Both Random and Guide

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Ratio (new series) XXVIII 3 September 2015 0034-0006
BOTH RANDOM AND GUIDED
R. van Woudenberg and J. Rothuizen-van der Steen
Abstract
This paper argues, first, that biological evolution can be both
random and divinely guided at the same time. Next it discusses the
idea that the claim that evolution is unguided is not part of the
science of evolution, and defends it against a number of objections.
Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is no real conflict between

the theory of evolution, properly understood, and Christian
belief, properly understood. More specifically, he has argued that
there is no real conflict between propositions [A] and [B]:
[A] God intended to create creatures of a certain kind –

rational creatures with a moral sense and the capacity to know
and love him – and then acted in such a way as to accomplish
this intention. (Plantinga 2011, p. 11)
[B] The diversity of life has come to be by way of natural
selection winnowing random genetic mutation. (idem;
Plantinga tags this claim “Darwinism”)
Plantinga furthermore argued that there is a real conflict between

propositions [A] and [C],
[C] The process of evolution is unguided – no personal agent,

not even God, has guided, directed, orchestrated, or shaped it.
(Plantinga 2011, p. 12; Plantinga names this the “naturalistic
origins thesis”)
Whereas [B] is part of the scientific theory of evolution, Plantinga

has argued that [C] is not; [C] is a philosophical gloss or add-on
to that theory. (Plantinga 2011, p. 63) Let us call this Plantinga’s
Claim.
But are [A] and [B] really compatible with each other, and is
Plantinga’s Claim true? These are the questions we seek to answer
in this paper, which is organized as follows. In section 1 we
BOTH RANDOM AND GUIDED 333
distinguish the compatibility question from various other ques-
tions in the neighbourhood. Section 2 discusses various argu-
ments to the effect that [A] and [B], or some other pair of
propositions in the close neighbourhood of [A] and [B], are
compatible with each other. Section 3 reviews Plantinga’s Claim,
so the claim that [C] is not part of the scientific theory of evolu-
tion. Section 4 discusses various objections to both the compat-
ibility claim, and Plantinga’s Claim – and finds them wanting.
1. Disentangling Issues
The question under discussion is whether [A] and [B] are com-
patible. Two propositions are compatible provided the one does
not entail the denial of the other, and the one isn’t massively
improbable given the other. (Plantinga 2011, pp. 143–41)
This question should be distinguished from various others. First
it should be distinguished from the question whether [A] and/or
[B] are true, and if they are, how we can know so much. The
compatibility question is also different from the question whether
we need to believe [A] in order to be able to explain [B]. The
compatibility of [A] and [B], we may note, can be discussed
independently of the actual truth values of [A] and [B], and
independently of whether we need [A] in order to explain [B].
2. [A] and [B]: Are They Compatible?
This section is about whether [A] and [B], or a pair of proposi-

tions sufficiently similar to [A] and [B], are compatible. It is
widely felt that they are not. (e.g. Ridley 2004, p. 92) One reason
adduced for their incompatibility has to do with randomness. [A],
it is said, entails a certain proposition X, the denial of which is
entailed by [B]. [A] entails that the creatures of a certain sort do
not result from a process that involves randomness or chance,
whereas [B] entails that they do result from such a process. Hence
[A] and [B] are thought to be incompatible.
1
Plantinga discusses various alleged areas of conflict between Christian belief and
science, but he doesn’t use one generic notion of ‘conflict’; in different areas conflicts
come to different things. Sometimes the alleged conflict is that a religious claim is not
‘compatible’ with science (or vice versa) in the sense explained in the body of the text. But
other times he uses a notion of conflict that is without the second conjunct of ‘compatible’.
(see footnote 3)

334 R. VAN WOUDENBERG AND J. ROTHUIZEN-VAN DER STEEN
We discuss three responses to this line of reasoning. Biochemist

Dennis Alexander has argued that the argument is flawed due to
not properly distinguishing between various senses of ‘chance’.
An event can be a chance event in the sense that (i) it is predict-
able in principle but not in practice, but also in the sense in which
events at the quantum level are chance events, viz. that (ii) it is an
event that cannot even in principle be predicted. Finally an event
can be a chance event in the sense that (iii) it has “no real rhyme,
reason, or intentionality”. (Alexander 2008, pp. 133–4) That in
some ultimate sense the universe came to be by a chance event in
sense (iii), Alexander avers, is a metaphysical statement that has
nothing to do with scientific claims to the effect that mutations are
products of chance events in senses (i) and (ii). What Alexander
is saying, then, is that [A] and [B], or some pair of propositions
closely related to [A] and [B], are compatible in the sense
explained.
Alexander makes the further point that “ ‘chance’ is simply a
handy description that we humans use for our beliefs about the
properties of matter. There is no such agent as ‘metaphysical
chance’ (= ‘chance’ in sense (iii)), but there is the human belief
held by some people that the universe has no ultimate meaning.
However, those who try propping up that particular belief-system
using the prestige of scientific theories will find not a shred of
comfort in evolutionary theory.” (Alexander 2008, p. 135) What
we find here in so many words is an endorsement of a close
relative of Plantinga’s Claim.
Alexander’s response, important as it is, may leave one with a
nagging worry. If, as Alexander says, only chance in senses (i) and
(ii) are relevant to evolution, this means that certain events,
perhaps those leading up to mutations, are in principle unpredict-
able, so also unpredictable for God (were he to exist), which raises
the question whether it is even so much as possible for God to
‘use’ chance events as instruments to attain the goal of creating
creatures of a certain kind.
Peter van Inwagen addresses exactly this question in an argu-
ment for the compatibility of Darwinism and design. His initial
move is not dissimilar to Alexander’s: the word ‘chance’, he says,
has more than one sense, and in some of its senses an event’s
being chancy is compatible with its being deliberately chosen.2 To
2
‘Chance’ has even more than the three senses that Alexander distinguishes. See Van
Woudenberg (2013).

see this, we must notice that according to the Darwinian account
of things, certain events, viz. the occurrence of mutations, are due
to chance in the following ‘Aristotelian’ sense:
. . . mutations do not occur in response to changes in the envi-
ronmental perils or opportunities that confront individuals or
species. There is—Darwinians insist—simply no correlation
whatsoever between the ‘usefulness’ to a particular species of a
possible mutation and the likelihood that it will occur. (Van
Inwagen 2003, p. 360)
Van Inwagen’s illustration of what the absence of correlation
comes to, refers to a certain species of toad that is slowly dying out,
owing to some gradual environmental change. Suppose, he says,
three mutations in the genome of that species are equally likely
from the perspective of molecular biology. One mutation would
enable the species to cope with the changing environment, one
would have no effect, and one would be lethal. These facts about
the respective ‘usefulness’ of the three mutations have no effect
whatsoever on the probability that any one of them will come to
be. But if this is what ‘absence of correlation’ means, and if this, in
turn, is what it means for a mutation to be ‘due to chance’, van
Inwagen notes, then it can both be true that a mutation is due to
chance and that God has been guiding evolution by deliberately
causing certain mutations. From the perspective of molecular
biology there is nothing incompatible between the claims that a
mutation is caused by God, and the claim that there is no corre-
lation between the likelihood that a mutation will occur and the
‘usefulness’ of that mutation. In other words, [A] and [B] are not
incompatible with each other.
One might object: but if God has been guiding evolution,
wouldn’t this be a reason for thinking that the correlation
referred to is not absent, as well as a reason for thinking that the
methods of science, such as statistical analysis, will reveal such a
correlation? Van Inwagen denies this. He reasoning is worth
quoting at length:
If God [has been guiding evolution], it doesn’t follow that the
history of terrestrial life would reveal anything inconsistent with
the Darwinian thesis that all mutations are due to chance.
Suppose that God has in fact been guiding evolution in this
way. Suppose also there is a record of the uncounted billions of
mutations that have ever occurred. Is there any reason to

suppose that a statistical analysis of all these mutations and

circumstances under which they occurred . . . would have to
uncover some significant correlation between the potential use-
fulness to species of various mutations and the likelihood of
their occurrence? If there is such a reason I don’t see it. (Van
Inwagen 2003, p. 361)
So Van Inwagen is suggesting that if God had been guiding evo-
lution, there is no reason to think that statistical analysis would
uncover any correlation.
Let us now turn to Plantinga’s argument for the claim that [A]
and [B] are compatible. Not unlike Alexander and Van Inwagen,
Plantinga argues that we can see they are compatible once we get
clear on what ‘random’ in the scientific theory of evolution means,
or what property it names. Plantinga cites two undisputed author-
ities, Ernst Mayr and Elliott Sober, who have provided slightly
different definitions of “random mutation”:
When it is said that a mutation or variation is random, the
statement simply means that there is no correlation between
the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of
an organism in a given environment. (Plantinga 2011: 11; the
quote is taken from Mayr 1988, p. 98)
There is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or
outside of them) that detects which mutations would be ben-
eficial and causes those mutations to occur. (Plantinga 2011,
p. 12; the quote is taken from Sober 2011, p. 192)
Plantinga remarks: “But their [the mutations’] being random in
that sense is clearly compatible with their being caused by God.”
(Plantinga 2011, p. 12)3 We can understand his point as follows.
The definitions stated above tell us, respectively, that random
mutations have the following properties:
(P1) they don’t correlate with the adaptational needs of
organisms;
(P2) they aren’t produced by a physical mechanism that detects
the adaptational needs of an organism and on the basis of this
detection causes a beneficial mutation to occur.
3
Plantinga is using ‘compatible’ here in the sense in which two propositions are
compatible provided the one doesn’t entail the denial of the other (he is not using it here
in the sense that ‘one proposition is massively improbable given the other’.)

What Plantinga claims is that when mutations have property (P1),
so when they don’t correlate with the adaptational needs of an
organism, this is entirely compatible with a particular mutation’s
being caused by God. And what he furthermore claims is that if
mutations have (P2), so if they aren’t produced by a physical mecha-
nism that detects the adaptational needs of an organism, and on
this basis causes a beneficial mutation to occur, this doesn’t entail
that they aren’t caused by God. After all, God is not a physical
mechanism. Here is an analogy relevant to the discussion of (P2).
There is no physical mechanism, either within school kids or
outside of them, that detects their mathematical disabilities, and
on this basis causes the kids to take extracurricular math lessons.
Even so, there being no such physical mechanism is entirely com-
patible with parents setting up things in such a way that their
math-deficient child takes extracurricular math classes.4
This, then, is Plantinga’s argument for the compatibility of [A]
and [B]. Eliott Sober concurs with Plantinga: “Theistic evolution
is a logically consistent position.” (Sober 2011, p. 190) His point is
that “evolutionary theory is neutral on one question about
naturalism—the question of whether a supernatural deity exists.”
(Sober 2011, p. 189) A theist who adopts [B], Sober says further-
more, could avail herself of the distinction between proximate
and ultimate causation—a distinction that suggests itself when
one considers questions like why sunflowers turn to the sun. One
could answer by citing certain mechanisms inside sunflowers (the
proximate causes), but also by reference to natural selection (the
ultimate cause). There is no conflict between these levels of expla-
nation. The theist, Sober suggests, could add “a still more distal
level of divine causation. God can direct the evolutionary process
in an ultimate sense, though mutations are undirected in a proxi-
mate sense. Biology says nothing about the former and theism says
nothing about the latter.” (Sober 2011, p. 196)
3. Plantinga’s Claim
As we have just seen, Sober in effect denies that proposition [C] is

“part of” science. Here too, then, he concurs with Plantinga and
van Inwagen. But others, as we shall see shortly, claim that [C] is
4
It is clear that Sober and Mayr disagree on (P2): Sober accepts it as a necessary
condition for an event’s being random, Mayr does not.

“part of” science. Before taking a look at how the “part of” argu-
ments go, it will prove useful to explicate what it is for a proposi-
tion to be “part of” a science. If we think of a theory T as a set S of
propositions {P1, P2, Pn-1, Pn}, then we can say that Pi is “part of” T
iff Pi is an element of S. If we are to apply this to the scientific
theory of evolution, we must first decide which propositions
jointly constitute the set that is that theory. Relevant here are such
propositions as that the earth is some 4.5 billion years old, that life
has progressed from relatively simple to relatively complex forms
(and not the other way round), that there is descent with modi-
fication (offspring differ in small and subtle ways from their
parents), that all forms of life have a common ancestry, and that
the process of descent with modification is driven by a mecha-
nism, natural selection operating on random genetic mutation,
perhaps in conjunction with other mechanisms. Are these propo-
sitions all “part of” the theory of evolution? It would seem that
they are, except for the first one, the ancient earth thesis. There is
a relation between the theory, so conceived, and the ancient earth
thesis, but it is not the “part of” relation; it is rather a
presuppositional relation: for the theory to work, it must be pre-
supposed that the earth is very old—old enough to permit the
slow progression from unicellular life forms to the current
biodiversity.
The “part of” relation in which propositions can stand to a
theory must also be distinguished from the relations of entailment
in which a theory can stand to a proposition. The proposition
“Venus and Mars attract each other” is entailed by the Newton’s
theory of gravity (in conjunction with other propositions), but it is
not a “part of” that theory.
It frequently happens that people associate propositions with a
theory that are neither “part of” the theory, nor presupposed, nor
entailed by it. For instance, the proposition that capitalism must
structure social life has been associated with the theory of evolu-
tion, while neither being “part of”, nor presupposed, nor entailed
by it.
Given these explications, we can now put Plantinga’s Claim as
follows: [C] is not “part of” the theory of evolution, nor is it
presupposed or entailed by it.
Back to the question how experts argue for [C], the claim that
the process of evolution is unguided by God. Plantinga notes that
although Dawkins (in Dawkins 1986) claims to argue that the
evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design, what he in

fact argues is “that it is not astronomically improbable that the
living world was produced by unguided evolution and hence
without design.” (Plantinga 2011, p. 24) But, as Plantinga rightly
notes, an argument of the form “p is not astronomically improb-
able, therefore p” is unprepossessing. You can’t conclude from “It
is not astronomically improbable that the Phoenix Suns will beat
the Chicago Bulls” that the Phoenix Suns will beat the Chicago
Bulls.
This leaves us to conclude that [C] is neither presupposed nor
entailed by the science of evolution: there is no scientific argu-
ment from the facts of evolution to the conclusion that [C]. But if
[C] isn’t supported by the facts of evolution, then how does [C]
relate to the theory of evolution? The relation, says Plantinga, is
that [C] is a philosophical “add-on” to the scientific theory of
evolution.5 (This is actually an appropriate name for this relation,
as we show below.6)
Van Inwagen, in his own way, also argues for Plantinga’s Claim.
First he defines Darwinism as the conjunction of the following
propositions: (a) all living organisms have a common ancestor,
(b) there have been organisms for thousands of millions of years,
(c) life exhibits enormous taxonomic diversity, and (d) only
natural causes have been at work in the production of this diver-
sity. (Van Inwagen 2003, p. 351) Of course, if Darwinism, thus
defined, is a scientific theory, Plantinga’s Claim is false. For then
a scientific theory explicitly states something in the close neigh-
bourhood of [C], viz. that only natural causes have been at work
in the production of the stupendous biodiversity. However, van
Inwagen next argues that (d) is a metaphysical, not a scientific,
thesis. Here is his reasoning:
Let us grant that a theory that postulates supernatural causes is

ipso facto not a scientific theory. Let us grant that it is an essen-
tial part of the methodology of natural science always to search
for purely natural causes. . . . let us grant them to see what
follows (or, more importantly, does not follow) from them.
What does not follow is that it is proper for a scientific theory to
5
Plantinga clearly assumes that the genuine “parts” of the theory of evolution are
things that are entailed by the evidence. He might have carved up the terrain differently by
saying that [C] is part of the theory of evolution, albeit an evidentially unsupported part of it.
Had he done so, a number of things would have to be phrased differently – but the
substance of his thought would remain unaffected by it.
6
See the end of section 4c.

include, to have as part of its propositional content, the thesis

that the phenomena of which it treats never have supernatural
causes. . . . I do not see why anyone who thinks that God had a
hand in the way evolution went can properly be said . . . to
reject any theory of evolution that could properly be called
scientific. (Van Inwagen 2003, pp. 359–60)
So Van Inwagen argues that [C], or some closely related proposi-

tion, isn’t part of the science of evolution. And also that accept-
ance of [A] doesn’t commit one to the falsity of [B]—they are
compatible.
The arguments by Plantinga and Van Inwagen in effect entail
that there is no scientific reason to accept [C]. But if there isn’t,
there is no conflict between science and [A], no conflict, that is,
between the science of evolution and the proposition that God
intended to create creatures of a certain kind and then acted in
such a way as to accomplish this intention.
4. Objections
In a recent paper Herman Philipse (Philipse 2013) has attacked

the claim that [A] and [B] are compatible, as well as Plantinga’s
Claim that [C] is not part of the scientific theory of evolution. This
section is a close examination of Philipse’s objections. We keep
closely to Philipse’s order of business.
Referring to Plantinga’s Claim, Philipse says:
In order to evaluate this surprising claim, one should distin-

guish [. . .] between three different questions: (a) is the
unguidedness-thesis part of the standard theory of neo-
darwinism (the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis)? (b) Does the
existing evidence support the unguidedness-thesis? And (c): is
it logically possible that given the available evidence, evolution
is nevertheless directed by someone? (Philipse 2013, p. 90)
What are the relations between questions (a), (b), and (c) on the
one hand, and Plantinga’s Claim on the other? Philipse nowhere
states these explicitly, but we surmise they are as follows. If the
answer to (a) is that unguidedness is part of the standard theory of
neo-Darwinism, then Plantinga’s Claim is refuted. And if the
answer to (b) is that existing evidence supports [C] to a significant

degree, Plantinga’s Claim is refuted too. And if the answer to (c)
is that it is logically impossible that, given the evidence, evolution
is directed by someone (so, if [A] and [B] are incompatible),
Plantinga’s Claim is refuted as well. Let us now canvass Philipse’s
answers to (a), (b), and (c).
(a) Is the Unguidedness-Thesis Part of the Standard Theory

of Neo-Darwinism?
With respect to (a) Philipse points out first that Darwin stressed
that the hypothesis that the Creator might direct mutations in
ways that are beneficial to a species is antagonistic to his theory of
evolution: “If genetic variation could be guided in a beneficial
direction, natural selection would be superfluous, so that the
internal logic or economy of the theory excludes the idea that
mutations are somehow orchestrated.” (Philipse 2013, p. 91;
Philipse is speaking in his own voice here – this is not a quotation
from Darwin.) “Accordingly”, says Philipse, “it is a central tenet of
the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis that genetic mutations occur
‘by chance’ or ‘at random’ in the sense of not being directed
toward the adaptive needs of the organisms concerned or of the
populations to which they belong, and that natural selection is not
goal-directed either.” (Philipse 2013, p. 91) The point attributed
to Darwin, then, is that “the internal logic” of his theory “excludes
the idea that mutations are somehow orchestrated”: natural selec-
tion would be superfluous if mutations could be guided. And this
is acknowledged in the Modern Synthesis where it is said that
mutations occur ‘by chance’ in the sense of not being directed
towards the adaptive needs.
Does this show that Plantinga’s Claim is false? Does it show that
[C] is “part of” the science of evolution? Not, for the following
reasons:
• Nothing that was said shows that natural selection “excludes”

the possibility that mutations are somehow orchestrated. This
is a point of logic. The following situation is not inherently
impossible: among the many mutations that occur, some are
orchestrated.
• Natural selection, Philipse’s Darwin tells us, would be “super-
fluous” if mutations could be guided. Something is “super-
fluous” if it isn’t needed. It is not entirely clear for what
natural selection would not be needed if mutations could be

guided. Perhaps the idea is that if God could guide mutations

in order to attain his goals, he would see to it that the entire
process of mutation and natural selection would come to a
halt, as there would be no need for it, since God could attain
his goals independently of that process. However, whether or
not this is correct, it is orthogonal to the compatibility issue:
it doesn’t show nor entail that [A] and [B] are incompatible,
nor that [C] is part of the science of evolution. Perhaps,
however, the idea here is that if God could guide mutations,
natural selection would be superfluous for explanatory pur-
poses. But this can easily be contested, as explanations can be
given at different levels. What is chancy at one level of expla-
nation, need not be chancy at another—as Sober has
reminded us.
• The fact that the Modern Synthesis accepts the idea that
mutations are random in the sense of not being directed to
the needs of an organism or population does not show
that [C] is part of the science of evolution. The burden of
Alexander’s, Van Inwagen’s, and Plantinga’s argument, as
expounded in section 2 is that [A] and [B] are fully compat-
ible. And so far we haven’t seen anything brought against
that claim.
So far, then, Plantinga’s Claim stands unrefuted.
But Philipse has more arrows in his quiver. After having con-
sidered the Mayr and Sober quotations in which they define
“random mutation”, he says:
From these quotes (sic) Plantinga correctly concludes that
being random in that sense is clearly compatible with being
caused by God. However, it doesn’t follow, and is in fact contra-
dicted by the quote from Mayr (unless one restricts the
meaning of this quote à la Sober to the absence of physical
guiding mechanisms), that randomness in the evolutionary
sense is also logically compatible with being guided by God, if at
least ‘guided’ means that mutations are somehow directed
towards new adaptations, or to the development of new species.
And what else could it mean? (Philipse 2013, p. 92)
He then concludes:
Clearly, then, the thesis that evolution is unguided is an integral
part of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, and Plantinga’s

argument to the effect that the thesis is a ‘philosophical gloss or
add-on’ to this theory is a non-sequitur. (Philipse 2013, p. 92)
In a footnote Philipse says:
One should diagnose Plantinga’s fallacy as a fallacy of ambigu-

ity because he confuses ‘uncaused’ with ‘unguided’. (Philipse:
2013, p. 92, fn. 20)
It seems initially as if Philipse agrees with Plantinga, for he starts

out by saying that from the quotes by Mayr and Sober, Plantinga
correctly concludes that a mutation’s being random in the senses
defined, is clearly compatible with their being caused by God. No
doubt Philipse is right here: that is what Plantinga concludes, and
correctly concludes.
But then he continues that although mutations’ being random
in the senses explained by Mayr and Sober is compatible with their
being caused by God, it is not compatible with their being guided by
God. Apparently Philipse thinks there is a difference between
these two concepts—a difference so important that not distin-
guishing them amounts to committing the fallacy of ambiguity.
But he nowhere explains what the difference is supposed to be.
This is unfortunate, for it is a very natural construal of what
Plantinga says about these notions that God’s guiding is a way of
God’s causing, so that if God caused certain mutations to occur in
order to secure certain adaptations, this just is (the very same
thing as) God directing mutations towards new adaptations. To
make the same point with a few more words, Plantinga’s thoughts
here can be put as follows: “There is no correlation between the
occurrence of mutations and the adaptational needs of organ-
isms. This is just saying they are random. Yet they are, of course,
caused. But what is the cause that causes mutations to occur?
Some mutations may be caused by God, and the full ensemble of
God’s causing certain mutations to occur constitutes the evolu-
tionary process being guided by God.” No fallacy here. And no
reason for thinking that [C] is part of the scientific theory of
evolution. And hence no reason for thinking that Plantinga’s
Claim has been undermined.
Philipse has one more arrow in his quiver. He claims that the
idea that mutations are ‘guided by God’ is contradicted by the
quotation from Mayr. So he thinks that the absence of a correla-
tion between the production of new genotypes and the

adaptational needs of organisms contradicts the idea that muta-

tions can be guided by God. Unfortunately Philipse gives no
reason for thinking so, nor does he indicate what is wrong with the
arguments contra contradiction such as Van Inwagen’s and
Plantinga’s. This being so, it is a non sequitur to conclude that
“Clearly, then, the thesis that evolution is unguided is an integral
part of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis.”
One may be inclined to respond as follows: who lays down the
law on what is and what isn’t “part of” the scientific theory of
evolution? It can’t be the philosophers who tell us that, it must be
the biologists. A rather standard textbook on evolution such as
Mark Ridley’s explicitly says that “it is one of the most fundamen-
tal claims in the Darwinian theory of evolution that natural selec-
tion is the only explanation for adaptation.” Ridley means this in a
way that can be regarded as an endorsement of [C].7 So if biolo-
gists say that [C] is a “part of” the scientific theory of evolution in
the strict sense, shouldn’t the rest of us comply? Not necessarily.
For consider the theory of evolution as including such proposi-
tions as that that life has progressed from relatively simple to
relatively complex forms, that there is descent with modification,
that all forms of life have a common ancestry, and that the process
of descent with modification is driven by natural selection oper-
ating on random genetic mutation, and also as including [C], and
let’s call this ET. This theory has the power to explain a certain set
of phenomena. Now consider another theory, which consists of
exactly all the propositions that are part of ET, except [C], and let
us call it, for obvious reasons, ‘ET-’. ET- has the power to explain
a certain set of phenomena. But now the point to see is that the set
of phenomena that can be explained by ET- is the exact same set
of phenomena as the one that can be explained by ET. The two
theories are equivalent, both in their explanatory scope and in
their explanatory power. But this means that [C] is inessential to
ET. It does no work. It is an add-on, a philosophical gloss on ET.
So far, then, Plantinga’s Claim stands unrefuted.
(b) Does the Existing Evidence Support the Unguidedness-Thesis?

Let us next turn Philipse’s discussion of question (b). Or, to quote
the question that Philipse actually sets himself to answer: does
7
Quoted after Philipse 2013, p. 92; the reference is to Ridley 2004, p. 256. Philipse says
that Ridley explicitly excludes theistic explanations (fn. 20).

“the existing evidence support [. . .] the thesis that mutations are
random, not in the sense of ‘uncaused’ but in the sense of
‘unguided to future adaptation’?” (Philipse 2013, p. 92) A bit
later, however, he gives another explanation of what ‘random’ is
supposed to mean by quoting Merlin, who says that it means that
“there is no specific causal connection between the probability of
a mutation being beneficial (in a given environment) and the
probability of it occurring (in this environment).” (Philipse 2013,
p. 91; the quotation is taken from Merlin 2010: 6) The thesis that
evolution is random in this sense, Philipse tells us, is “one should
admit that the empirical evidence supporting this claim is over-
whelming.” (Philipse 2013, p. 92) This is his startling answer to
(b). This is startling, for, as Plantinga (like Van Inwagen) has
argued, a mutation’s being random in the sense explained by
Merlin (which is obviously an explanation in the same spirit as the
explanations given by Mayr and Sober, and Van Inwagen) is fully
compatible with God directing mutations toward new adaptations.
This is left fully untouched by anything that Philipse has brought
forth. So, Philipse has either missed the last point, or has been
using ‘random’ equivocally. Either way, what he says causes no
problem for Plantinga.
(c) Is it Logically Possible that, Given the Evidence, Evolution is

Directed by Someone?
Let us finally turn to (c). Philipse’s answer is worthy of full
quotation:
It is trivially true that because our evidence is limited in prin-

ciple, it is always logically possible that there are hidden vari-
ables, which are still undetected or even undetectable. For
example, our available evidence concerning the Cretaceous-
Paleogene extinction event does not contradict the hypothesis
that God caused it by steering an asteroid towards Earth. But
why should we accept such a gratuitous speculation? A mere
logical possibility does not warrant a factual assertion, and if
someone claims that he knows this by means of an ‘Internal
Instigation of the Holy Spirit’, we should respond with a shrug.
(Philipse 2013, p. 93)
The answer to (c), then, is affirmative: given the available evi-

dence, it is logically possible that evolution is directed by

someone. So again no objection here against Plantinga. Hence

Plantinga’s Claim easily survives all of Philipse’s criticisms.8
Philipse is right, though, in saying that a mere logical possibility
does not warrant a factual assertion. That the conjunction of [A]
and [B] is logically possible, doesn’t entail that the conjunction is
true. No theist, or anybody else for that matter, would think
otherwise. But as was indicated in section 1, the question as to the
compatibility of [A] and [B] can be, and should be, discussed
independently of the actual truth values of [A] and [B].
Of course, theists are committed to the truth of [A]. But the
warrant for that doesn’t derive and cannot derive from [A]’s
compatibility with [B]. The warrant for [A], theists believe, must
come from elsewhere, from natural theology perhaps9, or revela-
tion10, or some form of experience11, or from what Aquinas called
the Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit.12 Whether a shrug is a
philosophically satisfactory response to this suggestion is a matter
for another occasion.13 For now the important point is that the
claim that [A] and [B] are compatible is left untouched by
Philipse’s criticisms.14
8
An anonymous reviewer for this journal has suggested that we might have read
Philipse in an uncharitable way, and that the point Philipse is trying to make is something
like this: Plantinga is suggesting that “God did it” should be annexed to evolutionary
biology, but he, Philipse, claims that the result is an inferior theory – a theory that makes
the wrong predictions. For instance, evolutionary theory might predict that there is a 50%
chance of a certain mutation occurring, while in fact there really is, say, a 75% chance that
God will cause it to occur. Our response is: Plantinga is not suggesting that “God did it”
should be “annexed” (or in the terms we have used earlier, should be made “part of”) the
scientific theory of evolution. Just as [C], as Plantinga has argued, is not “part of” the
scientific theory of evolution, he is committed to the idea that the denial of [C] is no “part
of” that theory either. (For this see also Bergmann (2013).) And if this is correct, the wrong
predictions worry cannot arise.
9
Manning (2013).
10
Swinburne (2007).
11
Alston (1991).
12
Plantinga (2000).
13
Fairness requires us to say that Philipse (2012) is far more than a shrug.
14
To be sure, we have not examined all of Philipse’s criticisms of Plantinga; but we have
examined all of his criticisms of Plantinga’s claims that [A] and [B] are compatible, and
that [C] is no “part of” science. Philipse’s further criticism of Plantinga is that the real
conflict between science and Christian belief is not of a logical but of an epistemological
nature. This criticism is examined in Van Woudenberg & Rothuizen-van der Steen
(2016).

5. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, then: various issues with respect to the

relation between [A] and [B] should be distinguished, one of
them being whether they are compatible. Alexander, Van
Inwagen and Plantinga argue in different ways that these propo-
sitions, or pairs sufficiently similar to [A] and [B], are compatible.
They also argue, in different ways, that [C] is not part of the
science of evolution. These claims have come under attack, but,
we have argued, the attack is unsuccesfull. And hence, if these
claims are false, they must false for reasons other than the ones we
have discussed.15
Department of Philosophy
VU University
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
R.van.Woudenberg@vu.nl
J.van.der.Steen@vu.nl
References
Alexander, D. (2008). Creation or Evolution: Do We Have to Choose? (Oxford: Monarch
Books).
Alston, W. P. (1991). Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca NY:
Cornell University Press).
Bergmann, M. (2013). “Is Plantinga a Friend of Evolutionary Science?” European Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 5, pp. 3–18.
Dawkins, R. (1986). The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton).
Manning, R. R. (2013). The Oxford Handbook to Natural Theology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Mayr, Ernst (1988). Towards a new Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press).
Merlin, F. (2010). “Evolutionary Chance Mutation: A Defense of the Modern Synthesis”.
Philosophy and Theory in Biology 2, pp. 1–22.
Philipse, H. (2012). God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
—— (2013). “The Real Conflict Between Science and Religion: Alvin Plantinga’s Ignoratio
Elenchi”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5, pp. 87–110.
Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
15
For discussion and comments we thank Terence Cuneo, Alvin Plantinga, Rik Peels,
Jeroen de Ridder and two anonymous referees for this journal. It is thankfully acknowl-
edged that work on the paper was made possible by a grant from the Templeton World
Charity Foundation; for the content of this paper the authors are solely responsible.

Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the Conflict Really Lies. Science, Religion & Naturalism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Ridley, M. (2004). Evolution (Third Edition. Oxford: Blackwell).
Sober, E. (2011). “Evolution Without Naturalism” in J. L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in
Philosophy of Religion, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 187–211.
Swinburne, R. (2007). Revelation. From Metaphor to Analogy (second edition) (Oxford:
Clarendon).
Van Inwagen, P. (2003). “The Compatibility of Darwinism and Design”, in N. A. Manson
(ed.), God and Design. The Teleological Argument and Modern Science (London: Routledge),
pp. 348–363.
Van Woudenberg, R. (2013). “Chance, Design, Defeat”. European Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 5, pp. 31–41.
Van Woudenberg, R. & Rothuizen-van der Steen, J. (2016). “Science and the Ethics of
Belief. An Examination of Herman Philipse’s Rule R.” Journal for General Philosophy of
Science 47.

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