Objectivity in Social Science, Review Author[s}: 1. Jaxvie Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Mar., 1975), 97-98 Stable URL: bhtp:flinks,jstor-org/sici?sici~0094-306 1%28197503%2943A2%3C91%3 ADISS®IE2.0.CORIB2S, Contemporary Soctotagy is currently published by American Sociological Association, ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at htp:sseww jstor org/aboutiterms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you hhave obtained prior permission, you may aot download an entie issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and ‘you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher eegarding aay futher use ofthis work, Publisher contact information ray he abained at fiupiovwrjstororgoumnalfasa en Each copy of any part ofa JSTOR transenission must contain the same copyright tice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission, ISTOR isan independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive ot scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact suppom@jstor org. hup:ttrwwjstor.orgy Tue Nov 29 14:08:18 2005THEORY 97 ‘culture. Using ten prominent anthropologists as his examples, Professor Hatch admirably accomplishes his purpose. Perhaps mare important, Hatch makes ‘lear that what is uue of his ten anthropolo- ists is true of social science in general— ‘namely, that the “objective truths" we base ‘on “empirical facts” are not something exist- ing in nature; they ace creations of our metaphysical presuppositions. L do not mean (o imply that Hatch is « throwback to philo- sophical idealism. He simply demonstrates thoroughly that objectivity (Le, carelul as sembly and analysis of represeatative data) does nat necessarily lead fair-minded, well- tuained social scientists to the same funda ‘mental conclusions. A major reason is that each observer's model-of-man (ie,, notion fof what humans ulimately are, "whether products of ecological determinism, of bio- logical entities, or purely cultural creations, (or what-have-you) shapes his or ber interpre tation of the information at hand. Although this may seem a qrism to some, it apparenity nnezdls constant reiteration, since we are te poatedly besieged by the proponents of vat fous schools of thought, old and new, who assect that their explanatory principle ls “the Professor Hatch's ten “anthropologists” in- clude Emile Durkheim, which may surprise 4@ few provincially.minded sociologists. What Wwe ought wo be surprised about are the bar tiers which keep so many sociocultueal an thropologists and sociologists uninformed about complementary Knowledge developed in the two disciplines which, in their nratual concern with social relationships in general, are fraternal if not identical twins, This complementarity is ilustrated by Hatch's can- sideration of Durkheim. Hatch does the hest job T have seen in portraying Durkheim's al- most compulsive drive to see social facts as things which cannot meaningfully be at- Gibuted (0 psychological oF Biotogical phe nomena. Durkheim's vast importance is thus demonstrated; he hoth symbolized and heavily influenced the sociological turn away from the 19th century assumption that society is simply a collection of individuals, with the latter being the ultimate buman reality Teonelude as I began: Evia Hatch's The- ories of Man and Culture is a good book. It will be useful in theory courses, It could ako serve very well as supplementary reading im sophisticated methodology courses which attempt to grapple with the abjectivity prob. em. Objectivity th Soetal Science, by FRANK CON: INGHAM. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. 154 pp, $8.50. LC. anv York University, Toronto Confronted by an “overwhelming maze" of arguments in favor of the imposstility of ‘bjective social science, Professor Cunning- hham, who believes in the abjective merits of Martist Theory, seeks to defend objectivity by criticizing the “recurrent” arguments against it, To hogin with, he cells us what objectivity is: “itis possible for an inquiry to be objec ive if, and only if, (a) it is possible for its deveriptions and explanations of & subject ‘matter to reveal . . . qualities and relations =. a8 they exist independently of an inquit- e's thoughts and desires regarding them... and (b) it isnot possible for «we inguirers folding rival theories... both to be justified.” Passing to the negative, he notes that ob- Jectivity is not to be identified with positivism, Moreover, it is quite in order for an objective social scientist to have values, to be conseious of being in an historically circumscribed situation, and to seleet from his expecience. Neither values, nor historicism, nor selectivity vitiates the possibility of achieving objectivity in the stipulated sense ‘These arguments quickly disposed af, Pro- fessor Cunningham turns to the novel argu: ments, (0 which the next four chapters. at his book are devoted, The heart of the view to be opposed states that: “If the theories fone holds determine what his perceptions and interpretations of things described by the theories can he, sa that his adaption or aban- donment of a theory eznnot depend on bis recognition of qualities and relations of the things concerned, then it would be plausible (0 argue that their adoption or abandonment is dependent on his values ar non-scientific ciccumstances of his historical period. And insofar as classification is on the basis of some theory, the theory would ipso facto determine one’s perceptions and interpreta- tions of what ig classified." He finds this view defended with arguments from the history and philosophy of science (by Kulm and Feyerabend), from linguistic relativity (by ‘Whorf, Sapir, Quine, Feyerabend}, from per- coptual relativity (by Cooley, Bergson, Pox lanyi, Hanson), and from the special nature ‘of the subject matter of the social sciences (ty Hayek, Schutz, Weber, Winch, Collingwood, Dray, Manohelm, ete.)98 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY: A JOURNAL OF REVIEWS In face of all this, Cunningham's basic argumentative strategy is always the same— the enti-objectivist conclusion does not follow from the premises and hence the impossibility (of objectivity is not proven, and/or the argument itself presupposes objectivity and hence is self-defeating. Kuna and Feyera- bend’s argument that theories, being altecna- (ive ways of seeing the wortd, are incom- mensurable, and hence that scientific change 4g not rational or objective, is held to be a selfdefeating theory. Linguistic relativism similarly tends to fall either into vagueness ‘and nonsequiturs, oF 10 presuppose the ob- jectivity it purports to undermine. On per- ‘ception, Cunningham holds that the objectivist position merely requires. some—not total— perceptual agreement, while the relaivist has fo come up with some explanation of man's success at controlling the environment he apparently perceives s0 differently. The argu- ment that man is a peculiar subject of inquiry, and that the investigator is investigating him= ‘self, is not sufficient to disallow the possibility of objectivity. Tn brief postscript, the author fences with thse who raise moral objections to cbjecti ity as detached, dehumanizing and dangerous. Cunningham argues that knowledge is pre supposed in even making such judgments and ‘that it had better be objective. ‘This is « book for those who cen absorb fan argument stated and dissected in an ab- stact and philosophical manner. Few social scientists and works of social science are re ferred to, none is discussed, The several au- thors mentioned in the summary above are cited very cursorily. The entire book is only 123 pages of text. [ cannot fault the author fon his reasoning, nor can T think of any Important anti-objectivist argument he has ‘overlooked. Nevertheless, the Book is not satisfactory, Partly this has to da with the extreme flat ress of the prose style, totally without colour ‘or dynamics, Pactly it has to do with the author's strategy. One nice point of the strategy is that no time is wasted on argue ‘ments from extceme skepticism and solipsism Less appealing is his treatment of the litera ture asa stockpile of arguments which he ‘can trundle out and defeat; white making no positive case for objectivity 2t all, This gives a sense of remoteness, timelesness even, somehow quite unconvincing even to a con: firmed objectivist like this reviewer ‘The point about various of the authors ‘mentioned is that they did not just sit around cooking up anticobjectvist arguments for the fun of it, Each of them repudiated objec- tivity because of what they thought were insuperable difficulties encountered in the course of their empirical work, And the problems each of them was working on were various: Kuhn, Whori, Bergson and Schutz were hardly studying the same problems Hence (oa defeat ia the abstract some particu lar argument they produced is not going 10 advance understanding of the peoblem at all. ‘This is why Professor Cunningham's faiture ta say anything positive about objectivity is a grave weakness. A survey of the arguments ‘on & topie dravn from ere, there, and every- where gives no sense of the real debate about the ceal issues with which the authors were concerned. Cunningham does nat look at one genuine debate in the literature of the social Sciences to see under what pressures the anti- objectivist arguments were developed. Most interesting, in view af his avowed Marxist sympathies, would have beea a scrutiny of the way some letterday Markists have tsed “Marxist” arguments against objectivity. ‘The book then is an academic exercise Ubich fails 10 explore the anti-objective phe- nomenon in interesting ways. Why is anti- ‘objectivism so beguiling? What makes some intellectuals ready to follow the argument ‘wherever it leads, even when it leads them by the nose into absurd and contradictory is? There are genuinely dificult (s0- iological?) problems here which this book, alas, does not tackle Sociology of Meaning, by Jonn B. O'Mattzy. London: Human Context Books, 1972. 308 Pp. Weevoron W, Isas0w University of Toronto ‘This book raises some important and in- teresting philosophical issues. But alas, it not only couches them in a florid and sesquipe- dalian jargon, but efter one has cut through the words and phrases, the book emerges 35 a sel of variations on what “radical theory" is and does, which in effect should be read as what the author thinks it ought to be and cought to do, ‘As conceived by O'Malley, radical theory {ig supposed to function as the ultimate means ‘of justification of all procedures and conctt- sions of inguicy. O'Malley says that “eritical social science,” in Habermas’ sense, medix ‘ates between radical theory and the sociologi- ‘eal analysis of “emplrical soci sciences," but ‘without its “radically theoretic” component, critical social science would lack the means