CSC303: Final Assessment

Released April 11th at 9:00AM, Due April 13 at 9:00AM, Toronto Time

Be sure to include your name and student number on the last page of the test. All tests
are to be submitted on Markus. You CANNOT submit the final late. Any legible PDF will be
accepted, but illegible solutions will get a mark of zero.

Since time is short, you may want to consider writing your solutions on paper and submitting a scan/photograph
of them – just bear in mind that MarkUs has a filesize limit of approx. 5MB, so you may have to compress
your PDF if go this route. If you’re a quick typesetter or have the time, then I strongly suggest typesetting
your solutions (e.g., in LATEX). The final’s .tex file is on Quercus.

You will receive 20% of the points for any (sub)problem for which you write “I do not know how to
answer this question.” You will receive 0% if you leave a question blank. If you submit irrelevant or
erroneous answers, you will receive 0 points. You may receive partial credit for the work that is clearly “on
the right track.”

The only resources you are allowed to consult are material from this class and the prerequisite classes
(e.g., lecture slides, E&K textbook, tutorial recordings, your own notes from this or prerequisite classes,
etc...). You are not allowed to collaborate with other students, or to consult the internet.

If you have a question, then please email me or make a private post on the message board, and I will
reply to you. I will try to answer questions as I receive them between 9AM and 5PM. Outside of these times
I’ll do my best, but I can’t make any guarantees. I will put any clarifications that I think are of value onto
the message board. Any corrections will be announced via Quercus, in addition to the message board.

You have 2 days to work on the test (From April 11 at 9AM to April 13 at 9AM). It should only
take you 3-6 hours to finish the final. We may have misjudged the difficulty – so please don’t panic if you
complete the final faster or slower.

Please read all questions before beginning, and contact me if you have any questions ASAP.
Make sure to check the course forum to see if I’ve posted a clarification there.

As always, do try to remember that you are far more than just a grade, and that you have already shown
remarkable skill and effort.

Good luck! :-)

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 Question 1:(10 points) Assume a given edge-weighted graph G = (V, E, w) obeys STC. G is simple (i.e.,
no self-loops and all edges are unique), and undirected. Apart from these two constraints, G is an arbitrary
graph. For each of the following scenarios, what properties (if anything) can we conclude about the local
bridges in the graph? Be as specific as possible.

(a) [5 points] For every edge in G, the endpoints have at least one distinct strong tie. i.e., for every edge
(A, B) ∈ E, then there must exist some nodes x, y ∈ V such that x ̸= y, the edges (A, x) and (B, y)
exist [i.e., (A, x), (B, y) ∈ E], and these two edges are both strong.

(b) [5 points] All edges in G are strong.

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 Question 2:(17.5 points) Assume there is an algorithm, A that runs on a signed graph (i.e., all edges are
labelled as either positive or negative). Algorithm A returns true iff it is possible to assign a colour to every
node in the graph, such that every node is either red or blue, the endpoints of all positive edges are the same
colour, and the endpoints of all negative edges are different colours.

(a) [5 points] If algorithm A returns true on a graph G = (V, E, w), then is G completable to a strongly
balanced network? Briefly explain.
(b) [5 points] If G is completable to a strongly balanced network, will Algorithm A return True?

(c) How do our answers change if we are instead interested in weak, rather than strong, structural balance?

(i) [2.5 points] If algorithm A returns true on a graph G = (V, E, w), then is G completable to a
weakly balanced network? Briefly explain.
(ii) [2.5 points] If G is completable to a weakly balanced network, will Algorithm A return True?
Briefly explain.

(d) [2.5 points] Briefly describe a polynomial time implementation of A. You do not need to state the
complexity (but you can if you so wish), and you do not need to provide pseudo code (but again, you
may if you wish).

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 Question 3:(17.5 points) For this question, you will be drawing one social-affiliation network, and using
it to explain various concepts. For this reason, read all parts of the question carefully before creating your
graph.

(a) [2.5 points] Draw your own social-affiliation graph with at most 20 nodes, and at least two foci. Briefly
explain the scenario that your graph describes (e.g., “Miriam and Diedre are friends, and all people
[listed here] except for Santiago are in the mock UN, ...”).
(b) [5 points] Does the graph in part a) exhibit homophily with respect to two foci of your choice? Justify
your answer as rigorously as you can (note: a p-vale is not required)
(c) [5 points] Use the graph from a) to illustrate the concept of influence. Explain the concept, and how
your example illustrates this concept.
(d) [5 points] Use the graph from b) to illustrate the concept of selection. Explain the concept, and how
your example illustrates this concept.

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 Question 4:(5 points) We are given an arbitrary directed graph G = (V, E), and a rank function r :
V 2 → N that tells us the rank of any node with respect to any other node. Furthermore, we are told that
there exists the nodes x1 , xn ∈ V , and G contains at least one path from x1 to xn (you may assume that
x1 , x2 , . . . xn is the shortest path). Under what circumstances is it impossible for decentralized search using
rank to find the shortest path from x1 to xn ? Briefly explain.

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 Question 5:(10 points) Consider the following graph. Your classmate claims that unscaled PageRank on
the following graph will converge to all nodes having a rank of 0.2

(a) [5 points] Represent the PageRank update on this graph as a matrix. Briefly explain how you produced
this matrix, and how to use it to perform the PageRank update.
(b) [5 points] Is the classmate’s proposed equilibrium correct? Explain.

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 Question 6:(10 points) In class we saw the Schelling Segregation model as an example of homphily driven
by selection. Provide an example of a model we saw in class that could serve to illustrate homphily due
to influence. You may provide a corresponding scenario/setup if it makes the illustration clearer, or if you
require a specific type of network for your example to work. Explain.

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 Question 7:(10 points) Explain why our algorithm for choosing initial adopters is not appropriate for the
complete cascade model. If you claim that the complete cascade model may have or lack a given property,
then you must provide a proof or counterexample unless it was already proven in class.

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Question 8: (10 points) Assume that for some given preferences, MPDA and FPDA return the same stable
matching. Does another stable matching exist, does no other stable matching exist, or is there insufficient
information to answer the question? Briefly justify.

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Question 9: (10 points) Consider the following bargaining network; in class we claimed that there is no
stable solution. Assume we change the rules so that node C will not enter a deal, unless it will receive a
payoff of at least m (e.g., C is too proud to enter a deal for less). Under this rule, is an equilibrium possible?
You can assume that payoffs of less than 1 cent are possible.
If yes, provide the smallest value of m under which an equilibrium can exist, and an example equilibrium
for this value. Briefly justify that your solution is an equilibrium, and that your value of m is minimal.
If no, prove that no stable solution can exist for any value of m.

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Question 10: (15 points) Recall in class, we saw that the following congestion network exhibits Braess’
paradox with the creation of the edge (D, C), when K = 45, and we have 4000 drivers all commuting from
A to B.
Specifically, without the edge (D, C) then the average transit time in the unique Nash Equilibrium is
65 minutes, and with the edge (D, C) then the unique Nash Equilibrium has an average transit time of 80
minutes.

(a) [5 points] Is there a finite, non-negative, value of K for which Braess’s paradox may not occur with the
creation of the edge (D, C)? If so, state one such K and briefly explain. Otherwise, explain why not.

(b) Assuming we fix K = 45, are there non-zero numbers of drivers, T > 0, for which Braess’ paradox may
not occur? Specifically:
(i) [5 points] Can the transit time improve with the creation of (D, C)? Explain.
(ii) [5 points] Can the transit time remain unchanged with the creation of (D, C)? Explain.

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Question 11: (0 points) Thank you for completing the final! If you could let me know how long it took you
and whether you preferred this format to an in-person final then it’d be very much appreciated :) There’s
an anonymous Google Form here: https://forms.gle/de7Ny7k4kikyWtKx7
Have a great summer!

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Name:
Student number:

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