Summing up the results of the presidential events of Viktor
Yushchenko, the following should be noted:
– The “my dear friends” (“Lyubі druzі”) cooperative 109
of Yushchenko’s had out rightly drowned in Vladimir
Vladimirovich’s lake.
– Pro-Ukrainian statements by Yushchenko were not backed
up by concrete actions.
– Nepotism and “sharovarschina”” [superficial attempts of
acting like a patriotic Ukrainian by wearing national cos-
tumes etc., but without having true patriotic feelings] in
domestic policy were compounded by devastating political
competition for the country’s leadership, which victimized
national interests.
– Short-sighted actions of the country’s leadership in the en-
ergy sector led to two gas wars with Russia, which Ukraine
had not only failed at, but also suffered an image loss in its
relations with the European Union.
– A marked increase in Russia’s actions in the international
arena had become a disturbing signal for the Ukrainian
government, but which failed to discern a direct and real
threat to the sovereignty of the country.
– Trying to get a MAP agreement for Ukraine’s rapproche-
ment with NATO ended in failure, and the results of the
armed conflict in Georgia were not critically interpreted
by the Ukrainian leadership.
– Opponents of Yushchenko made good use of his democratic
109
“My dear friends”—euphemism for a group of people close to Ukraine’s
President Viktor Yushchenko during his administration.
99
attitude and contrasting inability to communicate and fol-

low through with deliberately determined actions, some-
times verging on foul play.
The presidential term of Viktor Yanukovych began on a pos-
itive tone: his victory was declared to the entire civilized world
and was commonly believed that the new president still gave
preference to European integration as a way of self-preservation.
This was especially obvious during his first foreign visit as head
of state that took place in Brussels, where Viktor Yanukovych
stated that, “European integration is a priority of our foreign
policy and a key element of the strategy of socio-economic re-
forms that we are going to carry out.” 110 However, few expected
that the rapprochement with the Russian Federation would be
so rapid.
On April 21, 2010, Viktor Yanukovych quickly signed with
his then Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev the Kharkiv
agreements that provided for the prolongation of the Russian
Black Sea fleet in the Ukrainian port until 2042 in exchange for a
$100 discount on every thousand cubic meters of gas supplied by
the Russian company Gazprom to Ukraine. 111 The Rada’s ratifi-
cation of the document had passed in the midst of an egg-throw-
ing melee, followed by smoke bombs, and umbrellas as shields.
The Kharkiv Agreements were a Pyrrhic victory for Yanukovych’s
team, because in just two years, starting from the first quarter of
2010, the price of gas rose from $230 to $416 per thousand cubic
meters. Moreover, Ukraine remained for several years the only con-
sumer of Russian gas, and was not expected to change its supplier.
The December 2013 agreement between Vladimir Putin and Viktor
Yanukovych in Moscow had provided not only a $3 billion loan to
Ukraine, but also granted a new discount for Ukrainian consum-
ers. “The summation of the discounts provided by the Kharkiv
110
S. Leshchenko, “Viktor Yanukovych debuted on the European market,” http://
www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/03/2/4823824/
111
Kharkiv Addition to the Tymoshenko-Putin Gas Contract. Text of the docu-
ment, http://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2010/04/22/4956389/.
100
Agreements of 2010 would reduce the price for Ukraine to the level
of $268.5 per 1,000 cubic meters. Benefits for the first quarter of this
year are anticipated provided that Kyiv pays off the accumulated
debt in the future.” 112 This only confirms the assumption that the
price of natural gas for Ukraine was solely of a political nature.
From first sight, Moscow had make unobtrusive overtures to
Viktor Yanukovych and provided advisory, organizational, tech-
nical and cultural-ideological assistance in shaping the regime for
his one-man political power mode. On September 30, 2010, the
Constitutional Court increased his presidential powers as part of
the abolition of political reforms due to the passive behavior of the
Ukrainian elite.
The position of Ukraine’s Minister of Defense in February-
December 2012 was retained by Dmytro Salamatin, and the
Security Service was led by Aleksandr Yakimenko from January
2013 to February 2014. These two high-ranking security officials,
as evidenced by their biographies, were not only introduced into
Viktor Yanukovych’s early days’ environment, but also possessed
Russian passports. Yanukovych’s chief guard was a Russian citi-
zen, Vyacheslav Zanevsky, which bewildered many Ukrainian
politicians.
In the summer of 2012, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the On
the State Language Policy law which raises the status of the Russian
language and other languages of national minorities. This ratio-
nale is understandable, since the Russian minority is the largest
in Ukraine. But their position is unlikely to be seen as restrained.
Vadym Kolesnichenko and Serhiy Kivalov, the authors of the law
and members of the faction of the Party of Regions, were well aware
that the sixth convocation of the Rada could not afford to make
changes to the Constitution in the language issue, so they went in
a roundabout way with the support of the president. The adop-
tion of a “language law” would mean that a new division would
occur in Ukraine between the Russian and Ukrainian speakers.
112
T. Ivzhenko, “There was a week before the new gas war,” http://www.ng.ru/
cis/2014-05-22/1_gaswar.html.
101
The situation around the language issue had a depressing effect

on society, forcing many people once again to feel a threatening
“wind from the East.” 113
On February 23, 2014 after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, 114 this
unfortunate law was promptly quashed by the decision of the
Verkhovna Rada. It was used only once by Russia as a formal rea-
son for the annexation of Crimea and during the mass protests
in Donbas. This official act to repeal the “On the State Language
Policy” was not signed by the head of state, and in fact the docu-
ment remains still in effect.
During his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych intensified his an-
ti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Moscow, and throughout, the Ukrainian
president had been very loyal to the Kremlin. Paradoxically, Russia
with the grace of an elephant sitting on a bench, began to attract
Ukraine into its integration.
In December 2010, Vladimir Putin made a resonant statement
during his traditional television-dialogue session with his coun-
try. He stressed: “Now, regarding our relations with Ukraine. I will
disagree with you when you are told that if we were separated, we
would not have won the [Second World] War. We would still have
won because we are a country of winners. This means that the
war is won, I do not want to offend anyone, at the expense of the
industrial resources of the Russian Federation. It is a historical fact;
it’s all in the documents.” 115
I doubt that this provocative statement was an impromptu one.
Putin tested the Ukrainian establishment for the presence of any res-
idues of national pride. It is significant that the attention was on the
Second World War—an extremely painful subject for Ukraine.
113
“Council abolished the language law of Kolesnichenko,” https://www.pravda.
com.ua/news/2014/02/23/7015948/.
114
“Pro-Russian MPs met in Svalyava with Putin’s ‘Rusyns,’” http://zakarpattya.
net.ua/News/148687-Prorosiiski-deputaty-IEvroparlamentu-zustrilysia-u-Svaliavi-
z-putinskymy-rusynamy; O. Havrosh O. Ukraine and Russia.
115
“Putin: Russia would win the Great Patriotic War without Ukraine,” http://
www.tsn.ua/ukrayina/putin-rossiya-vyigrala-by-velikuyu-otechestvennuyu-voy-
nu-i-bez-ukrainy.html.
102
The Second World War was met by Ukrainians divided into

four countries: the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Romania,
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Ukrainian people suffered most
of the losses and from the hostilities and robberies rampaging on
Ukrainian territory, and lives and losses taken from Holocaust vic-
tims. At the same time, some of the more nationalistic Ukrainians
considered the war as an opportunity to restore Ukrainian state-
hood. The attempt was unsuccessful. Throughout the struggle of
Ukrainians against invaders (both Nazi and Soviet), interethnic
contradictions, in particular, Polish-Ukrainian, deepened. Mutual
hostility led to numerous casualties. Modern Ukrainian society
still appears to be divided about the memory of this war and the
assessments of its key events.
While Viktor Yanukovych tried to maneuver between the vari-
ous centers of influence, his presidency was a period of noticeable
loss of Ukraine’s foreign policy subjectivity against the backdrop
of growing authoritarian tendencies within the country—an of-
fensive attack against the opposition, and the non-perception and
rejection by the authorities in power for the necessary existence
of an independent media.
The Yanukovych presidency was approaching an Anschluss
type scenario—so called because of the Kremlin’s intentions re-
garding Ukraine. In essence, Russia wanted to capture Ukraine
without firing a shot by forcing the stick and carrot method to
force Ukraine into finally taking a geopolitical turn towards
Russia.
If in the summer and autumn of 2013, Russia was using the
“stick” in its relations to Ukraine, then Viktor Yanukovych’s re-
fusal for an association agreement with the EU during the sum-
mit of the Eastern Partnerships in Vilnius on November and
December were behind the “carrots”: Russia promised billion
dollar orders for the Ukrainian defense industry enterprises, 15
billion dollars of credit resources, and “cheaper” gas prices at
$268.5 per 1,000 cubic meters. At the same time, the Russian
side tried to play up the role of foreign forces involved in the
events on the Maidan, by first pushing for their development
103
then trying to hold them back. The provocations and verbaliza-

tions of completely divergent strategies of action by the protesters
have become commonplace.
By analyzing the results of Viktor Yanukovych’s tenure as pres-
ident, we arrive at the following conclusions:
- This fourth president was the most pro-Russian president
of all the heads of independent Ukraine.
- He could not resist the Kremlin’s pressure on the key issues
of domestic and foreign policies.
- Strengthening the personal power and permissiveness of his
“family” were problematic for the country.
- When trying to balance Ukraine between Russia and the
European Union, he fell between huge geopolitical divides from
which he could not climb out of.
- He was entangled in a critical relationship with the Russian
advisers which directly and indirectly influenced his decisions.
The Euromaidan upset Putin’s scenario for an Anschluss
Ukraine. Therefore, literally during the first quarter of 2014, the
Kremlin had introduced a hybrid military component with in-
tensified aggression and energy. In parallel, the European and
American information spaces unfolded their experts’ support of
Russia’s actions in respect to Ukraine. I recall that almost from
the beginning of performances at the Euromaidan, the Russian
high-ranking officials had started talking about the need to main-
tain a non-aligned status with Ukraine, the federalization of the
country, and giving the Russian language official status. Their
confidence was based on an excellent knowledge of what was hap-
pening in the corridors of the Ukrainian authorities, in particular,
the deplorable state of its armed forces.
Although formally the Ukrainian army was one of the largest
in Europe with significant arsenals, its real combat capabilities
were scanty. Military equipment and weapons were mostly ob-
solete, even the location of the troops provided for exceptionally
aggressive actions from the western direction (following the Soviet
tradition), while in the Donbas basin there were mostly air defense
units. In principle, Russia was not seen as an enemy, so it is not
104
surprising that the Ukrainian army was not too ready to resist an
attack. The territorial principle of manning the armed forces has
generated a decline in professional motivation for many soldiers.
Ukrainian defense enterprises were not able to produce more
than an 8% range of the necessary weapons. Even so, a signifi-
cant part of their production capacity remained idle. Equipment
became obsolete and could not even be exchangeable because
it would not provide profitable returns for weapons exporters.
The high level of dependence on imports was critical—the share
of imported materials accounted for 25%. The Ukrainian Army
continued to suffer from the underfunding of their basic needs
which directly affected their combat ability. Budget allocations for
re-equipment and maintaining technical readiness of their systems
and weapons were still far from being referred to as fiscal policy
priorities. Also, a large part of the money was not guaranteed from
a special financial fund. 116
At the same time, the products of the Ukrainian defense-in-
dustrial complex were supplied to sixty countries in the world,
and Ukraine fought without success to be among the top ten
leading arms exporters. Although the most frequently exported
items were stocks from the Soviet-era armed forces, the Pakistani
tank contract in the 1990s for example, demonstrated a signifi-
cant potential of the Ukrainian defense industry. Unfortunately,
Yanukovych’s team viewed the Ukrainian defense-complex pre-
dominantly as an enrichment tool, rather than a factor enhancing
the country’s defense capability.
In foreign policy, as in sports, the government often acts as
a partner to another country that is also a rival. Under this sort
of strategic partnership, a Russian-Ukrainian competition in the
post-Soviet space arose which had been for a long period masked
under the Kremlin’s neglect. The events of February to March
2014, and the subsequent developments showed the true attitude
of the Russian leadership towards Ukraine.
116
V.M. Begma, “Military-technical and defense-industrial policy of Ukraine in
modern conditions,” Analysis by M. Begma and O. O. Svergun: 2013-112.
105
The main goal of Russia in the confrontation with Ukraine was

for Ukraine’s complete subordination to Russia’s control within
a formal preservation of Ukraine’s independence. Sometimes it
seems that on the official level, Russia does not take Ukraine
seriously, but this impression is deceptive. Deception and ma-
nipulation—those are the important components of a hybrid
war and the formation of its methodological framework which
is more important than fighting individual phalanxes of troops.
The reasons behind the behavior of the Russian leadership were
twofold: on the one hand, the Kremlin was aware of the risk of
the emergence of a successful Ukraine so close in proximity to
Russia’s borders; on the other hand, Russia’s deliberate neglect was
also part of the Russian strategy towards Ukraine.
The Kremlin aggressively sought weaknesses within the internal
politics of Ukraine by flirting with the Rusyns in Transcarpathia 117
then pushing against Russians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea,
then playing on the fear of deportation and repatriation of the
latter. In this context, a special role is enhanced by the fact that
Russia has established in its territory a monolithic and monopolis-
tic information space that serves the Kremlin’s political interests.
Therefore, one should not be surprised that today, in the face

of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, the planned
waves of panic and disillusionment are pervading Ukrainian
society, contributing to the achievement of the objectives
of a hybrid war that were set long ago by the Kremlin.The
current confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is a war
of emotions through manipulation, with factors of trust and
distrust.
The indecisions of the Ukrainian political leadership for al-

most the entire period of independence caused a lot of missed
117
“Pro-Russian MPs met in Svalyava with Putin’s “Rusyns,” http://zakarpattya.
net.ua/News/148687-Prorosiiski-deputaty-IEvroparlamentu-zustrilysia-u-Svaliavi-z-
putinskymy-rusynamy; O. Havrosh “Ukraine and Russia. The Kremlin’s bet on the
Rusyn “premiere” without a portfolio,” https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28546663.html.
106
chances and opportunities for reform and has turned Ukraine

into a convenient object for hybrid aggression.
There are several reasons for Russia implementing a hybrid
aggression against Ukraine. It should be noted that as part of
the financing of special events and military information plans,
a sharp increase in the Russian budget revenues from energy
resources of the EU and Ukraine were sitting on a gas “needle.”
The Kremlin not only used oil and gas as energy weapons while
trying to subdue the European countries, but also received su-
per-profits that were obtained by the formation of a modern
system of propaganda.
In the first decade of the 2000s, even during the global eco-
nomic crisis, Russia had received astronomical incomes that are
still fueling Putin. With the formation of the regime of his per-
sonal power, limited only nominally, the Kremlin ruler got the
tools to implement his own nostalgia for the Soviet Union and
his imperial ambitions.
In fact, Vladimir Putin is conducting a “war” with Western
leaders on the territory of Ukraine. The “fraternal people” with
whom Russia shares two thousand kilometers of common border,
is believed by that president that there is something between
the cannon fodder and an unannounced herd that has no right
to their own opinions. The fierce clashes, with elements of the
opposition’s fight for its survival in the confrontation between
the largest nation in the world and the largest European country,
are pictures that draw the attention of the civilized world. And
Russia undoubtedly seeks to gain additional advantages in the
event of a victory over Ukraine.
Moscow sharply applied the Latin phrase regarding dou-
ble standards, “what is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed a bull”
personally to itself. The past defeat in the Cold War forced the
Kremlin to prove to the Russian people and in the eyes of the
world’s representatives the idea that Russia can still compete with
the United States on an equal footing.
The intellectual tradition of considering Ukraine as a bridge
between East and West, in particular between Russia and Europe,
107
led to a corresponding strategy and tactics of foreign policy. For

a long time, officials in Kyiv tried to stick to Russia, often to the
detriment of its own interests. But the annexation of Crimea and
the outbreak of the conflict in Donbas have left our country no
choice—its destiny is to change and survive.
108
RESULTS
A long-standing dispute between historians centered on the
relationship between accidents and patterns in histories which
may be relevant for the Ukrainian case. How was the Russian
aggression predetermined in 2014? The background relationship
between the two countries since 1991 indicates that, at least for
the Kremlin, 2014 was not a surprise. Several periods of Russian-
Ukrainian relations allowed us to speak of a stable unreceptive
view of the Russian political elite regarding Ukraine’s indepen-
dence and desire to “put Kyiv in its place.”
The main factors of the Russian Federation’s pressure on
Ukraine are the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimea problem and the
Russian-speaking population, gas dependency, and economic
attachment.
Ukraine was not a victim by accident from the aggression by
its northern neighbor. Ukraine was an unreformed country with
a weak civil society and state institutions, which lost its legiti-
macy through mass media and propaganda, both in the interna-
tional and domestic public spaces. At the time of the precarious
equilibrium following the defection of Viktor Yanukovych, it has
become a natural target. The main objective of the Kremlin was
not the conquest of Ukraine, and its transformation into a sat-
ellite state, but to establish control over it while maintaining the
formal attributes of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
109
SECTION 4
INFORMATION—A KEY
FACTOR IN HYBRID
AGGRESSION
The role of the information component in hybrid aggression.

Basic methods of distortion and falsification: forcing panic on
social networks, information sabotage on the national level,
speech-raising in enemy territory, and the establishment of
social homogeneity in Russia. Features of the Russian infor-
mation policy, public-private partnership in the sphere of mis-
information, the phenomenon of Russia Today, the direction
of the information policy of the Russian Federation.
I
It is necessary to clarify what information aggression is and what
are its features. This would seem obvious, and yet it’s not super-
fluous especially because since 2014, Ukraine continues to be a
convenient target for phishing attacks, despite the various and ap-
parent successes in tracking initiatives and debunking fake news
due to the seemingly growing media literacy of the population.
The concept of an “information war” has a synthetic character.
It has incorporated a number of phenomena that are found in the
public communities between the different social groups. This con-
cept is in line with the objectives of the impact on the people by
the designations of propaganda, counter-propaganda, special pro-
paganda, psychological warfare, and disinformation machinery.
The war has and continues to place tremendous stress to
[Ukraine’s] society. The unusual uncertainty of a situation sig-
nificantly and literally increases the need for any immediate
information.
It is by knowing that information which is the weapon that will

eventually come to many, but not to all. In the Ukrainian case,
the situation is compounded by the fact that over 20 years
after independence, our country has peacefully built a nation
but without immunity to the various manifestations of a war.
Perhaps that is why Ukrainians never used hybrid aggression
technology. The more sober-minded, creative, caring people
and opinion leaders will be the victims of a hybrid aggression,
and the more they will be in the aggressors’ aim.
The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation is a classic example of

the struggle for a place under the sun, and for the confrontation
over the future. The biggest post-Soviet republics are moving
at different speeds to realize their own roles on the European
continent. And if Russia is captive to exhibiting imperial stereo-
types that overstate the arrogance and self-esteem of its leader-
ship over millions of its citizens, then Ukraine is distinguished
by the complex geopolitical inferiority that is clearly caught by
the Kremlin.
115
Information warfare (as well as the war of images, which

will be discussed below) is an intellectual confrontation of
concepts, visions, and strategies drawn up in a short line of
posts in the news, photos and videos. Winning the information
front is not only for the dominance of one narrative (point of
view) over the other. Among the several objectives is to achieve
decision-making (by the military command, the people, the
elite social group) on the basis of profitable information for
the enemy. The decisions may concern different areas whether
it be an offensive towards a particular direction, or at a certain
point, on the decisions based on the choice of an ally, or even
a “third Maidan.”
It is necessary to understand that Russia is not going to ab-
sorb Ukraine in the classical sense of the occupation of one
nation by another. The deadly aim of the Kremlin is to make
it lethal for any Ukrainian state changes and for the officials
in Kyiv to obediently be a consistent ally. Otherwise, Ukraine
could become a real alternative to the Russian post-Soviet space
in terms of political influence and attracting investment oppor-
tunities which provide conditions for economic growth and
building a civil society.
It should be recalled that a cheap and effective, virtually
fail-safe information weapon has a much wider range of appli-
cations than any traditional kind of conventional weapon. It
is easier and many times far more effective than arrows, guns,
missiles, tanks and aircraft carriers. For instance, tell a soldier
that he does not need his own country, and so he thinks he
will not have to fight. Sow discord among allies, and you will
gain the advantage. This is the essence of information warfare.
Of course, the information war even today remains a comple-
ment to a traditional war. But when speaking about hybrid
aggression, its defining characteristic is worth remembering:
the prevalence of the information component of a non-military
war will turn it into a hybrid war.
The term “information war” was first used in 1966 by former
CIA Director Allen Dulles in the book The Secret Surrender.
116
SECTION 4 • INFORMATION—A KEY FACTOR IN HYBRID AGGRESSION
The next time this definition appeared was in the analytical

report by the American researcher Tim Rona of the Boeing
Company called “Systems Weapons and Information Warfare.”
According to the analyst, information structure is becoming the
most important part of the economy, on the one hand, and the
most vulnerable target on the other. 118
A key advantage of the information war is a wide range of the

applications of its instruments. Conducting an information
war is possible by using print media, radio, television, even
rumors, i.e., virtually any existing communication channels.
An information war is the confrontation between two or more

nations in the information field with the aim of harming critical
information systems, processes and resources, as well as other
entities in order to undermine the political, economic, and social
systems causing massive psychological processing of the popu-
lation, destabilizing the society in addition to coercing nations
to take action in the interests of the opposing side.
This is a planned influence on the entire information and
communication systems and (or) on the neutral nations in or-
der to create a favorable global information environment for the
conduct of any political and geopolitical operations that provide
maximum control over the space. 119
The objects for the opposition’s defeat in the information
war are: the consciousness, will, and feelings of the population
towards the enemy of the country, especially during elections,
referendums, and crisis situations; the system management deci-
sion-making within the political, economic, social, scientific, and
technical spheres. Also, in the areas of security and defense—in-
formation of the infrastructure. The main subjects of information
118
V.O. Sayapin, “Modern Challenges of Virtual Wars,” http://www.gramota.net/
materials/3/2013/12-3/41.html.
119
I. Vasilenko, “Information War as a factor in world politics,” Public Service,
No. 3 (2009): 80-86.
117
warfare are the foreign ministries and intelligence services of

foreign states, and their advocacy structures. 120 The goal of in-
formation warfare is the impact on the system of knowledge and
values of the enemy.
Information warfare is distinguished by a desire of the warring
parties to escalate the panic in hostile nations, thereby creating
an atmosphere of constant crisis and tension.
A set of methods and tools in the information war is limited

only by the imagination and the degree of cynicism because
there is virtually no possibility in most cases of predicting
the direction and tools for a possible attack.
Other advantages of conducting information warfare are no

less evident. Perhaps the most important of them is that this type
of war operation is not about killing people, and that it demands
far fewer resources. The military action plays a secondary role
and has subordinate importance. But foremost in the informa-
tion war is the impact on the minds and sentiments of millions
of passive participants.
Another of its most important features is the ability to si-
multaneously cause actions on several fronts and directions that
sometimes appear to be problematic in conventional combat
operations. The vectors, tasks, and even the sacrifices of infor-
mation warfare can be corrected within the processes of actual
combat operations and in accordance with strategic goals.
Information aggression leaves no traces to ascertain the

true aggressor and bring it to the arena of international
responsibility; however, the devastating effect of it can often
be comparable to carpet bombings in the absence of air
defense systems.
120
O. A. Ilyashov and N.B. Miesentseva, “The role and place of intelligence in
information confrontation,” Science and Defense, No. 3 (2011).
118
Often hidden and disorienting is the enemy-like character of

information attacks (or even not to attack, but only the creeping
onset of one) that places the victims into difficult choices. To
find an effective response for the challenges of the information
flow is problematic. This is due to the difficulty of establish-
ing some, mainly indirect signs and manifestations of the true
purposes of aggressive actions, and with it the lack of a clear
common classification (assessment methodology) about the va-
rieties of information and psychological aggression that allows
for the unambiguous identification of certain attributed actions
committed by an aggressor in the information-psychological
sphere, expansion, aggression, or war. 121 It must also be added
that the lack of political will on the part of a nation’s manage-
ment is often due to a lack of relevant professionals in the field
of information security.
The main danger of an information war is the absence of any
clearly identifiable (visible) signs of the devastating effects that
are typical of conventional wars, and even a clear criteria for
the aggression. Fuzziness and blurriness of the assessments of
events, people, phenomena and processes generated, including
saturation and multi-layer information fields are the characteris-
tic features of an information war. The population does not feel
that it is exposed to destructive influences. As a result, a society
is not lead to available action by its defense mechanisms. The
sense of danger, which in certain situations operates smoothly,
does not work in this case.
At first glance, information warfare looks like an absolutely
“peaceful war,” because it can go against the background of gen-
eral peace and prosperity, and not against an entire population.
It is characterized by the use of various methods to achieve the
main objectives in working with opinion leaders and different
social, age-related, and demographic groups. Aggression in the
field of information allows it to be selective since the perception
121
A.V. Manoylo, State Information Policy in Special Conditions: Monograph
(Moscow: MIFI, 2003), 230.
119
of information only allows 10% of the cultural stratum of society

to “leave” it in its entirety. 122
At the same time, the information war initiators consistently
strive to maximize the “area of defeat” with appropriate means if
following the principle of the Russian expression: “you’ll never
spoil kasha (porridge) with a lot of butter.” This type of thinking
contributes significantly to the informatization and virtualiza-
tion of modern society with the proliferation of social networks.
Therefore, the main task of a virtual war at the present stage is
the manipulation of mass consciousness on the Internet. 123
In the information war, the aggressor is betting that the
operation will allow the victim to turn off the ability to criti-
cally perceive the information and respond mainly with emo-
tions. “The central element of the virtual war is the principle of
self-synchronization, when groups of people, individuals, social
movements without negotiation, give a consolidated response
to an event, which is formed by the consent of all parties. Self-
synchronization eliminates all differences between actors, and
the actions are impersonal and universal at the same time. Those
who first respond to an event will set the tone and direction of
the reaction.” 124
The several types of information warfare are distinguished by:
Cyberwar—computer confrontation space via the Internet,
and aimed at destabilizing the computer systems of government
institutions, financial, and business centers, thereby creating
confusion and chaos in the life of the country.
Network war—a form of conducting conflict when its mem-
bers use network strategies and technologies adapted to the
122
N.M. Voloshina and V.V Chherevatey, “Informational influence on the pub-
lic opinion of Ukrainian society,” Modern Information Technologies in the Field of
Security and Defense, No. 2 (23) (2015): 144-149.
123
V.O. Sayapin, “Modern Challenges of Virtual Wars,” http://www.gramota.net/
materials/3/2013/12-3/41.html.
124
A. K. Cebrowski, “Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,” http://www.
iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ncw/implementation-of-NCW.pdf.
120
modern information age. Participants in such wars may be ter-

rorists, criminal groups, civil society organizations, and social
movements that manipulate the decentralization of computer
systems.
Electronic warfare—the use and management of information
in order to gain an advantage over the enemy by gathering tacti-
cal information, ensuring the security of their own information
resources, dissemination of false information about the enemy,
and obstructing the collection of information by the enemy.
Psychological warfare—a collection of different forms, meth-
ods and means of human exposure to change its psychological
characteristics in the desired direction, group norms of behav-
ior, mass sentiment, and the public consciousness as a whole.
Radio-electronic struggle—a set of agreed-on objectives,
tasks, places, and times of events, and the actions of the
troops in order to obtain information on the whereabouts of
radio-electronic means, command and control systems, and
weapons of the opponent, then destroying them, as well as the
electronic suppression of information transmission signals.
In modern warfare as is shown by the confrontational
standoff between Russia and Ukraine, the nature of a total
network-centric war exists in all its aspects, and not only with
the informational component itself, but also with the depen-
dency on the speed of the information exchanged, and the
speed of decision-making that is based on more complete
data volume.
In other words: those who wish to impose their agenda on

the population of another country can count on a victory in
the battle for their minds. Consider how lined up today the
Russian-Ukrainian relations are in the information sphere,
where messages are formed and their after-effects.
A variety of information warfare is psychological (informa-

tion-psychological) warfare. Psychological warfare is a com-
bination of different forms, methods, and means of exposure
121
to change the desired direction of a population’s psychological

characteristics (attitudes, beliefs, values, motivations, behaviors)
and group norms, mass sentiment, and social consciousness as
a whole.
According to British scientist Norman Copeland, morale “is
the most powerful weapon known to man, more powerful than
the heavy tank, than the most powerful cannon, than the most
destructive bomb.” 125
Apparently, in solidarity with Norman Copeland, informa-
tion warfare theorists offer an analogous and conceptual scheme
of information-warfare-as-hypnosis in the following methods:
– Calming down society by instilling in the media that there
are no more enemies, and will not be, and to divert them
by discussing certain minor topics: historical periods, the
interests of individual small nations (the goal is that society
as a whole must disappear as an object of consciousness);
– Forcing people to listen only to the enemy, for example,
through the promotion of its way of life, eliminating any
experiences of other countries and peoples;
– Convincing society not to reflect on whatever the enemy
says, even excluding the media from showing serious an-
alytical programs, and only focusing on bright entertain-
ment shows;
– Focusing attention on some particular subject, in addi-
tion to the directional flow of the manipulation, such as
terrorism to the security subsystems responsible for the
processing of information and how it did not carry out its
function, thereby causing upset and ruin;
– Continually inspiring the notion that society itself is be-
coming better and better so as to reduce people’s ability
to think critically.
The objective: the conversion of the public consciousness
into a passive state which still may be possible depending on
the information influences of the enemy.
125
N.Copeland, Psychology and Soldierr (Moscow:1992), 21.
122
The purpose of information and psychological war, by and

large are: to break the morale of the enemy, to mislead it, and
eventually win with minimal losses and with a symbolic cost
of material resources. An important caveat: the information-
psychological warfare is much cheaper in terms of classical war
appropriations. On the other hand, in the context of the appli-
cation of intellectual resources, this kind of confrontation is
much more costly because it requires more detailed work on
the design of strategies and tactics such as calculating the en-
emy’s weaknesses and the impact by a range of measures that
can have the maximum effect.
Information and psychological wars per se constitute a phe-
nomenon with the means to an end and in many respects are
the same. Human nature is such that it takes any decision on
the basis of the information available and, in any case, partic-
ularly the psychology of influences on that decision. From this
comes the purpose of psychological warfare which is to create
conditions for the dominance of the psychological factor in
the decision making process. For example, by transforming the
fear or the instinct of self-preservation as the main factor in
deciding the problems of an information war as being the most
authentic by convincingly presenting false or misleading infor-
mation and thereby in this way, adjusting any possible solu-
tion against the enemy. Therefore, information is a transport
mechanism, which brings one or another emotion intended to
influence the psyche.
Information warfare was not invented today, but due to the

conditions of an information-based society where there is a
significant increase in the speed of the spreading and diversity
of information, it has become the most effective. Its current
methods are based on historical experiences and acquired skills.
Information and its psychological impact have taken place in

several stages of development due to the nature and development
of communication tools.
123
The first stage was the use of primitive verbal and nonverbal
means of spiritual influence. Shouting, dancing, graphic paint-
ings, rumors, rigged predictions and prophecies were falsified in
everything that went on in the course of a society. These days,
the prophecies by evil demons and magicians are now wandering
through the vast expanses of web networks.
The second stage of an information war began with relative
literacy in terms of a wide coverage of various printed materials:
letters, books, newspapers, magazines, etc. During this develop-
ment, there was by and large, a special and effective means of
information warfare. Even today it remains effective but only has
since become a new factor because of technology via the infor-
mation being featured on the screen of a personal computer or
a Smartphone. The main thing is that these texts are written as
“short, strong and scary” and accompanied by illustrations sure
of causing emotional reactions.
The third phase was caused by the invention of photography,
and then with the telegraph, radio, phone, and later followed by
film and television. The data transfer speed has increased signifi-
cantly. As did the dependency. During World War II, and thereaf-
ter the Vietnam War, the importance of broadcasting in military
terms was demonstrated, and which then gave an impetus to the
further development of the means and methods of information
warfare. Even a cursory analysis of the state of broadcasting in
the ATO Zone 126 suggests that it is the Ukrainian side who de-
liberately acts as the aggressor.
The fourth stage continues in our time, and its specificity is
caused by the formation and development of an extensive in-
formation society. The advent of personal computers and public
telecommunication networks brought information warfare to a
new level. It became possible to conceal the influences of personal
information on a specific user of a computer network. Now, the
126
The monitoring mission of the MIP in the ATO zone conducted an anal-
ysis of the state of broadcasting of Ukrainian broadcasts on the territory of the
Denezhnikovsky village council, which is located in the Luhansk region. http://
www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=249640702&cat_id=244277212.
124
distribution of hearing “fake” posts no longer requires a few days

but only a few hours, and coverage may reach a vast amount now
known as the “broad masses of the population.”
Examples of effective disinformation for military purposes
can be found even in mythology and epics. For example, the
Biblical hero Gideon so confused the enemy, that they attacked
themselves. 127
The Odyssey maneuver was previously mentioned—the
wooden horse at the gates of Troy would be much less effective
if it had not been sent to them by the city people. They argued
that the horse was a gift to Athens, and were urged not to listen
to the prophetess Cassandra who warned the Trojans about a
catch. The expression “Trojan horse” has become a byword of
professional scouts to indicate the operation of enemy disinfor-
mation, followed by its military defeat.
The Chinese art of psychological influence was passed on
through numerous wars on China’s territory. The philosopher
Sun Tzu placed psychological impact on the enemy as one of
the first prerequisites in a military confrontation. In his treatise,
The Art of War he wrote: “In any war, as a rule, the best policy
is to capture the state as a whole; it’s much easier to destroy it.
Taking a prisoner of the enemy army is better than to destroy
it. Defeating hundreds and gaining victories in the battles is not
the end of the art of war. Subduing the enemy without fight-
ing—that’s the crown of excellence.” 128
Sun Tzu observed that “war is the way of deception,” so the
winner is the one who knows how to fight a war without fight-
ing. To do this, first, “disrupt enemy plans.” Secondly, “frustrate
its unions,” and thirdly “crush his troops. Decompose all the
good that there is in the country of the enemy. This causes strife
and clashes among the citizens of an enemy country. Stir up all
127
Y. O. Gorban, “Information War Against Ukraine and Means of Its
Management,” Bulletin of the National Academy of Public Administration under the
President of Ukraine, No. 1, (2015): 136-141.
128
http://uran.donetsk.ua/~masters/2014/fknt/kebikov/library/article9.pdf.
125
the means of government. Undermine the prestige of the enemy

leadership and at the right time expose them to public shame.” 129
The reception of propaganda and disinformation by the mil-
itary adversary was successfully used by many European mon-
archs and generals. It is no coincidence when only later that
one of the founders of the theory of war, Carl von Clausewitz,
directly linked the informational and psychological impact on
the enemy as: “War is an act of violence, having to force the
enemy to fulfill our will.” 130 In addition— and this must be
emphasized, this clearly demonstrates why this sort of proposal
is virtually impossible to refuse.
On the skillful use of information warfare techniques
Clausewitz focused on Napoleon. His thesis on the one to three
ratio of physical and moral forces (one unit of physical strength
would cost three units of morality) has repeatedly proven to be
a practice that took wing. To distribute propaganda materials
in Napoleon’s army, a marching printing press operated with
a set of foreign fonts. Trained agents spread rumors about the
power of a much larger army than it was in reality. This press,
Napoleon thought, should write only what he ordered, and keep
quiet about the facts that should not be spoken about. To him
belong the words: “Four papers can cause more harm than an
army of one hundred thousand.” Through his Minister of Police
Joseph Fouché, Napoleon often gave orders to newspapers to
confuse the enemy with false news.
The First World War was a fount of ideas and case studies
of military information warfare for many years. The most suc-
cessful advocacy efforts of the countries of the Triple Alliance
occurred at the beginning of the war, but later, due to the use of
a large number of false information, it had lost its effectiveness.
But the most prepared and, as a result, effective information
antagonist was England. The monarchy was obligated for its
victories on the battlefield to media magnate Lord Northcliffe
d.
130
C. von Clausewitz, Principles of Warfare (Moscow: 2009), 34.
126
who led the British by using war propaganda against the enemy
countries.
Lord Northcliffe’s propaganda involved a number of
principles:
– ensuring that the credibility and not the authenticity of
the propaganda content are due to a skillful combination
of false and true messages;
– the massive character of propaganda;
– preventing the propaganda of political actions of one’s own
government;
– propaganda support for the opposition of the governments
of hostile countries;
– conducting propaganda on behalf of the patriotic forces
of the enemy. 131
The scope and consequences of the First World War led to
a sharp increase in interest in the intensification of methods of
psychological influences. A variety of practices of ideological
and propaganda work during the war had created a sufficient
empirical basis for the construction of theoretical models and
the basis for writing scientific papers.
In 1920, a book was published in London by Campbell
Stuart called Secrets of Crewe House, which summarizes the
experience of British propaganda in the First World War. In
the early 1920s, other books were published in Germany—one
by Edgar Stern-Rübarth Propaganda as a Weapon of Politics
and Johann Plenge’s German Propaganda. In 1924 a study was
published by Friedrich Schoemann entitled The Art of Influence
on the Masses in the United States of America. Yet another book
was published in 1927 in London, by the Englishman Harold
Lasswell (later better known in the Russian-language academic
space as “Lassuel”) called Propaganda Technique in the World
War. It outlined the information-psychological sphere of war
for the first time in which propaganda was considered to be
131
(Moscow: MIFI, 2003), 236.
127
a special weapon that affects the moral (mental) state of the

enemy, designed to disrupt his state, or reject the enemy’s ha-
tred toward the country who was at war with them. The main
strategic objectives of propaganda in the book are mentioned
as: “The excitation of hatred of the enemy within its own pop-
ulation and in the population of allied and neutral countries;
maintaining friendly relations with the allies; preservation of
good relations with neutral countries and obtaining their sup-
port; and the demoralization of the enemy. The most important
factors in the success of propaganda are recognized by the skill
of the means that were employed, and the correct accounting
of the conditions for conducting the propaganda.” 132
In the context of the growing confrontation between the
winners and losers in World War I, as well as proliferating con-
flicts and strengthening totalitarian tendencies in Europe, a new
term appeared known as “information aggressor.” 133 Examples
of such information aggression was dealt with in Section 2 re-
garding how information was attacked by the USSR against
Poland in 1920–1930.
The Second World War marked a qualitatively new stage in
the development of information warfare. Propaganda had been
viewed as an important means of warfare, placing its role on
an equal footing as one of its homeland services. At the begin-
ning of the war, the British government helped to set up the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department where a “political war”
was launched with a wide radio propaganda scheme against
Germany by disseminating the relevant literature in its terri-
tory. The USA’s special agency was established in June 1942 to
conduct internal and external propaganda through its military
information management. By conducting a propaganda front
for interaction with the fighting forces, as well as the operations
132
G. Laswell, Techniques of Propaganda in World Warr (Moscow: 1929), 139-181.
O. Gorban, “Information war against Ukraine and means of its manage-
ulletin of the National Academy of Public Administration under the President
of Ukraine, No. 1 (2015): 136-141.
128
of “black propaganda” 134 the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

in the United States was engaged. 135
It is not superfluous to dwell on the activities of Paul Joseph
Goebbels, the propaganda minister of the Third Reich. It is no se-
cret that many achievements of this “demonic Nazi” are widely used
today. Therefore, let me remind the reader of the principles of pro-
paganda that were formulated by him:
- Propaganda must be planned and conducted at only one
instance.
- Only the authority may determine the propaganda performance
indicators.
- Black propaganda is used when the white is ineffective or
impossible.
- Propaganda characteristics should give people and events sharp
phrases or slogans.
- For better perceptions, propaganda must evoke the interest of the
audience and pass through an attractive communication medium.136
The Soviet school of military thought has developed in two main
directions—the military-technological and socio-political. The sec-
ond was called upon to play a “softening” role: political weapons
set the stage for intervention, weakened the morale of the enemy
by means of propaganda, misinformation or, for example, sabo-
tage (such as the sponsorships of pacifist movements in Western
countries). 137
In the course of conducting an information war, the media con-
centrates on controversial facts that divulge confidential information
134
“Black propaganda” is propaganda allegedly from one source, but is actually
from another. The masking of the true source of propaganda is most widespread
when it is the propaganda of a hostile country or organization with a negative image.
135
(Moscow: MIFI, 2003), 159.
136
Y. O. Gorban, “Information war against Ukraine and means of its manage-
ment,” Bulletin of the National Academy of Public Administration under the President
of Ukraine, No. 1 (2015): 136-141.
137
L. Vuichik, “Ukrainian hybrid war,” http://inosmi.ru/sngbaltia/20140515
/220303215.html#ixzz3IrQRtksR.
129
from the private lives of public policy makers which are scandalous
and “under investigation” thereby deliberately falsifying information
while savoring the “spicy” details. The problem is in the human sub-
conscious where activation of the mechanism will be turned to the
manipulation of feelings and emotions which is the foundation of
the psychology of crowd control. Information warfare is fueled by
constant misrepresentation, manipulation of the media, the creation
of virtual and real images of the enemy against the citizens of the state
who have also become victims of information aggression. In this way
by example, the citizens of Ukraine were convinced by the propagan-
da since the end of 2013 when the Russian media began coverage on
the Euromaidan in an aggressively propagandistic manner.
Ukrainian society was vulnerable to phishing attacks.
In multi-variance expert and analytical assessments, and

multiplied by the inherent emotional, psychological fatigue
of the Ukrainians in recent years, even banal unwillingness
to understand the intricacies of the context and check the
facts—all this creates virtually ideal conditions for successful
informational pressures from the outside. In its present state
of separation and exposure to different vectors, the influence
of Ukrainian society is a great target for information warfare.
By rocking social networks, and designing images for the TV
that might fall on generously fertilized soil will literally create
a daily threat to the political stability of the Ukrainian nation.
Individualism, embodied in the Ukrainian saying, “in the end,

it’s my house” takes on an actual new meaning of “I will shoot the
first shot” (i.e., “shooting the first enemy one will meet”) which
has acquired a menacing interpretation. Against the backdrop
of patriotic enthusiasm, the development of volunteerism and
voluntary movements of recent years in Ukraine, there are those
who actually don’t want to shoot that first person but only speak
generally about it. The same can be said about the process of
reforming as the country changes. Not all Ukrainians want to
leave their own personal comfort zones.
130
As noted by another Ukrainian, Hrihory Skovoro 138 the idea

of “cordial centrism” (the desire to live with a heart), and sub-
jection to emotional feelings which dominates over the intellect
and will, in themselves are not bad traits. Much worse is when
these thin strings of the Ukrainian soul are played by a hostile
enemy. A vivid example is the mothers’ protests. Mothers and
wives of the military blocked international routes and railways,
and picketed the interior of the Verkhovna Rada in rotation while
protesting against mobilization. The largest scale protests took
place in Yavoriv, Lviv region, in July 2014. There, relatives of the
mobilized blocked the 13th Army Corps division by lying under
the wheels of the buses, in order not to allow their men and sons
to go to war.
In the spring and summer of 2014, these protests have become
a notable media event as if an invisible hand were arranging the
mothers and wives of servicemen on strategic lines of commu-
nication, prompting slogans and tactics. I note that the protests
took place in different parts of our country, but done as if they
were premeditated scenarios. This is not surprising since women
are more psychologically susceptible to tragic information which
surfaces in a persistent, albeit low-intensity hostilities. 139
Experts have noted a link between the mothers’ protests and
serious losses in the armed forces units. That is quite explainable:
Ukrainian servicemen were seriously demoralized by the rear per-
formances in battle. They already found themselves in a difficult
situation, and forced to operate on their own territory. 140 This
element of the information war against Ukraine we must admit
yhorii Savych Skovoroda (1722—1794)—Ukrainian humanist, philosopher,

d educator.
A. Kislov, “Protests of mothers against ATO will grow into anti-war Maidan,”
INFOGRAPHY Y (2014), http://ru.golos.ua:8081/social_problem/14_07_02_protes-
tyi_materey_protiv_ato_pererastut_v_antivoennyiy_maydan_infografika.
140
“The experts found a connection between protests by military mothers and
attacks on the forces of the ATU,” (2014), http://vgolos.com.ua/news/eksperty_
znayshly_zvyazok_mizh_protestamy_materiv_viyskovyh_i_napadamy_na_syly_
ato_151074.html?print.
131
picked up by the Russian and Western media, and helped the

Kremlin into creating a favorable information picture for itself.
Protests for Nadia Savchenko 141 the first months after her return
to Ukraine (summer 2016) with calls to accelerate the release of
prisoners is, in fact, a continuation of the 2014 protests.
For a long period in independent Ukraine, peacefulness and
non-aggressiveness among its citizens were considered positive
signs. But today the situation has changed, so other features
of the Ukrainians’ national character should not be dismissed.
Among them: proficiency in the military arts, love of freedom,
and the persistent ability to resist and sustain. The ambiguous,
but nevertheless heroic war history of the UPA is the best evi-
dence of these characteristics.
If we define the basic methods of information aggression

against Ukraine, they include:
1. Disinformation and manipulation;
2. Propaganda;
3. Diversification and distortion of public opinion;
4. Psychological and psychotropic pressure;
5. The spread of rumors.
One example was the apparent misinformation broadcast

on July 12, 2014 on the Russian television Channel One about
the Ukrainian national guards’ alleged plot to crucify a Russian-
speaking boy. 142 Journalist Jill Doughertyy 143 notes that contem-
141
Dorosh S. Kazus, “Nadia Savchenko,” http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/
politics/2016/07/160725_savchenko_political_activities_sd.
142
“A refugee from Slavyansk remembers how she executed a small son and wife
of a militiamen,” http://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-12/37175-bezhenka_iz_slavyans-
ka_vspominaet_kak_pri_ney_kaznili_malenkogo_syna_i_zhenu_opolchentsa.
143
The former head of the Moscow bureau of the American based television
channel Cable News Network (CNN).
132
porary Russian propagandists use traditional methods: misin-

formation, half-truths, and labeling, as well as a huge number of
modern weapons information including digital communication,
blogs and social networks. Her colleague Masha Gessen 144 believes
that Russia has presented itself as the leader of the anti-Western
world, and Putin is the chief advocate of the values that the West
has neglected.
The purpose of the method of diversification of public opinion
is to spray the attention of the nation’s ruling elite onto a variety
of artificially accentuated problems thereby diverting them from
addressing the priorities of socio-political and economic devel-
opment in order to ensure the normal functioning of society and
the nation.
The forms of public opinion diversification are:
– The destabilization of the situation in the country and its
individual regions;
– Intensification of the campaign against the policies of the
ruling elite of the nation and its individual leaders of various
international institutions;
– Initiation of anti-dumping campaigns and different kinds of
scandalous trials, and the application of international sanc-
tions because of other reasons.
The representative of Informational Resistance 145 Vyacheslav
Gusarov 146 said that the Kremlin has launched an information
attack to support a new round of escalation in the conflict in the
East of Ukraine as a way to increase the pressure on the Ukrainian
authorities which will force them to accept the Moscow scenario
sian-American writer and journalist, former director of the Russian service

Liberty.
Information Resistance is a non-governmental project which began on March
2, 2014. Its main task is to counter the external threats facing Ukraine in these key
areas: military, economic, and energy, as well as in the field of information securi-
ty. “IR” functions as an initiative of a non-governmental organization “Center for
Military and Political Research” (Kyiv).
146
An expert on information security at the Center for Military and Political
Studies.
133
and thereby resolve the conflict. He calls the main lines of attack:
– The imposition of views on the inability of the Ukrainian au-
thorities to govern the nation;
– The formation of the currently held opinion that parliamentary
elections are more important for the Ukrainian elite than the
events in the East of Ukraine;
– Proliferation of the negative judgments about the military-po-
litical leadership of Ukraine;
– Dissemination of the views that the Ukrainian army in the
East of Ukraine is demoralized and cannot conduct operations;
– The imposition of the opinion that Ukraine cannot survive the
winter without Russian gas, and Kyiv will find it necessary to
return to Moscow for gas contracts.
Gusarov emphasizes that the Kremlin’s target audience for its
imposition of ideas are currently the population of the Russian
Federation, the Russian-speaking diaspora abroad, the population
of Ukraine including those within the occupied areas of Donbas,
the citizens of Western countries, as well as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India and China) countries and the Customs Union. 147
Psychological pressure is the impact on the human psyche
through intimidation and threats with the aim of prompting par-
ticular planned behaviors.
I want to emphasize that in the information war against

Ukraine, Russia uses almost the entire arsenal of effects
on people’s minds, both within the Russian Federation and
abroad. As a result, the attitude of Russians to Ukrainians
deteriorated sharply, and the stories about crucified boys and
slaves were created for the ATO 148 participants in Russia to
accept at face value.
147
7
V. Gusarov, “The Kremlin launched a new informational attack,” http://sprotyv.
info/en/news/4407-kreml-nachal-novuyu-informacionnuyu-ataku.
148
“Fake: ‘A Ukrainian soldier promises ‘a piece of land and two slaves,’” http://www.
stopfake.org/lozh-ukrainskim-voennym-obeshhayut-kusochek-zemli-i-dva-raba/.
134
The Russian leadership is committed to make every effort

that the international community only exclusively embraces the
Russian version of events in Donbas while trying to manipulate
the traditional standards of excellence in the information field
and presence in Western media. From almost the beginning of
the annexation of Crimea, Russia had intensified its agents of
influence connections with information sent to the European
media over the aggressive actions in the Crimean peninsula
thereby filling the void of the information space for the West. In
this, the Kremlin succeeded well, and only the passenger deaths
of the Malaysian airliner Boeing 777 in July 2014 contributed
to the loss of Russia’s information dominance.
Not only traditional media, but also social networks are

becoming a tool of influence in hybrid aggression. Due to
the efficiency of the dissemination of information, sufficient
anonymity and the possibility to manipulate the opinions
of consumers with the help of artificial users (bots) by the
information aggressors are able to achieve their goals with
a high degree of efficiency. In this context, social networks
can be compared with universal mass destruction weapons,
the protection from which is virtually non-existent.
Of particular note is the phenomenon of the high trust of

all the information published on the web. The user usually
does not check the information received and takes it as reliable
only on the grounds that it is published by a solid group with a
significant audience or re-posts from “friends” be they real or
virtual. In this respect it should be noted that the emergence
of the phenomenon of “opinion leaders” can be presented as a
separate independent person or group, or on a page in a social
network. It is they who you trust implicitly, sometimes even
counting their most reliable sources in certain matters, while
135
neglecting the fact that they may not be experts in this field. 149
In many respects the social networks provide an effective hy-
brid of aggression against the people the Kremlin still likes to
call “fraternal.”
The authoritative Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova
convincingly explained the motivation of the Russian leadership
waging unprecedented pressure on its recent strategic partner:
“Ukraine became Russia’s turning point, opening a new page in
Russian history. It dealt a fatal blow to the ‘Russian system’ when it
decided to go to Europe, that is, it was seen as a hostile civilization
by the Moscow vector.” 150
Shevtsova notes that the role and importance of Ukraine for the
Kremlin autocracy was always understood with the particular zeal
of destroying all hints of Ukrainian national consciousness. Stalin
decided to destroy the bud of Ukraine’s desire for its national spirit
with genocide. Without Ukraine, Russia is a neo-empire, if not an
empire at all. Now the Kremlin is aware of this, no matter at what
level, which emotion, or by sheer logic. No wonder Ukraine has
become Putin’s personal project. 151
A number of historical stereotypes continue to define the logic
of Russia’s actions in the international arena. To fight against them
rationally is almost impossible—they were rooted in the mind-set
from the time of the Russian Empire.
The most important principle of imperial thinking was formu-
lated even before the French Revolution. This is the concept of
legitimate influence—the legal right to carry out preventive con-
quests and explaining their idea of national security for the “distant
approaches.” The same concept of legal intervention was based on
the protection and even planting political regimes loyal to Moscow
in the neighboring countries. Of course, Russia was not the only
149
B.V. Kovalevich, “Social networks as a new tool for conducting information
wars in the modern world,” Grani, No. 4, (2014): 118-121.
150
Lilia Shevtsova, “Without Ukraine, Russia is a ‘non-imperial,’ or even an empire
at all,” http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/shevtsova-russia-kraine/2939347.html.
151
Ibid.
136
one in this position; such an approach could be called the modus

operandii of most European empires, and in the 20th century is one
of the signs of a bipolar world. However, in a multipolar world here
in the beginning of the 21stt century, a singular focus on a similar
approach looks to be at the very least strange and futile.
By adopting the concept of Moscow’s “primordial ancestry,” the
conquest of all the lands inhabited by Slavic peoples is then justi-
fied. There was (and still exists) an irrational belief that land out-
side Russia should belong only to them because of the Slavs living
there (in fact they are Russian, but in the current conditions they
are called the Russian-speaking populations). Hence the concept of
a “Russian world,” and the seizure of territories where Slavs lived is
treated as a continuation of the collective lands around the historic
center—Moscow. At the same time, of course, Russia ignored the
historical circumstances of the Old Slavic state of Kyivan Rus’. 152
Derived from the “primordial ancestry” and the imperial Slavic
autochthonous ideas of primitive superiority, Russia assumes
dominance over the other Slavic peoples. They are not perceived
in Russia as independent of any political nation, much less a na-
tion-state. Ukrainians, Belarusians and others are only considered
to be ethnographic groups of Russians.
With the advent of the second half of the 20th century, nation-
alism as an ideology of chauvinism and national existence was
only intended for the Russian national ideology which has itself
absorbed these currents. In the imperial mind-set, the sustained
image of those “funny/stupid Ukrainians” organically fit into the
ideology of Russian chauvinism, which had become particularly
popular at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. In the same vein, it
was contained in the developing and philosophical thought of the
Russian Empire. The galaxy of Russian philosophers of the late
19th to early 20th centuries substantiated and developed the idea of
152
Kyivan Rus—a medieval state on the territory of Eastern Europe with Kyiv as
its center. It existed from the end of 9th to the middle of the 13th centuries and was
an association of principalities under the rule of the Rurik dynasty. At its height of
power, it stretched from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, and
from the upper reaches of the Vistula in the west to the Taman Peninsula in the east.
137
“Russia’s great spiritual mission” and “the Russian universal soul,”

for the “purification of the world” through Orthodoxy. Russia was
to play a special role in the history of the world. This perception
migrated to literature and the arts, and has become part of the
public consciousness and political discourse.
Hence the ideology of the “Russian world.” True, there are some
values that exhibit remarkable properties for mutual pollination.
The authoritarian features of Vladimir Putin’s rule and the search
for its environment through the propagation of the principles of
“sovereign democracy” allows it to stand apart in the modern
world. This has led to a curious confusion: imperial ideas coexist
with the precepts of Stalinism and Brezhnevism without politicians
feeling any discomfort in broadcasting this volatile mix not only
in Russia, but also to the world.
And so goes the transfer of the patriarchal life of Russian soci-
ety into the political process where Russia is trying to revive the
imperial Domostroyy 153 based on the fabulously epic principles of
interaction between members of society. The king-father, was an
alternative to the evil boyars, and has now been replaced as the
friendly elder brother in the close-knit family of Soviet (Slavic)
peoples as opposed to aggressive, alien Western culture. The
scheme has only slightly evolved, but the archetypes of imperial
thinking remained unchanged for centuries. From time to time the
“older brother” can sacrifice something for the sake of supposedly
common interests for all.
At the same time, pay attention to the complex chronic sanctity
of the Russian people, who, as it turned out, were never involved in
any repression or famine, nor in the invasion of Czechoslovakia or
153
Domostroy—16th century monumental work of Russian literature in the genre
of “teachings” of rules for Russian life. Probably composed by the priests at Moscow’s
Blagoveschynskogo Monastery and edited by archpriest Sylvester, the spiritual father
of Ivan the Terrible. The structure of “patriarchal despotism” includes advice on
religious, social, family, economic and other issues. Most attention was centered
on the texts recommending cruel family punishments meted out by the husband
who was supposed to be “the thunderstorm for his wife.” Children and wives were
to be punished by “breaking rebellious ribs” and “whipping their whiskers off if
they looked at wine.”
138
Afghanistan, or the war in the East of Ukraine, not to mention the

almost legitimate annexation of Crimea. This “complex of inno-
cence” is an important foundation of modern Russian ideology—its
mechanism of mass production is indulged by millions of Russians.
Russian aggression against Ukraine has provoked a surge of
pride in the Great Russians as is seen in mostly inherent authori-
tarian societies. The annexation of Crimea has been approved by
90% of Russians. Putin’s approval ratings soared and his speech on
the occasion of the annexation of Crimea in the St. George Hall of
the Kremlin in March 2014 was interrupted 33 times by applause.
Since December 2013, the authoritative Russian Levada
Centerr 154 conducted a monthly survey to determine how Russians
assess the events in Ukraine. These data raised considerable inter-
est. In particular, more than 60% of respondents believed that it is
better to have Ukraine as an independent, sovereign and friendly
neighbor. Almost 60% of the Russians at the end of 2015 were
farther apart in seeing Ukraine in the EU, but leaving Ukraine the
right to choose with respect to the choice of integration. At the
same time, 64% of Russians were of the opinion that Russia should
not retain control of all post-Soviet states, while 55% would not
mind to focus only on internal problems, and only 31% believed
that geopolitical and strategic interests were more important for
the economic and social sphere.
In May 2016, a sympathetic response for Ukraine was report-
ed by only 39% of Russians. The situation in our country was
called “tense” by 66% of the respondents, while only 17% called
it “critical.” More than half (52%) of Russians believed that with-
in the year the situation would not be changing in Ukraine, and
one in four (25%) expected further deterioration. Improvements
for the situation were chosen by only 9% of Russians. Also, the
majority of Russians (30%) supported the independence of the
self-proclaimed LNR and DNR. The accessions of these territories
to Russia were expressed by 22% of the respondents, while 20%
154
Yuriy Levada Analytical Center is a Russian non-governmental, independent,
non-profit research organization.
139
were for the fact that these regions were independent of Kyiv, but
still part of Ukraine. In addition, the majority of Russians (36%)
were in favor of the need for closed borders and visas between
Russia and Ukraine. 155
It should be noted that for the majority of respondents, the dra-
matic events in the East of Ukraine which is called the Ukrainian
internal political conflict, or in other words—the civil war, only a
quarter of Russians agreed that this is a war between their country
and Ukraine and that Russian troops are truly on the territory
of Ukraine. It is significant that this figure remained unchanged
during the entire period of this war so far.
A characteristic feature of the Russian society’s position con-
cerning Ukraine is a denial of responsibility for what is happening
in our country. Exceptions are a mere 4–5% of the respondents.
The Russians blamed the West, led by the United States. Only 12%
of respondents were willing to admit, at least, the logic of the use
of sanctions as an instrument of containment of Russia’s aggressive
policy. The Russian citizens’ general opinion is: Putin’s policy in
Ukraine is only a reaction to the expansion of NATO (almost
50% believe this), and the threat against the Russian-speaking
population (44%). Clichés abound: “Russia is not to blame…,”
“we were forced to…,” “we defended…,” “we didn’t begin it—that
came from the other side…”
Paradoxically at first glance, the saturation of the information
field reports about Ukraine does not lead to their being better
informed. The reason is the existence of the Kremlin’s public-pri-
vate partnership management in the media field. However, only a
third of Russians believe that they are well or fairly well versed of
the situation. But, as practice shows, the Russians “very well un-
derstand the situation,” but in reality often differ from each other.
On the other hand, if immediately after the annexation of Crimea,
half of the Russians believed such a scenario was acceptable in
Donbas, now the supporters of such a course of events were left at
155
“The attitude of Russians towards Ukraine has improved over the year,” https://
tvrain.ru/news/otnoshenie411443/.
140
only 15%. The “hawks” are the 20–25% of Russians who continue,
in spite of it all, to support the deployment of Russian troops in
Donbas, and who are sympathetic (still!) to Viktor Yanukovych
and categorically against Ukraine’s membership in the EU. On the
other hand, about 10% had sympathized with the Euromaidan
from the beginning. 156
Russian propaganda both inside Russia and abroad are based
on old stereotypes, fears, and moods. Although the issue of
Crimea’s annexation by the Russian authorities in 2014 was pub-
licly raised as early as May 1998 when 77% of Russians would like
to see the peninsula “returned to Russia,” and half of them con-
sidered that would be the most appropriate mechanism for this
referendum. In March 2002, the same opinion was held by 80%,
and already 85% in 2008, while 67% admitted the possibility of
putting pressure on Ukraine to “get it back.” It is therefore logical
that 85% supported the annexation one and a half years after its
implementation.
In June 1994, 70% of the respondents believed that Russia
must protect Russian interests in the post-Soviet space. After 20
years, at the end of 2014, 70% of the respondents believed that the
Crimea should join Russia because it is “Russian land,” and the
population of the peninsula must be protected against Ukrainian
nationalists. It turns out that intervention in the affairs of inde-
pendent neighboring states is not necessary and is ugly. But that
will not make for a good argument. 157
For all its plasticity and unlimited capacity for mimicry,

Russian propaganda is based on well-known principles:
distrust of the West, the passive position of the majority
of Russian society, and keeping them discontented and
searching for that “moment of glory” with the status as the
last superpower.
Volkov, “Russian sociology of the Ukrainian conflict: it is not necessary to

but they did everything right,” http://carnegie.ru/2015/08/26/en61007/if5q.
157
Ibid.
141
At present, Russia does not spare money on propaganda, even

as an effort to restore its former Soviet influence. One of the keys
to its success is to create a situation in which even formally liberal
and opposition media are in line with the official propaganda
policies. For example, in August 2016 The New(Novy)Newspaper
published an article with the apocalyptic predictions of events
in Donbas in case of a possible attack by the Ukrainian army.
And the radio station Echo of Moscow w offered its listeners a poll
on the topic: “Should we hit Ukraine?” after the provocations in
Crimea. 158
In this context, the Kremlin’s toolkit was to push its provoc-
ative information by being cynical and pragmatic at the same
time by the following strategies:
– The operation of the principles of freedom of expression is
to spread misinformation in the public space and the sowing
of doubt with the help of multiple conspiracy theories and
falsifications.
– Constant increases in appropriations to ensure the impact
on public opinion.
– Being ideologically omnivorous by maintaining the ultra-left
and ultra-right movements, the “greens,” the anti-globaliza-
tion and other marginal political groups.
– The active use of the Russian Orthodox Church and
non-governmental organizations in order to create the ma-
trix of the “Russian world.”
– Involving representatives of the Western expert community
into the Valdai Club 159 which according to critics, works
on the principle of “loyalty in return for the access to re-
sources.”
– Exploiting the openness of Western societies where the
existing principles of competition are opportunities to
158
V.Shiryaev, “This is a war,” http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/74105.htm.
159
The Valdai Discussion Club is an expert-analytical center that was established
in 2004 in Veliky Novgorod, Russia. The Club owes its name to the venue of the
first conference held near Lake Valdai.
142
manipulate money, trade, and energy as instruments of

foreign policy.
– Using information, culture, and money as weapons which
are the most important parts of the hybrid nonlinear war,
and which combines all of these elements.
The Kremlin pays a lot of attention to the creation of a positive
self-image. For this purpose, it utilizes tools that can be attributed
to classic public relation strategies. For example, Russia Beyond
the Headlines (RBTH) is sponsored by the Russian government,
which comes out in 23 countries, 16 languages, and in the
world’s major publications and websites including The Telegraph
in Britain, and in the US, The Washington Post, The New York
Times (including the international edition), and the Wall Street
Journal. The editorial board and staff of RBTH distances itself
from Russia Todayy and denies that it publishes propaganda. The
publication claims that it exists to show the other side of Russia
for Western journalists, focusing on bilateral relations with Russia
and overcoming stereotypes. With clever use of the need to re-
spect the balance of opinion (a rule that can be called a postulate
of modern Western journalism), the Kremlin has access to the
pages and screens that are even critical of Putin’s media policies.
In an attempt to influence the Western media, the Kremlin
resorted to the help of Western PR companies, such as the in-
fluential Ketchum Inc., which slipped in pro-Russian stories in
The Huffington Postt and on NBC whose authors do not disclose
their ties with the Kremlin. The most prominent achievement of
Ketchum in this direction was the publication of Vladimir Putin’s
column in The New York Times on September 11, 2013, in which
the strangely intertwined insinuations of Obama’s inability to find
a solution to the Syrian crisis along with paraphrased quotes from
the Declaration of Independence appeared as: “There are large
countries and small countries. Their policies also vary. We are
all different, but when we turn to the Lord for the blessing, we
must not forget that God created us equal.” This passage can be
called an example of the Kremlin’s rhetoric by using the language
of the West against itself.
143
Russian propaganda has combined the best Soviet tech-

niques: criticism in the spirit of “itself as a fool” (or “criticism
in response to criticism”), and the KGB’s “active measures”—a
postmodern approach which is clever or sarcastic in tone while
hinting that it is all fiction. If the Soviets were forced to learn
and modify concepts such as “democracy,” “human rights,” and
“sovereignty” to hide their opposite intentions, Putin’s support-
ers are using the concept of playing them up while assuring the
world that even the West no longer believes in them. 160
Of course, a universal recipe of countering propaganda does
not exist and cannot exist. Propaganda is almost always one
step ahead, and its destroyers are forced to respond without
anticipating the step. Perhaps the only preventive method may
be raising a media literate population, but that requires con-
siderable time and resources and does not guarantee a perfect
result. Nevertheless, a number of methods to control rabid
propaganda manifestations are worth mentioning:
1. The formulation of transparent and effective information
security concepts, which will spell out strategic and tac-
tical goals and ways to achieve them.
2. Restrictive measures such as banning broadcasting of
certain television and radio stations, editing printed ma-
terials, preventing pro-Russian speakers in Ukraine and
overall content removal.
3. Operational refutation of obviously false and defam-
atory information within the wide dissemination of
information.
4. The functioning of national institutions in the most trans-
parent mode that will allow people to quickly respond to
the propaganda attacks.
5. Establishment of public structures and movements with
the aim of gathering and countering propaganda.
160
P. Pomerantsev and M.Weiss, “The threat of unreality: information, culture
and money as weapons of the Kremlin,” https://openrussia.org/s/tmp/files/Menace-
of-Unreality_RUS.pdf.
144
It should be understood that the main difficulty of informational

aggression confrontation is to find a delicate balance between the
protection of the national information space and the freedom of
the press. The results of the spreading of sensitive information are
decisions that people and politicians should make. Decisions based
on lies cannot be undone or reversed.
Presently, it appears critically important to create one’s own
high-quality level of information content which can be differen-
tiated depending on the audience. There are four main groups of
Ukrainian consumers of content: the population of Ukraine, the
population of the temporarily occupied territories, the population
in the zone of the ATO but under the control of Ukrainian territory,
and an international audience.
The formation of a balanced picture of information in the tem-
porarily occupied territory of Ukraine is a priority. Obviously, there
are a few prerequisites to solving this problem: reporting the in-
formation in Russian at sites accessible to local residents (via the
Internet, social networks, SMS-notifications while doing so in a
benevolent friendly manner, and without labeling). Without the
use of such tactics, there would not be any strategic successes to
speak of in the temporary struggle for the inhabitants’ mood inside
the occupied territories.
Summing up the preliminary results of the information and
psychological measurements of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine,
I would like to note the following:
– This component of interstate conflict was proven to be or-
chestrated by the most prepared aggressor.
– The creation of the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine
was not effective enough in turning the tide in case of an in-
formation counterattack. The Ministry of Information appears
to not be able to rise above tactical tasks. Therefore, the re-
strictions of hostile access to the Ukrainian information space
seem to be more important than the construction of the no-
torious wall on the border alongside the Russian Federation.
– Ukraine continues to operate reactively in the field of infor-
mation rather than proactively.
145
– In the international arena, the Russian news positions allow

it to more quickly convey their own point of view on what
is happening in Ukraine, and on a large scale by using their
own media that is oriented to the West, as well as acting as
agents of influence.
– The Kremlin is not ashamed to seek allies among Ukrainian
politicians of every persuasion, placing conditions for coop-
eration with number one being: the readiness to act within
the context for the destabilization of the country’s situation.
– The struggle for the restoration of foreign subjectivity, the im-
plementation of real, not declarative reforms, and strengthen-
ing the defense capacity are all prerequisites for an effective
information policy.
Russia bets on the flow of messages and fake phishing on
websites in its hybrid warfare. “Faces of democracy” are used by
the Kremlin to keep the discharge of internal political tension in
Ukraine. Virtually, not one event in Ukraine does not pass with-
out the presence of the Russian media, which really works for the
Western and Russian audiences. “Carpet bombing disinformation”
leads to an increase in panic, frustration, the appearances of nu-
merous fault lines splitting within Ukrainian society, and in the
end would lead to the destabilization of the situation inside the
country. All of this allows us to assert that resisting hybrid aggres-
sion is possible only by intercepting the initiatives in the field of
information via asymmetric and effective actions, and the forma-
tion of creating an attractive image of Ukraine in the eyes of the
international community.
146
RESULTS
One of the hallmarks of a modern hybrid of aggression is the
domination of the informational component. Information be-
comes invisible, but a cheap and effective weapon. The Ukrainian
case of recent years confirms this. Information warfare (as well
as the war of images, which will be discussed below) is an intel-
lectual confrontation of concepts, visions, and strategies drawn
up in a short line of messages in the newsfeeds and video images.
Winning the information front is not only done by the domi-
nance of one narrative (point of view) over the other.
The objects to defeat in an information war are: conscious-
ness, the will and feelings of the population of the enemy country
in times of objective and artificially created crises, the system of
government and decision-making, and the information infra-
structure of the enemy country. The main subjects of information
warfare are not only foreign policy ministries and intelligence
services of foreign countries, but also the information and advo-
cacy structures. The objectives of information warfare could be
the decision-makers (the military command, the people, the elite,
social groups) based on advantageous enemy information. They
may relate to different spheres of the life of the nation—whether
it is an offensive towards a certain direction, or at some point, a
decision in choosing an ally or even a “third Maidan.”
The means of confronting information calls may be different,
and their effectiveness will be measured by the differences. But
the most effective way for media literacy’s success is by the pro-
liferation of healthy skepticism in the perception of information
messages, and the creation of an alternative narrative.
147
SECTION 5
CULTURAL-IDEOLOGICAL
COMPONENTS
OF HYBRID
AGGRESSION
Historical stereotypes in hybrid aggression. Books as markers

for a “new historical sense.” Cinema films and documentaries in
the struggle for the minds and moods. Factors in the history of
confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Russian language as
an instrument of hybrid aggression. “The battle for the post-So-
viet future.” The problem of the local churches in Ukraine and
the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church.
H
Hybrid d aggression is carried out mainly in the non-military
sphere. Therefore, the impact in the field of culture at the na-
tionalal llevel can be attributed to the elements of hybrid aggression.
It is carrried out not so much to seize territory, but for the sake of
establishing
bl control over the sentiments and opinions of the na-
tion’s residents who are the victim of aggression. In this context, it
is impossible to overstate the role of culture for the development
and survival of any nation. It is therefore not surprising that the
Ukrainian national culture became a target in a hybrid war.
Cultural and ideological spaces have become a front for

fighting which at times is no less fierce than on a real
battlefield.
In this case, the prisoners may not be able to survive. “The

game is not worth the candle” if the destruction of the na-
tion’s historical foundations will cast doubt on the reality of its
existence.
Fortunately, Ukraine has not yet lost the war, even with the
battles being more difficult. Since the beginning of hybrid con-
frontation, it became apparent that cultural diplomacy and the
promotion of cultural achievements are the keys to victory. It is
believed that when the cannons speak, the muse is silent. But in
the case of Ukraine it should be (and is) the other way around.
Culture helps Ukrainians to explain themselves and to the world
what they are fighting for. 161
Books play a leading role in hybrid aggression. Although elec-
tronic publications have superseded classically printed books,
books still remain as concentrated carriers of ideas due to its
designs, and even act as visual instruments in influencing many
readers.
Modern Russian literature is rich and varied. Of particular in-
terest in this context is fantasy-based fiction and pseudo-novels.
161
T. Bilyak, “Culture as a weapon in a hybrid war,” http://global-ukraine-news.
org/2015/12/20/kultura-yak-zbroya-v-gibrydnij-vijni.
153
One of the common methods of modern science fiction in

Russia is “popadanstvo.” In this genre, the hero is transferred to
someone else’s time and (or) space—the future, the past, another
world. In these other times and worlds everything is possible in
particular, an alternative course of historical events, of course in-
creasingly in favor of Russia (that is, the Russian Empire, the USSR
or Kyivan Rus’). The modeling of alternatives to the history and
stories of how ordinary people fall into the past or the future are
widely distributed in the world, but perhaps nowhere, except
for Russian science fiction, are they not so heavily involved in
reactionary ideas. For example, here are two well-known books:
Travelers Sudoplatov: The Popadantsy Go for a Breakthrough by
Artem Rybakov in which the heroes help the Soviet Union win
the war against Nazi Germany in 1941. The other book is Save the
Futuree in which the popadanetss leader Viktor Poberezhnikh invites
the readers to imagine how Josef Stalin would advise Vladimir
Putin.
Contemporary Russian literary critic Vasil Vladimirsky explains
that the popularity of “popadancheskoy
“ y prose” is taken from the
features of mass psychology, based on the exploitation of a “loser
complex” which diminishes when a person gains confidence after
realizing that he or she has a hidden potential which was prevented
only by external circumstances. The literary quality of the books
that feature popadancheskoyy fiction has been steadily declining be-
cause of their mass appeal. Plots in the popadanchestva are repeat-
ed in many variations but is obviously a comfort for cushioning
against the shock that Russians had associated with the collapse of
the USSR and their desire to return to it (at least through fantasy)
and to their country’s status back into a superpower.
Ukrainian-German scientist from the University of Westphalia
Aleksandr Zabirko, who studied retro motives in post-Soviet
fiction, stated “I am convinced that this nostalgia for the Soviet
Union is not intended to return to the past, but rather focused on
the inclusion of the Soviet past with the new imperialistic patrio-
tism. The Soviet past becomes a ‘golden age’ of Russia. The authors
are inclined towards the pantheon of Soviet heroes, the imperial
154
SECTION 5 • CULTURAL-IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF HYBRID AGGRESSION
grandeur, and the technocratic power of the Soviet military indus-

try.” In his opinion, “a book about popadantsy” is not only a story
about time travel, it is also is about upward social mobility and
personal reincarnation of a typical loser turning into an epic hero.”
These are the stories about people like Arseny Pavlov, but
known by the nickname “Motorola,” who barely makes ends meet
by working at a car wash near Rostov. And then suddenly he be-
comes a well-known field commander and staunch non-violent
fighter against Ukrainian fascism. Another story is one in which
the former bricklayer Pavlo Dremov turns into a brave and noble
Cossack hetman and ruler of the self-proclaimed Soviet Socialist
Cossack republic in the city of Stakhanov. 162
Some books are the products of their authors’ distinct unbri-
dled imaginations but were commented on by the highest political
levels. For example, the first post-Soviet head of state of indepen-
dent Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis drew attention to the book
by the Russian journalist Mikhail Yuriev, entitled Third Empire:
Russia As It Should Be. Published in 2007, it describes how in the
year 2053 the whole of Europe and even Israel will be part of a
new “Russian Empire.” In it were descriptions of the war against
Georgia and Ukraine which at that time had not yet occurred. On
the other hand, Alexander Dugin 163 and Alexander Prokhanov 164
had not immediately become the leading ideologues of the modern
Russian political regime—for a long time they were left out in the
162
K. Skorkin, “How post-Soviet reactionary science fiction prepared the war in
Ukraine,” http://life.pravda.com.ua/culture/2015/12/17/204933.
163
Alexander Heliyovich Dugin—Russian philosopher, translator, political scien-
tist, journalist with fascist leanings, founder of the ideological movement “neo-evra-
zia.” Dugin professes right-wing extremism, terrorism and ultra nationalistic, impe-
rialistic ideas. Figured in the US financial sanctions against those guilty of aggression
against Ukraine.
164
Alexander Andrianovich Prokhanov—Soviet and Russian writer, screenwriter,
journalist, political and public figure, and Russian Orthodox nationalist chauvinist.
Chief editor of the newspaper Zavtra. Chairman of the Russian nationalist organiza-
tion Izborsky Club. In August 1991, he supported the actions of the GKChP. During
the Russo-Ukrainian War, he maintained close ties with the terrorists of the DPR
and LNR. In June 2015, he initiated the Orthodox canonization of Joseph Stalin.
155
political margins. Over time, their ideas were duly appreciated in

the Kremlin and embraced by foreign policy.
The Russian ideological machine vigorously responded against
the Orange Revolution which was perceived by the Kremlin as
a direct threat to Russia and the stability of its domestic policy.
Hence the emergence of the active promotion of Russia in several
books. Among them, a collection of Banderivshchyna which was
published in 2005 and is a collection of documents with comments
and “interesting historical facts.” Bandera is not alone among an
entire cohort of such editions, which are in fact very far from ob-
jectivity and very close to anti-Ukrainian propaganda. 165
At the beginning of 2009 in Russia, a book was published by
Maxim Kalashnikov and Sergei Buntovskogo called Independent
Ukraine: The Collapsed Project. As stated in the annotations to this
416-page book: “According to the modern Ukrainian mythology,
the Ukrainians—not Russians—but this particular country with its
own ancient history and culture and its own language has always
sought to create their own nation, but was constantly thwarted by
external forces. The main danger of this national-building myth
is the creation of Russophobia as the main national idea and cre-
ates Russia in the image of the enemy. Moreover, the enemy is
perceived not only as a neighboring nation, but also a large part
of the population in Ukraine has received the stamp of being its
own internal enemy. Accordingly, the country is even more broken
given the growing contradictions between the West and the East
and if this process is not stopped, Ukraine can expect the same
sad fate as Yugoslavia.” 166
For obvious reasons, during the presidency of Viktor
Yanukovych, books in which the situation in Ukraine is represent-
ed only in a dark light had decreased. However, since the spring
of 2014 and from a muddy stream of Russian book publishing,
165
Banderovshchina, (Moscow: Izmo “Exmo,” Publishing House “Algorithm”
2005), 304 pages.
166
M. Kalashnikov and S. Buntovsky, Independent Ukraine: The Collapsed Project
(Moscow: 2009).
156
it became stronger. Here is an interesting trend: by working in a

genre of pseudo-scientific fantasy, the enemies of Ukraine actually
got the opportunity to fight against Ukraine with real weapons in
their hands. However, not all of them have exchanged their pens
for firearms. For example, the Odesa author Lev Vershinin wrote
a blatant disregard for Ukraine in his books, Hopakiada (after the
Ukrainian dance called the “hopak”), and Ukraine: Eternal Ruin.
He preferred to move to Spain, where the fight against the blue
and yellow is much easier.
Several other scribblers found themselves in the separatist realms.
Fiction writer Fyodor Berezin, the author of books with such el-
oquent titles as: Ukrainian Front: Red Stars on the Maidan, and
Ukrainian Helll was seen surrounded by Igor Girkin (also known as
the Russian army veteran “Strelkov”) after which the writer became
deputy commandant of the captured separatists of Donetsk. 1677 Gleb
Bobrov, who before the Revolution of Dignity published a series of
novels about the “era of the stillborns,” participated in the ideological
formation of the self-proclaimed LNR. For many years the epistolary
foe of Ukraine Georgy Savitsky, (The Battlefield-Ukraine, the Broken
Trident, The Battlefield of Sevastopol, The Wrath of Novorossiia, Wild
Field 2017)
7 fought with weapons in his hands. Is it any wonder that
“NATO forces,” “Western private military companies,” and other
verbal constructs moved from the pages of books to the headlines
of Russian news agencies.
I note that Russia had spared no means and wasted no paper for
publications to form their own vision of not only what is happening
in Ukraine at the present stage, but also its past. If the publication
of books by Pavlo Gubarev such as The Torch of New Russia and
Yuri Evich’s In the Trenches of Donbas, and Way of the Cross of New
Russia should contribute to the formalization of the secessionist
entities and their promotion to the socio-political environment,
then there is a real ninth wave of pseudo-scientific literature in the
167
M. Gutkin. “War of Ukraine invented by science fiction writers?” https://
www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/ukraine-war—writer-fantasist-mg/2406591.html;
“Strelkov appointed science fiction writer Berezina as his deputy,” https://vz.ru/
news/2014/6/4/690070.html.
157
denigration of Ukrainian history. For example, in 2015, the world

saw the publication of the book by Andrey Vadzhry, There Never
Was a Ukraine: The Mythology of Ukrainian Ideology, and Valery
Korovin’s The End of the Ukraine Project, frantically urging their
readers that our country has no right to exist.
Paradoxically, the Revolution of Dignity provided the impetus
for Russian publishers to release tarnished versions of Ukrainian
history and literature, which are accessible to buy not only in Russia,
but also in a number of European Union countries especially where
there are numerous Russian-speaking communities. EU residents
who speak and read Russian are one of the main targets of such lit-
erature where the titles speak for themselves: How to Leash Ukraine
to Russia: The Myth of the Stalin-era Holodomorr by Yury Mukhin,
The Whole Truth About the UPA, by Andrey Kozlov, and Hunting
Bandera by Nikolai Lykov are all meant to form an aversion to
Ukrainian history.
Russian publishers willingly published the works of politicians
for whom the Revolution of Dignity has become an occasion to leave
their homeland behind. The flagship leader in this “Anti-Maidan li-
brary” is a work by the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Mykola
Azarov called Ukraine at a Crossroads: Notes of the Prime Minister.
Former Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko, 168 who tried to
drown the Maidan protesters in blood in early 2014, not only pub-
lished his book in Russia Bloody Euromaidan: Crime of the Century
in 2016, but also provided a newsletter about it edited by the leading
Ukrainian media. Political scientist Mikhail Pogrebinsky success-
fully combines his appearances on Russian television shows on a
given political topic along with forecasting negative scenarios for
the country in his book, Ukraine: In Anticipation for the Inevitable.
168
Vitaliy Y. Zakharchenko (January 20, 1963)—Ukrainian civil servant, busi-
nessman, former head of the State Tax Service and Minister of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine; suspected of crimes against humanity during the events of the Euromaidan.
Zakharchenko’s resignation from the post of Minister for the Interior and the in-
vestigation of his activities were some of the main demands of the Euromaidan
opposition political parties. He is wanted by the SBU since February 26, 2014.
Hiding from justice in Russia.
158
These proactive publications by Russian opinion leaders of

anti-Ukrainian works are revealing. For example, a recognized
hawk, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, had only a few years
ago produced a series of books with these evocative titles: The
Geopolitics of Russian Civilization, The Battle of Russia, Radical
Doctrines of New Russia, leaving no doubt as to their content. An
advisor to Vladimir Putin, and one of the ideologists of exerting
pressure on Ukraine, Sergey Glazyev (a native of Zaporozhye,
Ukraine) in 2015 published the book Ukrainian Catastrophe:
The American Aggression in World War II, explaining that what
is happening in Ukraine was based on conspiracy theories.
Another is his colleague Sergei Markov who formed the pro-Pu-
tin position in his Hybrid War Against Russia, which tried to
give an explanation of this popular term with pro-Kremlin
positions.
Hybrid aggression was the high point for the carrier of ideas
of Eurasianism Aleksandr Dugin, whose labored book Ukraine:
My War—Geopolitical Diary, offers its own vision of the political
situation in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. Formally belonging
to the “non-system opposition” Eduard Limonov had published
in 2015, Kyiv Kaput: The Hot Book which hit the Ukrainian
leadership with unfounded criticisms and conjectures.
Ukrainian authors have tried to respond in the form of an
adequate position with respect to what is happening in relation
to Russia. It is interesting that efforts in this process are not only
made by Ukraine’s citizens. US citizen, Sergei Loiko’s 169 artistic
novel, Airportt drew attention to the war in the Donbas. Yevgeny
Polozhy’s 170 short story collection, Ilovaisk is about one of the
most tragic pages of Russian-Ukrainian confrontation.
169
Sergei Loiko (b. 1953, Mikkeli, Finland)—journalist, writer, photographer,
translator. The author of numerous reports from areas of military-political conflicts,
including the former USSR.
170
Yevgeny V. Polozhy (b.1968)—Ukrainian writer, journalist, editor-in-chief of
several magazines, assaulted by thugs. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2014/04/the-disturbing-tally-of-activists-and-journalists-tortured-or-killed-
in-ukraine/361246/. ATLANTIC Apr. 25, 2014.
159
In the spring of 2015, Kharkiv sociologist Ihor Rushchenko

published the first study, Russian–Ukrainian Hybrid Way: Views
of a Sociologist. Unfortunately, it did not find widespread pop-
ularity in the academic community. Yours truly followed be-
hind Rushchenko with my book published in the Russian and
Ukrainian languages called Hybrid Warfare: Survive and Win.
These publications in fact formed the basis of hybrid aggres-
sion research, not only in Ukraine but also in Europe. It is also
worth mentioning the study by Taras Berezov, Annexation of the
Island of Crimea: The Chronicles of a Hybrid War. Also, a group
called the Information Resistance prepared the publication, The
Invasion of Ukraine: the Chronicle of Russian Aggression which
saw the light of day in 2016. In the same year, a book by jour-
nalist Serhii Markchenko (Serge Marko) also appeared called
Chronicles of a Hybrid War.
One of the answers for these “book challenges from the East”
is to have a ban strategy. The State Committee for Television
and Broadcasting issued on August 11, 2015 a list of 38 books
published in Russia to be banned and prevented from being im-
ported into the territory of Ukraine. However, it is the true that
the ban is not always observed and that there are no problems
acquiring volumes of anti-Ukrainian content by Petrivka, the
largest book market in the capital. The ban on the importing
of these books is not always effective, and the issue of halting
their distribution is debatable in practice even for the European
Court of Human Rights. Therefore, most countries are trying
not to advertise such books, according to Media Law Institute
attorney Ihor Rozkladai in his comments to Radio Liberty.
According to him, prohibiting the distribution of the books can
only be through the courts and only after the Security Service of
Ukraine for example, proves that the books violate the European
Convention on Human Rights. Otherwise, the ban would be easy
to appeal to the European Court. “You need to take each particu-
lar book to prove that it contains hate speech. And accordingly, if
it contains hate speech, then it is necessary, among other things,
to institute criminal proceedings,” said Rozkladai.
160
Bohdan Pavlychko, the director of the publishing house

Foundations, is convinced that the root of the problem is in
the unsaturated Ukrainian book market, and that “we will stim-
ulate Ukrainian publishing by using populist bans. Ukrainians
have read the books of our publishers. We must create an en-
vironment in which the industry can flourish. The first way,
taking into account the world experience, is to impose a duty on
Russian books and extend tax breaks for domestic publishers.” 171
It should be noted that cinema was also among cultural-ideo-
logical aggression-making. Moreover, Russian filmmakers have
continued the tradition of Soviet cinema in which the UPA
warriors are portrayed mostly as collaborators, Nazis or ban-
dits ((examples are the films Alarm in the Month of September,
State Border, It Was at Rivne). A worthy successor to this tra-
dition was the film released in 2010, We Are From Buduschego
2 in which writers were mixed in with UPA units and the SS
Division “Galicia.” It is interesting to note that in the detec-
tive-espionage series Liquidation, which takes place in postwar
Odesa, an OUN underground unit was featured that cooperated
with German agents. Ukraine responded to these film series
with The Guards 172 in which one of the main roles was played
by a Ukrainian actor Oleksiy Gorbunov who is well-known to
Russian viewers.
If the struggle for the minds of Ukrainian citizens by the
various contents of literature and film can be called rational, if
not often delusional from the Russian publishing houses and
film studios, then the situation in the ecclesiastical sphere is
compounded by several facts. It is not only because there is no
formal separation of church and state in Russia and Ukraine,
but also due to the active participation of the Russian Orthodox
171
A. Moskvichova, “Ministry of Culture wants to take on anti-Ukrainian liter-
ature,” http://www.radiosvoboda.mobi/a/27652953.html.
172
The Guards—the 2014-2015 Ukrainian military-drama television series aired
on Ukrainian television channel 2 + 2 and filmed at the Vasylkiv aircraft base, in
the Kyiv region. The program was aired in Ukraine and Poland.
161
Church in the construction of the “Russian world,” and of the

complex interdenominational situation in Ukraine.
The situation with the legacy of Kyivan Rus’, in particular,
Prince Volodymyr is very significant in the context of the strug-
gle for Ukraine’s historical heritage.
The starting point of Moscow’s self-consciousness was the
idea of the continuity of church and dynastic unity from Kyiv
to Moscow. St. Volodymyr was revered as the ancestor of the
Moscow rulers who were positioned as the only legitimate heirs
of the Kyivan princes. The principle of religious unity for all
Russia, formulated since the time of Ivan Kalita, 173 has become a
point-to-point policy issue for Moscow. That is why the struggle
for the “gathering of Russian lands”—the historical heritage of
Volodymyr [Vladimir in Russian] the Baptist—was, not at the
least, an ideological struggle for the appropriation of the history
of these lands.
At the beginning of the 15th century, the epithet of Prince
Volodymyr has found its final form as “holy and equal to the
apostles of the autocratic Russian land.” From the middle of the
15th century, St. Volodymyr acquired the Moscow principality
featuring a state-church cult with Moscow also possessing the
heritage of St. Andrew the Apostle. The idea of Moscow pos-
sessing the heritages of both St. Andrew and St. Volodymyr later
finds confirmation in its receiving the relics of the Baptism of
Kyivan Rus’. Part of the relics from the year 1640, originally
found in the ruins of the Church of the Tithes by Metropolitan
Petro Mohyla, were flown from Kyiv to Moscow and a few years
later, the relics of St. Andrew were taken from Thessalonica to
Moscow.
Volodymyr is valued as an historical figure whose identification
in the Russian Empire increased significantly at the end of the 18th
century. The revival of interest in the person and work of Volodymyr
was among the impetus of joining Crimea to Russia. It is from the
173
Ivan I Danilovich Kalita—Prince of Moscow from 1325 to 1340, Grand Duke
of Volodymyr until 1340, Prince of Novgorod from 1328 to 1337.
162
Black Sea coast of Kyiv where early Christianity first began. From the
point of view of St. Petersburg, it is here, in Chersonesos—the city of
Russian princes—where Russia again finds its faith and its history.
But the first large-scale celebrations in honor of St. Volodymyr
took place only in 1888 in honor of the 900th anniversary of the
Baptism of Russia. The day of his memory on July 15th turned into
one of the most important Russian religious holidays for it was spe-
cially decreed by the Russian Orthodox Church Synod. Already, in
the 21stt century, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia once again
elevated him to the status of the main patron saint in Russian history.
It is significant that the Kremlin’s “privatization” of Volodymyr
the Baptist began in preparation before the start of the aggression
against Ukraine. On July 31, 2013, after large-scale celebrations in
Kyiv and Sevastopol for the 1,025th anniversary of the Baptism of
Rus’, the President of Russia had established a special working group
for the preparation of events dedicated to the millennium of Prince
Volodymyr’s repose. 174 In Russia, the reactions were rather nervous
towards the decree by Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko had
declaring the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the death of
Volodymyr the Great. 175 These facts indirectly confirm that Russia
was preparing for the “subjugation of Ukraine” before the events
on the Euromaidan.
The precise role of Ukraine’s history is extremely important to
Russia’s imperial past. According to the well-known political scien-
tist Lilia Shevtsova, “Ukraine, upon leaving for the West takes with
it the legitimacy of the Russian nation, and we remain only as the
Muscovy who were inhabited by unknown people. Then Russia will
have to start counting its stories not beginning with the thousand
years of the history of Christianity and the Baptism of Rus,’ and St.
174
Alexey Kopyatok, “The project ‘The Baptist’: how Russia ‘appropriates’ itself
of Prince Volodymyr the Great,” http://sprotyv.info/en/news/13846-proekt-kresti-
tel-kak-rossiya-prisvaivaet-sebe-knyazya-vladimira-velikogo.
175
“Poroshenko has signed a decree on the commemoration of Prince Volodymyr
the founder of the state of Rus-Ukraine,” http://censor.net.ua/news/326291/poros-
henko_podpisal_ukaz_o_chestvovanii_pamyati_knyazya_vladimira_sozdatelya_go-
sudarstva_rusiukrainy.
163
Andrew from the 12th century—but that’s another story. Therefore,

Ukraine is of paramount importance for Russia. First, Ukraine is
there for the protection of Russia’s own history and nation. Secondly,
Ukraine is needed to protect the Kremlin’s own legitimacy. Third is
to prevent the Maidan from happening in Russia. Fourth is the big
challenge for Europe and the Western world. You [Ukraine] shook
the sleeping, paralyzed Europe and said: “Hey, you asleep there? And
we are fighting for your values.” 176 Frankly, this argument is much
better understood in Russia than in Europe.
Russia’s condescending attitude to Ukraine is by and large a
mask that allows Russia to hide the true motives of the Kremlin’s
aggressive actions. It would be wiser to assess Russia’s policy to-
wards Ukraine about the historical past issue based on the maxim
formulated by George Orwell: “Who controls the present, controls
the past. Who controls the past, controls the future.”
History as an ideological weapon, and a tool for massive brain-
washing has proven to be very effective. The prerequisites for this
are present in contemporary Russia in the form of rudimentary
phenomena in the post-Soviet republics where the Soviet model
of its world image and memory of the past is reinforced by the
sluggish years of Ukrainian historical scholarship. Ukraine is experi-
encing a serious shortage of diverse affordable and decent literature
that would be capable of revealing and singing the heroic pages of
Ukrainian history.
After gaining independence in 1991, the history of Ukraine had
to be written again. Twenty-five years later, after the Revolution of
Dignity, this problem is no less relevant and important. Ukrainian
historians need to move away from the Russian ideological schemes,
to resist the pressures of the Russian intellectual elite when present-
ing currently existing pain points, and from the dominance of the
Russian intellectual discourse (interpretations) within the Ukrainian
public space.
176
Lilia Shevtsova, “Putin is looking for new ways to strangulate Ukraine, http://
news.liga.net/interview/politics/3329055-liliya_shevtsova_putin_ishchet_novye_
sposoby_udusheniya_ukrainy_.htm.
164
It is no coincidence that today’s Russian-Ukrainian relations are

made of historical discussions on the leading edge of confrontation.
It would seem that past history is known to play a secondary role in
the contemporary ideological debates, information wars, and po-
litical conflicts. But it is the history, especially the episodes which
intersect the trajectory of past Russian and Ukrainian peoples that
becomes the subject of fierce controversy.
It is extremely important for Ukraine to prove that it was a
Russian colony with all the ensuing consequences of that status.
Russia is trying to “sell” the world community its own version of
“the brotherhood of the East Slavic peoples.” It has long lost its rel-
evance and validity.
Because the story is steeped in ideology and historical nuances
of past events, it is in Russia’s own interests that it is perceived as the
prescribed winners. Due to the presence of its imperial and Soviet
traditions, Russia has considerable experience in the formation of
the “correct perception” of historical events for their fellow citizens.
By virtue of the presence of history in the school educational pro-
grams on this subject, this topic appears to be easily digestible to
society because the average citizen is easy to convince of this or
that interpretation of past events as the sauce of public interest, or
through the instigation of fear and hatred.
Ukraine will have to learn to form its own view on historical

events. For our country, it is vital to create an attractive image
of its own which would be based on historical examples and
parallels. It is important to master this art by not bypassing
the difficult and contentious issues of a once common history,
thereby narrowing the space for speculation and distortions.
Ukraine does not come from out of nowhere. It fought hard for
its independence and today continues this struggle.
The myth of imperial Russia was not born yesterday, nor to-
day. Russia’s myth is skillfully and persistently supported by all
available means for one simple reason: the nostalgia for past
imperial greatness makes it possible for millions to find and
165
perceive an easily understandable explanation of the formation

and development of the Russian Federation’s mode of authori-
tarian rule. Moreover, the top-down interpretation of history is
perceived by their public with a sense of comfort, not rejection.
A significant part of Russia’s history is the basic formation of
national ideology questions, especially among them being: the
origin of the Russian people, the formation and development
of the nation, territory, assessment of the causes of imperial ex-
pansion, relations with neighboring nations—all of which quite
traditionally were interpreted into the “official history” over the
past 200 years. Therefore it is not surprising that the fundamental
basis of the Russians’ social consciousness has enough inertia to
play the perpetrating stereotypes for a long time and do not need
any additional transformational efforts by the authorities.
The Kremlin is well aware that in the history of humankind
the most successful integration projects are those that combine
economic interests with the civilizational proximity of the partic-
ipating nation-states. The latter assumes a common value system,
which is usually found through the religious confessional com-
munity. If we take the example of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine,
then besides the factors of religious communities and ethnic
proximity, the significant fact is that for over the past 200 years
of their separate existence as states 177 (i.e., via separate “historical
policies”—if they were formulated) that only occurred during
the last quarter of a century with the exception of the troubled
times of 1917–1920. This is a huge common historical experience
which Russia seeks to use for its own interests.
Middle-aged and senior citizens who have lived in the former
Soviet Union are united by the common experience of life in the
USSR. In Belarus and Ukraine, modern consumer schools of
“national history” legitimizing (i.e., explaining the natural and
non-randomness) modern independent statehood existence, and
1777
The exceptions are Eastern Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovina, which were
not part of the Russian Empire and became part of the Soviet Union only in 1939-
1945, but they do not constitute the majority of the population of modern Ukraine
(Author’s Note).
166
are made up of mostly young people who have not yet gained
access to the levers of public policy. Accordingly, a considerable
part of the population of Ukraine and Belarus are still the car-
riers of historical stereotypes that were initially shared with the
Russians.
It is interesting to note that this was a fact of discord during
the All-Ukrainian Referendum of December 1, 1991 178 when in-
dependence was voted in by 90% of the voters. Of course, at the
time, it was not possible in schools to comprehend another story
except the Soviet one. Before that, there were only three years of
freedom of speech with respect to the Ukrainian “national issues”
and the surge of social activism was in effect. But the idea of
Ukraine as something self-sufficient however, had to rely on its
non-randomness, naturalness, antiquity, duration in space and
time—in other words, its “separate” history. Unfortunately, in
2014, after 20 years of independence, part of Ukrainian society
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have not supported inde-
pendence, opting instead for an artificially created theme of being
its own “independent Donbas.” Their choice is not affected even
by the fact that in the period from 2010 to 2013 the notions of
“Donbas Feeds Ukraine,” and “Ukraine will disappear without
Donbas,” formed the basis of its national information policy.
In an effort to find an answer to the question about the causes
of aggressive behavior of Russia based on the historical past, it is
necessary to analyze the historical message of the broadcasts from
Russia to Ukraine during the years 2000–2014 in the ways it was
delivered, and the reasons for the relative successes/failures. The
main ones were:
“General History.” The essence of this idea is a postulate of the
“common destiny” of Eastern Slavic peoples over the centuries, the
178
All-Ukrainian Referendum in 1991 was regarding the territory of the former
USSR on the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. It was held on December
1, 1991. One question was on the referendum: “Do you confirm the Declaration
of Independence of Ukraine?” The referendum was voted by 31,891,742 citi-
zens—84.18% of the population of Ukraine. Of these, 28,804,071 people (90,32%)
voted “for” Ukraine’s independence.
167
fate of which was not interrupted until 1991. The collapse of the
Soviet Union in this context is considered an historical mistake, or,
according to Vladimir Putin, “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the 20th century.” 179 Despite all the contradictions of the Soviet
period, all his negatives are offset by the common victory over
Nazism in 1945. However, on this issue the Russian President has
a dissenting private opinion, which has already been mentioned.
A retrospective of this idea confirms the postulate that all the
achievements of Ukrainians in the past could only have taken
place with the participation of Russia, but when isolated from
Russia, the Ukrainian people then suffered the most painful
historical periods of foreign domination. Ukraine’s joining the
Russian nation could not be done by seizure or occupation, but
only when exclusively exempted from foreign domination or
reunification.
Holodomorr 180 denial and an apology for Stalin’s moderniza-
tion. It is reasonable to raise the questions about the initiators,
inspirers, and performers of how the Ukrainian perspective of
the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was perceived as a genocide against
the Ukrainian people. In Ukraine, it was perceived because of the
culprit party leadership of the Soviet regime in Moscow and in
Kharkiv (then the capital of the Ukrainian SSR). Such an assump-
tion, according to Russian historians, “blackens” the era that began
in Russia for rehabilitation and glorification. 181 (An example that
is widely used in Russian scholarship is the portrayal of Stalin as
an effective manager).
179
“Putin’s imperial cry for the lost union: ‘Speed and Conditions’ of the
Movement to Democracy—the Case of Russia,” http://censor.net.ua/news/48590/
imperskiyi_plach_putina_po_utrachennomu_soyuzu_quotskorost_i_usloviya-
quot_dvijeniya_k_demokratii__delo.
180
The Holodomor of 1932-1933—the genocide of the Ukrainian people, orga-
nized by the leadership of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the
government of the USSR in 1932-1933 by creating an artificial mass famine which
led to multimillion human losses in the countryside on the territory of the Ukrainian
SSR and Kuban, the overwhelming majority of these populations were Ukrainians.
181
“Glorifitsirovat”—to
t praise to excess.
168
Russia has consistently ignored the obvious connection “of

grain procurements” 182 and “the collapse of Ukrainization;” 183
and the coincidence of the areas with the greatest hunger that
included ethnic Ukrainians, and the terrorist actions by the au-
thorities to deprive them of any food. A simultaneous famine
occurred in the early 1930s in Kazakhstan which also involved
politics (an attempt to “besiege” nomads as a way to keep them
in line through another and local version of collectivization).
Russian historians and politicians try to justify collectiviza-
tion as the need for creating an industrial power foundation
for Ukraine, and this is a perception taken mainly by the older
generation.
The Great Victory and collaboration, 184 “brothers,” and “en-
emies.” The participation of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition
and the victory over Nazism is perceived in Russian official circles
as a complete historical indulgence for the Stalinist regime and
of that era. As Nazism was the greatest evil of the 20th century
and condemned by humankind, then all its winners were equally
“without sin.” Based on the same logic, any social movement,
and the armed forces of the Eastern European countries that do
not recognize the power of the Soviet Union (for example, the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army—UPA), are automatically considered
collaborators, however, the possibility is not considered a rejec-
tion of both Stalin and Hitler. This ignores the fact of the coop-
eration between the USSR and Nazi Germany in the 1930s and
the joint participation of these two totalitarian regimes before
the outbreak of the Second World War (the attack on Poland in
September 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, and the
182
Grain procurements—seizure of grain crops from peasants for state needs.
rainization—the promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture process
ormation and strengthening of Soviet power in Ukraine during the 1920s
and early 1930s.
184
Collaboration in the legal interpretation of international law—a conscious,
voluntary and deliberate collaboration with the enemy to his advantage and to the
detriment of the state.
169
Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, Northern Bukovina, and

Bessarabia in 1940).
The concept of the Great Victory has also been experienced
in recent years—from the evolution of the interpretation in the
framework of the “common destiny” or “total victory,” to the ne-
gation of the role of other nations with the exception of Russia in
the victory on the Eastern Front of World War II. Ukrainians are
the “traitorous people,” since they are now referred to generally
in the context of the “collaborative” OUN and UPA. 185 We have
already mentioned that in December 2010, Vladimir Putin stated
that Russia would have won the Great Patriotic War, and without
the help of Ukraine. 186
This statement can be considered the starting point of the
fine-tuning of the historical policy methods adopted by the Kremlin.
In fact, even before the Euromaidan Revolution, Ukrainians were
displayed to the public and media through the Russian historical
rhetoric in the ethnic friend category of “fraternal peoples,” but also
in a negative political one as “nationalist-fascist traitors.” However,
this did not prevent the Russian leadership at the highest political
levels to broadcast them as “fraternal people.”
The scenario of consistent “integration” of a holistic Ukraine
(while requiring the tactical politically correctness of addressing
the Ukrainians as a nation) was leading towards a new “Eurasian
space.” From around 2012, this was supplemented with a parallel
scenario of the dismemberment or annexation of Ukraine under
the pretext of restoring the “Russian-ness/Russianity” parts of
the population. Hence, the development of the concept of “New
Russia,” the emergence of which included creating a group of
“people’s republics” designed to play the role of gray zones with
different shades of this coloring but with the same international
legal uncertainty.
185
“Ukrainians ‘champions’ on collaboration with Nazi Germany?” http://likbez.
org.ua/ukrainians-champions-for-collaborationism-with-nazi-germany.html.
186
“Putin explained in figures of Ukraine’s role in the victory in the Great Patriotic
War,” http://delo.ua/world/putin-v-cifrah-o-roli-v-pobede149005/
170
Vladimir Putin publicly declared the historical origins of

an entity declared as “New Russia” on April 17, 2014. During
a live television broadcast with the Russian viewers, President
Vladimir Putin said: “There is only one region from the center
of of Novorossiysk, the so-called Novorossiia. Let me remind
you that this is the New Russia. Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk,
Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa—were not part of Ukraine in tsarist
times. These are all areas that were transferred to Ukraine by the
Soviet government. Why did they do that—only God knows.“ 187
Six months later, he returned to this thesis, stressing that
the capital of “New Russia” was the city of Novorossiysk. “In
fact, it was one of the regions from the center of Novorossiysk,
which was called Novorossiia. It is actually the Kharkiv, Luhansk,
Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa regions. These lands in the
1920s with the creation of the Soviet Union were transferred
from Russia to Ukraine,” Putin said at a Valdai Conference in
late October 2014. 188
Simultaneous implementation of policy scenarios with the
relevant historical background seems quite natural, since such
an algorithm allows an appropriate combination for a different
course of action. Actually, what we have observed in the perfor-
mance of the Russian leadership in 2014 is the midst of a hybrid
aggression. Diverse and sometimes conflicting clichés have been
used on a revolving basis, and the “shots” were called on the
public consciousness in Ukraine and on Ukrainians.
The artificiality of Ukraine/Ukrainians. The idea itself is
not new and dates back to the ideology of the Black Hundred
movement of the early 20th century. 189 This apogee of popularity
187
“Five high-profile Putin statements about the history of Ukraine. http://www.
bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2014/11/141110_ru_s_putin_on_histo-
ne.
eeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, http://kremlin.ru/
news/46860.
189
Black Hundreds—the collective name of extreme-right organizations in
Russia 1905-1917, united under the slogans of monarchism, ultra-chauvinism,
and anti-Semitism.
171
of such a world view belonged to the First World War. The

Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire was perceived as
“the Austrian intrigue” in order to split the unity of the Russian
people without taking into account the social and cultural factors
of the development of society.
However, in the Russian version of the spreading of this “his-
tory of Ukraine,” in which there is no place not only for the
Ukrainian nation, but also for a national identity (except in the
form of amusing or servile images) exhibits a sad symptom. This
is a departure from the at least moderately “condemned” negative
historical interpretations of Ukraine via the upfront unequivocal
retelling of autocratic ideologies during the First World War and
the era of imperialism. Since it is obvious that all “versions of
the story” were voiced after the approval of the supreme lead-
ership of Russia, this is evident of the Kremlin’s willingness to
try to change the political map and the system of international
relations in Europe.
The high degree of personalization of the Russian power sys-
tem suggests that it keeps in alignment with the application of
the “national leader,” which invariably in the second decade is
Vladimir Putin. That, and it must be emphasized, pays much
attention to the demonstration of his own vision of Ukrainian
history.
The psychological underpinnings of the Russian President’s
statements were observed by the well-known American politi-
cal scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, who stressed that “Mr. Putin’s
motivation is historical nostalgia, which has no connection with
reality. The accomplished fact is that neither the Kazakhs or
Ukrainians or Belarusians do not want to again become a part
of the empire, even disguised. As a consequence—any efforts
to create a new Russian empire will generate resistance, which
will harm the ability of Russia to become a modern, successful,
democratic and European state even later.” 190
190
Z. Brzezinski, “Putin’s motivation is historical nostalgia,” The Ukrainian Week,
No. 1, (2012).
172
During the meeting with the young Russian historians on

November 2014, Putin said: “We see that attempts to recapit-
ulate the society in many countries, including the re-coding of
the society of our country, and this cannot be associated with
attempts to rewrite history, to combine it with someone’s geo-
political interests.” 191 Putin’s history is perceived exclusively as
a set of “right” answers to every conceivable question about the
past for those who swear allegiance to all subjects under the
geopolitical entity.
A storm of emotions in the civilized world erupted against
Vladimir Putin regarding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which
in August 1939, a week before the start of the Second World War,
the Soviet Union and Germany divided the spheres of influence
in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the Russian President does not
consider “the brotherhood of the two dictators” on the eve of
the Second World War shameful. “Now I do not want to blame
anyone here,” said Vladimir Putin on November 5, 2014 during
that meeting with Russian historians. “But serious studies have
shown that such methods were then foreign policy. The USSR
signed a nonaggression pact with Germany—and then say, ‘Ah,
how bad!’ What is wrong here, if the Soviet Union did not want
to fight.”
It is interesting that in the five years prior to that meeting,
on August 1, 2009, the Polish newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza pub-
lished a slightly different assessment from Russia’s prime minister
at the time—Vladimir Putin: “Certainly, there are grounds to
condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded in August
1939.” 192
During that meeting with historians on November 5 th,
Vladimir Putin gave a clear signal that Kyivan Rus’ and Russia
191
“Putin has actually recognized that society is encoded in Russia,” http://www.
depo.ua/rus/svit/putin-fakticheski-priznal-chto-obshchestvo-v-rossii-zakodirova-
no05112014150500.
192
“Putin’s Letter to the Poles—Full Version,” http://google.com/news/
1,114881,6983945
173
are identical concepts. Let me remind you that in the spring of

2014, the term “Kyivan Rus’” disappeared in the Russian version
of Wikipedia, which has come to replace it as the “old Russian
nation.”
However, it was not done without another portion of “Putin’s
brand of historical discoveries.” According to him, “Yaroslav
Mudry (Yaroslav the Wise) 193 – who as his name suggests was
wise of course, and has done a lot for the country, but his suc-
cession was not ensured as it was in some Western countries.
The formula by which he inherited the throne in Russia was
very difficult, confusing, and has led to disunity.” 194 Putin said
this to the historians on November 5. His policy advice to them
was truly unique in its simplicity: “Read some history books.”
That meeting predictably turned its attention to Sevastopol,
not only the city of Russian sailors, but also the “historical spir-
itual font.” With the baptism of Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv in
Chersonesos 195 Putin also linked it with reference to Russia, with
no mention of Kyiv and Ukraine. More recently, he attempted to
co-opt another historical figure. In a statement during his visit
to Paris in May 2017, Vladimir Putin declared that the mar-
riage of the “Russian” princess, Anna Yaroslavna was the be-
ginning of French-Russian relations. Historians emphasize that
such an interpretation is extremely far from the truth, because
Anna did not consider himself either Russian or Ukrainian.
Anna Kyivskaya (Anna of Kyiv) is the actual inscription on the
193
Yaroslav Volodymyrovych also called “Yaroslav the Wise” (978?-1054), son
of Volodymyr the Great, was a Rus’ prince from the Rurik dynasty, also Grand
Duke of Kyiv (1015-1018, 1019-1054), Prince of Rostov (988-1010) and Novgorod
(1010-1034).
194
T. Melikyan, “Putin at a meeting with historians condemns Yaroslav Mudrogo:
wrong with successors,” http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/11/05/putin-na-vstre-
che-s-istorikami-osudil-yaroslava-mudrogo-oshibsya-s-preemnikami.html.
195
Chersonesos (Kherson during the Middle Ages, and as Korsun in ancient
sources) is an ancient Greek city-state in the southwestern part of Crimea (within
the framework of modern Sevastopol). On June 23, 2013, Chersonesos was included
in the list of UNESCO World Heritage sites.
174
monument dedicated to her in Senlis which appears to be the

closest of her self-identification as the wife of the French king.
(Senlis is a town in France where Anna Yaroslavna is buried
and where her monument was built with the assistance of the
Ukrainian authorities).
“Chersonesos? What is this? Sevastopol,” said the Russian
President. “Can you imagine what the connection is between
spiritual sources and national components. It refers to the
struggle for a place for Crimea as a whole, for Sevastopol and
Chersonesos. In fact, the Russian people for many centuries
struggled to get up from their historical spiritual font.” 196 This
raises a paradoxical situation: the historians are well aware that
the Russian President, to put it mildly, is talking nonsense when
trying to adapt a solution for Russia’s geopolitical objectives by
using disparate historical facts. Yet there is a rational link: Putin’s
self-confidence and arrogance does provide an unexpected ex-
planation. Many of Moscow’s attempts to impose the concept
of a “New Russia,” an idea that originated during the second
quarter of the 18th century and one that was exhumed from an
old chest buried in naphthalene mothballs, was never able to be
fully realized even by its creators during the time of Catherine II.
For most of its history, Novorossiia existed not as an adminis-
trative, but rather as a geographical concept. And it would not be
known what this area of upholding Ukrainian interests would’ve
been if not for the efforts of a number of modern Zaporozhye
and Odesa schooled historians, who since the mid-1990s, pur-
posefully and efficiently investigated the history of the Ukrainian
Steppes from the 18th-19th centuries and practically built an in-
surmountable barrier against the purely academic propaganda
work in forging the concept of “New Russia.” 197 However, one
196
T. Melikyan, “Putin at a meeting with historians condemns Yaroslav Mudrogo:
wrong with successors,” http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/11/05/putin-na-vstre-
che-s-istorikami-osudil-yaroslava-mudrogo-oshibsya-s-preemnikami.html.
1977
Viktor Brekhunenko, “At first, consciousness, then the weapon,” The Ukrainian
Week, No.52, (2014): 52-56.
175
must understand that in the modern world with rapidly changing

information and visions, any objective evidence given by profes-
sional scholars may be drowned out by professionally organized
informational noise.
It is worth noting that many of the current ideological con-
structions that the Kremlin uses in trying to explain the Russian-
Ukrainian relations have been formulated by the Russian elite
from as early as the 18th to 19th centuries, in many ways thanks
to the “useful khokhol”[Russian derogatory name for Ukrainians]
in the imperial service. In the Ukrainian elite environment, there
were always those who were ready to serve the empire, often
contrary to the interests of their cousins. At the same time, since
the 19th century, Russia had already imposed on the world its
interpretation of Ukrainian history and the image of Ukrainians
that were passed down and based on Russian expansionist inter-
ests. That empire was formed long ago, and very much still forms
the external representation of Ukraine and its past.
I am convinced that Russia will continue to not be limited
to the public “promotion” of its own historical views, but will
also try to use any opportunity to “correct” Ukraine’s historic
memory in its own interests. Ukraine’s challenge is to provide
an effective response.
Historian and journalist Sergey Gromenko offers a pragmatic
nationwide prescription on the “war of history,” which we cannot
be without today: “First, is to listen more to specialists rath-
er than to ‘experts’ who are guided by business conditions—no
‘Trypillian civilizations’ or ‘Ukrainians as Aryans,’ as well as ‘fra-
ternal peoples,’ or “fables of the Austrian General staff.’
“Second, do not feel remorse over spending money for or-
ganizing museums and having permanent and traveling exhibi-
tions, as well as support for scholarly publishing and for funda-
mental historical research.
“And, third, promote the formation of a new historical memo-
ry by renaming streets in honor of local heroes, opening memo-
rials, and emphasizing our Ukrainian position in international
organizations and events because there are still things that can
176
be pulled off by itself in a civil society even without government

aid.” 198
A well-known Ukrainian historian and popularizer of history
Kyrylo Halushko rightly observes: “We simply do not have a new
joint project, not enough reboot, and are lacking in having ‘other
new people’ above. We need to move from the stage of a ‘nation-
not-yet’ to the stage of a ‘nation-already-here,’ and our sad past
will be over. Being alive, of course, is good, but as someone smart
once put it, ‘alive are only those nations which have a program
for tomorrow.’ 199
“Kyivan Rus’-as a ‘true European Russia’ as opposed to a later
Asian franchise. 200 And if in the world’s capitals will confirm
that, yes, Ukraine is the real Russia—then it will be serious. The
weakness of modern Russia is in the hypertrophy of its symbolic
conspiracy.” 201 Halushka supports the Crimean journalist Pavlo
Kazarìn who claims that “Ukraine is not able to give the Kremlin
a symmetric punch. But in its possession it has an entire arsenal
of asymmetric responses that would be extremely painful for
Moscow. Ukraine is capable of hitting the archetypal symbols
of Russia, with its double-headed eagle, if God forbid, you will
have to prove your ancestry. If the Ukrainian elite had enough
ingenuity, they absolutely can start to deal with the Kremlin for
the brand of “Kyivan Rus’.”
Information warfare creates an image of the nation and forms
the agenda for its development. But history as ideology, when
turned back, is capable of providing the necessary respectability
for the most fantastic fabrications and allegations.
gei Gromenko. “Why Ukraine loses the war history with its neighbors,”
zhden.ua/History/117885.
rylo Halushko, “Historical myth about the ‘Ukrainians-poor,’” http://www.
a.com.ua/articles/2011/11/30/63438.
The meaning here is that the Moscow state has absorbed the tradition of
managing the Golden Horde.
201
P. Kazarin, “Abduction of Rus. Kyiv can take its true name in Moscow,” http://
www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2013/09/27/136919/view_print.
177
Summing up the preliminary results of which there is an

important element of the hybrid confrontation for the “fight
for history,” it is worth noting the following:
– Russia will not hesitate to distort the facts to confirm its
position on the basis of its presence in the archives of
the Russian Empire and the USSR.
– In Russia, there is a large-scale program of “Russification”
of history in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin has
successfully exploited the concept of the imperial
historical past while trying to bring Ukrainians down into
subservient roles and functions in the public sphere.
– Ukraine does not have an effective governmental policy
for its historical memory that can give impetus to the
nation’s formation.
Ukraine had to face the aggressive implementation of the val-
ues by the so-called “Russian world,” depriving it of the right to
its own national identity, and converting the Ukrainians’ status as
second class eastern Slavs. This is not the first time the Kremlin
has used this tool. Our country has not only become a testing
ground for the latest types of Russian weapons, but also as a place
to break-in brainwashing techniques.
“The Russian world” is an ideological alternative to Western
values in the minds of the citizens of Russia, Ukraine, and some
other countries, and is how the Russian Federation is trying to
spread its influence. According to Vladimir Putin, “The Russian
world can and should unite all those who cherish Russian words
and the Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or abroad.
This phrase ‘Russian world’ is often used.” 202
The matrix of the “Russian world” was formulated as a
pro-government slogan according to Russian political scientist
202
Lydia Sycheva, “Russian language, Russian culture, and Russian world, Russian
Federation Todayy No. 4. (2007), http://archive.russia-today.ru/2007/no_14/14_look.
htm/.
178
Andranik Migranyan: “The pretext of a ‘Russian world’ is under-

stood as primarily a community of people (civilization), which
is one way or another connected with Russia, and whose com-
munity is based on:
a) language and culture;
b) historical memory and the association of common histor-
ical memory values;
c) Orthodoxy;
g) the loyalty of today’s Russian state seeking to act in the
country and in the international arena as a natural succes-
sor of the Russian national tradition, the organic compo-
nent of which is the Russian Empire and the USSR.
“Of the last two components regarding the concept and ideol-
ogy of the ‘Russian world’ (Orthodoxy and loyalty to the Russian
nation), the rhetoric of Russia’s leading statesmen may emphasize
something smaller, but those (especially with regard to loyalty to
the Russian nation) are less important than the language, culture,
and common historical memory.” 203
We are dealing with a unique blend of Soviet and imperial
heritages which the Russian government tries to use for its own
interests in the former Soviet Union. The famous Ukrainian in-
ternational lawyer, Professor Volodymyr Vasilenko, recalled: “In
October 2000, Lyudmila Putin, then the wife of the Russian pres-
ident, in her speech at the All-Russian conference, “The Russian
Language at the Turn of the Millennium” proclaimed, ‘The
boundaries of the Russian language is what borders Russia.’” 204
At that time, the following sentence appeared to be only the
sounds of public opinion, but check the reaction of the inter-
national community and the mood within the Russian society
and of the “compatriots abroad.” This is evidenced by the place
203
Migranyan Andranik, “In orbit, the state language,” Russian Strategy, No.7,
(2007), http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/fullnews_arch_to.php?subaction=showfull&
id=1185274576&archive=1185275035.
204
V. Vasilenko, “Genesis and purpose of special operations against the Ukrainian
language,” http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/82032.
179
of the performance, and the speaker who made the statement.

Volodymyr Vasilenko rightly notes that “the thesis formulated by
it is nothing more than a reproduction of the concept of natural
language boundaries, which in the past was used by the strong
nations of continental Europe, including Nazi Germany, to justify
territorial expansion against neighboring countries, and as refer-
ring to the presence there of culturally related populations.” 205
Back in 2007, in his presidential address to the Federal
Assembly, Vladimir Putin outlined the boundaries of the “Russian
world,” and as “Russian being the language of the peoples of the
historic brotherhood, the true language of international com-
munication.” He is not simply the custodian of an entire layer
of truly global achievements, but also envisions a multi-million
dollar “’Russian world” living space, which of course would be
much broader than Russia itself. 206
“The Russian world” uses all available methods, acting not
only on the national level but also at the level of the media, ed-
ucation, social work, and entrepreneurship. The answer to all
is “the Russian world” which is not a fruitless attempt to shout
down political clowns, but an adequate response in all dimen-
sions of social life. 207
It is necessary to recognize at the level of politicians and

the thunderous “Russian world” that this is a technological
concept which in time must meet the requirements of a united
Russian state and cultural figures and commercial structures.
The experience of transnational business development and the
establishment of the geopolitical hegemony by the amateurs
of “metaphysical” and religious searches and adherents
of clear, analytically weighed business decisions made by
205
Ibid.
essage from Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly, on
2007,” http://www.rg.ru/2007/04/27/poslanie.html.
207
P. Okhotin, ‘“Russian world’ as technology,” http://tyzhden.ua/World/29591.
180
infernal activists who are willing to take on the responsibility

for the development of the Ukrainian cultural space—the
existence of the “Russian world” substantially limits Ukraine’s
ability to declare itself. However, to compete with those
instruments that are utilized by its adherents, it is necessary
to use non-linear instruments in order to be proactive and win.
According to the eminent theologian Kyrill or S.N. Govorun, 208

“In the early 2000s, this concept (‘the Russian world’) has turned
into something else, which could be described as a neo-imperial
project. At this stage, its further development includes the Russian
Orthodox Church—mainly through the site of the World Russian
People’s Council. Thus, in addition to its cultural basis, the ‘the
Russian world’ has gained another important ingredient—the re-
ligious. Cultural and religious elements were brought together in
what has been defined as ‘Russian civilization.’”
Ukraine appears to be the main target of the Kremlin’s influ-
ence by its taking advantage of the Russian Orthodox Church and
its Patriarch Kirill. This is not surprising, because the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the largest com-
ponent of the ROC. 209 Kirill (Gundyaev) not only had “pastoral
visits” in Ukraine during the period from 2009 to 2014, but vig-
orously opposed attempts to create a local Orthodox church with
autocephaly. For this purpose the elements of the actual influence
of the church and tools of the Orthodox organizations are in fact
pro-Russian. 210
208
Archimandrite Kyrill (born as Sergei Nikolayevich Govorun, January 28, 1974,
Zolotonosha, Ukraine) is an Archimandrite and senior lecturer at the Stockholm
School of Theology, also holds a Ph.D and is senior researcher at the Center for
Religious Studies at the Faculty of Philosophy Education and Science, National
Pedagogical University named after M.P. Drahomaniv, and publicist and research
associate at Columbia University (USA).
igious Directory, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/reference.
Zdioruk, V. M. Yablonsky, V. V. Tokman et al, Ukraine and the Project of
the “Russian World,” V. M. Yablonsky and S. I. Zdiorok, eds., (Kyiv: NISS, 2014).
181
After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the

conflict in Donbas, the “pastoral activity” of the patriarch of
the ROC Kirill had significantly decreased. The change of
the UOC-MP rector after the grave and prolonged illness of
Metropolitan Volodymyr 211 occurred in 2014 by Metropolitan
Onufriy. 212 He quickly received the status of a political figure,
due to a public refusal to honor the memory of the dead vic-
tims of the ATO citizens of Ukraine. 213 This would suggest
that the struggle for the souls and sentiments of Ukrainians
are far from complete.
The church in Ukraine, along with the army, has enjoyed
for many years the reputation of being a public institution that
is most trusted by Ukrainians. 214
The level of declared religiosity of Ukrainian society re-
mains high. On March 2016, believers made up 70% of the
respondents (compared to 76% in 2014). Those who hesitate
between belief and atheism—10%. The citizens’ opinions
on the prospects of a split with Orthodoxy in Ukraine dif-
fer. The emphasis is placed on two facts. First, an equal share
of respondents (24%) stated that “Orthodox Ukraine should
unite around the UOC-KP” and “The Orthodox Church of
211
His Beatitude, Volodymyr, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine (born
Viktor Markianovich Sabodan, November 23, 1935-July 5, 2014), the Bishop
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church since 1966, Metropolitan of Kyiv and all
Ukraine 1992-2014. Chairman and Permanent Member of the Holy Synod of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Permanent Member of the Holy Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church. Hero of Ukraine (2011). One of the most influential
bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church.
212
Onufriy (Orest Vladimirovich Berezovsky (b.1944)—Ukrainian church
figure. Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, head of the UOC-MP (August
17, 2014). Permanent Member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox
Church.
213
“Metropolitan Onufriy refused to stand up for the Heroes,” https://www.pra-
vda.com.ua/news/2015/05/9/7067252/.
214
“The church and national press are most trusted among Ukrainians,” http://
tsn.ua/ukrayina/naybilshoyu-doviroyu-sered-ukrayinciv-koristuyutsya-cerk-
va-i-vitchiznyana-presa 281811.html.
182
Ukraine should unite into one Church, which should seek

independence.” 215
Organized in July 2016, the UOC-MP (read – Russian
Orthodox Church) and the procession of the Sviatohirsk and
Pochayiv Lavras 216 was an attempt to simultaneously solve sev-
eral problems. The organizers tried an asymmetric response to
the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada’s decision to appeal for
an Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 217 Although
this recruitment is rather nominal, as the agenda for the Pan-
Orthodox Council was agreed upon in advance, the adherents of
the “Russian world” had to react. Interestingly, among the “de-
fenders” of Orthodoxy’s procession were mainly representatives
of the party’s “opposition bloc.” There is reason to believe that
the procession of the UOC-MP was used to test the reactions of
Ukrainian law enforcement agencies at public events, followed by
attempts to swing the situation in the country.
An important factor in hybrid aggression is language. The
use of the Russian language allows the RF to actively influence
the social and political moods in Ukraine over a long period.
Exclusively banning Russian as a way to solve this problem is
impossible. Monitoring the eight highest-rated television shows in
the Ukrainian language in 2013 accounted for only 31.8%. For the
Russian on-air programs—50.3%, and in comparison with 2012,
the share of Russian-language programs increased by 6.5% while
the Ukrainian language programs only by 2.9% (both figures are
due to the decrease in the proportion of bilingual programs).
215
“Religion, church, society and state: two years after the Maidan” (Informational
Materials), http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/Religiya_200516_A4.compressed.pdf.
216
“The religious procession of the UOC (the Moscow Patriarchate): without a
fight, but surrounded by the police,” https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/27884911.
html.
217
“The resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the appeal of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to His Holiness the Bartholomew, the Archbishop
of Constantinople and New Rome, the Ecumenical Patriarch for the granting of
autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine,” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/1422-19?test=4/UMfPEGznhh.EG.ZiipjOq1HI4/Us80msh8Ie6.
183
According to the results garnered by monitoring the six

highest-rated radio stations, it was found that in 2013, only
26.3% of the programs in the Ukrainian language were on the
air, and in Russian—43.8%, that is, for the first year Ukrainian
language programs decreased by 3.9% while the Russian lan-
guage ones increased by 4.2%. 218
The ongoing hybrid aggression in 2014–2015 caused a
decline in Ukrainian-language newspapers and magazines.
Realizing the impossibility of rapid changes in language
broadcasting, television and radio stations have adopted the
slogan “Yedina Krajina/One Country,” focusing on semantic
rather than linguistic content filling. Ukrainian language was
somewhat strengthened via education. And by reducing the
number of Russian films at the Ukrainian box offices, the posi-
tion of the Ukrainian language was also strengthened through
dubbing. 219
Although the Russian-language content is often dominant
in the cultural field, the situation is not dramatic. Russian lan-
guage usage in Ukraine has lost its status as a popular and fash-
ionable language, and no longer is the needed lift for advancing
up the social hierarchy. Events of 2014 and the beginning of
2015 allowed us to speak little about the loss of influence of
the formal “Russian world-like” tool in the consciousness of
Ukrainian citizens (obviously this effect is even more con-
centrated in the occupied territory of Donbas), but only as a
cardinal change in the overall picture of Ukraine. After the
Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, and the be-
ginning of the conflict in Donbas, a number of reasons arose
to legalize the patriotism of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians.
I believe that this type of development expands the horizon of
our country, and increases the arsenal of opposition against
Russia’s cultural expansion.
he state of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine in 2013,” http://texty.org.ua/

e/editorial/read/49503/.
219
“Creeping Russification continues in Ukraine,” http://dobrovol.org/article/334.
184
The investigative authority, The Razumkov Center 220 suggests

a positive trend in terms of opposition to the cultural-ideological
component of hybrid aggression. In June 2016, 60% of respon-
dents said they consider their native language Ukrainian, 15%
the Russian language, 22% both Ukrainian and Russian, while
2% of the respondents believe their relatives speak in other lan-
guages. At the same time in 2006, Ukrainian respondents cit-
ed Ukrainian as their native language at 52%, Russian at 31%,
Ukrainian and Russian equally at 16%, and other languages—1%.
Also an important fact: the Ukrainian cultural tradition itself
includes the majority (whether absolute or relative) of residents
of each of the regions of Ukraine: in the West—85%, in the cen-
ter—81%, in the South and East—64%, in Donbas—38%. A clear
gap is noticeable only between Donbas and all other regions. 221
As of November 2015, a relative majority (36%) of citizens
considered that the relations between Ukraine and Russia would
deteriorate within the next few years; while 31% believed that
the relations will remain unchanged. At the same time, the ma-
jority (62%) of citizens believe that it is necessary to reduce co-
operation with Russia, and its influence on Ukraine (35%), or
completely shut down cooperation with Russia (27%). Given the
current realities in the relationship with Russia, focus should
be on a limited coexistence in view of the fact that Ukraine,
with the Russian Federation, has a long common border, and
numerous economic, cultural, interpersonal, and historical ties.
It is clear that to change the political regime in Russia, restore
the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Russia, and compensate
for damages done to Ukraine from the aggression, only limited,
minimum but necessary contacts and cooperation in all fields
should be stressed. 222
220
The Razumkov Center is a leading non-governmental analytical center of
Ukraine conducting state policy research. Founded, August 19, 1994.
221
“National Security and Defense,” No. 8-9.(2015). http://razumkov.org.ua/up-
load/Identi2016.pdf.
222
Ibid.
185
Summing up the hybrid aggression in the cultural-ideolog-

ical sphere, it is necessary to note the following:
– The “Russian world” is hostile to the concept of an in-
dependent Ukraine, which especially has manifested in recent
years.
– Books written during hybrid aggression are used as in-
struments of pressure on representatives of the elite, and as a
kind of “milestone” which demonstrates the presence of Russia.
– The Kremlin does not intend to abandon the use of “his-
torical weapons” in the standoff with Ukraine; moreover, it
makes itself increasingly resistant.
– The Orthodox Church remains an instrument of influence
on the worldview of millions of believers, therefore the prob-
lem of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and
the creation of a local Orthodox Church in Ukraine remains
extremely acute.
186
RESULTS
The cultural-ideological components of a hybrid war include:
emphasizing the theme of “infringement” of the Russian language
and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, “the battle for history”
(the substitution of meanings of historical events, the delegitimi-
zation of the traditions of Ukrainian nationhood, and the essence
of the Ukrainian nation), flooding bookstores with products of
dubious quality along with a clear anti-Ukrainian premise, the “ap-
propriation” of historical and cultural figures (very indicative is
the situation with Volodymyr the Great), and the game of internal
divisions in Ukrainian society (for example, the memory of the
Second World War).
The common term for these complex influences is “soft power.”
The concept is not new, but in the Russian version the use of soft
power turns into serious consequences. Propaganda’s own narrative
through the concept of the “Russian world” has continued since the
beginning of the 2000s and has taken rather deep roots in Ukraine
by using the NGO networks, the political forces of the state and
regional levels, and control of the media and the “experts.”
Summarizing hybrid aggression in the cultural-ideological field,

it is necessary to note the following:
– The “Russian world” is hostile to the concept of an
independent Ukraine, which especially has manifested in
recent years.
– Books written during hybrid aggression are used as
instruments of pressure on representatives of the elite, and
as a kind of “milestone” which demonstrates the presence
of Russia.
– The Kremlin does not intend to abandon the use of
“historical weapons” in the standoff with Ukraine; moreover,
it makes itself increasingly resistant.
187
– The Orthodox Church remains an instrument of influence

on the worldview of millions of believers therefore, the
problem of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
and the creation of a local Orthodox Church in Ukraine
remains extremely acute.
188
SECTION 6
IN SEARCH OF AN
EFFECTIVE IMAGE
The features of positioning Ukraine in the modern world.

The reasons for the lack of an effective image of one of the
largest countries in Europe. Referendum in the Netherlands
as an example of the manipulation of information. Proposals
to reform the Ukrainian image.
A
A well-k
we known Ukrainian saying and one that very much refers to
the qu
quesstion of image positioning in modern Ukraine is: “A person
may kno
know how to cook, but does not know how to serve the food.”
For 25 yyears, our country was the bearer of faith for believing in
Ukraine’s
Uk i unique potential, while our neighbors during that time
managed to truly position themselves much more effectively. We
may have lost out on a lot, but not on everything.
Russian aggression in Ukraine has already actualized the issue on
how its image plays a role along with the information component
as part of the hybrid war. The Kremlin’s actions have attracted the
world’s attention to the situation in our country no matter how much
the aggressors hid their intentions. The secret not only became ob-
vious, but also gave Ukraine an opportunity to act on the offensive,
to talk about ourselves because of our increased recognition.
In today’s world, one of the instruments of a nation’s distinctive
image-making is based on and expressed by the current values of
its foreign policies. Ukraine’s image is formed in parallel with its
independence in international relations, and the intersecting space
for maneuvering both concepts do tend to overlap. Largely, the un-
derstanding about us by our compatriots in the modern West was
formed on stereotypes from previous eras, which were superim-
posed with new projections.
While in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was part of—and that was
important—an aggressive communist camp. The emergence of inde-
pendent Ukraine in 1991 caused much more surprise and ridicule in
the West than enthusiasm. The former US Ambassador to the USSR
Jack Matlock in The New York Review of Books called the Ukrainians
“the nowhere nation.” 223 Abraham Brumberg in the same journal
published the article, “Horrible Ukraine.” 224
At the time of the proclamation of independence, Ukraine was
little known to the general public abroad. The authorities have
223
Jack Matlock (b. 1929) - American diplomat, the US ambassador to the Soviet
Union 1987-1991.
2244
Abraham Brumberg (1926–2008 pp.)—American writer and editor, a specialist
in the history of the USSR and Eastern Europe, Jewish studies.
195
already tried for a long period of time to have independent Ukraine

ride along with the sharovarschinee [Ukrainians who dress up in eth-
nic outfits, sing ethnic songs, etc. without truly feeling patriotic] and
[venerating the national Ukrainian poet] Shevchenko for the various
generations while covering up their own lack of a strategic vision for
any prospects of development. Our country remains unacceptably
uninteresting to the outside world.
While Ukraine’s neighbors undertook reforms to attract

investment, defined foreign policy priorities, and found their
own places on the political map of Europe, the Ukrainian
government has been feeding on the Soviet legacy and from
time to time organized public shock sessions without therapy.
The consequences of such carelessness did not take long.

International scandals (“the Lazarenko affair,”225 “cassette scandal,”226
“chainmail scandal” 227) were aiming to hit not only the image of
Leonid Kuchma, but also the reputation of the entire young nation.
225
Pavlo Ivanovych Lazarenko (b. 23 January 1953) is a former Ukrainian politi-
cian and former Prime Minister who in August 2006 was convicted and sentenced
to prison in the United States for money laundering, wire fraud, and extortion.
According to the United Nations, approximately US $200 million was embezzled
by Lazarenko during 1996–97 from the government of Ukraine.
226
“cassette scandal” (also called “Kuchmagate” or the Melnychenko tapes)—a
political scandal in Ukraine that broke out after the release of cassette recordings
from President Leonid Kuchma’s office in the fall of 2000 testifying to the involve-
ment of then-President of Ukraine Kuchma and a number of other high-ranking
officials and politicians in the murder of journalist G. Gongadze.
227
On November 23, 2002, the US Ambassador to Ukraine stated that there
is no doubt in the United States about the authenticity of the records made by
Melnychenko in the office of President Leonid Kuchma. The Ambassador also
noted that, in an attempt to cast doubt on the authenticity of these records, there
was a desire to divert attention from President Kuchma’s agreement to sell Iraq the
Kolchuga Radiotechnical Intelligence stations. Earlier, in September 2002, the US
Department of State and Western media uncovered the sale of 4 “Kolchuga” com-
plexes by Ukraine to Jordan’s armed forces to Iraq, bypassing the sanctions imposed
on the Republic of Iraq. This information has led to the “chainmail scandal,” and
subsequently confirmed.
196
SECTION 6 • IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE IMAGE
Ukraine was humiliated at the Prague NATO Summit (2002) when

the table’s place cards were switched from English to French thereby
causing Leonid Kuchma to lose his seat among the American and
British leaders. This was the culminating action of others scourging
Ukraine.
For more than ten years after independence, the words
“Chernobyl” (Ukrainian transliteration: Chornobyl), “corruption”,
“Lazarenko”, “Mafia”, “Gongadze case”, “cassette scandal”, “illegal
immigrants” have all acted as informal but effective identifiers of
Ukraine. This conceptual series formed a negative image of our
nation, and the first official document devoted to the process of
correcting this unfavorable image was released only in 2003.
Then came about the national program for a positive internation-
al image of Ukraine for the years 2003–2006. Among the specific
measures contained in this program, it is worth noting the modern-
ization of correspondent bureaus for the leading Ukrainian media
abroad and promoting the development of the world service radio
broadcast of Ukraine and the World which was the launch of the
competition for the best coverage of Ukrainian issues in the foreign
and other media. 228
After the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry
was trying to ensure the formation of a more competitive im-
age for Ukraine, but without much success. In June 2007, Viktor
Yanukovych approved the concept for creating a positive inter-
national image of Ukraine for the years 2007–2010 as part of a
national program. Its goals included “the creation of the world
information space conducive to political and socio-economic
development of Ukraine and its perception by the international
community as a reliable and predictable partner that consistently
adhered to the principles of strengthening the democratic foun-
dations of society and the further liberalization of the economy,
and which has a developed industrial base, highly skilled labor re-
sources, significant innovation, science and technology, industrial,
228
“Document on the portal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,” http://zakon0.
rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1609-2003-%D0%BF.
197
agricultural and tourist Information potential, along with cultural

and historical traditions.” Among other measures was the creation
of the Ukrainian representative office for an information network
in the world information space using satellite communication sys-
tems covering the regions of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the CIS. 229
Unfortunately, this naive Ukraine-centrism could not become a
tool for an effective positioning of our country in a competitive
world.
Thanks to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine ceased to be terra
incognita for much of the world, and instead became a heroine of
news and analytical articles. But this breakthrough was not sup-
ported by the presence of a strategic vision for the future of the
nation. And so over time, the “Orange” image began to fade and
was replaced at the end by the disappointment in Ukraine by the
world’s elite. The lack of clearly defined national interests and a
coherent strategy for Ukraine’s program overshadowed the victory
of the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity and its impact on the
positive perception of Ukraine in the global information space.
After the election of President Viktor Yanukovych, the Foreign
Ministry returned to the question of Ukraine’s image abroad. In
September 2010, the development and implementation of a brand-
ing strategy for Ukraine emerged with a budget of $100,000,000
directed to the company CFC Consulting. 230
For about four months in 2011, CNN and the BBC World TV
channels were showing videos about Ukraine called Ukraine: All
About U 231 (which
( received nearly 13,000 viewers). Concurrently,
the National Agency for Investments and Management of National
Projects, headed by Vladyslav Kaskiv, launched an overseas pre-
sentation tour designed to convince foreign businesses and
229
P. Rozumnaya, “Optimization of strengthening the cultural presence of
in Europe, Analytical notes,” http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/1522.
Z.S. Lyulchak, A.A. Lipantsev, and Yu.I. Galoshchak, “National brand and
branding in the context of international events,” http://ena.lp.edu.ua:8080/bitstream/
ntb/16023/1/19-Lyulchak-127-136.pdf.
231
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pigu8RijfXk.
198
political establishments of Ukraine’s investment attractiveness.

Unfortunately, this activity did not have much success.
The preparation for the Euro 2012 soccer (football) cham-
pionship was awarded with another attempt to implement a
consistent policy image for Ukraine in the international arena.
Several international television channels began rotating a series
of promo videos dedicated to Euro 2012 with the theme: High
Time to See Ukraine. An example of the positioning of Ukraine’s
brand in the context of the wishes of the current government
was the presentation of the national’s agency’s preparation and
staging of the Euro 2012 logo in Ukraine. Its inspiration was the
sunflower which symbolizes Ukraine’s warmth, love, and kind-
ness. The National Information Center for “Ukraine 2012” was
commissioned to produce a promotional video about Ukraine
called Switch On Ukraine and broadcasted on the most pop-
ular channels in Europe. 232 Eurovision 2017 gave the Russian
Federation one more reason to create a negative image of Ukraine
in Europe. Here, a scandal occurred regarding the participant
representing Russia, Julia Samoilova, who is in a wheelchair. The
singer performed in occupied Crimea, and according to the laws
of Ukraine, had no right to enter. Consequently, a clash arose
when the participant could not get into the competition because
she violated the laws of the Festival’s host countr his is a
case of the mediaization of this chosen woman and her story in
order to get the desired propaganda or destructive effect, and is
an instrument of hybrid aggression against Ukraine. It seems that
Russia deliberately went on a provocation by choosing that par-
ticular singer, Yulia Samoilova, to participate in the Eurovision
Song Contest in Ukraine, even though she had previously vio-
lated the Ukrainian rules of entry into the Russian Federation
occupied Crimea.
232
O. V. Antonyuk, “Current state of the strategy of promoting the brand of the
Ukraine,” www.economy.in.ua/pdf/8_2011/20.pdf.
ps://www.unian.ua/politics/1836526-uchasnitsi-evrobachenn-
ya-vid-rosiji-samoyloviy-zaboronili-vjizd-v-ukrajinu.html.
199
I will allow myself to say that in Ukraine during the years

2007–2012, varying successes were seen in its fight against
foreign subjectivity, and an important factor in this struggle
were the relations within the country between rival faction
members of the political elite. They have not been able to
put national interests at least slightly higher than personal
ones. Meanwhile, Russia having been badly frightened by the
Orange Revolution, carefully formed an image of our nation
in the West as a failed state and succeeded often in this pro-
cess. The “gas wars” of 2006 and 2009, which was reported by
the Russian Federation in the one-sided parlance of football
commentators have been used to highlight the unreliability of
Ukraine not only as a gas transit country, but also as a partner
in general. On the other hand, holding the joint soccer cham-
pionship Euro 2012 with Poland prompted the Ukrainian state
machine for attempts to formulate and implement a strategy
of being an image positioning nation. Despite the somewhat
clumsy approach, along with the scandalous imprisonment of
Yulia Tymoshenko 234 and the usual Russian wave of negative
propaganda, many Europeans did come away with positive
impressions of Ukraine.
Events such as Euro 2012 and the Revolution of Dignity gave
rise to the phenomenon of volunteering public information
which began to occur after the change of power in Ukraine,
and supplanted by development funds from Western donors. In
March of 2014, the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center was created
234
Since May 2010, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine had launched a
series of criminal cases against former Prime Minister of Ukraine, and leader of
the “united opposition” against Viktor Yanukovych, Yulia Tymoshenko. Basically,
the cases were based on charges of “excessive official authority.” On October 11,
2011, Yulia Tymoshenko was sentenced to 7 years in “the case of a gas contract
with Russia.” This case was considered political persecution by the power of Viktor
Yanukovych. Officials from the West have said that Tymoshenko’s sentence is unfair
and politically motivated. Tymoshenko’s trial and verdict caused an avalanche of
feedback from leading world politicians. In particular, after the Tymoshenko verdict,
official statements came from all G8 countries (except Japan), and from European
countries and neighboring countries of Ukraine.
200
whose mission was “to provide the international communi-

ty with objective information about events in Ukraine, along
with the challenges and threats to national security in the
military, political, economic, energy, and cultural-ideological
spheres.” 235 The appearance of this information platform has
allowed some information to slightly shift the emphasis in a
favorable way towards Ukraine.
However, the appearance of the Ministry of Information
Policy in December 2014, which was headed by Yuriy Stets,
an experienced media manager with good policy recommen-
dations, did not entail a revolution in shaping the image of
our country in the international arena. While the government
should have as quickly as possible, solved the problem of cor-
rect positioning in the midst of global aggression, its strategy
primarily remained predominately reactive. For example, by
loudly touting the launching of foreign broadcasting in the
autumn of 2015, the Ukraine Today (UT) channel was not
introduced into the cable networks of European countries, and
so the quality of the broadcasts, and its content, were greatly
inferior to the television channels Russia Today and Russia-24.
The current state of Ukraine’s image is a strange mixture

that combines its orientation towards democratic change,
natural resources, and unique transit potential, along with its
bureaucracy and corruption versus the struggle for European
values and its confrontation with Russia.
I want to dwell on the most commonly used methods of

Russian influence on Ukraine’s image which is an example of
aggression in the information sphere. The first such manifes-
tations were realized back in the 1990s, when Russia period-
ically inflated the theme of the Chornobyl disaster and the
Chornobyl accident as generated by environmental threats on
a continental scale. As the aggravation of Russian-Ukrainian
235
http://uacrisis.org/ru/about.
201
relations escalated, the Kremlin’s promotional delights became

more sophisticated in the following statements:
“Ukraine is stealing gas.” Since 2005, Russian officials and
media represented Ukraine as a dishonest, or at least, as a ques-
tionable gas transit country, although for decades Ukraine has
never prevented disruption of natural gas supplies to Europe
through its territory. A parallel yet baseless charge was made by
Russia emphasizing the need for the construction of gas pipelines
and alternative Ukrainian gas transportation system routes (such
as the “Nord Stream” in the Baltic Sea, the second line of the
“Blue Stream” in the Black Sea, and the expansion belonging to
the “Gazprom” gas transport system in Belarus). The charges of
gas theft are not supported by concrete facts.
“Ukraine is not a state.” To make it easier for a soldier to
kill his enemies, he must dehumanize them. So it was regarding
the “dehumanization” and “delegitimization” claims held over
Ukraine. In the eyes of the civilized world the image of Ukraine
was purposefully shaped with overriding negative features. The
Russian media was determined to declare Ukraine “a bankrupt
country.” Most of the foreign editions did not have its own news
bureau in Ukraine (except for The Financial Times and the BBC
monitoring services), and for a long time their vision of the
country’s situation was often formed on the basis of analysis by
the Russian media that deliberately discredited Ukraine. 236
The priority of the Russian foreign policy strategy with re-
gard to our country is for the return of Ukraine within the zone
of exclusive Russian influence and Russia’s legitimization into
Ukraine’s state of affairs in the minds of the civilized world. 237
“Juggling identity.” The Russian Federation has for a long
time tried to shake the foundations of Ukrainian identity within
the arsenal of its means such as in the fight for historic heritage.
236
S.G. Denisyuk, “The image of modern Ukraine: structural components and
key indicators,” http://oaji.net/articles/2014/797-1400183027.pdf.
237
O.V. Yalova, “The Image of Ukraine on the Western and Russian Vectors of
Foreign Policy” (Dissertation, Kyiv National University—Taras Shevchenko 2006).
202
The RF “privatized” the most attractive and glorified episodes

of Ukrainian historical personalities (or in general, referred to
them as Russian or Soviet). At the same time, the most iconic
Ukrainian national heroes are discredited and demonized.
“Illegitimate power.” One of the key criteria for assessing
the influence of the government’s image and of certain political
leaders of the country is the mechanisms for ensuring the legit-
imacy of power. Legitimacy—this is not so much the rule of law
from a formal-legal point of view, or as a phenomenon of social
psychology, the adoption of a political power by society, or at
least passive obedience to it. Thus, new regimes emerging from
wars and/or revolutions can become legitimate if they provide
support for a significant part of society. That is, the nature of the
legitimacy of power, its sources and methods of providing will
directly determine the image of the country in the perception
of both the domestic and foreign public. It should be recalled
that the image of power is a form of manifestation of social
contradictions between the state and society, the apparatus of
management and its citizens. The more these contradictions are
sharply defined, the worse the image of power becomes, and
therefore, the worse the perception of the country’s image in the
eyes of the public. 238
For Ukraine, this aspect is important because only the recog-
nition of the legitimacy of power, which came in the wake of the
Euromaidan, provided Ukraine’s credibility to its Western allies.
And the denial of legitimacy by Russian propaganda has been
a consistent argument used to denigrate and destroy Ukrainian
sovereignty. Hence, in particular was the intensive image cre-
ation of the “legitimate” President Viktor Yanukovych through
the Russian information war against Ukraine.
“Divided country.” Ukraine’s regional diversity is used to
divide and contrast the inhabitants of one area with the inhabi-
tants of another area in various contexts, for example: historical
A. Galumov, The International Image of Russia: the Strategy of Formation,

(Moscow: Izvestiya, 2003).
203
memory, language attitudes, or even values. Russian media and

politicians had interpreted Ukraine as a divided nation oriented
towards the West or East, using the thesis of the deep-seated
conflict between the two community regions through the mem-
ories that are the bearers of different identities. These identi-
ties supposedly were formed as a result of different historical
experiences and different perceptions. But we must recall that
the history of the formation of our country as a whole makes it
possible to draw analogies with a number of European countries
such as Germany or France. In today’s world, regional differences
show strengths and not weaknesses.
It must be confessed: the approval of the division of Ukraine’s
“nationalist West” and “pro-Russian East” has become a popular
way to describe the situation in Ukraine in not only the Russian
but also in the Western media. Even though it is not correct, it is
a simple and facile way to explain many of the problems of our
young nation. The Russian-Ukrainian war only strengthened the
popular idea of Ukraine as a split country, with a clear reflection
of this split on the front lines in Donbas. 239
“Pulling the West Along”—This is an attempt to create a
pro-Russian coalition which is compounded by the active lobby-
ing of Russian interests to current and former European politi-
cians. To this should be added an active information campaign,
aimed at creating a positive image of Russia in Europe. Over
the years, Russia created the image of itself as a profitable and
understandable partner during the conflict with Ukraine. This
idea was working in order to blur the neeeded sanctions against
Russia, and causing pressure on Ukraine.
Moscow has traditionally operated within the main centers
of the EU decision-makers—Germany and France. However,
in Central Europe, its impact was noticeable. Indicative in this
respect was shown in the interview given in January 2015 by the
former Czech President Václav Klaus. He claimed: “The conflict
239
M. Ryabchuk, “Two Ukraines: the end of ambivalence?” http://krytyka.com/u/
articles/dvi-ukrayiny-kinets-ambivalentnosty.
204
in Donbas is a conflict in Europe, and of America against Russia.

Ukraine in this dispute is only a passive tool. Ukraine is a divided
and an artificially created country, without an historically sta-
ble territory and a homogeneous population. Therefore, transit
processes occurring in it are more difficult than in other states.
And the current crisis is the result of the desire to force Ukraine
to choose between East and West. But to put such a choice in
front of it means to destroy it.” 240 In this passage about European
policy, virtually all the possible stereotyped branding is exhibited
about Ukraine: the division between East and West, the appear-
ance of resembling a country as if by mistake, being a tool in
the hands of strong foreign players, and the lack of subjectivity.
Russia has consistently demonstrated a remarkable paradox
of thinking with regard to Ukraine. I note the most revealing
facts about its split consciousness:
– Many Ukrainians were directly involved in the construction
of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and in the inde-
pendent Russian Federation, but the names “Shahray” 241 and
“Pochinok” 242 in the early 1990s were shouted out loud. In
other words, during all times, Ukrainians traditionally pre-
ferred to serve the interests of empires. This did not prevent
the Russian authorities to refer to Ukrainians with disdain
and condescension in assessing their ability in state building.
– The similarity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages
and the interpenetration of cultures between the two peo-
ples have not actually made the Russian elite tolerant to
Ukraine—as before, Russian liberalism ends when it comes
to independent Ukraine.
240
K. Dombs, “Vaclav Klaus: It is absolutely clear that Crimea has never belonged
to Ukraine,” http://inosmi.ru/world/20150127/225864244.html#ixzz3T49A6lkF.
241
Sergei Mikhailovich Shahray (b. 1956)—Russian politician, Deputy Prime
Minister of Russia (1991–1994).
242
Aleksandr Petrovich Pochinok (1958–2014)—Russian politician, Minister
of Taxes and Duties (1999-2000), Minister of Labor and Social Development
(2000-2004).
205
– The Russian government loudly accused Ukraine of infringe-

ment of the rights of Russian-speaking populations, and of an
almost forced Ukrainization, however, the Russian govern-
ment did not bother to open at least one school with instruc-
tion in the Ukrainian language in their country.
– Over the past few years, the Russian government policy in
respect to Ukraine has been based largely on the ideological
“Russian world,” although much more promising would have
been a discussion about the more general Slavic (or universal)
values.
– Russia shamelessly privatized the most attractive episodes of
Ukrainian history and seeks to discredit Ukrainian historical
characters.
– Relations between Russia and Ukraine are depicted as though
Ukraine is still a colony of the former mother country while
the national consciousness of Ukrainians during the years of
independence has grown significantly. In an open confronta-
tion between the two former Soviet republics, it is not surpris-
ing to [Ukrainian President] Petro Poroshenko who claimed
that “60% of the fighters of the ATO speak in Russian.” 243
In times of statelessness of the Ukrainian people, Ukraine’s
image in the world was formed through the prism of the offi-
cial policies over those areas which included Ukrainian lands.
Naturally, that information about those Ukrainian territories and
its people were refracted through skewed optics and viewed as
such in Vienna, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Bakhchysarai,
Istanbul, and even Prague. Recall that in the 17th-19th centuries,
Europeans knew more about Ukraine than in the 20th century
when it was part of the USSR. Today, our country is not easy
to prove to the European layperson that it was once a colony of
Russia, just as India was to the British Empire.
Although Ukraine in 1944 became one of the founders of the
United Nations Organization and was at its disposal since the
243
“Poroshenko: ‘More than 60% of the fighters ATO forces speak in Russian,’”
http://www.ostro.org/general/society/news/463078/.
206
mid-1940s with its own diplomatic school, the country critically

lacked the strategic vision of its place in the European and world
political maps. The result was the notorious multi-vector policy,
later to become the Achilles’ heel of Ukrainian statehood.
It must be said that the original foreign policy positions
of post-Soviet Union Russia were much more beneficial than
Ukraine’s. Moscow had not only inherited a seat on the UN
Security Council, but also the treasures of the Diamond Fund,
the foreign exchange reserves of the USSR, and the lack of com-
plaints about the presence of its nuclear weapons arsenal. If we
talk about the separation of the former Soviet republics and
Russia, it can be said that in the early 1990s those [post Soviet]
countries practically fled from the once “fraternal family of na-
tions,” not thinking about the things left behind.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s foreign policy for most of the

period of its independent development was indicative of
being passive, and does not correspond to the potential of
our country’s foreign policy in many ways. The deficiency of
determination and perseverance demonstrated not so much
our diplomacy as the country’s political leadership.
“Ukraine’s foreign policy-makers caused a traditional error:

in times when it was necessary to act pragmatically, idealism
took precedence; and when it was better to be idealistic to win,
they instead used the principle of pragmatism. Thus, in the first
years of independence which demanded pragmatic solutions and
guarantees of independence and with it decisive steps towards
ensuring its own political and economic security with new ap-
proaches, a disproportionate amount of resources were spent on
the idealistic projects that resembled similar errors of Ukrainian
foreign policy in the years 1917–1919. During the second half of
the 1990s, when a number of such opportunities had been lost
and the only sound basis for an effective foreign policy could
have become the democratization of life in the country, a cer-
tain degree of political idealism in foreign policy reigned over
207
the principle of pragmatism which was considered as being not

quite appropriate, the effectiveness of which had been deliber-
ately limited.” 244
An unfortunate oversight is the lack of anchoring Ukraine’s
positive image when it was associated with the outside world.
The Chornobyl accident in 1986 not only dealt a powerful blow
to the environmental state of our country, but also tethered the
hands and feet of all who could have created a quality image
of Ukraine in the international arena, and from which could
have sowed for the leaders of the world community an impact-
ful impression from the first association upon hearing the word
“Ukraine.”
The consistent struggle of many generations of Ukrainians

for independence has left non-positive image moments for
the banal reason that history is written by the winners, and
Ukrainians, until recently, were not among them for too long.
The Ukrainian voice was lost in the European and Russian
backgrounds. For proper positioning, it needed a loud victory
to skillfully represent itself to the outside world.
I would like to remind the reader that Ukraine first appeared

on the mental map of Europe because of the War of Liberation
then under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky in the mid-
dle of the 17th century when it was known as “the land of the
Cossacks.” 245 Unfortunately, after 1654, in Pereiaslav, 246 the
244
V.A., Manzhola and M.G. Kapitonenko, Ukraine in the Post-bipolar System of
International Relations (Kiev, 2008), 16.
245
K.Galushko, “Ukraine on the Map Europe,” https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/3/34/Ukraina_na_karti_Europi.pdf.
246
Pereiaslav Council of 1654—(Also called the Treaty of Pereiaslav). The Cossack
council in Pereiaslav, Ukraine that Hetman B. Khmelnytskyi summoned on January
18 (8), 1654, to declare his Zaporozhian primacy to join forces with the Russian
Tsar, Alexei Mikhailovich against the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth; one of
the episodes of Ukrainian-Russian history designed for processing military and
political unifications.
208
Ukrainian Hetman’s full powers of sovereignty gradually but

steadily narrowed, and its foreign policy came under the control
of Moscow. Ukraine was almost forgotten after the 18th century
in Europe, which helped to shape the Valuev Circular 247 and the
Ems decree. 248
During the First World War, the Ukrainians were first used as
a policy tool of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Russia.
The military headquarters of both monarchies developed plans
for the dismemberment of the Romanov Empire giving the
Ukrainians an important role. 249 This fact allowed the Great
Russian chauvinists later to say that the Ukrainian nation was
invented by the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. In such a cyn-
ical approach to the fate of one of the largest European nations
it is not surprising that Ukraine was forced to pay for the lack of
its own state. After the First World War, Ukraine, unfortunately,
had lost the battle for independent statehood, remaining divided
into several parts.
It is worth noting that in the first half of the 20th century, the
Ukrainians received an undeserved image as militant anti-Sem-
ites—a problem that arose in the absence of being without a na-
tion. The catalyst for such a positioning was the murder in 1926
2477
Valuev Circular1863—The order issued in July 1863 by the Minister of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Empire P.Valuev on the prohibition of teaching or printing
science and religious books in the Ukrainian language which was considered to be
an artificial language.
248
Ems Act 1876—Secret decree on the complete prohibition of Ukrainian
writings, signed by Tsar Alexander II in the resort city of Ems (now Bad Ems,
Germany) in May 1876. The decree forbade printing Ukrainian original and trans-
lated books (even note texts), and importing Ukrainian books and brochures,
printed abroad, or in Ukraine. Also forbidden were Ukrainian performances, con-
certs, songs and declamations. Also led to the prohibition of nationally conscious
and intellectual activities and organizations and the center of Ukrainianophilia of
the Russian Geographical Society. The Kiev Telegraph was subjected to repression
by the royal authorities, and some professors from the University of Kyiv were
censured as well.
249
O. Pagir and Andreas Kappeler, “About why Ukraine remains a white spot on
the mental map of Europe,” http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/63189/PrintView.
209
of Symon Petliura 250 by Shalom-Shmuel Schwartzbard, 251 one

of the leaders of the Directory. During the trial, Schwartzbard
claimed that he took revenge for the pogroms against the Jews
that were carried out by the Army of the Ukrainian People’s
Republic. “There have always been forces that are interested in
creating and fueling anti-Semitic stereotypes about Ukrainians,
and after the Second World War, it was finally confirmed in
the minds of the Western community. On the one hand, there
have been facts about collaborations between Ukrainians with
German invaders in the destruction of the Jewish population
during the Second World War. On the other hand, there were
those who have an interest in inflating the topic and strength-
ening the stereotype that still causes great damage to the inter-
national image of the country.” 252
Perhaps the main problem in forming a positive image of
Ukrainians in the world was its remoteness and lack of inde-
pendence. In the best case scenario, the image formation of one
of the largest republics of the Soviet Union was represented by
primitive sharovarschinoyy [pretend patriots who dress in native
costumes].
We must acknowledge that Ukraine is still only coming out
of Russia’s shadow. In the West, many intellectuals of Ukrainian
origin from Soviet times are perceived solely as Russians. In
250
Symon Vasylyovych Petliura (1879-1926)—Ukrainian state, military and
political figure, publicist, literary and theater critic. Organizer of the Ukrainian
armed forces. Member of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada
as Secretary General for Military Affairs. The Main Ataman of the troops of the
Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) from November 1918. Head of the Directory
of the UPR (May 9, 1919—November 10, 1920). On May 25, 1926 tragically died
in Paris from the gunshot of the Bolshevik agent Sh. Schwartzbard, who in a later
court trial testified that he allegedly sought revenge for the victims of the pogroms
against the Jewish people for which he said Petliura bears responsibility. Petliura is
buried at the Paris Montparnasse Cemetery.
251
Shalom-Shmuel Isaakovich Schwartzbard (or Shvartsburd), (1886-1938)—
Russian-Jewish poet, anarchist, murderer of Symon Petliura.
252
O. Pagir and Andreas Kappeler, “About why Ukraine remains a white spot on
the mental map of Europe,” http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/63189/PrintView.
210
Germany, they know enough about Don and Volga Cossacks,

but almost nothing about the Zaporozhye, and that Kyivan Rus’
is part of the Russian state and the like. These mental percep-
tions from other people are very deeply rooted in the minds
of Europeans even at the household level, and it is difficult to
erase. 253
After Ukraine’s independence, which the West accepted at
first without the proper enthusiasm or involvement, Ukraine
took ownership of how the civilized world perceived it through
several successive stages:
From 1991 to the mid-1990s—The fear of Ukraine as a po-
tential “monkey with a nuclear grenade” was aggravated by the
memory of the Chornobyl disaster in Ukraine, and the presence
of a powerful nuclear arsenal with a large group of forces inher-
ited from the Soviet Union.
The second half of the 1990s—A gradual habituation towards
the existence of independent Ukraine was exhibited, but with
the continued perception of what was happening in our country
through the prism of the interests of Russia as the recognized
leader of the former Soviet Union. Bewilderment about the emer-
gence of an independent Ukraine was replaced by mistrust which
could not be shaken even with the voluntary renunciation by our
country from owning the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal.
The beginning of the 2000s—This was the period when
the perception of Ukraine in the civilized world was defined
through the beginning of the “cassette scandal,” and the case of
the “Kolchuga” deliveries, which were scandals of widespread
resonance (already referred to as the “chainmail scandal”). An
interesting fact: the compromising Leonid Kuchma targeted his
accusations against the US capital and the EU and not the citi-
zens of Ukraine. As a result, the West was provided the opportu-
nity to predictably turn away from our country. At the same time
in Ukraine, the economic situation had stabilized amid growing
interest from potential foreign investors.
253
Ibid.
211
2004–2006—The Orange Revolution demonstrated that

Ukraine was making a strategic choice in favor of rapproche-
ment with the West. The trend shifted to high expectations of
potential reforms, which quickly gave way to a sharp perplexity
because of the mutual confrontation between the Orange Maidan
leaders who competed for the right to lead the country on the
path of European integration, but were not able to articulate key
challenges or minimally move forward on this path.
2007–2012—The Russian-Ukrainian “gas war” occurred which
seriously undermined the EU’s confidence in our country as a
strategic partner. The election of President Viktor Yanukovych
in 2010 had demonstrated that Kyiv’s main vector of foreign
policy with a high degree of probability, would be Russian. The
disappointment of the “New Deal” was aggravated by the trial of
Yulia Tymoshenko which in the West was perceived as political
persecution by the Ukrainian president of his opponent.
2012—Ukraine and Poland co-hosting the Euro 2012 Football
(Soccer) Championship which allowed ordinary Europeans to see
firsthand that Ukraine is part of the European family. According
to the image-building value for our country, Euro 2012 was a
unique and unambiguous positive development that failed to
spoil even the colossal corruption during the preparations for
the event.
2013–2016 and onward—The Euromaidan events that have
become pro-revolutionary proved that Ukraine sees its future in
Europe. The interest in our country’s events grew significantly,
and resulted into Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the fo-
mented conflict in Donbas.
Over a long period of independent development leading up
to the Euromaidan, Russian interpretation and vision of Ukraine
had determined the European assessment of the situation in our
country. The majority of correspondents of the leading media
in Moscow had not only reduced the objectivity of journalists,
but swayed the factors of subjectivity of perception, because they
were always reporting the information based on whatever pic-
tures that were generated by the Kremlin.
212
In the context of the hybrid war launched by Russia against

Ukraine, the formation of an effective image of our country is
not a fad, but a necessity. Hybrid confrontation among other
things is a struggle over the images set forth by the aggressor
about the victims of aggression. Otherwise, a careless approach
in forming Ukraine’s image can be perceived as a collaborative
relationship with Russia.
The Ukrainian Institute of World Policy, a think tank, has
analyzed the European countries’ attitude to the events taking
place in recent times between Ukraine and Russia. The results
are noteworthy. The reaction in the Old World to Russia’s hybrid
aggression against Ukraine is a kind of litmus test that allows us
to analyze public opinion. Sixty percent of the EU citizens had
mostly pointed out that Donbas is “an armed conflict initiat-
ed by Russia,” and the Netherlands—even at 65%, favored the
Ukrainian perspective (which is markedly discordant compared
to France with its 6%).
According to 53% of polled respondents in Ukraine, the op-
tion of a “civil war” was considered a normal reaction. All of a
sudden, the Germans are among the strongest believers. It is
possible that many of them perceive what is happening as a “civil
war instigated by Russia” as a fairly common perception within
the German academic and expert circles. However, only 20% of
the EU citizens tended to believe that the conflict in Ukraine
was inspired by the West. In the West, the Italians tended to
blame Ukraine the most, and the least blame was accorded by
the Swedes.
If we talk about how the war impacts the perception regarding
Ukraine as a potential member of the EU, then the conclusion is
not a happy one: the status of being a “victim of aggression” does
not enhance the chances of receiving the nod as a “candidate for
EU membership.” The Balkan approach—the readiness to offer
the countries of the Western Balkans candidate status in the EU
when their war ended, no longer works. The reason is simple:
in the Balkans, all countries wanted to belong to the EU, and in
our case—only Ukraine. Russia does not want to be a member of
213
the EU and actually seeks to destroy the EU, thereby reinforcing

its superpower position on its ruins.
The most popular modern myths Russia propagates about
Ukraine feature the so-called fascists in power in Kyiv who had
only temporary successes with some EU countries, but generally
the falsehoods did not catch on. This proves clearly that even
propaganda worth a billion dollars will sooner or later turn out
to be impotent if it is opposed by reinforced concrete facts. 254
Although Russia has made great efforts for the preservation
of Ukraine’s image in the eyes of Europeans as a sphere within
Russia’s exclusive influence, the Russians were not very effec-
tive. A key role in this played in the destruction of the Malaysia
Boeing 777 plane that flew from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur
on July 17, 2014. This was an unprecedented crime which killed
298 people, and significantly damaged the prism of Russian in-
terests through which the representatives of the Old World had
seen Ukraine’s situation for the longest time.
Most citizens of the eight EU member states (60%) agree with
the fact that in Ukraine there is armed conflict that was inspired
by Russia. This assertion is more strongly supported by the Poles
(75%). Less committed to this view are the French (46%) and
British (49%). Fifty-three per cent of the respondents overall
believe that there is a civil war in Ukraine. Among the citizens
of Germany and Italy, most believe in the existence of a civil
war in Ukraine (61% and 59% respectively). Fewer EU citizens
agree that the conflict in the East of Ukraine was instigated by
the West, while 25% of respondents think that was the cause.
One-fifth of the residents of the eight EU member states do not
at all know what is happening in Ukraine. 255
According to the 28 EU member states (the United Kingdom
is currently de juree while awaiting Brexit), there are three different
254
A. Hetmanchuk, “‘So what was it?’ Europeans ponder about events in Donbas,”
http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/1794.html.
255
A. Hetmanchuk, “France and Italy are our weak links,” http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/
public/1640.html.
214
approaches to the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. First is

to agree with Russia and give it control over Ukraine, as had
already happened. The second concept is containing Russia with
economic sanctions. The third concept, and one that is gaining
ground in the West, is to allow concrete military assistance to
Ukraine. The latter is already a new approach based on the un-
derstanding that the Western partners see the importance of our
country as a strong sovereign nation.
In particular are the tectonic changes in German social
thought. Proponents of the Schröderization 256 of German foreign
policy published a “Letter of Sixty,” 257 where they urged Germany
and the West to end sanctions. In response, a week later, a letter
was sent to a hundred people representing the main forces of the
German expert community, which stated: “No, we cannot allow
more of this.” And the transformation that has also occurred in
Angela Merkel who holds the unity of the 28 EU countries on
one platform and who stated, “We cannot abandon the sanctions
and will keep the sanctions” is revealing. Ukraine has changed
Germany. The sentiments were influenced by the readiness
of Ukraine to mobilize, and towards the victims. Ukraine has
changed the German political psyche. 258
256
The word comes from the name of the former German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder now Chairman of the Nord Stream AG Shareholder Committee, a mem-
ber of the board of Gazprom; Putin’s personal friend. The definition indicates the
phenomenon of political corruption by lobbying for the interests of the Russian
Federation and Russian businesses in exchange for positions and/or monetary
rewards.
257
In December 2014, an open letter signed by 60 politicians and businesspeo-
ple, led by Schröder, was published in the journal Die Zeit. The letter criticised
the excessively anti-Russian standpoint of the German government in relation to
the crisis in Ukraine. The letter accused the Merkel government’s foreign policy of
neglecting German interests, and by accepting the American–Ukrainian standpoint,
and accused it of indirectly fomenting war in the 21st century Europe. (For more see
Karoly Gruber and Tamas Vaszari, The Development and Direction of Russo-German
Political and Economic Relations after 1990).
258
“Interview with Pavel Sheremet and Lilia Shevtsova: The Kremlin will use all
means to undermine Ukraine,” http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n79texts/Sheremet_Shevcova.
htm.
215
An important role in changing the German, and after it a com-

mon European position on the conflict in Donbas, was implement-
ed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s vision of the situation.
Let me remind you that this politician, along with then President
of France Nicolas Sarkozy, were among the initiators who vetoed
Washington’s initiative to grant Ukraine and Georgia a Membership
Action Plan (MAP) to prepare those countries for joining NATO in
2008. Moreover, up until 2014, Germany held consistent loyalties
to the Russian position allowing them to speak about the existence
of an informal Moscow-Berlin alliance. However, the development
of the conflict in Donbas, and the scale of Russia’s cynical behavior
contributed in shaping Ms. Merkel’s policy in favor of extending
sanctions against Russia for its unwillingness to fulfill the Minsk
agreements. 259
Why does the West perceive the events in Ukraine through the
prism of Russia’s vision and the political interests of the Kremlin?
There are several obvious reasons for this:
– Ukraine has not paid and does not pay enough attention to
the formation of forming a positive self-image in the world.
– Russia has successfully privatized the intangible components
of its common historical past (of its intellectual, cultural re-
sources, and achievements).
– It was taken for granted by the West that the nuclear state
status provided Russia with the role of the “regional police-
man,” while nuclear disarmament was demanded of Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan in the early 1990s.
– A long-term multi-vector foreign policy did not allow Ukraine
to clearly formulate how the international community and
their own citizens basically viewed their positions in the in-
ternational arena.
After the Orange Revolution, and during the presidency of
Viktor Yuschenko, the observations by experts regarding the po-
sitioning of our country’s image have been noted with Ukraine
259
“Merkel sees no grounds for abolishing EU sanctions against Russia,” https://
www.rbc.ua/eng/news/merkel-vidit-osnovaniy-otmeny-sanktsiy-es1471591558.html.
216
exhibiting both positive and negative features, and with a prepon-

derance of more negative traits. Among the negative assessments
were having to do with the prevailing bureaucracy, corruption and
backwardness in service, scandals, conflicts in the gas sector, etc.
Among the positive assessments were the orientation of Ukraine
towards democratic change, the weight of Ukraine’s natural resourc-
es, and the mental and behavioral characteristics of society. 260 The
situation is paradoxical since the positive features of the Ukrainian
national character are objectively more significant, but their influ-
ence was offset by the specific functioning of the Ukrainian state.
The Russian hybrid aggression gave Ukraine a chance to

express itself. Events of recent years have seriously changed
the perception of the West of what is happening in Ukraine.
And though bad for our country, the Dutch referendum could
not stop the inevitable process of rapprochement between
Ukraine and the European Union. Convergence was not only
in the international legal aspects, but also in the growth of
mutual understanding.
However, a referendum in the Netherlands needs an elabora-

tion. On April 6, 2016, 61% of the Dutch (c. 2.5 million people)
voted against the Association Agreement 261 between Ukraine and
the EU, while 38.21% (about 1.57 million people) were for it. The
turnout was 32.38% (from about 12.86 million entitled voters
which were estimated at around 4.15 million who turned out). 262
260
O.V. Petkova, “Methodical aspect of research of the image of the country
(on the example of research of the image of Ukraine), Political Management, Kyiv,
Ukrainian Center for Political Management, No. 5 (32) (2008): 168-175.
261
Agreement on the Association of Ukraine with the EU—an agreement between
Ukraine and the European Union which replaces the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement between the European Communities and Ukraine, and which allows the
transition from partnership and cooperation to political association and economic
integration.
262
“Announcment of the final results of the referendum in the Netherlands in
Ukraine,” http://www.interfax.ru/world/503397.
217
The voting procedure was preceded by a powerful information

campaign directed by Russia. One of the organizers of the refer-
endum, the Socialist Harry van Bommel, could not hide Russia’s
influence on the organization of a plebiscite. For several months,
the Russian TV channels, Channel One, Russia-24, Russia Today
and other media designed and broadcasted horror stories of various
forms and content. The subjects included showing the center of
Amsterdam where activists handed out leaflets with pictures of the
burned-out House of Trade Union in Odesa, and “a Nazi battalion in
the Azov.” Also shown were the recordings of statements from hos-
tile passers-by, who declared that Ukraine hit the Mayasia MN-17
airliner. The Dutch were frightened of a refugee influx from Ukraine
whom they considered to be Nazis, fascists, and terrorists from Kyiv.
At the end of 2015, the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf published
an interview with the Westfries Museum’s director. The director
reported the sensational news about a painting that was missing
from the museum ten years ago which was found and recovered.
Moreover, it was in the hands of the Ukrainian armed forces who
then required money for its return. It did not matter that it was not
true. The campaign under the slogan “Ukraine is stealing art!” was
not helpful for the Ukrainian image. 263
An applicable textbook case: On January 18, 2016 in the new-
ly created network account of a YouTube video, armed men ap-
peared who presented themselves as soldiers of the regiment “Azov”
in Ukrainian and English to “destroy the Dutch” if they suddenly
abandoned a referendum to ratify the Association Agreement. At
the end of the video, one of these “heroes” burned the flag of the
Netherlands. Of course, “Azov” on the official channel had denied
any involvement in the role 264 and sent a refutation to Dutch jour-
nalists, but a lie is always difficult to counteract.
263
A. Minakov, “5 myths about Ukraine: We are losing the information war in
the Netherlands,” http://nv.ua/opinion/minakov/5-mifov-ob-ukraine-my-proigry-
vaem-informatsionnuju-vojnu-v-niderlandah91845.html.
264
This fake film is distributed on the Internet; clips show where Azov allegedly
threatened with acts of terrorism against the Netherlands. http://www.eurointegra-
tion.com.ua/news/2016/01/19/7043547.
218
Why does such obvious and fake means of anti-Ukrainian media

work in such a highly media-literate country like Holland? The an-
swer is obvious: other countries know little about us, and Ukrainians
have not yet learned how to talk about ourselves. It did not work
in favor of Ukraine and the factor of the deaths in the Malaysia Air
Boeing 777 crash in July 2014 over the Donbas skies, in which on
board were about two hundred Dutch. The Russian propagandists
were able to deploy untruths against Ukraine. On the other hand,
the information campaign and the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs representing the Ukrainian community in the Netherlands
in support of the Association Agreement at least deserve respect.
Were it not for them, the voting results could have been even more
disastrous.
In the meantime, we are able to discuss the several aspects of
Ukraine’s image positioning in the world today:
– The over 25 year absence of Ukraine having a clear vision of its
future is reflected not only in its prospects, but also seriously
reduces the space for political maneuvering.
– The hybrid Russian aggression has taken over Ukraine’s prima-
ry concerns over its efforts to form an adequate image.
– Ukraine should abandon the textbook approach in its foreign
policy positioning, focusing instead on the search for innova-
tive approaches.
– In public-private partnerships in the field of propaganda, which
today is different from Russia’s, Ukraine should oppose the
collaboration with stakeholders who claim to have expertise
and resources in forming Ukraine’s image.
– As soon as possible, Ukraine will have to give up illusions about
“ukrainotsentrizma—Ukrainian centralism” in the world. It is
extremely dangerous at the present stage for the nation’s de-
velopment.
– Ensuring effective positioning in the modern world is the key
to preserving the sovereignty of Ukraine and the restoration
of its territorial integrity.
219
RESULTS
In the context of a hybrid aggression, unexpected factors often
are crucial to the survival of the nation. The international image
of Ukraine is just such a factor. The perceptions of our country’s
leading international actors will determine the quality of assis-
tance and the ability to withstand Russian aggression.
The image of Ukraine is formed in parallel with its indepen-
dence in international relations, and in its space for maneuvering
both concepts in how they intersect. Understanding of Ukraine
by our compatriots in the modern West was largely formed by
the stereotypes of previous eras, which imposed those projections.
Ukraine has gone from a surprise appearance as a nation, followed
by its rejection, and then to admiration. The considered reference
points of this process are the attainment of independence, the
renunciation of nuclear weapons and the signing of the Budapest
Memorandum (1994), the basis of the GUAM 265 in 1997, the “cas-
sette scandal” and the “Kolchuga scandal,” the Orange Revolution
in 2004, Euro 2012, and of course, events of the Euromaidan.
It should be noted that in creating the image of Ukraine in the
world, Ukraine itself has not played an active role which led to
the inefficient formation of the nation’s own self-image.
The current state of Ukraine’s image is a strange mixture that
combines its orientation towards democratic change, its natural
resources, and its unique transit potential, along with bureaucracy
and corruption, the struggle for European values, and confron-
tation with Russia.
265
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM)—a region-
al association of four states: Georgia, Ukraine, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the
Republic of Moldova. The basis for the formation of cooperation lies in the unity
in the positions of these countries with similar political and economic external
orientations. The organization was established in 1997 to counter Russia’s influence
in the region and was supported by the United States. The headquarters are located
in Kyiv on Independence Square.
220
Developing a strategy for constructing and implementing a

positive image of Ukraine in the world is not a fad, but a vital
necessity in the current situation.
221
SECTION 7
THE EUROPEAN
VECTOR OF HYBRID
AGGRESSION
The instrumentation of hybrid impact in Europe. How does

Russia “step on the gas”? Party and agents of influence—the
Kremlin picks up the keys. The factor of refugees as a tool in
influencing the hybrid war. Who is behind the terrorist attacks
in Europe?
C
Curren
from
rrenntly, Europe is going through, perhaps, not the best of
times. Terrorist attacks, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal
m tthe EU, the growing strength of marginal political
forces—all are exacerbated by the reluctance of the European
forces—
elites
lit tto seek answers to the challenges of a changing, modern
world. Now is the perfect time for populists and those who
want to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Old World.
Russia teaches a lesson on how to achieve this.
The instruments of influence on the political situation
in the world’s largest space for the rights, freedoms, and the
market economy can be quite varied. Most notable among
them are:
– The sponsorship of political forces having an impact
on the political life of the countries and the European
Union’s strength as a whole.
– Support for non-governmental organizations to provide
tools targeted for an effect on the public mood.
– Intensive and pragmatic use of opinion leaders such
as retired politicians, intellectuals, journalists, etc. in
exchange for a moment of glory when not called on at
the height of a crisis, or with any guarantee of utilizing
their expertise in the near future, they are nevertheless
still ready for involvement.
– The desire to use “the refugee factor” for the loosening
of social and political ties within the EU states.
– The placement of “jeans” (paid media coverage not
marked as advertising) which allows for the creation of
the illusion of an authoritative opinion and thus will
influence public opinion and the people’s mood.
– Economic leverage that provides the opportunity to
strike at the pockets of the various strata of the European
Union.
– The formation of dependence on the supply of hydro-
carbon raw materials, which is presented as an element
of stability for the usual way of life.
227
In this context, it is advisable to elaborate on the pop-

ular hybrid instruments of aggression against Europe.
Unfortunately, much of the political elite of the Old World
is in a state of bliss about Russia’s intentions. It seems to
me that the Kremlin’s desire to destroy the European Union
is incomprehensible, but in order to bring the situation as
much as possible into international relations via the format
of multi-polar chaos, Moscow would then raise the question
about redistributing the spheres of influence in the world. To
this end, Russia cleverly uses the existing democratic prin-
ciples of the EU, once again repeatedly turning them against
Europe.
In the economic sphere, such aggressive actions of Russia
marks the energy sector as a traditional meeting point of the
interests of Russia and the European Union. Until recent-
ly, the Kremlin felt like a fish in water, with the European
Union finding it hard to oppose anything. This is evidenced,
in particular, by the lack of energy carriers imported from
Russia, even in the hypothetical list of authorized products.
Europe cannot afford to abandon Russian oil and gas, and
the Kremlin is well aware of this. At present, the EU is try-
ing with limited success to wean itself away from its energy
dependence from Russia.
Putin’s current energy program was announced in February
2012. 266 It emphasized the need to create a European single
energy complex and to focus attention on the benefits of
“North” and “South” gas streams, among them the ability to
opt out of nuclear energy through the development of gas
pipelines. Then presidential candidate Vladimir Putin paid
particular attention to the criticism of the “Third Energy
Package,” the provisions of which prohibited energy suppli-
ers to control the transport infrastructure, which was quite
266
V. Putin, “Russia and the changing world,” http://mn.ru/poli-
tics/20120227/312306749.html.
228
SECTION 7 • THE EUROPEAN VECTOR OF HYBRID AGGRESSION
disadvantageous to Gazprom and accordingly, to Russia. 267

Russia was well aware of the rule: “Who controls the produc-
tion of energy, controls the geopolitical routes of delivery and
distribution.” To better maintain a monopoly on the extraction
of oil and gas, as well as their transportation to Europe, Moscow
tried to gain access to distribution networks in the EU in order
to create a closed energy cycle. The “energy superpower” status
provided the establishment of control over gas and oil pipe-
lines in the neighboring transit countries, which in turn made
it possible to dictate the prices of energy. Therefore, Moscow
was categorically against the EU’s Third Energy Package which
involved the separation of production, transit, and the sale of
energy. 268
At the same time, Putin remains consistent. In his reso-
nant address at the Munich Conference on Security Issues on
February 10, 2007, from which many experts were beginning
to notice the increased aggressiveness of Russian politics, he
reiterated that Russia would not ratify the Energy Charter. But
the EU was looking for an adequate response, and slowly but
267
Energy packages are a set of European Union directives in the field of gas and
electricity supply and related regulations. In 1996, the Electricity Directive was adopted,
and in 1998 a directive was placed on the gas sector. After a few years, this seemed in-
adequate. In 2003, the term of the second package of directives ended, which canceled
the first one. One of its main features was the division of vertically integrated companies,
for example, the activities of gas companies in the transportation of fuel should have
been formally separated from extraction and supply. The division concerned, inter alia,
accounting, but not property rights. The third energy package was adopted in September
2009. The main feature of the new package was the actual ban on companies that were
simultaneously selling and transporting gas and electricity. To solve this problem, com-
panies were offered to sell transport networks or to manage them in the hands of an
independent operator. The officially announced goal was to increase competition, to
enter new players’ markets, and reduce energy prices. New requirements for power
companies concerned not only European firms but also companies from third party
countries working with the European Union. They were warned that they could lose
access to the European market. In Russia, the third energy package was targeted against
Gazprom as the main supplier of gas to the EU, which deals with both the production
of fuel and its transportation and sale.
268
I. V. Gudkov, “Third EU energy package [electronic resource],” http://www.mgi-
mo.ru/files2/y11_2013/243404/10.3.3_gudkov.pdf.
229
surely was getting rid of its destructive energy dependence on

Russia. The EU has consistently been taking urgent measures
to minimize Russia’s status as a monopoly supplier of energy
to Europe. 269
The energy front of a hybrid war largely determines its char-
acter, sometimes a little too conspicuously to its participants.
For example, in the autumn of 2014, when a conflict with the
apparent participation of Russian troops in Donbas continued
for several months, Russia and Ukraine, through EU mediation,
resolved the issue of gas supplies. Our country for its provision
for the winter even paid $3.1 billion in debt to Gazprom, which
was pointless to dispute. On the other hand, it was because
of Russia’s aggressive actions that eventually forced our coun-
try’s leadership to go for a real diversification of gas streams.
Currently, Ukraine does not directly buy gas from Russia; in
fact, Ukraine is getting rid of the long-term and, apparently,
perpetual energy dependence on hydrocarbon deliveries.
The 2006 and 2009 gas wars have frankly demonstrated
Russia’s unfriendly intentions toward Ukraine with all its frank-
ness. Russian opposition leaders Boris Nemtsovv 270 and Vladimir
Milov 271 appreciated the outcome of the 2009 gas war: “The pros-
pect of future market losses as a result of the loss of confidence
in the reliability of gas supplies to Gazprom becomes realistic.
Alternative sources of gas supplies will be more actively explored.
269
“Presentations and discussions at the Munich security policy conference
[electronic resource],” - http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/02/10/1737_type-
63374type63376type63377type63381type82634_118097.shtml.
270
Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov (1959-2015)—Russian politician and statesman,
one of the founders and UDM “Solidarity” leaders, co-chairman of the political
party “RPR-Parnassus,” member of the Coordination Council of Russian opposition.
Known for publishing a series of reports on corruption and criticizing Vladimir
Putin, as well as one of the organizers and participants of the “Dissenters’ March”
(2007), “Strategii31” and protest rallies “For Fair Elections” (2011-2013).
271
Vladimir Stanislavovich Milov (b.1972) - Russian politician, chairman of the
Russian political party “Democratic Choice.” Author of critical analytical materials
on Putin’s political and economic decisions.
230
For example, new potential prospects may open up such as the

Nabucco gas pipeline, thereby bypassing Russia as the main
source of gas. Iran may become more accessible to Europeans
because of the alleged easing of policy on that country by the
administration of Barack Obama. The Croatian Government in
response to the Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis announced the ac-
celeration of the construction of a liquefied gas terminal called
Adria LNG, which can oust Gazprom on the Balkan gas market
and which was also affected by the crisis. Construction proj-
ects of LNG terminals had already begun working in Poland,
Lithuania, and Romania.” 272
The “gas wars” of 2006 and 2009 on the one hand were the
culminating attempts to process Gazprom as a way to establish
control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system. On the other
hand, they began to test the ability of the Kyiv officials to pursue
an independent policy not only in the energy sector. Since then,
the Ukrainian authorities failed, and Russia has stepped up the
pressure in all directions.
It is worth emphasizing that the gas crisis in 2009 was fol-
lowed by the conduct of a large-scale information-psychological
campaign and PR-support for the Gazprom actions by reputa-
ble international PR-agencies (Gavin Anderson, GPlus Europe,
Ketchum). This has borne fruit. Instead of Ukraine acting as
a solution to transit problems, the European public conscious-
ness withheld the long entrenched clichés of Russia propagan-
da: “Ukraine interrupted the gas transit to Europe,” “Ukraine is
an unreliable transit link between the ‘northern and southern’
flows.” Particularly widespread is the propaganda belief that
Ukraine is “stealing” gas.
But it was not only just the manipulative thesis about
Ukraine’s corruption which was at the heart of the 2009 gas
conflict. Ukraine was supposed to play the role of a detonator
to provoke political conflict along the East-West lines. The idea
was that in the event of a complete cessation of gas supplies (for
272
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2009/01/22/178046.
231
domestic consumption, plus transit to the EU) the powers in

Ukraine would not be able to ensure the supply of gas from the
main location in the western part of the country and on to the
east of inside the main industrial centers that would then remain
without heat. Such a development was to provoke, according to
the Russian strategists, “a social explosion in the East and South
of Ukraine.”
Of course, Gazprom behaves differently towards Ukraine
compared to other European countries. This is logical, because
the European gas market remains Russia’s natural field presence.
In 2015, Russia provided more than 30% of total gas consump-
tion and 66% of foreign imports in Europe. Of the 184.4 billion
cubic meters of gas in 2015, Germany was the majority consumer
of the market (47.4 billion), followed by Turkey (27), Italy (24.4),
the U.K. (22.5), France (10.5), and the Netherlands (8.4). 273
The peculiarity of the situation lies in the fact that, on the
one hand, it is easy to use energy resources as a foreign-policy
factor of pressure, since Russia’s supplies are practically unlim-
ited. However, within the EU—the leading member countries of
Europe—it went unnoticed and ignored for a long time. The eval-
uation of the energy activity of Russia is only carried out in the
origins of a business type system. “I do not think that the Russian
President Vladimir Putin will make energy supplies its policy
instrument,” said Günther Oettinger on August 26, 2014. 274 As
they say, no comment. On the other hand, other important issues
such as the possibility of imposing energy extraction sanctions
have yet to be touched. And that could seriously undermine
Russia’s position as an exporter to the world energy market.
Yet Moscow has no reason to believe that the European Union
will not restrict the import of hydrocarbons from Russia, as they
were excluded in the sanctions against the Russian regime as a
result from the efforts of the former EU Commissioner Oettinger.
n the sale of gas in Europe,” http://www.gazprom.ru/about/marketing/
274
http://ria.ru/economy/20140826/1021449457.html.
232
Awareness of this is largely due to the free hand given to Vladimir

Putin in not only by Russia’s aggressive actions in the East of
Ukraine, but also in a hybrid aggression against Europe.
Russia uses the proceeds from the exports of hydrocarbons
against European powers. The Kremlin is well aware of the com-
plex process of reaching consensus within the European Union.
Through modeling and provoking conflict situations, and using
the EU’s own democratic traditions against the Old World, Russia
seeks to undermine “standard democracy” by pushing a united
Europe out from the political map of the world, depriving it of
the status as one of the centers of influence in order to occupy
its place and strengthen its own position.
The political systems of European countries have been the

object of Russia targeting its resources, acting as agents of
influence, and using instruments of manipulation. Recognizing
that it is the political parties that are the main carriers of
ideologies and instruments of struggle for power in the
European Union, the Kremlin is actively recruiting in Europe
its allies among radical political forces. Their orientation
towards European values is a component of the continental
political landscape, while Russia means to greatly enhance
the propaganda effect within the EU, where the positions of
the Eurosceptics are quite strong.
Among the successive Kremlin allies, some of which are fi-

nanced by Russian money, are the Hungarian Nationalist Party
Jobbik, the Italian Northern League, the Greek Golden Dawn,
and the French National Front.
At the beginning of 2016, then director of the US National
Intelligence James R. Clapper was instructed to analyze the pos-
sibility of the secret financing of European parties by Moscow
over the past 10 years. Clapper’s department was to determine
whether the Russian special services were involved in the trans-
fer of money to European parties and foundations in order
to “undermine the political integrity” of the EU, blocking the
233
deployment of US missile defenses in Europe, and the desire to

create a Russian energy monopoly. According to The Telegraph,
the United States had decided to take this step because of fears
about the possibility of deploying a new Cold War in Europe.
Also, the publication stated that there was growing concern in
Washington about the possible intentions of Moscow benefit-
ting from the European division in order to achieve the lifting
of sanctions against the Russian Federation and have a negative
impact on NATO. 275 The concerns, frankly, were unfounded.
At present, Central Europe is an important base for the func-
tioning of the Russian secret services and their agents in the
political environment. The Internal Security Agency in Poland
is continuing to investigate the activities of the pro-Russian
groups operating in Poland. In early June 2016, law enforce-
ment officers raided the premises of the two leaders of the New
Right Congress Party, which supported the policies of Russian
President Vladimir Putin and promoted anti-Ukrainian views. In
late May, the officers pf the American National Security Agency
arrested Mateusz Piskorski, a leader of the unregistered party,
Change. The Internal Security Agency states that from 2013 to
2016 Piskorski “participated in the Russian Civil Intelligence
directed against Poland.” He is suspected of contacts with the
agents, and the promotion of Russian interests in manipulating
the sentiments of Polish society, for which he received a mon-
etary reward.
It is important for Ukraine to realize the fact that one of
Mateusz Piskorski’s deputies in Change was Konrad Renkas, the
founder of the Chainsaw Fraternity. In the pro-Kremlin media,
Renkas stated that Ukraine, having chosen the path of European
integration, is expected to return the properties to the Poles who
once lived on Ukrainian lands. He called for a similar restitution
in Western Ukraine, as well as in Kyiv, where Polish properties
were taken as early as the 1920s. Thus, the pro-Russian forces
275
Dmitry Ofitserov-Belskiy, “The boundaries of Eastern Europe’s energy depen-
dence,” http://intertrends.ru/userfiles/img/files/Ofitserov-belskiy20.pdf.
234
in Poland were intent on splitting the Ukrainians and Poles, as

well as to spread an anti-European sentiment among Ukraine’s
population.
An expert from the Warsaw University Center for the Study
of Eastern Europe, Kazimierz Vuytsitskyy, states that what can
be learned in the “handwriting” of the anti-Ukrainian actions in
Poland are the very forces that still exist and who painted swas-
tikas on Jewish graves in the Federal Republic of Germany in
the 1970s-1980’s: “It is known from the acts of the Stasi that an-
ti-Semitic inscriptions on Jewish graves in the Federal Republic
of Germany were the work of the special services of the GDR,
that is, in fact, Moscow. They did it to compromise democracy
in West Germany.” 276
The Kremlin shamelessly supports the radical forces in many
countries of the Old World, and they faithfully serve Russia.
These forces are not afraid of being marginalized from the
European political process as they are already often marginal.
But the growing popularity of the National Front in France, the
coming to power of Greece’s leftist coalition Syriza, the activ-
ity of the Jobbik Party in Hungary—all in the end show that
the results of elections to the European Parliament in which the
radical calling for the destruction of the EU had only received
about a quarter of the votes. 277 This exhibits that nationalism and
radicalism in the EU can very well find common ground with
the Kremlin’s Great Russian chauvinism. Russia is leveraging its
allies in its delicate missions, for example, during the Crimea
so-called “referendum.” 278
Many were significantly inspired by the Kremlin results of
the elections to the European Parliament in May 2014. One of
the main outcomes: the Europeans went on about the populist
promise for a quick solution to the problems. The representatives
276
http://ru.krymr.com/a/27802473.html.
p://www.ieras.ru/pub/analitlka/5.pdf.
p://glavred.info/politika/referendum-v-krymu-opublikovan-spisok-inos-
trannyh-nablyudateley274175.html.
235
of right-wing parties that went to the polls with the slogan “less
Europe, less European bureaucracy” and promising to fight
against the “dictation from Brussels,” received impressive support.
“The coup between the parliamentary groups has not oc-
curred. The largest number of votes gained by the European
People’s Party were the Socialists. The results of the liberals, the
far left, and the “greens” were much more modest. The real sur-
prise, though what many had expected, became an indisputable
breakthrough of nationalist, extreme right-wing, populist, and
anti-European parties. The biggest successes were achieved in
France and the UK, where Marine Le Pen and Naydzhel Faradzh
finished first. “ 279
A sufficiently high turnout (over 43%) is not indicative of
the growing number of supporters of the European project as a
whole. Voters supported the far-right in France, Greece, Great
Britain, Hungary and even Germany. In the year 2014, and for
the first time in its history, the neo-Nazi National Democratic
Party of Germany won a place in the European Parliament. It was
supported by 100,000,000 voters. If this claim was with absolute
certainty, that this is indeed disturbing for the Europeans, then
the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin’s allies in the Old World heard
the sound of the death knell with joy.
“People said it loud and clear: they do not want to be led by
those who live beyond our borders, by the commissioners and
technocrats whom they did not choose,” said Marine Le Pen,
leader of The National Front, which was supported by 4.1 mil-
lion voters. The National Front for the first time came ahead of
their competitors, the Socialist Party and the Union for a Popular
Movement during the national vote. In the UK, 27% of the vote
in May 2014 was received by the United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) who were speaking for the country’s withdrawal
from the European Union, the creation of jobs for the British,
tightening immigration policies in the UK, and in Europe as
a whole. This result also shook the traditional British system
279
http://ru.euronews.com/2014/12/19/poll-for-europe.
236
of balance between the two major parties: the Conservatives

and Labor. Local elections were held in England and Northern
Ireland, and together with the European one have shown that
the radicals affected the results of the 2015 national elections.
According to experts, their win in the elections to the European
Parliament would also weaken the influence of Cameron’s de-
cisions within the framework of the British government’s EU
institutions.
Among other right-wing parties who resulted in successful re-
sults was the Danish People’s Party (26.7%). At the same time and
in second place was Hungary where 14% of the votes were for the
nationalists of Jobbik, which will have three seats in parliament,
while the Hungarian Socialists were able to get only two. 280
If we talk about the frontal assault of the right and the
Eurosceptic possibility of recognizing their levels of European
triumphs sooner in Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands,
Romania, Poland and other countries, then the national ruling
parties in general had won. And in crisis-ridden Cyprus, the
openly pro-European party which supports the introduction of
painful austerity measures, had a victorious outcome.
The Europeans’ expression of will and whose procedures were
not only familiar for decades, also became the breeding ground
for Russian propaganda. The very consistent voice for the British
withdrawal from the European Union was the Russian state news
agency Sputnik. It actively agitated in Britain against continued
membership in the EU, stating that the UK will face a migration
crisis in continental Europe, and also highlighted the alleged
rape assaults by migrants that occurred in Cologne and Berlin.
The struggle for the success of Brexit was not the first test of
strength by the Russian propagandists in the guise of journalists
from the Old World. They were very active in supporting a ref-
erendum on Scottish independence, and in the first half of 2016
they also extensively covered the referendum in the Netherlands
280
http://gazeta.dt.ua/international/yevroparlament-vibori-zakinchilisya-ale-bit-
va-tilki-pochalasya-sered-yevrodeputativ-upershe-gromadyanka-ukrayini-_.html.
237
where residents voted against the Association Agreement be-

tween Ukraine and the EU
“Putin can hide his true intentions, but it is clear that he wants
to see a more fragmented Europe, and not a unified one,” said
Jürgen Hardt, a member of the Bundestag. The path to this goal,
he said, is through Berlin. “If you discredit Merkel and Germany,
you weaken the whole of Europe,” said Hardt in Bloomberg. 281
“Therefore there is nothing strange in the fact that Russia strongly
supports the Alternative for Germany—a political force that is
rapidly gaining strength in Germany. The Alternatives manage
and mobilize protest voters—those citizens who are disillusioned
with the traditional parties. Now its ideology is simultaneously
determined by the ultra-conservatives with a specific version
of economic liberalism...especially those in the party who are
‘Russian Germans’—the ethnic Germans from the former Soviet
Union, many of whom moved to Germany in the first half of the
1990s.” 282
Difficult is the situation for the authorities in France despite
the terrorist attacks uniting the French. After the shootings at the
newspaper Charlie Hebdo, as well as the taking of hostages in a
Jewish shop in the eastern part of Paris, a rally of solidarity and
unity was held with more than four million people who took to
the streets. However, the terrorist attacks in Paris on November
2015, and the bloody terrorist attack in Nice in mid-July 2016
confirmed that the French secret services so far had failed to
effectively counter the terrorists. Against this background, an
absolutely logical result was the decline in the popularity rating
of François Hollande, then the incumbent President of France
which at the end of June 2016 amounted to only 12%. 283
François Hollande sought to maintain his good political
reputation and avoided falling into the network of the next
Kremlin manipulation. Hollande, cold and aloof at first glance,
281
ps://lb.ua/world/2016/04/20/333442_bloomberg_rossiya_ispolzuet.html.
ps://meduza.io/feature/2016/08/25/alternativa-za-putina.
283
http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2016/06/30/7051423/.
238
was fortunately for Ukraine, not a victim of Moscow’s hypnosis,

unlike Nicolas Sarkozy, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon 284
and many other politicians. 285
Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008, maintained the status as the head of
state while actually playing up to Russia during its armed con-
flict with Georgia. The paradox of the situation was that while
Sarkozy was actually speaking on behalf of the European Union
as a whole, the EU’s confidence was severely shaken in its read-
iness to resist Russian expansion.
This French politician himself said while speaking at the Party
Congress that led them to political power: “We have a common
civilization with Russia. When we speak Russian, we speak of a
common culture, which does not happen when we communi-
cate with our Chinese, Vietnamese, and other friends, even if we
shared a common part of the story. The rupture of relations be-
tween Russia and Europe—it is a tragedy...Crimea chose Russia,
you cannot blame it in this. Similarly, just as I, in my time once
made Putin promise not to interfere with the separation of the
inhabitants of Kosovo from Serbia. If Kosovo had the right to
independence from Serbia, I do not understand how you can
talk about how Crimea had no right to secede from Ukraine to
join Russia without using the same evidence.” 286
The presidential elections in France were held in the spring
of 2017. The leader of the National Front, Marine Le Pen, was
a conductor of the ideas of the Kremlin in French society and
who perceived it as absolutely normal. The ideas that a Russian
284
Jean-Luc Mélenchon (b. 1951, Tangier)—French statesman and political leader
and left-wing journalist. French Minister of Vocational Education in the government
of Lionel Jospin from 2000 to 2002. A member of the French Senate of the Eson
(1986-2000; 2004-2010). European Parliament Member since 2009 (faction of the
European United Left/Left-Green North). One of the founders and chairman of the
“Left Party.” He participated in the 2012 presidential election, in which he received
11.1% of votes, fourth place.
285
Lazareva, “The Labyrinth of Responsibilities,” https://tyzhden.ua/
47085.
286
http://russian.rt.com/article/73131.
239
aggressor, as an invader of another country, and of being in

breach of its international obligations were blurred. Powerful
pro-Russian sentiments also prevailed in the French army. Some
of the highest ranking generals and officers believed that Putin’s
actions in Crimea were cool. 287
It is simplistic to consider Marine Le Pen solely as a recipient
of a loan in a Russian bank on the functioning of its political
power. 288
Apparently, she uses Russia as a lever of pressure on European
politicians, shocking the public and attracting attention. The for-
mat forces the French Nationalist leader to not only blame the
European Union for what is happening in Ukraine (she is a fierce
opponent of Ukraine’s European integration), but also to make
the following statements:
“In my opinion, the referendum results do not cause any con-
troversy. It was expected. And the people (the Crimeans), who
lived in fear, rushed into the arms of the country, from which they
came from, because you know that Crimea was part of Ukraine
for only 60 years.” 289 Although Marine Le Pen lost the presidential
election, and her party received minimal support in the parlia-
mentary elections, it is impossible to downplay the influence of
pro-Russian-minded French politicians.
At the same time in France, there are those who occupy other
right-wing positions besides the National Front. “For Peace in
Ukraine” is the slogan of the French supporters of the separat-
ists in Ukraine who organize meetings and conduct informa-
tion campaigns. “Ukrainians siphon gas from hospital patients”
was reported on the website of the radical group France Block
Identity. Alain Frany, one of the leaders of this organization had
visited Donetsk on the anniversary of the establishment of the
2877
H. Tregub, “Galina Ackerman: ‘The war in Europe still seems to its inhabitants
absolutely impossible,’” http://tyzhden.ua/World/128239.
p://ru.rfi.fr/frantsiya/20141122-mediapart-kak-marin-le-pen-poluchi-
skie-milliony.
289
http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/3/17/677511.html.
240
DNR, and was accompanied by Marine Le Pen’s old speechwrit-

er Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. He promoted the pan-Russian
ideology with a focus on the Russian part, and the doctrine of
a unipolar world. 290 These far-right politicians have not had a
great influence on French society, but the fact of their political
sympathies existing at all is indicative.
However, there are more examples of respectable French pol-
iticians in the service of the Kremlin’s interests. For example, a
deputy of the National Assembly of France Thierry Mariani has
organized visits to Russia-annexed Crimea for French parliamen-
tarians. 291 Between two visits to the Crimea in April 2016, Thierry
Mariani initiated the adoption of the resolution for the French
Parliament to abolish the sanctions against Russia. 292 It called to
cancel the European Union sanctions against Russia that were
imposed in connection with the Ukrainian crisis. The resolution
was then voted mainly by the MPs representing the rural regions
of France. They were primarily affected from the introduction
of anti-Russian sanctions because they lost a profitable Russian
market.
I will remind the reader that in 2012, Thierry Mariani was a
co-president of the non-governmental association, the Franco-
Russian Dialogue, which proclaimed its aim of “strengthening
strategic relations” between the two countries. On the Russian
side, the co-president of this association was Vladimir Yakunin,
who was until recently the head of Russian Railways (RZD). This
closest associate of President Putin was distinguished by among
other things, of owning his own shoe store.
The delegation that visited the annexed Crimea included
several party members including Thierry Mariani, and Nicolas
Sarkozy, the leader of the Republican Party and declared his
290
A. Lazareva, “Donetsk Jihad of the French radicals,” http://tyzhden.ua/
World/137351.
291
p://www.svoboda.org/a/27149009.html.
p://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3724511-v-krym-pryletely-frantsu-
zskye-deputaty.
241
readiness to run again for president in the spring of 2017. 293

This experienced politician, who among other things carries
the title of Honorary Professor at Moscow State University, can
be a convenient partner for the Kremlin if the realization of his
aspirations to split European unity comes true.
In the long run, Sarkozy’s hand can play the “Le Pen syn-
drome” in French politics more than once, but in the face of a real
threat of a National Front type victory, there are other political
leaders who have risen above the contradictions, and prevented
them from coming to power. Russia, however, is acting in support
of various ways for these two loyal politicians of French politics.
Because of the involvement in the Normandy Format,
Ukraine is interested in France. The representatives of the French
Government emphasize that there is no reason to worry, they
are not going to link Ukraine and Syria, or the possibility of
such a link, as Hollande said at a meeting with Putin. It is not
only a comforting protocol, but according to some insiders in
the French government offices, there is no plan to link these
themes. But the problem lies elsewhere. The problem is that Putin
is planning this. And the problem is that some business circles,
political parties, and expert communities in France are prepared
for such a scenario. 294
But, as in the whole of Europe, it appears likely that three
categories of people can be distinguished according to their ap-
proaches to Russia and its actions in Ukraine.. Some clearly ad-
here to the position of “Putin is the aggressor,” while others are
supporters of the position “Putin is the aggressor, but…”, and the
third—”Putin is not the aggressor.” There is reason to believe that
the category of “Putin is the aggressor, but…” in France today is
the most common group. And after the horrific terrorist attacks
on November 13, 2015 in Paris, with a strong Islamic following,
the number of supporters of this thesis has increased.
ps://meduza.io/feature/2016/08/26/frantsiya-dlya-frantsuzov.
Hetmanchuk, “Ukraine in France: there is interest, but they announce fa-
tigue,” http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/1868.html.
242
The main difference between Russian politics and the West

is the Kremlin backs the one person who does not face the
problem of a re-election (off the scale ratings allowed Vladimir
Putin to become someone who would not think about such
“trifles” as a re-election). Whereas, Russia’s European and
American counterparts are forced to take into account the
mood of the electorate, and Russia very effectively uses this
factor.
In 2015, every third person in the EU was concerned about

the growing number of migrants. This is evidenced by the sur-
vey results conducted in late May for the European Commission
by the agency Eurobarometer. The first place fear in the list of
concerns over these newcomers was the economic situation and
unemployment. However, the number of Europeans who were
afraid of terrorist attacks in the country increased from 17% to
23% in 2014. 295
According to Ukrainian journalist Elena Babakova, the right
to work in Poland should absolutely be allowed. “The question
of what to do with refugees has two aspects for Europe: econom-
ic-political and ethical,” she said. “The EU before taking in refu-
gees was clearly not ready for the tens of thousands coming every
year. Even the richer states cannot afford a full social payment for
the Syrians, Eritreans, or Nigerians as guests, not to mention the
poorer EU member states. Equally important is the ethical aspect.
The EU has enough supporters for the radical methods of strug-
gling with the migrants as for example Australia, Malaysia, and
Singapore where the influx of refugees are fed, provided medical
assistance, then thrown on the serviceable boats and sent back.
That happened only in the case of the return of the migrants to
Libya or Syria by the EU, condemning them to certain death.
United Europe has become so attractive because of the ideals on
which it was built, and among them as the number one priority
295
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_publ_en.pdf.
243
is the value of human life regardless of skin color, religion or

beliefs. For a long time, this was simply pleasant to talk about,
but now Europeans must decide what are their ideals, and what
are mere words.” 296
Is it any wonder that “Russia, together with Assad, used mi-
gration as a weapon attempt to derail the European structures
and destroy European decisiveness.” This statement was made on
March 1, 2016, by then-chief of NATO forces in Europe General
Philip Breedlove, who very strongly saw the need to curb the
Kremlin’s aggression. He noted that the Russian military weapons
which were used in Syria is “not characterized by a high degree of
accuracy.” Thus, according to the General, “it leads to a large flow
of refugees from areas that are being bombarded.” 297 The creation
of such an inhuman “domino effect” of thousands of people are
cruel and prudent weapons of hybrid Russian aggression.
On February 14, 2016, Republican Senator John McCain in
his speech at the Munich Security Conference, said that Russia
deliberately generates a flow of refugees from Syria to the EU in
order to destroy the unity of Europe and the European Union as
a whole. According to him, the Russian leadership is deliberately
worsening the humanitarian situation in Syria. “Putin wants to
use Syria as a testing ground for the latest Russian weapons. He
wants to provoke a new wave of refugees to hit Europe, to un-
dermine the European project,” said the prominent politician. 298
Grounds for such a conclusion were considerable enough. In
2015, more than one million people had crossed the European
border, while thousands were unable to get on land and died in
the waters of the Mediterranean. 299
296
Elena Babakov, “More important than Ukraine. Europe flooded the refugees,”
http://nv.ua/opinion/babakova/vazhnee-chem-ukraina-evropu-zahlestyvajut-be-
zhentsy62184.html.
297
http://censor.net.ua/n377113.
ps://russian.rt.com/inotv/2016-02-15/Makkejn-Putin-sobiraetsya-sdelat-iz.
p://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2016/02/160219_migrant_cri-
sis_charts.
244
Why should the situation of refugees be considered as an

instrument of hybrid aggression? The answer is obvious: the
destabilization of the European Union. The introduction of
another irritating factor makes the position of the EU agen-
da and other issues much less monolithic. By the Kremlin’s
fighting for the mitigation of its economic sanctions, causing
confusion and vacillation in the ranks of the European per-
spective, Russia creates a space for political maneuvering and
secret trading.
Will the influx of representatives from Third World coun-
tries into the Old World countries threaten Ukraine? The threat
does not lie on the surface. The logical chain of Russian pro-
paganda (with significant resources and real influence) in this
aspect is easy to ascertain. In Ukraine, there is a civil war, and
the EU is negligent in signing the Association Agreement with
promises for a visa-free regime. Russia appears as a “caring
nanny,” warning Europe of the flow of refugees from Ukraine.
According to the already mentioned reasons, based on the
inertia of thinking, most Ukrainians are Nazis and right-wing
nationalists.
Such propaganda masterpieces are not always directly
effective; sometimes they are indirect, but are no less effec-
tive. This is typical even in countries that call themselves
the strategic partners of Ukraine. For example, the Prime
Minister of Poland, Beata Szydło stated during the meeting
of the EU Council of January 19, 2016 that her country had
taken one million Ukrainian refugees. 300 And this statement
forced the denial by the Ambassador of Ukraine to Poland
Andrii Deshchytsia. 301 It is significant that the statement was
aimed at Szydło’s Polish voters. According to a survey of the
300
“Premier of Poland: We have hosted a million Ukrainians whom nobody want-
ed to help,” www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/01/19/7095970/.
301
Deshchitsa has denied Szydło’’s statement,” http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-
politycs/1948341-desica-polskomu-premeru-u-polsi-nemae-bizenciv-z-ukraini.
html.
245
International Organization for Migration, 55% of Poles per-

ceive Arabs as a threat, while 35% see Ukrainians as a threat. 302
The pro-Russian propaganda of March 2016 was predictably
focused mainly on “Europe’s responsibility” for the deployment
of the migratory crisis and the fact that Ukraine was not more “of
interest in the West.” This is stated in the following issue of the
Disinfo Review, prepared in the office of the EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, which
refuted the myths of Russian propaganda.
The pro-Kremlin commentators noted that “Germany and the
EU had cynically destroyed Greece,” sending back refugees from the
Middle East, and that the EU will soon collapse under the weight
of the problems associated with refugees; also the main cause of the
collapse will be Angela Merkel. Although it is clear that Russia is
bombing civilians in Syria, Vladimir Solovy lso argued that
the US and the EU absolutely do not care how many Arabs have
been killed.
Another thing that the Disinfo Review w observers noted was that
the pro-Kremlin media were reoriented towards Ukraine. The bulk
of the messages from the promoters of the Russian Federation pro-
claimed the fact that the US and the EU were already “tired of
Ukraine.” 304
It is well known that in the modern world, along with spies and
intelligence agents, agents of influence become especially important.
It is they, acting indirectly, in the northern hemisphere, who help
the states in which they work in to achieve their foreign policy goals.
And they do it at times not only for financial rewards, but according
Hetmanchuk, “How we lose pro-Ukrainian Poland,” http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/

778.html.
Vladimir Rudolfovich Solovyov (b. 1963)—Russian TV presenter, publicist,
actor, singer and public figure. Known for his anti-Ukrainian expressions and pro-
paganda. In August 2014, was included in the list of sanctions for his position on
the war in the South-East of Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea.
304
“‘Ukraine does not need the West, Europe is to blame for the refugee cri-
sis’—new Russian propaganda myths,” http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/
news/2016/03/8/7045916/.
246
to their own beliefs. These ideological allies are the most consistent,
but the emphasis is of course, not only having to do with them.
As was true during Soviet times, the Russian leadership has
adopted a strong tradition of sowing Russophilia among European
intellectual and artistic elites. Even the Soviet secret service worked
intensively among Western intellectuals and the European politi-
cal establishment by skillfully playing on the differences between
the US and the leading countries of Europe during the Cold War.
The restructuring has given rise to many in the West to think
about the possibility of Socialism with a human face. Although
the collapse of the USSR had buried these illusions, it has on the
other hand, generated confidence in Russia as an alternative to
the Western world.
The Russian propaganda machine works by taking advan-
tage of and being taken for granted in the Western world via the
pluralism of opinions and deftly putting it into Russia’s service.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s propagandists are trying to beat the
hated West with its own weapons of “soft power” by playing on
the European and American media through powerful public re-
lations firms.
Many influential European cohorts somehow support both
Russia and its policy. A classic “example of a supporter for the
Russian authorities’ personal and economic needs and interests is
the former Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder. He always
sympathized with Russia, and when he ceased to be Chancellor
of Germany, he received a warm position as the head of Nord
Stream AG, the operator of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. In that
capacity, the ex-Chancellor began to urge the EU to increase pur-
chases of natural gas from Russia and declared Moscow to be a
reliable supplier. In the current circumstances, Schröder at every
opportunity was pushing the West to start a new dialogue with
the Kremlin despite the occupation of Crimea and the War in
Donbas.” 305
305
“Agents of the Kremlin: Russian spends millions to create a strong network of
lobbyists in the West,” http://nv.ua/publications/agenty-kremlya14929.html
247
In general, the Russian lobby in Germany occupies a strong

position. Take for example, Alexander Rahr, an influential po-
litical scientist, author of numerous publications on Russian
politics and the book, A “German” in the Kremlin, bearing
complimentary accolades with respect to Vladimir Putin’s na-
ture. And even though Angela Merkel’s position had seriously
changed, one of the leaders of the Social Democrats, the former
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany and current President
of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is not ashamed to make
pro-Russian statements.
The Kremlin prefers not to bet on a single VIP-character from

European political parties but to diversify the risks on multiple
allies, not only to stimulate their political jealousy, but also
to guarantee Russia obtains the desired results. The Russian
Federation receives funds from the sale of oil and gas in order
to buy off European politicians in bulk and in retail.
In this regard, an example of this apparent Russian strategy oc-

curs in Italy, where the Kremlin has consistently flirted before with
two political heavyweights of the country, Romano Prodi 306 and
Silvio Berlusconi. 307 The center-left Prodi, who took part in the 2013
Valdai Forum in a dialogue session with Vladimir Putin and the
elected representatives of the Western political elite, is opposed to
sanctions against Russia. The former Italian prime minister, known
as the author of the aphorism “The EU and Russia are inseparable
as caviar and vodka,” paid a private visit to Moscow in December
2014, where apparently, he discussed the prospects for the resump-
tion of full-fledged relations between Russia and the EU. 308
306
Romano Prodi (b. 1939)—Italian center-left politician, Prime Minister (1996–
1998, 2006–2008). Between the two premierships was the President of the European
Commission (1999-2004).
vio Berlusconi (b.1936)—Italian statesman and political figure, served four
Prime Minister of Italy (1994–1995, 2001–2005, 2005–2006, 2008–2011).
308
http://russian.rt.com/article/65198.
248
No less intriguing are the relations between Vladimir Putin

and Silvio Berlusconi. He does not hide his pro-Russian views
and personal sympathies for his “friend Vladimir.” As the say-
ing goes, “nothing personal—just business.” In this case, the
personal interests of Silvio Berlusconi include the laying of
the South Stream 309 and the development of business ties with
Russia. Therefore, in the autumn of 2014, the Italian politician
accused the West of “an irresponsible attitude towards Russia,”
stressing that “Russia cannot but protect Ukrainian citizens of
Russian origin, which for the Russians are like brothers.” 310 And
in January 2015, using the occasion of the Islamist terrorist at-
tack against the French weekly editions of Charlie Hebdo, he
said that “sanctions are useless, moreover, they are harmful to
the foreign policy and harmful to our economy. I hope that the
Italian government will be the initiator to change the European
line.” 311
It is a mistake to assume that Russia closely cooperates ex-
clusively with the leaders of Western Europe. The newer EU
member states, the so-called “new democracies” are also locat-
ed within its sphere of interests for the Kremlin. As with the
partners from Old Europe, the Putin regime prefers to act in
“duplicate” when diversifying its political risks.
The Diet of Latvia presented a report at the end of 2015 on
national security by the outgoing Prime Minister Laimdota
Straujuma who announced there was a major revitalization of
Russian spies and agents of influence in the media.
309
South Stream—a previously planned Russian-Italian gas pipeline project that
was to pass through the bottom of the Black Sea from Novorossiysk to the Bulgarian
port of Varna (or to Romania), and further through the Balkan Peninsula to Italy
and Austria. In the spring of 2014, after Crimea was annexed by Russia, European
politicians called the gas pipeline project “dead,” and on April 17, 2014 the European
Parliament passed a resolution referring to the refusal of constructing a “South
Stream.” In mid-April 2014, the section of the South Stream gas pipeline was dis-
ed in Bulgaria.
p://www.vz.ru/news/2014/9/7/704466.html.
311
http://ria.ru/world/20150112/1042205030.html.
249
Russian agents are not limited to the collection of informa-

tion (including closed information)—they also try to influence
the decision-making both at the national level and at the level
of NATO.
Separately, the report refers to numerous attempts to exert
pressure placed on public opinion. In Latvia, there is a belief that
one can talk about the entire system, which is an integral part
of the traditional media, even though the media is designed to
influence the audience in Russia given how globalization and
the spread of the Russian language in the Baltic States have a
significant impact on the local population. 312
Equally notable occurrences were in the Czech Republic
whose former and current leaders made public political over-
tures to Russia. For example, former Czech President Václav
Klaus “was the only European politician who came to the an-
nual reception on the occasion of Victory Day on May 9, 2015
in the Czech Republic’s Russian Embassy. At this event, the St.
George’s ribbon was attached to his lapel it any wonder
that the former President of the Czech Republic in July 2014
offered his services as a mediator in the “inevitable” process
of the separation of Ukraine, referring to the wide experience
gained during the dividing of Czechoslovakia.” 314
Therefore, the statement by Václav Klaus who underlined the
view that “it is clear that Crimea had never belonged to Ukraine,
and you know it. Crimea has always belonged to Russia. For me,
this whole situation is not so tragic. For me, the root cause of all
is the internal crisis in Ukraine. Without the Maidan there would
not have been the annexation of Crimea” 315 is not surprising.
The current President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman in
his political position is not very different from his predecessor.
p://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/12/151210_latvia_russian_in-
e_activity_antonenko.
p://www.szona.org/set-lobbistov.
p://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2014/07/9/7024043/.
315
Ibid.
250
In the fall of 2014, Zeman said he did not see the point for
Western countries to economically support Ukraine: “In my
opinion, the most important thing we need to understand is
that only a civil war is happening in Ukraine. We have to deal
not with some dreams of support, including economic support
for Ukraine because of this civil strife, and as for economic
support—that is complete nonsense.” 316 In a fit of loyalty to
Russia, Mr. Zeman participated on January 2015 in the first
organized celebration of the 70th anniversary of the liberation
of the concentration camp of Terezin at the same time activities
were occurring in honor of the 70th anniversary of the libera-
tion of Auschwitz (Oswiecim) where the Polish authorities have
not invited Vladimir Putin. However, the Russian President did
not come to the Czech Republic.
A tandem curiosity exists within the Hungarian political
elite. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who controls a constitu-
tional majority in the Parliament, does not hesitate to show his
public sympathy for Vladimir Putin. The most recent manifes-
tation of that took place on February 2015 during the visit of
the Russian President in Budapest. Not without reason is Orban
called one of the main lobbyists for the Russian interests in the
European Union, and it continues to confirm the image of his
public statements. However, Budapest has not yet decided to go
into a direct confrontation with the EU. This is evidenced by
the referendum that was declared invalid on October 2, 2016,
when the question was raised about the agreement by the cit-
izens of Hungary regarding the EU quotas for admission of
refugees.
In the meantime, a key role in Eurosceptic manifestations
is played by the Jobbik Party. They do not even try to mask
their servile attitude towards the Russian leader. “Its own leader
Gábo Vona considers Russia a strategic partner for Europe, and
the March referendum in Crimea is for them a role model.” 317
p://ukranews.com/ru/article/2014/12/11/660.
317
http://nv.ua/publications/Agenty-Kremlya.
251
The Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico occasionally al-

lows himself to utter pro-Russian statements, however, recently
his activity had decreased significantly in this regard. Perhaps this
is due to the undisguised desire for Gazprom (read: the Kremlin)
to minimize the volume of gas pumping through the territory
of Central Europe. In Slovakia, such a prospect is fraught with
significant financial losses that may result in a political crisis.
The post-socialist states remain in Moscow’s steadfast attention
and focus for several reasons:
– Their political elite have less significant political experience
compared to their Western European counterparts, which
extends the scope of external influences.
– Their common socialist past has left a rich heritage, includ-
ing the existence of common or similar stereotypes, mental-
ity traits, perceptions of morality, and law.
– The ambitions of the Central European elite are a promising
ground for manipulation and clashes of interests
– The Kremlin actively offers “an alternative to the dictates of
Brussels,” thereby provoking decisions that can destroy the
European consensus.
It is significant that in relations with the European Union,
Russia often repeats itself even in the form of food supply re-
strictions. Such a mechanism of influence has already been used
against the post-Soviet states (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), al-
though it was far from being the most effective. It should be
acknowledged that some EU states have succeeded in circum-
venting sanctions. Russia seeks to influence the development of
the situation in a manner peculiar to itself, and in a maximum
number of ways.
It makes no sense to go into conspiracy theories and look
for the “hand of Moscow” in the Islamist attacks in Europe.
However, seeing what was happening in the Middle East and
among Islamists had always been a consistently high priority for
both the old Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. Because of
the current conditions of employment issues along with its own
security, Europe is not so closely following the developments in
252
Ukraine. However, the Kremlin repeatedly has shown a willing-

ness to “save Europe” from the Islamists.
The consequences of terrorist attacks in Europe appear to be
quite serious for Ukraine for the following reasons:
– The threat of the EU’s reduced attention on the Ukrainian
conflict places the issue as a secondary one on the agendas
of the EU authorities.
– Inhibiting Eurointegration tendencies in general.
– The increase in xenophobic and radical sentiments in
Ukrainian society.
– The growth of potential threats that are controlled and stim-
ulated by the Russian special services regarding the massa-
cres of Muslims in Ukraine, including the Crimean Tatars.
– Expectations of terrorist attacks generates panic in
Ukrainian society, and as a consequence, an increase in the
distrust of one another and the fragmentation of society
which reduces the effectiveness of a civil society and trust
in the authorities.
The terrorist acts in Europe by those who are willing to take
responsibility like the Islamic State, are a factor of the hybrid
impact on the Old World’s outlook. European society takes it
very seriously when their security is threatened, and for the sake
of its restoration, Europe could be persuaded to compromise.
This situation is worrisome for Ukraine which remains the main
target of hybrid Russian aggression.
What Europeans need to know to find the recipes for victory
over the hybrid aggressor are:
– Ukraine was placed in the role of victim in many ways be-
cause of its own lack of reforms. Transformation, however
painful it may be, would lead to smaller losses rather than
military action.
– Ukraine actually protects Europe from Russian military
pressure and it is clear that the conflict in Donbas requires
increased attention from the Kremlin.
– To weaken or even destroy the European Union is one of
the strategic objectives of Russia since the existence of the
253
influential European Union does not fit the Kremlin’s vision

of the modern world.
– Russia skillfully uses “soft power” technology and a variety
of non-military methods of pressure.
– The key factor in relations with the European Union for
Russia remains the energy factor, and the fall of the political
role of “energy weapons” can lead to greater EU resilience.
– It is gratifying to note that after the start of the hybrid ag-
gression against Ukraine, the European Union had begun
to analyze the flow of misinformation produced by the
Kremlin, but effective counteraction to it still remains a
problem.
– Stopping hybrid Russian aggression can only be done with
concerted action and awareness of the danger of the aggres-
sor’s actions for the entire civilized world.
254
RESULTS
The targeted treatment of the European public, the creation of
a “warm bath” for Russia, Russian companies and the protection
of their interests is as important a part of a hybrid of aggression
as the confrontation with Ukraine. The entire arsenal of means
used by the Russian Federation in Europe due to excess funds
from the sale of hydrocarbon raw materials is intended not only
to deprive our country of support, but also to ensure that a “busi-
ness as usual” approach occurs in a mutually beneficial format.
The instruments of influence on the EU by the Russian
Federation are very diverse. Here are some of them:
– Sponsorships of political forces having an impact on the
political lives of the countries and the European Union’s
strength as a whole;
– Support of non-governmental organizations which operates
as tools of influence on public attitudes;
– The use of opinion leaders—retired politicians, intellectuals,
journalists, etc. to create favorable background information;
– Promoting terrorism that is contrary to international law
and the principles of humanism in order to aggravate ten-
sion in the world, and in some regions create pressure on
the major international actors;
– Economic levers that allow the Russian Federation to influ-
ence foreign policy with Russia’s trade partners in the EU;
– The formation of an energy that is dependent on the hydro-
carbon raw materials.
Confrontation is complex at this stage—it is hardly possi-
ble, but in some aspects, overcoming the Russian influence is
still real. However, this will depend on each country’s political
situation.
255
SECTION 8
ONE FOR ALL

VICTORY
Hybrid technology for countering aggression. Ukraine’s actions

towards the security of the continent. The criteria for an effec-
tive response to the hybrid aggression in Ukraine.
H
Having
vingg become the object of Russia’s aggression, Ukraine has
lost a n
the sam
tunity
number of alternatives for its development. However at
me time—and this is more important— a unique oppor-
ity has developed for our country in finding a chance for
a reall affirmation of its sovereignty. Independence was rela-
tively easily obtained in 1991, but is now filled with not only
a genuine, tangible sense, but also with comparable risks. The
situation is complicated by the fact that survival can provide
specific and profound changes. We only have to change and
win, otherwise both the enemy and yesterday’s situational allies
will not oppose the division of Ukraine into pieces and which
will be done of course, under the most plausible excuses.
Unfortunately, Ukraine still remains terra incognita for
many European countries. Two revolutions in less than ten
years occurred on Ukrainian land, and for the Old World, this
is not enough evidence for the democratic development of the
country; rather, it indicates the lack of effective democratic
procedures. Unfortunately, the desire to preserve the ephem-
eral social stability has provoked systemic mistakes that have
shaped the image of Ukraine as a nation that has no vision of
its own future.
Unlike Russia, Ukraine cannot boast of consistency in

matters of foreign policy for the last 25 years. Until recently,
the topic of European and Euro-Atlantic integration in the
best case was an element of domestic political struggle, and
not part of the national strategy.The Revolution of Dignity
marked the beginning of an active phase of confrontation with
Russia, a long-term (and even age-old) strategic partner of
which Ukraine is associated by through millions of different
connections.
Russia’s unfriendly actions against Ukraine were not deployed

overnight. There is reason to believe that the “cassette scandal”
in 2000, which led to the political isolation of Leonid Kuchma
in the West, was launched in Moscow where it was cautiously
261
embraced when Kuchma promised during his inauguration of

“becoming a different President.” After the events of the Orange
Maidan seriously frightened the Russian elite, the Kremlin be-
gan to prepare for a possible neutralizing effect of Ukraine’s
growth in the post-Soviet space. Russia has not halted in its
abundant and real aspirations for the implementation of such
plans on this issue regarding Ukraine.
Several years before the annexation of Crimea and the fo-
menting conflict in Donbas, Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych
was under remote control by the Kremlin. After his victory in the
presidential elections, Russia and Ukraine signed the Kharkiv
Agreement 318 that extended the terms of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet in the Crimea until 2042 in exchange for a $100 discount
on gas. On July 1, 2010, the Ukrainian Parliament voted for the
non-aligned, neutral status of Ukraine. In the formal consolida-
tion of the text of amendments to the law “on the fundamentals
of national security” cooperation with NATO, Ukraine’s interest
was in shaping the European security system which in actuality
was the cross to bear for Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Numerous Russian efforts were in action to discredit the
historical heroes that could have become a consolidating force
for the Ukrainian nation, not only for those who are reminis-
cent of the axiom “history is written by the winners,” but which
also demonstrates Russia’s interest in blurring the ideological
foundations of Ukrainian society. Beginning with “the three
varieties of Ukraine”—the so called symptomatic findings by
The Kharkiv Agreements, also called the Kharkiv Pact, or the Yanukovych-
Medvedev Agreement—An agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
regarding the presence of the RF’s Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine signed
on April 21, 2010 in Kharkiv, Ukraine by President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev, regarding the extended term of stay of the RF’s Black
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol from 2017 to 2042 with an automatic extension of five years
if there are no objections and the rental is stable. The agreements stated terms for
the fleet’s increased stay in exchange for cheaper Russian gas for Ukraine via custom
duties cancellations. Ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the State Duma
of the Russian Federation on April 27, 2010. Denounced unilaterally by the State
Duma of the Russian Federation on March 31, 2014.
262
SECTION 8 • ONE FOR ALL VICTORY
Yanukovych’s political technologists in 2004 319 and in the hands

of Ukrainian politicians, Russia sought to destabilize the situa-
tion in our country, eroding the platform for consolidation of
the Ukrainian political nation.
Russia’s hybrid aggression in our country was an unprec-
edented challenge that was thrown at us and accompanied
by hostile actions in the military, informational, diplomatic
and economic spheres. At the beginning of the annexation of
Crimea, Russia was the state with which Ukraine was most-
ly linked with powerful economic, cultural, and international
ties that were legalized through the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation (the so-called Big Treaty) that was signed in 1997
and prolonged in 2012. The fact that Ukraine has withstood
Russia’s blows in 2014 after the amputation of Crimea and the
rocking of Donbas, exhibits the internal potential of the nation
and its viability. Contrary to numerous speculations, Ukrainian
statehood remains.
The ability to survive in the face of a well-planned aggression
surprised many Europeans. Actually, because of the Ukrainians’
resistance, the Russian Federation is constantly changing the
tactics of its actions and is consistently undermining the work
on all possible fronts—from the emotional to the military.
Today it is clear: relations between Russia and Ukraine will
no longer be the same, even after the end of the Donbas conflict.
The scale of worldview changes has not yet been fully realized.
Two of the largest republics of the former Soviet Union over
the centuries have been connected with each other in various
government formats, and the majority of Ukrainian politicians
had never considered the option of a war with Russia. Moreover,
speculations on this subject over the past two decades were not
taken seriously. Even the dramatic events around the island
of Tuzla in 2003 did not make the national elite implement a
319
Political language surrounding Viktor Yanukovych’s election campaign in 2004
for dividing Ukraine’s map into three parts: western as “grade 1,” central as “grade
2,” and eastern as “grade 3.”
263
declaration of a multi-vector war. In practice, it took a qualita-

tively new military doctrine to ensure the effective deployment
of military units around the perimeter of the Ukrainian border.
For Ukraine’s armed forces the potential enemy, as in the “good
old” Soviet times, was the West. The possibility of war with its
northern neighbor, and indeed the potential loss of part of its
sovereign territory were never considered as real threats.
Russia’s current hybrid war against Ukraine is the confronta-
tion between the two centers of gravity in the post-Soviet space.
Although presently, the economic situation of our country is
not encouraging, Ukraine is able to push off from the bottom
and start climbing up, while Russia continues to rely mainly on
its imperial phantom representation and nuclear arsenal as the
Kremlin’s last resort.
The recipe for victory in a hybrid war is not to increase
spending on information warfare and military allocations. I am
convinced that our nation will be able to hold out and win, and
is capable of not only convincing the citizens of our abilities
in maintaining internal political stability, but also to enlist the
support of the international community. The Russian confron-
tation against Ukraine does not allow for indifference among
neighbors and also among the most civilized countries of the
world. Therefore, internal transformations and external vectors
of information dissemination are closely interconnected.
But one can always bet on reality distortions made by Russia,
and so Ukraine must require of itself a clear definition of the
main areas for further development. One of the major differ-
ences between the hybrid war compared to a conventional war
is that a hybrid war is not so much after the possession of terri-
tories and natural resources as it is for the control of the mood
of the country and to make victims of the citizens. It is difficult
to resist this often invisible enemy, as though constantly fighting
with a shadow without it turning into a “witch hunt,” but it is
necessary. It is, without exaggeration, a guarantee for survival.
What should be the actions of Ukraine on this issue? First
and foremost, it must be purposeful and aimed at:
264
– Being effective in the fight against corruption. This

topic is painful for Ukraine because of the high integration of
the corruption schemes within the functioning of the political
community. Efforts to combat corruption will be a signal to the
West about the true reality of the choices made by the national
political elite if they demonstrate they choose the European way
of development.
– The formation of the middle class. Representatives of
small and medium-sized businesses and the former “Guards
of the Orange Revolution” have now become the vanguard of
Ukraine in a hybrid war. There is no fundamental significance
whether they speak in the Russian or Ukrainian languages, but
their not being indifferent saves and continues to saves the state-
hood of the largest European country. It is the development of
small and medium-sized businesses that will promote the de-oli-
garchization of our country and a new political elite in Ukraine.
– The formation of the armed forces and special services.
During the last ten years, the Ukrainian Army has been one
of the most authoritative state institutions. The development
of the armed forces and bringing them into alignment towards
international and NATO standards seem to be the most logical
and natural steps after the abolition of the non-aligned status of
Ukraine. Effective work of the security services can strengthen
the country’s defense potential and reduce the impact of hybrid
influence.
– Development of the national idea. Without a clear vision
of the prospects for its development, Ukraine is unlikely to live
up to its potential in the modern world. Therefore, it is vitally
important for the country to form a platform for national asso-
ciations which is urgently needed for its millions of citizens to
move forward. Obviously, this is not a new reading of the foun-
dations of integral nationalism, but the creation of prerequisites
for the consolidation of the political Ukrainian nation.
– Defining its place in the system of international rela-
tions. The struggle for sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the country is devoid of practical meaning if it does not allow
265
the country to develop further. Today, Ukraine has received the

last chance to try to catch up with Central European countries
in the quality of life and increasing the scope of its influence on
European policy. Ukraine can become a key link in the Baltic-
Black Sea regional security system and be a leading Central
European state, but only in the case of systemic changes.
I noted that the world interest in Ukraine grew significantly.
Our country no longer looks like a “gray zone” in the center of
Europe. But Ukrainian leadership was not able to carry out effec-
tive reforms, or to act without regard to partisan or clan interests.
The citizens’ self-sacrifices in trying to socially uplift themselves
have been broken down by the inability and inefficiency by those
who call themselves the “national elite.” In the face of the threat
of destruction of its nationhood, Ukraine must act asymmetri-
cally and balanced at the same time while demonstrating Russia’s
aggressive nature, but also stressing Ukraine’s appeal. Otherwise,
Ukraine is unlikely to survive and win in today’s competitive world
Changes in the perception of Ukraine are directly related with
the transformation of the attitudes over Russia’s aggressive actions.
The annexation of Crimea and the Donbas aggression were not
hushed up nor stopped on the brakes as happened in the case of
Georgia in 2008.
In February 2015, the US National Security Strategy was adopt-
ed in which new approaches were fixed towards Russia: Russian
aggression was assessed as a “threat to international standards,”
and it noted the need to support Ukraine in providing a collective
deterrence against Russia’s aggressive policies. On June 10, 2015
the European Parliament adopted a resolution, “On the Relations
Between the EU and Russia,” which states that it is impossible to
consider Russia as a strategic partner and proposes a review of
the system of relations with the Russian Federation. NATO has
stopped the practice of civilian-military cooperation with Russia,
and during the Warsaw Summit, Ukraine was promised unprec-
edented support.
Russia has been consistently trying to create a smokescreen
by substituting concepts in international political and diplomatic
266
struggles. Ukraine is still lacking a clear vision of its own prospects

and the ability to integrate into the European agenda. Constant
attention to the events in the East of Ukraine (for all its impor-
tance at the front) can lead to a decrease in the concentration of
the problems in the West at the very least, if not more importantly.
One of the goals of the Russian Federation is “to bring Ukraine
down from sight” and adjust the priorities of Ukraine in Russia’s
favor.
If Ukraine’s successes in the military sphere are obvious, the
reforms in other areas are often not as effective. Complaints can
dampen the quality of state information. In a hybrid confrontation,
the quality and speed of the disseminated information play prima-
ry roles. Awareness of this and making the necessary decisions are
the keys to a successful confrontation with Russia.
267
CONCLUSION
The 21st century was not a long period of general welfare. The
contradictions between the leading powers of the world have
not disappeared, rather the thesis that democracies do not
fight among themselves have acquired a modern tone: they
do not fight by conventional methods, but use other very di-
verse opportunities to spit at each other. Ukraine, paying little
attention to either its own development or the formation of its
positive image in the world while living with the illusions of
a Ukrainian-centric environment of the world, is now paying
the expensive price for the mistakes made.
BBut
ut th
immed
manag
here is a fact that requires both critical thinking and an
diate response from today’s Ukrainian society. Ukraine has
naged to survive through the first months of Russian aggres-
sion evven when its national machinery resembled a termite-eat-
en piece
i of furniture, and despite Ukraine not having sufficient
military combat experience to face the audacious acts of well-
trained saboteurs of direct Russian aggression. Perhaps this is not
a David and Goliath story, rather, it is more of a modern version
of the biblical story of Cain and Abel. Ukraine lost Crimea and
part of Donbas in addition to the destruction in the order of
20% of the national economy. These are major factors of desta-
bilization, but Russia still plans to build a barrier of so-called
“people’s republics,” to cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea ports
and destroy the export potential of the country—plans which
have not yet been implemented.
Ukrainians are surprising. They have become, perhaps, the
first on the continent, to lay down their lives for the values of the
European Union under the European flag, even without having
the prospect of membership in this international association.
Such altruism is hard to imagine considering the living standard
norms of Europe and its circle. It appears that no one dies for a
dream. But it was the citizens of Ukraine who were able to spend
millions of dollars to better equip and feed their armed forces
and helping them during the most difficult period. In Ukraine,
this applicable and well-known truth is literally understood:
“Whoever does not want to feed their army, will feed someone
else’s.” The Ministry of Defense’s decision to organize volunteer
troops appears to be unprecedented, but it was the only possible
solution when the previous army, afflicted with corruption, was
challenged.
An interesting situation emerged in Ukraine where the citi-
zens and informal groups began without government backing to
replace the cumbersome state-issued military machinery. It was a
question of necessity against the opposition’s information aggres-
sion for supplying the army with imports (often single-handedly)
of military equipment that was needed for years—having been
273
without it was deliberately deflating the morale of the armed

forces. Such a scenario of civil society development and self-re-
alization for the modern European might appear to be unusual,
but still indicates Ukraine setting a good example.
Although it’s not an absolute foolproof process, I want to
emphasize that civil confrontational activism against hybrid ag-
gression is truly invaluable and this information is worth shar-
ing information with the EU and NATO members. And some
members of the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union 320 and the
CSTO 321 would be better off taking a master class on the topic:
“How to stop the Kremlin’s aggressive actions.” The aggravation
in the Karabakh 322 conflict and alarms in Kazakhstan 323 indicate
that the plans of the Russian leadership have no place for inde-
pendence—not even for their loyal allies.
The Minsk Agreement which was approved by the leaders of
the Normandy Format 324 after exhaustive talks in February 2015
and which was repeatedly criticized in Ukraine and elsewhere,
320
The Eurasian Union is a geopolitical project for the restoration of Russia’s
imperial hegemony, initiated by Vladimir Putin. According to analysts, the Eurasian
Union is a Russian attempt for the antithesis of the European Union. Based on
pan-Muslimism and latent (hidden) Russian chauvinism. The ideological concepts
are the foundation of the “Russian world.”
321
Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO or Tashkent Treaty)
is a military-political international organization which includes Russia, Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.
322
“In Nagorno-Karabakh--a new conflict intensification,” http://www.dw.com/
irno-kara-bahh-uue-aggregation-conflict-a-37715538.
ese are, for example, the statements of Russian deputy Pavlo Shperov a dep-
uty of the State Duma, and member of the Liberal Democratic Party. At a meeting
of the parliamentary round table on January 26, 2017, Shperov said: “Not everything
is lost in the so-called neighboring countries. When we call our compatriots, let’s
say, in Kazakhstan, a diaspora that lives on land that is temporarily torn away. And
I believe that these lands are temporarily detached, the borders are not eternal ...
Those territories that are originally ours, they will return. And when we call our
compatriots ‘the Diaspora,’ we simply cut them off.”
324
Normandy Format (also in French as Format Normand)--meetings held from
2014-2017 for resolving the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in the four-sided
format of: Ukraine-Germany-France-Russia.
274
CONCLUSION
are still noteworthy for several reasons. The first and foremost
is that their achievement made it possible to sharply reduce the
level of losses and ultimately to direct the spotlight on the true
aggressor. Even the representatives of the special monitoring
missions in Donbas, who are characterized by their alertness,
increasingly point to the Russian separatists and those looming
behind their backs.
The so-called “Minsk 2” does become an example of hybrid
diplomacy since this document to which no signatures have been
signed by the official representatives of the states, have not been
ratified by any parliament, but still received the support of the
UN Security Council as a blueprint for resolving the conflict in
Donbas.
But these diplomatic innovations should not overshadow the
main thing: Russia violated the established post-World War II
world order, and strives to gain a foothold as one of the poles of
power. Its desire of pursuance is not only supported by significant
financial resources and rearmament of its army, but also by the
consolidation of the population around the idea of a “rebirth of
Russia.” But foreign policy goals are subordinate to domestic pol-
icies. Vladimir Putin and his entourage are deliberately forcing
the establishment of having Russia appear as a “besieged fortress”
inside the country in order to achieve the strengthening of his
presidential power.
European politicians who have intensively flirted with Putin
before the annexation of Crimea did not seem to realize how
dangerous the Russian game is. Armed with the idea of restoring
its influence and the restoration of the bipolar world, the Kremlin
is trying to smear Ukraine and destabilize the situation in the
European Union.
The number of disturbing “alarm bells” that have been heard
over the past few years have been ringing in the minds of every-
one who is worried about the new geopolitical reality and the
rapid divorce from the world’s anchors of stability and well-being.
Ukraine has been a hard nut to crack. Its resistance to Russian
expansion forced Putin to revise his plans and a timetable that
275
seemed inevitable for a “fraternal Blitzkrieg” or another “21st

Century Anschluss.” Although Russia has an obvious advan-
tage in virtually almost all respects for a conventional war, the
Ukrainians’ powerful spirit proved to be an important factor in
countering the largest post-Soviet state.
Our country today resembles a straw bull which is held in the
paw grip of the Russian bear. Both animals are stuck and cannot
move. Our Western partners prudently, so as not to provoke a
change in the vector of Russian aggression, will rub the sides of a
bullion of “resin” foreign policy support and financial assistance
so that the bear cannot roam freely and harm the West. At the
same time, the “horns” and “hoofs” as a means of self-defense
should and must be exclusively of Ukrainian origin. The West
leads Russia into a complicated political game that does not take
Ukrainian national interests into account.
This obvious fact does not remove from the agenda a few
important issues. What will be the configuration of European
security in the event of a hypothetical defeat of Ukraine? Will
the European Union be responsible for the consequences of the
humanitarian disaster that accompanies such a scenario? Are the
Western diplomats opposing a scenario of the “Bosniazation” of
Ukraine” which is obviously disturbing the minds of the political
leadership of Russia? Does NATO have time to help not only
Ukraine (the promises at the Warsaw Summit were generous, but
in practice only a mere criterion of truth), but will the members
of the Alliance on its eastern flank also help? Will Russian ag-
gression in Ukraine and its victims be stopped by other countries
whose policies cause irritation to the Kremlin?
The answers to these questions are now vigorously being ex-
amined in Brussels, Warsaw, and Washington, with periodical lis-
tening to the opinions of the officials in Kyiv and representatives
of Ukrainian NGOs. However, the prematurely written recipe for
curbing the largest state in the world with obvious ambitions is
not present today; it is created by trial and error while Ukraine
is experiencing the most difficult time in its newest history of
human sacrifices and infrastructure losses.
276
CONCLUSION
In any case, Ukraine should not wait out its fate according to
the outside players. At first glance, the recipe to repel aggression
and strengthening foreign policy subjectivity can be very sim-
ple: effective economic reforms must be implemented in parallel
with the strengthening of the defense capability of our country.
Creating an attractive image of a modern nation while support-
ing its allies in Europe are not problems, but opportunities. The
potential formation of a modern national idea is the unique rec-
ipe for building a successful nation through the development of
horizontal ties with neighboring countries. Ukraine will receive
the main dividends from the realization of these intentions, but
Europe, America, and the world will also not lose out.
277
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY
aggression— the use of armed force by the state against the

sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of an-
other state or in any other manner incompatible with the United
Nations Charter.
annexation—one of the types of aggression, the forcible ac-

cession by the state of all or part of the territory of another state
unilaterally, which entails a change in the legal status of the an-
nexed territory (as opposed to occupation).
asymmetric warfare — a kind of war characterized by a sig-

nificant difference in the military potential of the opposing
sides. Such wars often have strategies and tactics of non-tradi-
tional wars, as a weaker opponent tries to compensate for mil-
itary weakness by non-standard tactics, aggression, including
non-military spheres. Often, under an asymmetric warfare, a
partisan war and its derivatives are meant.
civil war — armed opposition groups organized within the

country or state, or (less frequently) between two countries that
were formerly members of a former single state association (ex-
amples, the former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union).
conventional warr—an armed conflict that is conducted in ac-

cordance with the norms of international law between sovereign
international political actors (states, unions of states).
counter-propaganda — a single, well-thought-out, dynamic

and effective system of activities that is an integral part of advo-
cacy, representing a set of tools, techniques, and methods aimed
at neutralizing and exposing the propaganda of competitors.
cyberwar — a confrontation via the Internet, its use as an in-

strument of aggression in order to destabilize Internet space of
the victim’s country and cause the maximum possible damage.
281
disinformation — deliberately false information provided to

more effectively combat operations and pushing the opponent
to a certain line of conduct; the process of manipulating true
information.
fake — unverified or deliberately false information published

in the media and social networks.
guerrilla warfare — transliteration from the Spanish guerril-

la; a partisan war. Varieties of guerrilla warfare include urban
guerrillas which uses unconventional methods of warfare against
government forces in urban conditions.
hybrid aggression — a complex of diverse methods of in-

fluencing the enemy along with an adjustable quantity and a
combined character, in which the military component itself is
not dominant. A hybrid threat implies the use of different com-
binations by the opponent: 1) political, military, economic, so-
cial, information means; 2) conventional, irregular, terrorist and
subversive means.
hybrid warfare— a set of pre-prepared and operationally

implemented actions of military, diplomatic, economic, infor-
mational character, aimed at achieving strategic goals. Its key
importance is the subordination of the interests of one state to
another in the conditions of formal preservation of the political
structure and sovereignty of the country that became the victim
of aggression. The basic components of the hybrid war can in-
clude traditional and non-standard threats, terrorism, subversive
actions, new or unconventional technologies in order to counter
the enemy’s military superiority. The main difference between
hybrid warfare and aggression is the intensity of the use of these
tools.
information security — the state of conservation and protec-

tion of information resources and space personality of the state
282
GLOSSARY
in information technology and in the information-psychological

sphere.
information warfare — use of manipulated information to

gain superiority over an opponent. Includes a collection of tac-
tical information, dissemination of propaganda materials and
knowingly false information in order to undermine the psy-
chological state of the enemy, creating an adverse image of the
enemy.
irregular troops — the general name of military units and

armed groups that do not have a clear organizational structure,
a common resource base, principles of staffing and training.
Examples of irregular forces include partisan detachments, ter-
rorist groups, national militias, and volunteer detachments.
media manipulation— a kind of psychological influence

through the media, the Internet, cinematography, sound record-
ings and videos, videotapes, teletexts, billboards and panels that
combine television, telephone, computer and other communica-
tion lines, and social networks which leads to the awakening in
the object of the influences of intentions that change a person’s
desire, mood, behavior, views, etc.
network-centric warfare —a war focused on achieving infor-

mation superiority through the unification of military objects in
the information network; a concept of warfare which involves
increasing the combat power by the grouping of joined forces
by creating an information and switching network that com-
bines the sources of information (intelligence), the authorities
and the means of defeat (suppression), which ensures that the
participants of the operations carry out reliable and complete
information about the situation in real time. This is due and
achieved by accelerating the process of managing forces and
means, increasing the pace of operations, the effectiveness of
defeating enemy forces, the survival of its troops and the level
283
of self-synchronization of hostilities; also a form of conflict in

which participants use network (horizontal) forms of organiza-
tion, doctrine, strategy, and technology, adapted to the modern
information age. Participants in such networks can be terrorists,
criminal groups, civic organizations, and social movements that
use decentralization and are flexible social structures.
prisoners of war — prisoners of war — (under the Geneva

Convention of August 12, 1949 on the treatment of prisoners of
war). Persons who fell under the control of the enemy and belong
to one of the following categories:
1. The personnel of the armed forces of the party in conflict,
as well as the personnel of the militia and volunteer units that are
part of these armed forces.
2. The personnel of other militias and volunteer units, including
the personnel of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
party in conflict and operating on their own territory or outside
it, even if this territory is occupied, if these militias and volunteer
units, including organized resistance movements, meet the fol-
lowing conditions:
a) have a person in charge of responsibility for their subordinates;
b) have a definite and distinctly visible distant sign;
c) openly carry weapons;
d) observe the laws and customs of war in their actions.
3. The staff of regular armed forces who consider themselves
subordinate to the government or the authorities not recognized
by the captive state.
4. Persons following the armed forces, but not directly involved,
such as civilians in military aircraft crews, military correspondents,
suppliers, personnel of working teams or services in which armed
services are placed on a daily basis forces, provided that they have
received permission from the armed forces they accompany, for
which the latter must issue them with an identity card of the pre-
scribed form.
5. Members of the merchant navy’s crew, including captains, pi-
lots and junks, and civil aviation crews of the parties to the conflict
284
GLOSSARY
who do not enjoy any preferential treatment under any other pro-
visions of international law.
6. The population of the unoccupied territory, which, when
approaching the enemy spontaneously of his own accord, takes
up arms to fight the coming troops, having not managed to form
regular troops, if it is openly armed and adheres to the laws and
customs of war.
propaganda— a form of communication aimed at dissemi-

nating various information in order to influence and transform
public opinion in favor of a certain ideology, cause, or position.
Propaganda spreads through various media, with the help of
rumors and other types of communication. Propaganda often
provides information selectively (though not completely true
because it is also a lie) to induce certain generalizations, or uses
emotionally charged messages to provoke an emotional rather
than rational reactions to the information provided.
psychological warfare — the psychological impact on the

forces of the enemy and the population in order to demoralize
them, change their course of thought, emotional state, system of
values. May be conducted during the preparation for and/or in
the course of military operations.
285
Євген МАГДА
ГІБРИДНА АГРЕСІЯ РОСІЇ:
УРОКИ ДЛЯ СВІТУ
Англійською мовою
Головний редактор Надія Фіголь
Переклад Ірен Забитко
Обкладинка Грасі Олійко
Фотографії Олександра Ратушняка
Дизайн, верстка Андрія Терехова
Підписано до друку 19.01.2018.

Формат 70х100/16. Папір BOOK Creame.
Ум. друк. арк. - 26,3. Друк офсетний. Гарнітура Minion Pro
Видавництво ТОВ “КАЛАМАР”

03150, м. Київ, вул. Боженка, 83/53.
е-mail: info@kalamar.ua
(Свідоцтво про реєстрацію:
Серія ДК, № 4939 від 14.07.2015 р.)
www.kalamar.ua
Надруковано у друкарні “Майстер книг”

Україна, м. Київ, вул. Максима Кривоноса 2Б.
Свідоцтво про реєстрацію ДК №3861 від 18.08.2010 р.
тел./факс: (044) 458 09 35; е-mail: info@masterknyg.com.ua
www.masterknyg.com.ua

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Yevhen MAHDA

Translated from the Ukrainian by Irene Zabytko

Автор / Author • Євген Магда / Yevhen Mahda

Photos were taken at the anti-terrorist war operations in Donbas.

of confrontation between the two largest countries of the for-

For almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

The European Union, and to a lesser extent the United States,

unlimited markets. For a while it seemed that they understood

sovereignty. Yanukovych’s part of the blame for Ukraine’s lack of

The current aggression in Europe bears little resemblance to

Although bursting shells and exploding mines occurred in

set-up a much more serious problem. Vladimir Putin seeks to

Russian TV channels covered a significant part of Ukrainian

nation-building elements. Actually, the Euromaidan events 9 were

The Kremlin unceremoniously flirted with politicians from

Approaches to the modern essence of war. Options for de-

and the Central Asian countries. 11 Similar methods were armed

officer of the White movement. 12 The strategy has since gained

Principles of “war without rules.” How hybrids became

Unfortunately, this is not an exaggeration. For inhabitants

An analysis of the main military components of modern war-

forms and processes which are stronger and have a superior

We shall return to information warfare in the following sec-

his many publications made him a key expert in this matter.

The case of Ukraine changed everything. The interest in the

conflicts that include combinations of partisan and civil wars,

Therefore, for Western politicians, media representatives, and

A hybrid threat will involve the use of various combinations

Hybrid aggression is a kind of transformer and similar to a

most specious, pseudo-scientific motives. If we analyze the

By analyzing the performance of Vladimir Putin, Western an-

The intensity of the use of RF hybrid vehicles and methods

Chief of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces General Staff

response. This is complemented by hidden military means, in-

point of view. According to journalist Alexander Dugin, 33 and

Using unbound hybrid aggression, Vladimir Putin conducts

The objective evidence of this thesis therefore finds an in-

the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of the Ukrainian economy has

The collision of the largest state in the world with one of

The Russian leadership has preferred to forget that it was the

is trying to recreate a bipolar world, which is also to create

development of Ukraine, the Russian suggestion is filled with

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for that Caucasian republic. Both

The indecisive hesitancy of the Ukrainian political leadership

The Russian leadership after the Euromaidan decided not

“Macedonians”) resulted in a rapid loss of control over Ukraine’s

Evolution and features of a hybrid confrontation. Causes of dis-

expelled from the habitable lands. The Athenians approached

This Horde tactic was later adopted by the Russian Federation

The revolutionary spirit of France’s National Army in the late

England and the Duke of Wellington made every effort to guar-

formations of irregular forces. Generous funding by the Russian

it undermines the morale of the enemy and creates favorable

with non-Polish populations. But popular uprisings did not

be protected by the Workers and Peasants Red Army, which is

for military action disguised as a “struggle of the people with a

Contrary to popular belief, the guerrilla war supporters of Ho

effect was achieved: the prestige of the US Army collapsed in the

participation of US troops was turned back onto the United States

modern weapons in connection with the tactics of dispersal, for

1999–2009 led to the soldiers who were without a state, and so

Reasons behind Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine.

in 1997. The “cassette scandal” of 2000, 70 and the subsequent re-