Persons and Family Relations Law - Midterm - Mama Gie Notes

PFR MIDTERM REVIEWER • If the law provides that it shall take effect immediately, it
means that it shall take effect immediately after

publication (dispensing the 15-day period)
ARTICLE 1 - THIS ACT SHALL BE KNOWN AS THE CIVIL CODE OF THE o Official gazette: the public journal & main publication of the
PHILIPPINES government of the Philippines.
• 1947 Roxas Code Commission started via EO 48 signed on March 20, 1947. o Newspaper in general circulation: newspaper published for the
Commission started working on May 8, 1947 & finished December 15, 1947 dissemination of news & one that is issued daily & sold for a fixed
• Signed on January 26, 1949 rate
• Took effect on August 30, 1950 • "unless otherwise provided" - the law may contain an exact for when it
• Prepared by the Roxas Code Commission. Members: becomes effective (date must be expressly provided), upon lapse of the said
o Dr. Jorge C. Bocobo (Chairman) period following its complete publication & not before
o Judge Guillermo B. Guevarra o Only applicable to date of effectivity & not to the requirement of
o Dean Pedro Y. Ylagan publication
o Francisco Capistrano • Application to EO's & Admin. Orders
o Arturo Tolentino (But was replaced by Dr. Carmelino Alvendia o Must conform to standards of the law
because former had to step down due to his election as a o If conflict exists with basic law, basic law prevails
congressman) • Examples of what should be published
o Presidential decrees & executive orders - promulgated by the
ARTICLE 2 - LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AFTER 15 DAYS FOLLOWING THE president in exercise of legislative powers
o Administrative rules & regulations - if their purpose is to enforce
COMPLETION OF THEIR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN
or implement a new law
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED.
o City charter
THIS CODE SHALL TAKE EFFECT 1 YEAR AFTER PUBLICATION
• Statutes that need not be published
• Importance of knowing effectivity dates & publishing
o Interpretive Regulations & those merely internal in nature. (Those
o Knowing when the law takes effect/is applicable
that only regulate personnel of the administrative agency)
o To be able to give clients sound advice based on the prevailing law
o Letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors
at the time of the offense/incident
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
• EO 200 - Put forth the requirement of the publication for effectivity
in the performance of their duties
o Section 1 - law shall take effect after 15 days following the
o Municipal ordinances
completion of their publication…unless otherwise provided
• Importance of publication
o NOTE: depending on the language used in the law:
o intended to enable the people to become familiar with the statute
• When the law does not provide its effectivity date, it will
o no one should be charged with notice of the statute’s provision until
take effect after 15 days of its publication
the said publication is completed & the 15-day period has expired
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS: MIDTERM REVIEWER | SBCA-SOL | AY 2021-2022 | 1ST SEMESTER | COMBINATION OF PERSONAL NOTES & COLLATED REVIEWERS | ATTY. ELIZA YAMAMOTO-SANTOS -1-
ARTICLE 3: IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE FROM ARTICLE 5: ACTS EXECUTED AGAINST THE PROVISIONS OF MANDATORY
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH OR PROHIBITORY LAWS SHALL BE VOID, EXCEPT WHEN THE LAW ITSELF
• Civil code provides that a mistake on doubtful or difficult question of law AUTHORIZES THEIR VALIDITY
may be the basis of good faith - Concept of Mitigation of Liability • General Rule: acts contrary to mandatory or prohibitory laws are void
• Conclusive presumption - can't be overcome by any additional evidence or • Exceptions:
argument o The law makes the act valid but punishes the violator
• Constructive notice - signifies that a person or entity should have known, as o Law itself authorizes its validity
a reasonable person would have, of a legal action o Law makes the act only voidable
• Applies to Mandatory & Prohibitive law o Law declares the nullity of the act but recognizes its effects as
• Ignorantia juris non excusat legally existing
• Mandatory law - one the omission of which renders the proceeding or acts
ARTICLE 4: LAWS SHALL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT, UNLESS THE to which it relates generally illegal or void
CONTRARY IS PROVIDED o Kinds of mandatory legislation
• General Rule: no retroactive effect unless contrary is provided • Positive - when something must be done
• Exceptions: • Negative/Prohibitory - when something should not be done
o Unless the law expressly provides for retroactivity (should not • Prohibitory law - those which contain positive prohibitions & are couched
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights) in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done
o When the law is Curative or Remedial (curative = cure defects in a otherwise than designated.
prior law | remedial - provides for the protection of a right)
o When the law is Procedural (statute deals with procedure only, ARTICLE 6: RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED, UNLESS THE WAIVER IS CONTRARY
applies to all actions) TO LAW, PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC POLICY, MORALS OR GOOD CUSTOMS,
o Interpretative Statutes OR PREJUDICIAL TO A THIRD PERSON WITH A RIGHT RECOGNIZED BY
o Emergency Laws LAW.
o Laws creating new rights • Waiver - intentional relinquishment of a known right, but must be clearly &
o Tax laws - when expressly declared or is clearly the legislative convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other
intent reasonable explanation
o When the law is penal in nature - favorable to the accused & not a o Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver & cannot be established
habitual delinquent by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact
• Ex Post Facto Law - criminal statute that punishes actions retroactively • Requisites for a valid waiver
o Characteristics o It must exist at the time of waiver
• Criminal matters o Person must have the capacity to make the waiver
• Retroactive in application o Waiver must be clearly shown
• Works to the prejudice of the accused o Person waiving must have the right which he is waiving
o In certain instances, the waiver must comply with formalities • Repeal - legislative act of (abrogating = pinapalitan), through a subsequent
o Must not be contrary to law, public order or policy, morals or good law, the effects of a previous statute or portions thereof
customs • Express Repeal - literally declared/stated
o Must not prejudice others with a right o When a law which expressly repealed a prior law is itself repealed,
• Example of what can be renounced - right of accused to be helped by counsel the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly
• Examples of what cannot be renounced - natural rights, rights that do not provided = basically previous law not revived unless expressed
exist, right to be heard in court, agreement to receive less compensation than • Implied Repeal - when a new law contains provisions contrary to or inconsistent
the worker is entitled to under the law, right to vote with those of a former without expressly repealing them
• Public policy - a system of courses of action, regulatory measures, laws, & o When a law which repeals a prior law impliedly is itself repealed,
funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a government the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
entity or its representatives language of the repealing statute provides otherwise
• Public order - actions that conform to society's general ideas of normal • Doctrine of Operative Fact - acts pursuant to a law which was subsequently
social behavior & moral values declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after
• Doctrine of Election of Remedies - designed to mitigate possible unfairness the declaration of unconstitutionality
to both parties; prevent double redress for a single wrong • Note: laws may lapse, meaning to say that it ends by itself in view of the
o When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election expiration of the period during which it was supposed to be effective
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final & bars any • Partially Unconstitutional Statutes - the remainder of the statute that is
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in considered valid & constitutional will be upheld
the absence of fraud by the other party o Judicial decision needed to declare unconstitutional
• Waiver by election - choice of a party between inconsistent remedies • Rules, Regulations, Administrative, & Executive Acts - when promulgated
in pursuance of the procedure/authority given upon the agency by law, take
ARTICLE 7: LAWS ARE REPEALED ONLY BY SUBSEQUENT ONES, & THEIR on the nature of a sanction provided by law
VIOLATION OR NON-OBSERVANCE SHALL NOT BE EXCUSED BY DISUSE, o If any of these are violative of the law/constitution, they are deemed
OR CUSTOM OR PRACTICE TO THE CONTRARY. invalid
• If articles are mutually dependent, if one gets declared unconstitutional, both
WHEN THE COURTS DECLARED A LAW TO BE INCOSISTENT WITH THE get stricken off
CONSTITUTION, THE FORMER SHALL BE VOID & THE LATTER SHALL
ARTICLE 8: JUDICIAL DECISIONS APPLYING OR INTERPRETING THE LAWS
GOVERN.
OR THE CONSTITUTION SHALL FORM A PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
ADMINISTRATIVE OR EXECUTIVE ACTS, ORDERS & REGULATIONS SHALL
THE PHILIPPINES
BE VALID ONLY WHEN THEY ARE NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OR THE
• Judicial decisions form part of the legal system but are not laws, but has
CONSTITUTION.
force of the law
• Constitution - supreme, organic, & fundamental law of the land
o They become part of the law upon application & interpretation by
the Supreme Court
o Exception - when a doctrine of the Court is overruled & a o The first duty of the judge is to apply the law provided that the law
new/different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied is clear & there is no doubt
prospectively • Construction & interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
• Supreme Court as final arbiter application is impossible or inadequate without them
• Doctrine of Res Judicata - conclusion reached in one case should be applied
to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same ARTICLE 11 - CUSTOMS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, PUBLIC ORDER
o Stare decisis, et non quieta movere OR PUBLIC POLICY SHALL NOT BE COUNTENANCED
• Doctrine of Stare Decisis - once matter is settled, case is closed • Countenance = admit as acceptable or possible
• Orbiter dicta - opinions not necessary to the determination of a case; they • Custom - rule of human action (conduct) established by repeated acts &
are not binding & can’t have the force of judicial precedents uniformly observed/practiced.
• Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet - interpretation placed upon the written • A custom is unwritten, spontaneous, & comes from society
law by a competent court has the force of law
• Duty of the court - courts have the principal function of not only resolving ARTICLE 12 - CUSTOM MUST BE PROVED AS A FACT, ACCORDING TO THE
legal controversies, butalso of interpreting & construing vague provisions RULES OF EVIDENCE
of law relative to a particular dispute • Must be proven as fact & the courts are not to take judicial notice thereof
• Supreme court - their decisions are considered authoritative & precedent- o Local custom must be properly established by competent evidence
setting • Custom automatically accepted in law - Muslim marriages
• RTC, MTC, & other inferior courts - decisions are merely persuasive • Elements
o Rule of conduct
ARTICLE 9: NO JUDGE OR COURT SHALL DECLINE TO RENDER JUDGMENT o Formed by repetition of acts
BY REASON OF THE SILENCE, OBSCURITY, OR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE o Uniformly observed or practiced as a social rule
LAWS. o Legally binding & obligatory
• Duty of judges - judges are tasked with dispensing justice in accordance • Custom propter legem or contra legem - in accordance with or against the
with the constitutional precept that no person shall be deprived of life, law
liberty, & property without due process
• Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege - if somebody is accused of a non- ARTICLE 13 - WHEN THE LAWS SPEAK OF YEARS, MONTHS, DAYS OR
existent crime, the judge must dismiss the case NIGHTS, IT SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD THAT YEARS ARE OF THREE HUNDRED
• Judges are liable if they fail or refuse to render a decision SIXTY-FIVE DAYS EACH; MONTHS, OF THIRTY DAYS; DAYS, OF TWENTY-
FOUR HOURS; & NIGHTS FROM SUNSET TO SUNRISE.
ARTICLE 10: IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION
OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT IF MONTHS ARE DESIGNATED BY THEIR NAME, THEY SHALL BE COMPUTED
& JUSTICE TO PREVAIL. BY THE NUMBER OF DAYS WHICH THEY RESPECTIVELY HAVE.
• Dura lex sed lex - the law may be harsh but it is still the law
IN COMPUTING A PERIOD, THE FIRST DAY SHALL BE EXCLUDED, & THE o When the Philippine Government has waived its criminal
LAST DAY INCLUDED. jurisdiction over the foreigners based on the principles of
• Impliedly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), Section international law & treaties
31 o When foreigners are within the territory of their Embassies
o Year - 12 calendar months considered as foreign soil
• But if a contract or other says "x months", it will become o Parliamentary Immunity
number of months X 30 days o Article 2 of the Revised penal code
o Calendar month - month designated in the calendar without regard • Application of its provisions - except as provided in the
to the number of days it may contain treaties & laws of preferential application, the provisions
o *Implied repeals are not favored shall be not only within the Philippine archipelago, but
o Week can be of two ways also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
• Ordinary week = 7 days o Should commit an offense while on a Philippine
• Week of labor = 6 days, in the absence pf an express ship or airship
agreement to the contrary (Lee Tay & Lee Chay, Inc. v. o Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency
Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa, L-7791, Apr. 19, 1955) note of the Philippines or obligations & securities
• Definition of DAY when filing pleadings - even if after hours, still properly issued by the Government of the Philippines
filed o Should be liable for acts connected with the
• Computing a period/day of performance - the first day shall be excluded & introduction into these islands of the obligations
the last day included & securities mentioned prior
• Day - 24hrs o While being public officers or employees, should
• Night - sunset to sunrise commit an offense in the exercise of their
• If obligation deadline falls on a holiday, the deadline is moved to the next functions
business day o Should commit any of the crimes against national
security & the law of nations, defined in title one
ARTICLE 14 - PENAL LAWS & THOSE OF PUBLIC SECURITY & SAFETY SHALL of book two of this code
BE OBLIGATORY UPON ALL WHO LIVE OR SOJOURN IN THE PHILIPPINE • Territoriality principle. - criminal law applies to the territory of the
TERRITORY, SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW Philippines & to all people in the Philippines
& TO TREATY STIPULATIONS • Principle of Reciprocity - permitting the application of the legal effects of
specific relationships in law when these same effects are accepted equally
• General Rule - citizens & foreigners are subject to all penal laws imposed
by foreign countries
by the Philippines as well as all laws enacted for the maintenance of public
security & safety
• Exceptions
ARTICLE 15 - LAWS RELATING TO FAMILY RIGHTS & DUTIES, OR TO THE • General Rule - real property, as well as personal property, shall be governed
STATUS, CONDITION & LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS ARE BINDING by the law of the place where these are situated
UPON CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVEN THOUGH LIVING ABROAD • Exceptions: Successional rights (the law of the person where he has
• Lex Nationalii - citizenship is the basis for determining the personal law nationality in governs)
applicable o Order of succession
• Exception o Amount of successional rights
o Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code: o Intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen & a foreigner is validly o Capacity to succeed
celebrated & a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the • Renvoi Doctrine - when a court is faced with a conflict of law & must
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse consider the law of another state, referred to as private international law
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. rules. This can apply when considering foreign issues arising in succession
• Status - more or less permanent in nature & not ordinarily terminable at planning & in administering estates
his/her own will o Local laws will apply if foreign law refers back to the local laws
• Capacity to enter into an ordinary contract is governed by the national law o When doubt arises as to whether a reference in our law to a foreign
of the person & not the law of the place where the contract was entered into law is a reference to:
o However, capacity to enter into other relations or contracts is not • The internal of said foreign land
necessarily governed by the national law of the person concerned • The whole of the foreign law including its conflicts of rules
• Principle of Processual Presumption - The foreign law, whenever • Possibility arises of referring back to the law of the first
applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law state
shall be presumed to be the same as the law of the forum.
ARTICLE 17 - THE FORMS & SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS, & OTHER
ARTICLE 16 - REAL PROPERTY AS WELL AS PERSONAL PROPERTY IS PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE IT IS SITUATED. COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE EXECUTED.
HOWEVER, INTESTATE & TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSIONS, BOTH WITH WHEN THE ACTS REFERRED TO ARE EXECUTED BEFORE THE DIPLOMATIC
RESPECT TO THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION & TO THE AMOUNT OF OR CONSULAR OFFICIALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IN A
SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS & TO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY FOREIGN COUNTRY, THE SOLEMNITIES ESTABLISHED BY PHILIPPINE LAWS
PROVISIONS, SHALL BE REGULATED BY THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE SHALL BE OBSERVED IN THEIR EXECTUTION.
PERSON WHOSE SUCCESSION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, WHATEVER
MAY BE THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY & REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY PROHIBITIVE LAWS CONCERNING PERSONS, THEIR ACTS OR PROPERTY,
WHEREIN SAID PROPERTY MAY BE FOUND. & THOSE WHICH HAVE, FOR THEIR OBJECT, PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC
• Lex rei sitae - law of the place where the property is situated is the basis for POLICY, & GOOD CUSTOMS SHALL NOT BE RENDERED INEFFECTIVE BY
determining the applicable law
LAWS OR JUDGMENTS PROMULGATED, OR BY DETERMINATIONS OR o Give everyone his due
CONVENTIONS AGREED UPON IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY o Observe honesty & good faith
• Lex loci celebracionis - law of the land where the marriage was entered into • Elements of an abuse of right:
o Applicable in so far as the extrinsic validity (forms & solemnities) o There is a legal right or duty
is concerned o Exercised in bad faith
• Extrinsic Validity - law provides clearly that the forms & solemnities of o For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
public instruments, wills, & contacts shall be governed by the laws of the • Good faith - refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of
country where they are executed the individual concerned
• Acts before diplomatic & consular officials - any act or contract made in a o consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
foreign country before diplomatic & consular officials must conform with & unscrupulous advantage of another.
the solemnities under the PH law • Bad faith - may mean a dishonest belief or purpose, untrustworthy
• Prohibitive law - shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgements in performance of duties, neglect of fair dealing standards, or a fraudulent
a foreign country intent
• Venues vs Jurisdiction
o Parties can exclusively agree on a venue, should there be a dispute ARTICLE 20 - EVERY PERSON WHO, CONTRARY TO LAW, WILFULLY OR
they can agree on where to file NEGLIGENTLY CAUSES DAMAGE TO ANOTHER, SHALL INDEMNIFY THE
o Jurisdiction is dictated by law LATTER FOR THE SAME.
• Indemnify = compensate
ARTICLE 18 - IN MATTERS WHICH ARE GOVERNED BY THE CODE OF • Punish illegal acts whether done willfully or negligently
COMMERCE & SPECIAL LAWS, THEIR DEFICIENCY SHALL BE SUPPLIED BY • Negligence - failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE. person that degree of care, precaution, & vigilance which the circumstances
• Suppletory = supplementary greatly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury
• This is unless otherwise provided
• The civil code is superior when expressly declared to be so ARTICLE 21 - ANY PERSON WHO WILFULLY CAUSES LOSS OR INJURY TO
• General is that the special law governs cases of conflict ANOTHER IN A MANNER THAT IS CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD
CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY SHALL COMPENSATE THE LATTER FOR THE
ARTICLE 19 - EVERY PERSON MUST, IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHTS & IN DAMAGE.
THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES, ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE • Acts contra bonus mores - acts that are against good morals; any act
HIS DUE, & OBSERVE HONESTY & GOOD FAITH. evincing bad faith or intent to injure
• Principle of abuse of rights - a person should not use his right unjustly or • Elements:
contrary to honesty & good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability o There is an act which is legal
• Standards: o But is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, public policy
o Act with justice o It is done with intent to injure
• Intended to expand the concept of torts: granting legal remedy for the untold ARTICLE 23 - EVEN WHEN AN ACT OR EVENT CAUSING DAMAGE TO
number of moral wrong which is impossible for human foresight to ANOTHER'S PROPERTY WAS NOT DUE TO THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF
specifically provide in the statutes THE DEFENDANT, THE LATTER SHALL BE LIABLE FOR INDEMNITY If
• Torts - wrongful act or an infringement of a right (other than under contract) THROUGH THE ACT OR EVENT HE WAS BENEFITED.
leading to civil legal liability • Unless there is a duty to indemnify, unjust enrichment will occur
• Breach of promise to marry
o Generally, not actionable
ARTICLE 24 - IN ALL CONTRACTUAL, PROPERTY OR OTHER RELATIONS,
o Except is used to defraud, has costs incurred, using promise to
WHEN ONE OF THE PARTIES IS AT A DISADVANTAGE ON ACCOUNT OF
marry to gain carnal knowledge
HIS MORAL DEPENDENCE, IGNORANCE, INDIGENCE, MENTAL
WEAKNESS, TENDER AGE OR OTHER HANDICAP, THE COURTS MUST BE
ARTICLE 22 - EVERY PERSON WHO THROUGH AN ACT OF PERFORMANCE
VIGILANT FOR HIS PROTECTION.
BY ANOTHER, OR ANY OTHER MEANS, ACQUIRES OR COMES INTO
• Unfair competition
POSSESSION OF SOMETHING AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LATTER WITHOUT
• The law takes great interest in the welfare of the weak & handicapped hence
JUST OR LEGAL GROUND, SHALL RETURN THE SAME TO HIM.
we have parens patriae
• Unjust enrichment - no person can claim what is not validly & legally theirs;
• Parens patriae – father or parent of his country – the power of the state in
should not unduly profit
safeguarding the rights of person under disability, such as the insane & the
• Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest - basic doctrine of unjust incompetent
enrichment means that a person shall not be allowed to profi t or enrich
• Vigilant for his protection – that in case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
himself inequitably at another’s expense
in favor of the underdog
• Accion in Rem Verso
• A confession obtained thru coercion, whether physical, mental, or emotional
o considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is
is inadmissible. What is essential for a confession’s validity is that it
no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, & quasi-delict
proceeds from the free will of the person confessing.
o Essential requisites
• The law in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorized neither oppression
• that the defendant has been enriched nor self-destruction of the employer
• that the plaintiff has suffered a loss
• Disadvantages
• that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal o Moral dependence
ground o Ignorance
• that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, o Indigence
quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict o Mental Weakness
• Solutio Indebiti - if you receive something by mistake, you are supposed to o Tender age
give it back o Other Handicap
• Negotiorum gestio - voluntary gesture; out of the goodness of your heart
ARTICLE 25 - THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE IN EXPENSES FOR PLEASURE o EXCEPT: as is needed for publication of information & pictures of
OR DISPLAY DURING A PERIOD OF ACUTE PUBLIC WANT OR EMERGENCY legitimate news value
MAY BE STOPPED BY ORDER OF THE COURTS AT THE INSTANCE OF ANY • Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another
GOVERNMENT OR PRIVATE CHARITABLE INSTITUTION. o Includes alienation of the affections of the husband or the wife
• Respect for the personality & dignity of others o Intriguing against another’s honor (gossiping) also included
o Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends
• Thoughtless extravagance during emergencies may incite the passions of
those who cannot afford to spend • Includes: gossiping & reliance on hearsay
• ONLY a charitable institution whether government or private may bring the • Vexing or humiliating
action o Includes criticism of one’s health or features without justifiable
cause
ARTICLE 26 - EVERY PERSON SHALL RESPECT THE DIGNITY, PERSONALITY, • Can be invoked for protective order
PRIVACY & PEACE OF MIND OF HIS NEIGHBORS & OTHER PERSONS. THE
ARTICLE 27 - ANY PERSON SUFFERING MATERIAL OR MORAL LOSS
FOLLOWING & SIMILAR ACTS, THOUGH THEY MAY NOT CONSTITUTE A
BECAUSE A PUBLIC SERVANT OR EMPLOYEE REFUSES OR NEGLECTS,
CRIMINAL OFFENSE, SHALL PRODUCE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, TO PERFORM HIS OFFICIAL DUTY MAY FILE AN
DAMAGES, PREVENTION & OTHER RELIEF:
ACTION FOR DAMAGES & OTHER RELIEF AGAINST HE LATTER, WITHOUT
1. PRYING INTO THE PRIVACY OF ANOTHER'S RESIDENCE;
PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION THAT MAY
2. MEDDLING WITH OR DISTURBING THE PRIVATE LIFE OR FAMILY
BE TAKEN.
RELATIONS OF ANOTHER;
• Relief against public officials
3. INTRIGUING TO CAUSE ANOTHER TO BE ALIENATED FROM HIS
• purpose is to end the bribery system when the public official for some flimsy
FRIENDS;
excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some kind
4. VEXING OR HUMILIATING ANOTHER ON ACCOUNT OF HIS of “pabagsak”
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, LOWLY STATION IN LIFE, PLACE OF BIRTH, • To be convicted of Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 (“Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice
PHYSICAL DEFECT, OR OTHER PERSONAL CONDITION. Act”)
o The offender is a public officer
• Respect for the personality & dignity of others o Who requested or received a “gift,” a present, a share, a percentage,
• Enhances human dignity & personality. Social equality is not sought but due or a benefit
regard for decency & propriety o On behalf of the offender of any other person
• Remedies: o In connection with a contract or transaction with the government
o Action for damages o In which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law,
o Action for prevention has the right to intervene.
o Any other relief
• Prying into the privacy of another’s residence
o Includes respect for another’s name, picture, or personality
ARTICLE 28 - UNFAIR COMPETITION IN AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL TEXT OF THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT THE ACQUITTAL IS DUE TO THAT
OR INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES OR IN LABOR THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE, GROUND.
INTIMIDATION, DECEIT, MACHINATION OR ANY OTHER UNJUST, • An acquittal on the ground that the guilt of the defendant has not been
OPPRESSIVE OR HIGHHANDED METHOD SHALL GIVE RISE TO A RIGHT OF satisfactorily established is equivalent to one on reasonable doubt & does
ACTION BY THE PERSON WHO THEREBY SUFFERS DAMAGE. not preclude or prevent a civil suit under Art 29
• Necessary in a system of free enterprise • Criminal liability is harder to prove – beyond reasonable doubt compared to
• Competition is good for the economy, but the competition must be within mere preponderance of evidence
the bounds of law • If in a criminal case, the accused is acquitted because the fact from which
• Conglomerates are not allowed to prevent connivance to monopolize any civil liability could arise did not exist, a case subsequently brought must
industries be dismissed
• Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, & industrial enterprises & • Proof beyond reasonable doubt - amount of proof which forms an abiding
labor. moral certainty that the accused committed the crime charged. It is not,
• Examples of acts not allowed: therefore, absolute certainty.
o A strike prematurely declared • Preponderance of evidence - as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
o A strike for trivial, unjust, or unreasonable cause outweighs that of the adverse party
o A strike carried out thru force, intimidation, or other unlawful • Substantial evidence - needed for labor & administrative cases; evidence
means that a reasonable mind can accept as proof of one's guilt or innocence
o The making of goods to deceive purchasers • Criminal Action takes precedence
o Selling goods above the maximum prices set by the state o General rule - civil action/case that was filed in congruence will be
instituted along with the criminal action
ARTICLE 29 - WHEN THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS • If degree of evidence in criminal case is not enough, they can still do civil
ACQUITTED ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVED action unless its an impossible crime or the person accused is not the one
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE who did it or there is mistake in identity
SAME ACT OR OMISSION MAY BE INSTITUTED. SUCH ACTION REQUIRES
ARTICLE 30 - WHEN A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IS BROUGHT TO DEMAND
ONLY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. UPON MOTION OF THE
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSE, & NO CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT, THE COURT MAY REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A BOND TO
PROCEEDINGS ARE INSTITUTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL
ANSWER FOR DAMAGES IN CASE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE FOUND
CASE, A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SHALL LIKEWISE BE SUFFICIENT
TO BE MALICIOUS.
TO PROVE THE ACT COMPLAINED OF.
• Does not speak of an independent civil action
IF IN A CRIMINAL CASE THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS BASED UPON
• Burden of proof:
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT SHALL SO DECLARE. IN THE ABSENCE o Preponderance of Evidence
OF ANY DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT, IT MAY BE INFERRED FROM THE o Clear & convincing evidence
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS: MIDTERM REVIEWER | SBCA-SOL | AY 2021-2022 | 1ST SEMESTER | COMBINATION OF PERSONAL NOTES & COLLATED REVIEWERS | ATTY. ELIZA YAMAMOTO-SANTOS - 10 -
o Substantial evidence o Art 31 contemplates a case where the obligation does not arise from
o Proof beyond reasonable doubt a crime but from some other act
• Article 31 likewise applies to culpa contractual.
ARTICLE 31 - WHEN THE CIVIL ACTION IS BASED ON AN OBLIGATION NOT o Culpa contractual - Negligence incident to the performance of a
ARISING FROM THE ACT OR OMISSION COMPLAINED OF AS A FELONY, contractual obligation
SUCH CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS & REGARDLESS OF THE RESULT OF THE LATTER. ARTICLE 32 - ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR ANY PRIVATE
• certain injuries which do not necessarily arise from the commission of a INDIVIDUAL, WHO DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY OBSTRUCTS, DEFEATS,
crime. VIOLATES OR IN ANY MANNER IMPEDES OR IMPAIRS ANY OF THE
• Article 31 seeks to give an aggrieved party a remedy & a cause of action in FOLLOWING RIGHTS & LIBERTIES OF ANOTHER PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE
this kind of situations. TO THE LATTER FOR DAMAGES:
• An example of this is quasi-delict 1. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
o Quasi-delict 2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
• Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, 3. FREEDOM TO WRITE FOR THE PRESS OR TO MAINTAIN A
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the PERIODICAL PUBLICATION
damage done
4. FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY OR ILLEGAL DETENTION
• Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
5. FREEDOM OF SUFFRAGE
contractual relation between the parties & is governed by
6. THE RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
the provisions of this Article.
PROCESS OF LAW
• Art. 31 does NOT provide for an independent civil action
o Independent civil action - one that is brought distinctly & separately 7. THE RIGHT TO A JUST COMPENSATION WHEN PRIVATE PROPERTY
from a criminal case, allowed for considerations of public policy IS TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE
because the proof needed for civil cases is less than that required 8. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
for criminal cases 9. THE RIGHT BE SECURE IN ONE'S PERSON, HOUSE, PAPERS, &
• Instances where the law grants an independent civil action: EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES & SEIZURES
o Art. 32 – breach of constitutional & other rights 10. THE LIBERTY OF ABODE & OF CHANGING THE SAME
o Art. 33 – defamation, fraud, physical injuries 11. THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION & CORRESPONDENCE
o Art. 34 – refusal or failure of city or municipal police to give 12. THE RIGHT TO BECOME A MEMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OR
protection SOCIETIES FOR PURPOSES NOT CONTRARY TO LAW
o Art. 2177 – quasi-delict or Culpa Aquiliana 13. THE RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN A PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY TO PETITION
• Culpa Aquiliana - negligence considered as an THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
independent source of liability in the absence of special 14. THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE IN ANY
relation
FORM
15. THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST EXCESSIVE BAIL • Two kinds of duties exercised by public officers
16. THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE HEARD BY THE HIMSELF & o Duties to the public
COUNSEL, TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE & CAUSE OF THE • officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM, TO HAVE A SPEEDY & PUBLIC TRIAL, collectively - to the body politic - & not to any particular
TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, & TO HAVE individual, who act for the public at large, & who are
ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.
COMPUSLORY PROCESS TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF
o Duties to individuals
WITNESS IN HIS BEHALF
• By reason of their employment by a particular individual
17. FREEDOM FROM BEING COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST
to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a
ONE'S SELF, OR FROM BEING FRCED TO CONFESS GUILT, OR
special & particular obligation to him as an individual
FROM BEING INDUCED BY A PROMISE OF IMMUNITY OR REWARD
• Serve individuals chiefly & usually receive their
TO MAKE SUCH CONFESSION, EXCEPT WHEN THE PERSON compensation from fees paid by each individual who
CONFESSING BECOMES A STATE WITNESS employs them
18. FREEDOM FROM EXCESSIVE FINES, OR CRUEL OR UNUSUAL • In determining whether a public officer is liable for an
PUNISHMENT, UNLESS THE SAME IS IMPOSED OT INFLICTED IN improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it
ACCORDANCE WITH A STATUTE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN must first be determined which of the two classes of duties
JUDICIALLY DECALRED UNCONSTITUTIONAL is involved
19. FREEDOM OF ACCESSS TO THE COURTS • Separate civil action for violation of constitutional rights
o The 1947 Code Commission found it imperative that a separate
IN ANY OF THE CASES REFERRED TO IN THIS ARTICLE, WHETHER OR NOT civil action is necessary for the violation of the individual’s
THE DEFENDANT'S ACT OR OMISSION CONSTITUTES A CRIMINAL constitutional rights
OFFENSE, THE AGGRIEVED PARTY HAS A RIGHT TO COMMENCE AN • Good faith is not a defense
• To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, it is enough that there
ENTIRELY SEPARATE & DISTINCT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, & FOR
was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs & it is not
OTHER RELIEF. SUCH CIVIL ACTION SHALL PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF
required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
ANY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (IF THE LATTER BE INSTITUTED), & MAY BE
PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
ARTICLE 33 - IN CASES OF DEFAMATION, FRAUD, & PHYSICAL INJURIES
THE INDEMNITY SHALL INCLUDE MORAL DAMAGES. EXEMPLARY
A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, ENTIRELY SEPARATE & DISTINCT FROM
DAMAGES MAY ALSO BE ADJUDICATED.
THE CRIMINAL ACTION, MAY BE BROUGHT BY THE INJURED PARTY. SUCH
CIVIL ACTION SHALL PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL
THE RESPONSIBILITY HEREIN SET FORTH IS NOT DEMANDABLE FROM A
PROSECUTION & SHALL REQUIRE ONLY A PREPONDERANCE OF
JUDGE UNLESS HIS ACT OR OMISSION CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE
EVIDENCE.
PENAL CODE OR OTHER PENAL STATUTE.
• Separate civil case during criminal proceedings
o Defamation • City/Municipal police force
o Fraud o duty of police officers to see to it that peace & order are maintained
o Physical injuries (including attempted, frustrated, consummated in the community.
homicide if there is any kind of physical injuries) o should a citizen go to them to seek assistance, their failure or refusal
o Public officer fails to render aid to render the needed assistance to maintain lawful order can be a
o Prejudicial question basis for claiming damages against them
• New concept of tort o city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
o Malicious or intentional
o Negligence – culpa Aquiliana or quasi-delict ARTICLE 35 - WHEN A PERSON, CLAIMING TO BE INJURED BY A CRIMINAL
• Culpa Aquiliana - negligence considered as an OFFENSE, CHARGES ANOTHER WITH THE SAME, FOR WHICH NO
independent source of liability in the absence of special INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION IS GRANTED IN THIS CODE OR ANY SPECIAL
relation LAW, BUT THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FINDS NO REASONABLE GROUNDS
• Quasi-delict - Whoever by act or omission causes damage TO BELIEVE THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED, OR THE PROSECUTING
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to ATTORNEY REFUSES OR FAILS TO INSTITUTE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, THE
pay for the damage done
COMPLAINT MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE
• Art 33 is more for the benefit of the claimant or victim than anybody else
ALLEGED OFFENDER. SUCH CIVIL ACTION MAY BE SUPPORTED BY A
• Where the civil case is brought ahead – there is no doubt that the civil case
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. UPON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION, THE
will not be suspended
COURT MAY REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A BOND TO INDEMNIFY THE
ARTICLE 34 - WHEN A MEMBER OF A CITY OR MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCE DEFENDANT IN CASE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE FOUND TO BE
REFUSES OR FAILS TO RENDER AID OR PROTECTION TO ANY PERSON IN MALICIOUS. IF DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL ACTION, AN
CASE OF DANGER TO LIFE OR PROPERTY, SUCH PEACE OFFICER SHALL INFORMATION SHOULD BE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,
BE PRIMARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, & THE CITY OR MUNICIPALITY THE CIVIL ACTION SHALL BE SUSPENDED UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE
SHALL BE SUBSIDIARILY RESPONSIBLE THEREFOR. THE CIVIL ACTION CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
HEREIN RECOGNIZED SHALL BE INDEPENDENT OF ANY CRIMINAL • Applies to cases when there is no independent civil action (such as when the
liability sought to be recovered arises from a crime) & not to a tortious action
PROCEEDINGS, & A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SHALL SUFFICE TO
such as that provided for under Art 33.
SUPPORT SUCH ACTION
• Rule 111 of Rules of Court
• Primary liability – against the member of the police force who refuses of
fails to render aid or protection
• Subsidiary liability – the city or municipality concerned in case of
insolvency
o Insolvency - financial distress
• The article does not apply to the PNP or the National Government
ARTICLE 36 - PRE-JUDICIAL QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE DECIDED BEFORE • Even if there is only one court before which the civil & criminal actions are
ANY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MAY BE INSTITUTED OR MAY PROCEED, to be litigated, the court when exercising jurisdiction over the civil actions,
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY RULES OF COURT WHICH THE SUPREME COURT is considered distinct & different from itself when trying the separate cases.
SHALL PROMULGATE & WHICH SHALL NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE • It is the defendant in a criminal case & NOT the prosecution who can raise
PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE. the issue of prejudicial questions
• Precedence • A petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the pending
o General Rule - where both a civil & a criminal case arising from prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence. prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation
o Exception - would be if there exist prejudicial questions which
should be resolved first before action could be taken in a criminal ARTICLE 37 - JURIDICAL CAPACITY, WHICH IS THE FITNESS TO BE THE
case & when the law provides that both civil & criminal case can SUBJECT OF LEGAL RELATIONS, IS INHERENT IN EVERY NATURAL PERSON
be instituted simultaneously such as that provided in Article 33 of & IS LOST ONLY THROUGH DEATH. CAPACITY TO ACT, WHICH IS THE
the Civil Code POWER TO DO ACTS WITH LEGAL EFFECT, IS ACQUIRED & MAY BE LOST
• Prejudicial question – one which must be decided first before a criminal • Juridical capacity – the fitness to be the subject of legal relations
action may be instituted or may proceed because a decision therein is vital o Passive
to the judgment in the criminal case o Inherent
• “Logical antecedent” of the issues of the case o acquired upon birth, Lost Only through death
• Requisites of a prejudicial question: o Can exist without capacity to act
o The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which • Capacity to act – the power to do acts with legal effect
the criminal prosecution would be based o Active
o In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil actions, the o Merely acquired
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined o Lost through death & may be restricted by other causes
o Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal o Exists always with juridical capacity
• Example of non-prejudicial question: • A person is presumed to have capacity to act
o The determination of a title of land in a cadastral case is not a • A 1-year-old boy has juridical capacity but has no capacity to act. When he
prejudicial question to a criminal case for falsification of a public becomes 18, he will have full civil capacity.
document filed against a notary public who allegedly falsified an
affidavit that had been presented as evidence in the cadastral ARTICLE 38 - MINORITY, INSANITY OR IMBECILITY, THE STATE OF BEING A
proceedings DEAF-MUTE, PRODIGALITY & CIVIL INTERDICTION ARE MERE
o A declaration of nullity based on the psychological incapacity in a RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT, & DO NOT EXEMPT THE
case for parricide INCAPACITATED PERSON FROM CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS, AS WHEN THE
• Not all previous questions are prejudicial, but all prejudicial are previous LATTER ARISE FROM HIS ACTS OR FROM PROPERTY RELATIONS, SUCH AS
EASEMENTS
• Restrictions on capacity to act A MARRIED WOMAN, TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE OR OVER, IS
o Minority – below 18 QUALIFIED FOR ALL ACTS OF CIVIL LIFE, EXCEPT IN CASES SPECIFIED BY
o Insanity or imbecility LAW.
• Insanity – In which a person’s mind is sick • Broader than Art. 38 – adds family relations & alienage & the like which
• Imbecility – feeble-mindedness or a condition in which a modify capacity to act.
person’s thinks like a small child • Family relations – the fact that a man is the father of a family creates an
o State of being a deaf-mute (may be sane or insane) obligation to give support to his family & to give his children their legitime
o Prodigality (the state of squandering money or property with a • Alienage – an alien cannot generally acquire private or public lands except
morbid desire to prejudice the heirs of a person) thru hereditary succession
o Civil interdiction (the deprivation by the court for a crime o 1``Even extends to alien corporations
punishable by imprisonment from 12 years & 1 day & more of a • Absence – the fact the one has been absent for several years & his
person’s right) whereabouts cannot be determined, subjects his property to administration
• To have parental or marital authority by order of the court although his capacity to act is not limited
• To be the guardian of the person & property of a ward
• To dispose of his property by an act inter vivos (ex. ARTICLE 40 - BIRTH DETERMINES PERSONALITY; BUT THE CONCEIVED
Donation) CHILD SHALL BE CONSIDERED BORN FOR ALL PURPOSES THAT ARE
• To manage his own property FAVORABLE TO IT, PROVIDED IT BE BORN LATER WITH THE CONDITIONS
• The restrictions in art 38 do not extinguish capacity to act, they merely
SPECIFIED IN THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE.
restrict or limit the same.
• Personality does not begin at birth, it begins at conception
• The incapacitated person is not exempt from certain obligations arising from
• Personality at conception is called presumptive personality
his acts (ex. If he commits a crime, his property may still be held liable)
• It is essential that birth should occur later – otherwise the fetus will be
considered as never having possessed legal personality
ARTICLE 39 - THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES, AMONG OTHERS,
• If the conditions specified in Art 41 are not complied with, the birth & death
MODIFY OR LIMIT CAPACITY TO ACT: AGE, INSANITY, IMBECILITY, THE of the child will not be recorded in the Civil Registry
STATE OF BEING A DEAFMUTE, PENALTY, PRODIGALITY, FAMILY • Conceived child
RELATIONS, ALIENAGE, ABSENCE, INSOLVENCY & TRUSTEESHIP. THE o Can received donations
CONSEQUENCES OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE GOVERNED IN THIS o Can receive support
CODE, OTHER CODES, THE RULES OF COURT, & IN SPECIAL LAWS. o Can inherit
CAPACITY TO ACT IS NOT LIMITED ON ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
OR POLITICAL OPINION. ARTICLE 41 - FOR CIVIL PURPOSES, THE FETUS IS CONSIDERED BORN IF IT
IS ALIVE AT THE TIME IT IS COMPLETELY DELIVERED FROM THE MOTHER'S
WOMB.
HOWEVER, IF THE FETUS HAD AN INTRA-UTERINE LIFE OF LESS THAN SEVEN ARTICLE 43 - IF THERE IS A DOUBT, AS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE PERSONS
MONTHS, IT IS NOT DEEMED BORN IF IT DIES WITHIN TWENTY- FOUR WHO ARE CALLED TO SUCCEED EACH OTHER, AS TO WHICH OF THEM
HOURS AFTER ITS COMPLETE DELIVERY FROM THE MATERNAL WOMB DIED FIRST, WHOEVER ALLEGES THE DEATH OF ONE PRIOR TO THE OTHER,
• Ordinary children – intra-uterine life of at least seven months (mere birth is SHALL PROVE THE SAME; IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF, IT IS PRESUMED
sufficient) THAT THEY DIED AT THE SAME TIME & THERE SHALL BE NO TRANSMISSION
• Extraordinary children – intra-uterine life of less than seven months (the OF RIGHTS FROM ONE TO THE OTHER.
child must have lived for at least 24 hours after its complete delivery from • Survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength
the maternal womb) & age of the sexes, according to the following rules of Sec3, Rule 131 of the
• The law says that the fetus is considered born only for civil purposes (art Rules of Court
41) which are beneficial (art 40) o Both under 15 years – older presumed to have survived
• A conceived child can be acknowledged even before it is born. o Both above 60 – younger presumed to have survived
• Donations to conceived & unborn children under Articles 742, 854 & 1025 o One under 15, one above 60 – the young one is presumed survived
of the NCC o Both over 15 & under 60
• Birth Certificate - Once it is registered with the office of the local civil • Sexes different – male is presumed
registrar, it becomes a public document. However, the entries therein are • Sexes same – the older is presumed
only prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein o One under 15 or over 60, the other between those ages – the one
• Complete delivery - once umbilical cord is cut between the ages is presumed
• Who can request for a copy of a birth certificate • Art 43 applies when the case involved two or more persons who are “called
o Person who it is to succeed each other” (Ex. Father & son)
o Spouse • Facts known or knowable from which a conclusion can be inferred will
o Descendant/nearest kin - in case of death prevail
o Parents • Applies only in the absence of evidence of who died first for succession
o Courts
o Authorized representative ARTICLE 44 - THE FOLLOWING ARE JURIDICAL PERSONS:
• RA 6809 - Age of Majority & Emancipation 1. THE STATE & ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS;
2. OTHER CORPORATIONS, INSTITUTIONS & ENTITIES FOR PUBLIC
ARTICLE. 42. CIVIL PERSONALITY IS EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH. THE EFFECT
INTEREST OR PURPOSE, CREATED BY LAW; THEIR PERSONALITY
OF DEATH UPON THE RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS OF THE DECEASED IS
BEGINS AS SOON AS THEY HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTED
DETERMINED BY LAW, BY CONTRACT & BY WILL.
ACCORDING TO LAW;
• Civil personality is extinguished by physical death
3. CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS & ASSOCIATIONS FOR PRIVATE
• Effect of death is determined by law, contract, will
INTEREST OR PURPOSE TO WHICH THE LAW GRANTS A JURIDICAL
• Death certificate - best proof of death
PERSONALITY, SEPARATE & DISTINCT FROM THAT OF EACH
SHAREHOLDER, PARTNER OR MEMBER.
• Public juridical persons ARTICLE 46 - JURIDICAL PERSONS MAY ACQUIRE & POSSESS PROPERTY
o Public corporations like the province & the city, the state itself OF ALL KINDS, AS WELL AS INCUR OBLIGATIONS & BRING CIVIL OR
• Private juridical persons CRIMINAL ACTIONS, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LAWS & REGULATIONS
o Private corporations, Partnerships, Foundations OF THEIR ORGANIZATION.
o Begins to exist as a juridical person from the moment a certificate • Rights of juridical persons
of incorporation is granted to it. (Proof of valid constitution) o To acquire & possess property of all kind
• Political Subdivision - municipalities, barangay, etc o To incur obligations
o To bring civil or criminal actions
ARTICLE 45 - JURIDICAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN NOS. 1 & 2 OF THE • A corporation may not form a partnership – the relationship of trust &
PRECEDING ARTICLE ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS CREATING OR confidence which is found in a partnership is absent in corporations
RECOGNIZING THEM. • RA 1180 – persons not citizens of the Philippines; associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which is not owned wholly by
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS ARE REGULATED BY LAWS OF GENERAL citizens of the Philippines, are prohibited from engaging the retail trade
APPLICATION ON THE SUBJECT. PARTNERSHIPS & ASSOCIATIONS FOR directly or indirectly
PRIVATE INTEREST OR PURPOSE ARE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF • A non-existent corporation or partnership cannot sue
THIS CODE CONCERNING PARTNERSHIPS. • An unregistered labor organization cannot sue
• Nationality of a corporation is generally determined by the place of its • Suability - ability to sue and be sued
incorporation • Liability - determined after judgment
• Exceptions
o For the grant of the rights in the Constitution to the operation of ARTICLE 47 - UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATIONS, INSTITUTIONS
public utilities & for the acquisition of land & other natural & OTHER ENTITIES FOR PUBLIC INTEREST OR PURPOSE MENTIONED IN NO.
resources, a corporation, even if incorporated here, cannot acquire 2 OF ARTICLE 44, THEIR PROPERTY & OTHER ASSETS SHALL BE DISPOSED
said rights unless 60% of its capital be Philippine-owned OF IN PURSUANCE OF LAW OR THE CHARTER CREATING THEM. IF
o During war, we may pierce the veil of corporate identity, & go to NOTHING HAS BEEN SPECIFIED ON THIS POINT, THE PROPERTY & OTHER
the very nationality of the controlling stockholders regardless of ASSETS SHALL BE APPLIED TO SIMILAR PURPOSES FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
where incorporation had been made REGION, PROVINCE, CITY OR MUNICIPALITY WHICH DURING THE
• Public Corporations - created by law, no need to register with the SEC EXISTENCE OF THE INSTITUTION DERIVED THE PRINCIPAL BENEFITS FROM
o GOCC - PAGCOR, PNB, DBP, etc
THE SAME.
o Always check the Charter
• Refers to public corporations or associations
• If something is not in the charter, rely on the Corporation • How assets are to be distributed:
code o Apply the provisions of the law or charter creating them
o In the absence of a provision – the assets will be for the benefit of • What controls now – Article 5 – 1987 Constitution
the place which was already receiving the principal benefits during o SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
the existence of the corporation or association 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
• Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction adoption of this Constitution;
o Protect the citizen/public from fraud by the corporation 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
o Directors/Shareholders can be included in the complaint Philippines;
• Winding up 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
o entails concluding all unfinished business pending at the date of who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
dissolution and payment of all debts. majority; &
o The partners must then settle accounts among themselves in order 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
to distribute the remaining assets. o SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
• Dissolution Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
o result of winding up. or perfect their Philippine citizenship
o Existence of Company Legal entity of the company continues at the o Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
commencement of the winding up. paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
o Dissolution brings about an end to the legal entity of the company. citizens.
• Dissolution of a public corporation o SECTION 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
o Follow what is in the charter, in favor of the city/municipality manner provided by law.
• Dissolving a private corporation o SECTION 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
o Settlement of liabilities retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are
o Liquidate assets deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
o SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
ARTICLE 48 - THE FOLLOWING ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES: interest & shall be dealt with by law.
1. THOSE WHO WERE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF o Jus sanguinis – one follows the citizenship of his parents – by blood
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; o Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
2. THOSE BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES OF FOREIGN PARENTS WHO, citizens & who are not – the determination by our tribunals might
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF SAID CONSTITUTION, HAD BEEN not be recognized internationally
ELECTED TO PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE PHILIPPINES; • The law that applies is the law that existed at the time of the person's birth
3. THOSE WHOSE FATHERS ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES;
ARTICLE 49 - NATURALIZATION & THE LOSS & REACQUISITION OF
4. THOSE WHOSE MOTHERS ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES &,
CITIZENSHIP OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, ELECT PHILIPPINE
• Naturalization is the process of acquiring the citizenship of another country
CITIZENSHIP;
(governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473)
5. THOSE WHO ARE NATURALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
• Jus soli - place of birth
• Jus Sanguinis - birth by blood • Proper & irreproachable conduct – determined by the
• Attributes of naturalization standards of morality prevalent in the country
o Citizenship is not a right, it is a privilege o He must own real estate in the Philippines, worth not less that
o The requisite conditions for naturalization are laid down by P5000 or must have some lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
Congress; courts cannot change or modify them occupation
o Only foreigners may be naturalized o He must be able to speak & write English or Spanish & any of the
o Naturalization may be revoked principal Philippine languages
o Naturalization demands allegiance to our Constitution o He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of
• Domicile of a juridical person the public or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private
o Principal place of business Schools where Philippine history, government, & civics are taught
o Must be provided specifically in the article ofincorporation or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire
• Qualifications for naturalization period of the residence required of him
o Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the hearing of the • Disqualification for naturalization
petition o Opposed to organized government
• Hearing – not the date of the declaration of intention not o Defending or teaching the propriety of violence
the date of filing o Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy
o Not less than ten years residence o Convicted of c crime involving moral turpitude
• Actual & substantial residence o Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
• Reduced to five years o Who during the period of their residence have not mingles socially
o Honorably held office with the Filipinos
o Established a new industry or introduced a useful o Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the US & Philippines are
invention at war
o Married to a Filipino woman. o Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the US whose
o Engaged as a teacher in a public or recognized laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens
private school not established for exclusive or subject thereof
instruction of children of persons of a particular • Loss & reacquisition of citizenship (Governed by Commonwealth Act No.
nationality or race in any of the branches of 63 as amended by Republic Act No. 106)
education or industry for 2 years o Naturalization in a foreign country
o Born in the Philippines o Express renunciation of citizenship
o Must be of good moral character, & believe in the principles o Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
underlying the Philippine Constitution & must have conducted laws of a foreign country
himself in a proper & irreproachable manner during the entire o Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
period of his residence in the Philippines in relation with the of a foreign country
constituted government & with the community in which he is living o Cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
o By having been declared by a competent authority a deserter of the THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IS ESTABLISHED OR WHERE THEY EXERCISE
Philippine armed forces in time of war THEIR PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.
o In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by • Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one
virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires has the intention of returning – residence coupled with the intention to
his nationality remain for an unlimited time
• Residence – a place of abode whether permanent or temporary
ARTICLE 50 - FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS & THE FULFILLMENT OF • Rules for determining the domicile of juridical persons
CIVIL OBLIGATIONS, THE DOMICILE OF NATURAL PERSONS IS THE PLACE o Get the domicile provided for in the law creating or recognizing
OF THEIR HABITUAL RESIDENCE. them or in their articles of agreement
• Domicile – one’s permanent place of abode o If not provided for, get the place:
• A person may be a citizen or national of one state without being a o Where their legal representation is established, or
domiciliary thereof o Where they exercise their principal functions
• Domicile is that place where a person has certain settled, fixed, legal • A de facto partnership can possess a domicile
relations because: • Domicile of a corporation is where the main office is located
o It is assigned to him by the law at the moment of birth (domicile of
origin) – applies only to infants
o It is assigned o him also by the law after birth on account of a legal
disability (domicile by operation of law)
o Because he has his home there – that to which whenever he is
absent, he intends to return (domicile of choice) Family Code: Mid Terms Reviewer
• Domicile can also be:
o By birth
o By choice FAMILY CODE - START OF APPLICABILITY AUGUST 3, 1988
o By marriage
• While residence is more or less temporary, domicile is more or less ARTICLE 1 - MARRIAGE IS A SPECIAL CONTRACT OF PERMANENT UNION
permanent BETWEEN A MAN & A WOMAN ENTERED INTO IN ACCORDANCE WITH
• A person can have several places of residence, but generally only one LAW FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONJUGAL & FAMILY LIFE. IT IS THE
domicile FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY & AN INVIOLABLE SOCIAL INSTITUTION
WHOSE NATURE, CONSEQUENCES, & INCIDENTS ARE GOVERNED BY LAW
ARTICLE 51 - WHEN THE LAW CREATING OR RECOGNIZING THEM, OR & NOT SUBJECT TO STIPULATION, EXCEPT THAT MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS
ANY OTHER PROVISION DOES NOT FIX THE DOMICILE OF JURIDICAL MAY FIX THE PROPERTY RELATIONS DURING THE MARRIAGE WITHIN THE
PERSONS, THE SAME SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE PLACE WHERE LIMITS PROVIDED BY THIS CODE.
• Marriage cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private • The principle is that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law
individuals or corporations effective at the time of the celebration of the marriage
• Marriage is vested with public interest, such that the legislature has enacted • Marriage contract in essence
a law-making mail-order bride a criminal offense - Anti Trafficking in o Contracting parties must only be two persons - a man & a woman
Persons Act of 2003 o Permanent contract
• Special contract therefore a subsequent valid marriage of the offender & the o Breach of obligations does not give rise to an action for damages
offended party in the crime of rape, likewise, extinguishes the criminal o Can be dissolved only by death or annulment
action or the penalty imposed for rape o Special contract
o Marital rape - penalized under RA 8353 o Both a contract & inviolable social institution
• The right to marry is a recognized fundamental human right under o Governed by law on marriage
international law o Not subject to stipulations except in property relations
• The constitutional provisions do not imply that the legislature cannot enact o Personal legal capacity is required
a law allowing absolute divorce – the legislature has plenary power to decide • Benevolent neutrality - respect the religion/custom
what sort of situations allowing absolute divorce may be recognized within • Property relations
the limits allowed by the Constitution o Conjugal ownership unless there is a prenup
• Constitutional provisions regarding marriage o Spouse may file judicial separation of properties
o Article 2, Section 12 • Always check the date of marriage to know which law applies
• The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall • Mistake in Identity
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous o Before in the civil code, it is grounds for annulment
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the o Now with Family Code, it is void ab initio
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The • Article 40 of FC
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing o Absolute nullity of marriage for purposes of remarriages must have
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of final adjudication from court declaring the marriage annulled
moral character shall receive the support of the • Article 52 & 53 of FC
Government. o Before one can remarry, they must fulfill what is ordered in the
o Article 15, Section 2 declaration of nullity of marriage, such as the dissolution of
• Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the properties
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. ARTICLE 2 - NO MARRIAGE SHALL BE VALID, UNLESS THESE ESSENTIAL
• Marriage does not shed the spouses’ integrity or their privacy as individuals REQUISITES ARE PRESENT:
• Property relations are fixed in marriage settlements executed prior to the 1. LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES WHO MUST BE
marriage ceremony – in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code A MALE & A FEMALE; &
• The nature, consequence & incidents of marriage as a social institution are 2. CONSENT FREELY GIVEN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SOLEMNIZING
governed by law & not subject to stipulations
OFFICER.
• The law provides that the contracting parties must be a male & a female SOLEMNIZING OFFICER & THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
• Silverio v. Republic – biological sex change – Court said that sex- THEY TAKE EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND & WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
reassignment surgery did not change his sex in the eyes of the law, therefore OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
he could not get married to his male partner.
• The sex is determined by visually looking at the genitals of the baby at the • It is not the presence or absence of the solemnizing officer which constitutes
time of birth – there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment surgery the formal requirement – but it is the absence or presence of the authority of
• Republic v. Cagandahan such solemnizing officer
o Congenital adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) where the person has both
• A valid marriage license must be issued by the local civil registrar of the
male & female body party place where the marriage application was filed
o Court considered the person as an intersex individual & granted the o It has a lifetime of 120 days from the date of issue & is effective in
preference of the person to be considered as a male person, thereby any part of the Philippines
allowing the change from female to male in the birth certificate of o The other requirements for the issuance of a marriage license are
the person. merely directory – their non-observance is a mere irregularity
• Requirements of Consent - not required to be in a particular form which will not render a marriage null & void or even annullable
o Freely Given o Ex. A party to whom a license is issues is represented therein by a
o Made in the presence of the solemnizing officer name other than his true name or had his name spelled wrongly will
• The total absence of consent makes the marriage void ab initio not invalidate a marriage solemnized on the authority of such
• However – if consent is merely vitiated – the marriage is voidable license
• Free consent connotes that at the time of the marriage ceremony the parties • The family code only recognizes ceremonial marriages – marriages
were capable of intelligently understanding the nature & consequences of solemnized by persons duly authorized by the state
the act • BUT – it does not generally prescribe any particular form of a marriage
• Need not be expressed in any special manner or in any particular form, so ceremony – minimum requirement is that the contracting parties appear
long as there is a manifestation that the contracting parties take each other personally before the solemnizing officer & declare that they take each other
as husband & wife as husband & wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age
• In the presence of the solemnizing office – in order that it may have due • Witnesses – there must be no less than two witnesses of legal age in
publication for the sake of notoriety & the certainty of its being made attendance
• The absence of witnesses will make the marriage void
ARTICLE 3 - THE FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE ARE: • It can be argued that the absence of two witnesses of legal age in a marriage
1. AUTHORITY OF THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER; ceremony is merely an irregularity in the formal requirements – such
2. A VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE EXCEPT IN THE CASES PROVIDED inadequacy is merely an irregularity not enough to invalidate a marriage
FOR IN CHAPTER 2 OF THIS TITLE; & o While there were no witnesses of legal age, or there was only one
3. A MARRIAGE CEREMONY WHICH TAKES PLACE WITH THE witness, or witnesses but not of legal age, there was still a marriage
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE ceremony performed where the contracting parties & solemnizing
officer were present – it was just deficient by the absence of the • Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong
required witnesses of legal age o HOWEVER! In Wassmer v. Velez the court held that to formally
o Therefore a marriage ceremony occurred though inadequate. set a wedding & go through all the preparations & publicity only to
o In Balogbog v. CA – the court held that it was enough that there walk out of it so close to the date of solemnization is different. It is
was proof that a wedding took place where an exchange of vows palpably & unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which Velez
can be presumed though the presence of witnesses will not must be made answerable for damages
necessarily be presumed • Article 35(a)
• Common law marriages are not recognized in the Philippines – only o Those contracted by any party below 18 years of age even with the
ceremonial marriages where solemnization is an inherent aspect is consent of parents or guardians
recognized in the Philippines • Article 45 - annulment provision
o Solemnized marriage of 18-21yo but no consent gained from
ARTICLE 4 - THE ABSENCE OF ANY OF THE ESSENTIAL OR FORMAL parents or guardians
REQUISITES SHALL RENDER THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO, EXCEPT AS o Consent obtained through fraud
STATED IN ARTICLE 35 (A). o Physical inability to consummate
o Unsound mind
o Consent obtained through force
A DEFECT IN ANY OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES SHALL RENDER THE
o Either party has STD that is incurable & serious
MARRIAGE VOIDABLE AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 45.
• Actional Situations for Breach of promise to Marry
o When preparations have already begun
AN IRREGULARITY IN THE FORMAL REQUISITES SHALL NOT AFFECT THE
o When promise to marry was used to gain sexual conquest
VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE BUT THE PARTY OR PARTIES RESPONSIBLE o When promise to marry is used to escape criminal liability
FOR THE IRREGULARITY SHALL BE CIVILLY, CRIMINALLY & • Putative Marriages
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE. o a duly formalized marriage that is invalid because of various
• Generally, the absence of any of the essential or formal requirements of a impediments (as consanguinity) through recognized in some states
marriage renders such marriage null & void as valid for certain purposes if contracted in good faith by at least
• Example: A marriage license which has already automatically expired is not one of the parties to it.
a valid marriage license, thereby making any marriage undertaken on the • Effect of Non Compliance to
basis of such alleged license void o Formal requisites
• Example: Marriage by way of jest – no genuine consent • valid but with irregularity (i.e. no witness of legal age,
• Defects in the essential requirements of marriage make the marriage merely issuance of marriage license despite no publication)
voidable (Arts. 45 & 46) o Essential Requisites
• Irregularities in the formal requisites do not affect the validity of the • Voidable if there is defect (i.e. consent through force)
marriage (exception Art. 14 – when between 18-21 did not obtain the • Void Ab Initio (i.e. marriage with expired license,
consent of their parents) marriage in jest)
ARTICLE 5 - ANY MALE OR FEMALE OF THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS OR reputation in such a way that the public will recognize the marital
UPWARDS NOT UNDER ANY OF THE IMPEDIMENTS MENTIONED IN status
ARTICLES 37 & 38, MAY CONTRACT MARRIAGE.
ARTICLE 7 - MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED BY:
ARTICLE 6 - NO PRESCRIBED FORM OR RELIGIOUS RITE FOR THE 1. ANY INCUMBENT MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY WITHIN THE
SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE IS REQUIRED. IT SHALL BE COURT’S JURISDICTION.
NECESSARY, HOWEVER, FOR THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO APPEAR 2. ANY PRIEST, RABBI, IMAM, OR MINISTER OF ANY CHURCH OR
PERSONALLY BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER & DECLARE IN THE RELIGIOUS SECT DULY AUTHORIZED BY HIS CHURCH OR
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE THAT THEY RELIGIOUS SECT & REGISTERED WITH THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
TAKE EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND &WIFE. THIS DECLARATION SHALL BE GENERAL, ACTING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE WRITTEN AUTHORITY
CONTAINED IN THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE WHICH SHALL BE SIGNED BY GRANTED BY HIS CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS SECT & PROVIDED THAT
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES & THEIR WITNESSES & ATTESTED BY THE AT LEAST ONE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BELONGS TO THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER. SOLEMNIZING OFFICER’S CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS SECT;
3. ANY SHIP CAPTAIN OR AIRPLANE CHIEF ONLY IN THE CASES
IN CASE OF A MARRIAGE IN ARTICULO MORTIS, WHEN THE PARTY AT THE MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 31;
POINT OF DEATH IS UNABLE TO SIGN THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, IT 4. ANY MILITARY COMMANDER OF A UNIT TO WHICH A CHAPLAIN
SHALL BE SUFFICIENT FOR ONE OF THE WITNESSES TO THE MARRIAGE TO IS ASSIGNED, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE LATTER, DURING A
WRITE THE NAME OF SAID PARTY, WHICH FACT SHALL BE ATTESTED BY THE MILITARY OPERATION, LIKEWISE ONLY IN THE CASES MENTIONED
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER. IN ARTICLE 32;
• Proxy marriages are prohibited in the Philippines – absence of the essential 5. ANY CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL OR VICE-CONSUL IN THE CASE
requisite that consent freely given must be made in the presence of the PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 10.
solemnizing officer & the absence of the formal requisite that the
contracting parties must personally declare before the solemnizing officer • Judges
that they take each other as husband & wife o Only within their courts’ jurisdiction
• Exceptions provided for in Art 35(2) – where the parties believed in good o Incumbent
faith that such solemnizing officer has the proper authority. o If a judge solemnizes a marriage beyond his jurisdiction that there
• Common-Law Marriages - not recognized is an absence of a formal requisite hence the marriage is void unless
o A common-law marriage may be defined as a non-ceremonial or either of the parties believed in good faith that such solemnizing
informal marriage by agreement, entered into by a man and a officer has authority to conduct such marriage
woman having capacity to marry, ordinarily without compliance o Sta Maria: The court erred in Navarro v. Domagtoy by stating that
with such statutory formalities as those pertaining to marriage outside of his jurisdiction its just a irregularity – but the decision is
licenses. Such agreement must be coupled by consummation, merely an obiter dictum & does not create a precedent
which includes at least cohabitation as husband and wife, and o National Jurisdiction of judges from
• Supreme Court o Marriage between a Filipino & a foreigner solemnized by a consul
• Sandiganbayan is void – limited authority
• Court of Tax Appeals o ONLY abroad – no authority in the Philippines
• Court of Appeals • Mayor
• Priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect o Local Government Code Sec.444 – the mayor of a city or
o Requisites municipality is now empowered to solemnize a marriage
• Must by duly authorized by the church or religious sect o Mayor is temporarily incapacitated – vice mayor or the highest
• Must act within the limit of the written authority granted ranking sangguniang bayan member shall automatically exercise
• Must be registered with the civil registrar general the power & perform the duties of the mayor
• At least one party must belong to the church or sect • Good faith defense – if either of the contracting parties believed in good
• Ship captain & airplane chief faith that such solemnizing officer had such authority, then the marriage
o Requisites shall be considered & as valid
• Must be in articulo mortis (at least one party)
• Must be between passengers or crew members ARTICLE 8 - THE MARRIAGE SHALL BE SOLEMNIZED PUBLICLY IN THE
• Generally the ship must be at sea or plane in flight CHAMBERS OF THE JUDGE OR IN OPEN COURT, IN THE CHURCH, CHAPEL
o Assistant pilot has no authority even if the pilot dies OR TEMPLE, OR IN THE OFFICE THE CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL OR VICE-
o Passengers not on the manifest are not included CONSUL, AS THE CASE MAY BE, AND NOT ELSEWHERE, EXCEPT IN CASES
o Can be solemnized during stopovers at ports of call
OF MARRIAGES CONTRACTED ON THE POINT OF DEATH OR IN REMOTE
• Military Commander PLACES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 29 OF THIS CODE, OR WHERE
o Requisites
BOTH OF THE PARTIES REQUEST THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER IN WRITING
• Must be a military commander of a unit
IN WHICH CASE THE MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED AT A HOUSE OR
• Must be a commissioned officer (start from second
PLACE DESIGNATED BY THEM IN A SWORN STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT
lieutenant, ensign & above)
• Directory in nature
• Chaplain must be assigned to such unit
• Nonobservance will not invalidate a marriage but held administratively,
• The chaplain must be absent at the time of the marriage
civilly or criminally liable
• The marriage must be one in articulo mortis
• Exceptions to the rule on venue are provided by law, namely:
• The contracting parties (members of the armed forces or
o marriages contracted in articulo mortis or in a remote place in
civilians) must be within the zone of military operation
o Within the zone of military operation – widespread military activity accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code
o marriages where both of the parties request a solemnizing officer in
over an area – does not refer to a simulated exercise
writing (Navarro v. Domagtoy) in which case the marriage may be
• Consul general, consul or vice consul
o Only when the contracting parties are both Filipino citizens solemnized at a house or place designated by the parties at a house
o Act as solemnizing officer & the local civil registrar or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
ARTICLE 9 - A MARRIAGE LICENSE SHALL BE ISSUED BY THE LOCAL CIVIL when contracts, among others, are executed before the diplomatic or
REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OR MUNICIPALITY WHERE EITHER CONTRACTING consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
PARTY HABITUALLY RESIDES, EXCEPT IN MARRIAGES WHERE NO LICENSE solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
IS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER 2 OF THIS TITLE. execution.
• If the contracting parties obtain a marriage license in a place other than the
place where either of them reside, it is merely an irregularity which will not ARTICLE 11 - WHERE A MARRIAGE LICENSE IS REQUIRED, EACH OF THE
render the marriage null and void CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL FILE SEPARATELY A SWORN APPLICATION
• The contracting parties should get a marriage license from the local civil FOR SUCH LICENSE WITH THE PROPER LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR WHICH
registrar of the city or municipality where either of them resides. SHALL SPECIFY THE FOLLOWING:
• Valid Marriage License 1. FULL NAME OF THE CONTRACTING PARTY;
o General Rule - the local civil registrar must issue the marriage 2. PLACE OF BIRTH;
license even if they find an hindrance in the impending marriage 3. AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH;
o Exceptions 4. CIVIL STATUS;
• Where the local civil registrar is judicially restrained from 5. IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, HOW, WHEN AND WHERE THE PREVIOUS
issuing the marriage license as ordered otherwise by a
MARRIAGE WAS DISSOLVED OR ANNULLED;
competent court at his own instance or that of nay
6. PRESENT RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP;
interested party (FC, Art 18)
7. DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES;
• Where the law clearly provides that, as to the foreigner, the
8. FULL NAME, RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP OF THE FATHER;
certificate of legal capacity is a necessary requisite before
a marriage license can be obtained 9. FULL NAME, RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP OF THE MOTHER; AND
10. FULL NAME, RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP OF THE GUARDIAN OR
ARTICLE 10 - MARRIAGES BETWEEN FILIPINO CITIZENS ABROAD MAY BE PERSON HAVING CHARGE, IN CASE THE CONTRACTING PARTY
SOLEMNIZED BY A CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL OR VICE-CONSUL OF HAS NEITHER FATHER NOR MOTHER AND IS UNDER THE AGE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. THE ISSUANCE OF THE MARRIAGE TWENTY-ONE YEARS.
LICENSE AND THE DUTIES OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND OF THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER WITH REGARD TO THE CELEBRATION OF THE APPLICANTS, THEIR PARENTS OR GUARDIANS SHALL NOT BE
MARRIAGE SHALL BE PERFORMED BY SAID CONSULAR OFFICIAL REQUIRED TO EXHIBIT THEIR RESIDENCE CERTIFICATES IN ANY FORMALITY
• Must be in accordance with Philippine laws IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECURING OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE.
• Duties of the local civil registrar and the solemnizing officer are performed
by the consul general, consul or vice-consul • There are EXCEPTIONS to the marriage license requirement
• Contracting parties must both be Filipinos a. Solemnized o
• The marriage ceremony shall be in accordance with the laws of the b. outside the Philippines where no license is required by the country
Philippines because Article 17 of the Civil Code pertinently provides that where they were solemnized (FC, Art 26)
c. Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members HAVING CUSTODY THEREOF AT LEAST FIFTEEN DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE
may be solemnized by a ship captain or an airplane pilot (FC, Art OF THE APPLICATION, SUCH PARTY MAY FURNISH IN LIEU THEREOF HIS
31) CURRENT RESIDENCE CERTIFICATE OR AN INSTRUMENT DRAWN UP AND
d. In remote place - residence of either party is so remote that there is SWORN TO BEFORE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR CONCERNED OR ANY
no means of transportation to enable them to personally appear PUBLIC OFFICIAL AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS. SUCH
before the local civil registrar (FC, Art 28)
INSTRUMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE SWORN DECLARATION OF TWO
e. Marriage in articulo mortis remains valid even when the ailing
WITNESSES OF LAWFUL AGE, SETTING FORTH THE FULL NAME, RESIDENCE
party survives
AND CITIZENSHIP OF SUCH CONTRACTING PARTY AND OF HIS OR HER
f. Among Muslims or members of ethnic cultural communities
PARENTS, IF KNOWN, AND THE PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH OF SUCH
solemnized in accordance with their customs (FC, Art 33)
g. Marriage in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of PARTY. THE NEAREST OF KIN OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL BE
military operations (FC, Art 32) PREFERRED AS WITNESSES, OR, IN THEIR DEFAULT, PERSONS OF GOOD
h. Marriage between man & woman who have lived together as REPUTATION IN THE PROVINCE OR THE LOCALITY.
husband & wife for at least 5 years & with no legal objection to
marry each other (subject to FC Art 34) THE PRESENTATION OF BIRTH OR BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE SHALL NOT BE
REQUIRED IF THE PARENTS OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES APPEAR
ARTICLE 12 - THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, UPON RECEIVING SUCH PERSONALLY BEFORE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR CONCERNED AND
APPLICATION, SHALL REQUIRE THE PRESENTATION OF THE ORIGINAL SWEAR TO THE CORRECTNESS OF THE LAWFUL AGE OF SAID PARTIES, AS
BIRTH CERTIFICATES OR, IN DEFAULT THEREOF, THE BAPTISMAL STATED IN THE APPLICATION, OR WHEN THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
CERTIFICATES OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES OR COPIES OF SUCH SHALL, BY MERELY LOOKING AT THE APPLICANTS UPON THEIR
DOCUMENTS DULY ATTESTED BY THE PERSONS HAVING CUSTODY OF THE PERSONALLY APPEARING BEFORE HIM, BE CONVINCED THAT EITHER OR
ORIGINALS. THESE CERTIFICATES OR CERTIFIED COPIES OF THE BOTH OF THEM HAVE THE REQUIRED AGE.
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE NEED NOT BE SWORN TO AND
SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX. THE SIGNATURE ARTICLE 13 - IN CASE EITHER OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAS BEEN
AND OFFICIAL TITLE OF THE PERSON ISSUING THE CERTIFICATE SHALL BE PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, THE APPLICANT SHALL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH,
SUFFICIENT PROOF OF ITS AUTHENTICITY. INSTEAD OF THE BIRTH OR BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE REQUIRED IN THE LAST
PRECEDING ARTICLE, THE DEATH CERTIFICATE OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE
IF EITHER OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES IS UNABLE TO PRODUCE HIS OR THE JUDICIAL DECREE OF THE ABSOLUTE DIVORCE, OR THE JUDICIAL
BIRTH OR BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE OR A CERTIFIED COPY OF EITHER DECREE OF ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS OR HER
BECAUSE OF THE DESTRUCTION OR LOSS OF THE ORIGINAL, OR IF IT IS PREVIOUS MARRIAGE. IN CASE THE DEATH CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE
SHOWN BY AN AFFIDAVIT OF SUCH PARTY OR OF ANY OTHER PERSON SECURED, THE PARTY SHALL MAKE AN AFFIDAVIT SETTING FORTH THIS
THAT SUCH BIRTH OR BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE HAS NOT YET BEEN CIRCUMSTANCE AND HIS OR HER ACTUAL CIVIL STATUS AND THE NAME
RECEIVED THOUGH THE SAME HAS BEEN REQUIRED OF THE PERSON AND DATE OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE.
ARTICLE 14 - IN CASE EITHER OR BOTH OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, ADVICE GIVEN, IF ANY, SHALL BE ATTACHED TO THE APPLICATION FOR
NOT HAVING BEEN EMANCIPATED BY A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE, ARE MARRIAGE LICENSE. SHOULD THE PARENTS OR GUARDIAN REFUSE TO
BETWEEN THE AGES OF EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY- ONE, THEY SHALL, IN GIVE ANY ADVICE, THIS FACT SHALL BE STATED IN THE SWORN
ADDITION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRECEDING ARTICLES, EXHIBIT STATEMENT.
TO THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, THE CONSENT TO THEIR MARRIAGE OF
THEIR FATHER, MOTHER, SURVIVING PARENT OR GUARDIAN, OR ARTICLE 16 - THE CASES WHERE PARENTAL CONSENT OR PARENTAL
PERSONS HAVING LEGAL CHARGE OF THEM, IN THE ORDER MENTIONED. ADVICE IS NEEDED, THE PARTY OR PARTIES CONCERNED SHALL, IN
SUCH CONSENT SHALL BE MANIFESTED IN WRITING BY THE INTERESTED ADDITION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRECEDING ARTICLES, ATTACH
PARTY, WHO PERSONALLY APPEARS BEFORE THE PROPER LOCAL CIVIL A CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY A PRIEST, IMAM OR MINISTER AUTHORIZED TO
REGISTRAR, OR IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT MADE IN THE PRESENCE SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF THIS CODE OR A MARRIAGE
OF TWO WITNESSES AND ATTESTED BEFORE ANY OFFICIAL AUTHORIZED COUNSELLOR DULY ACCREDITED BY THE PROPER GOVERNMENT
BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS. THE PERSONAL MANIFESTATION SHALL AGENCY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE
BE RECORDED IN BOTH APPLICATIONS FOR MARRIAGE LICENSE, AND UNDERGONE MARRIAGE COUNSELLING. FAILURE TO ATTACH SAID
THE AFFIDAVIT, IF ONE IS EXECUTED INSTEAD, SHALL BE ATTACHED TO CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE COUNSELLING SHALL SUSPEND THE
SAID APPLICATIONS. ISSUANCE OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE FOR A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS
• No more emancipation by marriage FROM THE COMPLETION OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE APPLICATION.
• Parental consent required of parties between the ages of 18 and above but ISSUANCE OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE WITHIN THE PROHIBITED PERIOD
below 21 does not add anything to the legal capacity SHALL SUBJECT THESSUING OFFICER TO ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
• The consent of the parents must be added thereto BUT SHALL NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE.
• Does not affect the validity of marriage but only subjects those who have
neglected to acquire
SHOULD ONLY ONE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES NEED PARENTAL
• Preference is given to the father to give consent
CONSENT OR PARENTAL ADVICE, THE OTHER PARTY MUST BE PRESENT AT
• The legal effect of the non-procurement of parental consent
THE COUNSELLING REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.
• Absence of parental advice does not affect the marriage; it does not even
ARTICLE 15 - ANY CONTRACTING PARTY BETWEEN THE AGE OF TWENTY-
make the marriage voidable
ONE AND TWENTY-FIVE SHALL BE OBLIGED TO ASK THEIR PARENTS OR
• While it is not an essential nor a formal requirement under Articles 2 and 3,
GUARDIAN FOR ADVICE UPON THE INTENDED MARRIAGE. IF THEY DO prescribing parental advice for those 21-25 years of age is in keeping with
NOT OBTAIN SUCH ADVICE, OR IF IT BE UNFAVORABLE, THE MARRIAGE Philippine tradition and it does not bar marriage totally. It is just a vehicle
LICENSE SHALL NOT BE ISSUED TILL AFTER THREE MONTHS FOLLOWING to induce further and more mature deliberation over the decision to get
THE COMPLETION OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE APPLICATION THEREFOR. married
A SWORN STATEMENT BY THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE EFFECT
THAT SUCH ADVICE HAS BEEN SOUGHT, TOGETHER WITH THE WRITTEN
ARTICLE 17 - THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR SHALL PREPARE A NOTICE • The issuance of the license despite the restraining order can be considered
WHICH SHALL CONTAIN THE FULL NAMES AND RESIDENCES OF THE only as an irregularity in the formal requisite of a valid marriage license
APPLICANTS FOR A MARRIAGE LICENSE AND OTHER DATA GIVEN IN THE which shall not affect the validity of the marriage
APPLICATIONS. THE NOTICE SHALL BE POSTED FOR TEN CONSECUTIVE
DAYS ON A BULLETIN BOARD OUTSIDE THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL ARTICLE 19 - THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR SHALL REQUIRE THE PAYMENT
REGISTRAR LOCATED IN A CONSPICUOUS PLACE WITHIN THE BUILDING OF THE FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW OR REGULATIONS BEFORE THE
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THIS NOTICE SHALL REQUEST ISSUANCE OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE. NO OTHER SUM SHALL BE
ALL PERSONS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF ANY IMPEDIMENT TO THE COLLECTED IN THE NATURE OF A FEE OR TAX OF ANY KIND FOR THE
MARRIAGE TO ADVISE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR THEREOF. THE ISSUANCE OF SAID LICENSE. IT SHALL, HOWEVER, BE ISSUED FREE OF
MARRIAGE LICENSE SHALL BE ISSUED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE CHARGE TO INDIGENT PARTIES, THAT IS THOSE WHO HAVE NO VISIBLE
PERIOD OF PUBLICATION. MEANS OF INCOME OR WHOSE INCOME IS INSUFFICIENT FOR THEIR
• Ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil SUBSISTENCE, A FACT ESTABLISHED BY THEIR AFFIDAVIT, OR BY THEIR
registrar OATH BEFORE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR.
• Failure of the parties to attach the marriage application that they have ARTICLE 20 - THE LICENSE SHALL BE VALID IN ANY PART OF THE
undergone marriage counseling provided for shall suspend the issuance of PHILIPPINES FOR A PERIOD OF 120 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ISSUE AND
the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the SHALL BE DEEMED AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED AT THE EXPIRATION OF
publication of the application THE SAID PERIOD IF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE NOT MADE USE OF
IT. THE EXPIRY DATE SHALL BE STAMPED IN BOLD CHARACTERS ON THE
ARTICLE 18 - IN CASE OF ANY IMPEDIMENT KNOWN TO THE LOCAL CIVIL FACE OF EVERY LICENSE ISSUED.
REGISTRAR OR BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION, HE SHALL NOTE DOWN THE • Only valid within the Philippines
PARTICULARS THEREOF AND HIS FINDINGS THEREON IN THE • 120 days from the date of issue – the date of the signing of the local civil
APPLICATION FOR MARRIAGE LICENSE, BUT SHALL NONETHELESS ISSUE registrar of the marriage license is that date of issue
SAID LICENSE • Not used within 120 days – automatically ineffective
AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE PERIOD OF PUBLICATION, UNLESS ARTICLE 21 - WHEN EITHER OR BOTH OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES ARE
ORDERED OTHERWISE BY A COMPETENT COURT AT HIS OWN INSTANCE CITIZENS OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, IT SHALL BE NECESSARY FOR THEM
OR THAT OF ANY INTERESTED PARTY. NO FILING FEE SHALL BE CHARGED BEFORE A MARRIAGE LICENSE CAN BE OBTAINED, TO SUBMIT A
FOR THE PETITION NOR A CORRESPONDING BOND REQUIRED FOR THE CERTIFICATE OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE, ISSUED BY
ISSUANCES OF THE ORDER. THEIR RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR OFFICIALS.
• The law does not restrain the local civil registrar from investigating any
impediment, but the local civil registrar is only generally prohibited from STATELESS PERSONS OR REFUGEES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SHALL, IN
withholding the marriage license despite the legal impediment LIEU OF THE CERTIFICATE OF LEGAL CAPACITY HEREIN REQUIRED, SUBMIT
AN AFFIDAVIT STATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING SUCH 6. THAT EITHER OR BOTH OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE
CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE. COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT REGARDING
• Without this certification of legal capacity, the local civil registrar will not PARENTAL ADVICE IN APPROPRIATE CASES; AND
issue the marriage license 7. THAT THE PARTIES HAVE ENTERED INTO MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT, IF
• This is an exception to the rule that the local civil registrar even if he finds ANY, ATTACHING A COPY THEREOF
an impediment in the impending marriage, must nevertheless issue the
marriage license, unless, at his own instance, or that of an interested party, ARTICLE 23 - IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE PERSON SOLEMNIZING THE
he is judicially restrained from issuing the marriage license
MARRIAGE TO FURNISH EITHER OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES THE
• If without the certificate of legal capacity, the marriage license was issued,
ORIGINAL OF THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 6
the marriage celebrated will still be considered as valid – merely an
AND TO SEND THE DUPLICATE AND TRIPLICATE COPIES OF THE
irregularity in complying with a formal requirement
CERTIFICATE NOT LATER THAN 15DAYS AFTER THE MARRIAGE, TO THE
• If they are stateless persons or refugees, they shall be required to file an
affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE PLACE WHERE THE MARRIAGE WAS
marriage in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity. SOLEMNIZED. PROPER RECEIPTS SHALL BE ISSUED BY THE LOCAL CIVIL
• if the contracting parties who are citizens of a foreign country desire to have REGISTRAR TO THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER TRANSMITTING COPIES OF THE
their marriage solemnized by their country’s consul-general officially MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER SHALL RETAIN IN
assigned here in the Philippines, they can get married before such consul- HIS FILE THE QUADRUPLICATE COPY OF THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, THE
general without procuring a marriage license here in the Philippines if their ORIGINAL OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE AND, IN PROPER CASES, THE
country’s laws allow the same. Such marriage shall be recognized here in AFFIDAVIT OF THE CONTRACTING PARTY REGARDING THE
the Philippines. SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE IN PLACE OTHER THAN THOSE
MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 8.
ARTICLE 22 - THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, IN WHICH THE PARTIES SHALL • Contracting of a lawful marriage – presumption which is considered
DECLARE THAT THEY TAKE EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE, SHALL satisfactory if not contradicted, but if it is contradicted, then it may be
ALSO STATE: overcome by evidence
1. THE FULL NAME, SEX AND AGE OF EACH CONTRACTING PARTY; • Presumption gains strength through the lapse of time
2. THEIR CITIZENSHIP, RELIGION AND HABITUAL RESIDENCE; • Presumption is one of strongest in law especially when the legitimacy of
3. THE DATE AND PRECISE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE children is involved
MARRIAGE; • Credible testimony gives rise to the presumption
o State v. Hodgskins – the testimony of an eye witness to be sufficient
4. THAT THE PROPER MARRIAGE LICENSE HAS BEEN ISSUED
should disclose not only the performance of the ceremony by
ACCORDING TO LAW, EXCEPT IN MARRIAGE PROVIDED FOR IN
someone, but that all the circumstances attending it were such as to
CHAPTER 2 OF THIS TITLE;
constitute it as legal marriage
5. THAT EITHER OR BOTH OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE
• Best evidence is the marriage contract or the marriage certificate
SECURED THE PARENTAL CONSENT IN APPROPRIATE CASES; o Mere Photostat copy is worthless – Vda. De Chua v. CA
• if such Photostat copy emanated from the Office of the ARTICLE 25 - THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR CONCERNED SHALL ENTER ALL
Local Civil Registrar and duly certified by the local civil APPLICATIONS FOR MARRIAGE LICENSES FILED WITH HIM IN A REGISTRY
registrar as an authentic copy of the records of the records BOOK STRICTLY IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THE SAME ARE RECEIVED. HE
in his office, such copy is admissible as evidence. SHALL RECORD IN SAID BOOK THE NAMES OF THE APPLICANTS, THE DATE
• If the Photostat copy was not certified but there was no ON WHICH THE MARRIAGE LICENSE WAS ISSUED, AND SUCH OTHER
objection from the opposing party and was subsequently
DATA AS MAY BE NECESSARY.
admitted by the court, said contained therein
• A certification of the local civil registrar that there was no record in his
o baptismal certificates, birth certificates, judicial decisions, and
office of any marriage license of the alleged spouses is enough to prove that
family bible in which the names of the spouses have been entered
the marriage is void due to the absence of a formal requirement, namely, a
as married are good evidence of marriage
valid marriage license (Cariño v. Cariño)
• It has been declared that a certificate of marriage made many years after the
marriage is inadmissible, especially where there was no register of the
ARTICLE 26 - ALL MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES, IN
marriage in the official records
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS IN FORCE IN THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY
• Mere cohabitation is not direct proof of marriage
WERE SOLEMNIZED, AND VALID THERE AS SUCH, SHALL ALSO BE VALID
• Conduct of the parties must be something more than mere living together, it
must be an association, consciously and openly, as husband and wife IN THIS COUNTRY, EXCEPT THOSE PROHIBITED UNDER ARTICLES 35 (1),
• Anyone assailing the validity of the marriage is required to make plain the (4), (5) AND (6), 36, 37 AND 38.
truth of law and fact that the marriage was not legal
o Evidence must be strong, distinct and satisfactory WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
• While obtaining a marriage license in a place which is not the place of VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY
residence of any of the contracting parties is merely an irregularity – it may OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER
give rise to the presumption or could indicate that the license may be TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY
spurious or non-existence UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. (AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 227)
• If the parties are not certain whether under the law, they can proceed with a • Lex loci celebrationis rule
marriage, they can file a petition for declaratory relief to seek from the court • Article 35 (1) – below 18 even with consent
a judgment on their capacity to marry. o will not be recognized even if valid in that place
o situation where the marriage abroad is between a Filipino and a
ARTICLE 24 - IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR TO Filipina and not between a Filipino or Filipina and an alien married
PREPARE THE DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY THIS TITLE, AND TO ADMINISTER in the alien’s state where the alien though below 18 is capacitated
OATHS TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES WITHOUT ANY CHARGE IN BOTH to marry
CASES. THE DOCUMENTS AND AFFIDAVITS FILED IN CONNECTION WITH • Article 35 (4) bigamous/polygamous
APPLICATIONS FOR MARRIAGE LICENSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM • Article 35 (5) mistake of one as to identity of the other
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX. • Article 35 (6) marriages void under Art. 53 (w/o a declaration of nullity)
• Article 36 – psychologically incapacitated
• Article 37 – incestuous • Mainly anchored on necessity and practicality
o Ascendants and descendants • Those who are authorized under Article 7 and the mayor may solemnize a
o Brothers and sisters, full or half blood marriage even without a valid marriage license if either or both contracting
• Article 38 – void for being against public policy parties are at the point of death
• The legal effect which may be given by one state to the marriage laws of
another state is merely because of comity (comity - an association of nations ARTICLE 28 - IF THE RESIDENCE OF EITHER PARTY IS SO LOCATED THAT
for their mutual benefit) THERE IS NO MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO ENABLE SUCH PARTY TO
• Marriages without a license solemnized abroad, and proxy marriages, shall APPEAR PERSONALLY BEFORE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, THE
be valid in the Philippine if such marriages are valid in accordance with the MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED WITHOUT NECESSITY OF A MARRIAGE
laws in force in the country where they are solemnized LICENSE.
• Common law marriages obtained abroad should not be recognized here
• If a Filipino contracts a marriage abroad with a person of the same sex,
ARTICLE 29 - IN THE CASES PROVIDED FOR IN THE TWO PRECEDING
Filipino or foreigner, the marriage shall not be recognized here
ARTICLES, THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER SHALL STATE IN AN AFFIDAVIT
• It is necessary to prove the foreign law as a question of fact and then to prove
EXECUTED BEFORE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR ANY OTHER PERSON
the celebration of marriage pursuant thereto by convincing evidence
LEGALLY AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS THAT THE MARRIAGE WAS
• Generally, absolute divorce between two citizens of the Philippines is not
recognized in the Philippines PERFORMED IN ARTICULO MORTIS OR THAT THE RESIDENCE OF EITHER
o Except if the foreigner spouse is the one who obtains the divorce PARTY, SPECIFYING THE BARRIO OR BARANGAY, IS SO LOCATED THAT
• The determinative point is the time the divorce is procured – citizenship THERE IS NO MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO ENABLE SUCH PARTY TO
• The Filipino who obtains the foreign absolute divorce will not be recognized APPEAR PERSONALLY BEFORE THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND THAT
here THE OFFICER TOOK THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ASCERTAIN THE AGES AND
• Implicit in the first paragraph is also the recognition that a Filipino’s foreign RELATIONSHIP OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES AND THE ABSENCE OF
marriage which is invalid under the laws where such marriage has been LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE MARRIAGE
solemnized, but which would have been valid had such a marriage been
celebrated in the Philippines, is likewise invalid in the Philippines ARTICLE 30 - THE ORIGINAL OF THE AFFIDAVIT REQUIRED IN THE LAST
• Petition for Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decree PRECEDING ARTICLE, TOGETHER WITH THE LEGIBLE COPY OF THE
o Show to the court the documents
MARRIAGE CONTRACT, SHALL BE SENT BY THE PERSON SOLEMNIZING
o Allege & show proof of existence of foreign law and compliance
THE MARRIAGE TO THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE MUNICIPALITY
with it
WHERE IT WAS PERFORMED WITHIN THE PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AFTER THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE MARRIAGE.
ARTICLE 27 - IN CASE EITHER OR BOTH OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
• The procedure in both Article 29 to 30 is relative to the duties of the
ARE AT THE POINT OF DEATH, THE MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED
solemnizing officer with respect to the affidavit is merely “directory in
WITHOUT NECESSITY OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE AND SHALL REMAIN
VALID EVEN IF THE AILING PARTY SUBSEQUENTLY SURVIVES.
character.” Nonobservance of the requirements will not render the marriage SOLEMNIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CUSTOMS, RITES OR
void or annullable. PRACTICES.
• Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines signed Feb. 4, 1977,
ARTICLE 31 - A MARRIAGE IN ARTICULO MORTIS BETWEEN PASSENGERS which does not provide that, for a marriage to be valid, a marriage license
OR CREW MEMBERS MAY ALSO BE SOLEMNIZED BY A SHIP CAPTAIN OR has to be procured by the contracting parties.
BY AN AIRPLANE PILOT NOT ONLY WHILE THE SHIP IS AT SEA OR THE • R.A. 6766, the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR),
PLANE IS IN FLIGHT, BUT ALSO DURING STOPOVERS AT PORTS OF CALL. Art. X, Sec. 2 provides: “Marriages solemnized between or among members
• Requirements for a ship captain and airplane chief to solemnize: of the indigenous tribal group or cultural community in accordance
o Marriage must be in articulo mortis (at least 1 is at the point of to...customary laws...shall be valid, and the dissolution...recognized.”
death)
o Marriage must be between passengers or crew members ARTICLE 34 - NO LICENSE SHALL BE NECESSARY FOR THE MARRIAGE OF
o Ship must be at sea or the plane must be in flight (including A MAN AND A WOMAN WHO HAVE LIVED TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND
“stopover” and “ports of call” since voyage is not yet terminated) WIFE FOR AT LEAST 5YEARS AND WITHOUT ANY LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO
MARRY EACH OTHER. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL STATE THE
ARTICLE 32 - A MILITARY COMMANDER OF A UNIT, WHO IS A FOREGOING FACTS IN AN AFFIDAVIT BEFORE ANY PERSON AUTHORIZED
COMMISSIONED OFFICER, SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE AUTHORITY TO BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS. THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER SHALL ALSO
SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGES IN ARTICULO MORTIS BETWEEN PERSONS WITHIN STATE UNDER OATH THAT HE ASCERTAINED THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE
THE ZONE OF MILITARY OPERATION, WHETHER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED CONTRACTING PARTIES AND FOUND NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE
FORCES OR CIVILIANS. MARRIAGE
• Requirements for a military commander to solemnize a marriage: • Living together as husband and wife must met 2 distinct conditions:
o Must be a military commander of a unit (at least a battalion) 1. Must live as such for at least 5 years characterized by exclusivity
o Must be a commissioned offer (rank from second lieutenant) and continuity that is unbroken.
o Chaplain must be assigned to such unit 2. Must be without any legal impediment to marry each other. (only
o Said chaplain must be absent at the time of marriage to the time of the actual marriage celebration)
o Marriage must be one in articulo mortis • While both must concur, they do not qualify each other, meaning during the
o Contracting parties, whether of the armed forces or civilians, must 5-year period, it is not necessary that they suffer from any legal impediment.
be within the zone of military operation “Legal impediment” refers to any possible ground or basis, including non-
• If chaplain is present, he must be the one who should solemnize. age and the status of being already married, to make a marriage infirm.
• Spouse who was living-in with his or her paramour can avail the exception
ARTICLE 33 - MARRIAGES AMONG MUSLIMS OR AMONG MEMBERS OF and marry his or her paramour without a marriage license after the death of
THE ETHNIC CULTURAL COMMUNITIES MAY BE PERFORMED VALIDLY his or her legal spouse.
WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF MARRIAGE LICENSE, PROVIDED THEY ARE
• Failure of the solemnizing officer to investigate the qualifications of the • Doctrine of unclean hands – the court should not grant relief to the wrong
contracting parties and of any legal impediments, shall not invalidate doer
marriage. o Not applied in nullity actions because it is merely judge-made and
• The falsity of the affidavit is not a mere irregularity – the exception is a has no statutory basis
substantial requirement of the law • Exceptions to the general rule of good faith and bad faith
o Article 35(2) – if either of the parties believed in good faith that the
ARTICLE 35 - THE FOLLOWING MARRIAGES SHALL BE VOID FROM THE solemnizing officer has authority to solemnize a marriage though
BEGINNING: he or she actually has none
1. THOSE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE o Article 41 – in cases of disappearance – the present spouse may
EVEN WITH THE CONSENT OF PARENTS OR GUARDIANS; remarry if with concurrence of the spouse in the subsequent
2. THOSE SOLEMNIZED BY ANY PERSON NOT LEGALLY AUTHORIZED marriage ceremony are in good faith (as to the disappearance of the
TO PERFORM MARRIAGES UNLESS SUCH MARRIAGES WERE lost spouse)
o BOTH CASES – even if only one of the contracting parties is in
CONTRACTED WITH EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES BELIEVING IN
good faith - the marriage is still valid
GOOD FAITH THAT THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER HAD THE LEGAL
• As a general rule, in void marriages – the property regime is one of co-
AUTHORITY TO DO SO;
ownership
3. THOSE SOLEMNIZED WITHOUT LICENSE, EXCEPT THOSE COVERED o If there is bad faith – the share of the guilty spouse in the co-
THE PRECEDING CHAPTER; ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children or
4. THOSE BIGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES NOT FALLING innocent spouse
UNDER ARTICLE 41; o Applies to all void marriages EXCEPT – to a subsequent void
5. THOSE CONTRACTED THROUGH MISTAKE OF ONE CONTRACTING marriage due to the failure of a party to get a prior judicial
PARTY AS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE OTHER; & declaration nullity of the previous void marriage pursuant to Article
6. THOSE SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGES THAT ARE VOID UNDER ARTICLE 40
53. • As a general rule – a void marriage can be collaterally attacked even if it is
not the main or principal issue of the case
• A void marriage is that which is not valid from its inception • Three cases where a direct attack (not collateral) must be undertaken
• Only marriages declared void by the legislature should be treated as such BEFORE so that the proper effects provided by law can appropriately apply
• A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court, o Art. 40 – obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity for purposes of
whereas marriage void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken remarriage
place and cannot be the source of rights • the only acceptable proof to prove the void status of the
• Void marriages can never be ratified or cured by any act of any of the first is a judicial declaration issued by the court directly
contracting parties stating that the first marriage is null and void
• As a rule, good faith and bad faith are immaterial in determining whether or o Where the SC alludes to it – like in cases of legitimacy of children,
not a marriage is null and void settlement of estate and property relations or criminal cases
o Art. 50 in relation to Art 43(3) and Art 86 (1) – revocation of a delivery of the children’s presumptive legitime's and a decree of
donation propter nuptials annulment or nullity recorded in the civil registry and registries in
• Below 18 years old property
o Declared by law as not possessing the legal capacity to marry o Noncompliance will render the subsequent marriage void
o Subsequent parental consent cannot ratify such a void marriage
• Non authority of solemnizing officer ARTICLE 36 - A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY WHO, AT THE
o Philippines exclusively recognizes ceremonial marriages TIME OF THE CELEBRATION, WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
• Good faith marriage TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE,
o Solemnizing officer had authority – ONLY THIS.
SHALL LIKEWISE BE VOID EVEN IF SUCH INCAPACITY BECOMES MANIFEST
o The good faith marriage contemplated in Art. 35(2) is not founded
ONLY AFTER ITS SOLEMNIZATION. (AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
on the actual marriage or the ceremonial marriage but on the
227)
reasonable belief by one or both of the parties that they were
• Determination of psychological incapacity depends of the facts of the case,
honestly married.
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
• Bigamous or polygamous marriage
predilections, generalizations but according to its own facts
o Except those allowed under special laws like the Muslim Code or
• The ground is restricted to psychological incapacity to comply with the
Art. 41, the law prohibits contracting a second bond of union as
essential marital obligations
long as the other spouse is still alive
• The malady or mental disposition must be such as to prevent them seriously
o In a bigamous marriage – the first marriage must have been valid
and effectively from having a functional normal marital life
o However, if the first marriage is in itself void, and a subsequent
• It must be a psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
marriage is contracted without a prior judicial declaration of nullity
celebration of the marriage
of the first marriage – the subsequent marriage is also void because
• The incapacity is clearly limited to his and or her failure or disregard to
it violates Art. 40 in relation to Arts. 52 and 53
comply with his and or her essential marital obligations although physically
• Mistake in identity
capable of doing so
o Mistake in identity is a ground for the nullity of the marriage
• Must be present at the time of the marriage ceremony but can be manifested
o Example: one of the parties marries the twin of the other party
later during the marriage
o Rationale: there is complete absence of consent – the contracting
• Such a marriage cannot be cured by cohabitation
party absolutely did not intend to marry the other
• Well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
o It does not include mistake in the name, the character of the person,
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable
or in his or her attributes, his or her age, religion, social standing,
• Can only be proven by indicators or external manifestations of the person
pedigree, pecuniary means, temperaments, acquirements, condition
claimed to be psychologically incapacitated
in life, or previous habits.
• Must be clearly alleged in the complaint filed in court
• Void under article 53
• Examples considered by the court:
o If declared void – to be able to marry again they must undertake the
o Prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sex
liquidation, partition and distribution of their properties, if any,
o Giving their barkada the importance and devotion which should be
given to his or her own spouse and children
Case Doctrines
o Dependent personality disorder, narcissistic and anti-social
personality disorder
o Mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder
Civil Code Case Doctrines
to dependent personality disorder
• PERSONAL AND LIMITED – just because a person is psychologically ARTICLE 2
incapacitated to perform with his or her present spouse, doesn’t mean that it TAÑADA v TUVERA
would be the same with any other person The clause “unless it is o/w provided” refers to the date of effectivity & not
• Molina doctrine: to the requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted.
o Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
plaintiff since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
o The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
• Medically or clinically identified PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY
• Alleged in the complaint Circulars & regulations w/c prescribe a penalty should be published before
• Sufficiently proven by experts becoming effective, this on the general principle & theory that before the
• Clearly explained in the decision public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
o The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the regulation or circular must be published & the people officially & especially
celebration informed of said contents & its penalties.
o Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable ARTICLES 3 & 6
o Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of DM CONSUNJI, INC. v CA
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage ART. 3: The application of Art. 3 is limited to mandatory & prohibitory laws.
o The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
articles 68 to 71 ART. 6: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. A person
o Interpretations by the Catholic Church while not controlling or makes a knowing & intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right
decisive should be given great respect by our courts exists & has adequate knowledge upon w/c to make an intelligent decision.
o The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state waived, w/ an awareness of its consequences.
• Te v. Te – SC stressed that each case on psychological incapacity must still
be seen on its own merits CUI v ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
• No awards for moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, negates bad (Art. 6, CC example of a waiver against good customs)
faith which is necessary for awarding moral damages Morals are those generally accepted principles of morality w/c have
received some kind of social & practical confirmation.
ART. 15: [This case is an example wherein a Filipino, who is naturalized as
ART. 10 a citizen of another country, can no longer be bound by our laws but rather
Bello v Court of Appeal the law of his adoptive country (since art. 15 applies only to citizens of the
Doubtful Statutes – The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the Phils.).]
appeal but should have certified the case to the proper court. It is of the
essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable ARTICLES 19-22
result of injustice and absurdity and that a literal interpretation is to be NIKKO HOTEL MANILA v REYES
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Art. 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts & social grievances.
ART. 15 & 16 Art. 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores & has the ff elements: (1) There is
MICIANO v BRIMO an act w/c is legal; (2) but w/c is contrary to morals, good custom, public
In the absence of evidence of [foreign] laws, they are presumed to be the order or public policy; & (3) it is done w/ intent to injure. A common theme
same as those of the Philippines. Conditions expressly ignoring the testator’s runs thru Articles 19 & 21, & that is, the act complained of must be
national law is contrary to law & is considered unwritten. intentional. Bad judgment cannot amount to bad faith.
PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA SPS. QUISUMBING v MERALCO

[This case is proof that, in the absence of an express foreign law stating o/w, Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured
we are to presume that foreigners are also bound by the nationality rule party in the position where it was before it was injured. They pertain to such
regarding their family rights & duties, or to their status, condition & legal injuries or losses that are actually sustained & susceptible of measurement.
capacity.] A person who initiates an adultery case must be an offended Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate
spouse, & by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. Basic is
the time of the filing of the complaint. the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be
capable of proof, it must also be actually proven w/ a reasonable degree of
ROEHR v RODRIGUEZ certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given Requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether
ample opportunity to do so. physical, mental or psychological – clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act
GARCIA v RECIO or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
ART. 3: [Ignorance of the law does not cover foreign laws.] It is well-settled by the claimant; & (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the
in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. cases stated in art. 2219 of the CC. Moral damages, thru incapable of
Like any other facts, they must be alleged & proved. pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered & not to impose a penalty. Moral damages are not intended
to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or wrongs w/c is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
correction for the public good. statutory law.
Award of attorney’s fees are given b/c it is readily apparent that petitioner ARTICLE 26
needed the service of a lawyer to argue their cause. TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO
An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v CA not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. [However,] (parents’) part.
where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman & his representation to fulfill that ARTICLE 36
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of giving herself unto him YU v PCIB
in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of w/c is a
her & that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, & the cognizance of w/c
entice or inveigle her to accept him & to obntain her consent to the sexual pertains to another tribunal.It generally comes into play in a situation where
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not b/c of such a civil action & a crim’l action re both pending & there exists in the former
promise to marry but b/c of the fraud & deceit behind it & the willful injury an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the crim’l action may
to her honor & reputation w/c followed thereafter. proceed.
GLOBE MACKAY v CA DONATO v LUNA

A right, though by itself legal b/c recognized or granted by law as such, may A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct & separate from the
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised crime but so intimately connected w/ it that it determines the guilt or
in a manner w/c does not conform w/ the norms enshrined in Art. 19 & innocence of the accused, & for it to suspend the crim’l case, it must appear
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for w/c the that the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Art. 19 lays down a rule of innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
conduct for the government of human relations & for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an ARTICLES 37-41
action for damages under either Art. 20 or 21 would be proper. GELUZ v CA
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
UE v JADER under art. 40 of the CC b/c that same article expressly limits such provisional
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
advantage of another, even thru the forms & technicalities of law, together born alive.
w/ the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious. Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of
RA 6809: AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM 21 TO 18 include artificial or juridical persons, for o/w these latter would be w/out the
YRS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EO no. 209, & FOR OTHER constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property w/out due
PURPOSES process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches & seizures. We
§1. Art. 234 of EO No. 209, the FC of the Phils, is hereby amended to read take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or
as follows: juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities &
in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless estates of deceased persons.
o/w provided, majority commences at the age of 18 yrs."
§2. Arts. 235 & 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed. DUMLAO v QUALITY PLASTICS
§3. Art. 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: Court cannot have jurisdiction over dead person as it can not be validly
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person served w/ summons. A dead person has no civil personality & his juridical
& property of the child who shall then be qualified & responsible for all acts capacity, w/c is the fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost thru
of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. death.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of 21.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or CITIZENSHIP & DOMICILE
responsibility of parents & guardians for children & wards below 21 yrs of FRIVALDO v COMELEC
age mentioned in the 2nd & 3rd pars. of Art. 2180 of the CC." In repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born [citizen] who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. [Repatriation retroacts to the
DE JESUS v SYQUIA date of the filing of application as P.D. 725 (repatriation law) creates new
A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights & capable rights (exception to art. 7, CC).]
of being dealt w/ as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot goven a
person’s future status w/ finality. This is b/c a person may subsequently
ARTICLE 43 reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
LIMJOCO v THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE recognized by law for that purpose.
W/in the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for
the legal fiction by w/c, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELEC
person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice Domicile [means] an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place w/c,
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights & fulfilling whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return.”
such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical
fiction is indulged. W/in the framework & principles of the constitution presence in a fixed place” & animus manendi, or the intention of returning
itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that there permanently.
while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in §1 (1) & (2) must be deemed to
The essential distinction b/w residence & domicile in law is that residence §4. Citizens of the Phils. who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for w/c the resident has taken unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
up his abode ends. If a person’s intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; renounced it.
if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. §5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the nat’l interest & shall be
It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different dealt w/ by law.
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile
in favor of another domicile of choice. An individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived & maintained residences in different places.
FAMILY CODE CASE DOCTRINES
Residence for election purposes is used synonymously w/ domicile. ARTICLE 1

PT&T v NLRC
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. Domicile of origin is not easily [Various laws prove that marriage is ‘an inviolable social institution’, e.g.
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. RA 6955 (bans mail order brides), the Constitution & the Labor Code, thus
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention making it illegal for an employer to terminate an employee who is
of abandoning the formal place of resident & establishing a new one; & 3. married/marries save exceptional circumstances.]
Acts w/c correspond w/ the purpose.
ARTICLE 2, §12, Consti
ARTICLE IV, 1987 Constitution The State recognizes the sancity of family life & shall protect & strengthen
§1: The ff are citizens of the Phils.: the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
(1) Those who are citizens of the Phils. at the time of the adoption of this the life of the mother & the life of the unborn from conception. The natural
Consti; & primary right & duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Phils.; efficiency & the development of moral character shall receive the support
(3) Those born before Jan. 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Phil. of the Government.
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; &
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance w/ law. GOITIA v CAMPOS-RUEDA
§2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Phils. from birth The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
w/o having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Phil. citizenship. support his wife; an obligation, the enforcement of w/c is of such vital
Those who elect Phil. citizenship in accordance w/ par. (3), §1 hereof shall concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by
be deemed natural-born citizens. his own wrongful acts.
§3. Phil. citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law. BALOGBOG v CA
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, requisites of the law are complied w/. However, judges who are appointed
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place – other to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only w/in said areas &
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. not beyond. (So, A & B wants to get married & they specifically want C,
RTC Judge of Bulacan to marry them. If A & B wants to have the marriage
ARTICLES 2-6 celebration outside of Bulacan, they cannot have C as the solemnizing
officer.)
EUGENIO v VELEZ
[Phil. Law does not recognize common law marriages] ARANAS v JUDGE OCCIANO
[A judge who solemnizes a marriage out of human compassion may
COSCA v PALAYPAYON nonetheless be liable for violating the law on marriage.]
The fact alone that [a judge does] not sign the marriage certificate or
contract, the same [does] not bear a date & the parties & the Local Civil ARTICLE 22
Registrar [is] not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by LIM TANHU v RAMOLETE
themselves show that [a judge] did not solemnize the marriage. The primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract. While a marriage may be proved by other competent
WASSMER v VELEZ evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained.
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally Proof of loss of the [marriage] contract or of any other satisfactory reason
set a wedding & go thru [wedding] preparation[s] & publicity, only to walk for its non-production [should be] first presented to the court.
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably & unjustifiably contrary to good customs for w/c defendant VDA. DE CHUA v CA
must be held answerable in damages in accordance w/ art. 21 [of the CC]. Best proof of marriage b/w man & wife is a marriage contract. A photostat
copy of the marriage certificate cannot be [accepted as a substitute] as this
ARTICLE 7 is a violation of the best evidence rule.
NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY
Under Art. 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any ARTICLE 25
incumbent member of the judiciary w/in the court’s jurisdiction”. Art. 8, w/c REPUBLIC v CA
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony The certification of “due search & inability to find” issued by the civil
& does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
provided in the preceding provision. A priest who is commissioned & to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. A
allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so certificate of “due search & inability to find” can sufficiently prove that a
only w/in the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An marriage license is not issued.
appellate court Justice or a Justice of [the SC] has jurisdiction over the entire
Phils. to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
ARTICLE 26 parties & not after the death of either, in w/c case the parties & their
GARCIA v RECIO offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino & a foreigner, Art. 26 of the FC the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Phils., provided it is consistent w/ their respective nat’l ART. 40: A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
laws. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but thru no
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact & demonstrate sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
divorce decree is insufficient. expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained & declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC v ORBECIDO
Par. 2 of Art. 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties MANZANO v SANCHEZ
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, For [the] provision on marital cohabitation (art. 34) to apply, the ff requisites
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen & obtains must concur:
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry 1) The man & woman must have been living together as husband & wife
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the for at least 5 yrs. before the marriage;
marriage. 2) The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3) The fact of absence of legal impediment b/w the parties must be present
ARTICLES 27-34 at the time of marriage;
NIÑAL v BAYADOG 4) The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
ART. 34: [The] 5 year[s] should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation together for 5 yrs & are w/o legal impediment to marry each other; &
as “husband & wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of 5) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
marriage to validate the union. 5-year common-law cohabitation period, w/c ascertained the qualifications of the parties & that he had found no legal
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period impediment to their marriage.
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
period should be the yrs immediately before the day of the marriage & it parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning de facto.
no third party was involved at any time w/in the 5 yrs & continuity – that is
unbroken. Free & voluntary cohabitation w/ another person for at least 5 yrs does not
sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Martial cohabitation for a
ART. 35: Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either long period of time b/w 2 individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.
absolute nullity. This need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment
MARIATEGUI v CA of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The laws presume that a man & a woman, deporting themselves as husband
& wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in ARTICLE 36
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed & board is REPUBLIC v CA & MOLINA
legitimate. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to that case, incapacity & that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
to be in fact married. Once a man & a woman have lived as husband & wife has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most
& such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
being married must be admitted as a fact. insensitivity or inability to give meaning & significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
REPUBLIC v DAYOT The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
For the exception in [art. 34] to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the juridical antecedence, & (c) incurability.
man & the woman must have attained the age of majority, & that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband & wife for at least 5 yrs. [“Difficulty”, if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations does not constitute psychological incapacity.]
ARTICLE 35 Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” & “conflicting personalities”
DOMINGO v CA in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
[Pursuant to the FC], a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities & duties as married
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked due to some psychological (not physical) illness. Failure of expectation is
for purposes of contracting a 2nd marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
must 1st secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before experts & (d) clearly explained in the decision. Art. 36 of the FC requires
they can be allowed to marry again. that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
Art. 40 denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage manifestations &/or symptoms may be physical. [It must be proved] that the
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, parties, or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
in such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, Psychological incapacity must be proven to be existing “at the time of the
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an celebration” of the marriage. The manifestation need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior children thru sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
thereto. fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of marriage. The senseless & protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
Psychological incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically the above martial obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every one TE v TE
of the same sex. Such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of Courts should interpret [Art. 36] on a case-to-case basis; guided by
marriage obligations. experience, the findings of experts & researchers in psychological
disciplines, & by decisions of church tribunals. By the very nature of Art.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party 36, courts, despite having the primary task & burden of decision-making,
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shownh must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence on the
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, expert opinion on the psychological & mental temperaments of the parties.
much less ill will. There is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the [This case is proof that there are people who are psychologically
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that incapacitated to be married to each other but not w/ everyone else. In this
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting & thereby case, a male diagnosed w/ dependent personality disorder is incompatible
complying w/ the obligations essential to marriage. w/ a female diagnosed w/ antisocial personality disorder.]
CHOA v CHOA
It is the height of absurdity & inequity to condemn [a person]
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill [his] marital obligations, simply b/c
[he] filed cases against [his spouse]. [Lack of attention to children,
immaturity & lack of an intention of procreative sexuality does not
constitute psychological incapacity.] A medical examination is not a
Some Case Digests
condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as
the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) V. REBESENCIO,
adequately. G.R. NO. 198587, [JANUARY 14, 2015], 750 PHIL 791-846
Article 17
CHI MING TSOI v CA
Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is FACTS:
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder w/c clearly Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the Royal
demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning & Decree in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is located
significance to the marriage’ w/in the meaning of Art. 36 of the FC. at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the FC is “to Office). Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. After undergoing trainings, respondents became Yes. Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic validity of
Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts and contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on forms and solemnities of contracts ... shall be governed by the laws of the country in
various dates in 2006 allegedly because the termination was made solely because which they are executed"(i.e., lex loci celebrationis). In contrast, there is no
they were pregnant. statutorily established mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters
pertaining to substantive content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes
Respondents allege that they had gone through the necessary procedures to process have emerged: (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex
their maternity leaves its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their loci solutionis or the law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or
maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. the law intended by the parties.
Saudia anchored its disapproval and its demand for their resignation on its "Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" where the employment of a Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the present dispute is
Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. lex loci intentionis. In this jurisdiction, this court manifested preference for allowing
the parties to select the law applicable to their contract that Philippine courts would
Respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal. do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow
The case was initially assigned to the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR. the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that
it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It claimed that all the law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. On the matter of pleading
determining points of contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the Complaint forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only
ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Executive Labor be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest
Arbiter dismissed respondents' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction/merit. On possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
respondents' appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission's Sixth Division
reversed the ruling of Executive Labor Arbiter. A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non conveniens grounds.
A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative forum's adequacy. The
NLRC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. CA denied petitioners' Rule statute of limitations abroad may have run, of the foreign court may lack either
65 Petition. CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Appeal subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Occasionally, doubts will
was filed. be raised as to the integrity or impartiality of the foreign court (based, for example,
on suspicions of corruption or bias in favor of local nationals), as to the fairness of
ISSUE: its judicial procedures, or as to is operational efficiency (due, for example, to lack of
Whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may resources, congestion and delay, or interfering circumstances such as a civil unrest).
exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in In one noted case, [it was found] that delays of 'up to a quarter of a century' rendered
adjudicating the present dispute the foreign forum... inadequate for these purposes.
HELD: The Court deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a
defendant not only allege supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in the
Philippine jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such danger is real and shall be liable to the latter for damages” and one of the rights as provided by part 6
present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in another jurisdiction of this article states, “The right against deprivation of property without due process
and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction. of law”. As provided by this article, MERALCO directly deprived the Quisumbing’s
of their property in the form of electricity without due process of law.
SPS. QUISUMBING V. MERALCO
(G.R. NO. 142943, 3 APRIL 2002) Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the
Article 21 billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral
and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered
FACTS: when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed
located at #94 Green meadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO
1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict
conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single-phase meters at the house and observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company
observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged
plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and
tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB
laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, representative was present.
defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an
hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and
couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are compensation for an injury
bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured.
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the
immediate reconnection. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST V. JADER
G.R. NO. 132344, 17 FEBRUARY 2000
ISSUE: Article 21
Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously, and malevolent manner done without
due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business FACTS:
reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages. In 1987, Romeo Jader was a graduating law student at the University of the East. He
failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an
RULING: incomplete grade (INC). He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student
Art 32 of the Civil Code provides that “Any public officer or employee, or any and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any by the Dean.
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among ABUNADO VS. PEOPLE
the fourth-year students should be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name appeared on G.R. NO. 159218, 30 MARCH 2004
the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies and later he gave
blowout celebrations. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and FACTS:
took review classes. However, he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1967 and they separated in 1966. He
because his academic requirements were not complete because it appears that his contracted a second marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then Narcisa went to Japan.
INC rating was not removed. While Narcisa was in Japan, he married Zenaida for the second time in 1989.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered Salvador’s affair with Fe Corazon Palto
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was not able and his second marriage to Zenaida. The event was followed by Salvador’s filing of
to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the UE’s negligence. He prayed for an annulment case and the other hand, Narcisa filed for bigamy against Salvador.
an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida
ISSUE: and that the bigamy case should be suspended since the annulment case is prejudicial.
Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading
a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation ISSUES:
when such is not the case. Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for the bigamy case to prosper?
HELD: HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual Annulment has no bearing upon determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and bigamy. The only requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
information to each student as to where he or she had already complied with the subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included
among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise by
faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful the Court. Salvador’s marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are both subsisting, which
prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the makes him guilty of bigamy.
Civil Code.
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that
a crime is committed against the state. Bigamy is a public offense which can be
denounced by even a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know of it.
BELTRAN v PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137567; 20 June 2000 (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action;
TOPICS: Prejudicial Question, Bigamy, Concubinage, and Nullity of Marriage and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
FACTS:
Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine, however, alleged that it was prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
Meynardo who left the conjugal home, and is now living with Milagros, his final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
paramour. involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of the the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
City Prosecutor of Makati City.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
saying that the pendency of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case. declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
from trying his case. The RTC denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration. Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a TE VS. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIANA CHOA
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife? G.R. NO.126746 November 29, 2000 346 SCRA 327
Art.36 Prejucial Question
RULING:
No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a Case Doctrine:
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
decisions. It has two essential elements: not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily a demurrer to evidence with leave of court. The trial court in its Order denied
be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspension a criminal case in petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence stating that the Demurrer could not be granted
view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the
accused.
The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in
effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Petitioner also filed with the Board of the PRC a Motion to suspend the proceedings
Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage and the
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous criminal case for bigamy. The Board denied the Motion. Petitioner then filed a
marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTC’s and
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. the Board’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of ISSUE:
the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial • WON the pendency of a civil case give rise to a prejudicial question in a
question involves a civil and a criminal case. The SC previously ruled that there is criminal case for bigamy
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. • WON there would be a prejudicial question if one of the cases is
administrative in nature
FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rights HELD:
on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they No. The CA did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment
would meet each other regularly. Liliana Choa gave birth on April 21, 1989 and of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial
petitioner stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended
respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a 2nd marriage with a certain Julieta until said civil case is terminated.
Santella. Private respondent charged petitioner with bigamy that was filed with the
RTC of Quezon City. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt
Meanwhile, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd marriage is
He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private
time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings
essential martial obligations. Private respondent also filed with the PRC an could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.
respective Engineering licenses.
The ruling in PEOPLE VS. MENDONZ (95 Phil 843) and PEOPLE VS. ARAGON the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment
(100 Phil 1033) cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.
the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect ISSUE:
at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages.
article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous HELD:
marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, yet unborn, is given by law a
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may
In LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731) the SC held that “Parties to a also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an
declaration the presumption of marriage exits. obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of
the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a
question involves a civil and a criminal case. The SC previously ruled that there is woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO GELUZ vs. CA

34 SCRA 132 2 SCRA 801
FACTS: FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant Felix Icao, were neighbors in Respondent Oscar Lazo’s wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner physician
Dapitan City. They had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao Antonio Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in
was married, he succeeded to have carnal knowledge with plaintiff several times 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. To conceal the pregnancy from her
under force and intimidation and without her consent. Carmen got pregnant despite parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had an abortion again on
of the drugs supplied by defendant. As a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet another
complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground abortion at Geluz’ clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan
of lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of
campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country,
has he given consent on the abortion. he continuously wrote letters which are solicitous of Antonia and the baby’s welfare.
He made hospital arrangements through his friend for Antonia’s delivery.
ISSUE:
Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover After giving birth, they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs
damages from the physician who caused the same. of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and married another woma.
HELD: It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain damages in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
behalf of an aborted child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to find given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
any basis for an award of moral damages. Oscar’s indifference to the previous
abortions of Nita clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of ISSUES:
his parental affections. • Whether the note to the padre and the other letters written by defendant to
Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s • Whether the defendant should be compelled to acknowledge the child
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only Ismael Loanco.
he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries.
HELD:
It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to be made The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the other letters to Antonia are
since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as sufficient proof of paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated. indubitable.
DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession
G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933 of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal
the father’s resolution to admit the status”.
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court compelling Syquia to
law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an unmarried scion of a provide support for the child Ismael Loanco.
prominent family in Manila. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on
June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On

February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev Father confirming that the child is his
LIMJUCO V. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC
(45 OG NO. 9, P. 397) G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS: FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court
the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. “is hereby authorized to foreclose
and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment”.
to the estate is a contravention of law.
Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision
ISSUE: had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial ordered the “foreclosure” of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land
personality. of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. The sale was confirmed
by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the
under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial action was filed. Oria’s death was not known to Quality Plastic AND that Testate
juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”. Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. On March 1, 1963 all testamentary
It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights heirs in Oria’s duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the
and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land.
surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the
Public Service Commission. ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Oria’s estate?
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case
No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the HELD:
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the person. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity, which is the
constitution. fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42,
Civil Code).
The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However, Quality plastics cannot be 2. Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
held liable for damages and other costs because they were in good faith in including
Oria as defendant for no one informed them of his death. HELD:
- foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in
ARTICLE-26 this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party.
- remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965 Philippine law;
- desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the other
FACTS: to recover damages;
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain - action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in
in one of Pastor’s friend’s house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicenta’s the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
parents arranged for them to be married properly in a church so as to validate their - SC reduced amount to pay for damages
marriage as advised by a priest. Vicenta opposed to a second marriage after receiving ○ Tenchavez ordered to pay Php 5,000 in damages
an anonymous letter alleging that Pastor is having an amorous relationship with ○ Escano orered to pay Php 25,000 in damages
matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her parents and Pastor went
back to work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her husband’s welfare in her
letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they became A R T I C L E - 36
estranged.
ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non- G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004
prosecution because she never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing
her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was Facts
single and left for the United States. She filed for divorce (1950) against Pastor in - Salvador married Narcisa in 1967
Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character” which the - Salvador contracted 2nd marriage to zenaida in 1989
Nevada court granted even when she was not yet an American citizen (1958). - Salvador filed for annulment from narcisa in january 1995
- Narcisa filed bigamy charges in may 1995
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents - Trial court convicted salvador of bigamy, zenaida was acquitted
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and - CA affirmed the trial court decision with modification on penalty imposed
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections. He
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. ISSUE
- Whether or not Salvador's petition for annulment is a prejudicial question
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
RULING
- No. the outcome of the petition for annulment has no bearing upon the ○ Elements of Prejudicial question
determination of the innocence or guilt in the bigamy case, since the bigamy • The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
- Prejudicial Question - defined as one based on a fact distinct & separate from the criminal prosecution would be based
crime but connected with it that it determines guilt or innocence • In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil actions, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined
- In this case, even if the petitioner obtained a declaration of nullity of marriage, the
point is that the second marriage was procured before the first marriage was annulled. A R T I C L E - 40
BELTRAN v PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES TE VS. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIANA CHOA
G.R. No. 137567; 20 June 2000 G.R. NO.126746 November 29, 2000 346 SCRA 327
Facts: Facts:
- Concubinage case with pendency of annulment declaration - Petitioner Te & Choa were married ion civil rights in 1988, did not live together
- Beltran (petitioner) seeks to set aside the order of RTC Judge Tuazon Jr that denied after the marriage
Beltran's petition for issuance of preliminary injunction to enjoin concubinage case - 1989 Choa bore a child & Te stopped visiting
on the ground that there is petition for nullity of marriage - May 1990 Te contracted 2nd marriage to Santella
- Beltran married Felix in June 1973 - June 1990, Choa filed complaint
- Felix allege Beltran left conjugal home to live with Salting - July 1990 Te filed for annulment
- Beltran filed for annulment in February 1997 - August 1990 bigamy case was filed in RTC
- Felix filed concubinage case & in September 1997 prosecutors office found - November 1990 Choa filed complaint with PRC vs Te & Santella for revocation of
probable cause to proceed license
- Beltran filed motion to defer proceeding including the issuance of warrant of arrest, - Petitioner filed for several actions
arguing that pendency of annulment decision posed prejudicial question ○ Demurrer to evidence & motion to inhibit in RTC = denied
○ CA - petition for certiorari against RTC Judge = denied
Issues: ○ PRC - motion to suspend proceeding in view of pendency for annulment = denied
- Whether or not Beltran's pendency of the petition for annulment is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case Issue:
- Whether or not Te's pendency of civil annulment creates prejudicial question
Ruling:
- No. concubinage was done during existence of marriage & not a prejudicial Ruling:
question to the concubinage - No. Petition has no merit. Pendency of the Civil Case for Annulment of Marriage
- Prejudicial Question - defined as one based on a fact distinct & separate from the did not pose prejudicial question
crime but connected with it that it determines guilt or innocence
- Outcome of civil case for annulment has no bearing on the criminal case as the first It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to be made
marriage was existing when 2nd marriage was contracted since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as
indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
GELUZ vs. CA
2 SCRA 801 DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo’s wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner physician FACTS:
Antonio Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in
1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. To conceal the pregnancy from her law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an unmarried scion of a
parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had an abortion again on prominent family in Manila. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on
June 17, 1931.
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet another
abortion at Geluz’ clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On
campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev Father confirming that the child is his
has he given consent on the abortion. and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country,
he continuously wrote letters which are solicitous of Antonia and the baby’s welfare.
ISSUE: He made hospital arrangements through his friend for Antonia’s delivery.
Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same. After giving birth, they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs
of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and married another woman.
HELD:
The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain damages in It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
behalf of an aborted child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to find charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
any basis for an award of moral damages. Oscar’s indifference to the previous given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
abortions of Nita clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental affections. ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre and the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only 2. Whether the defendant should be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael
he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. Loanco.
HELD: HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the other letters to Antonia are The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because
sufficient proof of paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
indubitable. juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”.
It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those
of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the
the father’s resolution to admit the status”. Public Service Commission.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court compelling Syquia to Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case
provide support for the child Ismael Loanco. No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within
A R T I C L E - 42-43 the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution.
LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
45 OG No. 9, p.397 DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC
G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of FACTS:
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag
Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision
and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. “is hereby authorized to foreclose
to the estate is a contravention of law - that it is an error to allow the substitution of the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment”.
the state as party applicant
Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision
ISSUE: had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial ordered the “foreclosure” of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land
personality. of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. The sale was confirmed
by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the
action was filed. Oria’s death was not known to Quality Plastic AND that Testate Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. On March 1, 1963 all testamentary denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the
heirs in Oria’s duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land for lack not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
of jurisdiction
ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Oria’s estate? unborn child.
HELD: RULING:
The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
person. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to
Civil Code). an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and
his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’
Oria could not have been validly served his summons. grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case,
had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that
The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However, Quality plastics cannot be of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
held liable for damages and other costs because they were in good faith in including
Oria as defendant for no one informed them of his death. The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
CONTINENTAL STEEL VS MONTANO the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
G.R. NO. 182836, OCTOBER 13, 2009 unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
FACTS: child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Union - Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery
which resulted to the death of their unborn child.
A R T I C L E - 48-51 that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700 On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of
9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she Timeline of events:
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before - Foundling
May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. ○ Sept 3, 1968 - found abandoned as newborn in Parish Church of Jaro, found by
Edgardo Militar
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally ○ Sept 6, 1968 - transferred the custody to Emiliano Militar; registered as foundling,
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar
(SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to ○ 5 Years Old - Susan Roces & Fernando Poe Jr filed for adoption
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a ○ May 13, 1974 - trial court granted petition; Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
naturalized American citizen in 2001. ○ 2nd half 2005 - Susan Roces found that lawyer who handled adoption failed to
secure new Certificate of Live Birth indicating new name & new parents
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating ○ May 4, 2006 - secured new certificate of live birth
medical condition, who then eventually died on February 3,2005. She then quit her
job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the - Marriage & US Citizenship
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. ○ July 27, 1991 - married Teodoro Llamanzares, dual Philippine-US citizen
○ July 29, 1991 - flew to US
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her ○ Oct 18, 2001 - naturalized US citizen
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new ○ Dec 19, 2001 - received US passport
Philippine Passport.
- Back to Philippines
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB , she ○ Dec 13, 2004 - Feb 3, 2005 - came back due to fathers health
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to ○ 1st quarter of 2005 - moved back permanently
Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American ○ May 24, 2005 - came back to the Philippines
passport. ○ 2nd half of 2005 - purchased a condo in San Juan
○ Feb 20, 2006 - condo titles transferred w Kids started attending Philippine schools
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ○ Feb 14 - Mar 11, 2006 - US trip to dispose remaining belonging○ Mar 2006 (late)
ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born - informed USPS of abandonment of address
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot ○ Apr 27, 2006 - sold US home
be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground ○ Early 2006 - acquired lot in Corinthian Hills QC
○ July 7, 2006 - took oath of allegiance pursuant to RA 9225 its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
○ July 10, 2006 - filed with Bureau of Immigration petition to reacquire citizenship definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
+ for kids
○ July 18, 2006 - BI ruled in favor & issued Identification Certificates (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as
○ Aug 31, 2006 - registered voter in Brgy Santa Lucia, San Juan to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
○ 2006/2007 - acquired Philippine passport Convention Law.
○ Oct 6, 2010 - Pnoy appointed Grace as Chair of MTRCB
○ Oct 20, 2010 - executed Affidavit of renunciation of allegiance to the US & of As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
citizenship satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently)
○ Oct 21, 2010 - submitted above affidavit to BI & then took oat as chair of MTRCB coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
○ July 12, 2011 - executed oath/affirmation of renunciation of US citizenship before acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning
the vice consul at US Embassy Manila. Grace stated that she had resided outside of to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay
the US from Sept 3, 1968 - July 29, 1991 & May 2005 to present (July 12, 2011) and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
○ Dec 9, 2011 - US Vice Consul issued certificate of loss of nationality effective Oct application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy
21, 2010 for Presidency was granted by the SC.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement. G.R No. 120295, 28 June 1996
HELD: FACTS:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee
satisfied the constitutional requirement that only natural-born Filipinos may run for made a petition to cancel the COC for being disqualified to seek public office
Presidency. because he was not a Filipino Citizen, which was granted by the COMELEC.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted upon until after
physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was May 1995 election. His candidacy continued and he was elected as Governor.
found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that However, the COMELEC affirmed his disqualification on May 11, 1995. Raul Lee
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes was proclaimed Governor.
parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible
under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on the grounds that:
1. He took an Oath of Allegiance on June 30 as his petition for naturalization in
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as September 1994 had been granted;
based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though 2. There is no more legal impediment for his proclamation;
3. The Vice Governor and not Lee should occupy the seat as Governor in case of Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of 1950 he returned to the
vacancy due to disqualification. Philippines for a four -month vacation, then on July 15, 1950, filed an application
for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate
ISSUE: course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this
Is Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election as Governor? course in July 1951 but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.
HELD: Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in
Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in the 1988 and 1992 elections the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile,
on the issue of his citizenship and he was stateless when he filed his COC for the which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is
1995 elections, thus making him ineligible to hold public office. But his case is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a
unique and the law should be interpreted liberally on his favor. resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time
being, merely to study.
1. He sought American citizenship to escape prosecution of the Martial Law, not to
denounce his being a Fiipino. ISSUE:
2. He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he files his COC despite being denied Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, when petitioner
several times. left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition.
3. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-acquire his citizenship
despite technical setbacks. HELD:
4. Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an American Citizen he opted on returning While domicile and residence mean the same thing, residence combined with
and serving his country which gives no doubt as to his loyalty and dedication to this intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed
country. permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though
5. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times which makes there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile.
him deserving to govern the people.
Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition
Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of Sorsogon and granted Filipino for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for
citizenship. the hearing, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside
continuously in the Philippines “from the date of the filing of his petition up to the
UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC time of his admission to Philippine citizenship”, he has not complied with the
95 P.R. 890 requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not
entitled to a judgment in his favor.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on However, the denial of his petition does not bar him to reapply for citizenship and
October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He undergo the same process again. He has to be committed to comply with the
went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland requirements.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC HELD:
248 SCRA 300 Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court
favors the conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in
FACTS: the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
Imelda was a little over 8 years old when her parents established domicile in district for the following reasons:
Tacloban, Leyte. She finished her studies and got her degree in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of
Manila in 1952 to work for her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
office at the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile,
Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and consequently became a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one,
a registered voter there. and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all
these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her action of returning to
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, also a candidate the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
requirement for residency. domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words “since childhood” in her The petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that “she the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. Respondent COMELEC
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner
the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 1 ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same
STAR PAPER V. SIMBOL company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor
GR No164774 Code or is a valid exercise of a management prerogative
FACTS: RULING:
Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia and Lorna E. Estrella were all The case at bar involves Article of the Labor Code 136 of the Labor Code which
regular employees at Star Paper Corporation. During their employment in the provides:
company, Simbol and Comia, met their co-employees, Alma Dayrit and Howard
Comia, and eventually married them. Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to
Prior to their respective marriages, Jospehine Ongsitco, the Manager of the Personnel stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
and Administration Department, advised them that should they decide to get married, deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
one of the should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, which otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
states that:
There are 2 types of employment policies involving spouses: policies banning only
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and
to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company. those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles, one male and another female) the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then
decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,
complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate
Simbol was compelled to resign on June 20, 1998. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000. treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the
plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-
As for Estrella, she got impregnated by one of her co-employees Luisito Zuniga, who spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit,
was a married man. Upon her return to the company after recuperating from an transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish
accident, she was denied entry and was handed a memorandum stating that she was disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a
being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum as she disproportionate effect on a particular class.
was on leave for 21 days and has not been given a chance to explain. The
management asked her to write an explanation but she was nonetheless dismissed by The state courts’ rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of
the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she submitted a letter of resignation marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts.
in exchange for her 13th month pay. Though they agree that the term “marital status” encompasses discrimination based
on a person’s status as either married, single, divorced, or widowed, they are divided
on whether the term has a broader meaning.
The courts narrowly interpreting marital status to refer only to a person’s status as The Court did not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’
married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader sole contention that “the company did not just want to have 2 or more of its
definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its intent. They employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity” is
hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married. lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the
They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by
single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the “identity, occupation, and place the law.
of employment of one’s spouse.” These courts have upheld the questioned policies
and ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their In the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but
respective state statutes. were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. The policy is premised on
the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If the
The courts that have broadly construed the term “marital status” rule that it questioned rule is upheld without valid justification, the employer can create policies
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one’s spouse. They strike based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the employee’s right to security of tenure.
state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual’s qualifications or co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The
work performance. These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way
the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the
of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on married persons working together in one company.
marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better
accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an PT&T V NLRC
employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is known as the bona 272 SCRA 596
fide occupational qualification exception.
FACTS:
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.
factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she
operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that represented that she was single although she was married. When management found
all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so
perform the duties of the job. she was subsequently dismissed from work.
Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee,
was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from
discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved
company rules. to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion company policy into misrepresenting
for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action. her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is
a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest
Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s
of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work. improper, illegal, or unjustified.
ISSUES: However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which
. Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the
employment was discriminatory dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.
. Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss
of confidence Grace attained regular status as an employee
. Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
HELD: dismissal.
There was discrimination
When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete
Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary
of the marriage of a female employee. employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it
Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than There was illegal dismissal
the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. benefits or their monetary equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who
have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over
at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of
and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are
executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital
Petition dismissed. relationship because of legal impediments.
ESTRADA V ESCRITOR In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long and arduous scrutiny into the
2006 origins and development of the religion clauses in the United States (U.S.) and the
Philippines, we held that in resolving claims involving religious freedom (1)
FACTS: benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and
requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial (2) in deciding respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause
Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court (from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling state
interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.
child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to Past Ruling:
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will
conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s
Administrative Code. claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state’s
"compelling interest" to override respondent’s religious belief and practice; and (c)
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started to respondent’s religious freedom.
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty
years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also The Compelling Interest Test:
admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the religious sect As previously stated, the compelling state interest test involves a three-step process.
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, We explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which must be
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their answered in each step, viz:
religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging First: “[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise
Faithfulness." of religion?"
The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring even if anchored directly on an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause alone, rather
into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about than a legislative exemption.
its truth as held in Ballard and Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimant’s belief is
ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatory At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality
regulation. accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions
every time a free exercise claim comes before it. Although benevolent neutrality is
Second, the court asks: "[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest of the
this infringement of religious liberty?" state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the
In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the test—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious
state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the exercise.
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what
extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of
Third, the court asks: "[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the "gross and immoral conduct”
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?" HELD:
The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its NO. A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "the
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override
achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. respondent’s fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the government
exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state
Three kinds of accommodation: objective is the least intrusive means.
Again, the application of the compelling state interest test could result to three
situations of accommodation: In its Memorandum-In-Intervention, the OSG contends that the State has a
• First, mandatory accommodation would result if the Court finds that compelling interest to override respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice, in
accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause. order to protect marriage and the family as basic social institutions. The Solicitor
• Second, if the Court finds that the State may, but is not required to, accommodate General, quoting the Constitution and the Family Code, argues that marriage and the
religious interests, permissive accommodation results. family are so crucial to the stability and peace of the nation that the conjugal
• Finally, if the Court finds that establishment concerns prevail over potential arrangement embraced in the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness should not be
accommodation interests, then it must rule that the accommodation is prohibited. recognized or given effect, as "it is utterly destructive of the avowed institutions of
marriage and the family for it reduces to a mockery these legally exalted and socially
The cases of American Bible Society, Ebralinag, and Victoriano demonstrate that significant institutions which in their purity demand respect and dignity."
our application of the doctrine of benevolent neutrality-accommodation covers not
only the grant of permissive, or legislative accommodations, but also mandatory Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
accommodations. Thus, an exemption from a law of general application is possible, fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances,
human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out
state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority
religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so
Clause as a source of right by itself. compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also
protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man
Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
and the family," or even "in the sound administration of justice" that must be weighed
against respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed.
exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words,
the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; GOITIA V CAMPOS-RUEDA
it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined 35 PHIL 252
if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
Facts:
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality Plaintiff, Eloisa Goitia Y De La Camara, was married to the defendant, Jose Campos
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by Rueda, on January 7, 1915.
the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by The defendant, after had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, on several times,
universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad, improper, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organ;
immoral and contrary to good conscience," the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to
that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on perform any of the acts other than legal and valid cohabitation.
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Because the plaintiff refused to perform the said acts, defendant maltreated the
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to plaintiff, by words and deeds and inflicting injuries in some parts of her body.
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate When the plaintiff was unable to induce the repugnant desires and maltreatment of
goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that the defendant, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly the home of her parents.
failed to prove this element of the test.
Issue:
whether or not the plaintiff can constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance?
Held: Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-
The court held that a husband, cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic
the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a
illegal, and unbearable conduct, drive his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and
relation and repudiate his duties there under. The court ruled that the wife, who is prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.
forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
other remedy, not withstanding the provision of art, 149 of the CC giving the person Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
who is `obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying fixed engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to
the same. The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them
on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate would resign from their jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the company
maintenance. policy against entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor
company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION V. GLAXO WELLCOME Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy
GR 162994 package to be offered by Astra.
Facts: Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Thereafter, Tecson
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application
had undergone training and orientation. was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson
management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co- defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the
employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company. Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides these conditions; that DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at
otherwise, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration,
“transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation but Tecson declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and
for employment outside the company after six months. Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy
on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor
companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
CA sustained; MR denied. the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access
Petitioner’s Contention: to its secrets and procedures.
that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce
distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to
policy restricts the employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was constructively expansion and growth.
dismissed
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social
GLAXO argues: justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be
that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause;
EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its
its secrets, procedures and policies; that Tecson can no longer question the assailed employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
company policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between
that such policy was stipulated therein. the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
ISSUE: Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the
Whether or not Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. PETITION
competitor companies is valid DENIED.
HELD: FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 2

The Court finds no merit in the petition.
REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing 185 SCRA 45
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive Facts:
pharmaceutical industry. Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the
RTC. She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of Hyperplasia (CAH) – a condition where persons afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Code. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition Code include even those that occur after birth.
is known as CAH. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s
uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has Respondent undisputedly has CAH. It is one of the many conditions that involve
no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and intersex anatomy. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, both male and female sexes.
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous
to her. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations, which should not be subject to outright
The RTC granted respondent’s petition. denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
Hence, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
of the abovementioned ruling. The OSG contends, among others, that Rule 108 does
not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court - Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil than female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Registries
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
ISSUE: intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition on the ground of her medical individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
condition. thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
RULING: preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
No. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
issue and the court must look to the statutes. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 6
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has
already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment EUGENIO V VELEZ
and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical 185 SCRA 45
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial
tendency due to CAH. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law husband,
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged
valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was
male. wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305
and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the
We respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change An exchange of pleadings followed.
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the
of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male. Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.
The Republic’s petition is denied.
Ruling:
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage
husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
at bar.
Issue:
We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in Ruling:
fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that
the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio
and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
COSCA V PALAYPAYON criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal
237 SCRA 249 solemnization of marriage.
Facts: WASSMERV VELEZ

Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the 12 SCRA 648
Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy,
respondents, for the following offenses: FACTS:
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided
2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases to schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as:
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other
4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of
5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend
6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an
absence of marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded
reflect any marriage license number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 7
of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for
breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such NAVARRO V DOMAGTOY
an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral AM MTJ 96-1088
damages against him.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted
Whether or not the award of damages is proper. evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well
HELD: as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also
unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable First, on September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an
withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s wife has been absent for
Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another
provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner judge.
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.” Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27,
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. upon the request of the parties.
Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, ISSUE:
reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
damages against him
HELD:
Yes. Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the
law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his
former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect
or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before
was only done by one party, the bride, NOT by both parties. More importantly, the starting the ceremony he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing marriage license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of resetting to another date.
the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as of compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
the marriage. solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished
the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
ARANAS V JUDGE OCCIANO Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to
AM MTJ 02-1309 him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
Facts: marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage
and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua, license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. due to her own fault and negligence.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
was not recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the 2001 confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own
pension of her husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal solemnized the same.
acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings. From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License
on 5 January 2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Orobia claimed it. Also, the Civil Registrar General and the Local Registrar of
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner
2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the
solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her
request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a
marriage license. The LCR informed the judge that they cannot issue the same due Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse. petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal
of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent
Issue: from disciplinary action
Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction
and without the requisite marriage license. WHEREFORE, Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt
Ruling: with more severely.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 11-25
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites LIM TAN HU V RAMOLETE
of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific (ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO LEONARDO NG SUA AND
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. CO OYO VS. HON. RAMOLETE AND TAN PUT)
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a
66 SCRA 425
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
FACTS:
administrative liability.
Respondent Tan Put filed a complaint against spouses Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay,
spouses Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo and their son Eng Chong Leonardo
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
for the share of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan in the partnership.
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
Tan Put alleged the following:
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
a. that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner in the
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should
commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company with Antonio Lim Tanhu and
also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
Alfonso Ng Sua.
Marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
b. that the defendant-petitioners, through fraud and machination, took actual and
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
active management of the partnership and although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license
the manager of Glory Commercial Company, defendant-petitioners managed to use
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
the funds of the partnership to purchase lands in the cities of Cebu, Lapulapu,
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner.
Mandaue, and the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla.
In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
c. that after the death of her husband, the defendants, without liquidation of the
partnership, organized a corporation with the paid-up capital from the partnership.
She contends that one-third of the interest belongs to her late husband.
d. When her husband died, he asked the defendants to liquidate the partnership but 2. An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received
the defendants never did. Later on, she was made to sign a quitclaim of all her rights P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law
and interest in the partnership in consideration of P65,000.00. Said quitclaim was in marriage and promised not to interfere with each other’s affairs.
the Hands of Lim Tanhu and a copy was never given to her.
e. That she gave some of her money to her husband for the start-up capital of the 3. Stated differently, since the existence of the quitclaim has been duly established
partnership without any circumstance to detract from its legal import, the court should have held
that plaintiff was bound by her admission therein that she was the common-law wife
• Defendant-petitioners replied to her complaint alleging: only of Po Chuan and what is more, that she had already renounced for valuable
a. Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four consideration whatever claim she might have relative to the partnership Glory
legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others, all residing in Hong Kong. Commercial Co.
Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and
what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children. 4. In the light of all these circumstances, We find no alternative but to hold that
b. Tan Put is aware that she is the common law wife of Tee Hoon. plaintiff Tan Put's allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan has
not been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary, the evidence on record
• Defendants also filed a counterclaim against Tan Put for causing delay in the convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was that of a common-law
operations of the business. (Note: This case involves a lot of appeals; motion to quash wife and furthermore, that all her claims against the company and its surviving
and 2 petitions for certiorari but I will stick to the partnership issue only.) partners as well as those against the estate of the deceased have already been settled
• Tan Put asked the lower court to dismiss the complaint as to the spouses Leonardo and paid.
Ng Sua but retained with respects to Tanhu and Ochay.
5. If Po Chuan was in control of the affairs and the running of the partnership, how
The lower court allowed the dismissal in part and allowed a motion to hold the could the defendants have defrauded him of such huge amounts as plaintiff had made
petitioners in default, and motion to present evidence ex-parte. (The judge here was his Honor believe? Upon the other hand, since Po Chuan was in control of the affairs
very biased). of the partnership, the more logical inference is that if defendants had obtained any
portion of the funds of the partnership for themselves, it must have been with the
ISSUE knowledge and consent of Po Chuan, for which reason no accounting could be
Whether or not Tan Put, the common law wife of Tee Hoon, has a right on behalf of demanded from them therefor, considering that Article 1807 of the Civil Code refers
Tee Hoon to claim his share in the partnership. only to what is taken by a partner without the consent of the other partner or partners.
HELD 6. Accordingly, defendants have no obligation to account to anyone for such

No. acquisitions in the absence of clear proof that they had violated the trust of Po Chuan
1. Tan Put cannot be considered as a legal party in interest because she was unable during the existence of the partnership.
to prove that her marriage was valid and subsisting. There was no marriage contract
shown nor evidence to support that such a marriage existed.
Dispositive Portion: (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held Davao City.
in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal
of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the
court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy
Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having
permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and proven his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but
except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent. it decided in favor of herein respondents.
VDA. DE CHUA V. COURT OF APPEALS Issue:

G.R. NO. 116835, 5 MARCH 1998 Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?
FACTS: Held:
From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which
Florita A. Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy
intestate in Davao City. of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best
evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates
On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove
petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of marriage especially so when the private respondent has submitted a certification
the two minors. from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered
and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse solemnized said alleged marriage.
of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent’s death, Davao City was his REPUBLIC V. CA AND CASTRO
residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In G.R. NO. 103047, 12 SEPTEMBER 1994.
support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents: (1)
photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the FACTS:
name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
(3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay
he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents.
1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and, Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required
for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 RULING:
was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro No. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no
marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple license would render the marriage void ab initio.
parted ways.
On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of
with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer’s efforts, they discovered Court, a certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his
that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
marriage. Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before
June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application Here, the Court held that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
Pasay City. the absence of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that the certification and the uncorroborated FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 26
testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage. REPUBLIC V ORBECINDO III
GR 154380, OCTOBER 5 2005
The trial court denied the petition. It ruled that the inability of the certifying official
to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage Facts:
license issued. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with
On appeal, the CA declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and a son and a daughter.
void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract; In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
hence, this petition for review on certiorari by Republic of the Philippines. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was valid. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
him currently live at California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. a foreigner; and
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
However, the Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
ISSUE: In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
Whether or not respondent Cipriano can remarry under Article 26 of the Family still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
Code. would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
HELD: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
YES. Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the family code will apply to the case. OSG’s Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
contention is therefore incorrect.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent was still barred from remarrying.
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the REPUBLIC V. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, GR NO. 221029, APRIL 24, 2018
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
FACTS:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) was previously married in the
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving Philippines to a Japanese national. She filed for divorce in Japan, and after due
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but proceedings, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court. Manalo sought
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment and to have the entry of
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule petitioner and the former Japanese husband’s marriage was previously registered.
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, denied the petition for lack of merit. It
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
2 of Article 26 as follows: afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated MORISONO V. MORISONO
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country”. GR NO. 226013, JULY 2, 2018
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Facts:
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if Luzviminda was married to Ryoji Morisono in Quezon City. While living in Japan,
it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree Luzviminda and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, which was eventually approved on and duly recorded with
remarry. the Head of Mizuho-Ku. In view of the same, Luzviminda filed a petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce decree before the RTC of Quezon City, so that
ISSUE: she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be
Whether or not the divorce decree abroad obtained by the Filipino spouse be able to marry again.
recognized and enforced in the Philippines?
The RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad
RULING: by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree
Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 (Family Code) speaks of “a divorce x x x validly is valid according to the national law of the alien – the same does not find application
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. ” Based on when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same. Invoking
a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines. Via petition for review
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of under Rule 45, Luzviminda elevated the case before the Supreme Court on pure
the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. question of law
The Supreme Court partially affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. The Court ISSUE:
noted that the burden was on the respondent to prove the divorce was validated by Whether, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
Japanese law as well as her former husband’s capacity to legally remarry. Thus, the initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against
case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and for his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry
consideration of evidence presented regarding Japanese law on divorce.
RULING:
Yes. pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages
between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction,
regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that
the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably
the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity ISSUE:
to the foreign law allowing. Whether the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by
Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's
petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was RULING:
anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings Yes. In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope of Article
which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the
Filipino spouse. The Court’s ruling states, in part:
In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an
did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted. is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON V. REPUBLIC marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
GR NO. 243722, JANUARY 22, 2020 result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife.
Facts: Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages
Petitioner Cynthia Galapon (Cynthia), a Filipina, and Noh Shik Park (Park), a where the divorce decree is:
Korean national, got married in the City of Manila in February 2012. Their (i) obtained by the foreign spouse;
relationship turned sour and ended with a divorce by mutual agreement in South (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and
Korea. After the divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija a Petition for
the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 27-35 (?)
The RTC granted the Petition.; however, the Court of Appeals (CA) held that the NINAL V. BAYADOG
divorce decree in question cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as 328 SCRA 122
Cynthia is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement. The CA pointed
out that the foreign divorce under the second (2nd) paragraph of Article 26 if the Facts:
Family Code must have been initiated and obtained by the foreigner spouse, and Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot
since the divorce here was jointly applied for and obtained by a Filipino and a by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
foreigner spouse, it was incorrect for the RTC to apply the provision of law. Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without any distinction
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
died in a car accident common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a (b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues: MANZANO V. SANCHEZ

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least A.M. MTJ-00-1329, 8 MARCH 2001
five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. Facts:
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge
Ruling: solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be “separated.”
computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and
absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married,
exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be
and continuity—that is, unbroken. charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents
gross ignorance of the law. got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Issue: Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid? decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third
marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father
Ruling: and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at ISSUE:
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage
Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda license.
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five HELD:
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s
for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage provided all requisites for its validity are present.
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Mariategui v. CA Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves
G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992 as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is
Facts: legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages and the ordinary habits of life.
during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor.
He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children
namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other
hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and
REPUBLIC V. DAYOT paper because they started living together five months before the celebration of their
GR NO. 175581, 28 MARCH 2008 marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman
Facts: who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union
maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately
at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third
August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.
Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that innocent and unwary parties.
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A.
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the FAMILY CODE A R T I C L E - 36
Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration CHI MING TSOI V. CA
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of 266 SCRA 324
the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were
not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the man and the FACTS:
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept in the
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual intercourse took place.
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations. She was found
healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s examination was kept confidential.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio? The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and that the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status
RULING: here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of
The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s fault. He One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
claims no defect on his part, as he was found not to be impotent, and any differences children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
between the two of them can still be reconciled. He admitted that they have not had cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and
intercourse since their marriage until their separation because his wife avoided him. protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is
He added that his wife filed this case against him because she is afraid that she will equivalent to psychological incapacity
be forced to return the pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant, will The petition is DENIED.
consummate their marriage.
DOMINGO V. CA
The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed 226 SCRA 572
the trial court’s decision. Hence, the instant petition
FACTS:
ISSUE Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition On May 29, 1991,
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated? entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against
Roberto Domingo. The petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the
RULING: following:
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. 1. Delia and Domingo married on November 29, 1976;
2. Later on found out, without the knowledge of Delia, Domingo had a previous
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost marriage with Emerina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical existing;
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage 3. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerina
is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Court sued them for bigamy;
clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and 4. Since 1979, respondent Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able
significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code to stay in the Philippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation
leave granted by her employer;
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged 5. Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other subsistence;
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither the trial court nor the 6. Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent Roberto, who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and
refuses to have sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains that there has never consent;
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void 7. While Delia was on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other another woman.
becomes immaterial.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
marriage, which is void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further GR NO. 108763, FEBRUARY 13, 1997
suggested that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired by their union. FACTS:
RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son. After a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
ISSUES: husband and a father since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
1) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. friends on whom he squandered his money; 2) he depended on his parents for aid
(If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of and assistance; and 3) he was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
remarriage.) resulting in frequent quarrels between them. When Reynaldo was relieved from his
2) Whether or not the petition entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and job, Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. In October 1986 the couple
Separation of Property” is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. In
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively. March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and
HELD: had since then abandoned them.
1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot
be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to
reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation. (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even
after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
On the other hand, the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring finances. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage. marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their only during the pre-trial conference. RTC declared the marriage void. The Solicitor
properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
of property relations governing them.
Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed. ISSUE:
W/N psychological incapacity on the part of Reynaldo has been established
HELD: ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL V. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What GR NO. 196359, MAY 11, 2021
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and Psychological Incapacity – Abandonment of certain portions of the Molina
duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the Guidelines – Expert witness not needed in proving psychological incapacity
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she FACTS
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. They were
problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert blessed with one child. However, even before their marriage, Rosanna already
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only observed Mario to be extremely irritable and moody. Earlier in their marriage,
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. Rosanna also observed Mario to be emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable,
and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that Mario was a drug addict.
8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity) Due to his erratic behavior, Rosanna caused Mario to be confined in a drug rehab
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. center twice. Mario’s irresponsibility even caused the closure of their family
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically business. Mario also exposed their daughter to his drug use. In December 2000, fed
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) up with Mario, Rosanna chose to live separately from him. In August 2003, Rosanna
clearly explained in the decision. filed a petition to have her marriage with Mario be declared void on the ground that
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after
incurable interviewing Rosanna, Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations.
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite invitation, refused an
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the In May 2007, the trial court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given ruled that Rosanna was able to prove her case. The Court of Appeals however
great respect by our courts. reversed the trial court on the ground that the findings of Dr. Garcia was unscientific
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor and unreliable because she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him.
General to appear as counsel for the state.
On appeal, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to revisit the Molina Guidelines
and the other nullity cases decided by the Supreme Court after Molina.
ISSUE: 4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious
Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void. psychic cause. It is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological
incapacity is a serious or dangerous illness BUT that “mild characterological
HELD: peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” are excluded. The
Yes. Dr. Garcia’s expert testimony is given due weight. HOWEVER, the Supreme psychological incapacity cannot be mere “refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill
Court declared, among others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert will.”
testimony is NOT a requirement.
5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
Below is the Supreme Court’s new set of guidelines in determining the existence of the celebration of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
psychological incapacity: its solemnization.
1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. 6. Essential marital obligations are not limited to those between spouses. Hence,
The Supreme Court however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity those covered by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
cases is clear and convincing evidence which is more than preponderant evidence wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
(ordinary civil cases) but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (criminal cases). their children.
This is because marriage is presumed valid and in this jurisdiction, a presumption
can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 7. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church of the Philippines has persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before
2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder secular courts. Canonical decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not
that must be proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the binding on secular courts. Canonical decisions are to only serve as evidence of the
durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” nullity of the secular marriage, but ultimately, the elements of declaration of nullity
which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.
family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to
understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital SUMMARY:
obligations. Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack
Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital
contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically
from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required. As an explicit
requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner. existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable
Psychological incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.
partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To
structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence
be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. of its existence.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that in voiding ill-equipped marriages, courts
are not really violating the inviolability of marriage as a social institution which is
enshrined in no less than the Constitution. Courts should not hesitate to declare such
marriages void solely for the sake of their permanence when, paradoxically, doing
so destroyed the sanctity afforded to marriage. In declaring ill-equipped marriages
as void ab initio, the courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of
marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby
made all the more strong.

Persons and Family Relations Law - Midterm - Mama Gie Notes

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PFR MIDTERM REVIEWER • If the law provides that it shall take effect immediately, it

means that it shall take effect immediately after

PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA SPS. QUISUMBING v MERALCO

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Facts: WASSMERV VELEZ

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