Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the USA was responsible

for the start of the Cold War. What is your view about the extent to which the
USA was responsible for the start of the Cold War?
These historians avoid retrospective determinism, making simplified conclusions, as both
the US and USSR had individual faults fuelling tensions, which is the basis of the post-
revisionist theory

This refers to whether historians believed that the US deliberately sought to fuel tensions by
maintaining superiority through flawed diplomacy and pacts.

Rather, US policies and actions were responsible for intimidating and threatening Soviet interests.

In essence, the Cold War was a geopolitical rivalry between the USA, USSR and both of their parties’
allies in which these two global superpowers sought to extend their ideological influence to fill the
post-war power vacuum. A series of tensions with no direct combat except through proxy wars, the
Cold War began in 1947, the year of the Truman Doctrine, ending in 1991 when the Soviet Union
collapsed. Historical interpretations with regard to the roots of the Cold War differ, which can be
categorised into two schools: that of the orthodox, attributing the blame to the USSR, and, more
recently, the revisionist, holding the USA responsible. Melvyn P Leffler upholds the latter belief,
arguing that Stalin was not concerned with World domination, as orthodox historians fervently
argue, rather he was focused on internal political affairs, such as creating and maintaining the five-
year plan, sustaining peace with the Allies as much as he could for the sake of the Soviet Union’s
economic rehabilitation. Similarly, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe argue that American
diplomacy instigated the Soviet’s actions through their reactionary foreign policies and controversial
leaders. Building on this very idea, the last historian, Martin J Sherwin, blames the USA for its
creation of the atomic bomb, claiming how this led to the arms race and thus defensive Russian
foreign policy. With the revealing of Roosevelt’s intentions, the bomb was intended to be used as a
diplomatic leverage over the USSR, which played a crucial role in creating rising tensions between
the two World superpowers. The aforementioned arguments will be judged based on the following
criteria. First, to what extent did the US fail to appreciate Soviet security needs? Second, to what
extent did the US put internal economic concerns before peace? Taking into consideration these
criteria and the evidence provided by several other historians, this essay will come to the conclusion
that the historians, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, provides the most compelling argument
that the US is, indeed, responsible for the start of the war to a large extent.
There is nearly a unanimous agreement within revisionist interpretations of the Cold War that the
US failed to appreciate Soviet security needs to a large extent. After having lost 20 million civilians
and soldiers, the Soviet Union emerged from World War II economically and demographically
exhausted, having experienced most of its land occupied by the Nazis. The Soviet Union’s fragile
economic condition is crucial to Leffler’s understanding of their interests and motives to maintain
security through peace. Leffler discusses in length Stalin’s state of helplessness and despair due to
his great miscalculation of the 1941 Nazi attack as he did not predict Hitler’s invasion “before the
British were defeated”1. This attack destroyed the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided
Poland and Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Nazis and was a pledge to not attack each
other for ten years. Based on this, Leffler argues that the Western forces overlooked the USSR’s
suffering through the form of betrayal. How could Stalin trust future pacts and be anything but
cautious with negotiations in Yalta and Potsdam following a punishing post-war loss? Indeed, Soviet
industrial output did not recover to its 1940 level for almost a decade and GDP fell by 34% between
1940-19422. Furthermore, despite the “accelerat[ion of] the rearmament effort and expan[sion of]
1
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 33)
2
“Soviet industry in World War II.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation: 31 st March 2023
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_industry_in_World_War_II#:~:text=As%20result%20of%20the
%20German,level%20for%20almost%20a%20decade.)

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Rayhana Jannath
 Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the USA was responsible
for the start of the Cold War. What is your view about the extent to which the
USA was responsible for the start of the Cold War?
the army”3, Stalin was gravely humiliated as “half the grain crops of Soviet Russia were in German
hands”4. Leffler then expounds upon how American policies and actions were indifferent to Soviet
insecurity and lack of trust: American and British emissaries witnessed the vulnerable state of the
USSR yet refused to open a second front in Western Europe to “divert the Nazi war machine and lift
the pressures of his army”5. Thus, Leffler shines a spotlight onto the legitimacy of Stalin’s security
concerns and distrust of the capitalist nations in his interpretation. Since the first criterion is focused
on the extent to which the US failed to appreciate Soviet security needs, Leffler first clarifies the
existence of Soviet insecurity before examining the US’ intentional neglect of Soviet needs. This
undermines Robert Jervis’ argument in which he distinctly indicates to the rigid dichotomy between
expansionism and security-seeking, whereby “mutual security [..] may not be attainable” 6. Jervis
opposes Leffler’s understanding of the Cold War as a security dilemma, attributing its origins to “a
clash between different social systems”7; hence why he asserts the historical opinion that security
was a façade the USSR exploited to veil their communist expansion, founded upon the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine of class struggle, which greatly set back Eastern Europe from prosperity like that of
the West. In light of this orthodox interpretation, it can be seen that Leffler lacks acknowledgment of
the tragedies and brutality of the Soviet system, which may have resulted in the US’ lack of
appreciation for Soviet security needs.

However, other historians claim that the USSR was motivated by their anti-capitalist communist
ideology, which advocated global revolution, hence why US policies and actions were a mere
reaction. Arthur Schlesinger Jr emphasises how “Soviet policy was amoral” 8 as “the Red Army
continued its advance into Eastern Europe”9, referring to the ‘Stalinisation’ of Poland, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Romania and East Germany between 1945 and 1947. Schlesinger scrutinises how this
desire for communist expansion stems from the “imperial Russian strategic ambitions which in the
nineteenth century led to the Crimean War” 10, building upon the argument that the Cold War was
inevitable, a means to prevent USA from “establish[ing] democratic-capitalist states on the border of
the Soviet Union”11.

This revisionist understanding mitigates Stalin’s desire to seize greater control of Eastern Europe
through the creation of a Soviet buffer zone that comprised of satellite states like Poland, Albania,
Hungary and Yugoslavia. However, Often neglected in the Orthodox school of the Cold War
historiography, Leffler attaches a greater significance to the Russian security needs as the impetus
for the Eastern European communist governments, as opposed to desire for global dominance and
expansion. Leffler then continues to indicate how the USA were responsible for their tension-fuelling
policies and actions by attaching less importance to Stalin’s communist motives, which “served
primarily as a lens through which Stalin interpreted threats and opportunities” 12. This demonstrates
Stalin’s pragmatic nature and belief in “pure realpolitik” 13, Here, Leffler establishes how Stalin’s need
for national security dominated Soviet foreign policy as the “overriding priority was to safeguard the

3
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 33)
4
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 33)
5
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 34)
6
Robert Jervis (2001) Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? (p. 40)
7
Robert Jervis (2001) Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? (p. 41)
8
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1967) Origins of the Cold War (p. 31)
9
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1967) Origins of the Cold War (p. 32)
10
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1967) Origins of the Cold War (p. 23)
11
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1967) Origins of the Cold War (p. 24)
12
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 34)
13
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 34)

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Rayhana Jannath
 Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the USA was responsible
for the start of the Cold War. What is your view about the extent to which the
USA was responsible for the start of the Cold War?
interests of Soviet Russia”14. Leffler substantiates his claim through Stalin’s demand for a “second
front in Western Europe to divert the Nazi war machine” as well as the “restoration of the 1941
boundaries” from the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact Irrespective of these genuine considerations, the US
decisively responded to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe with unmitigated hostility and
insensitivity.

He further highlights the US’ lack of tolerance for the Soviet’s volatile economic and geopolitical
situation, such as the Western remonstration against “Soviet intervention in Romania” 15 and
“creation of a communist government in Poland” 16.

Contributing to the idea of the stubbornness held by the US is Martin J Sherwin, who supports the
claims of David Reynolds in his article that specifically looks on the strain the atomic bomb had. He
believes that the US made it very difficult to obtain peace due to them being so untrustworthy. This
was demonstrated by Truman’s secretive actions where he refused to share the atomic bomb with
the USSR although claiming that they were allies. Sherwin places great emphasis on how Truman
wanted the atomic bomb “for international blackmail” 17 and went as far as to cutting out their most
trusted ally, Britain, from his scheme. The US armed forces were serviced by a massive nuclear
arsenal that had been further elevated from the discovery of the atomic bomb. It gave them an
advantage in both the quantity and the variety of its nuclear weapons. This then made it difficult for
conciliation and peace to prevail as the US had the upper hand which threatened the Soviets thus
increasing rivalry. This is crucial for Reynold’s interpretation of the origins of the Cold War as he
believes that the US had a need to “weaken permanently their traditional foe” 18 which would clearly
limit the opportunities of peace and conciliation.

Historian Arthur Schlesinger takes an orthodox view on the origins of the cold war, he places great
importance on the ideology of the soviet union and how it instilled revolutionist beliefs and
worldwide expansion. At the time, Marxist Leninism was a political idea central to the soviets
ideology, it influenced soviet ideas making Russian leaders develop a general view that the existence
of any non communist state was a threat to the soviet union. This meant that anything Roosevelt or
Truman did the soviets would still and always regard USA as the enemy. For instance soviets
misjudgement of the Marshall aid plan, which was set up by America to help support suffering
European economies, was regarded as an American attempt to gain control of the economies. As a
consequence, Schlesinger believes Americans actions and policies was a “brave and essential
response to communist aggression1.” Communist aggression can be demonstrated in the 1948
Berlin blockade, where the soviet union blocked the western powers access to berlin , leaving the
people suffering and to starve. This was seen by the USA and western powers as a direct attempt by
the soviet union to weaken them increasing tensions and forcing the USA to take desperate
measures to help those experiencing hardship in Berlin. These events, specifically the Berlin
Blockade is useful in showing the extent to which USSRS behaviour fuelled insecurities within the

14
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 34)
15
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 38)
16
Melvyn P Leffler (1994) The Specter of Communism (p. 38)
17
Martin J Sherwin (1973) The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War (pp 945-951)
18
David Reynolds (1994) The European Dimension of the Cold War pg.167

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Rayhana Jannath
 Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the USA was responsible
for the start of the Cold War. What is your view about the extent to which the
USA was responsible for the start of the Cold War?
USA, which can be applied to come to an overall judgement that the USSR was responsible for the
start of the cold war.

Schlesinger also assesses and attaches great weigh to the leadership of soviet leader Stalin, in
deciding if USSR was responsible for the outbreak of the cold war. In his article he describes Stalin as
dictatorial and paranoid and having “completely lost a sense of reality”, he also criticises the
revisionist approach for treating Stalin as just another “Realpolitik statesman” meaning a leader who
bases his political ideas on practical considerations rather then ideological. However, we know Stalin
placed great emphasis on communist ideologies and the significant influence of Marxist Leninism on
his political beliefs. Schlesinger also believes the cold war could have been avoided if the soviet
union hadn’t been “possessed by convictions of the inevitability of a communist world.” Stalins’
relationships with the western powers USA, Britain and France was always strained from a mutual
distrust , but particularly after the Potsdam conference relationships worsened due to Stalin
rejecting the idea of friendly neighbour relations with USA over eastern European control. Due to his
paranoia Stalins suspicions continually grew during the build up to the cold war, leading to him
deciding everything “ without any consideration for anyone or anything,” this shows the extent to
which USSRS mistrust and suspicions towards USA , lead to deteriorating relationships between the
two superpowers.

Similarly to Schlesinger, Martin J Sherwin also sees the aggression of USSR and high levels of mistrust
between the superpowers. Sherwin questions if Stalin acting aggressively is what lead to the atomic
bomb and “if diplomatic considerations related to soviet post-war behaviour influenced the
formulation of Roosevelts atomic energy policies?”2 implying USSRS behaviour was the main reason
behind Roosevelts atomic policies. The atomic bomb is also described as an “instrument of post-war
diplomacy” and how Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to work together in order to win the arms race
as they feared the USSR being in a position to produce the weapon and use it as international
blackmail, suggesting the creation of the atomic bomb was due to USSR fuelling fear within the USA.
American policies and wartime relationship was based upon the assumption that the soviets would
“surrender important geographical, political and ideological objectives in exchange for the
neutralisation of the weapon.” This means that all of USAs work on the atomic bomb and policies
was to try stop soviet ideologies such as a communist takeover, indicating USA went to a large
extent to attempt to get soviets to surrender their ideas but this did not work and instead made post
war aims more difficult to achieve. Sherwin also discusses the national interests of the USA and that
Roosevelt actually wanted friendship and co operation with the soviets. Roosevelt was consistent
with his public reputation for co operation and conciliation and also his efforts towards being post
war partners with the soviet union, therefore the USA can be seen as trying to amend relations and
create peace. However Roosevelt opposed discussions about the atomic project and was very
secretive towards Stalin , despite his advisers telling him not to be. For instance scientist Bohr
believed “disastrous consequences would result if Russia learned on her own about the atomic
bomb project” and if international control of atomic energy wasn’t discussed during the war an arms
race would without a doubt develop afterwards. Roosevelts passive resistance to the advise he got
during the formulation of the atomic bomb can be used to criticise weather Roosevelt genuinely did
want to better relations with the soviets. This links to Sherwin’s belief that “historians have
exaggerated his confidence and commitment in such an outcome,” referring to the outcome of

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Rayhana Jannath
 Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the USA was responsible
for the start of the Cold War. What is your view about the extent to which the
USA was responsible for the start of the Cold War?
amicable post-war relationships and that “Roosevelts enthusiasm for Bohr’s ideas were more
apparent then real.”

Consequently, it can be said that Roosevelt did want co operation and friendly relations with the
soviet union but the lengths to which Roosevelt went to achieve this is limited.

On the other hand Schlesinger and Sherwin also differ in their interpretations due to Sherwin’s belief
that America also implemented aggressive tactics and the release of the atomic bomb was a
significant cause of the cold war. Schlesinger lacks analysis on the impact of the atomic bomb
probably due to the fact he was a strident anti communist so wouldn’t want to highlight any faults in
USA. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki happened under Truman who
took over as president after Roosevelts death. Truman was much more strongly opposed to
communism in comparison to Roosevelt so the dropping of the bomb was seen as a huge display of
power and threat to the soviet union. As mentioned previously USA also failed to inform Stalin about
the atomic bomb, increasing the tension and intensifying the relations further. Despite the
aggressive attack on Japan, the USA did not actually intend to implement the bomb to threaten the
soviets, instead it was dropped in retaliation to the Pearl Harbour attack. Hence the dropping of the
atomic bomb was misjudged by the soviets, which again shows the extent to which USSRS mistrust
and suspicions lead to a deteriorating relationship between the two superpowers.

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Rayhana Jannath