JOSE M. ROY III, Petitioner vs.

CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA, THE SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMP
ANY,, Respondents
x---------------------------------------x
WILSON C. GAMBOA, JR., DANIEL V. CARTAGENA, JOHN WARREN P. GABINETE,
ANTONIO V. PESINA, JR., MODESTO MARTINY. MAMON III, and GERARDO C. EREBAREN,
Petitioners-in-Intervention,
x---------------------------------------x
PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. Respondent-in-Intervention,
x---------------------------------------x
SHAREHOLDERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent-in-Intervention.
G.R. No. 207246, April 18, 2017
(En Banc)

FACTS: The petitions are special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Roy
III, filed the initial petition and prayed that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and
direct the SEC to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution in accordance with the decision in Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves
(Gamboa Decision).

On June 28, 2011, the Court issued the Gamboa Decision, which reads: “the term ‘capital’ in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities
and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term ‘capital’ in determining the
extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate
sanctions under the law.”

On May 20, 2013, the SEC issued SEC-MC No. 8 entitled "Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-
Foreign Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution and/or Existing Laws by Corporations
Engaged in Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities." Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 provides:
“Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory
ownership requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required percentage
of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock,
whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. Corporations covered by special laws
which provide specific citizenship requirements shall comply with the provisions of said law.”

Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-MC No. 8 for not
conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision and Resolution and for having been issued
by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion. Roy seeks to apply the 60-40 Filipino ownership
requirement separately to each class of shares of a public utility corporation, whether common,
preferred non- voting, preferred voting or any other class of shares. Roy also questions the ruling of
the SEC that respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company ("PLDT") is compliant with the
constitutional rule on foreign ownership. He prays that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8
unconstitutional and direct the SEC to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of
compliance with Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in accordance with Gamboa.

1
ISSUE #1: Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing SEC-MC No. 8 in light
of the Gamboa Decision.

HELD #1: No. The Court finds SEC-MC No. 8 to have been issued in fealty to the Gamboa Decision
and Resolution. In the Gamboa ruling, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. The dispositive portion of the
Court's ruling is addressed not to PLDT but solely to the SEC, which is the administrative agency
tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution.

Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 clearly incorporates the Voting Control Test or the controlling interest
requirement. In fact, Section 2 goes beyond requiring a 60-40 ratio in favor of Filipino nationals in the
voting stocks; it moreover requires the 60-40 percentage ownership in the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or not. The SEC formulated SEC-MC No. 8 to adhere to
the Court's unambiguous pronouncement that "[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights is required."

ISSUE #2: Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that PLDT is compliant
with the constitutional limitation on foreign ownership.

HELD #2: No. SEC already clarified that it "has not yet issued a definitive ruling anent PLDT's
compliance with the limitation on foreign ownership imposed under the Constitution and relevant
laws. Thus, in the absence of a definitive ruling by the SEC on PLDT's compliance with the capital
requirement pursuant to the Gamboa ruling, any question relative to the inexistent ruling is
premature.

ISSUE #3: Whether judicial review may be exercised.

HELD #3: No. Petitioners' failure to sufficiently allege, much less establish, the existence of the first
two requisites for the exercise of judicial review warrants the perfunctory dismissal of the petitions.
The requisites are: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.

ISSUE #4: Whether or not the rule on the Hierarchy of Courts has been violated.

HELD #4: Yes. Petitioners' invocation of "transcendental importance" is hollow and does not merit
the relaxation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. There being no special, important or compelling
reason that justified the direct filing of the petitions in the Court in violation of the policy on hierarchy
of courts, their outright dismissal on this ground is further warranted. The Court may act on petitions
for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

ISSUE #5: Whether or not the petitioners failed to implead indispensable parties.

HELD #5: Yes. The petitioners should have impleaded not only PLDT but all other corporations in
nationalized and partly nationalized industries because the propriety of the SEC's enforcement of the
Court's interpretation of "capital" through SEC-MC No. 8 affects them as well. This is evidenced by the
number of intervenors. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, an indispensable party is a
party- in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Indispensable
parties are those with such a material and direct interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.

Other than PLDT, the petitions failed to join or implead other public utility corporations subject to the
same restriction imposed by Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. These corporations are in
danger of losing their franchise and property if they are found not compliant with the restrictive
2
interpretation

3
of the constitutional provision under review which is being espoused by petitioners. They should be
afforded due notice and opportunity to be heard, lest they be deprived of their property without due
process.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al, Petitioners vs. HEIRS OF IKANG PAUS, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 201273, August 14, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) issued a Resolution granting
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT) to the heirs of Ikang Paus, respondents herein. An Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-CALT-37 was thus granted to them.

Subsequently, petitioner Republic, through the OSG, filed a suit before the RTC for the reversion,
nullification and cancellation of the OCT No. 0-CALT-37. Petitioner allege, among others, that the
CALT was issued erronneously because the land covered by said Certificate forms part of the Baguio
Stock Farm (BSF) which is an agricultural land of the public domain protected from or ancestral land
claims.

The RTC dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the CALT
and the corresponding OCT were issued on the basis of Resolution issued by the NCIP. Thus, any
challenge against the CALT and the OCT necessarily calls for a review of the NCIP Resolution.
However, NCIP is a quasi-judicial body with a rank and stature equal to that of the RTC; hence, it
cannot review the Resolution of the NCIP or any document that flows from its proceedings.

The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA, however, affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Republic then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. In said
petition, the heirs of Mateo Cariño and Bayosa Ortega filed a petition-for-intervention seeking to
declare Section 53 of the IPRA as unconstitutional as it failed to provide sufficient standards to guide
the assessment and approval of ancestral land claims.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion, nullification and
cancellation of an OCT issued by virtue of Certificate of Ancestral Land Title granted by
the NCIP?

HELD #1: Yes. Tthe RTC has the original jurisdiciton over the complaint based on the following
reasons:

First, the suit filed by the Republic requires a factual determination of whether the land is indeed of
public domain. This then raises the issue of whether a CALT may be issued over it, and whether an
OCT may be issued arising from the CALT. This is therefore a complaint for the reversion of a land to
the public domain and the cancellation of a Torrens title covering a public land, both matters being
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Second, the nature of a reversion suit belong to the class of cases that 'involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein' and where the assessed value of the property
exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. In a reversion suit, the attack is directed
not against the judgment ordering the issuance of title, but against the title that is being sought to be
cancelled either because the judgment was not validly rendered, or the title issued did not faithfully
reflect the land referred to in the judgment, or because no judgment was rendered at all.

4
Third, the NICP or any Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties.
Thus, it may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by
any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. In this case, the RTC also has to
rule on whether the Register of Deeds of Baguio City acted correctly in issuing OCT

Fourth, the NICP has no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (Republic, Register of Deeds of
Baguio, and LRA). Under the IPRA law, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the
rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another
ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an
opposing non- ICC/IP. Thus, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction
of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority
to decide on a controversy involving, as well, rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a
court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the petition-for-intervention by the heirs of Cariño and Ortega
was proper?

HELD #2: No. The intervention lacks basis. The requisites for intervention of a non-party are as
follows:
1. Legal interest
a. In the matter in controversy; or
b. In the success of either of the parties; or
c. Against both parties; or
d. Person is so situated as to be adveresly affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof;
2. Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of orginal parties
3. Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding

In this case, the Heirs of Cariño and Ortega failed to prove a legal interest in the controversy. The
petition was filed to determine the jurisdiction over the Republic’s complaint; however, the issue
submitted in the intervention is the constiuttionality of Section 53. Furthermore, in determining the
constitutionality, it will delay the adjudication of the original complaint.

ISSUE #3: Whether or not the SC may review the issue of the constitutionality of Section
53 of IPRA?

HELD #3: No. The constitutionality of Section 53 of IPRA is not the very lis mota of the petition

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review.
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.

Here, it is unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of Section 53 of the IPRA in order to arrive at
the conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction over the Republic's Complaint.

5
 SPS. LINO REBAMONTE, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS NAMELY:
LUZVIMINDA R. PANISA, TERYLI M. REBAMONTE, NAIDA R. CERVANTES, JOEREL M.
REBAMONTE, AND HEIRS OF JEMUEL M. REBAMONTE, REPRESENTED BY JUDITH ANN
O. REBAMONTE, AND TERESITA M. REBAMONTE, PETITIONERS, V. SPS. GUILLERMO
LUCERO AND GENOVEVA S. LUCERO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 237812, October 02, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Respondent Guillermo's parents, Marcos and Tomasa, obtained a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and mortgaged the subject portion of the land as security. Then, the
spouses defaulted and the said lot was foreclosed in favour of DBP. However, the spouse was able to
repurchase such. After the said repurchase, they sold it to their son, Guillermo, evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale on Lot No. 1305-A.

However, prior to such sale, three separate unregistered sales in favor of Tomasa's cousin, petitioner
Lino, allegedly took place over certain portions of Lot No. 1305-A. As petitioner Lino took possession
of the aforementioned portions, respondent Guillermo was unable to possess the entire lot.
Respondent Guillermo repeatedly made demands for petitioner Lino to vacate the aforementioned
portions of the lot, but petitioner Lino refused to do so. Hence, Guillermo and his wife instituted a
Complaint for Recovery of Real Estate Property, Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages,
and Attorney's Fees against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The case was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Tacurong City, Branch 20 (RTC).

On the other hand, the petitioner Sps. Rebamonte also avers that there was defective service of
Summons. The court's process server resorted to substituted service without complying with the
requirement in connection thereto. Thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Teresita Rebamonte. Also, they stated that even up to now the counsel for the respondents
Sps.Lucero have yet to inform the court about the fact of death of Guillermo and the failure to effect
substitution renders the Decision of the [RTC] null and void.

ISSUE#1: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint filed by the respondents
Sps. Lucero, considering that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that the
jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the Municipal Trial Court of Tacurong City (MTC)
and not the RTC.

HELD#1: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case. According to Section 33(3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691,24 the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property located outside Metro Manila, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.

As admitted by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, Lot No. 1305-A "has a total market
assessed value of P11,120.00[.]"

Hence, on the question of jurisdiction, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are correct in saying that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case. Considering that the assessed
value of the subject property, as alleged by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, is well
below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint. However, in this case, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over subject matter is already barred by laches considering the 22 years that have
elapsed from the filing of the complaint.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Please check new jurisdictional amounts under RA 11576

6
ISSUE#2: Whether there was a defective service of summons and, consequently,
whether all the proceedings conducted by the RTC are considered null and void.

HELD#2: No, there was no defect in the service of summons. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules
of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the Sps. Rebamonte fully and
actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC and CA. After very actively participating in the
proceedings, and after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte cannot now
allege for the first time that their right to be heard was transgressed. The petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte's insistence that there was a violation of their right to due process due to the alleged
defective service of summons is outright nonsense. The argument is clearly unmeritorious.

ISSUE#3: Whether the failure to effect substitution for the death of respondent
Guillermo in 2000 violated Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.

HELD#3: No. In any case, the Court has ruled that [m]ere failure to substitute a deceased party is
not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there
was an undeniable violation of due process. When due process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance
with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.

In the instant case, there is absolutely no allegation that the right to due process of the respondents
Sps. Lucero was violated due to the non substitution of respondent Guillermo after the latter's death.
No one disputes that the respondents Sps. Lucero were fully able to participate and present their
evidence during the trial.

SPOUSES BELVIS, et al Petitioners vs. SPOUSES EROLA, Respondents

G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: This case involves a land located in Pontevedra, Capiz, registered in the name of respondent
Conrado V. Erola. Respondent Conrado allegedly allowed her sister petitioner Cecilia Belvis to possess
the lot, subject to the condition that they would vacate the same upon demand. Petitioner Cecilia and
her family possessed and cultivated the lot for over 34 years. On July 2, 2012, respondents sent
petitioners a letter requiring the latter to vacate the property within 30 days. Petitioners, however,
refused to comply. This led the respondents to file a complaint for unlawful detainer before the
MCTC.

In Petitioners’ Answer, they contend that the complaint should be dismissed because respondents
failed to personally appear during the barangay conciliation proceedings, and were merely
represented by their attorney.They also claim that Cecilia Belvis owns ½ of the subject property by
hereditary share since the land was purchased by their mother. They also argue that they have the
right of possession over the land because they were builders in good faith under Article 448 of the
Civil Code.

The MCTC, RTC and CA unanimously ruled in favor of respondents. On the procedural issue, the
courts held that respondent’s non-appearance during barangay conciliation was a mere irregularity
and that the same did not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the parties were referred
to Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) during pre-trial and even before the court during Judicial
Dispute Resolution (JDR), but still failed to settle amicably. On the substantive issue, the courts held
that petitioners failed

7
to prove that Cecilia was a co-owner of the land. Hence, petitioners had no right to retain possession
of the property under Article 448 because petitioners could not have built improvements on the
subject lot in the concept of owner since their possession was by mere tolerance of respondents.

ISSUE #1: Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of non-appearance
of the respondent during barangay conciliation proceedings.

HELD #1: No. The SC ruled that the respondents have substantially complied with the law.

Sec. 412 of the RA 7160 requires, when applicable, prior resort to barangay conciliation proceedings
as a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court. In relation thereto, Section 415 of the same
law holds that the parties must personally appear in said proceedings, without the assistance of
counsel or any representative. Failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings renders
the complaint vulnerable to a motion to dismiss for prematurity under Section 10, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.

In Lumbuan v. Ronquillo, the Court explained that the primordial objective of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules, is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the
quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.
Although mandatory, non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law
is not jurisdictional in nature , and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading.

In this case, aside from the barangay conciliation proceedings, the parties underwent mediation
before the PMC and JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was reached. Given the foregoing, the
Court finds that the purposes of the law, i.e., to provide avenues for parties to amicably settle their
disputes and to prevent the "indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts," have been sufficiently met.
Considering that the instant complaint for unlawful detainer, an action governed by the rules of
summary procedure, has been pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the technical
rules of procedure in the interest of speedy and substantial justice.

ISSUE #2: Whether petitioners were builders in good faith under Art. 448 of the Civil Code.

HELD #2: Yes. The SC reversed the decision of the CA and the lower courts. The SC explained in
this case the application of Art. 448 which provides:

"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of
the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."

General Rule in applying Art. 448:

The Court has ruled that Art. 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply
when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. From
these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that — by
some title
— one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.

Art. 448 is not applicable to co-owners:

Even assuming that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the subject property, Article 448 would still
be inapplicable. As previously held by the SC, Article 448 may not generally apply to a co-owner who
8
builds, plants, or sows on a property owned in common, "for then he [(the co-owner)] did not build,

9
plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-
owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-
ownership."

The reason for this rule is clear. Under Article 445 of the Civil Code rights of accession with respect to
immovable property apply to "whatever' is built, planted or sown on the land of another." A co-owner
of a parcel of land, however, builds on his own land and not that of another as "a co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion; but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly ABSTRACT." More
importantly, co-ownerships are governed by Articles 484-501 of the Civil Code, which already specify
the rights and obligations of a co-owner who builds, plants, and sows on a co owned property and
the rules for the reimbursement thereof.

Exception to the GR in applying Art. 448:

In exceptional cases, the Court has applied Article 448 to instances where a builder, planter, or sower
introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and consent of the owner. In
Department of Education v. Casibang, Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied beyond the
recognized and limited definition of good faith. The Court ruled therein that the structures were built
in good faith in those cases that the owners knew and approved of the construction of improvements
on the property.

The instant case falls into the exception:

In the instant case, while respondents may have merely tolerated petitioners' possession,
respondents never denied having knowledge of the fact that petitioners possessed, cultivated and
constructed various permanent improvements on the subject lot for over 34 years. In fact, the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that respondents ever opposed or objected, for over 34
years, to the improvements introduced by petitioners, despite the fact that petitioner Cecilia and
respondent Conrado are siblings and that both parties reside in Pontevedra, Capiz. As such, the Court
finds that respondents likewise acted in bad faith under Article 453 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on
the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the
other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with
his knowledge and without opposition on his part.

Pursuant to the aforementioned article, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as
though both acted in good faith. Therefore, Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code applies.

Under Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548, respondents as landowners have the following
options: 1) they may appropriate the improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the
value of the improvements introduced and the necessary, useful and luxurious expenses defrayed on
the subject lots; or 2) they may oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, if the value is not
considerably more than that of the improvements and buildings. Should respondents opt to
appropriate the improvements made, however, petitioners may retain the subject lot until
reimbursement for the necessary and useful expenses have been made.

The case was remanded to the MCTC to determine the proper application of Art. 448 in relation to Art.
546 and 548 of the Civil Code.

With regard to the determination of ownership:

The SC gave emphasis that the case is a complaint for an unlawful detainer. Thus, the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
10
ownership by any of the parties. The determination of the ownership of the subject lot is merely
provisional and is without prejudice to the appropriate action for recovery or quieting of title.

(Rule 1)

JOANNE KRISTINE G. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs. REYNALDO ADIAO, CRISTY ADIAO-

NIERVES AND CHRISTIAN ADIAO, Respondents
G.R. No. 222678, October 17, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: Joanne filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Reynaldo Adiao (Reynaldo),
Christian Adiao (Christian) and Cristy Adiao-Nierves (Cristy). Joanne alleged that she entered into a
Construction Agreement with Reynaldo and Christian whereby Reynaldo, as contractor, agreed to
undertake the renovation of Joanne's bungalow house. However, Reynaldo did not complete the
renovation of Joanna's house and left the project unfinished.

The RTC issued a Notice of Preliminary Conference (Notice of PC) which set the case for preliminary
conference (PC) on February 14, 2014 and required the parties to file their respective pre-trial (PT)
briefs and serve the same on the adverse party in such manner as to ensure the latter's receipt
thereof at least three days before the scheduled date. A Notice of Pre-Trial (Notice of PT) was
also issued on January 30, 2014 setting the case for PT on March 17, 2014 and the directive anent
the filing of the PT brief was reiterated.

On February 12, 2014, Cristy filed her PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof by registered
mail. During the PC held on February 14, 2014, all the parties and their counsels appeared. Reynaldo
and Christian filed their PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof on the said date. The parties
pre- marked their respective exhibits. On March 17, 2014, the PT hearing was held and attended by
the parties and their respective counsels. Joanna filed her PT brief, which was objected to by the
counsels of the other parties for being filed late.

The RTC dismissed the case because Atty. Patricio violated the mandate found in Section 6, Rule 18
of the Rules in relation to Section 5 of the same Rule. Joanna filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that her counsel received on February 12, 2014 a copy of the Notice of PC and the Notice of
PT and it was improbable for Joanna's counsel to submit the PT brief at least three days prior to
February 14, 2014.

ISSUE: Whether Joanne’s complaint was correctly dismissed for the latter’s failure to file
her PT brief on time.

HELD: No. Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules mandates that "[t]hese Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding."

Given the realities obtaining in this case, the liberal construction of the Rules will promote and secure
a just determination of the parties' causes of action against each other. As the court of the last
resort, justice should be the paramount consideration when the Court is confronted with an issue on
the interpretation of the Rules, subject to the petitioner's burden to convince the Court that enough
reasons obtain to warrant the suspension of a strict adherence to procedural rules.

The Court is convinced with the explanations of Joanna for her plea to relax the application of the
Rules in her case. The Court notes that the untimely filing of her PT brief was so far the only
procedural lapse that she committed. She had been diligent in the prosecution of her cause against
respondents, and had not demonstrated a proclivity to delay the proceedings. As she pointed out,
several matters that would be taken up in the PT hearing had actually already been accomplished in
the PC. In fact, even the trial dates had been agreed upon by the parties. In turn, as Joanna correctly
observes, respondents

11
were themselves not fully compliant with the Rules as observed by the RTC, and to the Court's mind,
they will not suffer substantial prejudice if the case is litigated on the merits.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties are given the full
opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides,
respondents would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing on the merits, as they
are not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

(Rule 2)

MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN AND ERLINDA V. VALDELLON, Petitioner vs. MISIBIS LAND,

INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 222166, June 10, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: On December 9, 1991, Petitioners purchased from Oscar and Cidra Garcia (Spouses Garcia) a
parcel of land (disputed lot) in Misibis, Cagraray Island, Albay with an area of 6.4868 hectares,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-77703 issued in the latter's name. Petitioners paid
the taxes arising from the transaction. On April 6, 1992, Petitioners, armed with the original owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-77703, attempted to register the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 9, 1991 (1991 DOAS) with the Register of Deeds of Albay (RD). They were
successful in having the 1991 DOAS duly annotated on TCT No. T-77703, but they were not able to
cause the transfer of the Torrens title in their name since they lacked the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) clearance necessary to do so. In 2010, when Petitioners resumed processing the
transfer of the Torrens title to their names, they discovered that the disputed lot had been
consolidated by Misibis Land, Inc. (MLI) with other adjoining lots in Misibis, and sub-divided into
smaller lots covered by several new Torrens titles. Upon further investigation, Petitioners learned that
TCT No. T-77703 had been stamped "cancelled", and replaced by different Torrens titles issued on
the basis of the following transactions:

Date Transaction Parties Resulting Titles

February 21, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale Spouses Garcia as TCT No. T-97059
(1996 DOAS) sellers and DAA Realty issued on February 22,
Corporation (DAA 1996
Realty) as buyer
April 21, 2005 Deed of Absolute Sale DAA Realty as seller TCT No. T-1382
(2005 DOAS) and MLI as buyer

With this discovery, Petitioners immediately caused, on September 1, 2010, the annotation of their
Affidavit of Adverse Claim on MLI's Torrens titles. On December 10, 2014, Petitioners filed a
complaint before the RTC (Complaint) against Spouses Garcia, DAA Realty and MLI, as well as
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to whom the disputed lot had been mortgaged. In their Complaint,
Petitioners stated their causes of action, as follows: (1) Declaration of Plaintiffs' Ownership and Nullity
of the [1996 DOAS,] [2005 DOAS] and [the April 21, 2005 MLI-PNB Mortgage], (2) Accounting and
Remittance, if any, of [a]ll [of MLI's] Income and Profits vis-a-vis the [disputed lot], (3) Exemplary
Damages, (4) Moral Damages, and (5) Attorney's Fees and Litigation Expenses. MLI claimed, among
others, that it was an innocent purchaser for value since it relied on DAA Realty's TCT No. T-97059
which did not bear any defects.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioners' Complaint should be allowed to proceed for trial on the
merits.

HELD: Yes. The Complaint should be allowed to proceed for trial. Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court allows parties to plead as many separate claims as they may have, provided that no rules
regarding venue and joinder of parties are violated. A complaint which contains two or more
alternative causes of action cannot be dismissed where one of them clearly states a sufficient cause
of action against the defendant. Here, recovery of ownership is not restricted to the mere fact that
a Torrens
12
title had been issued in favor of DAA Realty, and later, MLI. The above allegations show that the
recovery of ownership is predicated on the nullification of the underlying mode of transfer of title of
the disputed lot — the issuance of the Torrens titles to DAA Realty and then to MLI being merely the
result of the 1996 DOAS sought to be nullified. Here, Petitioners mainly argue that their Complaint
should be allowed to proceed since it is an action "primarily for [the] declaration of nullity of the
[1996 DOAS],"and alternatively, for quieting of title. Hence, the material allegations in Petitioners'
Complaint, including the possession by Petitioners of the owner's duplicate title of Spouses Garcia's
TCT No. T- 77703 and the annotation of the 1991 DOAS in both original and owner's duplicate title
covering the disputed lot, are deemed hypothetically admitted.

(Rule 7)
(Rule 3)

BDO LEASING & FINANCE, INC. (FORMERLY PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC.), Petitioner
vs. GREAT DOMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., AND
SPOUSES KIDDY LIM CHAO AND EMILY ROSE GO KO, Respondents
G.R. No. 205286, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Sps. Chao obtained from BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. (BDO), formerly known as PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc., loans evidenced by two promissory notes. As security for the payment of these
loans, Sps. Chao executed in favor of BDO a Chattel Mortgage. Subsequently, Sps. Chao failed to fully
pay their monthly amortization payments. Hence, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Personal
Property, with an application for the issuance of a writ of replevin (Complaint) was filed by BDO
before the RTC. The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond by
BDO in the amount of P10,000,000.00. BDO posted the said bond and the writ of replevin was issued.
Sps. Chao posted a counter-replevin bond (counter-bond) in the same amount which was issued by
Great Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. (Great Domestic). The RTC granted the
Complaint. The CA denied Sps. Chao’s appeal and the Supreme Court further denied the subsequent
appeal.

When the Supreme Court’s resolution attained finality, BDO filed a Motion for Writ of Execution before
the RTC, which was granted by the latter. However, the writ of execution was not satisfied. Hence,
BDO filed a Motion to Order Sheriff to Serve Writ of Execution on the Counter Bond. The RTC granted
BDO's Motion. However, it clarified that the liability of Great Domestic is only P5,000,000.00.

Thus, BDO filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Certiorari Petition)
before the CA arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondent
Great Domestic's liability on the counter-bond is only P5,000,000.00. The CA dismissed the Certiorari
Petition outright solely on the following procedural grounds:

First, it held that BDO failed to satisfy the rule on filing the proper certification against forum
shopping, as the latter failed to disclose and mention the pendency of another case involving BDO
and Sps. Chao, i.e., Civil Case No. CEB-24675 pending before the RTC, Branch 51 for nullification of
chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.

Second, it found that BDO failed to attach vital pleadings and documents needed in deciding whether
to grant the Certiorari Petition. Important pleadings and documents such as the Complaint, writ of
replevin, writ of execution, and other issuances and orders of the RTC were not attached to the
Certiorari Petition. This was in violation of Rule 65, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court.

13
Lastly, it held that BDO had no legal capacity to file the Certiorari Petition, considering that when PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. changed its name to BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc., BDO should have sued
under its new name "in order to avoid confusion and open door to frauds and evasions and difficulties
of administration and supervision."

ISSUE #1: Whether BDO's failure to disclose Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in the
Verification/Certification accompanying the Certiorari Petition merits the outright
dismissal of the said Petition.

HELD #1: According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the plaintiff or principal party shall
certify in a sworn certification:
a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein;
b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and
c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

While BDO failed to disclose the status of Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in its Verification/Certification, it
must be stressed that, despite involving the same parties, the aforesaid case and the instant case
involve two completely different issues. On the one hand, in Civil Case No. CEB-24675, the issue was
on the validity of the chattel mortgage executed by BDO and Sps. Chao that accompanied the loan
transactions entered into by the parties. On the other hand, in the Certiorari Petition, the matter in
focus is the execution upon the counter-bond filed in lieu of the final and executory Decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-24769. Either decision will not have any bearing as to the other.

There was an "absence of identity of causes of action and reliefs being sought between the instant
case and Civil Case No. CEB-24675." Jurisprudence holds that "an omission in the certificate of non-
forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal
as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certification are not present."

ISSUE #2: Whether the Certiorari Petition should be dismissed outright because of the
failure of BDO to attach certain documents.

HELD#2: No. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that a petition for certiorari must be
accompanied with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.

In Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora , while it is a general rule that a petition lacking copies of essential
pleadings and portions of the case record may be dismissed, such rule, however, is not petrified. As
the exact nature of the pleadings and parts of the case record which must accompany a petition is
not specified, much discretion is left to the appellate court to determine the necessity for copies of
pleading and other documents. There are, however, guideposts it must follow.

According to the aforementioned case: x x x not all pleadings and parts of case records are required
to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The
test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the
petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the documents that BDO failed to attach in its Certiorari
Petition, i.e., the Complaint, the writ of replevin, and the writ of execution, are not documents that
will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion. To stress, the instant case is centered
solely on the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC when it held that the liability of
Great Domestic is only P5,000,000.00. Statements or details found in the Complaint, the writ of
replevin, and
14
the writ of execution will not determine whether grave abuse of discretion was attendant in the RTC's
issuance of its Order.

ISSUE #3: Whether the change of name of BDO from PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. to
BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc. affected its capacity to sue and be sued, and the authority
of its authorized signatory, Vicente C. Rallos (Rallos), to file the Certiorari Petition.

HELD #3: No. The corporation, upon such change in its name, is in no sense a new corporation, nor
the successor of the original corporation. It is the same corporation with a different name, and its
character is in no respect changed. A change in the corporate name does not make a new
corporation, and whether effected by special act or under a general law, has no effect on the identity
of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities. The corporation continues, as before,
responsible in its new name for all debts or other liabilities which it had previously contracted or
incurred.

Hence, with BDO's change of name from "PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc." to "BDO Leasing and
Finance, Inc." having no effect on the identity of the corporation, on its property, rights, or liabilities,
with its character remaining very much intact, the Board Resolution and Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Rallos to institute the Certiorari Petition did not lose any binding effect whatsoever.

(Rule 14);

SPS. LINO REBAMONTE, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS NAMELY:

LUZVIMINDA R. PANISA, TERYLI M. REBAMONTE, NAIDA R. CERVANTES, JOEREL M.
REBAMONTE, AND HEIRS OF JEMUEL M. REBAMONTE, REPRESENTED BY JUDITH ANN O.
REBAMONTE, AND TERESITA M. REBAMONTE, PETITIONERS, V. SPS. GUILLERMO
LUCERO AND GENOVEVA S. LUCERO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 237812, October 02, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Respondent Guillermo's parents, Marcos and Tomasa, obtained a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and mortgaged the subject portion of the land as security. Then, the
spouses defaulted and the said lot was foreclosed in favour of DBP. However, the spouse was able to
repurchase such. After the said repurchase, they sold it to their son, Guillermo, evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale on Lot No. 1305-A.

However, prior to such sale, three separate unregistered sales in favor of Tomasa's cousin, petitioner
Lino, allegedly took place over certain portions of Lot No. 1305-A. As petitioner Lino took possession
of the aforementioned portions, respondent Guillermo was unable to possess the entire lot.
Respondent Guillermo repeatedly made demands for petitioner Lino to vacate the aforementioned
portions of the lot, but petitioner Lino refused to do so. Hence, Guillermo and his wife instituted a
Complaint for Recovery of Real Estate Property, Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages,
and Attorney's Fees against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The case was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Tacurong City, Branch 20 (RTC).

On the other hand, the petitioner Sps. Rebamonte also avers that there was defective service of
Summons. The court's process server resorted to substituted service without complying with the
requirement in connection thereto. Thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Teresita Rebamonte. Also, they stated that even up to now the counsel for the respondents
Sps.Lucero have yet to inform the court about the fact of death of Guillermo and the failure to effect
substitution renders the Decision of the [RTC] null and void.

ISSUE#1: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint filed by the respondents
Sps. Lucero, considering that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that the
jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the Municipal Trial Court of Tacurong City (MTC)
and not the RTC.

15
HELD#1: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case. According to Section 33(3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property located outside Metro Manila, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.

As admitted by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, Lot No. 1305-A "has a total market
assessed value of P11,120.00[.]"

Hence, on the question of jurisdiction, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are correct in saying that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case. Considering that the assessed
value of the subject property, as alleged by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, is well
below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint. However, in this case, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over subject matter is already barred by laches considering the 22 years that have
elapsed from the filing of the complaint.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Please check new jurisdictional amounts under RA 11576

ISSUE#2: Whether there was a defective service of summons and, consequently,

whether all the proceedings conducted by the RTC are considered null and void.

HELD#2: No, there was no defect in the service of summons. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules
of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the Sps. Rebamonte fully and
actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC and CA. After very actively participating in the
proceedings, and after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte cannot now
allege for the first time that their right to be heard was transgressed. The petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte's insistence that there was a violation of their right to due process due to the alleged
defective service of summons is outright nonsense. The argument is clearly unmeritorious.

ISSUE#3: Whether the failure to effect substitution for the death of respondent
Guillermo in 2000 violated Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.

HELD#3: No. In any case, the Court has ruled that [m]ere failure to substitute a deceased party is
not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there
was an undeniable violation of due process. When due process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance
with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.

In the instant case, there is absolutely no allegation that the right to due process of the respondents
Sps. Lucero was violated due to the non substitution of respondent Guillermo after the latter's death.
No one disputes that the respondents Sps. Lucero were fully able to participate and present their
evidence during the trial.

16
(Rule 3)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF MA. TERESITA A. BERNABE and
COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF BULACAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 237663, October 6, 2020

FACTS: The complaint involved parcels of lands which are portions of Clark Air Base. The specific lot
involved in this case is one allegedly owned and acquired by Francisco Garcia. Said lot was subject to
a cadastral case instituted by the Bureau of Lands. While the case was pending, respondents Heirs of
Bernabe mortgaged the subject property to Cooperative Rural Bank of Bulacan (CRBB). After being
informed of the mortgage, the Republic, through the OSG, filed an Amended Complaint impleading
CRBB as defendant. CRBB filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Republic never renounced its
ownership over the Clark Air Force Base, hence, the proper party to initiate a case for reversion is the
Director of Lands.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss of CRBB. The Court of Appeals denied the Republic's appeal.
It agreed with the RTC that the Republic is not the real party in interest because, from the allegations
of the Republic's Second Amended Complaint, the subject property being located inside the Fort
Stotsenburg Military Reservation, which is presently known as Clark Air Base, is under the direct
control and ownership of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Thus, the BCDA,
by virtue of its ownership over the subject property, is the party which stands to be benefited or
injured by the verdict in the instant case, and, being the real party in interest, the instant case for
reversion and cancellation of title must be lodged in its name as the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether it is BCDA which is the real party in interest and not the Republic.

HELD: No. As defined in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Section 2 adds that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. To determine who is the
real party in interest, the nature or character of the subject property and who has present ownership
thereof have to be inquired into.

The subject property was inside the Fort Stotsenburg Military Reservation (now Clark Air Base), which
was being used as a target range by the Clark Air Force Military personnel. In 1993, then President
Fidel V. Ramos, series of 1993 (Proc. 163), created the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), which
"shall cover the lands consisting of the Clark military reservations, including the Clark Air Base proper
and portions of the Clark reverted baselands (CAB Lands) x x x.” Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7227 or the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 created the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA). It expressly provides that the BCDA is to own, hold and/or administer the military
reservations and other properties transferred to it. However, the BCDA is a mere trustee of the
Republic. The transfer of the military reservations and other properties — the CAB Lands — from the
CSEZ to the BCDA was not meant to transfer the beneficial ownership of these assets from the
Republic to the BCDA. The purpose was merely to establish the BCDA as the governing body of the
CSEZ.

Being the beneficial owner of the CAB Lands, the Republic is the real party in interest in this case.
With these pronouncements, the Court now abandons its ruling in Shipside Incorporated that the
Republic is not the real party in interest in cases involving the title to and ownership of the military
reservations and their extensions, including the CAB Lands and Camp Wallace, transferred to the
BCDA. Henceforth, in cases involving the title to and ownership of the military reservations and their
extensions, including the CAB Lands and Camp Wallace, transferred to the BCDA, the Republic, being
the beneficial owner, is the real party in interest and not the BCDA.

17
(Rule 4)

PILLARS PROPERTY CORPORATION, Petitioner v. CENTURY COMMUNITIES

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201021, March 04, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: PPC filed a Complaint for sum of money against Century Communities Corporation (CCC) for
unpaid progress billings in connection with a construction contract where PPC agreed to deliver 210
housing units at Canyon Ranch, Cavite, among others to CCC at an agreed consideration. PPC also
sued People’s General Insurance Corporation (PGIC), which issued the bonds in favor of CCC to
guarantee the performance of PPC’s obligations, to exculpate PPC from any liability under the bonds
since PPC intended to prove that it was not at fault in the performance of its obligations under the
construction contract. CCC filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that the contract states that the venue
of action in case of litigation shall be the Court of Makati to the exclusion of others. CCC moved for
the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground that the venue was improperly laid pursuant to Section
1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules because the filing of the instant case before the court of Parañaque City
was in contravention of the express and exclusive agreement of the parties that in case of litigation,
the case should be filed in the court of Makati to the exclusion of other courts. PPC filed an
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss arguing that the inclusion of PGIC as co-defendant of CCC took away
the case from the jurisdiction of Makati courts because the general rule on venue (Section 2, Rule 4
of the Rules) should then apply, PGIC not being a party to the Contract. The RTC issued its Order
granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by CCC. The CA in its Resolution dismissed PPC’s Petition for
Certiorari which sought to set aside the Order of the RTC for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether venue was improperly laid.

HELD: No. Given the stipulation on venue in the Contract, where exclusivity is provided, the RTC had
enough legal basis to apply Section 4(b), Rule 4 and not Section 2, Rule 4.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that all other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff. However, the exceptions are provided in Section 4, Rule 4, (a) In those
cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or (b) Where the parties have validly
agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

To recall, the RTC applied Section 4(b) of Rule 4 on exclusive venue since the Contract of PPC and
CCC provides “that in case of litigation, the parties hereby agree that the venue of said action as the
Proper Court of Makati to the exclusion of others,” and not the general rule on venue which is the
place of residence of plaintiff or defendant at the election of plaintiff under Section 2 of Rule 4.

(Rule 6)

G. HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY,
INC. (CEPALCO) and FERROCHROME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: CEPALCO filed a collection suit against FPI. RTC rendered a decision in favor of CEPALCO
ordering FPI to pay CEPALCO. FPI appealed the Decision of the RTC-Pasig to the CA but CEPALCO
moved for execution pending appeal, which was granted by RTC-Pasig. FPI filed before the CA
a certiorari petition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.

18
The CA issued an initial TRO and then a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of
the Order granting execution pending appeal.

Later, GHI filed a case against Sheriff Baron, CEPALCO and FPI for Nullification of Sheriffs Levy on
Execution and Auction Sale, Recovery of Possession of Properties and Damages before the RTC-
CDO. GHI claimed that the levied ferro-alloy smelting facility, properties and equipment are owned by
it as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment dated March 11, 2003 (the Deed of Assignment) executed
by FPI.

CEPALCO filed its answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. In its counterclaim, CEPALCO assailed
the validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by FPI in favor of GHI. CEPALCO contended that the
Deed of Assignment was null and void for being absolutely simulated and, as a dacion en pago, it did
not bear the conformity of the creditor.

RTC-CDO rendered judgment in favor of CEPALCO against GHI.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in not dismissing CEPALCO's counterclaim for non-
payment of docket fees.

HELD: No. CEPALCO’s counterclaim and prayer for rescission of the Deed of Assignment can only be
viewed, as it is indeed, a compulsory counterclaim because it “arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.” Being a compulsory counterclaim, as of the filing of CEPALCO’s Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, it was not liable to pay filing fees on its compulsory counterclaim.

(Rule 7)

CARMELITA V. DIZON, Petitioner, v. JOSE LUIS K. MATTI, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Matti, Jr. alleged that Zenaida Acleto together with Mrs. Basilica C. Estaris, offered him a
townhouse for sale that belonged to Dizon. They made a physical inspection of the said townhouse
and was shown all the original documents including the original Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title
registered in the name of Dizon. After Matti, Jr. photocopied the alleged original Owner's Duplicate
Certificate of Title and brought it to the Register of Deeds, he personally verified that it was the same
with the one filed with the Register of Deeds hence he agreed to purchase the property. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed and was duly notarized and Matti, Jr. then paid Dizon. Matti, Jr. then
personally went to Assessor's Office to update the real estate taxes and to get a new Tax Declaration
for the property only to be told that all of the documents in his possession were falsified. Matti, Jr.
went back to the Register of Deeds to have the Owner's Duplicate copy authenticated by the said
office. Thereafter, Matti, Jr. was told verbally that said title is fake.

In order to protect his rights and to avoid any fraudulent transfer of the said property to an innocent
third party, he caused the annotation of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Despite oral and written
demand, Dizon has not rectified her alleged wrongdoings by delivering the authentic Owner's
Duplicate Copy. Thus, Matti, Jr. asked that Dizon be ordered to: a) Deliver the Owner's Duplicate
certificate to him or if Dizon refuses to do so, that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the TCT
and issue a new one in Matti, Jr.'s favor; b) that physical possession of the property be surrendered
to him; c) that Dizon be ordered to pay. Dizon alleged that Matti, Jr. has no cause of action because
she did not encumber and/or transfer ownership of her property to him. Dizon also claimed that she
did not execute nor signed the Deed of Absolute Sale nor did she participate in the negotiation,
preparation and execution of it. She also stated that she does not know Matti, Jr. nor a certain
Zenaida Acleto and Basilica Estaris. RTC dismissed Matti, Jr.’s complaint but CA granted his appeal.

19
ISSUE #1: Whether Dizon’s instant Petition should be dismissed outright based on the
defective Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

HELD #1: No. The instant Petition reveals that it was the brother of Dizon (Wilfredo) and not Dizon
herself, who executed the Certification. According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and as
held by a catena of cases decided by the Court, it is the plaintiff or principal party who should execute
the certification of non-forum shopping under oath. However, this rule is not entirely inflexible. The
Court has held that if, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign the
certification, another person may be authorized to execute the certification on his or her behalf
through a Special Power of Attorney. Dizon claims that she, a senior citizen, was suffering from
sickness while in United Kingdom at around the time of the filing of the instant Petition, disabling her
from traveling to the Philippine Embassy to personally execute a certification of non-forum shopping.
She presented a Medical Certificate and a Statement of Fitness Work for Social Security or Statutory
Sick Pay to show that she was in poor medical condition, preventing her from personally executing
the Certification. At the time of the filing of the instant Petition, a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Wilfredo to execute the Certification was not attached but Dizon was able to belatedly
submit before the Court a Special Power of Attorney fully signed by her and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy in London. The Court has held that the belated submission of an authorization for
the execution of a certificate of non- forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with Sections
4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied with reason and
liberality to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are used to help secure and not override substantial
justice. The dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will
result in unfairness.

ISSUE #2: Whether the CA erred in issuing its assailed Resolution insofar as it dismissed
outright Dizon’s Motion for Reconsideration due to the failure of her counsel to sign the
said pleading is concerned.

HELD #2: Yes. In the assailed Resolution, citing Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA held
that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him and that an unsigned
pleading produces no legal effect. While the CA is correct in invoking the aforesaid Rule, the rest of
Section 3, Rule 7 elucidates that the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. In this
case, the Court accepts Dizon's explanation that the failure of her counsel to affix his signature in the
Motion for Reconsideration was due to an honest inadvertence without any intention to delay the
proceedings. The Court is not inclined to dismiss outright an appeal on a purely technical ground,
especially if there is some merit to the substantive issues raised by the petitioner. It is settled that
liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules.

20
Rule 14

SUSAN A. YAP, Petitioner, v. ELIZABETH LAGTAPON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Lagtapon filed a civil suit against Susan A. Yap for a sum of money.
Summons were issued by process server Ray Precioso to Yap who refused to acknowledge its receipt.
Lagtapon filed a motion to declare Yap in default which was granted. Lagtapon presented her
evidence ex-parte resulting to the court rendering judgment in her favor. The Provincial Sheriff issued
a Notice of Sale on execution on Yap’s property. Joey Dela Paz, who mortgaged the property, found
out that the annotated title of the said property is in a Notice of Embargo. Yap discovered that she
was sued by Lagtapon and a judgment by default against her had long been issued. Yap filed a
Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC’s decision because the Summons was not
validly served on her, alleging when the Summons was served on the said address she already moved
out of the same. However, in the Return, the Summons showed that the same was served personally
on Yap and that she refused to sign the same, which prompted Precioso to leave a copy of the
Summons with Yap. The CA denied the Petition for Annulment and upheld the validity of the service
of Summons on Yap ruling that Yap's evidence failed to rebut the presumption of regularity.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over Yap’s person through service
of summons.

HELD: Yes. It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge
of one's official duties and functions. In the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service
of Summons on Yap is deemed regular and valid. The Return of Service of constitutes prima facie
evidence of the facts set out therein. The Return of Service states that the summons was duly served
personally to Yap but she refused to sign the same. Moreover, Precioso subsequently executed an
Affidavit supplying the place of service, which, to the mind of this Court, constitutes substantial
compliance with the Rules. Based on the said documents, it would be impossible for the Court to
determine where Yap had her residence at the time Summons was served on her person. Following
Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to
disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of Summons. The Court
upholds the finding of the CA in its questioned Decision that petitioner Yap’s evidence does not
constitute a clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity attendant to the
Returns of Service.

Therefore, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Yap's person, which renders the RTC Decision
valid.

(Rule 19)

SEVERINO A. YU, RAMON A. YU, AND LORENZO A. YU, Petitioners, v. DAVID MIRANDA,
MORNING STAR HOMES CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION - SAN JOSE BIÑAN - HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., TIMMY RICHARD T. GABRIEL, AND LILIBETH GABRIEL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 225752, March 27, 2019
FACTS: Morning Star sought to establish a housing project to be financed by the Home Development
Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG through the Group Land Acquisition and Development (GLAD) Financing
Program. Miranda entered into a contract with Morning Star for the supply and financing of the
backfilling material for the latter's housing project. However, Morning Star defaulted on its obligation
to pay Miranda. Thereafter, Miranda filed on on March 8, 2012 a Complaint for a Sum of Money with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment. Miranda prayed for the issuance of preliminary
attachment over 1.56 hectares of land registered under the name of Morning Star. On March 12,
2012, the RTC granted Miranda’s prayer for preliminary attachment.

21
On April 29, 2013, Yu, et.al. filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene, claiming that they have legal
interest in the properties subject of the preliminary attachment. They claimed that Morning Star is a
mere nominal owner of the subject properties and that they were the real owners. On May 19, 2013,
the RTC granted Miranda's Complaint. The said Decision eventually became final and executory.
Thereafter, in an Order dated July 29, 2013, the RTC denied the petitioners Yu's Motion for Leave to
Intervene, stating that they are not the registered owners of the properties, and that their rights may
be protected in a separate proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of the Motion for Leave to Intervene was proper.

HELD: Yes. Foremost, the RTC's Decision dated May 19, 2013 is already final and executory. The
case where the Yu, et.al. seek to intervene in has already ceased. Jurisprudence has made it clear
that "intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final
judgment.”

Furthermore, The only purpose of Yu, et.al.’s attempt to intervene is to question the inclusion of the
subject properties in the coverage of the preliminary attachment imposed by the RTC. It is apparent
that the involvement of the Yu, et.al. in the instant case is incidental to the cause of action, i.e.,
recovery of sum of money based on an obligation to pay. The issue on the ownership of the subject
properties and the propriety of their inclusion in the preliminary attachment is not determinative
whatsoever as to whether Miranda has a cause of action for recovery of money. In other words, Yu,
et.al. are not parties in interest without whom no final determination of the recovery of sum of money
case can be had — they are not indispensable parties. At most, the petitioners Yu may only be
considered necessary parties as they are not indispensable, but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. The non-inclusion of necessary parties does not prevent
the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.

In fact, under the Rules of Court, the filing of a motion for intervention was not even absolutely
necessary and indispensable for Yu, et.al. to question the inclusion of the subject properties in the
coverage of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

Under Rule 57, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, if the property attached is claimed by any third
person, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter
has possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff
shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent, on
demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in
a sum not less than the value of the property levied upon. No such affidavit was filed by the
petitioners Yu. Jurisprudence has held that a writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional
remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending; it is an ancillary remedy.
Attachment is only adjunct to the main suit. Therefore, it can have no independent
existence apart from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. In other
words, an attachment or garnishment is generally ancillary to, and dependent on, a principal
proceeding, either at law or in equity, which has for its purpose a determination of the justice of a
creditor's demand. Any relief against such attachment could be disposed of only in that
case.

22
(Rule 19)

MARTIN ROBERTO G. TIROL, Petitioner, vs. SOL NOLASCO, Respondent

G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: On October 10, 1991, Gloria Tirol (Gloria) died testate. She was survived by her husband
Roberto Tirol, Sr. (Roberto Sr.) and their six children namely: Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco, Anna and
Roberto Jr. On April 16, 1995, Roberto Jr. died intestate, and was survived by his four children from
his marriage with Cecilia Geronimo. At the time of his death, Roberto Jr.'s marriage with his wife had
been annulled. On January 8, 2002, Roberto Sr. died testate and was survived by his remaining
children Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco and Anna and his four grandchildren from Roberto Jr.

On April 2, 2002, Martin, Cecilia and Ciriaco filed before RTC-218 a petition to probate the wills of
Gloria and Roberto Sr. On February 25, 2011, Sol Nolasco (Sol) filed a Motion for Intervention stating
that she has a legal interest in the estate of Gloria and Roberto Sr. because she is the surviving
spouse of Roberto Jr. having married him on July 15, 1994. RTC-218 denied said motion to intervene.

On March 15, 2011, Sol also filed a Motion for Intervention in the intestate settlement of Roberto Jr.'s
estate proceedings pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 (RTC-101). This time, RTC-
101 granted said motion to intervene. Zharina has been appointed as Administratrix in the intestate
estate of Roberto Jr.

ISSUE: Whether Sol’s Motion to Intervene in the probate proceedings of Gloria and
Roberto Sr.’s wills before RTC-218 should also be granted despite Sol’s claim that she is
Roberto Jr.’s surviving spouse is still disputed.

HELD: No. In the settlement of a deceased's estate, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
provides: "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Given the exclusivity of jurisdiction granted
to the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of a decedent's estate, RTC-101 has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the intestate estate of Roberto Jr. while RTC-218 has exclusive jurisdiction
over the testate estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. Thus, only RTC-101, the court where the settlement
of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding is pending, has jurisdiction to determine who the heirs of Roberto
Jr. are.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides when and to whom the residue of the decedent's
estate is distributed, and how a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent is
resolved. The court which has jurisdiction to hear and decide any controversy as to who are the
lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. or as to the distributive shares to which each is entitled under the law is
undoubtedly RTC- 101 because it is the court which has first taken cognizance of the settlement of
the intestate estate of Roberto Jr. RTC-218, where the probate proceeding is pending, cannot rule on
the issue of who are the heirs of Roberto Jr. even if the share of Roberto Jr. in the estates of Gloria
and Roberto Sr. is to be determined therein. The probate court must yield to the determination by the
Roberto Jr.'s estate settlement court of the latter's heirs. This is to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate by co-equal courts.

As to protection and preservation of the share of Roberto Jr.'s shares in the testate estates of Gloria
and Roberto Sr., the same is now the look out of the administrator of his estate, Zharina. Section 2,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides: "For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for
causes which survive." Thus, the intervention of Sol in the probate proceeding will be superfluous
because she has an available remedy in the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding to question
any action of the administrator therein which is detrimental to the said estate.

Since intervention is not a matter of right but depends on the sound discretion of the court, Sol's
intervention in the probate proceeding is unnecessary because her right or interest in the estate of

23
Roberto Jr. can be fully protected in a separate proceeding — namely, the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s
estate proceeding pending before RTC-101. The second parameter to be considered in granting of
intervention under Section 1, Rule 19 — whether the intervenor's right may not be fully protected in a
separate proceeding — is wanting in the instant case.

Another reason in disallowing the intervention of Sol in the probate proceeding is the legal precept
that an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, viz.: x x x In general,
an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention
will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the
remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenor's case an aspect peculiar
to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the
would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the
nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of
the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the
principal suit or delaying the trial of the action. The issue as to whether Sol is a lawful heir of Roberto
Jr. will definitely enlarge the issues in the probate proceeding and involve determination of facts
peculiar only to her, which have nothing to do with the original parties. The other heirs of Gloria and
Roberto Sr. are not interested in who are the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. The respective shares of such
other heirs in the estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. will in no way be affected by who are declared as
the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. in the proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

With this extraneous issue being injected into the probate proceeding, the first parameter that has to
be considered whether to allow an intervention under Section 1, Rule 19 — no undue delay or
prejudice in the adjudication of the rights of the original parties — is not met. Thus, the intervention
of Sol in the probate proceeding should be denied.

(Rule 37)
(Rule 39)

VALENCIA (BUKIDNON) FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.,

REPRESENTED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION (FACOMA) AS TRUSTEES, Petitioner v. HEIRS OF AMANTE P. CABOTAJE,
Respondents
G.R. No. 219984, April 03, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: FACOMA represented by its Directors instituted an action for quieting of title and recovery of
ownership and possession of parcel of land, and damages against the heirs of Cabotaje and Estrada.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the Annulment and Cancellation of the Deed of Sale executed
by Estrada in favor of Cabotaje and all the Transfer Certificates of Titles issued. Aggrieved, the Heirs
of Cabotaje filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied.

Subsequently, the Heirs of Cabotaje filed a Notice of Appeal. Incidentally, FACOMA filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Notice of Appeal averring that the Motion for Reconsideration earlier filed by the Heirs of
Cabotaje did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal for the reason that the Motion
was but pro forma and raised no new issue. The RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for being filed out
of time.

The Heirs of Cabotaje filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
During the pendency of the Certiorari Petition, FACOMA filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment,
which was initially denied by the RTC but was subsequently granted after FACOMA’s filing of a Motion
for Reconsideration. The CA granted the Certiorari Petition filed by the Heirs of Cabotaje. Moreover,
the CA found that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Cabotaje is not a pro forma
motion.

24
ISSUE #1: Whether respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration was a pro forma motion.

HELD #1: No. The Court has decided in a catena of cases that the mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a
motion pro forma. In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Uy, citing Security Bank and Trust Company,
Inc. v. Cuenca, a motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the
arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise the same
arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous.

Hence, the Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC's Decision is not a pro forma
motion that prevented the tolling of the reglementary period to file an appeal.

ISSUE #2: Whether the Certiorari Petition is already moot and academic considering that
the RTC had granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by FACOMA during the
pendency of the Certiorari Petition.

HELD#2: No. The alleged execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening
event that would automatically moot the issues in this petition. Rule 39, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court states that where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal
or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages
as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

In the eventuality that the appeal of the Heirs of Cabotaje will prosper, contrary to the mistaken view
of FACOMA, the RTC may still order the restitution or reparation of damages in favor of the Heirs of
Cabotaje. Hence, the argument raised by FACOMA is erroneous; the appeal filed by the Heirs of
Cabotaje would not be a futile and purely hypothetical exercise that has no practical use or value.

Motion for Reconsideration

ALBERT B. DEL ROSARIO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202481, September 08, 2020
(En Banc)

FACTS: This case involves eight consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. ABS-CBN is a domestic corporation that owns a wide network of television
and radio stations. It was granted a franchise to operate as a broadcasting company. This franchise,
however, expired. ABS-CBN adopted a system known as the Internal Job Market (IJM) System, a
database which provided the user with a list of accredited technical or creative manpower and/or
talents who offered their services for a fee. The persons included are considered as independent
contractors and were paid hourly.

All workers were then asked to sign a contract that would place them under the IJM Work Pool, which
deprived them of particular pays and benefits. Aggrieved, the workers formed the ABS-CBN IJM
Workers’ Union and demanded recognition as regular employees. Additionally, in a memorandum,
ABS- CBN reclassified the status of its regular employees to mere talents or contractual employees.
Fearful of losing their jobs, the workers signed the said contract. Furthermore, ABS-CBN required the
workers in ABS-CBN Corporation v. Payonan, et. al. to sign an employment contract, which stated
that they were "freelance employees." Those who refused to sign were deprived of their benefits.
This prompted the workers to file a complaint for regularization and claim benefits due to regular
employees. The workers refused to comply so ABS-CBN effected a series of mass dismissals on
various dates. No notice of termination was given to the workers and were forthwith barred from
entering the company premises. From these series of summary dismissals sprung numerous
complaints filed before the LA. Over a span of almost eight years, various rulings have been rendered
by the LA, the NLRC, and the CA involving these instant petitions.

25
ISSUE #1: Whether the petitions should be dismissed on procedural grounds due to the
failure of the workers to file a motion for reconsideration.

HELD #1: No. As a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition for filing a special civil action for certiorari. However, this rule is not iron-clad, and is
subject to well- known exceptions. [1.] Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; [2.] Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
[3.] Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; [4.] Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; [5.]
Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; [6.] Where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; [7.] Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; [8.] Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and [9.] Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The
second exception applies here. Considering that the very livelihood of the workers is hanging by a
thread, the ends of justice will be better served by ruling on the merits of the case, rather than
summarily dismissing the petition on account of a procedural flaw.

ISSUE #2: Whether the workers are regular employees of ABS-CBN.

HELD #2: Yes. In ascertaining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has
invariably adhered to the four-fold test, which pertains to: (i) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (ii) the payment of wages; (iii) the power of dismissal; and (iv) the power of control over
the employee's conduct, or the so-called "control test."

Time and again, it has been ruled that the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is
the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business
or trade of the employer. As cameramen/editors and reporters, petitioners were undoubtedly
performing functions necessary and essential to ABS-CBN's business of broadcasting television and
radio content. In the same vein, the workers received their salaries from ABS-CBN twice a month, as
proven through the pay slips bearing the latter's corporate name. Their rate of wages was determined
solely by ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN likewise withheld taxes and granted the workers PhilHealth benefits.
These clearly show that the workers were salaried personnel of ABS-CBN, not independent
contractors. Likewise, ABS-CBN wielded the power to discipline, and correspondingly dismiss, any
errant employee. The workers were continuously under the watch of ABS-CBN and were required to
strictly follow company rules and regulations in and out of the company premises.

Finally, consistent with the most important test in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, ABS-CBN wielded the power to control the means and methods in the
performance of the employees' work. The workers were subject to the constant watch and scrutiny of
ABS-CBN, through its production supervisors who strictly monitored their work and ensured that their
end results are acceptable and in accordance with the standards set by the company. Likewise, ABS-
CBN controlled their schedule and work assignments (and re-assignments). Furthermore, the workers
did not have their own equipment to perform their work. ABS-CBN provided them with the needed
tools and implements to accomplish their jobs.

ISSUE #3: Whether the “Talent Contract and/or Project Assignment Form” was valid.

HELD #3: No. The fact that the workers signed a "Talent Contract and/or Project Assignment Form"
does not ipso facto make them talents. It is settled that a talent contract does not necessarily
prevent an employee from acquiring a regular employment status . The nature of the
employment does not depend on the will or word of the employer or on the procedure for hiring and
the manner of designating the employee, but on the activities performed by the employee in relation
to the employer's business. Besides, it must be remembered that labor contracts are subject to the
police power of the State and are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts. This means that

26
the Court shall not hesitate to strike down any contract that is designed to circumvent an employee's
tenurial security. Accordingly, ABS-CBN's Talent Contract, which deprives the workers of regular
employment, cannot stand.

ISSUE #4: Whether the workers in the cases were illegally dismissed by ABS-CBN and are
entitled to backwages and other benefits.

HELD #4: Yes. As regular employees the employer shall not dismiss them except for a just or
authorized cause provided in the Labor Code. The facts show that ABS-CBN failed to prove the
existence of just or authorized causes for terminating the services of the workers, save for its claim
that they are talents. Without any notice or warning, the workers were simply barred from entering
the company premises. Hence, the dismissed workers are entitled to the twin reliefs of reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time their
compensation was withheld up to the date of their actual reinstatement.

(Rule 39)

OLANDO SOLIVA, Complainant, v. REYNALDO TALEON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 10, DIPOLOG CITY, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-16-3511 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4346-P), September 06, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: Soliva was one of the defendants in a Civil Case for forcible entry and damages before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The MCTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Soliva filed a petition for
annulment of judgment and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. Soliva alleged that, while
the said urgent motion was pending, Sheriff Taleon issued notices of garnishment to several banks in
Dipolog City. Soliva argued that Sheriff Taleon should have first made a demand on the judgment
obligors before resorting to garnishment and/or levy. Further, he alleged that Sheriff Taleon filed an
ex parte request/manifestation to put Soliva’s properties under levy on execution. The Sheriff also
caused the publication of a Notice of Sale on Levy on Execution. Soliva also alleged that the MCTC
directed Sheriff Taleon to follow the procedure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by first making a
demand on the defendants to vacate the subject land and to pay the damages awarded to the
plaintiffs. However, instead of complying with the court’s directive, Sheriff Taleon proceeded with the
levy.

ISSUE: Whether Sheriff Taleon’s levy on execution was proper.

HELD: No. Sheriff Taleon disregarded the procedure for execution. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, in enforcing the writ of execution in ejection cases, the sheriff shall give
notice thereof and demand the defendant to vacate the property in three (3) days. Moreover, in the
execution of a judgment for money, the sheriff must make a demand first on the judgment obligor,
before resorting to garnishment and/or levy. As found by the OCA, while Sheriff Taleon argued that
he first made a demand on the defendants, such claim is not supported by a Sheriff’s Return.

27
(Rule 39)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. ROGUZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199705, April 03, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: RDC was awarded the construction of a 2.10[-] kilometer diversion road by DPWH. However,
the project was suspended due to DPWH's failure to secure the required Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) and to settle the attendant right of way (ROW) problems. The suspension lasted for
almost 32 months. Upon completion of the project, DC made its claim upon DPWH for the idle time
of equipment and other expenses incurred due to the suspension of work on the project in the
amount of P93,782,093.64.

DPWH’s Ad Hoc Committee recommended payment of RDC's claim but only in the reduced amount of
P26,142,577.09 and subject to the condition that RDC should waive or no longer claim the balance of
its claim including damages. Prompted by DPWH's repeated refusal to heed its demand for additional
compensation, RDC filed a Complaint against the DPWH before the CIAC to which the latter ruled in
favor of RDC.

DPWH filed with the CA a petition for review (DPWH's CA Petition) under Rule 43 seeking the reversal
of the Arbitral Award. Meanwhile, RDC filed two Motion for Reconsideration with CIAC but both
Motions were denied. Aggrieved, RDC filed a petition for review before the CA via Rule 43 (RDC's CA
Petition). Notably, RDC's CA Petition proceeded independently of DPWH's CA Petition, which had
already been pending with another division of the same court. The CA 7th Division granted DPWH's
CA Petition. However, months later, the CA Special 17th Division also granted RDC's CA Petition.

ISSUE: Whether res judicata applies.

HELD: Yes. Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The principle of res judicata precludes the re-
litigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in any future or other action between the same
parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action.

For the principle to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue
or fact actually determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be party to or was in
privity with a party to the former proceeding; (iii) there was final judgment on the merits in the
former proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party
against whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the
prior proceedings.

All the foregoing requisites are present. As between CA-G.R. SP No. 104920 (DPWH's CA Petition)
and CA-G.R. SP No. 107412 (RDC's CA Petition) which has given rise to the present case, there is an
identity of facts, issues and parties. There is likewise no allegation on the part of RDC that it had
been deprived of a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 104920.
The Decision rendered by the CA 7th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 104920 (DPWH's CA Petition) had
become final on July 30, 2011. Thus, it could not have been disturbed, let alone reversed, by a co-
equal division of the same court.

28
(Rule 39, Section 47 on Res Judicata)

EUFEMIA ABAD AND SPS. FLORDELIZA ABAD-CEZAR AND POLLIE CEZAR* WHO ARE
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
NAMELY: DOLORES LOLITA J. GALLARDO, JOCELYN A. GALLARDO, JUDITH A. GALLARDO
AND JONAH GALLARDO, ALL REPRESENTED BY DOLORES LOLITA J. GALLARDO AND
JONAH GALLARDO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 5826-B (subject lot) covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. (OCT) P-2769 registered in the names of Sps. Miguel and Agueda. Subsequently, OCT
P- 2769 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-131684 was issued in the name
of Enrique Abad (Enrique).
In their complaint for specific performance, surrender of title, redemption and consignation with
damages, the Heirs of Jose Eusebio averred that upon the death of Sps. Miguel and Agueda, the
land covered by OCT P-2769 was inherited by their three children Dionisio, Isabel and Enrique.
They all took possession of the land as co-owners.
Previously, the land became the subject of Civil Case No. 0591 filed before the RTC Branch 21
entitled Dionisio Abad and Isabel Abad v. Enrique Abad for annulment of deed and TCT T-131684
with damages. Said case was dismissed on the Manifestation of Dionisio and Isabel that a compromise
agreement had been forged between them and Enrique. A deed of partition was notarized and
executed whereby said land was divided. Isabel died leaving Lot 5826-B to his son Jose Eusebio,
married to Dolores Lolita. Later, Dolores Lolita, then widowed, obtained a P75,000.00 loan from
Eufemia Abad, which was secured by Lot 5826-B or the subject lot.
Upon demand, Eufemia refused to give the title of the subject lot unless the loan was paid. Eufemia
also refused to receive the payment of the loan and demanded instead P350,000.00, and would
return only one-fourth of the subject lot.
Respondents in the complaint filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The RTC found that
judgment on the pleadings was proper and res judicata attached in the present case in view of the
proceedings in the earlier Civil Case No. 0591, which the RTC took judicial notice of.

ISSUE: Whether res judicata has already attached in the present case.

HELD: No. Res judicata did not attach as there was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No.
0591. In Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, the Court observed: “The following are the
requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
is
— between the first and the second actions — an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action.”

The Manifestation filed submitting an amicable settlement was not attached to the Manifestation and
no such amicable settlement was ever submitted. Since no compromise agreement was filed with the
RTC Branch 21 and formed part of the records of the prior case, there was no compromise
agreement that was ever judicially approved and no judgment thereon was entered in the prior case.
Thus, there was no judgment on the merits in the prior case. Without a judgment on the merits in the
prior case, the rule of res judicata was incorrectly applied by the RTC in this case.

Besides, there is also no identity of causes of action in the prior case and in the present case. While
the prior case concerned the ownership of the subject lot, the present case does not only involve said
cause of action, but also possession and consignation.

29
(Rule 39)

JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS CRUISES LTD./EFFEL T. SANTILLAN, Petitioners,

vs. LORDELITO B. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 244098. March 3, 2021
(First Division)

FACTS: Lordelito B. Gutierrez (respondent) was hired as Third Cook for the vessel MV Mein Schiff I
by Jebsens Maritime, Inc. for its foreign principal, Sea Chefs Cruises Ltd. (collectively, petitioners). On
June 19, 2014, while on board, respondent experienced severe pain on the right paralumbar area,
accompanied by paresthesia on the lower right extremity, and difficulty in movement. He consulted
with the ship doctor and underwent MRI scan of the lumbosacral spine. Thereafter, respondent was
diagnosed with Disc Prolapse L4-L5 and medically repatriated on July 2, 2014. Two days after, he was
examined by the company-designated physician at Shiphealth, Inc. and was diagnosed with L4-L5
Herniated Nucleos Pulposus and was recommended to undergo physical therapy. He was given his
Final Medical Report which diagnosed that his condition had become asymptomatic and declared that
he was "FIT TO WORK FOR THE CONDITION REFERRED, CASE CLOSURE."

After receiving the fit to work diagnosis, respondent applied for re-engagement, but his application
was denied by petitioners because he failed the pre-employment medical examination (PEME). The
examining physician during the PEME declared that there was a '"high probability of recurrence' of
respondent's previous illness." He underwent an x-ray of the lumbar spine which showed a mild
dextroscoliosis of the lumbar vertebrae. Thus, respondent filed a complaint before the LA for
continuation of medical treatment, underpayment of sick leave pay, payment of sickness allowance,
and attorney's fees (First Case). LA Napiza dismissed the First Case due to the absence of contrary
medical findings from respondent's personally appointed physician to refute the fit to work diagnosis
of the company-designated physician. On July 3, 2015, respondent filed a second complaint, this time
for total permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees (Second Case). Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata,
arguing that the dismissal of the First Case barred respondent from claiming total and permanent
disability benefits in the Second Case. The CA overturned the findings of the NLRC, holding that the
Second Case was not barred by the First Case as they had different causes of action, issues, and
reliefs sought

ISSUE: Whether res judicata is applicable.

HELD: No. The literal interpretation of res judicata is "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It is anchored on the principle that parties
should not be allowed to re-litigate the same issue in multiple suits. Once a right or fact has been
tried and established or an opportunity for trial has been provided to the parties, the final judgment
of the court shall be conclusive as between the parties and their privies.

There are two concepts of res judicata, (1) bar by prior judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment applies when the following requisites are present:
1. The prior decision must be a final judgment or order;
2. The court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over parties;
3. There must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases; and
4. It must be a judgment or order on the merits.

The CA correctly ruled that the Second Case is not barred by res judicata as the third element is
lacking; the two cases are based on different causes of action. The present case is a claim for total
and permanent disability benefits while the First Case was a claim for continuation of medical
treatment, payment of sickness allowance, and underpayment of sick leave pay.

30
Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

AMA LAND, INC., Petitioner

vs. WACK WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: In mid-1990s, Ama Land, Inc. (AMALI), proposed a commercial and residential building
project located at EDSA corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City. In 1996,
AMALI notified Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc. (WWRAI), of its intention to use Fordham
Street as an access road and staging area of the project. As AMALI received no response from
WWRAI, the former temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a field office along Fordham Street.
AMALI then filed a petition before the RTC, wherein it sought the temporary use of Fordham Street
belonging to WWRAI as an access road to AMALI's construction site of its AMA Tower project
pursuant to Article 656 of the Civil Code, and to establish a permanent easement of right of way in its
favor over a portion of Fordham Street pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code. The RTC granted the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use Fordham Street
through a temporary easement of right of way.

In 1998, due to financial crisis, the construction of the project was put on hold. In 2002, AMALI filed
a petition for corporate rehabilitation which was later on approved. As AMALI resumed the project,
WWRAI filed in January 2010 an "Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing" its application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled against the motion. A motion
for reconsideration was filed but was denied, hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA was filed. Subsequently, after a clarificatory hearing, the CA granted WWRAI's application for a
temporary restraining order, and, accordingly, AMALI was commanded to cease and desist from
further committing the act complained of, which is the construction of the commercial and residential
condominium project located along EDSA comer Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village. Then, the
application of WWRAI for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted as well pending
resolution of the petition for certiorari before the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the CA in favor of

WWRAI was proper.

HELD: No. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as
well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or
the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to
prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case are fully heard.

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be
enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

WWRAI's allegation that its members' right to live in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be
violated in the event that the condominium project of AMALI will be erected is untenable. The alleged
noise and dust that may be caused by the construction is the natural consequence thereof. However,
this annoyance that may be brought by the construction is not permanent in nature but is merely
temporary and once the building is completed, said members' right to live in a peaceful, quiet and
safe environment will be restored without noise and dust. As to the allegations that said members'
privacy may be invaded for the reason that they may be photographed or videotaped without their
knowledge, these fears are merely speculative and cannot be taken into consideration.

31
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected by the injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are speculative and insufficient to
substantiate the element of serious and irreparable damage.

Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

SM INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, et al, Petitioners vs. MAC GRAPHICS CARRANZ

INTERNATIONAL, Respondent
G.R. Nos. 224131-32 & G.R. Nos. 224337-38, June 25, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: This case involves a 20-year period Lease Contract between Mac Graphics and Makro for
exclusive use of the latter’s billboard sites located in Cubao and Makati City, commencing on 15
January 2007. In the Lease Contract, Mac Graphics was obliged to secure necessary permits and
licenses for the use of the billboard, and Macro has the right to pre-terminate the contract
immediately in case of failure to do so. It also provides for a 90-day notice before terminating the
contract in case of non- compliance with any of its obligations. On 06 October 2008, Makro sent a
letter to Mac Graphics terminating the lease contract effective immediately for failure to obtain permit
from MMDA. Subsequently, Makro and its majority stockholder, SMIC, removed Mac Graphic’s
billboards in order to convert Makro outlets to SM Hypermart outlets. This led Mac Graphics to file a
complaint for Permanent Injunction with the RTC, with application for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The RTC granted the application on the ground that the lease contract was
pre-terminated by Makro without giving Mac Graphics the chance to remedy any alleged violation
thereof within the 90-day remedy period; as such, it has resulted to loss of profit and goodwill on the
part of Mac Graphics. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC; hence, Makro and SMIC filed a petiton
before the SC contending that Mac Graphics has no right in esse that warranted issuance of a WPMI.

ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s grant of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Makro and SMIC.

HELD: No.

Definition of Preliminary Injunction:

As defined by Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction is an order granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts or require the performance of a particular
act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.

Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction:

(a) the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual

Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction:

(1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

(2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
32
(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case,
free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
improper.

Irreparable Damage as a requirement:

With regard to the injury or damages, a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to
prevent grave and irreparable injury. The injury must be actual, substantial, and demonstrable.
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where
there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
"An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated
and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated
only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." An irreparable
injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it
affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the
property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense
the owner of the loss thereof.

Application in this case:

Mac Graphics failed to comply with the requisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

First, the damages suffered by Mac Graphics is not irreparable because the loss of profit is easily
subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted

Second, Mac Graphics has no clear and unmistakably right. Mac Graphics admits its non-compliance
with the licenses/permits and insurance stipulations in the lease contract, but invokes the 90-day
"remedy period." The petitioner argue that the outright pre-termination of the lease contract is
justified because Mac Graphics failed to obtain the stipulated licenses/permits and insurance on the
commencement date of the lease contract. Also, the insurance obtained was not compliant and
obtained beyond the 90-day "remedy period." In this case, the Petitioner has presented a substantial
challenge against or contradiction of Mac Graphic's position. A genuine doubt, which is more legal
than factual. Being more of a legal than factual determination, the lower courts should have been
more circumspect before making an "initial" resolution thereof. When the complainant's right is
doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is improper. While it is not required that the right claimed by
applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to
show, at least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge
or contradiction.

33
Preliminary injunction (Rule 58)

PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INCORPORATED, Complainant, vs. HON.

BERNABE B. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas,
Isabela, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538, November 21, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: PI TWO, a corporation which operates as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), is empowered to
acquire or purchase assets from banking and financial institutions. One of the properties it acquired
from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-374946 (Subject Property).

The Heirs of Wilson Nuesca filed a complaint for quieting of title alleging that the subject property
belonged to their father and the sale of the latter to Samonte, who then used the said property as
collateral for the loan she obtained from DBP, was null and void for lack of consideration and for
being prohibited by law.

Judge Mendoza issued an order directing the issuance of a 72-hour TRO, upon the posting of a bond
by the Heirs of Nuesa. On September 20, 2017, Judge Mendoza issued the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and was received by the sheriff. On September 25, 2017, Judge Mendoza
issued an Order extending the validity of the TRO until October 12, 2017. PI TWO filed an Ex
Abundanti Ad Cautelam Manifestation raising its objections to the said Orders issuing the TRO and
extending its validity. According to PI TWO, it never received the summons for the Quieting of Title
Case thus, the Court did not have jurisdiction over them. Subsequently, PI TWO filed the instant
administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment, assailing the judiciousness of the following orders issued by Judge Mendoza: September
20, 2017 TRO and September 25, 2017 Order extending the TRO up to October 12, 2017.

Judge Mendoza averred that he immediately issued the 72-hour TRO because he honestly believed
that there appeared an extreme urgency and that the Heirs of Nuesa would suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury since they were the present possessors of the property subject of the writ of
possession. Furthermore, he insisted that sufficient evidence was established for the extension of the
life of the TRO up to October 12, 2017, twenty (20) days from September 22, 2017, the day the
sheriff received the 72-hour TRO dated September 20, 2018.

ISSUE: Whether the extension of the TRO was proper.

HELD: No. A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the status quo until
the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, which cannot be issued ex parte." Otherwise
stated, a trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for a limited
period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice
and irreparable injury." In this instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the
preliminary injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour TRO should be extended.

A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for 20 days "if it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has twenty (20) days from its issuance to
resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for
preliminary injunction during this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired.

In this case, Judge Mendoza's failure to serve the summons on PI TWO after the issuance of the
assailed 72-hour TRO cannot be cured by his claim that it was received by the sheriff, the person
enjoined from implementing the writ of possession. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules, as bolstered by
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, is explicit that the adverse party should be immediately served with
the summons and a copy of the complaint.

34
Furthermore, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was belied by Judge
Mendoza's setting of summary hearing for the extension of the same, five (5) days after the issuance
thereof. Section 5, Rule 58 clearly states that such summary hearing must be conducted within the
72- hour period. Instead, Judge Mendoza set the hearing on September 25, 2017, two (2) days
beyond the effectivity of the 72-hour TRO.

To make matters worse, Judge Mendoza extended the 72-hour TRO, which had already expired, into
a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended. The TRO was issued on
September 20, 2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides that "in no case shall the total
period of effectivity of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours
provided." The effectivity of the 72-hour TRO issued by Judge Mendoza on September 20, 2017
therefore could only be extended until October 10, 2017, twenty (20) days after its issuance. Thus,
Judge erroneously extended the effectivity of the 72-hour TRO until October 12, 2017, two (2) days
beyond the period of effectivity of a TRO explicitly provided by the Rules.

Interpleader (Rule 62)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY
CRISANTA OLIQUINO, AND HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY MAXIMINO
AGALABIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: In 1977, DPWH conducted the widening of Visayas Ave., Quezon City. The construction
encroached upon Lot 643, the disputed portion. This portion was subdivided, and thereafter
registered in the name of the Republic without payment of just compensation. Subsequently, Crisanta
Oliquino filed with the DPWH a claim for payment of the just compensation for and on behalf of the
heirs of Eligio Cruz. The Republic released the partial payment of P39,533,239.12 out of the expected
amount of P71,355,000 in Crisanta’s favor. Confronted with conflicting claims of ownership over Lot
643, the Republic withheld further payments and demanded the claimants to settle their opposing
claims. Since the claimants failed to do so, the Republic was constrained to file an Interpleader,
impleading as defendants the following claimants: (1) Oliquino Group, (2) Agalabia Group; (3) Estate
of V. Uichanco; and (4) Atty. Borja. Subsequently, the De Leon Group filed a Motion for Intervention,
also claiming just compensation as heirs of Eligio Cruz which was granted by the RTC.

The Oliquino group presented before the RTC a Compromise Agreement which allocated the
remaining balance of just compensation corresponding to the disputed portion for approval. The
approval of the agreement was opposed by the De Leon group and Atty. Borja. Notwithstanding such
opposition, the RTC issued a Partial Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement. Consequently, a
Writ of Execution and Order of Delivery of Money were issued. Aggrieved, the Republic filed before
the CA a Petition for Certiorari which averred that the orders directing the execution of the partial
judgment are premature and were issued without legal basis since the same did not adjudicate nor
settle the conflicting adversarial claims of the other impleaded defendants who are not parties
to the Compromise Agreement, namely, Atty. Borja and De Leon Group. CA dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. CA held that since the Partial Judgment had attained finality, it may neither be
amended nor corrected. According to the CA, it is immaterial that the issue raised in the Interpleader
has yet to be resolved, as this does not derogate the judgment’s susceptibility to execution.

ISSUE: Whether the Compromise Agreement may be immediately executed despite not
all impleaded defendants are parties thereto.

HELD: No. Art. 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a “contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” A
compromise intended to resolve a matter under litigation is referred to as a judicial compromise. It
has the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may issue until it would have
received
35
the corresponding approval of the court where the litigation pends and its compliance with the terms
of the agreement is thereupon decreed. In the instant case, the Compromise Agreement divides the
Republic's entire remaining balance between and among the defendants, in accordance with the
terms agreed upon by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. The allocation of the remaining balance was
determined without the participation of all other claimants who likewise stand as parties to the
Interpleader. Clearly, the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving the Compromise
Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance without affording
the De Leon group and Atty. Borja of the opportunity to establish their entitlement, if any, to
compensation beyond the amounts unilaterally set by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. This defeats
the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to
protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said claimants and the
Republic.

Certiorari

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

HONORIO E. GUANLAO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 56, TRAYELLER KIDS INC., CELY L. GABALDON-CO and JEANNIE L.
LUGMOC, Respondents
G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: PBCOM filed for collection of a sum of money in the amount of P8,971,118.06 against
Trayeller Kids, Inc., Gabaldon-Co, and Lugmoc. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
Complaint alleging that their obligation had already been paid in full and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees. PBCOM paid the
additional docket fees but filed its Compliance a month later. RTC issued an Order dismissing
PBCOM’s complaint. PBCOM filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that it had paid the additional
docket fees within the period prescribed by the court as evidenced by the Official Receipt but again
dismissed by RTC. PBCOM filed a Notice of Appeal but the RTC denied it on the ground that said
appeal is not the proper remedy. PBCOM then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the
CA. CA then denied the petition and reasoned that, apart from availing itself of a wrong mode of
appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a motion for reconsideration. The
CA emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a petition
for certiorari to prosper.

ISSUE: Whether PBCOM’s petition for Certiorari and Mandamus must be denied for non-
compliance of the prior motion for reconsideration requirement.

HELD: No. While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-defined
exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(e) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
(f) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(g) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(h) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

36
Here, the first exception applies. The power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the
instances specified in the Rule 41. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of
appeal on an entirely different ground - such as “that an appeal is not a proper remedy.” The
authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and
not the RTC. The RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the
RTC is reversed and set aside and the RTC is directed to give due course to petitioners Notice of
Appeal and to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals for the review of petitioner’s appeal.

Certiorari

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT and NAILYN

TAÑEDO-DIMARUCOT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202069, March 7, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: Alvin filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage (RTC Petition) against his
wife Nailyn. In his RTC Petition, Alvin alleged that Nailyn suffers from psychological incapacity which
renders her incapable of complying with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, Alvin prayed that
his marriage with Nailyn be declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
rendered a Decision declaring Alvin and Nailyn’s marriage null and void. The Republic, through the
OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Alvin failed to prove the juridical antecedence,
gravity, and incurability of his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the Republic's
MR through the August 2010 RTC Order for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 15,
sections 4, 5 and 6. Thus, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was denied in the September
2010 RTC Order on the ground again that the MR did not comply with the requirements set forth
under Rule 15, Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules. Subsequently, the Republic filed a Petition for
Certiorari (CA Petition) before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for
issuing the August and September 2010 RTC orders. The CA held that the CA Petition warrants
outright dismissal because it was filed without the benefit of a motion for reconsideration - an
indispensable requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether CA’S outright dismissal of the CA Petition was proper as it was filed
without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order.

HELD: No. It is true that the Court has ruled that “certiorari, as a special civil action will not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors.” However, this general rule is subject to well-defined exceptions, thus:

[i] where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
[ii] where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
[iii] where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable;
[iv] where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
[v] where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
[vi] where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
[vii] where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
[viii] where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
[ix] where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The denial of the Republic's Notice of Appeal was premised on the RTC's earlier finding that the MR
was a pro-forma motion due to non-compliance with Rule 15. Clearly, the Republic's direct resort to
the CA via certiorari was warranted under the circumstances, as it was led to believe that seeking
reconsideration would have been a useless exercise. The CA thus erred when it caused the outright

37
dismissal of the CA Petition solely on the basis of the Republic's failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration.

Certiorari

Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ang

G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: The present controversy is a consequence of the execution of judgment in the case of
"People of the Phils. vs. Rodolfo Borja Tanio," for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical
Injuries. In that case, driver Rodolfo Tanio, driving a bus registered under the name of Davao ACF,
was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. MTCC convicted Tanio
and awarded in favor of Ang the damages. No appeal from the judgment was interposed, and in
time, the decision became final and executory. In view of its finality, the prosecution filed a Motion
for Execution against the accused Tanio which was granted. However, the writ was returned
unsatisfied as the latter had allegedly no properties that can be levied to satisfy the money judgment.
Hence, upon motion, the MTCC issued a writ of execution against ACF, being the employer of
accused Tanio. ACF moved to quash the writ.

The MTCC denied the motion to quash, but held in abeyance the execution pending the
determination of the existence of the requisites for subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code to attach. AFC filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to the RTC. This was, however,
denied by the RTC.

On appeal, the CA held that the RTC did not err in holding that the MTCC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its Order denying ACF's Motion to Recall and/or Quash the Writ of Execution
and ordering the conduct of a hearing to determine whether ACF should be held subsidiarily liable
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the civil liability ex delicto of its employee, accused
Tanio.

ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's holding that the MTCC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: Yes. ACF ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC for ordering the
execution upon ACF for subsidiary civil liability ex delicto of the latter's employee based on a
judgment that is supposedly void.

Firstly, MTCC held the execution in abeyance pending the determination of the existence of the
requisites for subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code to attach." In fact, the
MTCC ordered the conduct of a hearing where both, the prosecution and ACF shall be required to
present evidence to prove or disprove the existence of the foregoing elements. Hence, with the very
act alleged to be stained with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC, having not been
committed at all, on this point alone, the instant Petition should already be dismissed for lack of
merit.

Further, it must be stressed that, as correctly held by the CA, certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error was committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.

In the instant case, the primary argument of ACF is centered on the supposed erroneous award of
damages against the ACF's employee, accused Tanio, made by the MTCC convicting the latter. But,
such supposed errors merely pertain only to mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them
beyond the ambit of certiorari.

38
Mandamus

MAREY BETH D. MARZAN, Petitioner, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF OLONGAPO, HON. ROLEN
C. PAULINO, ANGIE SOCORRO S. BARROGA, and ARCHITECT TONY KAR BALDE III,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 232769, November 3, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: Marey Beth D. Marzan filed with the RTC a petition for Mandamus against the City
Government of Olongapo, Mayor Paulino et al., for her removal as City Budget Officer of the City
Budget Office. Marzan was initially appointed by former Mayor James Gordon, Jr. as City Government
Head II of the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) of Olongapo City but the latter issued a
Memorandum which facilitated her lateral transfer as City Budget Officer. Mayor Paulino was later
elected into office and appointed respondent Balde to Marzan's former position as Department Head
II of the CPDO. However, the CSC informed Mayor Paulino of the disapproval of her appointment due
to a supposed discrepancy issue. A letter of termination was sent to Marzan, where she then wrote a
letter to the CSC Regional Office inquiring the disapproval of her appointment. Marzan wrote back
that nowhere in the CSC letter was it mentioned that her services were being terminated and the
reason for her disapproval was the accountable officer's failure to perform the latter's ministerial duty
of facilitating her appointment. Marzan continued to report to work and the CSC Director advised her
to await the regional officer’s reply. However, upon going to work the Civil Security Service Unit were
there with Balde. She was instructed to remove her things immediately. The next day she received a
text message that men were instructed to prevent her from coming to work. Thus, her petition for
Mandamus. The RTC dismissed Marzan’s petition for Mandamus because she failed to exhaust her
available administrative remedies. The RTC explained that mandamus cannot be issued to compel
Marzan's reinstatement since such act is discretionary on the part of the appointing authority.
Aggrieved, Marzan filed an appeal with the CA via Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the
RTC. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether mandamus will lie to compel respondents to reinstate Marzan as

Department Head of the CPDO.

HELD: No. The writ of mandamus shall only issue to compel the performance of a ministerial act, or
"one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done." Considering that Section 13, Rule VI of the
Omnibus Rules does not apply, and that Marzan freely and knowingly vacated her former position as
Department Head of the CPDO, Marzan's reinstatement thereto constitutes a discretionary act which
cannot be compelled through a writ of mandamus.

Certiorari (Rule 65)

ALMA CAMORO PAHKIAT, MAHALITO BUNAYOG LAPINID AND FE MANAYAGA LOPEZ,

PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO AND COMMISSION ON
AUDIT - XII, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 223972, November 03, 2020
(En Banc)

FACTS: An information on the alleged falsification of disbursement vouchers (DV), missing DVs,
unrecorded check issuances and other irregularities in the financial transactions of Barangay
Poblacion was received by the Kidapawan City State Auditor. They conducted a 10-day audit on the
cash accounts and financial transactions to which they found several anomalies such as: transactions
of disbursements were not recorded, tampered records and checks, unauthorized disbursements,
missing checks, and improper handling of government funds by the Barangay Treasurer of Kidapawan
City.

39
The Commission on Audit recommended that criminal and administrative proceedings be instituted to
the involved persons. The Special Audit Report was then adopted as the complaint for Complex Crim
of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public or Commercial Documents and violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The complaint was instituted together with the administrative complaint
for Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found substantial evidence establishing the charges of
Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service and ordered the
Kidapawan personnel, including the petitioners, dismissed from service. However, ruling on the
separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed its earlier
decision and absolved them from liability.

As for the criminal charges, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was summarily
denied only because it had been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period under Section 7 Rule II
of the Ombudsman Administrative Order (A.O) No. 7, as Amended by A.O. No. 15-01. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed grave abuse of

discretion in summarily denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.

HELD: Yes. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "an act too patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law"
or that the tribunal, board or officer with judicial or quasi-judicial powers "exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility." The Court finds the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to have hastily and arbitrarily denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners.

While procedural rules are important since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice, such rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. Thus, if only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had entertained the
motion for reconsideration instead of denying it cursorily and only on the basis of it being late, it
would have realized that there was a compelling reason to overturn its earlier Resolution finding
probable cause against petitioners.

Here, the same set of officers who determined that petitioners had no participation in the anomalies -
a determination, in so many words, that petitioners were completely innocent of any wrongdoing-
essentially allowed, in the same breath, the continuance of the criminal prosecution against them
based on the same factual circumstances and subject matter. This denial of the motion for
reconsideration on a pure technicality in the face of their own unqualified exoneration of petitioners in the
administrative case is nothing but grave abuse of discretion - for certainly, if petitioners were already
found not to have had any participation in the anomalies, then these finding merits their exoneration
as well from the criminal case.

Certiorari

DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS COMPANY and NARCISO O. MORALES, Petitioners,
vs. CARLITO T. ABERGOS, respondent.
G.R. No. 245344, December 2, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: A complaint for constructive dismissal and payment of damages and attorney's fees was filed
before the Labor Arbiter by Carlito Torres Abergos (Abergos) against DLTB Co. and Narciso Morales
(Morales). He prayed in his complaint that he be declared as illegally dismissed from work and that
DLTB Co. and Morales, collectively, be ordered to reinstate him to his former position with payment of

40
full backwages and other benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Abergos. Abergos filed a partial appeal before the NLRC only
insofar as the Labor Arbiter's finding of strained relations and order for payment of separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement, were concerned. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's ruling after determining
that there was no evidence or allegation of strained relations between the parties. After
reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Without
moving for reconsideration, Abergos filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari is proper despite failure to move first for a
reconsideration of the NLRC’s resolution.

HELD: No. A motion for reconsideration, when allowed to be filed, is an indispensable condition to
the filing of a petition for certiorari. As the Court held in Sim v. National Labor Relations Commission:
Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is
no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A "plain" and
"adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of
which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give
the lower court the opportunity to correct itself. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, as
follows:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

Here, the CA should have dismissed the petition for certiorari outright. There is nothing on record to
justify a relaxation of the rules. Abergos failed to provide any justification for not filing a motion for
reconsideration or that his case falls under any of the exceptions. Abergos, who sought the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, must apply for it in the manner and strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the law and the Rules of Court. He failed to show any concrete, compelling and valid
reason for dispensing with the motion for reconsideration.

The only remedy available to a party aggrieved in a decision of the NLRC is a petition for certiorari
before the CA, and for which the petitioner must show that such remedy is the only plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy. As shown above, Abergos's failure to file a motion for reconsideration meant
that when he filed his petition for certiorari, it was not the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available.

41
Certiorari

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH

DIVISION) AND BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021
(First Division)

FACTS: This case involves the Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Service for the National
Broadband Network Project (NBN Project) between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment, Inc. (ZTE), a Chinese corporation doing business in the People's
Republic of China. Abalos was a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

Abalos was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019.
According to the prosecution's theory, Abalos, while occupying the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC, wielding his powers and influence as such, for a fee or commission, brokered in favor of
ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, a project of the Philippine Government and requiring
approval by the NEDA. Abalos also purportedly offered bribes to Sec. Neri in relation to approving
ZTE's NBN proposal, and to Jose Perez De Venecia III, in consideration of the withdrawal of of
another company’s NBN proposal.

Sandiganbayan ruled that because of the prosecution's failure to prove such fact, Abalos was
acquitted of the crime charged. The Petitioner then filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the SC alleging that Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion effectively denying petitioner its right to due process when it
disregarded the whole picture portrayed by the prosecution's evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper.

HELD: No. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to in order to correct perceived
errors of fact or law by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers where said tribunal is not
shown to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Jurisprudence instructs that where a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. That an abuse in itself to be "grave" must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction
of the court, no less, will be affected.

Petitioner's grievances against the Sandiganbayan certainly fail to meet the above threshold. Its
protestations that the Sandiganbayan "refused to consider the plain and accepted meaning [of
Abalos' acts]" and "disregarded the whole picture portrayed by the prosecution['s] evidence" are
essentially disagreements with the Sandiganbayan's understanding, evaluation and appreciation of
the evidence presented. The Petition does not demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan's conclusions are
utterly baseless or arbitrary. In fact, a perusal of the Assailed Decision reveals that the
Sandiganbayan exhaustively discussed every testimony offered by the prosecution to support its case.

Corollary thereto, the alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and whatever flawed conclusions
of the Sandiganbayan, is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction, and therefore not within the
province of a special civil action for certiorari. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by
the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. For as long
as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any supposed error committed in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable and may be corrected by a timely
appeal.

42
Expropriation

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 214782, April 3, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against National
Transmission Corporation (TransCo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao. The MTC
rendered judgment in favor of BDC and ordered TransCo to vacate the subject lot. TransCo
interposed an appeal before the RTC. In the meantime, TransCo filed a Complaint for Expropriation of
the parcel of land before the RTC. TransCo deposited the amount of P10,704,000 with the Landbank
of the Philippines, purportedly representing the provisional value of the property sought to be
expropriated. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order granting the Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Possession. Meanwhile, the RTC dismissed TransCo’s appeal in the unlawful detainer case
for being “moot and academic” that with the filing of an expropriation proceeding covering the
subject property, the issue in the appealed case which is also possession has become moot and
academic. In filing the said expropriation proceeding, Transco may be considered to have abandoned
its appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo’s appeal allegedly because it has
become moot and academic with the filing of the expropriation complaint involving the
same property subject of the unlawful detainer case

HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment
against a public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied
the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title
thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel
the public utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the
remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as
equitable estoppel.

The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the
landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or
(2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
herein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just
compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court,
if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.

Here, the subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation proceedings could not have rendered the
unlawful detainer case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding with the
unlawful detainer case and not dismissing it following the prevailing jurisprudence.

43
Partition

ROGELIO LOGROSA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CLEOFE and CESAR AZARES, SPOUSES
ABUNDIO, JR. and ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA and ARLENE ANG,
and SPOUSES BONIFACIO, JR., and WELHELMINA BARUIZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019

FACTS: A verified complaint for partition was filed by petitioner Logrosa. He alleged that he, together
with the other respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands (subject properties). The
Transfer Certificates of Titles of the subject properties all indicate that petitioner Logrosa, together
with the respondents, are co-owners of the subject properties.

Respondents Sps. Azares contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name
appeared in the titles of the properties, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of
the same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance,
much less paid the taxes due thereon. Respondents Sps. Azares further alleged that they purchased
all the properties to provide one place for all the parties herein to live near each other for easy access
and mutual security.

ISSUE #1: Whether petitioner Logrosa is one of the co-owners of the subject properties
as evidenced by the transfer of certificate of titles.

HELD #1: Yes. Petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony to prove that he is a
co- owner of the subject properties. No one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates of title
all of which clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the
subject properties.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility
has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended
with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application. In the instant case, there is no
accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the TCTs through means
of fraud or bad faith.

ISSUE #2: Whether petitioner Logrosa can demand for partition.

HELD #2: Yes. A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets
forth in his/her complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same. The
law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through
gratuity or through onerous consideration. In other words, a person who derived his title and was
granted co- ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition. Respondents Sps. Azares
maintain that there was no gratuitous granting of title and co-ownership rights to petitioner Logrosa
and that they only intended to designate petitioner Logrosa as a mere trustee of the subject
properties. However, to reiterate, this self-serving testimony of respondents Sps. Azares based on
their mere say-so cannot stand, vis-á-vis the strong legal presumption created by the certificates of
title and the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject
property.

44
(Rule 47)

THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO, namely LOLITA CULLADO, DOMINADOR CULLADO,

ROMEO CULLADO, NOEL CULLADO, REBECCA LAMBINICIO, MARY JANE BAUTISTA and
JIMMY CULLADO, petitioners, vs. DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019

FACTS: An accion publiciana was filed by the respondent Dominic Guiterrez against the petitioner
before the RTC. Petitioner interposed the special and affirmative defenses of his actual possession
and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open, adverse and continuous manner. RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioner and ordered the respondent to reconvey the property to the petitioner.
Respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment before the RTC but was denied. Respondent filed
a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction before
the CA. CA granted appeal by reason that the defense of the petitioner constitutes a collateral attack
against Dominic's title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana.

ISSUE #1: Whether the petition for exceptional remedy of annulment of judgment filed
by Dominic before CA was proper.

HELD #1: Yes. A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary
or other appropriate remedies provided by law; and such action is never resorted to as a substitute
for a party's own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies. The
Court detailed that considering that the respondent had already availed himself of the remedy of a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, raising the issue of extrinsic fraud with the trial
court, he is effectively barred from raising the same issue via his petition for annulment of judgment.
However, the same cannot be said for the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court explained
further that if the respondent is able to prove that the regional trial court indeed went beyond its
jurisdiction in issuing its decision, nothing prevents him from asking for its annulment on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the regional trial court was proven to have acted beyond its
jurisdiction when it ordered the reconveyance of the property to the petitioner.

ISSUE #2: Whether the RTC can rule with finality on the issue of ownership given the fact
that the original complaint was accion publiciana.

HELD 2: Yes. An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of real property independently of title. In such proceedings, when the issue of ownership
is raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. The Supreme Court clarified that in an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership
(i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack
on the plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done
only to determine the issue of possession. In such a case, the adjudication is not a final and
binding

45
determination of the issue of ownership and will not bar the parties or even third persons from filing
an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.

In view of the foregoing, the RTC was clearly without jurisdiction to order reconveyance of the land
to the petitioner, because that can be done only upon a definitive ruling on the said issue - something
that cannot be done in an accion publiciana.

Rule 65

JAMES S. PFLEIDER, Petitioner, V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS – CEBU CITY, ATTY. MARIE
LUISE PFLEIDER ALBA, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: DAVID JOHN
THADDEUS P. ALBA, FERDINAND REY P. ALBA AND JOHANNA A. BILBAO, AND THE
FORMER REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MILAGROS S. DELA CRUZ,
Respondents
G.R. No. 196058, November 12, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were siblings and among the compulsory heirs who inherited the
properties of Fred G. Pfleider. Such inherited parcels of land were used as collaterals in the Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.

Petitioner averred that respondent volunteered to represent all of Fred's compulsory heirs before the
PNB upon agreement that all siblings must prepare their share on the amortization payments. After
some time, petitioner was shocked when he learned that the entire lot, including his share in the
inheritance, was consolidated, and registered in the name of the respondent. Petitioner maintained
that respondent’s action was not only tainted with fraud but also violated the implied trust created
between respondent and her siblings. Hence, the filing of the instant Complaint.

Respondent sought the dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent
contended that there was another case pending between them involving the same issues, the same
properties and even the same pieces of documentary evidence. RTC rendered its Order finding that
litis pendentia did not obtain in the instant Complaint but later reversed on motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Appealed to the CA,
petitioner’s appeal was denied outright for availing of a wrong remedy, stating that the instant
Appeal merits outright dismissal.

In questioning the correctness of the assailed Decision and Resolution issued by the CA, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed

petitioner's appeal outright.

HELD: No. The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory language, in establishing
the rule that an appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to the CA shall not
be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed outright.

Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or
final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:

(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse
is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court; and

46
(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Corollary, under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, as issues purely of law are not
reviewable by the said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review
from the appellate judgment of an RTC shall be dismissed.

The Court thus agrees with the CA's decision to dismiss petitioner’s appeal outright. The appeal of
Pfleider, as correctly held by the CA, essentially raised issues purely of law.

Rule 65

SPOUSES JOSE and CORAZON RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), SPS. JOHN SANTIAGO and HELEN KING, IMELDA
ROGANO and SPS. BONIE GAMBOA and NANCY GAMBOA, represented by JOHN
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183324 June 19, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: A verified Complaint was filed by the Sps. Balbino and the Sps. Nicolas against the Sps.
Rodriguez before the HLURB which issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Cease and Desist Order
against the Sps. Rodriguez. The aforementioned Complaints deal with the Ruben San Gabriel
Subdivision, which is located at Barangay Wakas, Bocaue, Bulacan. In the said subdivision, the Sps.
Rodriguez acquired several parcels of land, thereby closing an inner road. It was alleged by the
complainants that they are residents of the subject subdivision. They asserted that the subject road
lot being claimed by the Sps. Rodriguez as their own property cannot be closed or conveyed without
the prior approval of the court because it is an existing road lot subject to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 440.

The HLURB Field Office and the Board of Commissioners both decided against the Sps. Rodriguez.
Without filing an appeal before the Office of the President (OP), the Sps. Rodriguez filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA against
the HLURB, the Sps. Santiago, Rogano and the Sps. Gamboa. The CA dismissed the Petition outright
for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.

Also, the Sps. Nicolas filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt before the Supreme Court against the Sps.
Rodriguez and Manlulu, alleging that “despite vigorous protestation on the part of the Sps. Nicolas,
and after having been warned of the existence of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the HLURB,
the Sps. Rodriguez, in complete defiance of the injunction issued by the HLURB continuously,
maliciously and feloniously dumped filling materials that would ultimately block the road lot leading to
the inner lots of the subdivision.

ISSUE #1: Whether the outright dismissal by the CA of the Rule 65 petition was correct.

HELD #1: Yes. As held time and time again by the Court, for a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner
must not only prove that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must also show that there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate
grievance. An available recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or
acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

To emphasize, under the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB, “any party may, upon notice to the Board
and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the

47
President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O.
No. 18, Series of 1987.” In the instant Petition, the Sps. Rodriguez failed to provide any explanation
whatsoever to justify their failure to seek prior recourse before the OP. To stress, the special civil
action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has lost .
Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

ISSUE #2: Whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction in the petition for indirect
contempt for contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the
HLURB.

HELD #2: No. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction. The Court holds that the Sps. Nicolas’ Petition
for Indirect Contempt should be dismissed.

Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal in stating that, with respect to
contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the HLURB, it is the
regional trial court of the place where the contemptuous acts have been committed, and
not the Court, that acquires jurisdiction over the indirect contempt case.

There is absolutely no basis under the Rules of Court to support the Sps. Nicolas’ theory that the
Court has jurisdiction over a case for indirect contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial
body just because the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is pending appeal before the Court. To
the contrary, the Rules of Court unambiguously state that it is the regional trial courts
that have jurisdiction to hear and decide indirect contempt cases involving disobedience
of quasi-judicial entities.

In the instant Petition for Indirect Contempt, the Sps. Nicolas pray that the Court conduct a hearing
and receive evidence on the supposed disobedience and resistance being committed by the Sps.
Rodriguez and Manlulu. In other words, the Sps. Nicolas would want the Court to conduct a fact-
finding hearing to determine whether the Sps. Rodriguez and Manlulu committed indirect contempt.
Obviously, such a prayer cannot be seriously entertained. As held time and time again, it is
elementary that the Court is not a trier of facts. It is within the province of the lower courts, and not
the Court, to receive evidence and to make factual findings based on such evidence.

Rule 65

ATTY. AROLF M. ANCHETA, Petitioner, V. FELOMINO C. VILLA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 229634, January 15, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: Felomino C. Villa (Villa) was the winning party in a case before the CA. He filed a Motion for
Writ of Execution. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Arolf Ancheta, issued an
Order granting Villa's motion, but this was opposed by the other party. Subsequently, Villa learned
from close friends that Ancheta was given money to issue a resolution or order reversing the writ of
execution earlier issued in his favor. Thus, Villa filed a Motion for Inhibition against Ancheta, which
was granted. The case was then indorsed to the DARAB Regional Office.

However, Villa alleged that the supposed Order by Ancheta granting the quashal of the writ was
secretly added to the records of the case to influence the Regional Adjudicator. Thus, Villa filed a case
against Ancheta for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and for violation of R.A. 3019. The
Ombudsman found Ancheta guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on him a fine in lieu of
suspension. It ruled that Ancheta either neglected to tear or pierce the printed unofficial order or
delete the same in his computer files.

48
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition outright for the following procedural defects: 1) The assailed
Decision and Resolution stemmed from an administrative disciplinary complaint before the
Ombudsman; hence, a petition for review under Rule 43 was the proper remedy, not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65; 2) payment of docket and other legal fees is short.

ISSUE: Whether Ancheta availed of the correct remedy of petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

HELD: Yes. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, Ancheta correctly filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43. Appeals from the decisions of the
Ombudsman rendered in administrative disciplinary cases should be filed before the CA through a
Rule 43 petition. However, the CA failed to consider that Ancheta was meted the penalty of a fine
equivalent to one-month salary by the Ombudsman. Such penalty was final, executory, and
unappealable under Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order No. 07, issued by the Ombudsman to
implement Section 27 of R.A. 6770, which reads in part: “SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.
— Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent
to one-month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the motion for Reconsideration.”

Given the final, executory and unappealable nature of the Ombudsman’s decision, Ancheta’s remedy
is a Rule 65 Petition, as held in Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman: x x x In Republic v. Francisco, we
ruled that decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final
and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not
hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed,
modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it
had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

Ancheta was therefore correct in filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the Ombudsman
decision considering that the same was final, executory and unappealable and he was able to show
that the Ombudsman grossly misappreciated the evidence so as to compel a contrary conclusion.

Rule 65

LOURDES M. PADAYHAG (or HEIRS OF LOURDES M. PADAYHAG), Petitioner

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SOUTHERN MINDANAO COLLEGES, represented by its
President, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 202872 & 206062, November 11, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: This case involves six (6) parcels of land, which are claimed by two (2) parties: The Heirs of
Lourdes Padayhag, and Southern Mindanao Colleges (SMC). The Director of Lands instituted a
cadastral case pursuant to the government's initiative to place all lands under the Cadastral System.

On May 30, 2006, the RTC, sitting as Land Registration Court, rendered a Decision in favor of SMC.
The Padayhags filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, SMC
appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and then further denied the Motion
for Reconsideration.

49
On February 5, 2013, SMC filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court". In a Resolution, the
Supreme Court resolved to deny SMC's motion for extension for lack of payment of docket fees.
Thereafter, an Entry of Judgment was issued certifying that the said Resolution had become final and
executory.

On March 8, 2013, SMC filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether SMC's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail
the CA Decision.

HELD: No. A petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 is the proper
remedy of a party desiring to appeal by certiorari a judgment, final order or resolution of the CA.

SMC is not justified to avail itself of a Rule 65 certiorari petition after its earlier attempt to avail of a
Rule 45 certiorari petition had failed. SMC, prior to the filing of the SMC Petition, attempted to comply
with a Rule 45 certiorari petition when it filed an "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court".

Given that SMC resorted to successive Rule 45 and Rule 65 certiorari petitions to question the CA
Decision and Resolution and that the Rule 45 certiorari petition had already been denied, the denial
of the SMC Petition is in order because certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal
where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence as in this case where the
appeal was lost due to non-payment of docket fees.

Rule 41

ILUMINADA C. BERNARDO, Petitioner, vs. ANA MARIE B. SORIANO, Respondent

G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Iluminada C. Bernardo filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus praying that Evangeline Lawas,
Head Social Worker of the DSWD in Mandaluyong City, be ordered to produce the person of her
minor granddaughter, Stephanie Verniese B. Soriano, before the RTC of Mandaluyong City. According
to Bernardo, Stephanie was being deprived and restrained of her liberty while under the custody of
the DSWD, and despite demand by Bernardo, the DSWD refused to release the minor under
Bernardo’s custody and care. Soriano, the surviving parent of Stephanie, for her part, filed a
Complaint-in- Intervention seeking to be granted custody of her child, and thus, the battle for the
permanent custody of Stephanie between Bernardo and Soriano ensued.

The RTC in its Decision dated 05 August 2010, upheld Soriano's right to parental custody and
parental authority but ruled that, in the meantime, it will be for the best interest of the minor to stay
with Bernardo for one school year while studying. Bernardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On 31 August 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying Bernardo’s Motion for Reconsideration. This
prompted Bernardo to file a Notice of Appeal. On the very same day, Soriano timely filed through
registered mail her Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

The RTC's denial of Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration on August 31, 2010 prompted Bernardo to
file a Notice of Appeal on 08 September 2010. However, the Notice of Appeal of Bernardo was denied
due course. The RTC ruled that the assailed 05 August 2010 Decision and the 31 August 2010 Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration have not yet attained finality, and thus, may not be the
subject of an appeal.
The RTC ratiocinated that Soriano, who received a copy of the 05 August 2010 Decision on 13 August
2010, timely filed her Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

50
Accordingly, through an Order dated 22 October 2010, the RTC granted Soriano’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and allowed Soriano to take custody of her minor child immediately.

ISSUE: Whether the pendency of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Soriano
precluded Bernardo from filing her own Notice of Appeal.

HELD: No. Bernardo's Notice of Appeal should have been deemed perfected as to her.

With respect to Bernardo, the RTC's Decision did not cease to be an appealable judgment,
transforming into a mere interlocutory order, for the sole reason that the opposing party, Soriano,
filed her own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. With Bernardo's own Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied by the RTC, according to Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Bernardo already had 15
days to file a Notice of Appeal regardless of Soriano filing her own Motion for Reconsideration.

There is nothing in the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on the
opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Similarly, a party's undertaking to file a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal.
Jurisprudence holds that "each party has a different period within which to appeal" and that "[s]ince
each party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal."

Hence, a party's ability to file his/her own appeal upon receipt of the assailed judgment or the denial
of a motion for reconsideration challenging the said judgment within the reglementary period of 15
days is not affected by the other parties' exercise of discretion to file their respective motions for
reconsideration.

If the RTC granted due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the RTC would not have been divested
of jurisdiction to decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and that Soriano's right to file her
own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated whatsoever. This is the case because
under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

Rule 41

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, V. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR

THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020
(First Division)

FACTS: The case involves two successive petitions for replacement of lost owner's duplicate Transfer
Certificate of Title. The first petition was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for insufficiency of
evidence, i.e., for failure to prove the fact of loss, while the second petition was dismissed by the RTC
on the ground of res judicata. The present case is an offshoot of the second petition.

In 2011, PBCOM filed a petition for issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 21320 in lieu of
the lost one (first petition). After PBCOM's ex parte presentation of evidence, the RTC dismissed the
first petition for insufficiency of evidence. PBCOM filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and
prayed that it be allowed to present additional evidence to prove the allegations in its first petition.
The RTC, Branch 62 gave PBCOM five (5) days to file a supplemental motion but failed to comply and
did not bother to set its foregoing motions for hearing. Thus, the RTC considered the omnibus motion
for reconsideration as well as the Manifestation as abandoned.

51
Instead of filing an appeal from the order, PBCOM filed the second petition, docketed as LRC Case
No. 12-AD-1401, raffled to RTC, Branch 63. The allegations in the second petition were essentially the
same as that contained in the first petition. The RTC-Branch 63 dismissed the second petition, motu
proprio, on the ground of res judicata. As the first petition was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence,
i.e., an adjudication on the merits, the RTC-Branch 63 held that the second petition involving the
same parties and cause of action was barred by prior judgment.

PBCOM sought reconsideration, which was, however, denied. It then filed a notice of appeal, which it
later withdrew. Thereafter, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the respondent
judge therein committed grave abuse of discretion (1) in dismissing the second petition on the
ground of res judicata and (2) in dismissing, without first determining, whether the evidence
presented in the first petition was identical to the evidence intended to be presented in the second
petition. PBCOM claimed that the dismissal of the first petition did not bar the filing of a second
petition, for otherwise, it would be forever barred from securing a "replacement copy of the missing
title."

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and held that: (1) PBCOM availed of the wrong remedy as
the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata was a complete disposition and was
thus reviewable via appeal; and (2) all elements of res judicata were attendant, given that PBCOM
sought the issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 21320 in both petitions.

PBCOM thus filed the instant Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging, among others, that:
(1) the Rules of Court and the concept of res judicata do not apply to land registration; and (2) it
availed of the correct remedy.

ISSUE #1: Whether PBCOM availed of the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of
the second petition.

HELD: No. PBCOM availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to
challenge the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata. A Rule 65 petition
for certiorari is not the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the second petition. Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court governs ordinary appeals from the Regional Trial Courts.

In Medina v. Spouses Lozada, the Court explained: An order or a judgment is deemed final when it
finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In
other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. An order of dismissal,
whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are
terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore, the remedy of the
plaintiff, except when otherwise provided, is to appeal the order.

Applying the foregoing, there is no question that (1) a dismissal on the ground of res judicata is a
final order that completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be done in the RTC and
(2) such dismissal does not fall within the enumeration of orders from which no appeal may be taken.
In fact, a dismissal on the ground of res judicata is expressly declared to be appealable under Rule
16, Section 1 in relation to Section 5.

Evidently therefore, appeal — and not a special civil action for certiorari — was the correct remedy to
challenge the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata. As appeal was available,
PBCOM's Rule 65 petition would not prosper even if the ground therefor was grave abuse of
discretion. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a special civil action for certiorari could only be
availed of when a tribunal "acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of [its] judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction" or when it acted
without or in excess of its x x x jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

ISSUE #2: Whether RTC-Branch 62’s dismissal of the first petition precluded PBCOM from
filing a second petition to replace its owner's duplicate certificate of title In the interest of
52
substantial justice, the Supreme Court relaxed the technical rules of procedure to resolve
the novel issue presented in this case.

HELD#2: No. A registered owner who fails to prove the loss or destruction of his/her owner's
duplicate certificate of title may not be barred from refiling a new petition to replace the same. It is a
fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.

Ownership of registered land is evidenced by the certificate of title, which is indefeasible and
incontrovertible. Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1529 or the ''Property Registration Decree" mandates
the issuance of this certificate of title in duplicates — the original certificate of title, which is either an
original certificate of title or TCT to be kept by the Register of Deeds and an owner's duplicate
certificate of title to be kept by the registered owner.

The requirement that the owner's duplicate certificate of title be presented for voluntary transactions
is precisely what gives the registered owner "security" and "peace of mind" under the Torrens
system. Without the owner's duplicate certificate of title, transfers and conveyances a] like sales and
donations, mortgages, and leases, and agencies and trusts while valid, will not bind the registered
land. As such, the owner's duplicate certificate of title safeguards ownership. At the same time, the
owner's duplicate certificate of title is also crucial to the full and effective exercise of ownership rights
over registered land. Hence, a registered owner has a substantive right to own and possess the
owner's duplicate certificate of title and to replace the same m case of loss or destruction.

In view of the foregoing, PBCOM, as the undisputed registered owner of the land covered by TCT No.
21320 on file with the Register of Deeds, cannot be barred by res judicata from filing a second
petition to replace its owner's duplicate certificate of title in case of loss or destruction of the original
duplicate.

RTC-Branch 62 dismissed the first petition because PBCOM failed to show that it exerted its best
efforts to locate the title. This dismissal is obviously without prejudice to the right of PBCOM, as the
undisputed registered owner, to subsequently and sufficiently prove that the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. 21320 has indeed been lost.

Rule 45

Rule 46

WILFREDO CABUGUAS, RENATO CABUGUAS, ALEJANDRO "TABOY" CANETE AND ELEAZAR

MORTOS, • Petitioners, vs. GALLANTS. TAN NERY, REPRESENTED BY KATHERINE TAN
NERY-TOLEDO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 219915, April 03, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: Gallant S. Tan Nery (Nery) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property and
Ejectment before the DARAB, Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator against Wilfredo
Cabuguas et. al involving a parcel of land issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, in
favor of Nery. Nery claimed that Wilfredo Cabugas was employed to conduct the act of brushing and
land preparation of his landholding for the purpose of planting yellow corn but the latter occupied the
land, built a house and even invited other person to also build a house thereon.

In his answer, Wilfredo claimed that Nery is not an actual occupant or resident where the subject
property is located and the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to him will bear this
out while Wilfredo et. al. has been actually possessing, occupying, tilling and cultivating their
respective portions of the subject landholding for a long period of time and have acquired a vested
and preferential right to become farmer-beneficiaries thereof pursuant to Section 22 of RA 665, thus,
they cannot be ejected therefrom as they are more qualified to become beneficiaries than Nery.

53
When the case reached the CA, the CA ruled in favor of Nery. Hence, after their Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

However, it appears that petitioners commenced a separate action to assail the CLOA of Nery, and it
also appears that the action was decided in favor of petitioners and that it has become final and
executory. Nonetheless, the Certificate of Finality attached by petitioners is not a certified true copy.
Further, the determination of its validity and its effect on this case is a factual matter that the
Supreme Court cannot determine.

ISSUE: Whether this case should be remanded to the CA.

HELD: Yes. In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque (Manotok) the Court explained the propriety
and rationale behind remanding a case to the CA for the determination of a factual issue, thus:
“Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may,
whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues
to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the
body that rendered the assailed decision. The CA generally has the authority to review findings of
fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a
body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including
documentary evidence. x x x The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the
grant of authority to the CA to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the
Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of
fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for
carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive
and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence.
The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters
submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis
of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein.”

Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46 of the Rules of Court, and consistent with the Court's ruling in
Manotok, this case is remanded to the CA in order to: (i) allow petitioners to present proof of the
status of the CLOA of the subject property; and (ii) allow respondent to present controverting
evidence, if there be any.

Rule 45

PAZ MANDIN-TROTIN, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO A. BONGO, SABINA BONGO-BUNTAG

AND ARTEMIA BONGO-LIQUIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 212840, August 28, 2019
Second Division

FACTS: The instant controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Danao, Panglao, Bohol,
containing an area of 32,668 square meters, more or less. Lot No. 3982 is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 64051 registered in the name of Candido Bongo. Candido Bongo is the
husband and father of Heirs of Candido Bongo - Francisco, Sabina and Artemia et al). Candido is also
the only brother of Diosdado Bongo, the father of Heirs of Diosdado Bongo.

The Heirs of Diosdado Bongo's claim over the subject land is founded on the alleged acquisition of
the land by their father Diosdado from its previous owner. They caused the filing of an adverse claim
and an action seeking the annulment of the Heirs of Candido Bongo's title, recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 3982, and. Thereafter, intervenor/cross-claimant Paz Mandin-Trotin (Trotin)
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention.

54
The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Candido Bongo. Aggrieved, the Heirs of Diosdado Bongo
appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. Without filing a
motion for reconsideration, intervenor Trotin filed the instant Rule 45 Petition against respondents.
The respondents filed their Comments to the Petition for Review seeking the dismissal of the Petition
for lack of merit on the ground, among others, that Intervenor Trotin attempts to introduce new
evidence, which is the Affidavit of Merit, alleging for the first time the existence of the Agreements
that were allegedly executed in 2000 and 2001 (while the trial of the case was on going) by Sabina
Bongo-Buntag and Artemia Bongo-Liquit separately with intervenor Trotin. The respondents contend
that Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules prohibits the raising of new issues on appeal not raised during
the trial.

ISSUE: Whether the Agreements may be considered as newly discovered evidence.

HELD: No. The requisites for the introduction of newly discovered evidence are: (1) the evidence
was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change
the judgment if admitted. If the alleged evidence could have very well been presented during the
trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same could not be considered newly discovered
evidence.

The said evidence, if indeed the Agreements were executed in 2000 and 2001, as claimed by
intervenor Trotin, were available during the trial and could have been presented during that time.
Therefore, the requisite that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence is wanting. The evidence that intervenor Trotin
seeks to introduce at this late stage of the proceedings is NOT newly discovered evidence.

Rule 45

PNOC ALTERNATIVE FUELS CORPORATION (PAFC), Petitioner, v. NATIONAL GRID

CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NGCP), Respondent
G.R. No. 224936, September 04, 2019
(Second Division)

FACTS: NGCP is a private corporation which seeks to expropriate, upon payment of just
compensation, a certain area of a parcel of land situated in Bataan that is part of the Petrochemical
Industrial Park. The said land was originally part of a parcel of land of the public domain reserved by
the government for the Lamao Horticultural Experiment Station. Subsequently, 418 out of the 621
hectares of land of the public domain were declared as an industrial reservation to be administered
by the National Power Corporation (NPC). Later, through a presidential proclamation, the area was
enlarged and reserved for industrial purposes, including the establishment of an industrial estate
under the administration of the National Development Company (NDC) or a subsidiary organized for
such purposes. Afterwards, the administration, management, and ownership of the parcel of land of
the public domain was then transferred to the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). PNOC’s
subsidiary, PNOC Petrochemicals Development Corporation (PPDC), the primary purpose of which is
to administer and operate the Petrochemical Industrial Zone was changed to PAFC, the respondent in
this case. PNOC had organized PAFC and assigned ownership of the property to PAFC via Deed of
Assignment.

In 2011, NGCP filed its Complaint seeking to expropriate the subject property from PAFC. NGCP
sought to exercise its right of eminent domain over the subject property because negotiations
conducted with PAFC on the establishment of transmission lines were unsuccessful. NGCP invoked its
general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain under Section 4 of RA 9511, which allows it
to exercise the right of eminent domain with respect to private property. During the pendency of the
expropriation case, RA 10516 was passed, expanding the use of the Petrochemical Industrial
Park to include
55
businesses engaged in energy and energy-allied activities or energy-related infrastructure projects, or
of such other business activities that will promote its best economic use.

It is admitted by all parties that the subject property, sitting within the Petrochemical Industrial Park,
is an industrial zone. Further, it is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR that the industrial estate
is being owned, managed, and operated by the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in its
private capacity.

RTC issued the Order of Expropriation and ruled that NGCP has a lawful right to expropriate the
subject property upon payment of just compensation. PAFC filed its Motion for Reconsideration but
which was denied hence it directly filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court

ISSUE #1: Whether PAFC was correct in filing its Rule 45 petition directly before the
Supreme Court.

HELD #1: Yes. Section 4, Rule 67 states that: “A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.” Therefore, the proper remedy of a
defendant in an expropriation case who wishes to contest an order of expropriation is not to file a
certiorari petition and allege that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
expropriation. The remedy is to file an appeal of the order of expropriation.

Under Rule 41, in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be
filed directly before the Supreme Court, not via a notice of appeal or record on appeal, but through a
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. The instant Petition may be decided by
dealing purely with questions of law. Here, PAFC raises the argument that the expropriation of the
subject property by NGCP is invalid because such exercise of eminent domain was neither done
directly by Congress nor pursuant to a specific grant of authority. It is readily apparent that this
primary argument is legal in nature. PAFC did not commit a procedural error in filing the instant
appeal via a Rule 45 petition directly before the Court.

ISSUE #2: Whether the NGCP is empowered to expropriate the subject property despite
it being owned by the State.

HELD #2: Yes. The subject property in this case, though owned by a State instrumentality, is
considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private property, and is therefore within
the coverage of Section 4 of RA 9511.

Considering that NGCP is empowered to expropriate private properties exclusively, the concept of
private property and land of the public dominion must be distinguished. Article 419 of the Civil Code
classifies property as either of (1) public dominion or (2) of private ownership. Article 420, in turn,
identifies lands of public dominion as either (1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character; or (2) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Hence, based on
Article 420 of the Civil Code, there are three kinds of property of public dominion: (1) those for public
use, which may be used by anybody, such as roads and canals; (2) those for public service, which
may be used only by certain duly authorized persons, although used for the benefit of the public; and
(3) those used for the development of national wealth, such as our natural resources. Properties
owned by the State which do not have the aforementioned characteristics of a land of public
dominion are patrimonial properties. These properties are owned by the State in its private or
proprietary capacity. Even if patrimonial property refers to land owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities, such is still deemed private property as it is held by the State in its private and
proprietary capacity, and not in its public capacity. Hence, the mere fact that a parcel of land is
owned by the State or any of its instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of
public dominion and not private property. If land owned by the State is considered patrimonial
property, then such land assumes the nature of private property. Land of the public dominion
56
expressly deemed by the State to be alienable

57
and disposable, susceptible to the commerce of man through sale, lease, or any other mode of
disposition, assumes the nature of patrimonial property. The subject property in this case, though
owned by a State instrumentality, is considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature of
private property.

The management and operation of the industrial estate is proprietary in character, serving the
economic ends of the State. The laws governing the subject property have unequivocally declared
that the subject property is alienable, disposable, appropriable, may be conveyed to private persons
or entities, and is subject to private rights. With the subject property expressly declared by law, i.e.,
P.D. No. 949, as amended by RA 10516, to be an industrial and commercial estate that may be
transferred or conveyed to private persons so that business activities may be conducted therein, there
is no doubt that the subject property is patrimonial property. In other words, NGCP has the authority
under Section 4 of RA 9511 to expropriate the subject property

Rule 64

EMERITA A. COLLADO, SUPPLY OFFICER III, PHILIPPINE SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL

(PSHS), DILLMAN CAMPUS, QUEZON CITY, Petitioner, VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR,
HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. [COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT] AND THE
DIRECTOR, LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL SERVICES OFFICE,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193143, December 01, 2020
(En Banc)

FACTS: A contract was entered into by and between the PSHS, Diliman Campus and N.C. Roxas,
Inc., for the construction of the PSHS-Mindanao Campus Building Complex in the amount of
P9,064,799.76. Upon post-audit, the Auditor discovered that the liquidated damages imposed by
PSHS Management on the contractor was only P252,114.79 instead of P2,400,134.65. Consequently,
the COA State Auditor IV (COA Auditor) issued Notices of Disallowance covering the deficiency in the
amount of liquidated damages.

Since it was found that there was an overpayment in the progress billings amounting to
P2,148,019.86.15, the COA Auditor held the following persons solidarily liable: x x x (iii) Rufina E.
Vasquez (Vasquez), Administrative Officer V, for her act of "certifying the expense as necessary,
lawful and incurred under her direct supervision, and (iv) Collado for her act of "computing the
erroneous liquidated damages to be imposed.

The COA National Government Audit Office I (COA-NGAO) sustained the findings of the COA Auditors.
Collado and Vasquez subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 16, 2001. On automatic
review, the COA-CP in the 2002 COA Decision denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Subsequently, Collado and Vasquez filed a Petition for Review with the COA-CP again. In the 2008
COA Decision received by Collado on May 15, 2008, the COA-CP, treating the Petition for Review
(Petition for Review) as a motion for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision, affirmed the 2002
COA Decision with finality.

Unsatisfied, in a Letter dated June 10, 2008, Collado and Vasquez again sought reconsideration of the
2002 COA Decision insofar as it found them liable. The Legal Services Sector-Adjudication and Legal
Services (LSS-ALS) denied due course to the Letter for being a second motion for reconsideration of
the 2002 COA Decision — a prohibited pleading under Section 13, Rule IX of the 1997 COA Rules.

Thereafter, Collado, acting alone, insisted that the Letter dated June 10, 2008 was only the first
motion for reconsideration directed against the 2008 COA Decision and not a second motion for
reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision. The LSS-ALS denied petitioner Collado's request for
reconsideration. Hence,

58
Collado filed this instant Petition for Certiorari (Petition) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court on August 20, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether this instant Petition was correctly

filed. HELD: No. This instant Petition was filed out of time.

By filing the Petition for Review with the COA-CP — the very same body that rendered the 2002
COA Decision — Collado was seeking a reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision. In this regard, in
the 2008 COA Decision, the COA-CP was correct in treating the Petition for Review as a first motion
for reconsideration. At that point, upon the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, Collado
should have already filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court within the period provided
in Rule 64 of the Rules.

Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules, which specifically governs the mode of review from judgments,
final orders, or resolutions issued by the COA, states: “SEC. 3. Time to file petition. - The petition
shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final
order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt
the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial.”

The 2008 COA Decision — the final dispositive act of the COA-CP on the motion for reconsideration
of the 2002 COA Decision — was received by Collado on May 15, 2008. Following the last sentence
of Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules, Collado had only five days therefrom, or until May 20, 2008,
within which to file the proper petition. Considering therefore that the instant Petition was filed only
on August 20, 2010, or more than two years after Collado's receipt of the 2008 COA Decision, the
Petition was perforce filed out of time.

59